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
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


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THE HISTORY
OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

BY
EDWARD THORNTON, ESQ.

AUTHOR OF "THE GAZETTEER OF INDIA," ETC.



SECOND EDITION,

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TO ALL
ALBION

HENRY MORSE STODOLSKY

GLOSSARY.

ABAD.—Cultivated, peopled, founded. Coupled with a name it denotes the founder: as *Ukber-abad*, the city founded by Ukber, on the site of the Hindoo village of Agra. *Shahjehanabad*, city founded by Shah Jehan on the site of the old city of Delhi; the old names, however, are retained by the people in spite of the Great Mogul. *Allah-abad*, the city of God—the name given by the Mahomedans to the Hindoo holy place at the junction of the rivers Ganges and Jumna, known to the Hindoos as Prag or Pryag.

ABDAR.—A domestic whose duty it is to superintend the water for drinking, to cool and clear it; employed as butler by the English.

ABKAR.—Distiller of spirits.

ABKARY, ABKARRE.—Excise; the revenue derived from spirits and intoxicating drugs.

ADAWLUT, UDALUT.—A court of justice. *Sudder Udalt*—principal court. *Deewanee Udalt*—court for civil suits. *Foujdaree or Nizamut Udalt*—criminal court.

AHIR, UHEER.—Shepherd, a caste from which the Bengal army accepts recruits.

AKALEE.—Sikh armed fanatic.

AMIL.—Dominion; a farmer of revenue; an officer of government.

AMILDAR.—Governor.

AMILDAREE.—Territory, government.

AMKEN, UMEEN.—Agent, a title given to the native judges by the English: as *Sudder Ameen*—chief judge; *Sudder Ameen Ala*—principal chief judge.

AMKEE, EMIR.—A nobleman amongst the Mahomedans.

ANKOOS.—A weapon; a kind of axe, used to drive an elephant.

ARAK, ARRACK.—Spirit; juice; fermented liquor.

ARRUR, URHUR (corruptly, *Rhhr*).—A kind of pulse (*Cytisus Cajan*). It grows strong and bushy; when cut (in February) the sharp stakes left are very dangerous to horses' hoofs; they are often mis taken for cotton stalks.

ARZI, URZEE.—A letter addressed to a superior, a petition.

ASAMI, ASSAMER.—A cultivator; a client; a constituent.

ATTA, OTTA.—Coarse flour.

AURUNG.—Depôt; factory.

AVATAR.—Incarnation of the Deity.

AYAH.—Female servant; lady's-maid.

AYEEN.—Laws; regulations; institutes.

AZAN.—The Mahomedan call to prayers.

B.

BABOO.—A title of rank, but now used indiscriminately like "Esquire" in England.

BADMUASH, BUDMAASH.—A disreputable person; one who has no ostensible means of gaining his livelihood.

BAGH.—A garden.

BAHADOREE.—A hero; a warrior; a title of rank amongst the Mahomedans; a new order established in the native army by the English.

BAHORA, BUHORA, BOHRA.—A money-lender.

BAIE, BHYE.—A lady; title given to Mah-ratta princesses.

BAIRAGEE, BYRAGHEE.—A Hindoo religious mendicant.

BAJSHNUVEE.—A follower of the god Vishnoo.

BAIT.—A residence, abode. *Bait-colah*—the house of God, Mecca.

BAKHSH.—A gift; one who gives. *Bukhsheesh, Buxis, Bakhshceesh*—present, reward.

BAKHSHEE.—Paymaster; treasurer to the army; commander-in-chief.

BANDY, BUNDEE.—A cart or carriage.

BANG, BHUNG.—The leaves of the hemp (*Cannabis sativa*), bruised and pounded in a mortar, and infused in water; an intoxicating drink. The leaves are smoked, and also chewed.

BANJARA, BRINJARU.—Carriers of grain laden on bullocks, and especially employed in supplying troops; a tribe.

BANKA.—A dandy; a fop; an idle dissolute fellow. The Delhi *banka* is famous as the dissipated dandy of India.

BANYAN, BUNYA.—A merchant; the caste of Hindoo traders. In Calcutta, the cashier and chief manager of a mercantile establishment.

BARAH.—Twelve. *Barah Wusaf*—a religious festival of the Mahomedans; the 12th of the month in which Mahommed died.

BARAT, BURAT.—A Mahomedan festival.

- Shub-i-Barat*, observed with fasting and illuminations—the night of record, on which men's deeds for the coming year are said to be registered in heaven.
- BARKANDAZ**, **BURKUNDASS**.—A matchlock man; *Burk*, lightning—*undaz*, who throws; an armed guard.
- BASTEE**, **BUSTEE**.—A village.
- BATTA**, **BATTU**.—Difference in rate of exchange. *Bhatta*—extra pay, additional allowance; an established addition to the allowances of the armies in India.
- BAZAR**.—A market; a daily market; the street of shops.
- BEGHA**, **BIGAH**.—A measure of land, one-third of an English acre.
- BEGAB**, **BEGAREE**.—Forced labourers pressed to carry without pay.
- BEGUM**.—A princess; a lady of rank.
- BELATTEE** (see **VILAYUTEE**).—A foreigner.
- BEPARREE**.—A trader; a shopkeeper.
- BETEL-NUT**.—The *Areca Catechu* chewed by the natives of India; cut in pieces, it forms an ingredient of the *beerhi* presented to visitors and guests. See **PAN**.
- BHAAE**.—Brother. *Bhaee-bund*—brotherhood; a community or association.
- BHANGY**, **BANGY**.—A load divided and hung to both ends of a bamboo pole, carried over the shoulder. *Bhangy-burda* or *bhangy-carrier*—the man who accompanies a traveller with the luggage slung over his shoulder.
- BHEEL**.—A wild tribe inhabiting the Malwa and Mewar forests. There is a Bheel local corps in the Indian army.
- BHISTIE**, **BEESTIE**, **BHISHITTEE**.—From *bikisht*, paradise; a water-carrier; a Mahomedan who supplies water from a leather bag, *mussuk*. The blessing of water is so great in a hot climate that the carrier is as one from heaven.
- BHOW**, **BHAU**.—A brother; a cousin; a title of respect affixed to a name, as *Huree-bhau*.
- BHYLEE**, **BYLEE**.—A carriage for riding in, drawn by bullocks; some are on four wheels, highly ornamented, and hung round with bells.
- BIRI**, **BERREE**.—A lady; title of rank; mistress.
- BIDREE**.—A mixed metal of copper and tin, capable of high ornament, and of which hooka bottoms and mouthpieces are usually made.
- BIRT**.—A charitable allowance; fees to family priests.
- BISATEE**.—A pedlar; a hawker; called by the English a *doorwala*.
- BOHRA**.—A village banker; a tribe of bankers and traders held in great respect in Goozerat.
- BRAHMIN**.—A man of the first caste of Hindoos, whose duty it is to study and expound the sacred books. The Brahmins now are divided and subdivided into numerous tribes and families holding no social relations, and they all engage in many of the lay occupations of the day; they are soldiers, watchmen, bailiffs, bankers' porters, cooks, domestic chaplains, &c. All classes employ them as domestic servants; as the religion of the Hindoos is one of ritual, ceremonial, and meats, they find it safest to employ a Brahmin cook, to insure the purity of their food.
- BRIJ**.—The terrestrial paradise of the Hindoos; the country around Muttra, between Agra and Delhi, sacred to Krishna, who was born there and performed his miracles.
- BRIJBASHEE**.—An inhabitant of the Brij; an armed Hindoo; watchmen, guards, doorkeepers—many from the Brij seeking to be so employed.
- BRIJBHAKA**.—The dialect of the Brij Hindoe, in which most of the popular poems of the Hindoos are written.
- BUN**.—A wood, a forest; as *Sunderbun* or *Soonderbun*, the forest of Soondree trees; *Brindabun*, the forest of Vrinda.
- BUNDOBUST**.—Arrangement; bargain.
- BUNGALOW**.—A thatched house, after the fashion of Bengal.
- BYWUSTU**.—A written opinion on Hindoo law by a Pundit, or a Brahmin learned in the law.

C.

- CAYMACAN**, see **KAIMUKAM**.
- CHABOOK**.—A whip.
- CHABOOKSOWAR**.—A rough rider.
- CHAND**.—The moon.
- CHANDNEE**, **MOONBEAMA**.
- CHANDNEE CHAUK**.—The bright street (a famous street in Delhi).
- CHAPPA**.—An impression; a stamp.
- CHAPPA KAGHUZ**.—Printed paper; a newspaper.
- CHAPPA KHANA**.—A printing-office.
- CHARYAR**.—*Char*, four—*yar*, friend. The four caliphs (successors to Mahommed), Aboubukr, Omar, Osman, and Ali.
- CHARYAREE**.—A Mahomedan of the Soonee sect—who maintain the rightful succession of the four Caliphs.
- CHATTA**.—An umbrella—the emblem of royalty.
- CHIK**.—A screen made of split bamboos and painted.
- CHIT**, **CHITHEE**.—A note; a letter.
- CHOB**.—A stick; a staff of office; a silver or gold stick.
- CHOBDAR**.—An attendant carrying a mace or stick of office.
- CHOUERY**, **CHOREE**.—A Brahmin learned in the four Vedas. See **SEPOY**.
- CHOUDREE**, **CHOWDEY**.—The head-man of a trade; syndic; a title of respect addressed to carters, carriers, camelmen, &c.
- CHOUK**, **CHROKE**.—A square; an open place in a street.
- CHOUKEE**.—A station; a police-guard station; a chair; a seat.
- CHOUKEEDAR**.—A policeman; guard; watchman.

GLOSSARY.

v

CHOULTREY (properly, **CHAOTRE**).—A public lodging-place; a station; an inn.

CHOUTH.—A fourth; a blackmail demanded from the princes of India by the Mahrattas—a fourth of their revenue.

CHUBRNA.—Paroled gram, or chick-pea, used by the Hindoos marching or travelling, when they cannot have their food cooked by the rules of their caste.

CHUBOOTRA.—A raised terrace in the front of a police-station, or round a tree; a platform where business is carried on, or a public meeting held.

CHUKLA.—A large division of the country, now almost confined to Oude.

CHUKLADAR.—The superintendent or governor of a chukla.

CHULAN.—An invoice; voucher; passport; list of letters, or prisoners forwarded.

CHUMAR.—A worker in leather, or carrier; saddler; a low caste of Hindoos, divided into many tribes, who work as cultivators; manufacturers of indigo, &c.

CHUNAM, CHOONA.—Lime.

CHUNDAL.—Low caste; an outcast; term of abuse.

CHUPATEE.—A cake of unleavened bread, made of coarse flour—*Atta*, the common food of all Hindoos, and the lower classes of Mahomedans in India; cakes of all kinds.

CHUPPRASS.—A badge; a metal plate engraved, and worn on a belt as a badge of office.

CHUPPRASSKE.—The wearer of a chupprass; employed as messengers, couriers, policemen, watchmen, &c.

CHURKH.—A pulley; a wheel.

CHURUKPOOJA.—The ceremony of swinging on a wheel; the swinging festival of Hindoos suspended by hooks passed under the skin above each bladebone, now almost confined to Bengal.

CHURRUNDAR.—A supercargo—a servant placed on board a boat, in charge of the goods, by an insurance office.

CHURBUS.—The intoxicating exudation of the hemp-plant.

CIBCAR, SIKAR.—A superintendent; chief; the government; chief clerk. In Calcutta all native clerks are called *sikars*; a large division of the country under the Mahomedans.

COLE.—A barbarous tribe, inhabiting the Rajmahal Hills and Jungle Muhals beyond Burdwan, akin to the Bheels and Gonds.

COOLY, see **KOOLI**.

CORAH.—New, unbleached silk; piece goods unbleached.

COSS, KOS.—A measure of distance, about two English miles.

CUTCHA, see **KUTCHA**.

CUTWAL, see **KOTWAL**.

D.

DAKE, DHYE.—A wet nurse; a female servant; a female commissioner employed by the courts to swear native women.

DAKH, DAWK.—Post; relays of men or cattle along the road for carrying letters, goods, or travellers.

DAKH-GHUR.—Post-office.

DAKH-CHUKKE.—Post-station for relays.

DAKAIT, DAKOIT.—Gang-robber; a burglar.

DALKE, DOLLY.—A rude basket of flowers and fruits; a tray of presents, consisting of fruit, sweetmeats, spices, preserves.

DANA.—Grain; corn.

DANA-KHORRE.—The commissariat; grain-consumers.

DAROGHA.—A superintendent; a chief officer in police and other departments of government, particularly the customs and commissariat.

DECCAN, DUKHUN.—The south; the south of India.

DERVISH, DURWESH.—A religious mendicant (Mahomedan).

DES, DESA.—The country; a place; emphatically applied to particular districts. In the Himalaya it means the plains.

DESEE.—Belonging to a country; in Bengal, applied to indigo-seed grown there. *Pur-deese*—a foreigner.

DEVA, DEV, DEO.—A god; a divinity; a man of high rank; a king.

DEVALU, DIWALU.—A temple.

DEVEE, DEVI.—A goddess; a name of Durga, the wife of Shiva.

DEWAN, DIWAN, DIVAN.—Royal court or council; a minister of state.

DEWANEE.—Relating to a dewan; civil administration. See **ADAWLUT**. The right to receive the revenue of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, conferred on the East-India Company by the Great Mogul. *Dewan-i-am*—a public hall of audience; *Dewan-i-khas*—private chamber of council.

DHOBER, DHOBY.—A washerman.

DHURMSALA.—A building for a pious purpose, a hospital, a monastery, a temple.

DHURNA.—Sitting at the door of a house to compel payment of a debt; bankers and money-lenders employed Brahmins for this purpose. The Brahmin sat fasting and resolved to die if the debt were not paid, and the debtor would incur the guilt of killing a Brahmin. As long as the Brahmin sat, the dwellers of the house could not cook or eat, fire could not be taken into the house, and for the time being they were excommunicated. The practice is forbidden by the laws of the East-India Company.

DOAB.—From *do*, two, and *ab* water; a tract of land lying between two rivers. The country between the Ganges and the Jumna rivers is emphatically the Doab. In the Punjab, or five rivers, there are the following tracts called *Doab*:—Between the Sutlej and the Beah, the Julunder Doab; between the Beah and Ravee, the Barea Doab; between the Ravee and Chenab, the Rechna Doab; between the Jhelum and Chenab, the Jetch Doab;

- between the Indus and the Jhelum, the Doab of Scinde Sagur.
- DOHARE, DOHYE.**—An exclamation of distress when claiming protection from the authorities; shouting for mercy.
- DOBBE.**—A Brahmin read in two Vedas. See **SEFOY**.
- DOOLY.**—A litter, a swing, a rude palanquin.
- DOORGA.**—The name of a goddess, wife of Siva.
- DOORGAPOOJA.**—The worship of Doorga, celebrated for ten days in Bengal in the month of October; the Doorgapooja holidays are strictly kept in Calcutta.
- DOUR.**—A sudden expedition; sessions; circuit.
- DUFFADAR.**—An officer of rank in the army or police.
- DUFTUR.**—An office, record-office.
- DUFTURKE.**—Record-keeper; bookbinder and paper-ruler; office servant.
- DURBAR.**—A court; a royal court; a levee.
- DURGAH.**—A Mahomedan saint's tomb or shrine; a royal court.
- DURKE.**—A tailor.
- DUSSERA.**—A festival in honour of Doorga; additional holidays in Calcutta to the Doorgapooja; a military festival in the north-west of India; the fortunate time for opening a campaign.
- DUSTROORE.**—Fee; perquisite; commission—especially demanded by servants from tradesmen on purchases made by their masters.
- DUSTUK.**—A passport, now applied to a process served on revenue defaulters.

E.

- EED.**—A holy observance amongst the Mahomedans; the two enjoined by the Koran are, 1st, The Eed-ool-fitr, the termination of the fast of the month Ramzan, observed with prayers, rejoicings, and distribution of food to the poor; 2nd, The Eed-oo-zoha, observed in commemoration of Abraham's sacrifice of his son (Ishmael, not Isaac, according to the Mahomedans); it is observed with prayers and offerings; sheep, oxen, or camels are sacrificed; the kings of Delhi sacrificed a camel with their own hands on this festival.
- EEDGAH.**—A platform screened by a brick wall, where the festivals of the Eeds are celebrated; it is usually outside the towns.
- EMAM, IMAM.**—A chief in religious matters, whether the head of all the Mahomedans as the caliph, or the priest of a mosque, or the leader in the prayers of the congregation; the Sheehs recognize twelve Imams, descendants of Ali and his successors, of whom the last, Imam Mehdee, is believed to be still alive.
- EMAMBARA.**—A building in which the festival of the Mohurrun is celebrated, and some-

times used as the mausoleum for the family of the founder, see **MOHURRUN**.

F.

- FAQUIR, FUKKEE.**—A Mahomedan religious mendicant.
- FARASH.**—A servant, whose business it is to spread carpets and mats, and sweep them—a Mahomedan domestic.
- FARAZI.**—The name of a sect of Mahomedans lately established in Lower Bengal, and now very turbulent.
- FARNUWEE, FARNAVEZE.**—*Phur*, an office, and *nuwee*, writer—a public officer, the keeper of the registers; title given to the minister of state of the Mahrattas. The title is familiarly known as that of Nana Farnuwees, who was for many years the prime mover of the policy of the court of Poona.
- FATHA.**—The first chapter of the Koran; an opening; a commencement.
- FERINGEE, VERINGHEE.**—A Frank; a European; perhaps *Varangi*—*Varangian* of the Greeks.
- FOUJ.**—An army; police jurisdiction.
- FOUJDAREE.**—The office of magistrate, or criminal judge. See **ADAWLUT**.
- FURMAN, FIRMAN.**—A mandate; a royal command; a patent; a passport.
- FUSL.**—A section; a chapter; a season; a crop or harvest. There are two harvests; the *khuref*, or autumnal rain crops, as indigo, cotton, rice, pulse of many kinds; the *rubbee*, or spring crops, wheat, barley, and gram, or chick-pea.
- FUSLEE.**—A harvest year, or era, originated by Akber.
- FUTWA.**—A judicial sentence; the written opinion on Mahomedan law given by the Mahomedan law-officer of a court.

G.

- GANJA.**—The hemp-plant (*Cannabis sativa*), see **BANG**; also an intoxicating liquor made by infusing the flowers and leaves in water.
- GARRE.**—A cart, a wheeled carriage of any description.
- GARREWAN.**—A carter, a coachman. The native servants do not approve of the word, and think it more respectable to be called *coachman*.
- GAUD, GAD.**—Sediment; precipitate; indigo when precipitated, before it is pressed or dried.
- GAUT, GHAUT, GHAT.**—A landing-place; steps on the banks of a river; a pass through mountains; a place where washermen wash at a tank or river.
- GENTOO** (from the Portuguese *Gentio*).—Gentile; a Hindoo.
- GHAZEE.**—A champion; one who fights against infidels for the propagation of the faith.

- G.HAIB, G.HYB.**—Hidden, missing. *Peerghy*—"the hidden saint"—the name of a mosque near Hindoo Rao's house, at Delhi, used as a battery. The legend is of a Mahomedan saint who was translated to heaven at this place.
- GHER.**—Clarified butter. The butter is boiled in water and skimmed off. In this state it can be kept in a hot climate for a long time, and, when done carefully, remains very good. The Hindoos use it universally, and soak their chupatees or cakes in it, more or less, as they can afford it.
- GHOLAM, GOLAM.**—A youth, a servant, a slave; used as "humble servant" in English letters.
- GHOORKA.**—The people of Nepal, in the Himalaya mountains. They are descended from the Oodipoor rajpoots, and particularly honour the god Guruknath, hence the name Goorkha. They occupied the Kemaon hills some generations before their conquest of Nepal in 1768.
- G.HORA, G.HODA.**—A horse. *Ghora-wala*—a groom. See **GORA**.
- G.HUR.**—A house; a hut; residence. See **GURH**.
- GODOWN, GODAM** (from the Malay *gudang*).—An outhouse; a warehouse; the commissariat depôts.
- GOINDA.**—A spy; an informer.
- GOLA.**—A granary; salt depôt.
- GOLUNDAR.**—An artilleryman—from *gola*, a ball; *wadai*, who throws.
- GOMASHTA.**—An agent; a confidential factor.
- GOND, GOAND.**—A barbarous tribe inhabiting the country west of Cuttack to the Vindhya hills, called *Gondwanes*.
- GOOJUR.**—The name of a numerous class in the North-West Provinces, engaged in agriculture, but notorious cattle-lifters, thieves, and plunderers. A black mail is paid at many of the stations in the North-West Provinces, to the chiefs of Goojur villages, to secure the house property, the police being quite inefficient.
- GOOROO.**—Spiritual teacher; domestic chaplain of the Hindoos.
- GORA.**—White man. *Gora-logue* or *log*—Europeans; generally applied to soldiers.
- GORAI.**—A village watchman; a messenger; and who acts as guide to travellers.
- GOSAIN, GOSHTN.**—A religious mendicant, specially applied to influential families, descendants of gossains of great repute. There are various convents of these mendicants in Western India, of great sanctity.
- GOWALA.**—A cowherd; a tribe from which the Indian army receives recruits.
- GRUNTHA.**—The book of the Sikhs, a large collection of moral poems by their teacher Nanuk, the founder of the sect, in 1419.
- GUBUR, GUKBRE.**—A fire-worshipper; an infidel; commonly applied to Parsees.
- GUDDER, GUDI.**—A cushion, or carpet on which a person sits; the seat of rank or royalty.
- GUJOOWAR.**—The sovereign of Baroda; the chief of one of the states of the Mahratta confederacy.
- GUL.**—A noose; a snare. *Gul dena*—to hang a criminal. *Gul Shuheed*—"the hanged saint," one Roshun Khan, at whose tomb the Mahomedans worship and burn lamps at Dehli; he was hanged, in 1835, for the murder of Mr. Fraser, commissioner of Dehli, at the instigation of Nuwab Shums-oo-Deen, and canonized for having killed the infidel—one of those acts and signs neglected by the English government.
- GUNJ.**—A mart; anemporium; a collection of articles, as a cruet-stand; a canteen. Compounded with a founder or the name of the original village, as *Revelgunj*, *Gopeegunj*.
- GURH.**—A fort. Compounded thus, *Futih-gurh*—"Fort Victory;" *Ali-gurh*—"Ali's Fort."
- GURHEE.**—A small fort.
- GURRAH.**—A water-pot; an earthen vessel or pitcher.

H.

- HACKERY.**—A native cart drawn by bullocks.
- HAI, HUIJ.**—The pilgrimage to Mecca.
- HAIJE, HAGI.**—One who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca; a title of respect.
- HAKIM.**—A ruler; a governor; a superior; a judge; addressed to a superior as a title of respect. See **HUKHEM**.
- HATH, HAUT.**—A market; a fair.
- HATHA, HATTA.**—An inclosure; the ground inclosed round a bungalow; a court-yard; the presidencies of India—as *Madras Hatta*.
- HATHI, HATHEE.**—An elephant. *Hathes khana*—elephant house, or stable.
- HAWILAT, HAVILAT.**—A thing given in trust; prisoners remanded; witnesses detained in *hawilat*—in charge of an officer of the court.
- HAVILDAR, HAWILDAR.**—One holding a trust; a native non-commissioned officer in the Indian army.
- HIJRA, HIJREE.**—Departure from one's friends and country. The flight of Mahommed from Mecca to Medina was constituted the commencement of the Mahomedan era: it took place on the night of Thursday, the 15th of July, A.D. 622; hence the Mahomedan era of Hijra commences from 16th July, 622.
- HOLI, HOLKE, HOOLY.**—A popular festival of the Hindoos; saturnalia held about the end of February in the North-West Provinces, during which rude frolics, flinging dust and coloured powder, squirting coloured water on passers-by, and the like, are indulged in; the Kayaths and inferior castes get drunk, and the Brahmins, Rajpoots, and all, sing and shout lascivious songs and filthy abuse; the rites close with bonfires on the last night. In Bengal, a swinging festival is held at the same time.

HOONDER, HUNDI.—A bill of exchange.
HUK, HUQ.—Truth; the true God; a true, just or legal right; privilege or fee established by usage. *Huk-ool-Talookdar*—the right of the Talookdar.
HUKEM, HAKIM.—A sage; a physician. The descendants of a famous sage retain it as a title in the family. See **HAKIM**.
HULAL.—Lawful; allowed; an animal killed in a lawful manner for food by a Mahomedan; opposed to *Huram*.
HULWAI, HULWANE.—A confectioner.
HURAM.—Unlawful; forbidden; applied to all things or acts which the law and the prophets forbid; unclean; wicked; vicious; disloyal. See **NIMUKRAM**.
HURKARU.—A messenger; courier.
HURUM, HARAM, HUREEM.—Sacred; forbidden; closed to promiscuous access (hence applied to the women's apartments in the East); also the name of the enclosure round the temple of Mecca; a sanctuary. See **KAABA**.
HURUMZADA.—Base-born; son of the Hurum; a word of abuse; bastard.
HUZAR.—A thousand.
HUZARI, HUZARE.—A commander of a thousand. Districts are often distinguished according to their revenues, as the *Beest Huzari*—the 20,000.
HUZOOR.—The presence; the royal presence; the presence of a superior authority, as a judge; a man of rank; especially applied to the king of Dehli, as *The Huzoor*.

I.

ID.—See **EKD**.
IJARU, IZARU.—Price; profit; an estate held on a farming lease; a farm of the revenue.
IJLAS.—A sitting, especially of a court of justice; sessions. *Ijlas-i-Council*—a meeting of the supreme council.
IKBAL, IQBAL.—Prosperity; good fortune; acceptance.
ILAKA, ELAQA.—Property; estate; jurisdiction.
IMAM.—See **EMAM**.
INGLIS.—English; invalid soldiers; pension to invalids.
ISLAM.—The faith, the Catholic faith of the Mahomedans. See **MUSULMAN**.

J.

JAGEER, JAGHIRE.—A grant of land, rent free, conferred for services to the state, either for life or for ever; an estate in fee-simple and untaxed.
JAMPAN.—A kind of chair carried on men's shoulders, used in the Himalaya hills.
JAT, JAUT.—The name of a large tribe of Hindoos, principally inhabiting the country on the banks of the Jumna from Agra to Dehli. Their chief is the rajah of Bhurtpoor. Many of these have become Sikhs.
JAY, JAY.—Victory; an exclamation like

"hurrah," "hurra." *Lik Sahib kee jay!* was once a favourite shout of victory when Lord Lake led the armies in India.
JEMADAR.—An officer in the native army; a chief of police; a superintendent.
JHEEL.—A shallow-lake; a morass.
JOGEE, JOGI.—One who practices religious abstraction; in general, a religious Hindoo mendicant. There are many convents of Jogees, many of whom are great rogues and thieves.
JUHANPUNAH.—Asylum of the world, a title addressed to sovereigns; it was especially taken by the kings of Oude created by the English.
JUMMA, JAMA.—Amount; aggregate; total.
JUMMA MUSJID.—The principal mosque of a city; the cathedral of the Mahomedans. Gibbon erroneously translates it "royal mosque."
JUNGLE, JUNGUL.—A forest; a thicket; the country as opposed to the town; wild; waste.
JUNTR.—A dial; a mystical diagram; a machine of any kind.
JUNTR MUNTR.—Conjuring; performing mystical ceremonies; the native observatories and gnomons at Benares and Dehli are so named.

K.

KAABA, KABA, CAABA.—A cube or square; any square building—whence, especially, the temple at Mecca to which the Mahomedans make their pilgrimage.
KAFIR.—An infidel; one who does not acknowledge Mahommed as the prophet; a term of abuse.
KAIDER, KYDER.—A prisoner; a convict.
KAIMUKAM, CAYMAGAN.—A representative; a deputy; a viceroy.
KAIT, KAYUTH.—The writer or accountant caste—the most respectable of the mixed castes.
KALIJUG, KULJOG.—The last and worst of the four ages, the iron age, the present age, of which about 5,000 years have passed: it is to last 432,000 years.
KARINDA.—An agent; a manager; a superintendent.
KASID, COSSID.—A courier; a messenger; an express messenger.
KAZEE, CARY, CADL.—A Mahomedan judge. Under the English, their judicial functions have ceased, and they only act at marriages, funerals, and domestic ceremonies of the Mahomedans. It is applied as a title to families, descendants of Kazees.
KERANT.—A manager; one who conducts affairs; the European clerks in Calcutta.
KHADIM.—A servant; an attendant on a shrine, or saint's tomb.
KHALIFA, CALIPH, KHULEEFU (from *Khalf*, a successor).—The successors of Mahommed; the defenders of the faith. In India the tailors are so nicknamed.
KHALSA.—The exchequer lands, the property

- of government not farmed or given as jagheers; the collective denomination of the Sikhs.
- KHAN.**—A Mahomedan title; also a common adjunct to the names of Afghans and Pathans. See **MUSULMAN**.
- KHIDMUT.**—Service.
- KHIDMUTGAR.**—A domestic servant; the English apply it only to table servants.
- KHILLUT, KILLAT.**—A dress of honour; the present of a superior to an inferior, and may consist of arms, horses, elephants, &c. Kings, when giving *khilluts*, cause the recipients to be robed in their presence in the dress of honour.
- KHUBUR.**—News; information; care. *Khubur ki baghus*—a newspaper. *Khuburdar*—take care!
- KHURKEF.**—See **FUSL**.
- KHURKETA.**—A bag; a purse; the envelope of a letter, especially the silk and embroidered bag in which natives of rank send their letters to men of rank—hence the letter from a prince to the governor-general is so named.
- KHUTPUT.**—Wrangling; dissension. At Baroda and in the Bombay presidency, it means bribery and corruption; corrupt influence.
- KHUSANA.**—Treasury.
- KHUSANCHER.**—Treasurer.
- KILLA, QULU.**—A fort.
- KILLADAR.**—Governor of a fort.
- KINCOB, KIMKHAB.**—Brocade; gold and silver thread patterns woven in silk.
- KIST.**—Instalment; periodical payment of revenue—hence, popularly, it is revenue.
- KISTBUNDER.**—Settlement of instalments, as to time and amount.
- KOER, KUAR, KOOMAR.**—A youth; a prince; title of the heir apparent of a rajah; a Hindoo title, but retained in families of Hindoo converts to Mahomedanism.
- KOOL, COOLY.**—Daily hire or wages; all porters and day-labourers are so called; a tribe of barbarians in Goosarat.
- KORAN, KURAN.**—The sacred book of the Mahomedans—the revelation made to Mahomed orally, collected by his successor Omar, and committed to writing.
- KORI, CORYE.**—A score, twenty; corruptly in Calcutta *Corge*, which appears to be a misreading of *Corye*.
- KOS.**—See **COS**.
- KOTE.**—A fort; a fortified residence; the regimental treasury.
- KOT-HAVILDAR.**—The native officer in charge of the regimental treasury, or the cash of his company.
- KOTHEE.**—A spacious house; a factory; a mercantile house or firm; a warehouse.
- KOTWAL, CUTWAL.**—The chief police-officer of a city.
- KUBEER.**—The great, huge, immense; Sultan Kubeer, "the Great Sultan"—the title the Egyptians gave Napoleon Bonaparte, translated by Sir Walter Scott "the Sultan of Fire"!
- KUCHA, CUTOCHA.**—Raw, unripe, anything in a crude, raw state, as unburnt bricks—applied to silly, weak persons, to short weights and measures, to anything badly done, in contrast to Pukka.
- KULAM.**—A word; a speech.
- KULAM-OOLA.**—The word of God; the Koran.
- KULIMAH.**—The Mahomedan creed: "There is no God but the one God, and Mahomed is the messenger of God."
- KUMURBUND, CUMMURBUND.**—A girdle of many yards of cambric; it is disrespectful to appear without this in the presence of a superior.
- KUTTAB-MOOK, HEE.**—Dagger-faced; a regiment of Sikhs, so named by Runjeet Singh, and still retained in the English service.

L.

- LAKH, LAC, LAKSHA.**—One hundred thousand; an insect which constructs its nest in numerous small cells, so called from the number found in a nest. The dye called *lac* is furnished from this insect, and the resinous substance of the nest supplies the shell-lac.
- LAKHIRAJ.**—Rent free; lands exempted for some particular reason from paying any revenue.
- LAL.**—Red. *Lal coorte*—red coat; a soldier in the Company's service. *Lal shurab*, commonly written *Loll shrab*—red wine—exclusively applied to claret.
- LALLA.**—A writer; a clerk. It is applied as a term of respect to members of the writer caste, or to any respectable person not of high rank, as *Lalla Joteepershad*.
- LASGAR, LUSHKUR.**—A native sailor; tent-pitchers and camp-followers with artillery. The proper word is *lushkree*—of or belonging to a lushkur or army.
- LAT, LATH.**—A staff; a column; a pillar; especially the monoliths found in the north-west provinces of India, bearing ancient inscriptions; one at Dehli is known as Feroz Shah's Lat.
- LATTEE.**—A staff, a bludgeon.
- LATTERAL, LATEKWALA.**—A club-man, a man armed with a bludgeon; men retained by zemindars and indigo planters in Bengal to protect their own rights in the absence of protection from the government of India.
- LIFAPA, LUFAPU.**—An envelope.
- LILAM.**—See **NEELAM**.
- LOG** (properly, **LOKA**).—Man; mankind, in ordinary use: as *Sahib-log*—European gentry; pronounced and sometimes spelt *logue*.
- LOOT.**—Plunder; pillage; robbery.
- LOOTER.**—Plunderer.
- LYLUT-OOL-QUDEE.**—The night of power, the 27th of Ramzan, when the Koran descended from heaven, and which is observed with much reverence by the Mahomedans in India.

LYLUT-OOL-MIRAJ.—The night of Mahomed's ascent to heaven.

M.

MAASH, MUASH.—Means of living; a pension. See **BADMASH**.

MAFFE, MUAFEE.—Forgiven; remitted; a grant of land free of rent or taxation to a temple, or provision for the repairs of a tomb; lands given to a priest, or for service in general.

MAHA DEO.—The great God; usually applied to Siva.

MAHA-RAJA, MAHARAJ.—The great raja, a title of reigning Hindoo princes.

MAHAJUN.—A great man; but now, universally, a merchant, banker, trader, or money-lender.

MAHOUT, MAHA, WUT.—An elephant-driver.

MALGOOZAR.—One who pays revenue.

MALIK, MALIC.—A master; owner; used as a title of respect. See **MULIK**.

MALIKANA.—Right of the malik or proprietor; an allowance made to a landholder by government when the management of his lands is taken from him for various reasons.

MANJER, MANJHEE.—The steersman of a boat; the master of a boat.

MASHA.—A weight used by jewellers; one twelfth of a tola. The small or jewellers' weights are thus—

4 dhan or grains	
of rice	= 1 ruttee.
8 ruttee	= 1 masha.
12 masha	= 1 tola.
5 tola	= 1 chittak.

The unit of the English system in India is the tola, equal to 180 grains English troy weight; the standard of the bazar seer is 80 tolas; the Company's rupee weighs one tola.

MAUGRABY, MOOGHRIER.—Western; an inhabitant of the west side; usually applied to the west of Africa.

MAUND, properly MUN.—A measure of weight in India, varying much in value. The Company's maund is equal to 80 lbs.; the Calcutta bazar maund = 82 lbs.; factory maund = 74 lbs. 10 oz. 10½ drs., or one factory maund and a half is equal to one English cwt. The table of weights is:—

16 chittaks	= 1 seer.
40 seers	= 1 maund.

MEEB.—A chief; a leader. See **MUSSULMAN**.

MEHTUR, MIHTUR.—A prince; the lowest caste of sweepers and scavengers is thus named in derision.

MELA.—A fair; an occasional market; usually a Hindoo religious festival, held at a favourite place of pilgrimage, where traffic and amusements are carried on. Thus at Hurdwan the *mela* is famous for horses, and is the great pilgrimage of the Hindoos to the Ganges. A jubilee is held every

twelfth year, and the numbers gathered together on these occasions are said to reach a million.

MERIAH.—A human victim, usually a child; young persons kidnapped by the Gonds of the hills west of Cuttack, kept amongst them in ignorance of their fate, and after a season sacrificed to their deity, the Mother of the Earth, to insure fruitful seasons.

MIRZA.—A title given to the Syuds, the descendants of the prophet; in Persia, prefixed to a name, a secretary; when following it, a prince; but in India it is prefixed as a title of rank.

MITHAKE, METOY.—Sweetmeats. Lord Ellenborough, when governor-general of India, distributed 80,000 seers, = 60,000 lbs. of "their favourite metoys" to the sepoys composing the army of observation and retribution assembled at Ferozpoor, at the close of the last Cabul campaign.

MOCHER.—A saddler.

MOCHULKA.—A deed; usually a recognizance required by a magistrate; an engagement under penalty.

MOCUDDUM, MOKUDUM.—The head man of a village or tribe.

MOFUSSUL.—Separate; distinct. In Hindostan, a subordinate district; the country; the provinces. *Sudder*, the principal station; *mofussul*, the dependencies thereon.

MOGUL, MOGHUL.—The title of one of the great Tartar tribes, the Mongol; or a member of one. A title especially applied to the kings of Delhi of the house of Timour, although they were more properly of Turkish descent.

MOHUR.—A seal; a seal-ring; a gold coin with the seal of the sovereign. The mohur of Akbar bore the following inscription—"The glory of the faith, Mahommed Akbar, the victorious emperor;" on the reverse, the kulimah or creed. The mohur of Aurungzebe—"Shah Aurungzebe Alungeer issued coin brilliant as the sun;" on the reverse—"Minted at the seat of the caliphate, Akberabad, the year of the reign of fortunate associations." The mohur of Shah Alum, the last of the Moguls who struck coins, and continued by the East-India Company—"Defender of the Mahomedan faith, reflection of divine excellence, the Emperor Shah Alum, has struck this coin to be current throughout the seven climates." The value of the mohur in account is 16 rupees, or nearly £1. 12s. sterling. The East-India Company have ceased to coin gold.

MOHURRIK.—Sacred; unlawful; the first month of the Mahomedan year, in which it was held unlawful to make war. Amongst the Sheeahs this month is held in peculiar veneration, as being the month in which Husun and Hoosyn, sons of Ali, were killed by Yezced. In India, after ten days' public mourning, the members

- of this sect proceed in procession, carrying a bier representing the funeral of the murdered saints; all the men are armed, and frequent affrays occur between them and the Soories, the opposing sect. When Hindoo festivals occur on the same day, and the processions meet, serious battles take place. The English government put down all these affrays by sending a guard of soldiers into the cities on the anniversary of the Mohurrim. See **EMANBARU**.
- MOLLY, MALEK**.—A gardener.
- MOONSHI, MUNSHI**.—A writer; a secretary; applied by the English to teachers and interpreters of languages.
- MOONSHI**.—A judge; title of the lowest rank of civil judge in India.
- MORKE, MORI**.—A water-course, a drain.
- MOULVIE, MOOLVI**.—A learned man and expounder of Mahomedan law.
- MUDRASA, MUDRUSSA**.—A college.
- MURUL, MAHAL**.—A place; a house; an apartment; the women's apartments; a division; a province or district, as the *Jungle Mahals*—districts in the west of Bengal; *mukulla*—a division of a town, a quarter. See **TAJ**.
- MULIK, MELIK**.—A king; a sovereign. See **MALIK**.
- MULLA**.—A sailor; a boatman; a ferryman.
- MUNDER**.—A market; a shop or storehouse. *Subzee munder*—the green market, where fruit and vegetables are sold.
- MUNSOOB, MUNSAB**.—Office; dignity.
- MUNSOOBADAR**.—A military title and rank conferred by the Moghul sovereigns, with assignment of a jaghire.
- MUSAL, MUSHAL**.—A torch; a lamp.
- MUSALCHER**.—A torch-bearer; attendant of a palkee traveller during the night; a domestic servant of the English, who cleans the plates and dishes, or carries a lamp at night—always a Mahomedan.
- MUSALU**.—Spices, condiments; any mixture as seasoning; drugs; bribes—oil to make the wheel go.
- MUSJID**.—A mosque; see **JAMMA**.
- MUSNUD**.—A throne; a chair; the throne of a Mahomedan prince.
- MUSOOLA**.—A kind of boat for crossing the surf at Madras; it is usually from thirty to forty feet long by six and eight feet deep, flat-bottomed, and having the planks sewn together with withes of straw between each plank as oakum; it has ten oars and can carry twenty passengers.
- MUSSUK**.—A leather bag for carrying water; the bag carried by the *bhistie*.
- MUSSULMAN, MOOSLIM**.—A believer in the faith; a Mahomedan. See **ISLAM**. This people never call themselves Mahomedans; the word is purely European. In India there are four great divisions of Mooslims:—1st. The Syuds, who pretend to be descended from Hoosyn, the son of Ali and grandson of Mahomed, and who take the title of "meer" and "mirza" prefixed.
- 2nd. Moghuls or Tartars, taking the title of "beg" after their name. 3rd. The Patans, Robillas, and Affghans, who are entitled "khan." 4th. The Sheikhhs, miscellaneous and converted Hindoos. They prefix this as a title, thus—*Sheikh Gool Mahomed, Sheikh Peerbuksh*. All these are to be found in the native army of the English; their favourite branch being the cavalry.
- MYDAN, MAIDAN**.—A plain; a field of battle.

N.

NABOB, see **NUWAB**.

NAG, NAGA.—A snake, a serpent deity; *Nag-poor*, the city named after the serpent deity.

NAIB.—A deputy; a viceroy.

NAIK.—A leader, or chief in general. In the native army of India, a corporal.

NAKHODA, NAQODA.—The commander of a ship. In India, the captain of an Arab ship.

NANA.—A maternal grandfather. The Mah-rattas address their chiefs as *Nana* and *Mamoo*, a maternal uncle, *Chucha*, a paternal uncle—epithets of endearment.

NAZIM.—An administrator; a governor; a viceroy; the title of the nuwab of Moor-shedabad.

NAZIR.—An inspector. In ordinary use, the officer of a criminal court, whose duty it is to execute the orders of the magistrate; a sheriff.

NEELAM.—An auction; a public sale.

NIMUK-NAM (properly, **NIMUK-HURAM**).—False to one's salt; faithless; disloyal; perfidious; the greatest crime a man can be guilty of. The king of Delhi so designated the kings of Oude, his hereditary prime ministers, because they threw off their allegiance and assumed the crown. *Nimuk-hural*; loyal, faithful, grateful, see **HURAM**.

NIZAM.—Administration; also an administrator; a viceroy. Hence the title of the nuwab of Hyderabad, the viceroy of the Deccan, **Nizam-ool-Moolk**.

NIZAMUT.—The office of nizam; the administration of police and criminal law. See **ADAWLUT**.

NUDDIE, NUDDY.—A river; a stream.

NUGUR.—A town; a city. Compounded with proper names, as *Srinugur*; corrupted by Europeans into *nagore*, as *Ohandanagore*.

NUKARA.—A kettledrum, the use of which was restricted to persons of high rank.

NULLAH.—A water-course, a gully cut by the rains; a rivulet; a ravine.

NUWAB (plural of **NAIB**, but used in the singular).—A viceroy, or governor of a province under the Mogul; a title of rank conferred on the nobles surrounding the throne.

NUZUR, NUZZURANA.—A present; an offering from an inferior to a superior, or to a holy man; the present made on being presented to a king or chief; a fine or fee; a bribe.

NUZURANKE, NISSARA.—A Christian, a Nazarene (?).

O.

OMLAH, UMLAH, plural of AMIL.—The collective native officers of a court of justice in India; the officers of any establishment, public or private.

OMRAH, UMRAH (plural of AMREE).—The nobles of a Mahomedan court.

OTTA, ATTA.—Coarse wheaten flour; the principal food of the sepoy, made into thin unleavened cakes, called *chapatties*.

OTTO (properly UTTUR).—Essence; juice; oil of roses; fragrance.

P.

PADDY, PADL.—Rice in the husks, whether growing or cut.

PADSHAH.—A king.

PAGODA.—The European designation of a Hindoo temple; the old gold coin of Madras, having a temple for its device, but called by the natives, *hoon* or *varaha*. The star pagoda is commonly valued at eight shillings.

PALANQUIN, properly PALKEE.—A litter; a vehicle carried on men's shoulders, in which the traveller can recline at full length.

PAN, PAUN.—The aromatic leaf of the *Piper betel*. In use, a leaf is rolled up with a few small bits of the areka-nut, grains of Paradise (cardamum), a little catechu, and unslaked lime, to bring out the colour of the catechu; sometimes a little dry tobacco is included to make the whole more pungent; this is called a *beera* or *beerkee*, and is chewed, acting as a carminative and antacid tonic; it is presented to guests and visitors, and is then called *pan-sooparee*. It is universally used, particularly by native ladies. The catechu becomes bright scarlet in the course of mastication.

PANCH.—Five.

PANCHAYUT, PUNCHAIT.—A jury of five; a committee of five, held in towns and villages to try all questions affecting caste, usages, and occupation. Municipal questions are thus settled amongst the natives in India.

PANDEY, PUNDIT.—A learned Brahmin; one who makes some branch of Sanscrit learning his special study and teaches it. See **SEPOY**.

PARSEE.—A worshipper of fire; the name of the race settled at Bombay and Western India, who still observe the ancient religion of the Magi; they are enterprising merchants and shipbuilders; their ancestors fled before the Mahomedans from Persia in the eighth century. The word correctly means only "Persian."

PATAN.—An Afghan. See **MUSSULMAN**.

PATHUCK.—A reader; a public reader; a Brahmin who reads the epic poems and *pooranas* in public. See **SEPOY**.

PEER.—A holy man. Among Mahomedans, a saint; a spiritual guide.

PEON.—A messenger; a porter; a police-officer.

PERGUNNAH.—A small district, or subdivision of a country; a hundred.

PERWANAH, PURWANUH.—An order; a written precept; a warrant; a license; a passport; a letter from a superior to an inferior, opposed to *Arzi*.

PESHGUSH, PAJSHGUSH.—Tribute.

PETTAH, PETTAL.—The suburbs of a fortified town; that part of a fortified place lying beyond, below, or around a fortress or citadel.

PHANS.—A snare; a noose; a halter.

PHANSIGAR.—A Thug; a hangman.

PHOUNSDAR.—See **FOUDAR**.

PINDARA.—A body of marauders.

PINDAREE.—A member of an organized troop of marauders, who, from time to time, entered upon plundering expeditions at a distance from their own villages. They were extinguished as a body by the marquis of Hastings; they were originally a body of irregular force attached to the Mahomedan armies.

POLIGAR, POLYGAR.—A petty chieftain. In the south of India, they were more or less independent,—subject, however, to pay a tribute or service to the paramount power, when they could be coerced. They subsisted by plunder. On the subjugation of the country, they were mostly dispossessed; some were pensioned, and some allowed to hold villages, the latter have now subsided into peaceable landholders.

POONAH, POONYA.—Virtue; moral merit. In Bengal, the ceremony with which the rent-payers open the year's accounts.

POOR, PORE.—A town; a city. It is used in composition, as *Cawnpore*—the city of Kama, the Hindoo Cupid, properly *Kam-poor*. Kama is the husband of Ruttee the Hindoo Venus.

POORUB.—The east.

POORUBEE, POORUBEAH.—Natives of the eastern provinces, or those on the Ganges around Patna and Behar.

POOTR, POOT.—A son. *Brahmapootr*—the son of Brahma, vulgarly, *Burampootr*; *Raj-poot*, the son of a *Raja*.

POTEL, POTAIL.—The head man of a village. He is head of the police, and acts to a limited extent as magistrate; the term is current in the countries subject to the *Mahrattas*.

POTEE, POTHEE.—A book; the MSS the Brahmins read.

POTTAH.—A lease.

PUGREE.—A turban; the head-dress of the Indians. It is an act of great disrespect to appear in the presence of a superior without the turban; in distress, and in claiming assistance or redress, it is thrown to the ground.

PUHAR.—A mountain; a hill.

PUHAREE.—A mountaineer; hilly country.
PUKKA, PUCKA.—Ripe; mature; cooked; correct; complete; solid; intelligent; sharp; knowing. *Pucka-ghur*—a house built of burnt bricks and mortar; the contrast in all respects to *KUCHA*.
PULTUN.—A regiment; battalion.
PUNDIT.—A learned Brahmin; see **PANDEY**.
PUNJ.—Five.
PUNJAB.—Five waters; the country subject to Lahore, watered by five rivers.
PUNT.—Abbreviation of Pundit. It denotes a Brahmin who is not a Sanscrit scholar, but employs himself in accounts and writing.
PURA, PARA.—Other; different; foreign.
PURDA.—A veil; a screen; a curtain.
PURDA-NUSHEEN.—Seated behind a screen; a lady, as one who observes the rules of seclusion.
PURDES.—A foreign country; a distant land.
PURDESHE, PARADESH.—A foreigner; one from a distant country.
PUTTUN.—A town; a city; whence Patna in Behar, Puttan in Sindh.
PYSA, PIE.—A copper coin, under the native governments of very variable value. The English government has fixed the weight of its pyas at 100 grains:
 4 pyas = 1 anna.
 16 annas = 1 rupee.
 The rupee weighs 180 grains, and is valued at two shillings.

R.

RAJ.—A kingdom, or principality; a reign. *Company-ke raj*—the Company's reign; *Moghul-ke raj*—the dynasty of the Moghuls.
RAJA.—A king; a prince. A title given to Hindoos of rank. *Raj-coomar*—the son of a raja. (See **KOBE**.)
RAJPOOT.—Son of a raja. (See **POOTR**.) The general designation of the races in the north and west of India, who claim a descent from the sun and moon. The country they inhabit—*Rajpootana*.
RAMA, RAM.—A name given to three avatars. The second prince of Oude. *Ram, ram*/the salutation of the common classes of Hindoos.
RAMZAN, RAMADAN.—The ninth month of the Mahommedans, during which the faithful fast from morning dawn till the appearance of the stars at night.
RANA.—The title of the Rajpoot princes of Oodipoor, in Central India.
RANEE.—Princess, wife of a raja.
RAO.—Chief; prince, probably from raja. Amongst the Mahrattas a title given to distinguished persons, civil or military.
RAO.—A mountain torrent, where it debouches on the plains (provincial).
ROWANNA.—A passport; a certificate from the collector of customs to cover cargoes of goods.
ROY, RAI.—A prince; corruption of raja; an order of civil rank conferred on Hindoos, as *Ram Mohun Roy*.
RUBBEE.—The spring harvest. (See **FUEL**.)
RUPPEE, ROOPPEE.—The standard silver coin of India. (See **PYSA**.) The government of the East-India Company struck their coin in the name of the last king of Dehli, Shah Alum, and with the same legend as the *Mohur*, until 1835, when the Mahommedan coinage was abolished—the English government no longer declaring Shah Alum (deceased, 1806) to be the “defender of the faith of Mahommed”—and the Company's rupee was introduced, bearing on one face the head of the sovereign of Great Britain, and on the reverse the designation of the coin in English, Persian, and Sanscrit, with the words “East-India Company” in English.
RUSUD, RUSSUD.—Grain, forage, and supplies for an army, ordered to be ready at halting-places.
RUTTEE.—The seed of the *Abrus precatorius*, used by jewellers and goldsmiths as the basis of their weights. (See **MASRA**.)
RYOT, RAUT.—A subject; a farmer; a peasant.
RYOTWAR, RYOTWARRE.—Relating to ryots; the revenue settlement and assessment made directly with the cultivator of the soil.

S.

SAHOO.—A merchant; a banker; from whence *Sahookar*, corruptly *Sowkar*.
SAIB, SAHIB.—A master; a lord; the designation of the Europeans in India, like Mr., Sir. *Sahib-log*, Europeans.
SALIS.—An umpire; an arbitrator.
SANTRI.—(See **ZAMORIN**.)
SAWMT, SWAMI.—A master; an owner; a husband; a title given to the idols in the south of India; especially applied to the heads of religious orders.
SENDER, SIDL.—A name given to Africans in Bombay. Some of them were distinguished officers under the Mahommedans, and they were the chief naval officers of the Moguls on the coast of Guzerat.
SHEER, SER.—A measure of weight. 40 Seers are equal to one *Mauud*.
SEPOY, SIPAH, SIPAHEE (from *Sip*, a bow).—A soldier. The soldiers of the Bengal army were recruited from the Brahmin, Rajpoot, Aheer, and Gowala castes. The Brahmins are the most numerous, and are designated by the titles of their various families: thus—*Pandey* or *Pundit*, descended from men learned in the four Vedas or Sanscrit scriptures; *Doobe*, i.e. *Do Vedas*—learned in two Vedas; *Tewarie*, i.e. *Tri-Ved*—learned in three Vedas; *Chobe*, i.e. *Char-Ved*—learned in four Vedas; *Pathuck*—a reader of the Vedas in public; *Sootul*—a priest of lay Brahmins; *Thakoor*—title of a Rajpoot. *Sipah Salar*—commander of an army; the commander-in-chief.

- SERAI, SERAHE.**—A palace; a large building for the accommodation of travellers; usually a large square, with space in the middle for beasts of burden, carts, &c.; an inn.
- SETH, SEETH, SET.**—A merchant; a banker. Often used as a respectful designation—as *Luchmeechund Seth*.
- SHAH.**—A king.
- SHAHZADA.**—Son of a king; the eldest son of the Great Mogul.
- SHASTER.**—The sacred books of the Hindoos.
- SHASTRY.**—An expounder of the shaster; learned in the shaster.
- SHEIK, SHAIKH.**—An elder; a chief. See MUSSULMAN.
- SHIAH, SHEEIAH.**—The name of one of the two great divisions of the Mahommedans. This sect denies the lawful succession of the three first caliphs, and claims the immediate succession to Mahommed as the right of Ali. The Persians, the Oude family, and the lower orders of Moslems in Hindostan are of this sect. See MOHURRID and SOONEE.
- SHIKAR.**—Hunting; sport; game.
- SHIKAREE.**—A hunter; sportsman; game-keeper.
- SHROFF, SURRAJ.**—A banker; money-changer; valuer of coin.
- SHUHE, SHUHUR.**—A town; a city. Used as an affix in composition, as *Bolundshuhur*—the high city.
- SICCA.**—A die; a stamp; a seal; a royal signet; stamped coin. *Sicca rupee*—the silver coin of India previous to the coinage of the Company. See RUPEE.
- SIKH.**—A disciple; the followers of Nanuk; the dominant sect of the Punjab. Nanuk and his successors were Hindoo reformers, and admitted nearly all castes of Hindoos into their community. Hur Govind, the first warlike leader, was born in 1606. In 1708 twelve tribes of Sikhs captured Lahore, and occupied the Punjab. In 1805 Runjeet Singh established the independence of Lahore.
- SINGH.**—A lion; the title of the princely and military castes. The Sikhs adopted it.
- SIRCAR.**—A chief; the government; a head clerk. See CIRCAR.
- SIRDAR.**—A chief; a head man; the head of a set of palkee-bearers; the Hindoo *major domo* in an English family.
- SOBAH, SOOBAH.**—A province; a large division of territory.
- SOBAHDAR, SOOBAHDAR.**—Governor of a province; viceroy under the Mogul; the highest grade of native commissioned officer in the Indian army.
- SONA.**—Gold.
- SONAR.**—A goldsmith.
- SOOKUL.**—A priest to lay Brahmins; a title of a family of Brahmins. See SEPOY.
- SOONEE, SOONL.**—A follower of the traditions of Mahommed; the designation of one of the two great divisions of the Mahommedans, who, in opposition to the Sheehs, affirm the lawful succession of the first three caliphs, Aboobukhr, Omar, and Osman; the Arabs, Turks, Affghans, and most of the educated Moslems, are of this sect. The royal family of Delhi are Soonees. See SHEEIAH.
- SOUA.**—A bargain; trade.
- SOUADAGUR.**—A merchant; a shopkeeper.
- SOUKAR, SAHOOKAR.**—A merchant; a banker. See SAHOO.
- SOWAR.**—A rider; a horseman; a dragoon.
- SOWAREE.**—Equipage; retinue; cavalcade.
- SUBZEE.**—Greenness; vegetables. *Subzee-mundee*—the green-market; the larger leaves of the hemp, and the intoxicating beverage made by pounding them and mixing them with water.
- SUDDER.**—Eminence; chief; supreme. *Sudder Adaulut*—chief court. *Sudder Dewanee*—chief civil court. *Sudder Nizamut*—chief criminal court.
- SULTAN, SOOLTAN.**—A sovereign prince. *Sulataen*—the plural; in India the members of the royal family of Delhi.
- SULTANUT.**—Empire; sovereignty; a kingdom.
- SUNNOD.**—A grant; a diploma; a charter.
- SUTTEE, SATI.**—A virtuous wife; especially one who crowns her life of duty by burning herself on the funeral pile of her deceased husband.
- SYCE, SAJES.** A groom; a horsekeeper.
- SYER, SAYER.**—Miscellaneous revenue; various imposts in addition to the land-tax; customs; transit duties; licenses, &c.
- SYUD.**—A lord; a chief; the descendants of the prophet, who take the title of *Meer* or *Mirza*. See MUSSULMAN.

T.

- TABOOT.**—A coffin; the bier carried by the Shihs in procession at the Mohurrim. See TAZEERA.
- TAL.**—A pond; a lake. *Nynee Tal*, the lake of the goddess Nynee; a sanatorium in the lower range of the Himalaya hills, north of Rohilkund, in the province of Kumaon, near Almora.
- TALOOK.**—Property; a dependency; an estate. A talook was frequently granted on favourable terms of assessment for services; or given to influential men in farm, where the country had suffered from droughts, the ravages of an enemy, or predatory hordes.
- TALOOKDAR.**—The holder of a talook under many forms of tenure; but during the anarchy that followed the destruction of the Mogul power by Nadir Shah, the talookdars held their lands in regular descent, and were recognized by all the chiefs who came into power, until the English became paramount; when, in the course of the revenue settlements of the North-West Provinces, a searching inquiry was made, and their claims to a proprietary right were disallowed. In most cases they were

- ousted, and an allowance for life made them, and that as a favour.
- TAJ.**—The mausoleum of the Begum Noor Jehan at Agra, vulgarly so called. This lady's title was *Moomtaz-ool-muhl*—the exalted of the palace; the last syllable of the title has become *taj*, and the tomb is called *Taj dehee ka rana*—the Taj lady's mausoleum. She was the favourite wife of the emperor Jehangeer, who struck coins in her name in the year A.D. 1624.
- TANK.**—A reservoir of water; a pond.
- TATTOO.**—A pony; a horse employed in carrying burdens in panniers.
- TAZEKA, TAZIA.**—A model of the tomb of Hoosun and Hoosyn at Kurbala, carried in procession by the Indian Sheehs at the Mohurrim; it is made as cheap or as expensive as the means or piety of the owner will admit of. The common ones are thrown into a pond outside the town, at a place called Kurbala, at the close of the ceremonies; the more valuable are preserved.
- TELINGA.**—The country so named by the Mahomedans, the Carnatic; a native of Tilang, whence the first native soldiers, dressed and disciplined after the European fashion, were recruited; hence it came to mean soldier. In Upper India all Europeans are called *telinga* by the bulk of the people, disrespectfully.
- THAKOOR, THAKUR.**—An idol; a deity; a lord; a master; the head of a tribe; the title of Rajpoots, especially the chief or head man of a Rajpoot tribe. Strangers meeting whilst travelling and wishing to exchange civilities—to smoke together, to offer tobacco or pan—instead of asking "What caste are you?" ask, "Who is your *Thakoor*?"—who is your deity? It is a family name in Bengal indicating Brahminical origin. Dwarkanath Thakur, who died in London in 1846, was a highly respected member of this family.
- THANA, TANNA.**—A station; a police-station. Under the native governments it was a military post; under the English government it is exclusively a police-establishment.
- THANADAR.**—The chief police-officer of the district subordinate to a thana.
- THUG, TUG.**—A cheat; a knave; applied now to the highway plundering associations who invariably garotte their victims before robbing them. These assassins have laws, rank, and superstitions of the most extraordinary kinds which regulate all their expeditions; their correct appellation is *PHANSIGAR*, which see.
- TODDY, TAREE.**—The juice of the palmyra and coconut-trees, drawn off by incisions in the bark, at the root of the leaves. When first drawn the juice is sweet, insipid, and harmless, but after fermentation it becomes a fiery and highly intoxicating spirit. The trees are all liable to duty and are included in the excise laws of the East-India Company.
- TOPASS, TOPAZ.**—Descendants from the Portuguese settlers in India, perhaps from *topee*, a hat. They were extensively employed as soldiers in the early history of the Company; they are now only heard of as waiters on board of country ships.
- TOPE.**—A gun; a piece of ordnance. *Tophams*—artillery; park of artillery; arsenal.
- TOPE, TOPU.**—A grove of trees; properly of those which bear fruit, as mango, tamarinds, &c.; a southern word, used by the English only in the Bengal presidency.
- TOPE.**—Curious monuments of antiquity, first noticed in Afghanistan by Mr. Elphinstone; they are also found in the Punjab, in many parts of India, and in Ceylon. See Fergusson's "Hand-book of Architecture."
- TOPEE.**—A hat; a cap; a skull-cap. *Topewala*—a European, the wearer of a hat. The people of India suppose that there are twelve tribes of Europeans, known by the different kinds of hats they wear, hence *Baruk-topee* means all Europe—the twelve hats.
- TUHSEEL.**—Collection, especially of the government revenue.
- TUHSEELDAR.**—A native collector of revenue, particularly the land revenue.
- TUKSAL.**—A mint.
- TUKYA, TUKIYA.**—A pillow; the grove in which a religious mendicant resides; the seat of a fakir. These places often form the rendezvous of thieves and Thugs; travellers stop at these places to chat and smoke, and often incautiously discover their secrets. Many a conspiracy and evil design has been traced to these groves, which have never been sufficiently watched by the English government.
- TULWAR.**—A sword.
- TUMASHA.**—A spectacle; a show; a scene; a ball; a riot; a fight; any excitement.
- TUNCAW, TUNKHA.**—An order or draft for money; an assignment by the ruling authority in payment of wages; pay; allowances.
- TUPPUL.**—The post; the carriage and delivery of letters—used in the Madras presidency.
- TUSSUR.**—An inferior sort of silk, the produce of a worm found wild in many parts of India, the *Bombyx paphia*. Tusser cloth is imported from Bengal in small quantities, and is sometimes embroidered as robes for ladies.

U.

UKBER.—See **AKBER**.

UR, OOR.—A village; a town; a country. This word has suffered from the bad pronunciation of the English, as *poor* in northern India, and has become *ore*,

as *Vellora* for Velloor, *Nellore* for Nelloor.

URDOO, OERDOO.—A camp; a royal encampment. Now applied to the *lingua franca* of India, the language of the royal camp of the Mahomedans, being formed on a Hindoe and Sanscrit basis, with a copious introduction of Persian and Arabic words, the result of the conquest of Hindostan by a people whose language and literature were Persian and Arabic. Now, many Portuguese and English words have been admitted: in the courts such words as "pleadings," "decrees," and "stamp"—and in ordinary life "towel" and "kettle"—are found in the Oordoo or camp language of India.

UTTUR.—See OTTO.

V.

VAKHEL, WUKHEL, VAKIL.—An agent; an ambassador; in India, an authorized pleader in the courts.

VEDA.—The general name of the chief scriptural authorities of the Hindoos; more correctly, the four canonical works, entitled the *Rig Veda*, *Yujoor Veda*, *Sama Veda*, and *Atharva Veda*.

VILAYUT, see BELATTEE.

VISHNOO, VISHNU.—The second of the Hindoo triad; the preserving power—as Siva, Sheva, or Sib is the third, or the destroying and renovating power—and Brahma is the first, the creator.

VIZIER, WUKHER.—The principal minister in a Mahomedan sovereignty. The Oude family were considered hereditary viziers to the Great Mogul, until they rebelled, by assuming the dignity of king.

W.

WAHABEE.—Follower of a Mahomedan reformer of Arabia, especially of the practices of the sect of Shiabs. In India the word has become a term of abuse, equivalent to "kafir" or infidel.

WALA, WALU, WAL.—Used only in composition; it denotes a person who does any act, is possessed of any property, is charged with any duty, as *gao-walu*—a

cowherd; *Dehli-walu*—an inhabitant of Dehli; *box-walu* (in Anglo-Indian)—a pedlar, a box-fellow.

Y.

YOGEE. See JOGEE.

Z.

ZAMORIN.—The ruler of Calicut; possibly a corruption of *Zemindar*, in the feminine *Zemindareen*.

ZAT, JAT.—Sort; tribe; race; caste.

ZEMINDAR, ZUMEENDAR.—A landholder; an occupant of land. The tenures by which land is held in India are numerous and perplexing, but this term is applied to all who have the semblance of a proprietary right by usage, long possession, or otherwise, in the North-West Provinces. In Bengal, under the perpetual settlement of 1793, they were all declared "actual proprietors."

ZEMINDAREE.—The office and rights of a zemindar; the tract of land constituting the possession of a zemindar; an estate.

ZENANA.—The female apartments, used for the females of the family; the HARAM, which see.

ZILLAH, ZILA.—Side; part; division; district. The name of the divisions or collectorates in India. Bengal proper is divided into 29 zillahs and commissionerships:—Behar, 12 districts; Orissa, 7 districts; North-West Provinces, 37 districts; hill and other districts, 18; Punjab, 19 districts; Madras, 21 districts; Bombay, including Scinde and Sattara, 18 districts; besides the provinces of Assam, Arracan, Pegu, Oude, and others, to the number of 9, directly under the supreme government of India. The whole yields a land revenue of £17,000,000 sterling, according to the estimates of 1856. The gross revenue of India amounts to £31,000,000 sterling.

ZOOLFUCAR, ZULFIKAR.—The name of the sword of Mahommed, and afterwards of Ali. The symbol of the sword on Mahomedan coins; hence the name of the current silver coin of Hyderabad.

ZUPT, ZABT.—Occupation; seizure. In law—attachment; distraint; sequestration; confiscation.

CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX.

A.D.

- 1001.—Sultan Mahmoud, of Ghizni, invades India.
- 1024.—Sultan Mahmoud, in his twelfth and last invasion of India, destroys the temple of Somnaut. The sandalwood gates of this temple were brought back from Affghanistan by General Pollock, and are now preserved in the fort of Agra.
- 1191.—Conquest of Upper India by Mohammed Ghoomy, founder of the Gaurian dynasty.
- 1193.—Capture of Delhi by Mohammed's Lieutenant, Kootb-ood-Deen, the "Polestar of the Faithful."
- 1206.—Kootb-ood-Deen, on Mohammed's death, proclaims himself king of Delhi, and founds the dynasty of the Slave-kings; he himself having originally been sold into captivity as a prisoner of war.
- 1294.—Feroze founds the dynasty of Khilgy, and sends the first Mahomedan expedition into the Deccan.
- 1320.—The Khilgyan dynasty supplanted by that of Ghazi Khan Toghluk, governor of the Punjab.
- 1351.—Death of Mohammed Toghluk. This headstrong and tyrannical prince twice attempted to remove the capital of his kingdom from Delhi to Deogur, which he named Dowlatabad, or the Fortunate City.
- 1388.—Death of Feroze Toghluk, a prince celebrated for the number and magnitude of his public works.
- 1398.—Invasion of India by Timour the Tartar; capture of Delhi, and massacre of the inhabitants.
- 1497.—Vasco de Gama doubles the Cape of Good Hope, and reaches Calicut, where the Portuguese finally effect a settlement.
- 1510.—Capture of Goa by Albuquerque.
- 1526.—Timour's great-grandson, Baber, seats himself on the throne of Delhi, and terminates the Patan dynasties that had ruled for 300 years.
- 1556.—Akbar succeeds his father Hoomayoon, killed by a fall as he descended from the roof of his palace. Akbar reigned gloriously for fifty-one years. The state of Upper India at that time is set forth in a book compiled under the em-

A.D.

- peror's instructions, and entitled "Ayeen Akberry" (the Institutes of Akbar). In this reign three Portuguese missions, of a religious character, were sent from Goa to Delhi by the emperor's request.
- 1591.—First "adventure" from England.
- 1599.—Association of London merchants to fit out three ships for the Indian trade.
- 1600.—Association merges into a chartered company, under the style and title of "Governor and Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies."
- 1607.—Akbar's son Selim ascends the throne, and assumes the name of Jehangir, or Conqueror of the World. His favourite queen was the famous Noor Mahal, or Noor Jehan.
- 1609.—Captain Hawkins arrives at Agra, on behalf of the English Company.
- 1612.—Factories established at Surat.
- 1615.—Sir Thomas Roe arrives at Ajmere, as ambassador to the court of the Great Mogul from James I.
- 1627.—Jehangir succeeded by his son Shah Jehan. Destroys the Portuguese factory on the Hooghly. Subdues the Deccan. Dissensions of his sons, and consequent civil wars.
- 1658.—Having defeated his two elder brothers, Aurungzebe imprisons his father and usurps the throne.
- 1666.—Death of Shah Jehan.
- 1680.—Death of Sevagee, the founder of the Mahratta power, of which Sattara subsequently became the principal seat.
- 1700.—Calcutta founded. The settlement called Fort William, in compliment to the reigning sovereign.
- 1702.—The rival companies coalesce into "The United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies," and so continue till 1838.
- 1707.—Death of Aurungzebe at the age of 94, after a troubled reign of nearly fifty years. Bernier, the traveller, resided some years at his court.
- 1739.—Capture and pillage of Delhi by Nadir Shah; 8,000 persons supposed to have been massacred in a few hours. Eight years afterwards Nadir was assassinated in his tent at Meshed, in Khorassan.

- A.D.
- 1746.—Madras taken by Labourdonnais, but restored to the English by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749.
- 1748.—Death of Nizam-ool-Moolk. Dupleix, governor of Pondicherry, espouses the cause of his grandson Mozuffar Jung, and places him on the throne. The English side with the Nizam's second son, Nazir Jung, to whom his rival surrenders.
- 1750.—Nazir Jung quarrels with the English, and in a battle with the French is murdered by some of his own followers. Mozuffar Jung restored to the musnud. Glorification of Dupleix. Mozuffar Jung being slain in battle with some rebellious nawabs, the French support Salabat Jung, a younger brother of Nazir Jung. English influence in Southern India on the wane.
- 1751.—Clive volunteers to attack Arcot with 300 sepoys and 200 Europeans. Succeeds, and holds it against an overwhelming force for fifty days. English prestige revives. Clive destroys Dupleix, and levels Futtehabad to the ground.
- 1752.—D'Auteuil surrenders to Clive. Chunda Sahib murdered at the supposed instigation of Mahomet Ali, nabob of the Carnatic. Covelong and Chingleput fall to Clive.
- 1754.—Departure of Dupleix for Europe. Gheriah, a stronghold of pirates on the western coast, taken by Clive and Admiral Watson. Clive governor of Fort St. David. Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, soubahdar of Bengal, takes the English factory at Cossimbazar, and marches upon Calcutta. Fort William surrenders. The Black Hole: 146 persons confined in a room 18 ft. by 14—next morning only twenty-three found alive. Clive and Admiral Watson hasten from Madras to the Hooghly.
- 1757.—Recapture of Calcutta. Reduction of the French settlement at Chandernagore on the Hooghly. Meer Jaffier, one of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah's chief officers, conspires against him. Battle of Plassey fought on the 23rd June; Clive with 3,000 men and eight field pieces defeating the soubahdar's army of 50,000 men with forty guns. Meer Jaffier deserts to the English towards the close of the action, and by them is proclaimed soubahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. Assassination of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah. Omichund basely cheated by Clive.
- 1758.—Arrival in India of Count de Lally, governor of the French settlements. Fall of Fort St. David. Lally besieges Madras. Siege raised by Admiral Pocock.
- 1759.—Brilliant successes of Colonel Forde in the Northern Circars, and fall of Masulipatam. Indecisive naval engagements between Admiral Pocock and M. D'Aché. Wandewash surrenders to Colonel Coote. Capture of Dutch squadron in the Hooghly.
- A.D.
- 1760.—Defeat of the French at Wandewash; Bussy made prisoner. Arcot and other places surrender to Colonel Coote. Clive returns to England. Mr. Vansittart governor of Fort William. Meer Jaffier superseded by his son-in-law Meer Cossim.
- 1761.—Fall of Pondicherry. Departure of Lally for Europe; beheaded in 1766. French power in the Carnatic annihilated. Major Carnac defeats Emperor's army near Patna, and takes M. Law prisoner.
- 1762.—Manilla taken by General Draper, the antagonist of "Junius," but restored to Spain in the following year.
- 1763.—Meer Cossim deposed, and Meer Jaffier restored. British take Moorshedabad and Mongheer. Massacre of British prisoners at Patna by Sumroo. Patna taken by storm.
- 1764.—Mutinous spirit of the British army. Twenty-four sepoy grenadiers blown away from guns by Major Munro. Meer Cossim, vizier of Oude, defeated at Buxar by Munro.
- 1765.—Death of Meer Jaffier; succeeded by second son, Noojum-ad-Dowlah. Clive returns to Calcutta. The Emperor confers upon the Company the Dewanny, or collection and management of the revenues, of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. Clive enforces covenants against receiving presents; speculates in salt.
- 1766.—Abolition of double batta, except at Allahabad, when on active service. Mutinous spirit of the European officers; fomented by Sir Robert Fletcher, who is cashiered, but afterwards restored. Clive forms a military fund for invalid officers and soldiers, and their widows, by means of a sum of five lacs of rupees bequeathed to him by Meer Jaffier. This fund was warmly supported by the Company, but has been long since exhausted.
- 1767.—Clive finally quits India. Hyder Ali attacks Colonel Smith's force, but is defeated.
- 1768.—Captain Nixon's detachment out to pieces by Hyder Ali. Royal commissioners sent out to inquire into causes of the ill success of the war with Hyder Ali, &c.—lost at sea. Case of the nabob of Arcot—his agent, Mr. Macpherson, unduly influences the duke of Grafton, who sends out Sir John Lindsay with secret powers—succeeded by Sir Robert Harland.
- 1769.—Hyder Ali appears before Madras and solicits peace, which is accorded.

WARREN HASTINGS.

- 1772.—Warren Hastings governor of Bengal. Harsh treatment of Rajah Shitabroy. Discontinues payment of tribute to the emperor of Delhi.

- A.D.
- 1773.—New India Bill passed—presents and private trading prohibited to the servants of the Company—Supreme Court established at Calcutta.
- 1774.—Colonel Champion defeats the Rohillas at Kuttera. Seizure of Salsette.
- 1775.—Death of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah, nabob-vizier of Oude—succeeded by his son, Azoff-al-Dowlah. Various charges alleged against Warren Hastings. Nuncomar, his chief accuser, convicted of forgery and hanged.
- 1776.—Dissatisfaction at home regarding Governor-General's proceedings. Colonel Maclean declares himself authorized to tender Hastings's resignation, which is accepted by the Court, and General Clavering appointed to succeed. Lord Pigot, governor of Madras, unlawfully arrested by his own Council—he dies.
- 1777.—Hastings repudiates his agent, and refuses to resign—judges of the Supreme Court decide in his favour.
- 1778.—Renewal of war between French and English—Pondicherry capitulates to General Munro. Sir Thomas Rumbold governor of Madras.
- 1779.—Colonel Egerton's force, panic-stricken, take to flight—disgraceful convention with Rugonath Row.
- 1780.—Sir Elijah Impey, previously chief-justice of the Supreme Court, made judge of the Company's Sudder Dewanny Adawlut. Duel between Francis and Hastings—Francis is wounded and leaves India. Captain Popham carries Lahore and Gwalior by escalade. Hyder Ali invades the Carnatic. Bassein surrenders to General Goddard. Seindia, defeated by Colonel Camac, sues for peace, which is granted on too favourable terms. Colonel Baillie's force annihilated by Hyder Ali. Sir Eyre Coote proceeds from Bengal to take command of Madras army. Arcot surrenders to Hyder Ali.
- 1781.—Total defeat of Hyder Ali, on the 1st July, by Sir Eyre Coote. Tippoo Sultan repulsed from Wandewash. Hyder again defeated on the 27th August and 27th September. Dutch settlements in the Indian peninsula and in Ceylon taken by the English. Cheyt Singh, rajah of Benares, arrested by Hastings, whose position becomes perilous. Cheyt Singh deprived of his zemindaree.
- 1782.—Colonel Braithwaite's corps cut to pieces by Tippoo Sultan. Indecisive naval engagements between M. Suffrein and Sir Edward Hughes. Death of Hyder Ali. Hastings has an interview with vizier of Oude at Chunarghur: concludes a treaty. Spoliation of the Oude begums.
- 1783.—Death of Sir Eyre Coote. Peace between French and English. War with Tippoo Sultan. General Matthews trea-

- A.D.
- cherously made prisoner with other officers, and murdered.
- 1784.—Mangalore capitulates to Tippoo. Peace concluded on the 11th May. Hastings visits Lucknow. Mr. Pitt's India Bill passed: Board of Control established.
- 1785.—Hastings returns to Europe, is succeeded by Mr. Macpherson, temporarily, who makes way for Lord Cornwallis.
- 1786.—Impeachment of Warren Hastings: preliminary proceedings. Lord Cornwallis appointed governor-general.

LORD CORNWALLIS.

- 1787.—Hastings formally impeached.
- 1788.—Hastings's trial in Westminster Hall: Burke and Sheridan deliver most eloquent speeches; trial lingers till 23rd April, 1795, when Hastings is acquitted.
- 1789.—Tippoo Sultan attacks Travancore, but is repulsed, narrowly escaping with his life: English take part with the rajah.
- 1790.—General Medows governor of Madras: indecisive hostilities.
- 1791.—Lord Cornwallis assumes the command: takes Bangalore and advances upon Seringapatam, but is compelled by famine to fall back upon Bangalore, after defeating Tippoo in a general action under the walls of his capital. Capture of Hooliandroog, Ooscore, and Nundedroog. Defence of Coimbatore by Lieutenant Chalmers. Fall of Savandroog, Ootradoorg, Hooly Onore, and Simoga.
- 1792.—Lord Cornwallis again sits down before Seringapatam on the 5th February; on the 26th Tippoo's two sons are given up as hostages, Coorg ceded, prisoners set free, and a large sum of money paid.
- 1793.—Pondicherry and all other French settlements reduced. Perpetual settlement of Bengal. Lord Cornwallis returns to England, and is succeeded by Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, who essays the non-interference policy, and allows the nizam to throw himself into the arms of the French.

SIR JOHN SHORE.

- 1795.—Death of Mahomet Ali, nabob of Arcot. Reduction of the Dutch settlements in Ceylon, Malacca, Banda, Amboyna, and Cochin.
- 1797.—Death of Azoff-al-Dowlah; succeeded by his reputed son Vizier Ali, then at Calcutta: whose spurious birth being recognized, he is set aside for Saadut Ali, brother of the deceased Azoff.
- 1798.—Sir John Shore returns to England; succeeded by Lord Mornington.

LORD MORNINGTON: MARQUIS
WELLESLEY.

- A.D.
1798.—Zemaun Shah threatens India from Cabul. Tippoo intrigues with the French at the Mauritius. Tree of liberty planted in his capital, and himself addressed as "Citizen Tippoo." War determined on. Nizam's French contingent disarmed and broken up. Mr. Cherry murdered at Benares by Vizier Ali's orders; the latter escapes to Bhotarel, and thence to Jynehur, but is given up on condition of life being spared.
- 1799.—British army takes the field under General Harris. Tippoo repulsed by General Stuart and Colonel Montresor at Sedaseer. General Harris lays siege to Seringapatam; its capture, and death of Tippoo. His territories divided between the English and the Nizam. Restoration of ancient royal family of Mysore. Command of Seringapatam confided to Colonel Arthur Wellesley. Dhoondia creates disturbances in Bednore; flees into Mahratta territory, and is plundered of everything. Lord Mornington returns to Calcutta. Restoration of the adopted son of the rajah of Tanjore. Troublesome correspondence with Saadut Ali, vizier of Oude.
- 1800.—British government assumes entire civil and military administration of Surat. Dhoondia Waugh finally defeated and slain. Lord Mornington created Marquis Wellesley.
- 1801.—General Baird's expedition to Egypt. Company assumes administration of the Carnatic, but confers title of nabob on Mahomet Ali's son, Azim-ul-Dowlah. Mr. Henry Wellesley, afterwards Lord Cowley, deputed to Lucknow. Treaty with the vizier, who agrees to cede territory in Rohilcund for maintenance of contingent. Court of Directors refuse to sanction the College of Fort William, proposed by the marquis.
- 1802.—Governor-General visits Lucknow. Settlement by Mr. Henry Wellesley with nabob of Furruckabad. Holkar defeats the combined armies of the peishwa and Scindia. Peishwa concludes defensive alliance with British government at Bassein.
- 1803.—General Wellesley restores the peishwa at Poona. Mahratta confederacy. General Wellesley captures Ahmednager. Broach falls to Colonel Woodington, and on the same day, August the 29th, General Lake destroys Perron's French contingent at Alyghur. Coel taken. Alyghur carried by assault. Scindia's army, under Bouquin, defeated by Lake six miles from Delhi, September 11th. Lake restores Shah Allum to the throne. Wellesley defeats the Mahrattas

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- at Assye, September 23rd. Agra capitulates to Lake, October 17th. Colonel Harcourt occupies Cuttack. Battle of Laswaree won by Lake, November 1st. Asseerghur falls to Colonel Stevenson. Wellesley defeats Scindia's army at Argaum, November 21st. Gawilghur taken by Wellesley and Stevenson. Rajah of Berar makes peace, December 17th. Scindia makes peace, December 30th. War in Ceylon disgraceful to the British arms.
- 1804.—Commodore Dance with a fleet of Company's ships repulses a French squadron. Treaty of alliance with Scindia, 27th of February. Colonel Don captures Tonk Rampoor from Holkar. Colonel Monson's disastrous retreat. Holkar re-occupies Muttra, and threatens Delhi, but is repulsed by Colonels Burn and Ochertony. Lake routs Holkar's army at Deeg, 13th November. Deeg captured 24th December.
- 1805.—Unsuccessful siege of Bhurtpore by General Lake. The rajah sues for and obtains peace. Mr. Jenkins's camp plundered by Scindia's Pindarries. Sir Arthur Wellesley returns to Europe. Hostile preparations against Scindia; suddenly discontinued—Marquis Wellesley being superseded on the 30th July by the arrival of Marquis Cornwallis, who adopts an ultra-pacific policy. Death of Marquis Cornwallis at Ghazepore, near Benares, 30th October. Government provisionally assumed by Sir George Barlow, first member of council, who carries out the non-interference policy. Colonel Malcolm concludes treaty with Scindia, 25th November. Peace concluded with Holkar.
- 1806.—General Lord Lake quits India. Mutiny at Vellore, and massacre of Europeans—suppressed by Colonel Gillespie. Lord William Bentinck, governor of Madras, recalled by the Court of Directors. Sir John Cradock removed from command of the Madras army. Ministers appoint Lord Lauderdale as Governor-General; opposed by Court of Directors, and Lord Minto finally sent out.

LORD MINTO.

- 1807.—Lord Minto arrives at Calcutta, 31st of July.
- 1808.—Disturbances at Travancore—Colonel Macaulay, British resident, narrowly escapes with his life.
- 1809.—Operations in Travancore under Colonel St. Leger; dewan commits suicide, his brother taken and executed. Mr. Metcalfe concludes treaty with Runjeet Singh. Mutinous proceedings of European officers of Madras army, fomented by General McDowall and Colonel St. Leger—the

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- latter suspended; the former removed from command of the army, and lost on his passage home. Occupation of island of Rodriguez. Brilliant attack on Bourbon.
- 1810.—Island of Bourbon surrenders to the English. Naval disasters. Capitulation of the Mauritius. Suppression of piracy in the Persian Gulf. Capture of Amboyna, Banda Neira, and Fort Nassau.
- 1811.—Reduction of Dutch settlements recommended by Mr. Stamford Raffles. Expedition against Batavia under Sir Samuel Auchmuty. Surrender of the island. Sultan of Palimbang massacres the European residents.
- 1812.—Massacre of Palimbang avenged by Colonel Gillespie. Conquest of Java. Mission of Mr. Elphinstone to Cabul, and of Sir John Malcolm to Persia.
- 1813.—Lord Minto returns to England. Renewal of Company's charter for twenty years; exclusive trade with China continued, but trade with India thrown open.

LORD MOIRA : MARQUIS HASTINGS.

- 1814.—Earl of Moira arrives at Calcutta in October. Aggressions of the Nepaulese. Repulse of the British at Kalunga, and death of General Gillespie. General Martindell's failure before Jyetuck.
- 1815.—Several forts taken by Colonel Ochterlony. General Wood fails before Jeetgurbh. Occupation of Kumaon. General Ochterlony gains various successes. Candy annexed to British empire by Sir Charles Brownrigg, governor of Ceylon. Gungadthur Shastri murdered at Punderpore by agents of the peishwa's minister, Trimbackjee Dainglia, who is finally surrendered to the British and confined in the fort of Thannah.
- 1816.—Peace concluded with Nepaul. Disturbances at Bareilly excited by Mahomedan fanatics, under the pretext of opposing a house-tax. Governor-General resolves on the suppression of the Pindarries.
- 1817.—Hattaras and Moorsaum taken by General Marshall. Mr. Elphinstone concludes treaty with the peishwa, June 13; but on the 5th November the peishwa's troops plunder and burn the British residency. Peishwa's army defeated by Colonel Burr, and Poona surrenders to General Lionel Smith. Sir Thomas Hislop takes command of the army of the Deccan. Treaty concluded with Scindia. Appa Sahib, rajah of Nagpore, attacks a small British force under Colonel Hope-Clayton Scott at Seetabuldee on the 27th November, but is signally defeated. The rajah ultimately surrenders, and his capital capitulates, December 30. Pindarries defeated at Jubbulpore by General

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- Hardyman. Holkar's army defeated at Mahidpore, December 21, by Sir John Malcolm, acting under Sir Thomas Hislop. Governor-General created marquis of Hastings.
- 1818.—Treaty with Holkar signed, January 6th. Captain Staunton with a small detachment repulses peishwa's entire army at Coorygaum. General Smith surprises peishwa's army at Ashtee, and makes prisoner the rajah of Sattara. Sir Thomas Hislop takes Talneir, and puts the killadar to death after surrender. Appa Sahib convicted of treachery and dethroned. Mundela taken by General Marshall. Chanda falls to Colonel Adams, and Malligaum to Colonel MacDowell. Peishwa surrenders to Sir John Malcolm, and is dethroned, but obtains an extravagant pension. Appa Sahib excites disturbances in Nagpore; takes refuge in Asseerghur. Order of the Bath extended to Company's officers—Sir David Ochterlony the first G.C.B.
- 1819.—Asseerghur, after a stout resistance, surrenders to General Doveton; but Appa Sahib had escaped to Lahore. Pindarries annihilated—their leader, Cheetoo, killed by a tiger. Vizier of Oude encouraged by the Governor-General to assume title of king, and renounce his allegiance to emperor of Delhi. Affairs of William Palmer & Co. at Hyderabad.
- 1823.—Marquis of Hastings returns to Europe. Mr. Canning appointed to succeed him, but elects Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs. Lord Amherst therefore succeeds marquis of Hastings.

LORD AMHERST.

- 1823.—Lord Amherst arrives at Calcutta, August 1st, and relieves Mr. Adam of his provisional duties. Burmese attack a British post on island of Shapoorree, at the mouth of the Naf, and refuse redress.
- 1824.—Burmese invade Cachar. War declared. Bengal and Madras troops rendezvous at Port Cornwallis in the Great Andamans, under command of Sir Archibald Campbell. Capture of Rangoon. Stockades at Kemendine carried by assault. General actions, in which the British always victorious. Successful expeditions against Khyloo, Martaban, and Mergui. Disasters in Arracan; defeat and death of Captain Noton at Ramoo. Burmese repeatedly defeated. Rangoon set on fire, December 14. Bassein occupied by Major Sale. Mutiny of the 47th Bengal native infantry at Barrackpore. Sir Edward Paget suppresses the mutiny with terrible rigour.

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- 1825.—Reduction of Donobew. Capture of Promé, April 25. Burmese driven out of Assam by Colonel Richards, and out of Arracan by General Morrison. Armistice concluded, October 18; but hostilities resumed, November 3, and Burmese again repeatedly defeated. Lord Combermere lays siege to Bhurtpore, December 10. The place stormed on the 18th, and the fortifications levelled.
- 1826.—Peace concluded with Burmah, 2nd of January; but hostilities resumed in a few days. Capture of Melloon. Enemy routed at Pagahm. Peace finally concluded at Yandaboo. Treaty with Siam. Mr. Jenkins concludes treaty with Nagpore.
- 1828.—Earl Amherst quits India, leaving Mr. Butterworth Bayley provisional governor-general.

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

- 1828.—Lord William Bentinck arrives at Calcutta, and assumes the government of India. Half-batta reduction, November 29th.
- 1829.—Abolition of suttee, or immolation of widows on the funeral pyre of their husbands.
- 1831.—Disturbances in Baraset between Hindoos and Mahomedan reformers. Governor-general, acting on orders from home, introduces various financial reforms. Siamese expelled from Queda by the Malays, but return through the assistance of the English.
- 1832.—Disturbances in Chota Nagpore. Rajah of Coorg becomes embroiled with the British government. Revenue settlement of the North-west Provinces by Mr. R. Mertins Bird.
- 1833.—Unsatisfactory correspondence between rajah of Coorg and the Government. Free-trade to India and China. East-India Company cease to trade, and become solely the governors of India, and administrators of its revenue.
- 1834.—Rajah of Coorg dethroned and sent to Benares: his territory annexed. Abolition of corporal punishment in the native army. Natives first admitted to the magistracy. Measures taken for the suppression of infanticide, thugges, and dacoitee. Claims of the Lucknow bankers brought before Parliament.
- 1835.—Foundation of medical college at Calcutta. Lord William Bentinck returns to Europe. Temporarily succeeded by Sir Charles Metcalfe, who emancipates the press. Lord Heytesbury appointed governor-general, but on the fall of the

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Peel ministry is superseded, previous to sailing, by Lord Auckland.

LORD AUCKLAND.

- 1836.—Lord Auckland arrives at Calcutta, March 5.
- 1837.—Death of Nusseer-ood-Deen, king of Oude: disputed succession: Nusseer-ood-Dowlah placed on the throne by Colonel Low and the British contingent. Captain Burns at Cabul. Captain Vickovich, the Russian emissary, also at Cabul. Siege of Herat by the Persians.
- 1838.—British force occupies island of Karrak in the Persian Gulf; Persians raise siege of Herat. Tripartite treaty signed at Lahore, June 26, between the British Government, Runjeet Singh, and Shah Shoojah-ool-moolk, with the object of restoring Shah Shoojah to the Afghan throne, from which he had been driven by his brother, Dost Mahomed Khan. Large army collected under Sir Henry Fane, who resigns in favour of Sir John Keane.
- 1839.—Sir James Carnac, governor of Bombay, deposes rajah of Sattara, and raises that prince's brother to the musnud. Army of the Indus takes the field. Kurrachee taken by Bombay force. Arrival at Candahar. Shah Shoojah enthroned. Death of Runjeet Singh. Ghuznee carried by storm. Shah Shoojah enters Cabul. Dooranee Order instituted. Colonel Henry, 37th Bengal native infantry, killed by Kojuka. Kelat falls to General Willshire.
- 1840.—Army of the Indus broken up, January 2. Lord Auckland created an earl, and Sir John Keane a peer. Colonel Orchard repulsed at Pishoot. Lieutenant Clarke's detachment cut to pieces. Kelat recaptured, and Lieutenant Loveday murdered. Major Clibborn's disaster. Enemy defeated in valley of Bameean by Colonel Dennie. Defection of 2nd Bengal cavalry at Purwan. Dost Mahomed Khan surrenders himself to Sir William Macnaghten. Kelat re-occupied by General Nott. Nasir Khan defeated by Colonel Marshall at Kotree. Captain Brown retires to Poolagee, after an heroic defence of Kahun.
- 1841.—Unsuccessful attack on Sebee, a Kojuck stronghold. Kelat-i-Ghiljje taken by Colonel Wymer. Sir William Macnaghten appointed to succeed Sir James Carnac as governor of Bombay, but detained at Cabul by the defection of the Ghiljje chiefs. Sir Robert Sale forces his way through the Khoord-Kabool pass and the valley of Tazeen, and reaches

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Jellalabad on the 12th November. Riot in Cabul, 2nd November—death of Sir Alexander Burnes and other officers. General Elphinstone, enfeebled by years and disease, vacillates. British troops misconduct themselves in action. Major Pottinger escapes with difficulty from Kohistan. Continued reverses at Cabul. Sir William Macnaghten murdered at an interview with Akbar Khan, 23rd December. Kurnool, in the Madras presidency, annexed.

- 1842.—Evacuation of Cabul by British forces, 6th January—cut to pieces in the pass of Boothauk—ladies and married officers alone made prisoners—Dr. Bryden reaches Jellalabad, which is bravely held by Sir Robert Sale. General Nott defeats Akbar Khan at Candahar. Lord Auckland quits India 12th March.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

- 1842.—Lord Ellenborough arrives at Calcutta, February 28th. Colonel Palmer capitulates at Ghuznee: capitulation violated. Earthquake demolishes Sale's defences at Jellalabad, February 19th. Akbar Khan defeated, April 7th: death of Colonel Dennis. Jellalabad relieved by General Pollock, April 16th. General England repulsed, falls back upon Quetta. Governor General recommends withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan. Generals Nott and Pollock demur. General England reaches Candahar. Colonel Wymer brings off garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje, which he dismantles. General Pollock forces his way to Cabul, and on the 16th September, plants British colours on the Bala Hissar. General Nott, on the 17th arrives at Cabul, bringing with him from Ghuznee the gates of the temple of Somnauth. General McCaskill storms Istaliff, September 29th. British prisoners enter Sir Robert Sale's camp at Urghandee, September 20th. Army retires from Afghanistan, and is received with honours by the Governor-General at Ferozepore. Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier force a quarrel upon the Ameers of Scinde. Meer Roostum of Khyrpore persuaded to resign his turban to his younger brother Ali Morad. Panic-stricken, he flees to Emamghur, a fortress in the desert.
- 1843.—Sir Charles Napier crosses the desert and destroys Emamghur. The Beloochees attack the residency at Hyderabad, but are repulsed by Colonel Outram and Captain Conway. Sir Charles Napier defeats the Ameers at Meeanee, six miles from Hyderabad, February 17th, and enters the capital of Lower Scinde, February

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20th. Battle of Hyderabad, March 24th. Reduction of Omercoote. Annexation of Scinde. Mama Sahib appointed regent of Gwalior through British influence, but soon deposed by the maharanees. After some hesitation governor-general decides upon interfering with the internal administration of Gwalior, and arrives at Agra December 11th. British army crosses the Chumbul under Sir Hugh Gough, and is attacked at Maharajpore, December 29th; Mahrattas defeated, and also at Punniar by General Grey, on the same day.

- 1844.—The Mahrattas submit; treaty concluded January 5th; army disbanded, and a contingent raised. Lord Ellenborough recalled by Court of Directors.

LORD HARDINGE.

- 1844.—Sir Henry Hardinge appointed governor-general May 28th, 1845. Sikhs cross the Sutlej and threaten Sir John Littler at Ferozepore, December 14th; Lord Gough defeats the Sikhs at Moodkee, December 18th; Sir R. Sale and Sir J. McCaskill killed. Sir Henry Hardinge and Lord Gough defeat the enemy at Ferozeshah, December 22nd, after two days' fighting. Sikhs recross the Sutlej.
- 1846.—Sir Harry Smith loses his baggage at Buddiwal, January 21st, but defeats the enemy at Aliwal, January 28th. Lord Gough wins the battle of Soobraon, Feb. 10th. Lahore occupied, February 20th. Cashmere sold to Golab Singh. Governor General created a peer, 1847. Lord Hardinge resigns.

LORD DALHOUSIE.

- 1848.—Lord Dalhousie appointed governor-general. Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieut. Anderson murdered at Mooltan. Lieut. Herbert Edwardes and Colonel Cortlandt, with their irregular levies, hold Moolraj in check. City of Mooltan falls to General Whish, December 21st. Annexation of Sattara.
- 1849.—Moolraj surrenders the citadel, January 21st. Lord Gough defeats the Sikhs at Chillianwallah, January 11th, and again at Goojerat. Punjab annexed, March 30th. Sir Charles Napier appointed commander-in-chief.
- 1850.—Differences between governor-general and commander-in-chief; the latter resigns.
- 1851.—War declared against Burmah. Trial of Jotee Pershad at Agra; acquitted.
- 1852.—Rangoon taken by Commodore Lambert and General Godwin, April 15th. Bassein falls May 19th, and Prome October 9th. Pegu annexed to British

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- empire, December 20th. Ali Morad convicted of forgery; Khyrpore annexed.
- 1853.—Peace with Burmah, June 30th. Punjab board abolished: Sir John Lawrence appointed chief commissioner. Nagpore annexed, for want of an heir. First railway opened, April 16th: Bombay line.
- 1854.—Ganges Canal opened, April 8th: constructed by Sir T. P. Cautley. Uniform cheap postage introduced, October 1st: electric-telegraph message from Agra to Calcutta, March 24th.

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- 1855.—Treaty with Dost Mahomed signed at Peshawur. The four per cent. loan. Mr. Halliday appointed lieutenant-general of Bengal. Sontal insurrection; put down by General Lloyd. Calcutta and Raneegeunge railway opened, February 3.
- 1856.—King of Oude deposed; Oude annexed, February 7th. Sir James Outram appointed chief commissioner. Lord Dalhousie returns to Europe, and is succeeded by Viscount Canning.

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HISTORY

OF THE

BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

REVIEW OF THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF INDIA.—CONQUESTS OF THE PERSIANS, AND OF ALEXANDER.—RISE, PROGRESS, AND DECLINE OF THE MAHOMETAN POWER IN INDIA.

THE early history of India is involved in the deepest obscurity. When the country was first peopled, from whom the settlers descended, and whence they migrated, are questions which may furnish appropriate exercise for speculative ingenuity, but upon which there exists no information that can afford a basis for even plausible conjecture. Although it would not be perfectly accurate to affirm that the Hindoos have no historical records, it is undoubtedly in this species of composition that their literature is most deficient. Genealogies of different lines of kings are not wanting; but these, apparently, are for the most part mythological, not historical; and, even where they have some pretensions to the latter character, the difficulties which surround every attempt to give them a consistent interpretation, deprive them of all interest for the general reader. The researches of Oriental scholars may, in time, reduce to intelligible form the mass of crude materials which exists in the native records, and elicit light and harmony from sources which now present only darkness and confusion; but when it is recollected that the history of the earlier centuries of Rome, which had for ages commanded belief and respect, has been assailed, and, in the opinion of many competent judges, invalidated, by the acuteness of modern criticism, an additional reason is furnished for hesitating to ascribe much importance to records which have not yet been subjected to similar searching inquiry.

But, whatever opinion may be formed upon these points, destined, in all probability, long to remain subjects for controversy, the Hindoos are indisputably entitled to rank among the most ancient of existing nations, as well as among those most early and most rapidly civilized. The earliest notices which have descended to us lead to the conclusion that, long before the commencement of the Christian era, India exhibited the appearance of a country

whose manners and institutions had become fixed by time; where not only all the useful arts, and many of those conducive to luxury and refinement, had been long known and successfully practised, but where man, resting at length from physical labour, and escaping from sensual enjoyment, found both leisure and inclination to engage in intellectual exercises. Ere yet the Pyramids looked down upon the valley of the Nile—when Greece and Italy, those cradles of European civilization, nursed only the tenants of the wilderness—India was the seat of wealth and grandeur. A busy population had covered the land with the marks of its industry; rich crops of the most coveted productions of nature annually rewarded the toil of the husbandman; skilful artisans converted the rude produce of the soil into fabrics of unrivalled delicacy and beauty; and architects and sculptors joined in constructing works, the solidity of which has not, in some instances, been overcome by the revolution of thousands of years. The princes and nobles of India, unlike the wandering chieftains of the neighbouring countries, already dwelt in splendid palaces, and, clothed in the gorgeous products of its looms, and glittering with gold and gems, indulged a corresponding luxury in every act and habit of their lives. Poets were not wanting to celebrate the exploits of their ancestors, nor philosophers to thread the mazes of metaphysical inquiry, and weave the web of ingenious speculation, with as much subtlety, and perhaps with not less success than has attended the researches of subsequent inquirers. These conclusions are not based upon conjecture, but rest upon documents still existing, though grievously mutilated; for the historian of antiquity, like the comparative anatomist who examines the animal relics of the antediluvian world, must found his conclusions upon fragments—which, in this instance, however, are

sufficient to prove that the ancient state of India must have been one of extraordinary magnificence.

Whether the present inhabitants of India are generally descended from those by whom the country was originally peopled; whether the various castes into which the Hindoo population are divided constitute one nation or more—the inferior tribes having been conquered by the superior,—are questions which have been discussed with great ingenuity, but upon which, in the present state of inquiry, it would not be proper in this place to offer a positive opinion. Descending to the period when the light of authentic history begins to dawn—though too faintly to be of much value—we find India an object of attraction to the cupidity or ambition of its neighbours. The Persians, under Darius Hystaspes, certainly conquered a portion of India, but its extent is uncertain. It must, however, be presumed to have been considerable, since the amount of tribute drawn from the Indian satrapy is stated to have been nearly a third of the entire revenue of the Persian monarchy.

The next invader of India, of whom we have any record, was Alexander. He crossed the Indus, traversed the Punjaub, and designed to advance to the Ganges; but this intention was frustrated by the refusal of his soldiers to follow him: a refusal which can scarcely excite surprise, when the discouraging circumstances to which they had been exposed are remembered. The march into the Punjaub was performed in the rainy season. It consequently involved a degree of suffering to which troops are rarely subjected, and which none but the most hardy frames can endure. Foiled in his plan of advancing to the Ganges, Alexander was more successful in another direction. A fleet was constructed or collected to the amount, it is said, of nearly two thousand vessels. With this force Alexander proceeded down the Indus to the ocean, while a portion of his army, overrunning the country on each side of the river, compelled it to acknowledge the Macedonian conqueror. The progress to the sea was necessarily slow. When completed, the less serviceable ships were laid up in the Delta, while a select number of the best class, manned by about ten thousand Greeks and Phœnicians, were placed under the command of Nearchus, for the purpose of exploring the navigation between the Indus and the Euphrates, the king himself leading back the remainder of his army through the thirsty desert of Gedrosia. The Greek dominion in India did not expire with the life of Alexander. For two complete centuries after his death, the provinces bordering on the Indus were governed by monarchs of the Syrian and Bactrian dynasties, some of whom carried their victorious arms as far as the Jumna and the Ganges. Their coins are still found in great numbers in the neighbourhood of those rivers. An irruption of the Tartar hordes put an end to the Greek dominion in Asia. Any further

notice of that dominion would here be superfluous, as the Greeks left upon the country and people of India no permanent impression of their conquest.

One of the very earliest objects of commerce seems to have been to satisfy the craving of less favoured nations for the costly commodities of India. Even before the time of Moses, a communication with Western Asia had been established for this purpose; it was the monopoly of this trade which, more than any other cause, contributed to the proverbial prosperity of Tyre, and which, after the destruction of that city, rendered Alexandria the commercial capital of the world. The growing demand for Eastern commodities consequent on the progress of luxury throughout the Roman empire occasioned a diligent cultivation of the intercourse with India, and drew forth many bitter invectives from the political economists of the day, against a trade so calculated, in their opinion, to drain the empire of its wealth. The fulfilment of their prophecies was, however, prevented by an unexpected event, the occupation of Egypt and the greater part of Asia by the Mahometans, and the consequent obstruction of both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the two principal channels of Indian commerce. The ambitious and aggressive spirit of Mahometanism, far from being satisfied by these vast and speedy conquests, soon led its votaries into India. From the middle of the seventh to the commencement of the eleventh century, various inroads took place, but they seem to have resembled rather marauding expeditions than deliberate attempts at conquest. Having satiated themselves with pillage, the invaders retired.

The first Mahometan prince who established a solid power in India was the Sultan Mahmood, son of Sabatagin, who, having raised himself from an humble station to regal power, reigned at Ghizni, in Affghanistan, in great splendour, and became the founder of the Ghiznividian dynasty. His first expedition is entitled to no notice, as it does not appear probable that he reached any part of the country now known as India. In a second attempt he defeated the Rajah of Lahore, and having enriched himself with much plunder, stipulated for the payment of an annual tribute. The hostile visits of Mahmood were subsequently often repeated, greatly to the increase of his own wealth, and not without advantage to the cause of the Prophet. In the progress of his conquests, Mahmood captured and destroyed many monuments of Hindoo idolatry. Among them were the famous temples of Nagrakote and Somnaut. Of the magnificence and strength of the latter, Gibbon gives a glowing description. "The pagoda of Somnaut," says the historian, "was situate on the promontory of Guzerat, in the neighbourhood of Diu, one of the last remaining possessions of the Portuguese. It was endowed with the revenue of two thousand villages; two thousand Brahmins were conse-

crated to the service of the deity, whom they washed each morning and evening in water from the distant Ganges; the subordinate ministers consisted of three hundred musicians, three hundred barbers, and five hundred dancing-girls, conspicuous for their birth and beauty. Three sides of the temple were protected by the ocean; the narrow isthmus was fortified by a natural or artificial precipice; and the city and adjacent country were peopled by a nation of fanatics. They confessed the sins and the punishment of Kinnore and Delhi; but if the impious stranger should presume to approach *their* holy precincts, he would surely be overwhelmed by a blast of the divine vengeance." Their confidence, however, was vain. The invincible temple was taken, and the gigantic idol to which it was dedicated broken to pieces. According to popular report, the Brahmins offered immense sums to ransom their god; but Mahmood, declaring that he was a breaker of idols, and not a seller of them, ordered the work of destruction to take place. It is added that his incorruptibility was rewarded by the discovery of a vast store of diamonds and pearls within the idol. The story is so striking, that it is a pity it should not be true. But unfortunately the earlier authorities make no mention of any offer of ransom, and as the idol was solid it could contain no treasure.

Although the career of Mahmood was almost a constant succession of conquests, his sovereignty over many of the provinces included within his empire was little more than nominal. The Punjab was nearly all that was really subjected to the Mahometan government.

The dynasty of Ghizni was continued through a succession of princes, some of whom made incursions into India, either to add new territories to their dominions, or to vindicate their claims to those subdued by their predecessors. Latterly, their connection with that country was drawn more close by the state of their affairs elsewhere. The wars in which they were involved with the Suljook Turks and with the Affghan house of Ghoor, dispossessed them of a considerable portion of their original territories, and drove them from their capital of Ghizni. The royal house in consequence took refuge in India, and the city of Lahore became their capital. They recovered possession of Ghizni for a short period, but were again expelled from it, and their dynasty closed with a prince named Khoosrow Mullik, who being treacherously seduced into the hands of Mohammed Ghoory, the empire was transferred to the race to which the victor belonged.

Mohammed Ghoory, founder of the Gaurian dynasty, was nominally the general of an elder brother, but in reality his ruler. Having settled the affairs of Lahore, he returned for a time to Ghizni. He subsequently advanced to extend his conquests in India, but at first without success, being signally defeated by a

confederation of native princes, and effecting his own escape with difficulty. Having recruited his army, he in turn gained a victory over his former conquerors, took possession of Ajmere, and subjected it to tribute. One of his generals, named Kootb-ood-Deen, expelled the ruler of Delhi, and made that city the seat of a Mahometan government, compelling all the districts around to acknowledge the faith of Islam.

In the expeditions of Mohammed, plunder was regarded as an object equal, perhaps superior, in importance to the propagation of the faith. The accumulation of treasure went hand in hand with idol-breaking, and, when cut off by the hands of assassins, Mohammed left behind him wealth, the reputed amount of which the native historian represents as almost incredible. The larger portion of this wealth was undoubtedly obtained from India. His conquests extended into Guzerat, to Agra, and to the boundaries of Bengal. Succeeding princes carried the Mahometan arms into that country.

Kootb-ood-Deen, already mentioned, became independent on the death of his master Mohammed, and Delhi, the seat of his government, is thenceforth to be regarded as the capital of the Mahometan empire of India.

This prince had been a slave, but, manifesting an aptitude for learning, was instructed by the favour of his master in the Persian and Arabic languages, and in those branches of knowledge to which they afforded admission. His patron dying, he was sold by the executors of his deceased master to a merchant, who again sold him to Mohammed Ghoory, with whom he became a great favourite. His talents justified the distinction with which he was treated, and he was finally dignified with the title of Kootb-ood-Deen, the Pole Star of the Faithful.

The series of princes commencing with Kootb-ood-Deen are, in Oriental history, denominated the slave kings. After a few reigns, they were succeeded by the dynasty of Khilgy. Under Feroze, the first prince of this house, the earliest irruption of Mahometan arms into the Deccan appears to have taken place. This step was suggested by Alla-ood-Deen, the nephew of the reigning sovereign, to whom its execution was intrusted, and the motive to the undertaking was the reputed wealth of the princes of the south. From one of them immense plunder was obtained, and the commander of the expedition, on his return, mounted the throne of Delhi, having prepared the way by the assassination of his uncle and sovereign. The house of Khilgy terminated with a prince named Moobarik, who was murdered by a favourite servant, to whom he had confided all the powers of the state. The usurper was defeated and slain by Ghazi Khan Toghluq, governor of the Punjab, who thereupon mounted the throne, to which no one could show a better claim, all the members of the royal house having perished. Thus com-

menced the dynasty of the Toghluks. So rich a harvest had been reaped by the first spoilers of the Deccan, that their example found many eager imitators. In one of these predatory visits, a prince, named Mohammed Toghluks, was so much struck with the central situation of Dowlatabad, formerly under the name of Deogur, the capital of a powerful Hindoo state, that he resolved upon making it, instead of Delhi, the seat of the Mahometan empire in India. He returned to Delhi for a short period, but recurring to his former resolution, he again transferred the seat of government to Dowlatabad, and carried off thither the whole of the inhabitants of Delhi, leaving his ancient metropolis to become, in the language of the Mahometan historian, a resort for owls, and a dwelling-place for the beasts of the desert. But this prince was not destined to enjoy repose in his newly-chosen capital. Intestine commotion and foreign invasion desolated his dominions, and in Dowlatabad, under the very eye of the monarch, pestilence and famine thinned the number of the pining and miserable exiles with whom his wanton tyranny had hoped to stock his favourite city. After a time, permission was given to the inhabitants to return to Delhi. Of those who made the attempt, some perished on the road by famine, while most of those who gained the city found that they had escaped death by the way, only to encounter it in the same frightful form at the place from which they had been so capriciously expelled, and a return to which had been the object of their fondest hopes. Famine raged in the city of Delhi, says the native historian, so that men ate one another. In every quarter disaster attended Mohammed Toghluks. The Punjab was invaded. Bengal revolted, and the greater part of his possessions in the Deccan were wrested from him. In those provinces where the authority of Mohammed Toghluks was still recognized, his cruelty and extortion had excited a universal feeling of detestation, and he complained that he no sooner put down disaffection in one place, than it broke out in another. The person to whom this complaint was addressed ventured to suggest as a remedy, that the sovereign should abdicate the throne. The advice was received by Mohammed with an expression of anger, and the avowal of a determination to scourge his subjects for their rebellion, whatever might be the consequence. This intention he did not live to fulfil. An attack of indigestion relieved his enemies from the effects of his vengeance, and himself from a combination of difficulties which only the highest genius or the happiest fortune could have overcome.

Under his successor, Feroze Toghluks, a qualified independence of the throne of Delhi seems to have been conceded both to Bengal and the Deccan. This prince, celebrated both for the number and magnitude of his public works, as well as for his clemency, moderation, and love of learning, is remarkable also for

having twice abdicated the throne. He died at an advanced age, ten years before the invasion of Timour, better known in Europe under the name of Tamerlane.

Timour was a Mogul—a race, the fame of whose arms had already spread terror wherever they appeared, and who had aided in changing the face of the civilized world. The Huns, who under the ferocious Attila gave a fatal blow to the tottering fabric of the Roman empire, were, it has been supposed, chiefly Moguls. In the thirteenth century, their leader, Chengiz, or Zingis, having subdued all the neighbouring Tartar tribes, extended his conquests far and wide, leaving to his successors a larger extent of dominion than Rome possessed at the period of her highest grandeur. They pursued the course which he had so successfully begun. Carrying their arms westward, they traversed Russia and Poland, and, advancing their hordes into Hungary, Bohemia, and Silesia, struck terror into the heart of Europe. The empire was divided after the death of Chengiz, and the thrones which arose on its foundation, after a time, experienced the ordinary lot of Oriental sovereignties. Weakness and disorder had overspread them, when the barbaric grandeur of the Mogul empire was revived by the energy of a soldier of fortune, who, having delivered his own countrymen from subjection, led them forth to add to the conquests, and swell the list of crimes by which, at former periods, they had devastated the world.

The situation of the Mahometan government at Delhi was calculated to invite the attacks of ambition. For a considerable period, the city had been a prey to disorder and violence. After a series of short and weak reigns, marked only by crime and suffering, two candidates for the vacant throne were set up by rival bodies of chieftains. Each held his court at Delhi; the pretensions of both were maintained by an appeal to arms, and thus was produced the extraordinary spectacle of two emperors at war with each other while resident in the same city. For three years the possession of the sceptre was thus contested, the people being subjected to all the calamities of civil war, as carried on in the East. At length, Yekbal, an ambitious and intriguing omrah, succeeded in obtaining the imperial power, which he exercised in the name of a prince who enjoyed nothing of sovereignty beyond the title.

It was at this period that Timour, emphatically called "the firebrand of the universe," commenced his march. He crossed the Indus and advanced towards Delhi, his course being everywhere marked by the most horrible excesses. While preparing to attack the capital, Timour became apprehensive of danger from the number of prisoners which had accumulated during his progress, and, to avert it, he put to death, in cold blood, nearly one hundred thousand of them. Having freed himself from this source of disquiet, he arrayed his

troops against the imperial city. Its wretched ruler issued forth to make a show of resistance; but it can scarcely be said that an engagement took place, for the troops of the Emperor of Delhi fled, almost without fighting, pursued by the conqueror to the very gates of the city. The sovereign and his minister fled from its walls under cover of the night, and the submission of the principal inhabitants having removed every impediment to the entry of Timour, he caused himself to be proclaimed emperor, and his title to be acknowledged in all the mosques. The first function exercised by a Mahometan conqueror is to levy contributions on the conquered, and arrangements were made for carrying into effect this necessary consequence of Timour's success. Some degree of equity was to be observed, for the measure of contributions was to be regulated by the rank and wealth of the inhabitants. Some of the richest, however, it was represented, had shut themselves up, and refused to pay their shares. Troops were sent to enforce compliance; confusion and plunder ensued; the city was set on fire, and the triumph of Timour closed with one vast scene of indiscriminate massacre and pillage. The flames which had been kindled by vengeance or despair, irradiated streets streaming with blood and choked with the bodies of the dead. Amidst these horrors, the author of them secured a booty so vast, that the cautious historian refrains from mentioning the reputed amount, inasmuch as it exceeded all belief.

The success of Timour was not followed by the permanent results which might have been expected. He remained at Delhi only a few days, and having glutted himself with plunder, returned to the capital of his Tartar dominions. His invasion of India resembled rather one of those predatory irruptions so common in Eastern warfare, than a settled plan of conquest. After he quitted Delhi, his authority virtually ceased, and the city remained for some time a scene of the most frightful disorder. It slowly recovered from this state, and the authority of its former ruler within its walls was to some extent restored, but the reins of extended empire had slipped irrecoverably from his grasp. The state of anarchy which had prevailed had emboldened the governors of the provinces to renounce their allegiance to the Court of Delhi. New kingdoms sprung into independent existence, and in a brief period a very small district round the city of Delhi was all that remained to its ruler.

Though the positive authority of Timour ceased with his departure from Delhi, a prince named Khizr, who obtained the government shortly afterwards, acknowledged a nominal vassalage to him, and caused coin to be struck in his name; but the dynasty of Timour was not actually established in India until the celebrated Baber, after some abortive attempts, succeeded in seating himself on the throne of Delhi.

In establishing his authority, Baber encountered difficulties which, to a mind of less energy, might have appeared insuperable. He persevered, however, and extended his conquests as far as Behar, when his progress was terminated by his death. That event, according to some authors, was hastened by superstition. His favourite son, Hoomayoon, was dangerously ill, and some pious follower of the Prophet suggested that in similar circumstances Heaven had been sometimes pleased to accept the most valuable thing possessed by one friend as an offering in exchange for the life of another. Baber was struck by the suggestion, and exclaimed that, next to the life of Hoomayoon, his own life was what he most valued; and that this he would devote as a sacrifice for his son's. His friends pointed out a more easy though highly costly sacrifice in a diamond taken at Agra, reputed the most valuable in the world, and quoted the authority of ancient sages in proof that the proper offering was the dearest of worldly possessions. But Baber was inflexible, and proceeded to carry his intention into effect, according to the most approved forms of Mahometan piety. He walked three times round the sick prince, in imitation of the mode of presenting offerings on solemn occasions, and then retired to prayer. After some time, it is stated that he was heard to exclaim, "I have borne it away, I have borne it away;" and from that time Baber's health is said to have declined, and that of Hoomayoon to have improved. On the recovery of Hoomayoon, it is only necessary to remark that he enjoyed the advantage of youth. With regard to the decline of Baber, it is to be observed that he was previously in ill health, and no one acquainted with the effects of imagination in producing or aggravating disease, will doubt that the conviction of his being a doomed man might accelerate the fate which he believed inevitable, more especially when acting upon a frame previously enfeebled by sickness. But whether this effect was produced or not, there is certainly nothing remarkable either in the death of the father or the recovery of the son.

The son of Baber, after a few years of stormy contention, was forced to yield the throne to an Affghan usurper, named Sheer. Many public works tending alike to use and ornament, are attributed to this prince; but their reputed number and magnitude seem hardly consistent with the brevity of his reign, which lasted only five years. In addition to his other measures for the public advantage, he established horse posts for the benefit both of the government and of commerce. Tradition adds, that during his reign, such was the public security that travellers rested and slept with their goods in the highways without apprehension of robbery. The death of Sheer was succeeded by a struggle for the crown, which ended in the restoration of the exiled son of Baber. This prince dying from a fall very shortly after his elevation to sovereign

power, made way for his son Akbar, whose name occupies so conspicuous a place in the pages of Oriental history.

Akbar was not fourteen years of age when he ascended the throne. The youth of the sovereign exposed the empire to attack, and the task of defending it was intrusted to a distinguished chief named Beiram, who entered with vigour upon the task of reducing to obedience all who disputed the authority of the monarch. He succeeded in giving stability to the throne; but his imperious temper, aided by the intrigues of those who hated or envied him, gradually diminished his influence at court; and the attainment by the sovereign of the period of manhood made him naturally anxious to be released from a state of pupilage. Akbar accordingly issued a proclamation announcing his own assumption of the reins of government, and forbidding obedience to any orders not bearing his seal. Beiram had recourse to rebellion, but, being unsuccessful, was compelled to throw himself on the clemency of his sovereign. Akbar received his repentant minister with the greatest kindness, and offered him his choice of a provincial government, a residence at court, or a pilgrimage to Mecca, with a retinue and allowances suitable to his rank. Beiram chose the last, but never reached the place to which discontent and devotion to the Mahometan faith had united in directing his steps, being assassinated on the road by an Affghan, whose father he had slain in battle.

The reign of Akbar was long, and during the greater part of it he was engaged in resisting rebellion or invasion within his actual dominions; in endeavouring to reduce to entire subjection those countries which owned a nominal dependence upon him, or in extending his empire by fresh conquests. At this period the greater part of the Deccan was subject to Mahometan princes, the descendants of former invaders; but community of faith did not protect them from the effects of Akbar's desire for empire. Akbar demanded that they should acknowledge his supremacy. This they refused; and the emperor proceeded to attack them. His success was but partial, but it was sufficient in his own judgment to authorize his assuming the title of Emperor of the Deccan. With one of the kings who had denied his right to superiority, Akbar entered into relations of amity and alliance. The Shah of Beejapoor offered his daughter in marriage to the son of Akbar. The offer was accepted. The nuptials were celebrated with great magnificence. Ferishta, the eminent Mahometan historian, is said to have attended the princess on the occasion, and, at the invitation of her husband, to have accompanied the royal pair to the city of Berhampoor. But neither the conversation of the learned historian, nor the charms of the youthful bride, preserved the prince from courses injurious to his health and very inconsistent with his creed; for, within a few months after his

marriage, he died from the consequences of excessive drinking. His death, and the circumstances connected with it, severely affected the previously declining health of Akbar, who, in about six months, followed his son to the grave, after a reign of more than fifty-one years.

Akbar left an only son, Selim, who ascended the throne after a brief struggle made by a party in the court to set him aside in favour of his own son. Selim, with oriental modesty, assumed the name of Jehangir, Conqueror of the World. He was himself, however, under the control of a female, whose name is distinguished in the romantic annals of the East, and as his passion is the most remarkable circumstance of his life, it merits some notice. The captivator of Jehangir was the daughter of a Tartar adventurer, who had raised himself to favour in the court of Akbar, and, according to the legend current in Asia, her birth and infancy had been distinguished by circumstances of an extraordinary character. But whatever might have been the events of her childhood, she grew up a woman of the most exquisite beauty; while in the arts of music, dancing, poetry, and painting, it is said she had no equal among her own sex. Selim saw and admired her, but she was betrothed to a man of rank. The prince appealed to his father, who was then living, but Akbar would not suffer the contract to be infringed, even for the gratification of his son, and the heir to his throne. The death of the emperor, and the succession of Selim, removed the obstacle thus interposed either by justice or prudence. The object of Selim's passion had indeed then become a wife, but this was a matter too trivial to be an impediment to the gratification of the wishes of the Conqueror of the World. The presumption of her husband in appropriating a treasure which a prince had aspired to possess was punished by his death. On the inexplicable coldness with which Jehangir subsequently regarded the woman for whom he had incurred so much guilt, and on his sudden and extraordinary relapse into all the wild abandonment of his former passion, it is unnecessary to dwell. Suffice it to say, that after the lapse of some years the emperor espoused the aspiring beauty, whose embraces he had bought with blood. The name of the enslaver of the Conqueror of the World was changed to Noor Mahal, Light of the Harem. At a later period her name was again changed by royal edict to Noor Jehan, Light of the World; and to distinguish her from other inmates of the seraglio, she was always addressed by the title of empress. Thenceforward her influence was unbounded. Her family were raised to the highest offices and distinctions. Her father became vizier, and her two brothers were raised to the rank of omrahs. The history of Noor Jehan—of her intrigues and triumphs, her crimes and her misfortunes—is full of interest; but to pursue it further would not be compatible with either

the limits or the object of this work. One event, immediately relating to that object, must not be passed over. It was in the reign of Jehangir that an English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, deputed by James I., arrived at the Mogul court, in the hope of securing protection to the English in the commerce which they were carrying on with India. Little, however, was effected by the ambassador, although his reception was courteous and magnificent.

The latter years of Jehangir's reign were attended by many vicissitudes of fortune, of which the haughty and vindictive character of his empress, and the rebellious spirit of his sons, were among the principal causes. The death of the emperor made way for the succession of his son, Shah Jehan, who commenced his reign by a liberal use of the bow-string and the dagger. Resolved, like Macbeth, to secure the throne, he was more successful than that usurper in carrying his resolution into effect; and, with the exception of himself and his sons, all the male posterity of the house of Timour were disposed of. Yet the reign of Shah Jehan was at an early period disturbed by disaffection. An able and ambitious general, named Lodi, who held the chief command in the Deccan, had manifested reluctance to acknowledge the claims of Shah Jehan, and it became necessary to employ force to produce conviction of the rightfulness of the emperor's title. Lodi yielded to this argument, and tendering submission, was apparently forgiven. His pardon was even sealed by an appointment to a provincial government, but being ordered to attend at court, his reception there was accompanied by such studied insult, that an affray took place in the royal presence; swords were unsheathed, and Lodi and his relatives fled. He took the road to the Deccan, where he had previously established an interest. Thither he was followed by the emperor at the head of an immense army. After a variety of operations in different quarters, the imperial arms were everywhere successful, and Lodi, having experienced innumerable disasters, died, with the few followers that still adhered to him, in an encounter prompted by the energy of despair. The emperor continued to prosecute the war in the Deccan; but the ravages of the sword were but a small part of the calamities which that unhappy country was destined to bear. A severe drought produced famine—famine was followed by pestilence, and the dreadful mortality which ensued probably hastened the termination of hostilities. During his progress homeward, Shah Jehan took possession of several fortresses, and extorted money or an acknowledgment of his supremacy, as well as a promise of tribute, from the princes through whose dominions he passed.

In following the history of the Mogul empire, an incident which occurred in the reign of Shah Jehan directs attention to a European nation which for a time acted a conspi-

cuous part in India. The governor of Bengal complained to the emperor that he was annoyed by a set of "European idolaters," who had been permitted to establish themselves at Hooghly, for the purposes of trade, but who, instead of adhering strictly to the business of merchants, had fortified themselves, and become so insolent as to commit acts of violence on the subjects of the empire. These "European idolaters" were the Portuguese, to whose extraordinary career of discovery and conquest it will now be proper to advert. Their discoveries received the first impulse from Henry, the fifth son of John, the first king of Portugal of that name. Under his auspices, several expeditions were fitted out for exploring the coast of Africa and the adjacent seas. The first discovery was not very important, but was sufficient to afford encouragement and stimulate to perseverance. It consisted of the little island of Puerto Santo, so named from its having been discovered on the festival of All-Saints. This was in the year 1418. In the following year the adventurers were further rewarded by the discovery of Madeira. For more than half a century the voyages of the Portuguese were continued in the same direction, but in general without more important results than occasional additions to the small stock of geographical knowledge then existing. Little progress seemed to have been made towards the attainment of the grand object of these enterprises—viz., the discovery of a new route to India—till the latter end of the fifteenth century, when Bartholomew Dias eclipsed the fame of all preceding navigators, by his success in reaching the southernmost point of Africa, and in doubling the famous promontory called by himself Cabo Tormentoso, the Cape of Storms, but more happily and permanently designated by his sovereign, Cabo de Bona Esperanza, the Cape of Good Hope. Emanuel, the successor of John of Portugal, proceeded in the steps of his predecessor. An expedition was fitted out in furtherance of the object in view, and committed to the care of Vasco de Gama. It sailed from Lisbon on the 9th of July, 1497, doubled the Cape on the 20th of November following, and finally reached Calicut; thus achieving the triumph so long and so anxiously sought. The admiral was forthwith introduced to the native prince, a Hindoo, called by the Portuguese historians Zamorin, by native authorities, Samiri; and after a short stay, marked by alternations of friendliness and hostility, set sail on his return to Portugal, where he was received with the honours which he had so well earned.

The Portuguese returned, and received permission to carry on the operations of commerce. But disputes soon arose, and acts of violence were committed on both sides. The power and influence of the Portuguese, however, continued to extend, and the assistance afforded by them to the neighbouring King of Cochín, in his quarrel with the Zamorin, was

rewarded by permission to erect a fort for their protection within the territories of the former prince. Thus was laid the foundation of the Portuguese dominion in the East. An attempt to obtain possession of Calicut failed. Against Goa the invaders were more successful. That city was taken by storm; and although subsequently retaken by a native force, was again captured by the Portuguese, and became the seat of their government, the capital of their Indian dominions, and the see of an archbishop—the primate of the Indies.

The Portuguese were not slow in improving the advantages which they had gained. They claimed the dominion of the Indian seas, extended their commerce into every part of the East, established numerous factories and forts for its management and protection, and waged destructive wars—sometimes in maintaining what they had acquired, sometimes in endeavouring to add to their power.

At Hooghly they appear to have established themselves with their usual views, and they probably exhibited their accustomed insolence and violence. Shah Jehan entertained no affection for them, having, when engaged in rebellion against his father, been personally offended by the commander of the Portuguese force at Hooghly. The taunt was treasured up, and the complaint of the governor of Hooghly afforded an opportunity of showing that it was not forgotten. The emperor's orders on the occasion were not more brief than decisive:—"Expel these idolaters from my dominions," was the imperial mandate. The subahdar, to whom it was addressed, lost no time in acting upon it. He proceeded to attack the Portuguese factory, and a practicable breach being effected, the place was carried by assault. The Portuguese defended themselves with courage, and after the enemy were in the town, continued to fight under cover of the houses; but being no match for their assailants in point of numbers, they were compelled, after an unsuccessful attempt to make terms, to lay down their arms, and trust to the clemency of the victor. Their fate was better than might have been anticipated, for the conqueror spared their lives, and contented himself with wreaking his wrath on their numerous images, which were forthwith broken down and destroyed. The affair was altogether trivial, and would deserve no notice, but as being the first instance in which the arms of the Mogul were directed against Europeans in the East.

In other quarters Shah Jehan carried on warlike operations upon a larger scale. Professing the opinion that "it is not enough for a great prince to transmit to his posterity the dominions only which he has received from his fathers," he proceeded to manifest a practical adherence to it by taking measures for the subjugation of the Deccan. An immense force was collected and divided into several armies, destined to execute the ambitious orders of the emperor.

Those orders were marked by the most reckless disregard of human suffering. The country was delivered over to fire, and the people to the sword. One hundred and fifteen towns and castles were taken in the course of a year, and the kings of Beejapoor and Golconda, unable to offer any effective resistance, were compelled to propitiate the emperor by the most humiliating submission. They renounced their rank as sovereign princes, and received commissions from the emperor, constituting them hereditary governors of their own dominions. In all their public acts they were to acknowledge the emperor and his successors as lords paramount, and to designate themselves the humble subjects of the Emperor of the Moguls. Tribute, under such circumstances, was not to be forgotten, and large annual payments were stipulated for, the first of them to take place on signing the treaty.

But the Deccan was not to enjoy any long interval of peace. A Persian, named Mir Jumla, who had acquired considerable wealth by trading in diamonds, became a resident at the court of Kootb, sovereign of Golconda, and ultimately obtained the highest command there. In that capacity he had conducted a war of several years' duration in the Carnatic, where he had gathered spoil of immense value. Dissatisfied with his sovereign Kootb, Mir Jumla threw himself upon Aurungzebe, son of Shah Jehan, who then commanded for his father in the Deccan. The desertion of Jumla was followed by the imprisonment of his son, and the confiscation of so much of his wealth as was within reach. Jumla, who had acquired the confidence of Aurungzebe, thereupon exerted his influence with the prince to bring about a war with Kootb. Aurungzebe warmly pressed the same views upon the emperor, whose consent to commence hostilities was readily obtained. The command of the expedition was intrusted to Mohammed, Aurungzebe's eldest son. Kootb being wholly unprepared for war, became alarmed, and sought to save himself by concessions, but those which he was prepared to yield fell short of the demands of his invaders. Mohammed thereupon entered Hydrabad, and the scene so often acted under Mahometan conquerors was repeated. Fire and massacre raged through the city, and the activity of the first of these agents disappointed in a great degree the appetite of the conquerors for plunder. So rapid was the progress of the flames, that nothing was saved except such articles as were indestructible even by fire. Similar horrors followed at the old city of Golconda, whither Kootb had retreated, and which was entered by Mohammed shortly after. Kootb was now at the mercy of his conqueror, and it is said that he was only saved from death by the beauty of his daughter, whom, amidst these scenes of blood and slaughter, Mohammed married.

The termination of the war afforded the

Deccan but a brief period of repose. In the following year the dependent king of Beejapoor died. The vacant throne was filled without reference to the emperor, and the omission of this ceremony was deemed a fit occasion for again consigning the Deccan to the horrors of war. The command of the invading force was given nominally to Jumla, who had established himself in high favour, but was actually possessed by Aurungzebe. Victory again attended the armies of the emperor. The principal fortresses were, in rapid succession, reduced, and the offending king constrained to sue for peace, at the expense of any sacrifice that the caprice of his conquerors might demand.

The court and empire of Shah Jehan were now about to be agitated by extraordinary events. The atrocious case which Shah Jehan had taken to preserve the throne to his own family, did not secure him in the tranquil occupation of it. He had four sons, named Dara, Shooja, Aurungzebe, and Morad. The emperor being afflicted with serious illness, the exercise of the government devolved upon Dara. An edict, directing that the seal of Dara should be considered as valid as that of the emperor, had been issued some time before the latter became incapacitated for rule, but until that period Dara made no use of this extraordinary power. The illness of the emperor, however, accelerated a crisis which had long been in preparation. Dara issued an order, forbidding, under pain of death, all intercourse with his brothers on the existing state of affairs. Their agents at court were imprisoned, their papers seized, and the property in their hands attached. His brothers, on their parts, were not idle. Shooja, the second, was administering the government of Bengal. Aurungzebe was in the Deccan; Morad, in Guzerat. Each on receiving intelligence of his father's illness assigned to himself the crown. Shooja was the first to advance towards the capital. The emperor, however, recovered, and Dara, with a propriety of feeling not common in the East, returned the government into his hands. Shooja's plans were not disconcerted by the change. Affecting to disbelieve the report of the emperor's recovery, he advanced, but it was to his own discomfiture. He was met by a force commanded by Soliman, the son of Dara, and entirely defeated.

Aurungzebe was less precipitate. He paused to make his blow more sure. He levied forces, but not, he professed, to promote any ambitious designs of his own. With characteristic craftiness, he assured his brother Morad, that his own views were directed to heaven, and not to a throne; but Dara, he declared, was unfit for sovereignty, while Shooja was a heretic, and consequently unworthy of the crown. Under these circumstances, he was anxious to assist Morad in ascending the throne, after which he should retire to spend the remainder of his life in the exercise of

devotion. Morad was entirely deceived by these professions, and a junction of their forces was determined upon. While Aurungzebe was waiting for the arrival of Morad, he learnt that an immense force, under a distinguished Rajpoot commander, had advanced to oppose him. Had Aurungzebe been then attacked, his defeat would have been almost certain; but he was saved by the absurd vanity of the Rajpoot general, who waited for the junction of the brothers, that he might in one day triumph over two imperial princes. That triumph was denied him, for after a long and murderous conflict, he quitted the field a vanquished man, though exhibiting to the last abundant and extravagant proofs of his own contempt of danger.

The result of the battle excited great alarm in the court of Shah Jehan. Shooja, ever since his defeat, had been besieged by Soliman, the son of Dara, in a fortress to which he had retreated; but as the combination of Aurungzebe and Morad seemed likely to afford sufficient occupation to the emperor and his forces, it was deemed expedient to bring the war with Shooja to as speedy a termination as possible. He was accordingly reinstated in the government of Bengal, on giving a solemn promise to abstain from converting his power into the means of attacking his sovereign. The army under Soliman, being thus set at liberty, marched to effect a junction with another commanded by Dara, which was advancing against the rebel brothers, Aurungzebe and Morad. Dara had fortified himself, about twenty miles from Agra, in a position from which it was difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge him; but a traitor within the camp suggested to Aurungzebe a circuitous movement towards Agra, which was adopted, the tents, baggage, and artillery of his army being left to deceive their opponents. It was not till the rebels were in full march to Agra that Dara became aware of the artifice which had been practised. He succeeded, however, in intercepting their progress; but a trial of strength was now inevitable, although it was important to Dara to postpone a battle till the arrival of his son Soliman, who was advancing to join him with the flower of the imperial army. The conflict which took place was obstinate, and the result for a long time doubtful. Ultimately the victory was decided by one of those accidents which have so often determined the fate of armies and of nations. Dara, from some cause, dismounted from an elephant which had borne him throughout the day; and his remaining troops, seeing the elephant retreating with the imperial standard, and missing the prince from the situation which he had previously occupied, concluded that he was slain. Dara mounted a horse, but it was only to discover that he was deserted by his followers, who, becoming panic-struck by the supposed loss of their general, had precipitately fled. Thus Aurungzebe became master of a field upon which, just before,

he had found himself scarcely able to maintain the contest. The army of Aurungzebe had once been saved from imminent destruction by the infatuation of the Rajpoot general, in allowing his junction with the army of Morad. The combined forces of the rebel brothers were now, to all appearance, preserved from a similar fate by the inability of Soliman to effect a timely junction with his father Dara.

The next object of Aurungzebe was to obtain possession of the person of his father. A long series of stratagem and counter-stratagem was played between the emperor and his son, who sought his throne. The latter, being the greater artist, ultimately triumphed. Aurungzebe then saluted Morad emperor, and gravely solicited permission to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Morad, who at last began to discern the real views of his hypocritical brother, was not disinclined to be relieved from his presence; and, after some feigned reluctance, gave the required consent.

Aurungzebe pretended to make preparations for his journey; it was never commenced; and each of the brothers, lately confederates in crime, and still ostensibly warm friends, turned all his thoughts to the discovery of means for destroying the other. The superior genius of Aurungzebe for intrigue again insured his success. Morad was seized and placed under restraint. The time had now arrived when Aurungzebe thought it safe and expedient to appropriate that prize which he had so long coveted. A body of those convenient friends who are never wanting to the favourites of fortune—who watch the slightest intimation of a desire, and stand obsequiously ready to anticipate the wishes of those on whose favour they live—besought Aurungzebe to crown his possession of imperial power by the assumption of the imperial title. He seemed grieved and almost offended by the proposal, but not to disappoint the wishes of those who loved him, he finally accepted the honour thus thrust upon him. His ascent to the throne was not marked by any pompous ceremonial, for Aurungzebe affected to despise magnificence, and his contempt for display was, at this time, strengthened by the knowledge that his finances were not in a condition to bear any extraordinary charge.

Shah Jehan and Morad, his youngest son, were now prisoners of Aurungzebe. Dara, the rightful heir to the throne, was flying ingloriously to the boundaries of the empire before the arms of Aurungzebe. Soliman, the son of Dara, having been abandoned by the greater part of his once fine army, found a precarious refuge with the chief of a small state near the source of the Ganges. Shooja, the second son of Shah Jehan, alone remained in a condition to offer any effective resistance to the actual possessor of the throne of Delhi. The rich and populous districts of Bengal afforded ample means for recruiting the loss which Shooja had sustained in his conflict with Soliman. To gain time for the purpose, he

had recourse to dissimulation, that never-failing ingredient of Oriental policy. He congratulated Aurungzebe on his attaining the throne, and solicited a commission continuing him in the government of Bengal. Aurungzebe, though he did not grant what was asked, met the overtures of Shooja with great courtesy, and both princes were profuse in professions by which neither was deceived. At length Shooja took the field at the head of a numerous army, and marched on the capital. Having passed Allahabad, he took up a strong position about thirty miles distant from that city, where he awaited the approach of Aurungzebe. That wary general was in no haste, for he did not desire to bring the enemy to action till the arrival of his son Mohammed, who was advancing from the north with reinforcements; but, on receiving this accession of strength, he moved forward with celerity, and the fate of the empire was placed on the issue of a battle. On the first day of the conflict, the evening closed without any decisive advantage on either side. On the following day victory seemed about to crown the arms of Aurungzebe, when an unexpected act of treachery threw his army into confusion.

Jeswunt Singh, the Rajpoot chief whose insane vanity had formerly led to his defeat by the combined forces of Aurungzebe and Morad, had made his peace with the former prince, and on this occasion his troops were arrayed in the cause of the new emperor. He received orders to advance, and he made a show of obeying them; but at a critical moment of the battle, when victory seemed within the grasp of Aurungzebe, and when retreat was ruin, the Rajpoot commander retired with all his force. To aggravate the effect of his secession, he fell suddenly on the rear of his allies, seizing the baggage and putting to the sword the women, with whom the movements of an Eastern army are encumbered. Panic, so easily propagated through an Oriental army, began to take place, and, but for the firmness of Aurungzebe, would soon have decided the question of victory or defeat. He remained seated on an elephant apparently regardless or unconscious of the danger which menaced him. A personal conflict between the brother competitors for the empire was averted by an officer of Aurungzebe, who rushed before that prince, disabling the elephant on which Shooja was mounted, so as to render him unmanageable. The place of Shooja was immediately taken by one of his chiefs, who advanced against Aurungzebe on an elephant, and by the violence of the shock threw that of the emperor on his knees, a position from which the animal was with difficulty recovered. For a moment the firmness of the usurper seemed to desert him. He had one foot placed ready to alight, when he was recalled to a sense of his situation by the emphatic exclamation of an officer: "Stop—you descend from the throne." Aurungzebe regained his place, and the fight continued. His

elephant showing a disposition to turn, Aurungzebe ordered his feet to be locked, and in this position the emperor sustained the thickest of the fight. Shooja committed the error which had been fatal to Dara, and from which Aurungzebe was only preserved by the stern warning of a follower. When his elephant could not be moved forward he descended, and mounted a horse which was brought on the emergency. The appearance of the elephant with the empty castle, gave rise to a report that Shooja had fallen, and flight became universal. Aurungzebe was unable to pursue his victory, but he remained master of the field. In the night, however, his ally, the Rajpoot chief, returned and plundered the camp. This act of aggression was chastised in the morning; but though in the scrambling conflict which ensued fortune went against the rajah, he was able to carry away his booty. He had the further consolation of a temporary enjoyment of the distinction of a conqueror, for he presented himself before the walls of Agra, and boasted that he had defeated the emperor. The delusion was dissipated by the appearance of Aurungzebe, who entered Agra amid many manifestations of humility and self-denial. His father was within its walls, and, on his account, his filial piety silenced the guns which would otherwise have celebrated his entrance. "It was not fit," he said, "to triumph in the ears of a father over the defeat of his son."

Shooja fled in the direction of Bengal, pursued by Mohammed, at the head of a considerable force, against which the former was unable to bear up. Shooja, therefore, continued to retreat, till an extraordinary incident for a time changed the aspect of affairs, and afforded him hope of better fortune. Before the war Mohammed had been enamoured of one of the daughters of Shooja. An overture of marriage had been made and accepted, but the breach between the imperial brothers had prevented its being carried into effect. Mohammed's passion seemed to have passed away; but while engaged in pursuing the retreating army of Shooja, he received a letter from the object of his attachment, lamenting the unhappy dissensions between her father and the man who had been destined for her husband. This letter had the effect of reviving the affection of Mohammed in all its former strength. The prince at once abandoned the cause of his father, and passed over to Shooja. He had calculated upon being followed by a large part of his army, but in this he was disappointed. He obtained the hand of her for whom he had sacrificed his position as the heir of Aurungzebe, and the nuptial celebrations were joyous and magnificent; but calamity was approaching with rapid steps, and the ruin of Mohammed followed hard on the indulgence of his passion. The detestable policy of Aurungzebe discovered the means of alienating the affections of Shooja from his son-in-law, and they were employed with his usual precision and success. A letter was ad-

dressed by Aurungzebe to Mohammed, apparently in answer to one from the prince to the emperor. The letter adverted in terms of mild reproof to the conduct of Mohammed; his alleged professions of repentance were noticed in language of pardon and approbation; and the execution of certain designs, which were only darkly alluded to, was laid down as an indispensable condition of complete forgiveness. The letter was placed by Shooja in the hands of Mohammed, who disavowed having entered into any correspondence with his father; but Shooja could not prevail upon himself to yield belief to his protestations, and he dismissed the prince from his court. The infliction of perpetual imprisonment, or of summary death, would have been in perfect accordance with the received practice of the East; but Shooja not only suffered Mohammed to depart, and to take with him his wife, but also a vast amount of treasure, with which the munificence of the monarch had endowed his daughter. The banished pair proceeded to the camp, in which, a short time before, Mohammed had held the chief command, but where now, though he was received with the honours due to his rank, the troops by whom he was surrounded were rather his keepers than his guards. He was placed in confinement at Gwalior, and whether he was ever permitted to emerge from his prison-house appears doubtful. But it is certain that he never again attained any portion of power, and that he died in obscurity and neglect.

Shooja, who, since the fatal conflict with the army of Aurungzebe, had been constantly retreating, was at last compelled to quit his own dominions and seek safety in Arracan; but even there he was still pursued by the machinations of his implacable brother. Shooja had carried with him considerable treasure, and this added to his danger, by exciting the cupidity of the rajah with whom he had sought refuge. A pretext for violence was readily found, and, under the combined influence of avarice and fear, Shooja and his two sons were murdered. His wife destroyed herself, and two of his daughters followed her example; a third was forced into a marriage with the rajah, but survived the closing calamities of her house but a short time.

Dara, after his defeat, wandered for a time in various directions, apparently without any fixed purpose. In Guzerat he, after a time, obtained assistance, which enabled him again to place himself at the head of an army; and having opened a correspondence with Jeeswunt Singh, the Hindoo rajah—who, notwithstanding his recent treachery, appears to have obtained the emperor's pardon, and to have been left in possession of his power,—that person intimated his intention of deserting Aurungzebe in the hour of danger, and urged Dara to hasten and support his defection. Dara's evil fortune or want of judgment on this, as on so many other occasions, prevailed. He waited to augment his forces, and Aurung-

zebe, having overcome Shooja, was left at leisure to direct his armies against his elder brother.

Dara had fortified himself in a strong position near Ajmere. To dislodge him was a difficult, if not an impracticable task, and Aurungzebe, as usual, thought treachery a better weapon than those upon which more high-minded warriors depend. Two chiefs, who had previously been adherents of Dara, now held commands in the army of Aurungzebe. At the suggestion of that prince, they addressed a letter to Dara, offering to renew their former allegiance to him, and promising to march over to his camp at sunrise the next morning. Dara was warned not to trust to this overture, but the warning was vain. He ordered that admission should be given to the expected deserters, and at the appointed time they commenced the anticipated movement. To countenance the delusion, the artillery of Aurungzebe opened a fire upon them, but with powder only. On reaching the entrance to the camp the mask was thrown off—somewhat earlier, perhaps, than was intended, in consequence of the suspicions of one of Dara's officers, who required the strangers to stop till he should be satisfied of their real designs. The unwelcome challenge was answered by an arrow which pierced the heart of the cautious officer, and a contest hand to hand then commenced. The assailants gained the summit of a mountain at the back of Dara's camp, and from this elevation cast down stones and fragments of rock upon their enemies beneath, while Aurungzebe, with his whole line advanced in the front. Confusion raged throughout the camp, and panic, that mighty conqueror of armed hosts, did its work. Dara's loss is said to have amounted to four thousand, while that of Aurungzebe did not exceed two hundred.

Dara was once more a wanderer without a resting-place, and for a time was subjected to almost inconceivable distress. He meditated escaping into Persia, but the severe illness of his wife, which rendered her removal impossible, and his reliance upon the friendship of a chief whom he had twice saved from death when judiciously condemned, delayed his purpose. The sultana died, and Dara proposed to carry into execution his contemplated flight into Persia. After proceeding a short distance he perceived the obliged and grateful chief with whom he had lately sojourned following him at the head of a large body of horse. Dara at first supposed that this was an escort of honour; but he was soon undeceived by finding himself surrounded, disarmed, and bound. He was thus carried to Delhi, and, after being paraded ignominiously through the city, was thrown into prison. There, after a brief interval, he was murdered. It is not undeserving of mention that the treacherous chief, who had delivered his benefactor to captivity and death, did not lose his just reward. Having narrowly escaped death from

the indignation of the people at the gates of Delhi, when returning from his atrocious errand, he was less fortunate on approaching his own government, being slain by the country people when only a short distance from its boundaries.

The occurrence of these events was anterior to the death of Shooja, which has been already noticed. Soliman, the son of Dara, had for a time found an asylum with the Rajah of Serinaghur. But the rajah had his price, and Aurungzebe was willing to pay it. Soliman, aware of the negotiation, endeavoured to escape the fate prepared for him by flight to the northward; but, losing his way in the mountainous country, he fell into the hands of his betrayer, by whom he was forthwith transferred to the tender care of Aurungzebe.

The course of events relieved Aurungzebe from another source of disquiet. After an imprisonment of more than seven years, his father died, thus leaving the usurper without a competitor. From the age which Shah Jehan had attained, his death could not be regarded as a remarkable event; but the character of his son was such as to countenance suspicion that nature had not been left entirely to perform her own work.

Aurungzebe was now the undisputed master of a vast empire; but a new power was rising in the Deccan, which was destined to occupy a prominent place in the history of India. The Mahrattas consisted of several tribes of mountaineers, whose origin and early history partake of that obscurity which hangs over Hindoo antiquity. At this period they were brought into notice by the appearance among them of one of those remarkable men whose ambition and success astonish and afflict the world. The name of this Mahratta leader was Sevajee. His father, named Shahjee, had been a successful adventurer, who, though of humble origin, had played an important part in the intrigues and wars of the Deccan. Sevajee was born amid the storms of war, and during his childhood, was frequently in danger of falling into the hands of enemies. Under these circumstances his education comprehended little more than instruction in horsemanship, and in the use of the various weapons employed in the Deccan, in which accomplishments he acquired considerable skill and activity; but he imbibed at the same time a deep attachment to his native superstitions, and a determined hatred of the Mahometans. His chosen associates were persons of wild and lawless habits, and scandal attributed to him participation in the profits of gang-robbers. But his ambition soon aimed at higher objects. The unsettled state of the country favoured his views, and his operations were so cautiously conducted as to attract little notice, till he had possessed himself of a considerable territory, and presented an appearance sufficiently formidable to control the jealousy of his neighbours. When Aurungzebe entered the Deccan, he opened a correspondence with

Sevajee, but both were such perfect masters of every description of political intrigue, that neither succeeded in gaining any advantage. Sevajee continued to pursue his own objects by his own means until the government of Beejapoor deemed it necessary to make an active effort to subdue him. An expedition was despatched for the purpose, but Sevajee disposed of its commander in a manner perfectly characteristic. He affected alarm, and proposed submission. A Brahmin, in the service of his Mahometan enemy, was accordingly despatched to confer with him. To this person Sevajee enlarged on his own devotion to the Hindoo faith, on the exertions he had made in its cause, and those which he still meditated; the effect of these topics on the Brahmin being aided by large presents, and still larger promises. By the united influence of these motives, the pious Brahmin was so overcome as to be induced to suggest a plan for getting rid of his employer. This was eagerly embraced by Sevajee, and the conference broke up. The desired object was to be effected by prevailing upon Afzool Khan, the Mahometan general, to afford Sevajee an interview, each to be attended by only a single follower; and the worthy Brahmin found little difficulty in betraying his master into the snare. At the appointed time Sevajee prepared himself for the holy work which he was about to execute by the ceremonies of religion and the solace of maternal approbation. He performed his ablutions with peculiar care, and, laying his head at his mother's feet, besought her blessing. Thus morally armed for the conflict, he did not, however, neglect to provide himself with the more substantial requisites of success and safety. To appearance his covering was only a turban and a cotton gown, but beneath he wore a steel-chain cap and steel armour. Within his right sleeve he placed a crooked dagger, called, in the language of the country, a scorpion; and on the fingers of his left hand a treacherous weapon called a tiger's claw, which consists of three crooked blades of small dimensions, the whole being easily concealed in a half-closed hand. Thus accoutred he slowly advanced to the place of meeting. The Khan had arrived before him, and Sevajee, as he approached, frequently stopped, as though under the influence of alarm. To assure him, the armed attendant of the Mahometan general was, by the contrivance of the friendly Brahmin, removed to a few paces distant from his master, and the latter approaching Sevajee, the conference commenced by the ordinary ceremonial of an embrace. The Mahratta prepared to make the most of his opportunity, and struck the tiger's claw into the body of the Khan, following the blow by another from his dagger. The Khan drew his sword and made a cut at his assassin, but it fell harmless upon the concealed armour. Sevajee's follower rushed to his support, and a preconcerted signal being given, a body of troops attacked those of his

adversary, who had been stationed at a little distance, and who, being unprepared for such an attack, found themselves exposed to an enemy before they could stand to their arms. The victory enriched Sevajee with a vast amount of plunder, but this was little compared with the accession of reputation which he owed to it,—the perpetration of successful treachery being, in Mahratta estimation, the highest exercise of human genius.

Sevajee was not always equally fortunate, and a succession of disasters at length compelled him to tender his submission to Aurungzebe. It was graciously received, and Sevajee was invited to Delhi; the invitation being accompanied by a promise, by no means unnecessary, of permission to return to the Deccan. Upon the faith of this he proceeded to Delhi, but his reception was unsatisfactory, and having expressed some indignation, it was intimated that the emperor for the future declined seeing him at court. He was subsequently placed under some degree of restraint, but he succeeded in outwitting his keepers and effecting his escape.

Sevajee now applied himself with his usual energy to the task of more effectually establishing his power and influence. By a series of intrigues he procured from Aurungzebe a recognition of his title of rajah, and various favours for his son; and he availed himself of the opportunity afforded by a period of comparative leisure to revise and complete the internal arrangements of his government. His inactivity seemed to favour the belief that he was satisfied with what he possessed, and would now settle down into a quiet dependent of the Mogul emperor. Those, however, who entertained this belief were deceived. His warlike habits were soon resumed; several important places were taken, and Surat, which he had plundered some years before, was again subjected to the same operation. On this, as on the former occasion, the inmates of the English factory defended themselves with a spirit worthy of their national character. The Dutch were not attacked, their factory being beyond the scene of action. The French purchased an ignominious immunity, by giving the Mahrattas a passage through their factory to attack a Tartar prince returning from Mecca with a vast treasure of gold and silver, and other valuable articles. In addition to his land force, Sevajee fitted out a powerful fleet, calculated either to co-operate with his troops by land, or to add to his wealth by successful piracy; and being thus prepared to support his intention, he resolved to content himself no longer with exercising the functions of sovereignty, but determined to assume the style of an independent prince, and to establish an era from the date of his ascending the throne. He was enthroned with all the reverence which superstition could lend to the ceremony, and assumed titles not inferior in swollen grandeur to those borne by other Eastern potentates. The addition of dignity

which he thereby gained made no change in his habits. He continued his predatory system of warfare, from which the kingdoms of Beejapoor and Golconda were the chief sufferers. His death took place in the fifty-third year of his age. At the time of its occurrence he possessed a tolerably compact territory of considerable extent, besides many detached places, and his personal wealth was immense. He was succeeded by his son Sumbhaje, after an unsuccessful attempt to place on the throne another son named Raja Ram.

It will now be proper to return to Aurungzebe. Aided by the Portuguese, who were easily bribed by the promise of commercial advantages, the emperor's deputy in Bengal waged war with the Rajah of Arracan, and added Chittagong to the imperial dominions. On the other side, the empire was placed in some danger from a misunderstanding with the court of Persia; but this was adjusted by the mediation of Jehanara, sister of the emperor, a woman of extraordinary talent and address. A revolt of the Patana took place, a private soldier who happened to bear a strong resemblance to Shooja, the deceased brother of the emperor, being placed at its head, and imperial honours paid him. This was suppressed, and after the lapse of some time, confidence having been restored between the Patan chiefs and the emperor's representative at Peshawar, that officer invited the supporters of the pretender to a festival, where, having intoxicated them with drugged wine, he caused them all to be murdered, a sufficient force having been procured to master their retinues. Aurungzebe on this occasion acted with characteristic hypocrisy, in which nature and long practice had made him a complete adept. He publicly reprobated the atrocity of the act, but privately assured the wretch by whom it had been perpetrated of his favour.

With the Rajpoot states, the hypocrisy of Aurungzebe found another mode of exercise. Conversion to the Mahometan faith was proposed to their acceptance, and the alternative was submission to an oppressive capitation tax. To prepare the way for the designs of Aurungzebe, two Rajpoot princes are said to have been taken off by poison, and a treacherous attempt to subject the children of one of them to the initiatory rite of Mahometanism was defeated only by the desperate valour of their guards. In the war which ensued Aurungzebe gained little either of honour or advantage, and his fourth son Akbar, while engaged in it, was tempted by the offer of the aid of the Rajpoots to raise the standard of rebellion against his father. Aurungzebe took the same course by which he had ruined his son Mohammed with Shooja. He addressed a letter to Akbar, applauding a pretended scheme by which that prince was to fall upon the Rajpoots when attacked by the emperor. This, as was designed, fell into the hands of the Rajpoot commander, and Akbar

was consequently believed to have betrayed his allies. Having thus become an object of enmity with both parties in the war, his only chance of safety was in flight, and he sought refuge with Sumbhaje, by whom he was received with extraordinary distinction.

Aurungzebe now turned his attention towards the Deccan, and prepared to prosecute his views there with vigour. He proceeded thither in person, with an immense force. His eldest son, Shah Allum, was ordered with an army to the Concan, to reduce the Mahratta fortresses on the sea-coast; but the ravages of pestilence so thinned his ranks, that he was compelled to return without effecting anything, and with only the wreck of his army. In other quarters the emperor's arms were more successful. Beejapoor, the capital of the kingdom of the same name, fell to him. The fate of Golconda was more protracted. The king, after sacrificing every article of value, even to the ornaments of the women of his harem, in the vain hope of propitiating his invader, retired to the citadel of his capital, and there sustained a seven months' siege. Aurungzebe ultimately triumphed by the use of those means of conquest which were so consonant to the constitution of his mind. A powerful chief and favourite of the king of Golconda, who had been most active in the defence of the place, was gained over by bribes and promises to admit, in the night, a body of Mogul troops. Golconda thus changed its master, and its former sovereign ended his days in prison at Dowlatabad.

Another triumph awaited Aurungzebe. The Mahratta power had declined in the hands of Sumbhaje, who was abandoned to sensual indulgence. A plan to obtain possession of the person of this prince was laid and executed with success. Life was offered him, on condition of his embracing the Mahometan creed, but he replied by abuse of the Prophet; and after being subjected to dreadful tortures, he was publicly beheaded in the camp bazaar.

But the Mahratta, though crippled, was not destroyed. The brother of Sumbhaje was placed on the throne, and all the forms of government maintained. Sattara became the residence of the rajah, and the principal seat of the Mahratta power. In a few years a greater force was in the field than Sevajee had ever commanded, and tribute was levied according to approved precedent. The emperor, however, appeared unexpectedly before Sattara, which being inadequately provisioned for a siege, fell into his hands, though not without occasioning him severe loss. From some error in the construction of a mine, it exploded in a direction not contemplated, and it is said that two thousand of the besiegers were destroyed by the accident. A month before this event, the Mahratta sovereign had died from the consequences of over-exertion. He was succeeded by his eldest son, a boy only ten years of age.

A child on such a throne as that of the

Mahrattas, with his mother for a guardian, would seem to have little chance of success when opposed by a warrior so experienced, and a negotiator so unprincipled as Aurungzebe. The Mahrattas, however, continued to prosper; and though Aurungzebe, by a series of sieges which occupied several years, succeeded in gaining possession of many strong fortresses, not only were his efforts to crush the enemy abortive, but the vast army which he maintained was insufficient even to support his authority. His embarrassments were aggravated by the difficulty of procuring the means of subsisting so large a force. A scarcity of grain arose, and the supplies of the imperial army from Hindostan were intercepted by the Mahrattas, who everywhere ravaged the country in search of plunder. The grand army itself was attacked on its route to Ahmednuggur, a part of it defeated, and its baggage plundered. The person of the emperor might perhaps have fallen into the hands of the Mahrattas on this occasion had they ventured to persevere in the attack, but on the approach of the emperor's train the enemy retired. The great age of Aurungzebe probably saved him from the mortification of beholding a large portion of his conquests severed from the empire which he had so laboured to extend. But his earthly career was approaching its termination, and the close of his life found a fitting scene amid the turbulence, desolation, and suffering, which raged around him. He died in 1707, after a reign of nearly half a century, and at the patriarchal age of ninety-four.

The ruling passion of Aurungzebe was the love of dominion, and he subjected it to no restraint from the obligations of morality. He was a consummate hypocrite, ever ready to cover the most guilty designs with pretences of devotion and religious zeal. He is said to have made good laws, and to have enforced them with vigour, at the same time that the administration of the empire was mild and equitable; but though his dominions may not have been in all respects so badly governed as those of some other Oriental despots, the general tenour of his life evinces an utter disregard of all the principles of justice, and a total insensibility to the kind and generous emotions of nature. It may be that he rarely committed a crime which he did not believe necessary to the furtherance of his purposes, but no moral obstacle was ever suffered to impede them. He manifested a preference, indeed, for certain modes of obtaining any object of desire, but those modes were the meanest and the most vile. Craft and fraud were his favourite instruments, and his long life was an unbroken chain of deceit and treachery. A superficial observer of his character will condemn his bigotry; a more profound one will probably acquit him of this charge, but it will be only to pass a severer sentence on his atrocious hypocrisy. Where there is so little to relieve the moral darkness

of the picture, it is neither instructive nor agreeable long to dwell upon it; and as the progress of the state is here more strictly the subject of attention than the character of its head, it will be sufficient to observe that, under Aurungzebe, the Mogul empire attained its widest boundaries, as well as the summit of its prosperity and splendour.

The death of Aurungzebe was followed by a contest for the succession. It ended in the elevation of his eldest son, Shah Allum, to the throne, which he occupied only five years. Several weak princes followed in rapid succession, whose brief and inglorious reigns may be passed without notice. The terrible visitation which marked that of Mohammed Shah, entitles it to be excepted from oblivion. Nadir Shah, a native of Khorassan, and the son of a maker of sheepskin-coats and caps, had renounced the peaceful occupation of his father for that of a robber chief, and finally seated himself on the Persian throne. Nadir being engaged in war with the Afghans, had reason, or pretended that he had reason, to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the court of Delhi in relation to his enemies. The murder of an envoy furnished him with a less equivocal pretext for hostilities; and he advanced to inflict punishment with that vigour and celerity which ever distinguished his movements. On the plain of Karnal, about four days' journey from Delhi, he fell suddenly upon the unsuspecting forces of the emperor, and quickly putting them to flight, removed every obstacle to his advance to the capital, the gates of which were thrown open to receive him. For two days after the entry of the Persian, peace and order prevailed; but a report of the death of Nadir Shah having been raised, the inhabitants, under cover of the night, rose upon the invaders, and the city became a scene of tumult and violence. Nadir Shah made some efforts to undeceive the people, but to no purpose. The light of the morning, however, discovered the falsehood of the report which led to the popular outbreak, by showing Nadir Shah in person, giving orders to his troops to slaughter, without regard to sex or age, the inhabitants of every street or avenue in which they should find the body of a murdered Persian. These orders were fearfully executed, and eight thousand Hindoos, Moguls, and Afghans perished in a few hours. Pillage accompanied bloodshed, and the horrors of the scene were aggravated by the flames which rose from every quarter of the capital. The appetite of the destroyer was at length satisfied, and an order given to stay the carnage.

But Nadir Shah had no intention of allowing Delhi to escape with this limited experience of the effects of successful invasion. He proceeded to seize the imperial treasures, represented as being of vast amount. The property of the subjects was not permitted to enjoy an immunity denied to that of the sovereign; contributions were demanded and

levied with rigid severity. Among a people with whom avarice is so strong a passion, there were, of course, many attempts to conceal the possession of wealth; where this was suspected, torture was used to enforce a discovery. Famine and pestilence followed closely on the devastation of the city, and assisted in completing the horrors of a scene from which numbers escaped by becoming their own destroyers.

Nadir Shah did not exercise the power which he certainly possessed of putting an end to the Mogul sovereignty, but contented himself with annexing to his own dominions the provinces on the west side of the Indus, permitting Mohammed to keep the rest. The conqueror then withdrew from Delhi, having retained possession of it not quite two months. In that space, however, a fatal blow had been struck at the grandeur of the Mogul empire.

That empire was, indeed, fast tending to its close. The Deccan can scarcely be considered as forming a portion of it after the death of Aurungzebe. Many years before the Persian invasion, a powerful chief had been appointed governor of that region, with the imposing title of Nizam-ool-Moolk, Regulator of the State. Though nominally the servant of the emperor, his object from the first was to establish himself as an independent sovereign, and he succeeded. In the subsequent history of India, the Nizam will be found occupying a prominent place among the Mahometan princes of that country. Another important limb was severed from the Mogul empire soon after the visit of Nadir Shah; the sovereignty of Bengal being seized by one of those speculators in thrones, to whose hopes the unsettled state of the country afforded encouragement. The government of Oude was usurped by another. On the western side, some of its provinces fell to the Afghans, who penetrated to the heart

of the empire, and plundered its capital. The Seiks, a sect of semi-religious, semi-political adventurers, profited also from the distracted state of the country in this quarter. In others, the Jâts and the Rohillas contributed to relieve the Mogul princes from the toils of government; while the Mahrattas, amidst these convulsions, were not unmindful of the opportunity of obtaining accessions of territory, power, and influence. A portion of the public revenue, which in their plundering expeditions they had originally levied as the price of peace, was now, by the weakness of the Mogul state, ceded to them as of right. The entire surface of India was studded with their possessions, which, extending eastward, westward, and southward, to the sea, and northward to Agra, wanted nothing but compactness to constitute them a mighty empire. During the reign of a weak successor of the energetic founder of the Mahratta power, all authority was usurped by the principal officers of the state. Two powerful kingdoms were thus formed, the one under the Peishwa, whose capital was at Poona; the other subject to the commander-in-chief, who fixed the seat of his government at Nagpore. The latter acknowledged a nominal dependence upon the former, and both mocked the Rajah of Satara with ceremonious but empty homage, while they withheld from him all substantial authority. Other Mahratta chieftains of inferior importance also assumed sovereign power, the principal of whom, with the title of Guicowar, held part of Guzerat in a sort of feudal dependence upon the Peishwa, and fixed his residence at Baroda.

Such was the state of India about the middle of the eighteenth century, when a new power was to enter the field of Indian politics, and the foundations of a new empire were about to be laid.

CHAPTER II.

RELATIONS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS WITH INDIA.—ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH EAST-INDIA COMPANY.—WARS OF THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN SOUTHERN INDIA.—CRITICAL POSITION OF THE ENGLISH.—DUPLEX AND CLIVE.—FATE OF ORUNDA SAHIB.

THE first appearance of the English in India gave no promise of their future grandeur. The London East-India Company, established solely for the purposes of trade, was incorporated towards the latter end of the reign of Elizabeth. Bantam, in Java, for the trade of the Indian Islands, and Surat, for that of the Continent, were long their principal stations. On the Coromandel coast they first established themselves at Masulipatam, subsequently at Armegum, and finally at Madraspatam, where, by the favour of a native prince, they obtained permission to erect a fortification, which received the name of Fort St. George. Tegna-patam, on the same coast, which was purchased

from another native prince, was, in like manner, fortified, and became a station of some importance under the name of Fort St. David. On the opposite coast, the island of Bombay, which had been ceded to the British crown as part of the marriage portion of Catherine of Portugal, Queen of Charles the Second, was, by that sovereign, granted to the Company, and in process of time it superseded Surat as their principal station on the western coast. In Bengal their progress was slow and subject to frequent checks. They, however, succeeded in establishing various factories, of which that of Hooghly was the chief, but for the most part they were dependent on Fort St. George.

In the year 1700, the villages of Chuttanutte, Govindpore, and Calcutta, having been obtained by means of a large present to Azim, grandson of Aurungzebe, the new acquisitions were declared a presidency. They were forthwith fortified, and in compliment to the reigning sovereign of England, the settlement received the name of Fort William. Thus was the foundation laid of the future capital of British India.

Among the projects resorted to for supporting the government of William the Third, was that of establishing a new East-India Company, the capital of which was to be lent to the Crown. This, though a violation of the rights of the old Company, was carried into effect. The new corporation commenced trade under the title of the English East-India Company, and a struggle between the two bodies was carried on for several years. A compromise at length took place. The old Company surrendered its charter to the Crown, and its members were received into the new corporation, which thenceforth, until the year 1833, bore the title of the United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies.

For nearly forty years after this union of the Companies, the history of the British connection with India presents nothing but a detail of the operations of trade, varied only by the efforts of the United Company to obtain protection from native princes, to exclude those who sought to invade their privileges, and to regulate the conduct of their servants. So humble were the views of the Company, and so little resemblance did its chief servant bear to a governor-general in later times, that the outlay of little more than a hundred pounds in the purchase of a chaise and a pair of horses for the President at Calcutta, was regarded as a reprehensible piece of extravagance, and the amount ordered to be repaid; the Court of Directors observing, that if their servants would have "such superfluities," they must pay for them.

Late in the year 1744, war was declared between France and England, and soon after the declaration, a British fleet was despatched to India, which, after cruising with some success, appeared off the coast of Coromandel, threatening Pondicherry. In consequence, however, of the intervention of the Nabob of the Carnatic and the fears of the British government of Madras, it retired without effecting or even attempting anything against the French settlement. The appearance of a British fleet in the Indian seas was soon followed by that of a French squadron, commanded by La Bourdonnais, a man whose name is eminent in the history of the brief and inglorious career of his countrymen in the East. After some encounters of no great importance, but in which the English had the advantage, the French fleet attacked the British settlement of Madras. As the nabob had interfered to protect the French possession of Pondicherry from the English,

and had assured the latter that he would in like manner enforce the neutrality of the French, application was made for the fulfilment of his promise; but it was not accompanied by that species of advocacy which is requisite to the success of Oriental diplomacy, and it was, consequently, disregarded. The result was disastrous; the town was forced to capitulate, the goods of the Company, part of the military stores and all the naval stores, were confiscated, and a treaty was signed pledging the British to further payments, in consideration of the evacuation of the town. The period, however, for performing this stipulation was extended, in consequence of the intrigues of Dupleix, Governor of Pondicherry, who claimed, in virtue of that office, supreme authority over all the French possessions in India. This man, in whose character ambition, vanity, and duplicity reigned in a degree which makes it impossible to determine which predominated, had promised possession of Madras to the nabob—that prince, when he was perfectly aware that his interference could be of no avail, having thought fit to express his displeasure at the conduct of the French. But the nabob, estimating the promises of Dupleix at their real value, resolved not to trust to them, but to endeavour to secure by arms that which there was little hope of securing in any other manner. He made the attempt at the expense of about seventy men killed, and was compelled to retire to St. Thomé, about four miles distant from Madras, the French not losing a man. In the new position to which he had retreated, the same ill-fortune attended him, for, being attacked by the French, he was totally defeated, and forced to retire to Arcot. This was a severe lesson to the presumptuous confidence of the nabob, who had calculated upon finding Madras an easy conquest. A cotemporary historian observes that, measuring the military abilities of the Europeans by the great respect and humility with which they had hitherto carried themselves in all their transactions with the Mogul government, he imagined that this submission in their behaviour proceeded from a consciousness of the superior military prowess of the Moors, by which name the Mahometans were then understood.

The success of the French was followed by an act of atrocious perfidy towards their European opponents. The treaty concluded by La Bourdonnais was declared null; the property of the English, excepting a few personal articles of trifling value, was seized, and those who refused to swear allegiance to the French king were required to depart from Madras within four days. The governor and principal inhabitants were marched under an escort to Pondicherry, where they were paraded in procession to grace the triumph of Dupleix.

On the authorities of Madras becoming prisoners to the French, the Company's agents at Fort St. David assumed the general admini-

stration of British affairs in that part of India. Against this place Dupleix directed the arms of the French ; but the aid of the nabob had now been secured by the English, partly by the desire which he entertained of revenging his defeat, partly by virtue of an engagement to defray a portion of the expense of his army ; and thus assisted, the English were able to repel the attacks made upon them. The appearance of a British fleet also added to their confidence and security. Thus foiled, Dupleix had recourse to those arts of intrigue in which he was a proficient, and by them succeeded in detaching the nabob from his European allies. He was still, however, unable to possess himself of Fort St. David, and the arrival of an additional naval force under Admiral Boscawen emboldened the English to undertake an attack upon Pondicherry. This, however, failed, no less signally than the attempts of Dupleix upon Fort St. David. The information of the assailants was imperfect and erroneous ; the engineers were unequal to their duty ; in some instances even the want of courage was as manifest as the want of conduct, and the British force returned from Pondicherry with the loss of more than a thousand men. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle restored Madras to the English, who resumed possession in August, 1749.

Humble as was yet the position occupied by our countrymen in India, there were not wanting indications of an approaching change in their relations to the people of the country. Instead of seeking protection from the native authorities, they began to be regarded as in a condition to extend it. Prior to the restoration of Madras, a Mahratta prince had presented himself at Fort St. David to solicit their assistance in regaining the throne of Tanjore, from which he had been expelled. The fugitive prince promised that the fort and territory of Devi-cootah should be the reward of placing him on the throne, and to remove any doubts of the practicability of effecting his restoration, he declared that, if supported by a moderate force, the people would rise in his behalf. On the faith of these representations, the British authorities despatched an expedition against Tanjore, but the expected assistance from the people of that country was not forthcoming ; and after encountering some difficulties and disasters, the British troops returned to Fort St. David. The government, however, resolved upon making a second attempt, although it was apparent that no hope of assistance from the population of Tanjore could be entertained. It was thought dangerous to continue under the reproach of defeat, and further, a strong desire existed to obtain possession of Devi-cootah, on account of its presumed commercial advantages. A new expedition was fitted out, and Devi-cootah was taken. With this acquisition the war terminated, the reigning sovereign of Tanjore consenting to confirm the English in the possession of it, and to make a small provision

for the support of his rival ; the English, on their part, engaging for his peaceable behaviour. These terms, it was believed, were more favourable to the invaders than could have been obtained but for the extraordinary circumstances of the Carnatic.

The Rajah of Trichinopoly had died without issue, in the year 1732. Three wives survived him, the second and third of whom duteously devoted themselves to death on his funeral pile. The first, either from a dislike to this mode of quitting life, or, as was alleged, in obedience to the wish of the departed rajah, conveniently communicated to his confidential minister, preferred to live and to succeed to the government. The commander-in-chief of the forces raised a party in opposition to her pretensions, and to resist him the queen sought the assistance of the Nabob of Arcot. It was readily given ; and an army was despatched by that prince to Trichinopoly, under the command of his son, who was aided by the counsels of a man named Chunda Sahib. This person, who was allied to his sovereign by marriage, possessed considerable ability and not less ambition. By the successful exercise of the former, he had found means to gratify the latter, having raised himself by a series of successful measures, first to the actual administration of the government, and, finally, to the attainment of the formal appointment of Dewan. In seeking the assistance of the nabob and his ambitious minister, the queen was not insensible of the danger which she incurred, and the foreign troops were not admitted into the fort until the good intentions of their leaders were vouched, to all appearance, by the most solemn obligation that can bind the conscience of a Mussulman. Chunda Sahib tendered his oath upon the Koran as the guarantee that the troops should be introduced for no other purpose than the confirmation of the queen's authority, after which they should be faithfully withdrawn ; but the oath was actually taken, not upon the Koran, but on a brick wrapped in a covering similar to that in which the sacred book of the Mahometans is usually enveloped, and Chunda Sahib felt his conscience free. He exercised his freedom to the full extent, by putting an end to the authority of the queen, imprisoning her person, and hoisting on the wall of the fort the flag of Islam. Chunda Sahib having achieved this conquest, was thought the fittest person to administer its government under the authority of his master. This appointment excited jealousy and alarm in the minds of some of the advisers of the Nabob of Arcot, and they endeavoured to communicate to that prince a portion of their feelings. Failing in this, they commenced a series of intrigues with the Mahrattas, the object of which was the removal of Chunda Sahib, who, with his eldest son, was finally made prisoner and marched to Sattara. A Mahratta governor took his place, and a large extent of country thus fell under the power of that people.

The wife and younger son of Chunda Sahib took refuge at Pondicherry. There they were treated with great respect by Dupleix, the governor, who designed to make Chunda Sahib an instrument of advancing the French interests in India. A correspondence with the prisoner of the Mahrattas was opened, and the French governor had the satisfaction of ascertaining that he was not indisposed to enter into his views. To serve them effectually, however, it was necessary that he should be at liberty; negotiations for the purpose were commenced, and Chunda Sahib obtained his freedom. He left Sattara early in 1748, and for some time his fortune was chequered by an alternation of happy and adverse events. But these were of little importance compared with others which followed, and which not only affected the interests of Chunda Sahib, but convulsed the whole of that large portion of India denominated the Carnatic. These events were the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk, and the contest which ensued for the possession of his power and territories. The deceased Nizam left several sons, and in addition to their claims, whatever they might be, those of his grandson, by a favourite daughter, were asserted, on the ground of an alleged testamentary disposition. Chunda Sahib determined to make common cause with Mozuffar Jung, the grandson of the deceased Nizam, this determination being taken with a due regard to his own interests. His price was paid in his appointment to the rank of Nabob of Arcot, and the conquest of the Carnatic was to be forthwith undertaken. Dupleix was perfectly ready to assist the confederates, and a force of four hundred Europeans and two thousand sepoys, under the command of M. d'Auteuil, was despatched to their aid from Pondicherry. They joined without difficulty the army with which they were to co-operate, now amounting to forty thousand men. A victory gained principally by means of the European troops, the death of the reigning Nabob of Arcot, the capture of his eldest son, and the flight of the younger to Trichinopoly, left the conquerors at liberty to march to the capital, of which they immediately proceeded to take possession. The news of these events reached Tanjore while the English were in that country, and tended materially to assist them in making favourable terms with the reigning prince. Between that prince and Chunda Sahib there were many grounds of enmity, and the success of the latter was the source of great alarm at Tanjore. The feeling was not ill-founded, for Chunda Sahib, after wasting some time in ostentatious pageantry at Arcot and Pondicherry, proceeded to Tanjore, demanding a large sum for arrears of tribute alleged to be due from the sovereign of that country, and another sum of great amount to repay the expenses of the expedition. After a long season of negotiation, and some demonstration of hostility, the Tanjore government agreed to

pay a heavy ransom; but before the first payment was completed, Chunda Sahib received intelligence of the advance of Nazir Jung, the second son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, who, being on the spot when his father died, had seized his treasure, and was recognized by the army as his successor; and who, to give to his assumption of the sovereignty a colour of right, pretended that his elder brother had renounced his claim. The news of his approach relieved Tanjore from the unwelcome presence of its invaders, for although but a small part of the stipulated ransom had been received, they broke up their camp with precipitation, and retired towards Pondicherry. Nazir Jung was at the head of an army estimated at three hundred thousand men, but the actual strength of which fell far short of that number. On entering the Carnatic he sought the assistance of the English, who, it is said, were convinced by the vastness and splendour of his retinue, that he was the lawful ruler of the southern provinces. It is probable, however, that in complying with his request for military aid, the English were more influenced by the fact that the power and influence of the French were exerted in favour of the rival of Nazir Jung, than by any regard to the legitimacy of his title; but, whatever were their motives, they despatched to his camp, which was now in sight of that of Mozuffar Jung, a body of six hundred Europeans, commanded by Major Lawrence. It is a remarkable fact, that while the English and French were thus preparing for hostile action in Asia, the two nations in Europe were at peace. With reference to this anomalous state of things, Monsieur d'Auteuil sent a message to Major Lawrence, intimating that although the two nations took opposite sides, it was not the intention of the French commander to shed any European blood; but as he did not know in what part of Nazir Jung's army the English took post, he could not be blamed if any shot came that way. Major Lawrence answered that the English colours were carried on the flag-gun of their artillery, and that if M. d'Auteuil would look out, he might thence ascertain where the English were posted; that he was as unwilling as the French commander to spill European blood, but that if any shot came his way it would certainly be returned. Subsequently a shot from the French intrenchment did fly over the English battalion, and Major Lawrence, conceiving that it was fired by M. d'Auteuil, with the design of trying the disposition of the English, ordered it to be answered from three guns.

At the time when the French commander made the communication which has been related, he was in a state of great difficulty and perplexity. Several officers who had obtained a liberal share of the partial payment made by the King of Tanjore to the invaders of his dominions, had found that their newly-acquired wealth required leisure to enjoy it, and they had, consequently, solicited and ob-

tained permission to quit the camp for a short time and to seek repose in the city. This created discontent among those called upon to supply their places. They complained loudly of being exposed to danger without hope of advantage, while the men who, without fighting, had acquired wealth at Tanjore, were permitted to retire from the field; and they demanded such an amount of money as would place them on an equality with those whom they succeeded. To restore military subordination, one of the malcontents was arrested, but the measure was met by a demand from all the rest to be placed in the same situation with their companion. This requisition would probably have been complied with, had not necessity forbidden it. So many officers could not be spared, and for the time they escaped punishment. The natural consequences of this impunity were manifested in the conduct of the private soldiers, who, imitating the example of their officers, became insubordinate, insolent, and regardless of their duty. The disorder was consummated by thirteen of the discontented officers throwing up their commissions and quitting the camp, when M. d'Auteuil, fearful of risking a battle under such circumstances, determined on withdrawing from the field and marching back to Pondicherry. This determination was a severe blow to the hopes of the party in whose cause they had taken the field; and it was the more fearful because there was little reason to doubt that the retreat of the French would be followed by the defection of the whole army. Before this should take place, it behoved the confederated leaders to choose the course which appeared most likely to insure their safety. Chunda Sahib resolved to accompany the French to Pondicherry. Mozuffar Jung, who had been for some time in negotiation with Nazir Jung, resolved to surrender himself to that prince. Promises of liberal treatment were held out to him, confirmed, it is stated, by the sanction of an oath. They were fulfilled in the mode usual in the East. When the person of the defeated prince was secured, he was subjected to all the rigours of captivity.

Among the immediate consequences of these events were the retaking of Arcot, and the transfer of the government to Mahomet Ali Khan, son of Anaverdy Ali Khan, the former nabob, who had fallen in the battle which gave possession of Arcot to Chunda Sahib.

But Nazir Jung was not of a disposition to pursue his good fortune. Differences arose between the English commander and the prince, in consequence of the constant evasion of a request of the former for the confirmation of a grant of a territory near Madras, made by Mahomet Ali in return for the assistance rendered him. Another cause of difference was the refusal of the English to march with Nazir Jung to Arcot, a step which it was unadvisable for them to take, as it would have exposed their settlements to the attacks of the French.

The result was, that Major Lawrence, the commander of the English troops, returned to Fort St. David, and Nazir Jung proceeded to Arcot. There, regardless of the perils by which he was surrounded, he surrendered himself entirely to pleasure.

The French commander, in the mean time, was not idle. He captured a fortified pagoda about fifteen miles west of Fort St. David, and the restored Nabob of Arcot, becoming alarmed at his progress, claimed the assistance of the English, promising to pay all the expenses of the troops that should be afforded him. A force consisting of four hundred Europeans and fifteen hundred sepoys, commanded by Captain Cope, was despatched in answer to the request of the nabob; but differences not less irreconcilable than those which had separated the English and Nazir Jung, and not very dissimilar in their nature, brought the plan of co-operation to a speedy close; an event accelerated by the inability or unwillingness of the nabob to discharge his engagement to defray the expenses of the British force. Immediately on the departure of that force, the French attacked the camp of Mahomet Ali. It would be ridiculous to call that which ensued a battle, for the French had only to march up to the intrenchments, which were abandoned by those within them. Horse and foot fled with the greatest precipitation and in the utmost confusion. The French did not lose a single man, while the nabob lost nearly a thousand, and with difficulty made his own escape to the camp of Nazir Jung. The French advanced to Gingee, a fortress of some strength, which was magnified extravagantly in the estimation of native opinion. Of this place they gained possession with a rapidity calculated to astonish even themselves, and which had the effect of awakening Nazir Jung from the torpor in which he had so long slumbered. He took the field, but with a diminished army, and under other discouraging circumstances. Supplies were procured with difficulty, and from this cause, combined with the inclemency of the weather, sickness began to appear in his camp. Within that camp, however, he had worse enemies than even famine and disease. Dupleix had been for several months carrying on an intrigue upon a large scale, and at length the disaffected officers of Nazir Jung commanded one-half of his army. This attack upon the fidelity of his enemies' officers had not prevented Dupleix from carrying on simultaneously a negotiation with their master, who, wearied with the difficulties with which he had to contend, difficulties greatly aggravated by his own weak and unwarlike character, had resolved to end them by conceding to the French nearly all they asked. At the very time, however, when the concession was resolved on, the plot, of which Nazir Jung was to be the victim, was ripened. Its maturity was announced to Dupleix, and he promised to take measures for securing the success which so

much time had been spent in preparing. In December a force of about eight hundred Europeans, and about three thousand sepoys, under the command of M. de la Touche, advanced from Gingee upon the camp of Nazir Jung. After defeating the advanced posts, they attacked the main body of the army with success. Some anxiety was excited by the appearance of a vast body of horse and foot at some distance, drawn up in order, and extending as far as the eye could reach; but it was set at rest by discerning in the centre an elephant bearing a white flag, which was the signal of the confederates of the French, and a halt was made until some further demonstration of their intentions should be made. The issue was not long doubtful; Nazir Jung fell by the hands of one of his treacherous dependents, and Mozuffar Jung was saluted Viceroy of the Deccan. The fall of the chief in Oriental armies almost invariably followed by flight, and this instance afforded no exception to the rule. Victory rested with the French, and they forthwith applied themselves to reap its fruits. In this labour, however, they met powerful competitors in the Patan chiefs whose perfidy had led to their triumph. These worthy persons proceeded to Pondicherry for the purpose of enforcing their demands, extending to the remission of all arrears of tribute, which they had not paid for three years, the grant of certain additions of territory, the exemption of those additions, as well as of the countries which they previously possessed, from the payment of tribute to the Mogul empire, and, what more nearly concerned the French, the delivery of one-half of the value found in Nazir Jung's treasury. After much discussion, in the course of which Dupleix paraded his own moderation as an example for those with whom he was negotiating, some abatement was effected in their claims, and the nabobs swore on the Koran allegiance to the new viceroy.

Pleasure and magnificent display now occupied the entire attention of the French and their ally. The new prince was enthroned with the greatest pomp, and in the splendid pageant Dupleix was the principal actor. Attired as a dignified Mahometan in a dress presented to him by the new sovereign, the vain but wily European bent before the prince in acknowledgment of being appointed governor of all the provinces south of the Kistna. This was not the only favour bestowed on the French and their representative. Dupleix was elevated to the rank of a *Heft Huzaree*, or commander of seven thousand horse, and permitted to bear an ensign, assigned to persons of the highest note in the empire. No money was to be current in the Carnatic but such as was coined at Pondicherry; the Mogul's revenues in all the countries under Dupleix's government were to be remitted to him, and he was to account for them to the viceroy; the authority of Chunda Sahib, as Nabob of Arcot and its dependencies, was to

be subordinate to that of Dupleix, and in the distribution of rewards and honours to those who had assisted Mozuffar Jung in obtaining the throne, the will of Dupleix was that of the sovereign. According to the constitution of the Mogul empire, many of these grants could have no validity till confirmed by the emperor; but Dupleix did not, on this account, postpone the assumption of the powers conveyed. He held his durbar or court in his palace at Pondicherry, surrounded by all the state which became an Eastern potentate. One Oriental custom was alike agreeable to his vanity and his cupidity, and it was rigidly enforced. Neither native nor European was suffered to approach his august presence without a propitiatory gift. The same spirit was carried into the settlement of his claims upon the gratitude of Mozuffar Jung. It is true that to the Patan chiefs he had vaunted of his moderation; but his self-denial was not so rigorous as to restrain him from receiving for his private benefit a sum of money, which, it is believed, did not fall short of three hundred thousand pounds sterling, besides other marks of the kind feelings of Mozuffar Jung, in the form of valuable jewels. Thus provident for himself, decency required that he should show some regard for the interests of those whom he commanded and those whom he served. Accordingly a sum of about fifty thousand pounds was obtained from the prince for distribution among the officers and troops who fought at Gingee, and another sum of like amount was paid into the treasury of the French government for the expenses of the war.

These affairs being adjusted, Mozuffar Jung set out for Golconda, escorted by a detachment of French troops, European and sepoy, commanded by M. Busey. In passing through the territory of one of the Patan nabobs, who, having placed Mozuffar Jung on the throne, had failed of obtaining the full reward to which, in their own estimation, they were entitled, an affray took place between some horsemen of the prince's train and some villagers. This gave a pretext for the nabob of the district to attack the army of his acknowledged lord; and though the fidelity of himself and his brethren had been vouched by an oath on the Koran, it appeared that none of them felt any hesitation in turning their arms against one to whom they had so lately bound themselves by the most solemn sanction in relations of subordination and allegiance. Having betrayed the predecessor of Mozuffar Jung, they now arrayed their troops against the sovereign of their own choice and creation. A conflict ensued, in which, by the aid of the French troops, the twice perfidious nabobs were worsted. One of them was slain, and another left the field desperately wounded. The imprudent ardour of Mozuffar Jung in pursuing them led to his own destruction. The flying chief turned on his pursuer, and in a personal contest Mozuffar Jung received in the brain the javelin of his adversary, who the

next instant fell mortally wounded by the followers of the prince.

In this emergency it became necessary to the interests of the French to find a successor to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, whose inclinations might be as favourable to them as were those of their fallen patron. Mozuffar Jung had left a son, but he was an infant, and the favours received from his father were not sufficient, in the judgment of the French commander, to counterbalance his own want of power to add to them. The support of the French was therefore unceremoniously transferred to another branch of the vice-regal house, and Salabat Jung, a younger brother of Nazir Jung, whose cause the English had embraced, was chosen by the French as the new ruler of the Deccan. This arrangement had been made by M. Bussy under circumstances which rendered it expedient that some determination should be speedily taken; and, on communicating it to his principal, Dupleix, he had the satisfaction to find that it was entirely approved. The new subahdar being ready to confirm all the concessions and privileges which his nephew had conceded to the French, and even to go beyond him in this respect, it is obvious that he possessed the only qualification which, in the eyes of Dupleix, would give to one candidate for the throne a preference over another.

While the French were thus carefully and energetically advancing their interests, the English were doing little for the protection of theirs, and Mahomet Ali seeing slight prospect of successfully maintaining himself as Nabob of Arcot by the aid of his English allies, was endeavouring to make terms with their enemies. To avert this result, and in compliance with his pressing solicitations, small bodies of troops were sent by the British to his assistance, but little success attended their operations, and the dominions claimed by Mahomet Ali were gradually passing into the hands of his competitor. The British troops finally took refuge under the walls of Trichinopoly, followed by Chunda Sahib and the French. The conflict of interests between the English and the French seemed indeed about to find a termination in the complete and unchecked ascendancy of the latter power. The trade of the English Company would have been lost with their political influence, for if Dupleix had failed entirely to drive them from the coast, he would have thrown in their way impediments which would have rendered their commerce unprofitable. Such appeared to be the probable tendency of events at the moment when the foundations of the magnificent empire of British India were about to be laid.

Among the commercial servants of the English East-India Company was a young man named Robert Clive. The son of an obscure country gentleman, of good lineage but small fortune, he had been sent to India in the capacity of a writer, partly because the appointment afforded a provision for one mem-

ber of a very large family, and partly because the wayward character of the youth seemed to offer but slender hope of his succeeding in any pursuit that might be open to him at home. The duties and occupations of writers at that period were far different from what they are now. They were not employed in preparing themselves, by study and by practice in subordinate offices, for controlling at a future period the revenues of vast and populous districts, or exercising the highest and most important judicial functions. They were literally commercial clerks; and though there was then, as now, a gradation of rank through which they ascended, that gradation had reference solely to commerce, as the names by which the superior classes were distinguished, factor, and junior and senior merchant, sufficiently indicate. From the peculiar situation of foreign traders in such a country as India, a few of the highest class of servants were occasionally called upon to discharge political and diplomatic duties; and from the same cause a few troops were entertained for the defence of the Company's factories. But the employment of the Company's civil servants in duties unconnected with trade was an accidental and extraordinary departure from the general course of things, and their military establishment was maintained solely for the protection of their commerce.

The counting-house and the warehouse were scenes little adapted to the vivacious temperament of Clive, and his career at Madras, where he arrived in 1744, was not quite unmarked by that erratic conduct which had distinguished him at home. Instances are on record, and might readily be quoted; but as they form part of the personal, not the political history of Clive, it is more important to advert to such incidents as are connected with public events, and have the further advantage of giving indications of those qualities which were more fully developed at a future period. When Madras was taken by La Bourdonnais, Clive was among the English residents who became prisoners of war, and gave their parole. The subsequent infraction of the terms of the capitulation was regarded, and justly, as relieving them from any obligation which they had incurred under that capitulation, and Clive, disguising himself as a native, succeeded in making his escape to Fort St. David. The circumstances of the times concurring with Clive's inclinations, he, in 1747, obtained an ensign's commission, and was present at the unsuccessful attack on Pondicherry with Admiral Boicawen. Here, on occasion of a want of ammunition for the battery at which he was posted, his impetuosity led him to run himself for a supply, instead of sending for it. This act was misrepresented as arising not from zeal but fear. Clive called upon the party who had thus aspersed his military character for satisfaction, and the point would have been referred to the last appeal sanctioned by the usages of society in such cases,

but for the interference of bystanders. A court of inquiry was held on the conduct of the two disputants, and the public submission of his defamer cleared the reputation of Clive, soon to be more decisively vindicated by his own daring acts. Clive was engaged in the second expedition against Tanjore, and held the commission of lieutenant. He volunteered to lead the attack, and Major Lawrence having had previous opportunities of becoming acquainted with his courage and military talent, yielded to him the post which he sought. The force placed at his disposal consisted of thirty-four Europeans only, but seven hundred sepoys were to act with them. A rivulet was to be crossed, and the Europeans effected the passage with some difficulty, and with the loss of four of their small party. A part of the sepoys then passed, and Clive, with the Europeans, advanced briskly to attack the intrenchment in flank, the sepoys being ordered to close upon the Europeans. Instead of obeying these orders, they waited upon the bank for the passing of more of their number, and the rear of Clive's handful of men was thus left exposed. The consequence was, that when just presenting their muskets to fire, a body of Tanjore horse, which had been concealed, rushed out, sword in hand, and by a rapid evolution gained the rear of the European party, twenty-six of whom were immediately cut down. The sabre of one of the horsemen was lifted to add Clive to the number, and he only escaped the fate of the greater part of his companions by darting aside while his assailant passed him. At the close of the Tanjore war Clive returned to the mercantile service, but was appointed commissioner for supplying the troops with provisions—an appointment which associated him, though not as a soldier, with the feeble and unfortunate attempt of the English to aid Mahomet Ali, which ended in their retreat upon Trichinopoly. To that place he subsequently accompanied Mr. Pigot, a member of council at Fort St. David, in charge of some recruits and stores. Returning with an escort of only twelve sepoys, they were attacked by an hostile party armed with matchlocks, who harassed them for some hours and killed seven of their men. The rest, having expended all their ammunition, were ordered to disperse, and Pigot and Clive only saved themselves by the fleetness of their horses. Another reinforcement sent shortly afterwards was intrusted to Clive, who then received a captain's commission. It was joined by a detachment from Devi-cottah, under Captain Clark, who took the command of the whole; and, after a skirmish with part of the French force, arrived safe at Trichinopoly. But the timid and petty spirit in which the operations of the English had been conducted was ill-suited to the genius of Clive, and on his return to Fort St. David he made such representations to the governor, Mr. Sanderson, as convinced him that the cause of Mahomet Ali could not be

effectually aided but by adopting a course far more bold and vigorous than had yet been taken.

Clive suggested an attack upon Arcot, and offered himself to lead the expedition. Both his suggestion and his services were accepted; but the force placed under his command was proportioned to the means of the British government, and not to the duty to be performed. It consisted of only three hundred sepoys and two hundred Europeans, and the despatch of even this insignificant number of men almost denuded Fort St. David and Madras of troops. The deficiency of numerical strength was not made up by the skill and experience of the officers who were to act under Clive. These were eight in number; but six of them had never been in action, and four of the six were, like Clive, volunteers from the commercial service. With three field-pieces this small body, on the 26th of August, marched to the attack of Arcot, in which was a governor and eleven hundred men. On the 30th they halted within ten miles of the city, and the news of their approach having preceded them, panic prepared the way for an easy conquest. The spies of the enemy reported that they had seen the English marching with unconcern through a violent storm of thunder and rain, and this report gave such an impression of the resistance of the approaching foe, that the garrison abandoned the fort, and the English, a few hours afterwards, marched through a hundred thousand spectators to take possession of it. The greatest order was preserved, and a favourable impression was made on the inhabitants by the restoration to its owners of property to a large amount, which had been deposited in the fort for the sake of security. The first care of Clive was to improve his good fortune by making provision for a siege; but it little suited his impetuosity to wait the chance of attack, and accordingly he made various sorties in quest of the enemy, who usually fled on his approach. On the 14th of September he attacked their camp by night, and dispersed its occupants in every direction, without the loss of a man from his own force. Two eighteen-pounders and some stores were expected from Madras. An attempt made by the enemy to intercept them was defeated; but the convoy sent out for their protection having greatly weakened the garrison of the fort, the enemy was emboldened to make an attack upon it with his entire strength, horse and foot. This attempt, too, failed, and on the arrival in the town of the detachment in charge of the expected field-pieces and stores, it was abandoned.

Thus far Clive's success may be regarded more as the result of good fortune than of military skill. He had now to show that he was not a mere child of fortune, and that the confidence reposed in him was not misplaced. It had been foreseen that the acquisition of Arcot would be followed by the withdrawal

of part of the force of Chunda Sahib from Trichinopoly, and this was one object of the attempt. Accordingly, the success of Clive was no sooner known than Chunda Sahib detached four thousand sepoy to act against him. These, being joined on their route by Rajah Sahib (son of Chunda Sahib) with one hundred and fifty French from Pondicherry, entered the town on the 23rd of September. On the 24th, Clive made a sally, driving the French from their guns—four field-pieces—but was unable to execute a design which he had formed of carrying them off. On this day he had a narrow escape from death. A sepoy, who was taking aim at him from a window, was disappointed of success through Clive being dragged aside by an officer named Treinwith, who was immediately shot through the body by the man whose aim he had defeated. On the following day the enemy received a reinforcement of two thousand men from Vellore, and possession was taken of all the avenues leading to the fort. Thus invested by a large force, the fort of Arcot seemed little likely to sustain a protracted siege. The stock of provisions was not more than sufficient to supply the garrison for sixty days, and it became necessary to send all the inhabitants, except a few artificers, away from the fort. Of the eight officers who had accompanied the expedition, one had been killed and two wounded; another had returned to Madras. The troops fit for duty were reduced to one hundred and fifty Europeans and two thousand sepoys. Even this small force was daily diminishing; for although none of the garrison were allowed to appear on the ramparts, except the few necessary to avoid a surprise, several were killed and wounded by the musketry of the enemy, who, sheltered by the surrounding houses, and firing from resting-places, were enabled to select their objects with deadly certainty. The besieging force consisted of one hundred and fifty Europeans and about ten thousand native troops of various descriptions.

The enemy being ill-provided with artillery, had for some days produced little effect by their attempt at bombarding the fort. The arrival of two eighteen-pounders and several pieces of smaller calibre from Pondicherry, enabled them to erect a battery, which, almost as soon as brought into play, disabled one of Clive's eighteen-pounders and dismantled the other. The battery continued firing for six days, and a practicable breach was made to the extent of fifty feet. But Clive and his men had been no less active in constructing works for defence, and the enemy appeared afraid of attempting to improve their opportunity of attack.

The critical situation of Clive did not prevent him from indulging in acts requiring labour which could not very well be spared, and whose chief result was a gratification of that love of mischief by which his boyhood had been remarkably distinguished. The fort

contained an unwieldy piece of ordnance, which, according to the current tradition, had been brought from Delhi by Aurungzebe, drawn, as it was said, by a thousand yoke of oxen. Clive caused a mound of earth to be raised on the top of the highest tower of the rampart, so as to command the palace across the intervening houses. On this the gigantic engine of destruction was elevated, and being loaded with thirty pounds of powder and a ball proportioned to its dimensions, it was discharged by means of a train carried to a considerable distance on the ground. The ball went through the palace, to the great terror of Rajah Sahib and his principal officers collected there. No other result appears to have been contemplated; but this was deemed sufficient to justify a repetition of the salute on two succeeding days, at the precise time when the rajah's officers assembled at headquarters. On the fourth day the amusement derived from this exercise was terminated by the bursting of the monster gun which had afforded the means of its enjoyment. It seems, however, to have imparted to the enemy a desire to retaliate. They, in return, raised a vast mound of earth, which commanded not only the gate, but the whole interior of the fort. Clive suffered them to complete the work, and to mount on it two pieces of cannon. He then began to fire on it with his remaining eighteen-pounder: in less than an hour the mound fell with fifty men stationed on it, some of whom were killed and others disabled.

The battery first erected by the enemy was to the north west of the fort. Subsequently another was erected to the south-west. The wall in this direction was in a very ruinous condition, and a breach was soon made. The garrison kept up a vigorous fire of musketry against the battery, and several times drove the enemy out of it, but the breach notwithstanding was daily enlarged.

With the prospect of an immediate attack from a force overwhelming, when compared with the means of resistance, Clive's confidence never appears to have deserted him. The Company's agents at Madras and Fort St. David were anxious to relieve him, but a small detachment despatched for the purpose were unable to effect their object, and after a sharp conflict with a considerable number of Rajah Sahib's troops, were compelled to retreat. A body of six thousand Mahattas, who had been hired to assist the cause of Mahomet Ali, lay about thirty miles from Arcot in a state of most suspicious inactivity. The nabob's affairs being thought desperate, his mercenary allies were not disposed to waste their strength in his defence. In the hope of stimulating them to action, Clive found means of communicating with them. Their commander, in reply, expressed his admiration of the gallant conduct of the defence of Arcot, by which, he said, he was then first convinced that the English could fight, and promised to

send a detachment to their aid. Intelligence of these communications having reached Rajah Sahib, who commanded the besieging army, he became apprehensive of the probable result, and sent a flag of truce with proposals for the surrender of the fort. Honourable terms for the garrison were offered, and a large sum of money for Clive; while, that no motives for compliance might be wanting, the consequences of refusal were declared to be the storming of the fort and the immolation of every man in it. Clive's answer was strikingly characteristic of the man. He not only refused to surrender the fort, but conveyed his refusal in terms of haughty defiance. The merits of Chunda Sahib's claims were somewhat unceremoniously noticed for the purpose of reproach; the offer of personal advantage to Clive was treated, as it deserved, with contempt; and the threat of storm and slaughter was met by the taunting remark, that the English commander had too high an opinion of the prudence of Rajah Sahib, to believe that he would attempt to storm until he was provided with better soldiers than the rabble of which his army was then composed. Notwithstanding this answer, some of the enemy hovered round the ditch, conversing with the sepoys in the British service, and recommending them to desert. They were warned to retire, but the admonition being disregarded, it became necessary to render it more impressive by the adjunct of a volley of small arms, which killed some of the intruders and dispersed the rest.

Before any steps were taken by the enemy in consequence of Clive's refusal of the proffered terms, the promised detachment of the Mahrattas arrived in the neighbourhood and attempted to enter the town, but found every street and avenue barricaded. Thus impeded, they had recourse to their usual and most approved occupation of plundering, relieved by setting fire to some houses in the outskirts of the town, after which they retreated.

Clive was accurately informed of all the proceedings of the enemy, and as the day of attack approached, he succeeded in becoming possessed not only of their general design, but of the precise disposition proposed to be made of their force. The dawn of day on the 14th November was to decide the success of the meditated attempt, and the signal for its commencement was to be the discharge of three bombs. The knowledge of its approach did not diminish the confidence of Clive, nor disturb his equanimity. He made the arrangements which appeared to him necessary for meeting the approaching conflict, and then, to remove the effects of the excessive fatigue which he had undergone, and to gather renewed strength for the struggle, he resigned himself to sleep, with as much calmness as though all danger was at an end, giving orders that he should be awakened on the first alarm.

The day of attack was one among the most distinguished in the Mahometan calendar. Happy was the Mussulman to whom it brought death from the sword of the unbeliever, for his fall was regarded as but a sudden introduction to the highest paradise. By this belief the enthusiasm of the enemy's troops was wrought up almost to madness, and it was further increased by the free use of an intoxicating substance called bang. The morning came, and with it the expected movement. Clive was awakened, and found his garrison at their posts according to the disposition which he had previously made. On the enemy's side a vast multitude were in motion, bringing ladders to every part of the wall that was accessible. Besides these desultory operations there were others in progress, all directed to the same end. Four principal divisions of the enemy's troops marched upon the four points where an entrance to the fort seemed the more likely to be effected—the two gates and the two breaches which had been made in the wall. The parties who attacked the gates drove before them several elephants, armed with plates of iron on their foreheads, with which it was expected they would beat down the obstacles which stopped the course of the assailants: but the device was more disastrous to those who employed it than to those against whom it was directed. The elephants, wounded by the musketry of the British force, turned and trampled upon those who were urging them forward. At the north-west breach, as many as it was capable of admitting rushed wildly in, and passed the first trench before their opponents gave fire. When given, it was with terrible effect. A number of muskets were loaded in readiness, which those behind delivered to the first rank as fast as they could discharge them. Every shot did execution, while three field-pieces contributed effectually to thin the number of the assailants. In a few minutes they fell back: but the attempt was only suspended, not abandoned. Another and another party followed, and were driven off as had been those who preceded them.

To approach the south-west breach, the enemy embarked seventy men on a raft, who thus attempted to cross a ditch, and had almost gained their object, when Clive, observing that his gunners fired with bad aim, took the management of one of the field-pieces himself. This he worked with such precision and effect that a few discharges threw the advancing party into confusion. The raft was overset, and those on board thrown into the water, where some were drowned. The remainder saved themselves by swimming back, abandoning the unfortunate raft which was to have borne them to the breach.

These various attacks occupied about an hour, and cost the enemy in killed and wounded about four hundred men. After an interval employed by the assailants in endea-

vouring, under much annoyance, to carry off their dead, the firing upon the fort was renewed, both with cannon and musketry. This was again discontinued. A formal demand of leave to bury the dead was complied with, and a truce of two hours agreed upon. At the expiration of the prescribed time the firing once more recommenced, and lasted until two o'clock on the following morning, when it ceased, never to be renewed. At daybreak, the gallant defenders of the fort learned that their besiegers had precipitately abandoned the town. The garrison immediately marched into the enemy's quarters, where they found several pieces of artillery and a large quantity of ammunition. These spoils were forthwith transferred to the fort, and thus ended a siege of fifty days.

In the evening of the day on which the enemy fled from Arcot, the detachment from Madras, which had been prevented from entering the town, arrived in it. Clive, leaving a garrison in the fort, took the field on the 19th of November with two hundred Europeans, seven hundred sepoy, and three field-pieces. Having summoned Timany to surrender, which immediately yielded, the British force waited for the promised aid of the Mahrattas, who were to join them with a thousand horse; but these adventurers were for some days too much occupied with the interesting duties of plunder to perform their engagement. Their labours, however, received a check from a sudden attack of the French troops of Rajah Sahib, who surprised their camp, and by relieving them of such articles as could be conveniently carried off, demonstrated to the Mahrattas that they must not hope to enjoy a monopoly of the occupation in which they delighted. Intelligence being received of the approach of an European party from Pondicherry, Clive was anxious to obtain the assistance of the Mahrattas in intercepting them before they could join Rajah Sahib. But the only motive by which they could be affected was wanting—there was no prospect of plunder—and Clive marched without his allies. Rajah Sahib made a forced march to arrive where he was to be joined by the reinforcement from Pondicherry; but the Mahrattas were still immovable, until they learned that the reinforcement expected by the enemy were the bearers of a large sum of money: a discovery which had a remarkable effect in rendering them anxious for a conflict, to which they had previously shown so much indifference. But not more than six hundred horse could be collected for the duty, the rest being otherwise engaged. By a forced march of twenty miles, Clive and his Mahratta associates came in sight of the enemy's force, and, notwithstanding a great disparity of numbers, defeated them. In the pursuit a considerable booty fell into the hands of the victors, much to the gratification of the Mahrattas, with whom the service in which they were engaged became popular. The fort of Arnie, Clive was compelled, for

want of cannon, to pass; the governor refusing to surrender, although he agreed to take an oath of allegiance to Mahomet Ali. The great pagoda of Conjeveram was the next object of attention. Here the French maintained a considerable garrison, which had afforded them opportunity of interrupting the communication between Arcot and Madras. From this place they had surprised a party of disabled men retreating from the siege of Arcot, and after murdering five or six as they lay helpless in their litters, relented so far as to spare the lives of two officers named Revell and Glass, whom they made prisoners. On being summoned to surrender, the French commander, on the plea that none of his garrison understood English, required his two prisoners to write to Clive informing him that if the pagoda were attacked they would be exposed on the works. The British officers made the desired communication, but added an expression of their hope that no regard for them would induce Clive to discontinue his operations for the reduction of the place. Clive, however, was compelled to wait the arrival from Madras of the means of effectually commencing an attack. These being obtained, the walls, after three days' battery, began to give way, and the French commander, apprehensive of the just resentment of the English for his cruelty, abandoned the place in the night. Clive having destroyed the defences of Conjeveram, proceeded to Madras, and thence to Fort St. David, to receive the congratulations which awaited him, and which he had so nobly earned.

While Clive, in Arcot, had thus been pursuing an uninterrupted career of success, Chunda Sahib and his French allies were labouring for the reduction of Trichinopoly. But their works were constructed without skill, and their labour and ammunition expended with little effect. Their views, however, were aided by the pecuniary distress of Mahomet Ali, whose troops openly threatened to desert a master who was unable to pay them. Among the projects of Mahomet Ali, who seems to have had no definite plan of proceeding, but to have intrigued with all parties, in the hope that chance might work something in his favour, was an application to Mysore for aid. That country had long been governed in the name of sovereigns who possessed no particle of real power. A prince, labouring under the misfortune of having been born deaf and dumb, succeeded to the throne early in the eighteenth century. His imperfect organization placed him at the mercy of others, and the mental feebleness of his successors led to the continuance of the system of royal pupillage. The ambassador of Mahomet Ali at first met little encouragement from the lordly servants who then exercised sovereignty in the court of Mysore, but magnificent promises, the extent of which was kept secret from the British authorities, dispelled the coldness with which his mission was

first received. The negotiation was brought to a successful conclusion, and its provisions ratified by an oath. The face of Mahomet Ali's affairs now began to brighten. In addition to the army of Mysore, the government of that country took into its pay six thousand Maharrattas, of whom those who have been already noticed in connection with the siege of Arcot, formed part. "In conformity," says the historian of Mysore, "to the uniform principle of Indian policy, as the affairs of Mahomet Ali appeared to improve, he acquired more friends." The Rajah of Tanjore declared in his favour, and despatched a considerable body of troops to his assistance. From other quarters the nabob received further aid, and his army, thus reinforced, became numerically superior to that of Chunda Sahib. But the army of the latter was stronger in regular troops, and so little reliance did the officer commanding the British force place on his native allies, that he perseveringly resisted their repeated solicitations to attack the enemy till he was reinforced from Fort St. David.

The enemy, however, emboldened by the retirement of Clive, had again appeared in some force in the province of Arcot, and having burnt several villages, and plundered some houses belonging to the English, they returned to Conjeveram, repaired the defences, garrisoned the place with sepoys, and threatened to attack the Company's fort of Poonamalee. This diverted to another quarter the British reinforcements destined for Trinopoly, it being deemed indispensable to check the ravages of the enemy in Arcot. For this purpose all the force that the British authorities could assemble was required. Including a levy of sepoys, a detachment of Europeans from Bengal, and drafts from the garrisons of Arcot and Madras, it did not, however, amount to seventeen hundred men, of whom less than four hundred were Europeans. The European force of the enemy was about equal to that of the British, but his native troops, horse and foot, amounted to four thousand five hundred. The British had six field-pieces; the enemy a large train of artillery. The talents and previous success of Clive pointed him out as the commander of the expedition in the absence of Major Lawrence, that able and experienced officer, who was among the first to discover the genius of Clive, having proceeded to England before that genius was fully developed. In anticipation of an attack from the English, the camp of the enemy had been strongly fortified; but, on the approach of Clive, it was abandoned, and his force concentrated at Conjeveram. Thither Clive proceeded by a forced march, but found the pagoda in charge of a garrison, who surrendered at the first summons. The object of the enemy had been suspected, and it now became more apparent. The garrison at the fort of Arcot had been considerably weakened in order to add to the

force placed under the command of Clive, and it was anticipated that the enemy designed to take advantage of this circumstance. Clive accordingly advanced towards Arcot, and on the road received intelligence that the enemy had entered the town of Arcot, and skirmished against the fort with muskets for several hours. The attempt was to have been aided by co-operation from within the fort, the enemy having corrupted two native officers in the British service, who, on a given signal, were to have opened the gates for their admission. The intended treachery was discovered in time to defeat it. The enemy finding their signals unanswered, retired with precipitation. These facts were communicated to Clive by letter from the commanding officer at Arcot, but he was unable to state what route the disconcerted foe had taken.

Uncertainty on this point did not long prevail. Near the village of Coverpah, the van of the British force was unexpectedly saluted by a discharge of artillery from a thick grove of mango trees. Clive immediately made provision for the safety of his baggage, and for the disposal of his troops for action. For a time no very decisive results appeared. Two parties of infantry, French and English, continued for two hours to fire upon each other, and the enemy's cavalry made several unsuccessful attacks on a small force, European and native, which was opposed to them. But the artillery from the grove did considerable execution, and Clive found that he must either become its master or determine on a retreat. The grove, in which the artillery was placed, was defended in front by a steep bank and ditch, but in the rear it was reported to be open and unguarded. Two hundred Europeans and four hundred sepoys were accordingly despatched thither, and the anxiety of Clive for their success led him to accompany them through part of the circuit which it was necessary to make. This anxiety had nearly proved fatal to his hopes. The infantry who were left firing on that of the French, dispirited by the absence of Clive, and discouraged by the departure of the detachment sent to attack the enemy's artillery, were giving way, and some were actually in flight. The return of Clive was just in time to avert the consequences of his temporary absence. With his wonted address he rallied the fugitives, though not without some difficulty, and the firing was renewed. The attention of the enemy was thus diverted from the more important operation which was in progress in another part of the field.

The party who had been despatched to the rear of the grove halted at the distance of three hundred yards from it, and an ensign, named Symmonds, advanced to reconnoitre. He had not proceeded far before he came to a deep trench, in which a large body of the enemy's troops, who were not immediately wanted, were sitting down to avoid the ran-

dom shots. The approach of Ensign Symmonds being observed, he was challenged, and the party in the trench prepared to fire. His acquaintance with the French language saved his life, and probably prevented the failure of the attack, for, being mistaken for a French officer, he was suffered to pass. Proceeding onward to the grove, he perceived that, besides the men stationed at the guns, there were one hundred Europeans to support them, but that they kept no look-out, except towards the field of battle. Having made the observations necessary, he returned, keeping at a distance from the trench where his progress had nearly been intercepted, and rejoined his detachment. Upon his report, they immediately marched towards the point of attack, taking the way by which he had returned. They entered the grove unperceived, and at the distance of thirty yards gave fire. The effect was to paralyze the enemy, who, without returning a shot, abandoned their guns and sought safety in flight. Some took refuge in a choultry, or house of accommodation for travellers, where they were so much crowded that they were unable to use their arms, and quarter being offered them, it was joyfully accepted.

The sudden silence of the artillery informed the British troops in front of the enemy of the success of the attack on his rear. The arrival of some fugitives from the grove conveyed the same intelligence to their opponents, who immediately followed the example of their companions and fled.

The force of the enemy having been broken in Arcot, Clive and his troops were ordered back to Fort St. David, preparatory to their being despatched to Trichinopoly. On their march, they passed the spot where Nazir Jung had been murdered. To commemorate the success of the French, Dupleix had planned the erection of a new town, to be called Dupleix-Fateabad. In the centre of this city of victory was to have been placed a column with inscriptions in various languages, recounting the event which it was designed to keep in memory, and magnifying the valour of the French. "Unluckily," says Major Lawrence, "future ages will not be the wiser for it." Clive destroyed all that existed of the projected town, including the foundation which was to support the commemorative column. Thus the evidences of French glory scarcely endured longer than the success which they were intended to record.

The force destined for Trichinopoly was soon ready for the field, and Major Lawrence arriving from Europe at this time, it was placed under his command. The detachment moved, and on the 27th March was within eighteen miles of Trichinopoly. Here, being informed that a strong party was posted to intercept them, Major Lawrence resolved upon proceeding by another road; but, by a mistake of his guides, was led within reach

of the very post which he had desired to avoid, and the troops received the fire of six pieces of artillery. It was returned from four field-pieces, supported by one hundred men under Clive, while the line marched on, and was soon out of the reach of the enemy's guns. They then halted till the party with the field-pieces came up. On the following day a more serious affair took place; but the commander of the native cavalry of the enemy being killed, his men, according to established precedent, took to flight, and the rest of the army soon followed their example. The victory would have been more complete, but for the failure of the native troops to co-operate with the British allies. The Mahrattas remained at a distance, idle, though probably not unconcerned, spectators of the fight. Their passiveness was occasioned by the peculiar situation of their leader, who was engaged in a negotiation with Chunda Sahib, and feeling uncertain what turn affairs might take, was unwilling to commit himself with either party. The rest of the British allies appear to have declined fighting, in deference to the example of the Mahrattas. Happily the day was won without them, and the British detachment advanced undisturbed to Trichinopoly. Here the respective commanders had an opportunity of conferring on a plan of operations, but the Mahometans and Hindoos not being able to agree on a fortunate hour of attack, nothing was determined on. A few days after the arrival of the English reinforcement, the French abandoned their posts, and retreated to the island of Seringham. This movement being hastily made, and without due preparation, was attended with very considerable loss. The retreating enemy carried off their artillery and part of their baggage, but a large store of provisions was burned.

A bold suggestion of Clive's was now acted upon by the commander of the British expedition. It was to divide the small force under his command, and while one half remained at Trichinopoly, to post the other half between Seringham and Pondicherry, in order to cut off the communication on which the French must now depend for their supplies. Major Lawrence justly considered Clive as the fittest man to undertake the command of the separate body, but a difficulty existed in the fact that all the captains in the battalion were his seniors. It was removed by the native generals, who unanimously declared that they would not make any detachment of the troops for the purpose, if they were to be commanded by any other person than Clive. Everything being arranged, the favourite captain marched on the 6th of April, with four hundred Europeans and a much larger number of sepoy, four thousand native horse and eight pieces of artillery. He took post at a fort a few miles from Seringham, and on the high road to Arcot and Pondicherry.

Dupleix had become greatly dissatisfied with

the prospect of affairs at Trichinopoly, and, in the hope of retrieving them, had sent reinforcements of as large amount as he could raise, under Mons. D'Auteuil, who was forthwith authorized to assume the chief command; M. Law, who had for some time held it, having displayed little either of enterprise or talent. Clive, apprized of the approach of this force, marched out to intercept it; and D'Auteuil, knowing how much depended on his effecting a junction with the army at Seringham, withdrew to a fort which he had just quitted. Clive not meeting the enemy's reinforcement where he had been led to expect them, considered that the report of their approach was a ruse to draw him from his fort, and marched back with all possible speed. This was not the fact; but the French commander at Seringham hearing of Clive's departure, but not of his return, resolved to take advantage of it, by attacking the few troops which had been left in possession of the British post. With this view he despatched eighty Europeans and seven hundred sepoy, aided by the services of eighty English deserters. Through a mistake at one of the outposts, the attempt of the enemy had nearly succeeded. The party being challenged, answered that they were friends, and one of the deserters stepping forward, stated that they had been despatched by Major Lawrence to reinforce Captain Clive. This assertion, corroborated by the fact of so many of the party speaking English, satisfied the guard. The strangers were suffered to enter without the pass-word being demanded, and one of the guard was despatched to conduct them to head-quarters. They marched on without giving any disturbance, or meeting with any, until they arrived at a pagoda, where they were challenged by the sentinels, and simultaneously by others posted at an adjacent choultry, within which Clive was asleep. They answered these challenges, not as before, by an attempt to parley, but by discharging a volley into each place. That directed to the choultry was not far from deciding the question of success, a ball having shattered a box at Clive's feet and killed a servant sleeping close to him. After this discharge the enemy pushed into the pagoda, putting all they met to the sword. Clive, awakened by the noise, and not imagining that the enemy could have advanced into the centre of his camp, supposed the firing to proceed from part of his own sepoy, and that the cause of it was some groundless alarm. In this belief he advanced alone into the midst of the party who were firing, as appeared to him, without purpose, and angrily demanded the cause of their conduct. In the confusion he was at first scarcely observed; but at length one of the enemy's sepoy discovering or suspecting him to be an Englishman, attacked and wounded him. By this time the French were in possession of the pagoda. Clive ordered the gate to be

stormed, but it would admit only two men abreast, and the English deserters within fought with desperation. The officer who led the attack, and fifteen men engaged in it, were killed, and the attempt was then relinquished until cannon could be obtained. At daybreak the French officer, seeing the danger of his situation, endeavoured to escape it by a sally; but being killed with several of his men, the rest retreated into the pagoda. Clive, advancing to the porch to offer them terms, experienced another of those remarkable escapes in which his career so much abounded. Rendered weak by the wounds which he had received, he leant upon the shoulders of two sergeants. Both these men were of lower stature than their commander, who, from this cause, as well as from the effect of weakness, stood in a stooping position, his body being thus thrown slightly behind theirs. An Irishman who took the lead among the deserters came forward, and addressing Clive in opprobrious language, declared that he would shoot him. This was not an idle threat, for he instantly levelled his musket in the direction in which Clive was standing and discharged it. The ball passed through the bodies of both the men on whom Clive was leaning, but from his relative position with regard to them, he was untouched. This occurrence is said to have facilitated the surrender of the pagoda, the Frenchmen thinking it necessary to disown the outrage which had been committed, lest it might exclude them from being admitted to quarter. The enemy's sepoy without the pagoda endeavoured to re-pass the boundaries of the British camp, and succeeded; but the Mahratta cavalry setting out in pursuit of them, overtook and cut them to pieces. Clemency is not a common weakness in the Mahratta character, and according to the report of those engaged in this exploit, not a single man of seven hundred escaped with his life.

The tide of success now flowed steadily in favour of the British cause. D'Auteuil continued to retire and his force to diminish. Further resistance appearing hopeless, if not impossible, he surrendered with the whole force remaining with him, consisting of only one hundred Europeans (thirty-five of whom were British deserters), four hundred native infantry, and about three hundred and forty cavalry. A considerable quantity of military stores passed into the hands of the conquerors, and a large amount of money was expected, it being known that D'Auteuil had with him a considerable sum. This expectation, however, was disappointed, the wary Frenchman having contrived to secrete a great part of it among his personal baggage, which he was permitted to carry away without examination. A part of the remainder was embezzled by the troops on both sides, so that not more than fifty thousand rupees were regularly taken possession of for the benefit of the captors.

The progressive success of the British arms

had materially affected the state of affairs in the island of Seringham. The scarcity of supplies, and the small probability of effectually removing this difficulty, the constant annoyance sustained from the English posts, and the expectation, almost amounting to certainty, that these attacks would become more frequent, as well as more alarming—these causes tended to chill the friendship of the native chiefs who had brought their troops to the service of Chunda Sahib, and gradually to detach them from his interest. The greater part of them demanded their dismissal, a demand which he was in no condition to resist; and the request being granted, many of the dismissed parties passed forthwith without hesitation into the service of the British. The desertions, and the fatal blow inflicted on the French interest by the surrender of D'Auteuil, rendered the prospects of Chunda Sahib gloomy indeed.

He had vainly endeavoured to urge the French commander, Law, to a more enterprising course of action, and the time when such a course could have availed was now past. The health, too, of the ambitious aspirant to the government of the Carnatic had given way under the pressure of mental anxiety; and without the means of evading the difficulties which surrounded him, or the energy to attempt to force his way through them to a place of safety, his thoughts were no longer turned upon either of these objects. Only one termination of his wretched fortunes was before him, and the sole question for his determination was, whose captive he should become. By the advice of Law, he was dissuaded from surrendering to the English, and induced to trust his person for a time to native faith. A negotiation was commenced, which was managed by Monackjee, the commander of the Tanjore troops, with all the success derived from dealing with a man who had no resource but to yield. Its completion was hastened by a representation from Monackjee of the necessity of a speedy conclusion, lest the advance of the English should deprive him of the power of insuring the safety of Chunda Sahib, a danger of which the negotiators on the other side were fully aware. Still they hesitated; and their anxiety to discover and obtain some better security than a Mahratta promise, led to a private interview between Law and Monackjee, in which a demand was made of hostages for the safety of Chunda Sahib. To this demand it was replied, that if treachery were designed, no hostage would prevent it; that the act of giving any would betray the secret of the negotiation, and that the escape of Chunda Sahib would thereby be rendered impracticable. These arguments were not the only means employed to remove the scruples of the French officer. One pledge of fidelity could be given without difficulty and without danger; and Monackjee did not refrain from tendering the same security for the safety of Chunda Sahib, which the latter had afforded for his friendly intentions in introducing his troops into Trichino-

poly. He bound himself by the most solemn oath to perform the articles of his engagement, and prayed that his own weapons might be turned to his destruction if he failed. That engagement obliged him to convey the fugitive, under an escort of horse, to a French settlement; and, in addition to the weight of the general's oath, the sincerity of his purpose was confirmed by the testimony of one of his officers; who assured Law that he was appointed to command the escort, and exhibited a palanquin which had been prepared for the journey. Whether or not the oath, with its corroborative testimony, dispelled the doubts which had previously existed, cannot be known, but those by whom they were entertained were not in a condition to insist on any other security, and Chunda Sahib proceeded to the camp of Monackjee. He expected a guard to insure his safety; and a guard was ready to receive him. But, instead of taking his place in the palanquin which had been made ready for his journey, he was forced into a tent, and there loaded with irons. The news was immediately spread through the camp, and the fate of the prisoner became an object of intense anxiety to all parties. In the morning a conference was held on the subject, when great diversity of opinion prevailed. No one suggested the fulfilment of the engagement by which Chunda Sahib had been entrapped into captivity; but there were many competitors for the office of keeping him in safe custody, or consigning him to the still safer custody of the grave. The nabob Mahomet Ali, the Tanjore general Monackjee, the commander of the Mysore troops, and the chief of the Mahratta force, all contended for the possession of the person of Chunda Sahib; and Major Lawrence, who was present, seeing no chance of agreement, proposed that he should be given up to the British and confined in one of their settlements. In resisting this proposal, the other claimants were once again unanimous; and the meeting broke up without coming to any decision. Two days afterwards, the cause of dispute was removed. A follower of Monackjee entered the tent, where lay the defeated candidate for the government of the Carnatic, bowed down by sickness, bonds, and mental suffering. He needed not to speak his errand. The prisoner too clearly understood it, yet still clinging to hope, where reasonable hope could not exist, implored that he might be permitted to see Monackjee, on the plea that he had something of importance to communicate. But the business of his ferocious visitor was not negotiation. The captive's request was answered by a thrust which pierced his heart; and the assassin, having thus done his work, cut off his victim's head as evidence of the deed. This was immediately sent to Mahomet Ali, who, after gratifying himself and his court with an inspection of it, directed that it should be publicly exhibited for the pleasure of the multitude.

The fortune of those whom Chunda Sahib had quitted, so unhappily for himself, remains

to be noticed. Before his departure, the English force had received a battering train from Devi-cootah, and the French commander had been required to surrender at discretion. Subsequently a more peremptory demand was made, and Law, being at length convinced of that which he was reluctant to believe—that D'Autenil and his force had fallen into the hands of the British—requested a personal conference with Major Lawrence. The result was that, after much altercation, partly grounded on the anomalous position of the English and French, in thus being at war in India while in

Europe they were in peace, terms were agreed upon and a capitulation signed. The officers were to depart on parole, the privates to remain prisoners, the deserters to be pardoned. On the 3rd of June, Captain Dalton took possession of Seringham, with the artillery and military force. The troops immediately in the French service were marched to Fort St. David,—those of their allies were suffered quietly to disperse. Thus, without a battle, ended the struggle to secure to Chunda Sahib the government of the Carnatic, on the very day which closed his earthly career.

CHAPTER III.

DISPUTES RESPECTING THE POSSESSION OF TRICHINOPOLY.—SUCCESSSES OF CLIVE AND LAWRENCE.—WAR WITH MYSORE.—DEPARTURE OF DUPLEX FOR EUROPE.

THE success which had attended the operations of the force engaged in the cause of Mahomet Ali, it was the desire of Major Lawrence to improve. He accordingly urged upon the nabob the necessity of proceeding to the reduction of those parts of the Carnatic which had not yet been subjected to his authority. The propriety of this advice could not be disputed; but though calculated alike to advance the interests and gratify the vanity of the prince, he manifested a reluctance to act upon it, which, to the British commanders, was unaccountable. The mystery was at length explained. The price at which Mahomet Ali had agreed to purchase the aid of Mysore was, the cession to that power of Trichinopoly and all its dependencies, down to Cape Comorin. Under this agreement, Nunjeraj, the Mysorean commander, demanded the transfer of the fortress which had just surrendered. Mahomet Ali objected, but Nunjeraj refused to march unless his demand were complied with. Men are seldom at a loss for reasons to justify a course which they are disposed to follow, and on such occasions the ingenuity of Oriental diplomacy is never baffled. Mahomet Ali adduced numerous arguments with the view of convincing Major Lawrence and Nunjeraj that he ought not to surrender Trichinopoly. With the former he found little difficulty, but the Mysorean leader was not so easily satisfied. In estimating the motives of Mahomet Ali, they may all be passed by, the fact being simply, that he was resolved not to part with Trichinopoly if it were possible to retain it. The state of affairs caused by the refusal of the nabob to execute an engagement with Mysore, which had been kept secret from the British, was productive of great embarrassment to the last-named power. Major Lawrence applied for instructions from the presidency, and both the contending parties made applications to the same quarter. But the British authorities refused to interfere, and only recommended to the

disputants an amicable adjustment of their differences.

The office of a mediator, thus declined by the representatives of the East-India Company, was readily taken up by the Mahratta chieftain, Morari Row. This person having had the good fortune to secure the confidence of both parties, entered upon his duties in form. A conference was agreed upon, which took place in the nabob's palace, and was graced by his personal presence. The interests of Mysore were under the care of two commissioners specially deputed for the purpose. Captain Dalton, an English officer in command of the garrison, was present as a spectator. The performances of the day commenced by a long speech from the Mahratta, who enlarged upon the circumstances which had led to the connection of Mahomet Ali with Mysore, and on the events which had followed. When his hearers and himself had been sufficiently gratified by the display of his eloquence, Morari Row produced the treaty on which the decision of the question at issue mainly depended, and, with the air of an honest and impartial umpire, called upon Mahomet Ali to fulfil his engagement by the delivery of Trichinopoly.

The nabob performed his part no less admirably. He listened to the harangue of his friend with patience, acknowledged his obligations to Mysore with becoming gratitude, and expressed his resolution to fulfil his engagement in due time. But he claimed indulgence, because, having no considerable fortified town but Trichinopoly, he was for the present unprovided with any place to which he could remove his family. When the whole of the province of Arcot should be reduced to obedience, the difficulty would no longer exist; and, to give time for the purpose, he required a respite of two months, at the end of which period Trichinopoly should be given up. This exposition of the intentions of Mahomet Ali was perfectly satisfactory to his friend the

Mahratta; the conference terminated, and the Mysorean commissioners withdrew. It was now no longer necessary to preserve the tone which had been previously maintained. The chief actor in the scene which had just closed assumed a new character, in which no eyes but those of the nabob and Captain Dalton were permitted to view him. Casting off the solemn dignity of the umpire, and assuming a deportment at once confidential and courtly, the versatile Mahratta expressed a hope that the nabob attached no importance to what he had said in presence of the Mysorean commissioners; and to show that his penetration into the views of others was not inferior to his skill in concealing his own, he further intimated his conviction that the nabob had no intention of performing the promise which he had then made. The acute perception of Morari Row, so far from offending the nabob, seemed to win his affection. Charmed not more by the friendly disposition than by the profound sagacity of the Mahratta, Mahomet Ali presented him with a draft for 50,000 rupees, as a retaining fee for his services, with a promise of as much more if he could succeed in procuring relief from the fulfilment of the treaty. Morari Row readily accepted both the money and the commission, intending at all events to profit from both parties, and, if possible, to overreach both by obtaining Trichinopoly for himself.

The disputes, jealousies, and private designs of the native powers, placed a bar on the prosecution of the object for which they were ostensibly brought together. Under the expectation that affairs would be arranged between the nabob and the Mysoreans, the British troops had marched from Trichinopoly to aid in establishing the authority of Mahomet Ali in other parts of the dominions which he claimed. The troops of the nabob and his allies were to follow; but neither Mysoreans nor Mahrattas were willing to move. Their inertness, and the information which reached the British commander as to the probable result of his advancing, induced him to return two days after he had quitted Trichinopoly. The presence of the British troops brought about the appearance of an accommodation. The nabob made over to the Mysore general the revenues of the island of Seringham, and of some adjacent districts, which the latter was to collect for himself; the promise of surrendering Trichinopoly at the end of two months was repeated, and in the mean time Mahomet Ali agreed to receive into the city seven hundred troops, provided they were not Mahrattas, for by this time the nabob had become suspicious of his favourite advocate and ally. On these conditions, the assistance of Mysore was to be continued. This arrangement answered the purpose of both parties, which was to gain time and opportunity for effecting special objects. Mahomet Ali was not prepared to convert his ally of Mysore into an avowed enemy, be-

cause it would interfere with his prospects of obtaining the yet unsubdued districts to which he laid claim; while Nunjeraj was well pleased that the nabob and his English allies should depart for this or any other purpose, as their absence was necessary to enable him to put into practice the design which he had formed of possessing himself of Trichinopoly. His desires and expectations were to a certain extent gratified. The nabob marched to the northward, accompanied by a British force consisting of five hundred Europeans and two thousand five hundred sepoys; leaving only two hundred Europeans and fifteen hundred sepoys in garrison at Trichinopoly, under the command of Captain Dalton. The Mysoreans and Mahrattas were to follow; but their commanders chose that they should remain where they were. The army of the nabob was further weakened by the secession of Monackjee and his troops, in consequence of the authorities of Tanjore disapproving of the proposal to give up Trichinopoly to the Mysore government. Other chieftains followed the example of Monackjee and departed with their troops, and Mahomet Ali was thus left without any efficient support except that which he received from the British.

Mahomet Ali, and a large part of the British force, had no sooner left Trichinopoly than the designs of Nunjeraj became apparent. His first attempt was directed to corrupt a corps of Mahomet Ali's troops, whom he had the satisfaction of finding not indisposed to his purpose. Large sums of money were expended in bribing these men; and the liberality of Nunjeraj would probably have been rewarded with success, had not its fame reached the ears of Captain Dalton. That officer, previously on his guard, now redoubled his vigilance, causing the artillery on the ramparts to be pointed every evening inwards, towards the quarters of the Mysore troops who had been admitted within the place, and those of the corps upon whose cupidity Nunjeraj had practised. Other precautions followed. At an inspection of the army, the troops who had been tampered with were ordered to deliver up the flints of their guns for the alleged purpose of being replaced by better. This proceeding convinced the officers through whom the bribes of Nunjeraj had been conveyed, that the transaction was no longer a secret; and their only course being now to make their peace in the best manner that offered, they voluntarily communicated to the British commander that which he already knew, protested that they had taken Nunjeraj's money from no other motive than the influence of compassion for the distress of their men, who had received scarcely any pay for nine months, and implored forgiveness. To aid their suit, and attest their sincerity, they brought the money which they had received, and which, judging from the share of the principal officers (16,000 rupees), appeared to have been dispensed with

no niggard hand. "Captain Dalton," says Orme, "made them few reproaches." Whether his forbearance was occasioned by a belief in the sincerity of their repentance and a conviction of their returning fidelity, or whether it originated in some other motive, the historian does not relate. But it is certain that, notwithstanding the signs of penitence which they had manifested, Captain Dalton did not think their continuance at Trichinopoly desirable; he accordingly despatched them to join their master, Mahomet Ali.

Neither the discouragement of defeat, nor the unpleasant consciousness of having expended money without return, withheld Nunjeraj from pursuing the object on which he had set his mind; and it now occurred to him that the assassination of Captain Dalton and of Khair-o-Deen, the brother-in-law of Mahomet Ali, would be important steps towards its attainment. Among such a population as then inhabited and surrounded Trichinopoly, it was not difficult to find instruments for this or any other base purpose. Several persons were to assist in executing the dark commission, but its fortune was not better than that of the plan by which it had been preceded. Intelligence was obtained of the design, and two of those who were to have carried it into effect were arrested. Nunjeraj was reproached with this atrocious attempt, but, as might have been expected, he denied all knowledge of it. The two men who had been secured were each sentenced to be blown from the mouth of a gun, but the humanity of Nunjeraj, or some other feeling, induced him to interpose for their protection. He did not indeed appear personally as a supplicant for mercy towards those whom he had instigated to crime. His assumption of such an office would have been inexpedient and probably vain; he therefore had recourse to the Mahratta chief, Morari Row, who readily entering into the amiable feelings of his friend, solicited from Captain Dalton the pardon of the guilty men. In consequence of this intercession, the criminals escaped with no severer punishment than the terror of having been bound to the muzzles of two guns, preparatory, as they believed, to their execution. This unexpected exercise of mercy is ascribed by Orme to the reluctance of Khair-o-Deen to offend the Mahrattas; but it was certainly injudicious, and is not unfitly characterized by a later writer as unaccountable. Its effect was shown in renewed attempts to corrupt the fidelity of the garrison. An overture was made to a native officer in command of one hundred and eighty sepoy, by two agents of Nunjeraj, whose mission was authenticated by the possession of engagements signed by their master. But these emissaries made an unfortunate choice of a subject for the commencement of their practice. The man whom they addressed, an old and faithful servant of the Company, acknowledged the favour intended him in a manner at once unexpected and un-

desired. He seized the parties by whom his fidelity had been assailed, and carried them to Captain Dalton. Whether the charity of the Mahratta chief was exhausted, or whether his good offices were on this occasion exerted in vain, does not appear, but the men were executed; and the result of this step was, that Nunjeraj could henceforward find among his own people none bold enough to undertake the work either of corruption or assassination. He was obliged, therefore, to seek elsewhere for emissaries, and after a short interval he imagined that he had found in a European the person of whom he was in search. The individual thus honoured with the notice of the Mysorean leader was a Neapolitan, named Clement Poverio. This man, who had been long resident in India, had the command of a company in the service of Mahomet Ali, and in the exercise of his duty had frequently the guard over the French prisoners in the city. In addition to his military occupations, Poverio was engaged in trading pursuits, which led him into the Mysorean camp, and from his knowledge of the native languages he had sometimes acted as an interpreter between Captain Dalton and Nunjeraj. Opportunities, therefore, were not wanting for communication with Poverio, and of one of these Nunjeraj availed himself to seek his assistance in getting possession of the town. To show the feasibility of the project, Nunjeraj affirmed that, in addition to the Mysorean troops in garrison, he had many friends in the town; and to connect the interest of the stranger with his own, he held out a promise of large reward. Poverio met the overture with the air of a man who is not indisposed to compliance, but who sees difficulties and dangers which require some consideration. He said that he must try the disposition of his officers, and left Nunjeraj under the impression that his object was likely to be attained. On his return to the town, Poverio's first act was to proceed to Captain Dalton, to whom he made a free communication of all that had passed with Nunjeraj. He was instructed to return to the camp on the next day, and avow his willingness to undertake the task for which his service had been sought. He did so; and his management of the affair was so dexterous, that he succeeded in entirely securing the confidence of the Mysorean leader. A plan of operations was arranged, and the terms of carrying it into effect fixed. An agreement embodying those terms was drawn up, signed by Poverio and Nunjeraj, and solemnly impressed with the great seal of Mysore. By this instrument it was stipulated that Poverio should receive 20,000 rupees for his personal benefit, and 8,000 more to buy fire-arms. With these he was to arm the French prisoners, who were to be set at liberty for the purpose of aiding in the capture of the place. Simultaneously with their release, Poverio was to seize on the gate nearest the place where the Mysoreans

were encamped, and to hoist a red flag as a signal for the army to move to take possession of the town. That nothing might be wanting to insure success, six resolute ruffians were provided, whose especial duty it was to watch for Captain Dalton's appearance after the alarm was given, and to despatch him. Hitherto all went well for the purpose of the British commander. He had made the necessary preparations for defence without exciting suspicion of his connection with the visits of Poverio to the Mysore camp, or his cognizance of the plan which had been arranged with Nunjeraj. All the cannon that could be brought to bear on the Mysorean camp was prepared to greet the enemy on his approach, and about seven hundred men were concealed near the gateway where admission was expected, ready to receive the intruders in a manner not anticipated. But the attempt never was made, having been frustrated in an extraordinary manner. When all his arrangements were completed, Captain Dalton informed Mahomet Ali's brother-in-law of the design which had been laid to surprise the place, and of the means which had been provided for its defeat. The representative of the nabob regarded the matter in a very different light from Captain Dalton. He had no disposition to encounter the hazard of an attack, and, in the language of Major Lawrence, consulting nothing but his fears, he sent a message to Nunjeraj, informing him that his plot was discovered, and that measures had been taken to prevent its execution. This step he deemed a master-stroke of policy, and communicated the intelligence of it to Captain Dalton with much self-gratulation. Nunjeraj, as might have been expected, abstained from any attempt against the city, and not thinking himself quite safe within the reach of its guns, removed his camp to some distance. His disappointment sought relief in inflicting vengeance on Poverio, for whose person, dead or alive, he offered a large reward. This led to a recommendation from Major Lawrence to retort on the enemy with their own weapons. Captain Dalton continued to hold frequent conferences both with Nunjeraj and Morari Row; and Major Lawrence's advice was that advantage should be taken of one of these opportunities to seize the two native generals. The authorities of the presidency decided against this suggestion, and it cannot be doubted that they decided rightly.

The hollow friendship which subsisted between the respective parties congregated in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly continued until the expiration of the two months fixed as the date at which the surrender of the town to Nunjeraj was to take place. A formal demand was then made of it; but Mahomet Ali's brother, whose courage always beat high when no immediate danger was to be apprehended, met the call in a spirit of lofty indignation. He reproached the messengers of Nunjeraj with the treachery of

their master, the proof of which he exhibited in the agreement with Poverio bearing the signature of Nunjeraj, and distinctly informed them that the city would not be given up at all. He intimated, however, that the nabob was not forgetful of the expenses incurred by the state of Mysore on his account, and promised that the amount should be repaid; a communication which would have been more satisfactory, if the promise had not been qualified by a postponement of its execution until the nabob's finances should be in a better condition. To this qualification Nunjeraj did not hesitate to avow his dislike. The claim which he made amounted to 8,500,000 rupees; and as a proof of his moderation and desire for a peaceful settlement of differences, he professed himself willing to abandon his claim to Trichinopoly, if immediate payment of his demand were made—a condition which he knew could not be complied with.

Such was the state of affairs at Trichinopoly. To the northward Mahomet Ali succeeded in obtaining a partial recognition of his authority, but the more powerful chiefs waited the chance of events, and the stronger fortresses were invincible by his arms. In this situation he applied to the British authorities for an additional force to undertake the reduction of Gingee. To this attempt the judgment of Major Lawrence was decidedly opposed, and he proceeded to Madras (to which place the presidency had recently been removed from Fort St. David), for the purpose of dissuading the Company's government from compliance. But his representations were disregarded. Two hundred Europeans, with fifteen hundred sepoy, were placed under the command of Major Kinneir, an officer who had recently arrived in India; and this force, with six hundred of the nabob's cavalry, was destined to achieve the object which Mahomet Ali had in view. At first some trifling advantages were gained, but upon the troops arriving within a short distance of Gingee, the wisdom of Major Lawrence's advice became apparent. The force under Major Kinneir was utterly unequal either to attack the fortress or to maintain possession of the passes through the mountains by which Gingee was surrounded. The garrison was summoned to surrender, and with this ineffectual measure ended the demonstration against the place. In the mean time Duplex had despatched a considerable body of French troops, which had taken a post in the rear of the force employed against Gingee. To meet this new difficulty reinforcements were obtained, and Major Kinneir retired to give the enemy battle. Here misfortune continued to attend this ill-planned and ill-fated expedition. The point of attack selected by Major Kinneir was badly chosen, and by an artifice the English were led away from their field-pieces to a place where they were exposed to those of the enemy. Major Kinneir was severely wounded at a time when part of his troops were giving way. This increased the

panic which had already begun, and Europeans and natives alike fled in disorder. Of the entire force, only two ensigns and fourteen British grenadiers stood their ground. These gallantly defended their colours till shame induced a few of the fugitives to return, when the whole retired in good order. The disgrace brought on the British arms by this affair was worse than the defeat. It was so felt by Major Kinneir, who recovered of the bodily wound which he had received, but shortly afterwards sunk under a disease engendered by a wounded spirit.

The English troops and those of Mahomet Ali retired to a redoubt about three miles from Fort St. David, where they waited for reinforcements from Madras, at which place a body of Swiss had just arrived from Europe in the service of the Company. These it was proposed to despatch to the aid of the British force in the neighbourhood of Fort St. David, and one company was embarked in small country boats to proceed thither. But the arrangement was defeated by a movement on the part of Dupleix, which the Madras authorities had not anticipated. When the boats arrived in sight of Pondicherry they were seized, the troops taken out, carried into the town, and made prisoners. This proceeding, Dupleix alleged, was quite as justifiable as the capture of his troops at Seringham. Indeed it would demand the exercise of a very skilful casuistry to reconcile any part of the hostile operations carried on between the English and French in India, while the two countries were at peace at home, with the received principles of the law of nations.

On the news of the seizure of the boats and the imprisonment of the troops reaching Madras, it was resolved not to intrust the remainder of the Swiss, consisting of another company, to the same mode of conveyance. They were accordingly forwarded in one of the Company's ships, and Major Lawrence embarked with them. The enemy's force which had defeated Major Kinneir had been considerably strengthened, and now amounted to four hundred and fifty Europeans, fifteen hundred sepoys, and five hundred native horse. It was encamped close to the bounds of Fort St. David. The army of which Major Lawrence took the command was superior as to numbers. It consisted of four hundred Europeans, seventeen hundred sepoys in the British service, and about four thousand of the nabob's troops, cavalry and infantry. The enemy seemed impressed with a belief that the allied force was too strong for them, as, on Major Lawrence's arrival, they retired in the night to Bahoor. Being followed, they still continued to retire towards Pondicherry; and their commander, a nephew of Dupleix, named Kerjean, despatched a letter to Major Lawrence, protesting against a violation of the French territory. The orders of Major Lawrence forbade his entering its limits, and he consequently contented himself with attacking

an outpost which lay beyond them. This the enemy abandoned, and the whole army withdrew under the walls of the town.

In this situation they manifested so determined a disposition to remain, that Major Lawrence became weary of waiting for a change. Stratagem at length relieved him from the monotonous duty of watching an enemy whom he was desirous of engaging, but who would not advance, and whom he was forbidden to follow. The British force made a precipitate movement back to Bahoor, and their apparent want of confidence deceived Dupleix, whose sanguine reliance upon his own good fortune rarely suffered him to doubt when appearances were favourable to his views. Kerjean was not deceived, and on receiving orders from his uncle to follow the English, he remonstrated. He was answered by orders to the same effect as those which had preceded them, and so peremptory in tone as to leave him no choice but to obey. He did obey—advanced in the direction in which Major Lawrence had retired, was attacked by that officer, and summarily defeated. The enemy's line being broken by the English grenadiers, gave way, and panic flight succeeded. The nabob's cavalry were desired to pursue, but they found more agreeable employment in plundering the enemy's camp. Kerjean, with thirteen of his officers and one hundred men, were made prisoners, and the whole of the enemy's stores, artillery, and ammunition was taken.

This success of the British army produced a marked effect upon the state of feeling at Trichinopoly. Dupleix had been intriguing both with the Mysoreans and the Mahrattas, and he had not found it difficult to detach them from a cause towards which neither bore any sincere good-will. Emissaries of these parties had proceeded to Pondicherry, where a treaty had been concluded, Dupleix engaging to put the Mysorean chief in possession of Trichinopoly. The mask of friendship for the nabob and his British ally was about to be dropped, and a large body of Mahrattas was actually despatched to join the French. Their progress was slow, as the plunder of the provinces through which they had to pass required time; and this saved them from a step which, under the circumstances, they would have regarded as false, and might have found inconvenient. The news of the affair at Bahoor gave a new direction to their route. They proceeded to the camp of Mahomet Ali; and their commander, after congratulating the nabob on the happy success of his arms, lamented deeply his own disappointment in having been deprived of the honour of sharing in the glories of the day. What degree of credit Mahomet Ali afforded to these professions is uncertain, but the Mahratta gave some evidence of his friendship which ought to have been conclusive: he took the oath of fidelity to Mahomet Ali.

The British authorities were not in a con-

dition to add greatly to the amount of force employed in aiding the cause of the nabob. Notwithstanding this, an application was made by that prince for the means of reducing two strong places, called Chingleput and Covelong. All that could be furnished was a body of about two hundred Europeans and five hundred sepoys. This force was not only small, but was formed of very unpromising materials. The European portion of it consisted of recruits just arrived at Madras, whose character seems to have been such as left England little reason to regret their departure. Indeed such, according to Orme, was then generally the case with regard to military adventurers in the East; for, speaking of this body of recruits, he observes, that they were, "as usual, the refuse of the vilest employments in London." The sepoys might have some advantage over their European coadjutors in point of character, but they had none in respect of experience, being newly raised and unaccustomed to a military life. With such troops, however, it was resolved to reduce forts of considerable strength—a task which might justly have been regarded as hopeless, but for the union of talents, intrepidity, and perseverance, which had already enabled their destined commander to triumph where circumstances seemed to warrant no feeling but despair.

Clive, though in a miserable state of health, the consequence of the climate and of his previous fatigues, volunteered his services to command the expedition, and the offer was too welcome to fail of acceptance.

Covelong is situated about twenty miles from Madras. It had no ditch, but a strong wall flanked by round towers, on which were mounted thirty pieces of cannon. The French had obtained possession of it by stratagem in 1750. It was now garrisoned by fifty Europeans and three hundred native troops.

The British detachment, accompanied by four 24-pounders, marched on the 10th of September. On arriving near their destination, half the party were despatched under the cover of night to take possession of a garden lying about six hundred yards south of the fort, which they effected. At break of day a detachment from the garrison approached unobserved, and their fire having killed the officer in command of the British party, his troops fled with a degree of determination which appeared to indicate that Madras was the point to which they were bent, and that their speed would not slacken until they arrived there. Their course, however, received a check from encountering Clive, who was advancing with the remainder of the force; but even the influence of this fortunate and popular commander was scarcely sufficient to turn the fugitives from their purpose. With great difficulty and some violence, they were at length brought back to the garden, which the enemy immediately abandoned. The French commander being summoned to surrender, replied

in a gasconading strain, declaring that, if the English persisted in the attack, he and his men were determined to die in the breach. Clive resolved to give them the opportunity of redeeming their promise, if so disposed, and proceeded to erect a battery at the distance of about three hundred yards from the fort; but the construction of the work was impeded by the fire of the enemy, of which both Europeans and natives manifested their dislike by taking flight on every alarm. One shot striking a rock which was occupied as an English post, seemed likely to be fatal to the hopes of Clive. The rock being splintered, fourteen men were killed or wounded by the flying fragments; and this mischance had such an effect upon the rest, that it was some time before they could be brought to expose themselves to the danger of similar untoward visitations. The extraordinary regard which these troops manifested for their personal safety was strikingly illustrated in the case of one of the advanced sentries, who, several hours after the alarming accident, was found calmly reposing at the bottom of a dry well. The name of this cautious person is unfortunately not recorded.

Such were the instruments with which Clive had to perform the duty intrusted to him. His own bearing was what it had ever been. Wherever the enemy's fire was hottest, there was Clive, self-possessed and unconcerned as if on parade. So impressive was the lesson conveyed by his cool intrepidity, that it was not without effect even on the debased specimens of manhood whom it was his misfortune to command. In the space of two days his example led them to assume some appearance of soldierly feeling, and to perform their duties with some degree of firmness. On the third day he had to march with half his force to meet a party of the enemy from Chingleput, who had advanced within four miles; but these troops seemed to have enjoyed a community of feeling with those of Clive. On his approach, they fled with great precipitation. On the following day the battery was finished, but its fire was silenced by a message from the French commander, offering to surrender the place on the single condition of being permitted to carry away his own effects. The offer was immediately accepted, the English marched in, and by this arrangement the French commander was spared the painful task which he had imposed upon himself of dying in the breach. The effects which he had been so anxious to secure by a special condition consisted of turkeys and muffs: the stock in trade of the representative of the French monarchy, who united the business of a huckster with that of his military command. The fall of Covelong restored to the East-India Company fifty pieces of artillery, which they had lost on the capture of Madras. On the following morning a body of the enemy's troops, advancing from Chingleput to relieve the garrison at Covelong, were discovered and attacked by ambuscade. Mistaking the nabob's flag, which was par-

tially white, for their own, they continued to advance with perfect confidence, till a volley from their concealed assailants struck down a hundred of them, and so paralyzed the remainder that a large proportion did not retain sufficient presence of mind even to run. Two pieces of cannon, and nearly three hundred prisoners, including the commanding officer, were taken. The rest of the detachment, throwing away their arms, fled back to Chingleput, bearing the news of their own discomfiture and of the occupation of Covelong by the British. The receipt of this intelligence was immediately followed by the arrival of Clive, who, with his unvarying promptitude of action, marched to Chingleput, to follow up the blow which the enemy had received. A battery was erected five hundred yards from the wall, but the distance being too great, it was advanced to within two hundred yards. In four days a breach was effected both in the outer and inner walls. The next labour was to fill up the ditches; and this was about to be commenced, when the French commander offered to surrender, if the garrison were permitted to march away with the honours of war. Though the wall had been breached, and the ditches might possibly have been filled up, the place was yet capable of offering a degree of resistance not to be despised by such a force as that at the disposal of Clive. In this view he exercised a sound judgment in agreeing to the terms demanded. No one who has studied the character of Clive will suspect him of declining to fight when there was a fair prospect of gaining any advantage; and the fact that, in this instance, he granted to the garrison the privilege of withdrawing from the place, may be regarded as convincing proof that they were in a condition to insist upon it. A pause in the brilliant career of this distinguished commander will now for a time withdraw him from the notice of the reader. His health being greatly impaired, he proceeded to England shortly after the surrender of Chingleput.

The French garrison evacuated Chingleput on the 31st of October, and marched to Pondicherry. On the 15th of November the troops under Major Lawrence were compelled by the severity of the weather to retire to winter quarters; and the army of Mahomet Ali was, from the same cause, broken up. From Trichinopoly, Morari Row, with the greater part of the Mahrattas, departed for Pondicherry. Those who had been led by the success of Major Lawrence to join Mahomet Ali proceeded, under pretence of seeking winter quarters, to meet their countrymen from Trichinopoly. Nunjeraj deeming it necessary to account to the British commander for the departure of Morari Row, ascribed it to a dispute that had arisen in the settlement of accounts. He continued, too, to make the warmest professions of friendship for the English, and, as a proof of his sincerity, he caused all provisions coming to Trichinopoly to be intercepted and carried to his own camp. It thus became

impossible for the British authorities long to postpone their choice between abandoning the cause of Mahomet Ali or assuming a position of avowed hostility towards Nunjeraj. The base and treacherous means to which the latter had resorted for the purpose of removing Captain Dalton, deprived him of any claim upon the British authorities, and of all right to hope that their mediation should be exerted to procure the fulfilment of that provision of the treaty with Mahomet Ali which stipulated for the surrender of Trichinopoly. It was to be expected, therefore, that the presidency of Madras should decide, as they ultimately did, upon issuing the requisite instructions to treat Nunjeraj as an enemy.

The first hostile movement on the part of the British took place late in the year 1752, when Captain Dalton, under cover of the night, attacked the camp of Nunjeraj. Orme observes, that if the British had brought with them a petard, they might probably have forced the pagoda, and finished the war by securing the person of the Mysorean commander. But no result seems to have been contemplated beyond that of exciting alarm in the enemy's camp; and no other was achieved beyond apprising Nunjeraj of the precise views of his late ally. This hostile visit was soon returned. Nunjeraj attacked an advanced post which the British had established, and panic seizing the troops stationed to defend it, they were nearly all out to pieces. The British force was thus deprived of seventy Europeans and about three hundred sepoy—an amount of loss which it was not in a condition to bear. Captain Dalton now regarded the presence of the large body of Mysoreans within the city with apprehension; and the mask of friendship having been dropped on both sides, they were required to depart, their commander only being detained, under the belief, apparently erroneous, that he was the brother of Nunjeraj.

The prospects of the British force in Trichinopoly were becoming extremely gloomy. The Mysorean commander, judging that famine would afford the most probable method of reducing the town, adopted the most rigorous measures for bringing about the result which he desired. All supplies from the adjacent country destined for Trichinopoly were intercepted; and, in conformity with the practice not common in Europe, but said to be of ancient standing in Mysore, the disapprobation of Nunjeraj was intimated by cutting off the noses of those who ventured to disregard his wishes. The magazines in Trichinopoly had been intrusted to the care of a brother of Mahomet Ali, who had always represented the amount of stores to be abundant. Satisfied with his testimony, Captain Dalton abstained from any personal inspection, until, through the measures of Nunjeraj, both the inhabitants and garrison of Trichinopoly became entirely dependent on the stock of food accumulated within the place. The

British commander now learnt with dismay that the careful and honest administrator of the stores had taken advantage of the growing scarcity in the city to sell at a high price a considerable quantity of the provisions on which reliance was placed for defeating the blockade, and that what remained was only equal to the consumption of a few days. In this emergency his only hope rested on the assistance of Major Lawrence, to whom a messenger was forthwith despatched.

The difficulties of Major Lawrence at that time needed no accession. He had left Fort St. David early in January, and proceeded to Trividy, for the purpose of co-operating with Mahomet Ali, to whom Dupleix was still able to offer a degree of resistance which, under the circumstances, was formidable. While the English and the Mysoreans were contending for the possession of Trichinopoly, the prospects of the French had undergone various changes. Ghazi-oo-Deen, the eldest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, had suddenly given a practical denial to the assertion that he had renounced his right of succession, by appearing before Aurungabad at the head of an immense army, and proclaiming himself, under the authority of the Mogul emperor, Soobahdar of the Deccan. A vast Mahratta force, acting in concert with him, also entered the province of Golconda; and a proposal was made to Dupleix to withdraw his assistance from Salabat Jung in consideration of great benefits to be bestowed by his rival. On this offer, however, Dupleix was spared the trouble of deliberating, as Salabat Jung found means to remove his brother by poison within a very short period after his arrival at Aurungabad. His army thereupon dispersed. Dupleix, however, had still sufficient ground for anxiety. Salabat Jung, after the murder of his brother, had manufactured an edict of the Emperor of Delhi confirming Dupleix in the office of nabob. This was despatched with much parade; and though Dupleix was far too shrewd and too well informed to be deceived by the attempt, he thought it advisable to pretend to be deceived. The mission was received with extraordinary respect, and the important intelligence of which it was the channel was ostentatiously circulated throughout the country occupied by the French. But the alleged favour of the Mogul emperor did not remove the main source of Dupleix's difficulties. He was grievously at a loss for money, which, as Orme observes, "in the wars of Hindostan, is of more service than any title whatsoever." To supply this want he determined to create a new nabob of Arcot; and a person named Murteza Khan, who had the reputation of being extremely rich, was selected for the appointment. It was a distinction which he had long coveted, and which, some years before, he had taken some pains and incurred some guilt to obtain. Murteza Khan was a relative of Dost Ali, the Nabob of Arcot, under whom the atrocious seizure of Trichinopoly was per-

petrated by Chunda Sahib. The nabob was succeeded by his son Subder Ali, who, after overcoming the effects of poison prepared for him by Murteza Khan, full by the poignard of a Patan assassin, hired for the work by the same person. But Murteza Khan did not secure the prize for which he had twice conspired against the life of his relation. A storm was raised which he had not the courage to encounter; and, disguising himself in female attire, he escaped from Arcot to his own fort of Vellore. Two years afterwards, the youthful son and successor of Subder Ali met the fate of his father, and common report attributed to Murteza Khan a principal share in the contrivance of this murder also. Such was the man to whom the patronage of Dupleix was extended. Murteza Khan, however, notwithstanding his former attempt upon the nabobship, displayed little alacrity in securing the honour now tendered him. That honour was indeed to be purchased by the disbursement of part of his wealth, and Murteza Khan was intensely avaricious. The acceptance of it also involved some danger, and Murteza Khan was singularly pusillanimous. The recollection of his former inglorious flight from Arcot would naturally act as a check upon his aspirations to return thither, and Dupleix was long kept in doubt as to his determination. At length Murteza Khan so far overcame his fears for his treasure and his personal safety as to proceed to Pondicherry, where he was solemnly installed in his new dignity; and, greatly to the joy of Dupleix, advanced a considerable sum for the expenses of the war. But Dupleix was not long destined to rejoice in the co-operation of so valuable an ally. The first advance made by him was also the last. A little explanation of what was expected convinced Murteza Khan that the purchase of the nabobship was an unpromising speculation, and that it would be better to submit to the loss which he had already sustained than to incur the obligations attendant on completing the bargain. He accordingly discovered that his presence was indispensable at Vellore, and forthwith returned thither to repair the loss which his fortune had suffered by his temporary enjoyment of the rank of nabob.

Dupleix was thrown altogether upon his own resources. Though by no means indifferent to the possession of wealth, the desire of accumulation was in him controlled by a passion for securing to himself and his country the ascendancy in the field of Indian politics, and his large private fortune was freely dispensed to gratify this passion. He was thus able, in the month of January, to bring into the field five hundred European infantry and sixty horse, together with two thousand sepoys. This force was powerfully aided by a body of four thousand Mahratta cavalry under Morari Row, who dreadfully harassed the British troops under Major Lawrence, the officer being sometimes obliged to march his

entire force to Fort St. David to escort his supplies. This state of things the British commander would have been glad to terminate by an engagement, but the French could not be brought to quit their intrenchments, and a successful attack upon their camp was deemed impracticable.

The intelligence from Trichinopoly determined Major Lawrence immediately to march with the larger part of his force to its relief. He arrived on the 6th of May, but his army had suffered on its march from the desertion of foreigners, and still more from the oppressive heat of the weather. Several men died on the road, others were sent back to Fort St. David, and on the day of arrival at Trichinopoly one hundred were placed in the hospital. After providing for the duties of the garrison, the combined forces of Major Lawrence and Captain Dalton could furnish for the field only five hundred Europeans and two thousand sepoy; and it was soon further diminished by the detachment of seven hundred of the latter in search of provisions. The presence of a body of Mahomet Ali's horse was to be regarded as a source of weakness rather than of strength: always, in the language of Colonel Wilke, "ill paid, ill commanded, spiritless, and mutinous," they now manifested their usual characteristics, and did not even dissemble their dislike to fighting.

Dupleix, fully aware of the importance of counteracting the object of Major Lawrence's march to Trichinopoly, had despatched thither successive reinforcements; and there were then arrayed there against the British and their ally four hundred Europeans, fifteen hundred sepoy in French pay, three thousand five hundred Mahrattas, eight thousand Mysore horse, twelve hundred Mysore sepoy, and about fifteen thousand irregular infantry—making together nearly thirty thousand men. This disproportion of force was sufficiently dispiriting, and the success of the earlier operations of Major Lawrence was not calculated to dispel the feeling which the comparison engendered.

Previously to the arrival of Major Lawrence, Captain Dalton, by a series of annoying attacks upon the force immediately engaged in maintaining the blockade, had succeeded in frightening them from their position; and, after lingering in the neighbourhood for a few days, they rejoined the main body in the island of Seringham, thus affording room for the access of supplies to Trichinopoly. But the respite was of short duration. An attempt made by Major Lawrence to force the enemy's position in the inland of Seringham failed. He then endeavoured to establish himself in the position from which the enemy had recently withdrawn, and the maintenance of which was so important for securing supplies. But this he was unable to effect; and being compelled to retire nearer the fortress, the enemy were enabled again to interrupt the communication with the country and stop the transit of pro-

visions. In the hope of being able sometimes to evade the vigilance of the blockading force, a post was established at a place called the Golden Rock. This was attacked by a body of the enemy's troops commanded by M. Anstruc, a French officer of reputed ability; and, before assistance could be afforded, the sepoy who defended the post were overcome, and the French colours hoisted. Major Lawrence, on becoming aware of the attack, put in motion all the troops at his disposal; but some were necessarily left for the protection of the camp, and a considerable number of sepoy had gone into the fort to obtain rations. From these causes, the force with which he marched to the relief of the party on the rock amounted only to about four hundred Europeans and five hundred native troops, aided by a few field-pieces. On observing that the French had succeeded in carrying the rock, the British commander paused. Nearly the whole of the vast force opposed to him now met his eye. The rock was covered by the enemy's sepoy, supported by the French battalions. The whole Mysore army was drawn up in the rear. The enemy's artillery was firing from the right and left, and the Mahratta horse were hovering on the flanks and rear of the English, occasionally charging with a view to create confusion. With such a prospect, a pause might well be excused, but it was only momentary. Finding his officers and men alike anxious to engage, Major Lawrence determined to trust to their enthusiasm, and a party of grenadiers was ordered to march and attack the rock with fixed bayonets. The order was received with three cheers, and the party advancing at a rapid pace, but with the most perfect regularity, neither halted nor gave fire till they reached the summit of the rock; the enemy retreating precipitately down the opposite side. Major Lawrence, with the remainder of his men, moved round the rock and attacked the French battalion in front, while the British grenadiers on the rock, with a select party of sepoy who had followed, poured a heavy fire upon its right flank. Thus assailed, the French troops began to waver, and a charge by the English bayonets completed their dismay. They fled with the utmost precipitation, leaving three field-pieces in the hands of the victors. The English had yet, however, a difficult task to perform in returning safely to the camp in the face of such overpowering numbers; but this, notwithstanding some attempts of the enemy's cavalry to prevent it, was effected.

Brilliant as was the success of the British arms, the numbers of the enemy's troops were so great, that no reasonable expectation of ultimate success could be entertained, unless reinforcements from some quarter could be procured. Major Lawrence observes that a victory or two more would have left all his men on the plains of Trichinopoly. In the hope of obtaining the fulfilment of promises of assistance often made by the Rajah of Tanjore,

it was resolved that Major Lawrence should proceed in the direction of that country, accompanied by Mahomet Ali. The latter personage left his palace under an escort of English bayonets designed to guard him not from the enemy, but from his own troops, who assembled in the outer court and declared their intention not to permit his departure until their arrears of pay were discharged. Of the vast host which the nabob nominally commanded, exactly fifty accompanied him towards Tanjore. The rest remained a few days under the walls of Trichinopoly, when they went over to the enemy in a body, having previously communicated their intention to Captain Dalton, and requested as a parting favour that he would not fire on them. That officer, glad to be rid of them upon any terms, made them happy by promising not to interfere with their movements; and the gallant body retired at noon-day, without an effort on the part of their English allies to detain or annoy them.

The object of Major Lawrence in marching towards Tanjore was effected. He obtained from the sovereign of that country the assistance of three thousand horse and two thousand foot, under the command of Monackjee. He was also at this time reinforced by about one hundred and seventy men who had just arrived from England, and by three hundred native troops. Thus strengthened, he again approached Trichinopoly, but found the whole force of the enemy prepared to dispute his return thither. Having a convoy of several thousand bullocks, it would have been desirable to avoid an action; but this being impracticable, the requisite dispositions were made for an engagement, which terminated in favour of the English. The fears or the ill judgment of one of their officers had nearly endangered their success, when the gallant bearing of Major Lawrence retrieved it. A favourable opportunity being presented for attacking a body of the French which had halted imprudently, a party was despatched for the purpose; but the officer appointed to lead it sent word that he could not proceed without artillery, and that he was halting until its arrival. The answer of Major Lawrence was given in person. Putting his horse into a gallop, he rode up to the party, and dismounting, placed himself at its head. His example was nobly followed: the enemy shrunk from the bayonets of the English grenadiers, and the main body moving to aid the party led by Major Lawrence, the fate of the day was determined. The enemy, however, carried off one prize, of which they made an extraordinary use. This was the palanquin of the English commander, which being carried to Pondicherry, was there paraded through the town in triumphant confirmation of a report assiduously circulated, that the French had been successful in a battle in which Major Lawrence was killed.

A few weeks afterwards a more decisive advantage was gained. Both armies had been in the mean time reinforced, but that of the

enemy in by far the largest proportion. The recent success of Major Lawrence was, however, calculated to inspire confidence, and his situation with regard to supplies required a bold and active course. He thought it advisable to engage while he could be "master of his own dispositions." The result of this determination was a brilliant victory, in which M. Anstruc and several other officers were made prisoners, and the whole of the tents and stores of the enemy captured. The fall of Weyoonda, a place of some strength, shortly followed. On this occasion, the European and native troops seemed to vie with each other in daring courage and devotedness of spirit. The British sepoys could not be restrained by their officers from attempting to enter the breach, though assured that it was not yet practicable, and repeated attempts were made to ascend under a most galling fire from the enemy above. Baffled in their efforts, they rushed to the gate, which some endeavoured to force, while others fired upwards on those engaged on the ramparts. At length an Englishman, acting as serjeant in a company of sepoys, mounting the shoulders of one of the men, succeeded in laying hold of the carved work of the gateway, and thus assisted climbed to the top. Those behind handed up to him the colours of his company, which, unaided, he planted on the parapet. About twenty of the company, following the example of the serjeant, were enabled to join him by the employment of similar means with himself; and while some of this heroic band were engaged with the enemy, others descended on the inside of the rampart and opened the gate, through which the rest of the assailing party rushed like a torrent.

Soon after the capture of Weyoonda, Major Lawrence took up quarters for the rainy season about fifteen miles from Trichinopoly, the Tanjore troops having previously returned home. Here, on the 28th of November, they received news of an attack made by the French on Trichinopoly. The attempt was unexpected, the garrison in a great degree taken by surprise; and could the French have abstained from firing, it is not improbable that the place might have been carried. But the first shot brought all to their posts, and the French were driven back with a loss of Europeans estimated at five hundred men.

A long interval of comparative repose which succeeded was broken by a serious disaster to the English arms. In the early part of the month of February, a party of European and native troops, engaged in the conveyance of stores, was surprised and defeated with great loss. One of the most lamentable consequences was the destruction of the gallant company of grenadiers who had contributed so largely to their country's honour and success: of whom Orme observes, that "they may be said, without exaggeration, to have rendered more service than the same number

of troops belonging to any nation in any part of the world."

Before this event, an attempt had been made by the representatives of the French and English East-India Companies to negotiate; but after several days had been consumed in fruitless discussion, they separated without a single step being gained towards reconciliation. But the year was not to close without a renewal of proceedings for pacification conducted under different auspices. The extraordinary position of the French and English in the East had been forced on the attention of the respective governments at home; and the resolution to dispatch a British squadron with reinforcements, induced the French to consent to an arrangement for the settlement of the disputes between the two countries, by commissioners to be deputed for the purpose. The negotiations were to be conducted on the spot where the dispute had arisen, and it might have been expected that Dupleix would have been continued by the French government as its representative. This, however, was not the fact. He was superseded by the appointment of M. Godheu, who arrived at Pondicherry on the 2nd of August, and proclaimed his commission. The first result was a suspension of arms for three months, which commenced on the 11th of October. On the 14th of that month Dupleix departed for Europe.

Towards the close of the year a treaty was concluded, subject to confirmation in Europe; and on the 11th of January following a truce was agreed upon, till the pleasure of the European authorities should be known. In the mean time everything was to remain on the footing of *uti possidetis*. By the treaty both parties were restrained from interfering in the disputes of native princes, but by the articles of truce they engaged to oblige their allies to observe the provisions of the treaty, and in case of contumacy, to enforce compliance by arms. The commander of the Mysoreans, however, denying the right of the French to conclude any treaty for him, continued to prosecute his favourite scheme of getting possession of Trichinopoly, till, alarmed by the reported approach to his frontier of a body of Mahrattas to levy contributions, and by the simultaneous advance of Salabat Jung to demand the Mogul's tribute, he suddenly decamped.

The English continued to aid Mahomet Ali in collecting his revenues and reducing his refractory vassals to obedience. This perhaps

was not in strict accordance with the letter of the treaty with the French, but the latter, under M. Bussey, were rendering similar assistance to Salabat Jung. In Madura and Tinnevely, the operations of the English were attended with little success and still less honour; and an attempt to coerce into obedience the notorious Murteza Khan was met by an intimation from the governor of Pondicherry, that it was regarded as an infraction of the treaty and would be dealt with accordingly. The attempt was thereupon abandoned.

The services of the fleet which had arrived from England under the command of Admiral Watson, not being required for any other object, were employed in the suppression of a system of piracy which for nearly fifty years had been a source of serious annoyance to the trade on the coast of Malabar. It was carried on by a family bearing the name of Angria, the founder of which had been the commander of the Mahratta fleet, and who, availing himself of the opportunities which the events of the times threw in his way, obtained the grant of certain forts and districts convenient for the exercise of the trade of piracy, and established a petty sovereignty. His descendants failing in their allegiance to the Peishwa, that potentate united with the English to chastise them. Early in 1755, a small British force commanded by Commodore James attacked and captured Severndroog, one of the forts of Toolajee Angria, and also the island of Bancoot. The Peishwa's fleet were to have assisted in the enterprise, but they never ventured within gun-shot of the fort. In February following, Admiral Watson sailed with the fleet under his command to attack Gheriah, the principal harbour and stronghold of the pirates. In this service he was aided by Clive, who had recently arrived at Bombay from England, with a force intended to be employed against the French in the Deccan, but which, from the change of circumstances that had taken place, was now at liberty for any other service. The Mahrattas were to co-operate in the attack on Gheriah, but the allies seem to have been quite as desirous of outwitting each other as of overcoming the enemy. Both parties meditated an exclusive appropriation of the booty which was anticipated, and both took much pains to attain their object. The English were successful. The place fell into their hands, and their Mahratta friends were disappointed of the expected prize.

CHAPTER IV.

CAPTURE OF CALCUTTA BY SOORAJ-OO-DOWLAH.—THE BLACK HOLE.—RECOVERY OF CALCUTTA BY CLIVE.—CAPTURE OF CHANDERNAGORE.—BATTLE OF PLASSY.—ELEVATION OF MESS JAFFIER TO THE THRONE.—DEATH OF SOORAJ-OO-DOWLAH.—TREACHERY TOWARDS OMICHUND.

CLIVE had returned to India with the appointment of Governor of Fort St. David. Thither he proceeded, when his services were no longer required on the western coast, and in the month of June formally entered on the duties of his office. But in this comparatively quiet post he had not remained quite two months, when the aid of his military talents was called for in a part of India where they had never yet been exercised.

Aliverdi Khan, Soubahdar of the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, had died in the month of April. He was succeeded by Mirza Mahmood, better known by his assumed name of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, who appears to have stood to Aliverdi Khan in the double relationship of grandnephew and grandson. Aliverdi Khan had been the architect of his own greatness, and his career was not unstained by crime; but his talents were considerable, his habits of life grave, and his government as free from oppression as was consistent with the maintenance of an Oriental despotism. It has been said that he was "perhaps the only prince in the East whom none of his subjects wished to assassinate." The character of his successor was widely different. His intellect was feeble, his habits low and depraved, his propensities vicious in the extreme. From a child he had been sullen, capricious, and cruel. His education afforded no corrective of these evil dispositions, but, on the contrary, tended to foster them. He was the idol of the prince to whom he was destined to succeed; and through the doting fondness of age his early years were passed amidst unbounded indulgence. Such a training, operating upon such a nature as that of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, produced the result which might have been anticipated. His advance towards manhood was marked by a corresponding advance in vice. His companions were selected from the lowest and basest of mankind, and with these congenial associates his days and nights were passed amidst every species of intemperance.

Aliverdi Khan had occasionally called upon the English to contribute to replenish his treasury. These demands were sometimes refused, and the refusal was followed by the stoppage of trade. But the Soubahdar was an intelligent prince, and knew the value of European commerce too well to destroy it. The disputes which arose never proceeded to extremities, and the English, on the whole, found little reason to complain. The death of Aliverdi Khan and the accession of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah,

made an important difference in their position. The new Soubahdar was known to entertain unfavourable views towards the English. It has been said, indeed, that his predecessor, notwithstanding the great moderation of his government, shared those views, and that his last advice to his grandson was to deprive the English of military power. But whether the hatred of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah were stimulated by the advice of his grandfather, or left to its own operation, it is certain, that, at a very early period after his accession to power, it was actively manifested.

The subordinate government of Dacca had been administered by an uncle of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, who had died a short time before Aliverdi Khan. His dewan, or treasurer, not deeming his family or his property safe in Dacca, had sent them away under the care of his son, named Kishindoos, who had solicited and found a temporary refuge in Calcutta. This gave offence to Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, who endeavoured, but without effect, to persuade Aliverdi Khan that the English were actuated by hostile feelings towards him. The death of his grandfather relieved him from restraint, and immediately after that event he addressed a letter to the President of Calcutta, requiring that Kishindoos should be given up. But this letter was forwarded in a manner so extraordinary as to warrant suspicion of its authenticity. The bearer, disguised as a peddler, came in a small boat, and on landing proceeded to the house of a native named Omichund, by whom he was introduced to the British authorities. Omichund, who was the richest merchant in Calcutta, had been largely engaged in providing the Company's investments, and from this occupation a great portion of his wealth had been derived. But of this source of profit he had been for some years deprived, in consequence of some dissatisfaction which had arisen with the quality of the goods, and which had led to the employment of factors by the Company, to purchase at the provincial markets. The British council appear on this account to have viewed the alleged communication from Sooraj-oo-Dowlah with increased distrust, and to have regarded it as a contrivance of Omichund to give himself importance. The messenger was accordingly dismissed without an answer. It was not long before another communication from Sooraj-oo-Dowlah was received on a different subject. He had heard that the English were strengthening their fortifications, and he required them to desist. An answer

was returned, in part denying the truth of the report which had reached the prince, and in part justifying the proceedings which he ascribed to the English authorities, on the ground of apprehended hostilities with the French. This letter threw the Soubahdar into a transport of rage; and although then actually on his march to reduce a refractory dependent to obedience, he abandoned this object in order to turn his arms against the English. He forthwith presented himself before the English factory at Cossimbazar, which immediately surrendered without an effort being made to defend it.

The news of the fall of Cossimbazar was received at Calcutta with feelings of dismay. The garrison did not amount to two hundred; not more than a third of their number were Europeans, and few, if any, had ever been in action. In addition to the regular troops in garrison, Calcutta boasted a militia formed from the European and native inhabitants; but so little attention had been given to training this force, that when called out, it is said, there were scarcely any among them "who knew the right from the wrong end" of their muskets. The works were altogether inadequate to sustain a protracted siege, and had they been of greater strength little would have been gained, as the stock of provisions within the place was not more than equal to a few weeks' consumption of its crowded population. The supply of ammunition would not have sufficed for three days' expenditure, if in a good condition, and great part of it was spoiled by damp. There was hardly a carriage that would bear a gun, and numerous pieces of cannon were lying useless under the walls. Assistance was naturally sought from Madras and Bombay; but, with the use of ordinary expedition on the part of the Soubahdar, it was obviously impossible that any could arrive in time to save Calcutta from falling into the hands of the enemy. Application for aid was made to the Dutch and French authorities, but from neither was any obtained. The answer of the Dutch was an unqualified refusal. The French, less dogged, but more insolent, offered to join the English, if the latter would quit Calcutta and remove their garrison and effects to the French settlement of Chandernagore.

In the mean time the Soubahdar was advancing, and the celerity of his movements relieved the English from the perplexities of long suspense. Within a very few days after the fall of Cossimbazar became known, the enemy's guns were heard at Calcutta. The usual method of calming the angry feelings of eastern princes was resorted to. A sum of money was tendered in purchase of the Soubahdar's absence, but refused. Some show of resistance followed, but there was little more than show. The means of defence were indeed small; but had they been greater, they would probably have been vain, from there being no one competent to direct them effectually. Some

of the military officers, and among them those of the highest rank, are represented as notoriously incompetent, and their deficiencies were not counterbalanced by the wisdom or vigour of the civil authorities. It is a small reproach to the civil and commercial servants of the Company, that they were generally deficient in military knowledge and skill; but many of them seem to have been no less deficient in energy, presence of mind, and a regard to the most obvious demands of duty. The natural result was, that while the thunder of the enemy roared without, insubordination, division, and distraction were aiding him within. All authority seems to have been at an end. "From the time," says an eye-witness, "that we were confined to the defence of the fort itself, nothing was to be seen but disorder, riot, and confusion. Everybody was officious in advising, but no one was properly qualified to give advice." In such circumstances, the expediency of abandoning the fort and retreating on shipboard naturally occurred to the besieged, and such a retreat might have been made without dishonour. But the want of concert, together with the criminal eagerness manifested by some of the principal servants of the Company to provide for their own safety at any sacrifice, made the closing scene of the siege one of the most disgraceful in which Englishmen have ever been engaged. On the 18th of June, it was resolved to remove the female residents at Calcutta, and such effects as could be conveniently carried away, to a ship lying before the fort. In the night the general retreat was to take place. Two civil servants, named Manningham and Frankland, volunteered to superintend the embarkation of the females, and having on this pretence quitted the scene of danger, refused to return. Others followed their example, and escaped to the ship, which in the evening weighed anchor and dropped down the river, followed by every other vessel of any size at the station. In the morning no means of escape were available, except two small boats which still remained at the wharf. These were eagerly seized by parties of panic-stricken fugitives, and among those who thus departed were Mr. Drake, the Governor, and the Commandant, Captain Minchin. Abandoned by those whose especial duty it was to protect them, the devoted community proceeded to take measures for establishing some authority in place of that so unworthily renounced. The senior member of council remaining in the fort waived his claim, and Mr. Holwell, another member, assumed the command with the full consent of all parties. No expectation was entertained of preventing the ultimate fall of the place; the only object in view was to defend it until a retreat could be made, and a Company's ship which had been stationed up the river would, it was anticipated, afford the means of escape. Orders were sent to bring the ship as near the fort as was practicable, and the commander proceeded

to carry them into effect; but the pilot, infected by the dastardly feeling which had overcome so many of his superiors, lost his presence of mind, and ran the ship aground. There was now no hope but in the considerate feelings of those who had fled from their companions, still exposed to dangers which they had refused to share. Ignobly as they had abandoned their proper duties, it could not be believed that, when the consciousness of personal safety had calmed their agitation, and time had afforded opportunity for reflection, they would coolly surrender a large body of their countrymen to the mercy of a despot, whose naturally cruel disposition was inflamed by the most savage hatred of the English. To the hope of succour from this quarter the inmates of the besieged fort naturally turned when all other failed. For two days after the flight of the governor and those who accompanied him, the defence of the place was maintained with little skill indeed, but with considerable perseverance. For two entire days did the besieged throw up signals, calling upon their fugitive companions to assist them in escaping the dangers which those companions had feared so much, that they had sacrificed even honour to safety. For two entire days did the fugitives look upon those signals, while the flames which burst from all parts of the town testified still more amply to the distress of their countrymen, and the continued firing of the enemy told of their increasing danger, without making a single effort to answer the calls upon their humanity, or to interpose the slightest assistance. One who had given minute attention to the subject observes, that "a single sloop with fifteen brave men on board might, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, have come up, and anchoring under the fort, have carried away all" who remained to become a tyrant's captives; but even fifteen brave men were wanting for the duty.

The enemy entered, and the Company's servants, civil and military, by consequence became prisoners. They had at first no reason to apprehend any great severity of treatment, the Soubahdar having assured Mr. Holwell, "on the word of a soldier," that no harm should come to them. Harm, however, did come, whether by the contrivance of the Soubahdar or of some of his dependents. Difficulty was found, or pretended, in discovering a proper place of security, and, after some search, a room attached to the barracks, which had been used for the confinement of military offenders, was selected for the purpose. The dimensions of this place were eighteen feet by fourteen. On three sides there was no provision for the admission of air or light; on the fourth were two small windows secured by iron bars; but these, it is represented, from their position not being to the windward, could admit little air, an evil aggravated by the overhanging of a low verandah. Within a space thus confined and ill ventilated, on a sultry night in the sul-

triest season of the year, were immured one hundred and forty-six human beings, a vast majority being Europeans, to whose northern constitutions the oppressive climate of Bengal could scarcely be made supportable by the aid of every resource that art could suggest, and several of them suffering from the effects of recent wounds. Few of the persons knew anything of the place; those who did could not at first persuade themselves that their guards seriously proposed to shut up such numbers in that narrow prison, or they might perhaps, as one of the survivors afterwards declared, have preferred to encounter instant death, by rushing on the swords of the soldiers, to the lingering torture which awaited them. When at length they perceived the horrors of their situation, an offer of a thousand rupees was made to an officer of the guard if he would procure the removal of part of the prisoners to another place. He withdrew, but returned with an answer that it was impossible. The offer was doubled, and the man again withdrew; but he returned only to disappoint the hope of relief, if any hope existed, by declaring that the desired change could not be effected without the orders of the Soubahdar; that he was asleep, and none dared to wake him. Of the horrors of the night which succeeded, no words can raise an adequate conception. The heat and thirst soon became intolerable; and though resistance to the fate that impended seemed useless, to yield to it calmly was more than could be expected from human nature. The rapidly sinking strength of the sufferers was exhausted, and their torments aggravated, by frantic struggles with each other to gain a position near the windows, or to obtain a few drops of the water with which their guards, more in mockery than in mercy, scantily supplied them through the grating. In these dreadful contests, some were beaten down and trampled to death—while, in the more remote parts of the room, the work of the destroyer was in fearful progress through the overpowering heat and the vitiated condition of the air—and happy might they be esteemed whose sufferings were thus shortened. Of the remainder, some were in a state of delirium; others rapidly advancing to that state, but still retaining a consciousness of the scene and circumstances around them, strove by insult and abuse to provoke the guards to fire on them. At length the morning came, and with it an order for bringing out the prisoners. The execution of the mandate was impeded by the piles of dead which blocked up the doorway; an obstacle which it required some time to remove. Those in whom the spark of life was not extinct then came forth, once again to inhale the pure air of heaven. Their number was twenty-three: of these several were soon after carried off by putrid diseases, the consequence of the cruelty to which they had been subjected.

The precise share of the Soubahdar in this

atrocious transaction is not ascertainable. One of the sufferers believed that the orders were only general, and amounted to no more than that the prisoners should be secured. He attributes the barbarity with which they were enforced to the soldiers intrusted with their execution, and it is certain that the horrors of the Black Hole afforded them entertainment. "They took care," says Holwell, "to keep us supplied with water, that they might have the satisfaction of seeing us fight for it, as they phrased it, and held up lights to the bars that they might lose no part of their inhuman diversion." Another of the prisoners seems to have thought that the orders were specific as to the place of confinement, but that they were issued in ignorance of its small dimensions. But these apologetic suggestions, however creditable to the generosity of the sufferers, can do little to relieve the character of the man under whose authority this wholesale murder of prisoners took place. The character of the officers of a government is in a great measure determined by that of those whom they serve; and if the servants of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah exercised any discretion in the choice of a prison, it may safely be concluded that their choice was made under a full impression that it would not be disagreeable to their master. The subsequent conduct of the Soubahdar shows that such a belief would have been well warranted. When Mr. Holwell was admitted to his presence on the morning after the murder, exhibiting on his person painful evidence of the sufferings of the night, the Soubahdar expressed neither regret for the horrors that had occurred, nor displeasure at the conduct of those who had been the direct instruments of producing them; but harshly interrupted Mr. Holwell's attempt to describe them by a demand for the treasure supposed to be concealed.

"All was lost," says Orme, "before the presidency of Madras even received intelligence of the danger." The surrender of Cosimbazar was not known there until the 15th of July. Disturbances with the native princes were too common to excite much surprise, and it was supposed that the attack upon Cosimbazar was the result of a temporary outbreak either of jealousy or avarice, and that the wrath of the hostile prince would in due time be appeased, in the usual way, by a present. It was, notwithstanding, thought advisable to strengthen the British establishment in Bengal, and Major Kilpatrick was despatched thither with two hundred and thirty troops, mostly Europeans. On the 5th of August news arrived of the fall of Calcutta, which "scarcely created more horror and resentment than consternation and perplexity."

Part of the council were opposed to sending any large force to Bengal, from a fear of diminishing the security of the English interests on the coast of Coromandel, and desired to try the effect of negotiation. This line of policy

was strenuously resisted by Orme, the celebrated historian, then a member of the council of Madras. He maintained the necessity of dispatching such a force as should be sufficient to act with vigour and effect against the Soubahdar, and, after much opposition, his advice prevailed. To carry it into effect the co-operation of Admiral Watson, with the squadron under his command, was requested. This was readily granted; but a difficulty was started as to the disposal of the captures which might be made by the fleet. This was no sooner arranged than other difficulties arose out of the questions, who should command the land forces—what should be the extent of the general's authority—his military and diplomatic powers—in what relation he should stand to the late governor and council of Calcutta—and how far their authority should be maintained or reduced? More than six weeks had intervened before the fall of Calcutta was known at Madras; more than two months was subsequently consumed in disputes.

Mr. Pigot, the governor of Madras, was desirous of undertaking the command of the expedition, but he was without military experience, and claimed more extensive powers than his associates in the government felt justified in granting, and they declined to gratify him. The next claim was made by Colonel Alderoron, who was at Madras in command of one of the king's regiments, but his want of acquaintance with the peculiarities of Indian warfare was regarded as disqualifying him for the duty; and another objection to his being intrusted with it was grounded on his being independent of the Company's servants, and little disposed to recognize their authority. Colonel Lawrence was in every way qualified for the command, and would, without doubt, have been nominated to it, had he not been incapacitated by the state of his health. It would have been strange if in this emergency Clive should have been forgotten. Orme had the credit of suggesting him as the leader of the expedition, and the proposal, being warmly approved by Clive's early and undeviating friend, Colonel Lawrence, was finally adopted. The powers of the former governor and council of Calcutta, in civil and commercial affairs, were preserved to them, but in all military matters Clive was to be entirely independent. This was strongly objected to by Mr. Manningham, a member of the council of Calcutta—a gentleman who boasted the unenviable distinction of having been foremost in the disgraceful flight from that place, and who had been deputed by the fugitives on a mission to Madras. His remonstrances, without doubt, received all the attention which the firmness of his character demanded, but they were ineffectual.

The troops destined for the expedition amounted to nine hundred Europeans and fifteen hundred sepoy. The squadron under Admiral Watson consisted of five ships. In these and in five transports the forces were

embarked; but, when on the point of departure, they were deprived of the royal artillery and of the king's guns and stores by the pertinacious refusal of Colonel Alderston to suffer them to proceed unless he had the command. These were consequently disembarked. On the 16th of October the expedition sailed from Madras, and on the 20th of December all the ships except two, after encountering some disasters, had arrived at Fulta, a village on the Hooghly, at some distance from Calcutta, at which the British authorities had re-assembled when beginning to recover from the effects of their panic. The absence of the two missing ships seriously diminished the efficiency of the force. One of them, the *Cumberland*, which bore the flag of Admiral Pocock, the second in command, was the largest in the squadron, and had on board two hundred and fifty of the European troops: the other, a Company's ship, named the *Marlborough*, contained the greater part of the field-artillery. The detachment under Major Kilpatrick, which had been dispatched from Madras on the arrival of the news of the fall of Coesimbazar, was at Fulta, but, having suffered dreadfully from the effects of long encampment upon swampy ground, was not in a condition to add materially to the strength of the British force. Of two hundred and thirty men who had originally composed it, one-half had perished, and of those who survived only thirty were fit for duty. Reinforcements were expected from Bombay, but Clive determined to wait neither for them nor for the arrival of the two ships which had been separated from the rest of the fleet, but to advance at once upon Calcutta.

The reduction of that place had been regarded by Sooraj-oo-Dowlah as the most glorious achievement performed in India since the days of Timour. The conquest was announced at Delhi by letters magnifying its importance, and dwelling with equal diffidence and complacency on the glory of the conqueror. But, though satiated with honour, Sooraj-oo-Dowlah was in other respects grievously disappointed. He had imagined Calcutta one of the richest places in the world, and had anticipated immense wealth from its plunder. Now that the prize was in his possession, he found that he had greatly over-estimated its value. Most of the inhabitants had removed their property in contemplation of the Soubahdar's visit, and the season of the year was one in which no large stock of merchandise was accumulated at Calcutta. The treasury of Omichund furnished about four lacs of rupees, besides some valuable effects; and merchandise to the amount of about two hundred thousand pounds, the property of other parties, fell into the hands of the invaders. The soldiers having appropriated so much of this as they were able to conceal, and the officers appointed to superintend the plunder having provided for themselves as far as they imagined they might with impunity, the remainder formed a solid appendage to th

abounding glory in which Sooraj-oo-Dowlah rejoiced. Mr. Holwell and other servants of the Company were treated with great cruelty, in the expectation that they might thereby be brought to discover some concealed treasure; but as none existed, no revelation of the place of its concealment could be made; and the Soubahdar having left in Calcutta a garrison of three thousand men, quitted it with little gain in any respect, except of self-satisfaction. His disappointed feelings found consolation in hostile messages to the French and Dutch, both of whom he threatened to extirpate unless they immediately contributed to the replenishment of his treasury. They endeavoured to soothe him by professions of respect and attachment, but the Soubahdar did not choose to be paid in such currency; and, after some hesitation, the Dutch were obliged to purchase his forbearance by the contribution of four lacs and a half of rupees, while the French obtained the like favour by the payment of three lacs and a half. The better terms accorded to the latter were in consideration of their having furnished the Soubahdar, when on his march to Calcutta, with two hundred chests of gunpowder, a service which the prince was too grateful to forget, even when engaged in plundering those to whom he was indebted for it. Thus, neither Dutch nor French had much reason to rejoice in the success of the policy which had restrained them from affording aid to the English.

From the view which Sooraj-oo-Dowlah took of his own military genius and its results, he had never contemplated the probability of any attempt on the part of the English to recover that which they had lost. Indeed, had he been correct in his estimate of the population of that division of the earth within which England lies, and of which it forms a very small part, he might have been justified in the proud contempt which he displayed for his enemies; for it was the belief of this prince that "there were not ten thousand men in all Europe!" Yet the loss of the trade carried on by a small fraction of this scantily peopled portion of the globe was seriously felt in the diminution of the revenues of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah; and he was meditating the grant of permission to the English to return, under severe restrictions, when this exercise of his clemency was arrested by intelligence that they had returned without invitation, in great force, and were advancing upon their old settlement. The whole army of the Soubahdar was forthwith ordered to assemble at Moorshedabad, the capital of his dominions, for the purpose of resisting the daring strangers. In the mean time dispositions had been made for defending Calcutta by the officer in command there, who, says Orme, "had no courage but much circumspection." To this person letters were forwarded from Clive and Admiral Watson, addressed to the Soubahdar. They were copen, and the cautious officer, after ascertain-

ing their character, declared that he dared not send letters written in such menacing terms.

On the 27th December the fleet left Fulta, and the next day anchored at Moidapore, where the troops were disembarked for the purpose of marching to attack Budge-Budge, a fort of some strength, about ten miles distant. The march thither was one of dreadful fatigue, and occupied sixteen hours. The country was such as could not be traversed, under the most favourable circumstances, without extreme labour, and the troops on this occasion had not only to encounter the difficulties which it presented to their own passage, but also to draw two field-pieces and a tumbril loaded with ammunition. This arose from the continued apprehensions of the council at Fulta, who, clinging to their first fear with more than martyr's steadfastness, did not venture to provide a single beast either of draught or burden, lest they should incur the Soubahdar's resentment. After such a march, it may well be believed that the troops stood in need of rest; but unfortunately they resigned themselves to it without taking the common precaution of stationing sentinels to guard against surprise. Monichund, the governor of Calcutta, was in the neighbourhood with a force of upwards of three thousand horse and foot. He was apprized of the movement of the English, and about an hour after they had laid down to sleep commenced an attack. Clive's intrepidity and presence of mind succeeded in averting the danger so negligently incurred. He promptly made the necessary dispositions for repulsing the enemy, which were executed with precision and effect. The enemy were driven from the posts which they had occupied, but still seemed prepared to contest the fortune of the day, till a shot passing near the turban of Monichund so astounded that gallant commander, that he instantly turned his elephant and fled with his whole force.

Although the British troops were in this affair taken at a disadvantage, the result seems to have impressed the enemy with a conviction that they were not to be despised. The following day was fixed for an assault on Budge-Budge, but in the evening a drunken sailor belonging to the British squadron having straggled to the ditch, crossed it, and scrambled over the ramparts. Finding no sentinels, he shouted to the advanced guard of the British force that he had taken the fort, and on their proceeding to join him, it was found that the place was evacuated. Monichund returned to Calcutta, but remained there only a few hours, when, leaving a garrison of five hundred men, he went away with the rest of his force to Hooghly, "where," says Orme, "having likewise communicated his own terrors, he proceeded to carry them to the Nabob at Moorsheadabad."

Calcutta, after the discharge of a few shots, was abandoned to the English, who, on the

2nd January, once more became masters of the place from which a few months before they had been so ignominiously expelled. But the want of an enemy did not insure peace. The jealousy of the British authorities gave rise to fierce disputes as to the right of command. Admiral Watson was singularly tenacious of his rights, and of those of the service to which he belonged. Clive was not slow in upholding his own claims as commander-in-chief of the Company's forces in Bengal, and as holding, moreover, the rank of lieutenant-colonel in his Majesty's service—an honour which had been conferred upon him before he left England. At the same time the Governor and Council of Bengal, though they had found their authority a burden in time of danger, were quite ready to resume it when the danger was passed. A party of sepoys having entered the fort at the same time with a detachment from the ships were unceremoniously turned out by the latter; and Clive, on his arrival, was informed that none of the Company's officers or troops should have admission. His was not a spirit to submit tamely to such an interdiction, and he accordingly entered in defiance of it. He found the fort in possession of Captain Coote, a king's officer, who showed him a commission from Admiral Watson, appointing him governor. Clive denied the authority of the admiral, and threatened to put Captain Coote under arrest if he refused to acknowledge his own. Captain Coote thereupon desired that Admiral Watson should be made acquainted with the state of affairs on shore, to which Clive assenting, a message was despatched to the admiral, who, in reply, informed Clive that, if he did not immediately evacuate the fort, it should be fired on. Clive replied that he could not answer for consequences, but that he would not abandon the fort. Further attempts to shake his resolution were made, but Clive persisted in maintaining his claim, with the qualification that if Admiral Watson would come on shore and take the command himself, he would offer no objection. This expedient was adopted. The admiral came, and having received the keys of the garrison from Clive, held them till the next day, when he delivered them in the king's name to the Company's representatives. Thus ended a very idle dispute, by which some time was wasted, the public service impeded, and much ill feeling engendered among brave men engaged in a common cause.

These divisions being healed, the British proceeded to push their success in the direction in which Monichund had fled. A force was detached to attack Hooghly. The fleet prepared the way by battering the fort, and a breach, barely practicable, having been made, it was determined to storm. A false attack at the main gate was made by one division of the troops, while Captain Coote with the other and some sailors succeeded in entering the breach undiscovered. The garrison no sooner

perceived the English on the ramparts than they quitted their posts and made their escape at a small gate.

Thus far success the most ample had attended the progress of the British arms; yet even the bold and sanguine spirit of Clive began to doubt of the expediency of persevering in hostility. The Soubahdar was advancing, and the terror of his approach deterred the country people from bringing provisions either to the town or the army, which was encamped at a short distance from it. Another cause of alarm was the arrival of intelligence that war had been declared between England and France. The truce between the two nations in India was consequently at an end; and as the French had a garrison at Chandernagore containing nearly as many Europeans as the English had in the field, the possibility of their junction with the Soubahdar could not be regarded without the utmost apprehension. Sooraj-oo-Dowlah professed to be willing to treat, but did not slacken his march. On the 3rd February the van of his army was seen advancing in full march towards Calcutta, while some villages in the distance were in flames. Either from a belief that an attack would be hazardous, or from a fear of interrupting a settlement by negotiation, little resistance was offered by Clive, and on the next morning the main body of the enemy advanced. A letter was at the same time received from the Soubahdar desiring that deputies from the English camp might be sent to him. Two civil servants, Messrs. Walsh and Scrafton, were appointed to this duty. On being introduced to the chief minister he affected a suspicion that they intended to assassinate the Soubahdar, and desired to examine whether they had not pistols concealed about them. This ceremony performed, he called upon them to part with their swords, but with that demand they refused to comply, and it was not enforced. When brought into the presence of the prince, they delivered their proposals, which he read, and then having whispered to some of his officers, he desired the deputies to confer with his dewan. The conference, however, did not take place. Omichund, after the capture of Calcutta by the Soubahdar, had been his constant follower, in the hope of getting back some part of the property which he had lost. Being the owner of many houses in Calcutta, and having other interests there, he was anxious at the same time to maintain his influence with the English, and on this occasion he probably saved the lives of the two deputies. He had been present at the audience, and as the deputies were returning he took an opportunity of advising them to take care of themselves, adding, with a significant look, that the Soubahdar's cannon was not yet come up. The deputies, not slow in understanding his intimation, nor backward in acting upon it, ordered their attendants to extinguish their lights; and in-

stead of going to the tent of the dewan, proceeded, in darkness, silence, and panting haste, to the British camp. On receiving their report, Clive determined to attack the enemy on the following morning. The attack was made, but without much judgment. The English, however, succeeded in passing entirely through the enemy's camp, though a thick fog prevented their turning their success to the best account. Neither party derived much either of honour or of satisfaction from the affair, but the Soubahdar's confidence was greatly shaken by it, and he retired some distance with his army. Negotiation was then renewed; and on the 9th February a treaty was concluded, by which the Soubahdar agreed to restore the Company's factories, but only such of the plundered effects as had been brought to account in the books of his government, which probably formed a very small part of them. The English were to be permitted to fortify Calcutta in whatever manner they might think expedient, and to coin money in their own mint. All merchandise under their dustnucks or passes was to be exempt from tax, fees, or imposition of any kind; they were to have possession of certain villages, and to be generally confirmed in all the privileges which had been granted them by the Mogul emperors from their first arrival in the province. Two days after the signing of the treaty, the newly established chain of friendship received another link by the addition of an article of alliance offensive and defensive.

While the negotiations with the Soubahdar were in progress, the relative position of the French and English had occupied some degree of attention. It was part of Clive's instructions to attack the French settlement of Chandernagore, if during his command in Bengal news should arrive of war having been declared between England and France. That news had been received; and immediately on the conclusion of the articles of alliance with the Soubahdar, Clive had sought permission to act upon his instructions. The request was for a time evaded, and Clive availed himself of the Soubahdar's temporizing conduct to move a part of the English troops in the direction of Chandernagore. The French, however, were in correspondence with Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, and the advance of the British force was stopped by a peremptory injunction from that prince. Clive was fearful of irritating him by a resumption of hostilities; and the French, while endeavouring to strengthen their interest by negotiation with the Soubahdar, were unwilling, till those arrangements were completed, to risk an attack from the English. Both parties sought to postpone the commencement of actual warfare, and an extraordinary measure for effecting their common object was seriously discussed. Formerly England and France had waged war in India, while the two countries were at peace at home. This it was now sug-

gested to reverse: peace was to be maintained in Bengal between the representatives of the respective nations, though war raged elsewhere. A proposal to maintain neutrality was made, and an arrangement based upon it would most probably have been concluded had the French authorities at Chandernagore possessed powers to enable them to complete it. But they were dependent upon the government of Pondicherry, and in consequence of that dependence they were unable to enter into any other than a provisional agreement, subject to confirmation or rejection by the controlling authority. Clive was willing to suspend the commencement of hostilities upon the chance of the treaty being confirmed; but Admiral Watson took a different view, and expressed himself strongly against giving effect to any treaty until it had been ratified by the government of Pondicherry.

While affairs were in this state, advice was received of the arrival of Admiral Pocock in the *Cumberland*, together with part of the troops which had been despatched from Madras, and also of reinforcements from Bombay. Clive had constantly maintained the necessity either of agreeing to a neutrality, or of immediately attacking Chandernagore. The additional strength now obtained seemed to favour the adoption of the latter branch of the alternative, but it was not determined on without considerable hesitation. The members of the select committee were, Colonel Clive, Mr. Drake, Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Becher. The two latter were for maintaining neutrality; Clive was for attack; Mr. Drake seems scarce to have been more master of himself than at the moment of his discreditable flight from Calcutta. "He gave an opinion," says Clive, "that nobody could make anything of." Subsequently Major Kilpatrick asked Clive whether he thought the land and sea forces of the British could oppose Chandernagore and the Soubahdar's army at the same time; and, on receiving an answer in the affirmative, he desired to withdraw his former opinion, and adopt that of Clive. The conversion of Major Kilpatrick was followed up by voting the unintelligible "opinion of Mr. Drake to be no opinion at all;" and thus a majority in favour of war was secured. The immediate result was the dismissal of the French deputies, although it is said that the treaty of neutrality was even fairly copied, ready for the signature of those by whom its terms had been arranged. But a new difficulty occurred. Admiral Watson, though opposed to neutrality, was unwilling to attack the French without the permission of the Soubahdar. To obtain it, he had addressed to him a series of letters written in a style of bold expostulation, and, latterly, even of menace. In a letter bearing date the 7th of March, he says, "I now acquaint you that the remainder of the troops, which should have been here long ago, and which I hear the colonel expected, will

be at Calcutta in a few days; that in a few days more I shall despatch a vessel for more ships and more troops; and that I will kindle such a flame in your country as all the waters in the Ganges shall not be able to extinguish. Farewell! remember that he who promises you this never yet broke his word with you or with any man whatsoever."

The answer of the Soubahdar presents a perfect contrast to the direct and blunt style of Admiral Watson's communication. After referring to the principal parts of the admiral's letter, he thus proceeds: "If it be true that one Frenchman does not approve and abide by a treaty entered into by another, no confidence is to be placed in them. The reason of my forbidding war in my country is, that I look on the French as my own subjects, because they have in this affair implored my protection; for which reason I wrote to you to make peace with them, or else I had neither pleaded for them nor protected them. But you are generous and wise men, and well know if an enemy comes to you with a clean heart to implore your mercy, his life should be granted him, that is if you think him pure of heart; but if you mistrust his sincerity, act according to the time and occasion." This communication was the result partly of the Soubahdar's fears, and partly of a timely present administered to his secretary. The words "act according to time and occasion" were vague enough, but they were construed into a permission to attack the French; and though subsequent letters evinced a contrary disposition on the part of the Soubahdar, they were not allowed to alter the determination of the British authorities.

Chandernagore was accordingly attacked, and fell. The honour of the conquest is principally due to the naval force, or rather to a portion of it. The *Cumberland* could not be brought up the river in time, and Admiral Pocock, unwilling to be disappointed of a share in the approaching attack, took to his barge, the oars of which were plied night and day till he reached the place of action, where he hoisted his flag on board the *Tiger*. The *Salisbury* was by an accident thrown out of action, and the entire brunt of the engagement was sustained by the flag-ships of the two admirals, the *Kent* and the *Tiger*.

"Few naval engagements," says Sir John Malcolm, "have excited more admiration, and even at the present day, when the river is so much better known, the success with which the largest vessels of this fleet were navigated to Chandernagore, and laid alongside the batteries of that settlement, is a subject of wonder."

The fire of the ships, says Orme, "did as much execution in three hours as the batteries on shore would have done in several days, during which the whole of the nabob's army might have arrived, when the siege must have been raised; otherwise the troops alone were sufficient to accomplish the success." A body

of the Soubahdar's troops was stationed within the bounds of Chandernagore, previously to the attack. They belonged to the garrison of Hooghly, and were under the command of Nunoomar, governor of that place. Nunoomar had been bought by Omichund for the English, and on their approach, the troops of Sooraj-oc-Dowlah were withdrawn from Chandernagore, lest, as the commander alleged, the victorious standard of the Soubahdar should be involved in the disgrace about to overtake the French.

It had been expected that Clive would be able to effect the re-establishment of the British interests in Bengal in time to return in April with his troops to Madras, at which place a visit from the French was apprehended; and compliance with this expectation was now enjoined by the government of Fort St. George. But the state of affairs in Bengal did not, in Clive's judgment, warrant so early a departure. It can scarcely be questioned that this view was a just one. Had Clive at this time returned to Madras, he would have left the possessions and commerce of his country in Bengal to the mercy of Sooraj-oc-Dowlah and the French commander Law.

Alarmed by the success of the English at Chandernagore, and by a report that the Affghans were in full march to Behar, the Soubahdar thought it necessary to assume an appearance of cordiality towards the victors. He addressed letters of congratulation to Clive and Watson, but at the same time made a most suspicious distribution of his military force and protected the French who had escaped from Chandernagore. These, by the Soubahdar's assistance, reached the French factory at Cossimbazar, where M. Law held the command. Clive demanded leave to attack them, but in place of granting it, the Soubahdar furnished them with money, arms, and ammunition, to enable them to escape, under a promise of being recalled at some future period. He had for some time carried on a correspondence with M. Bussy, urging him to repair to the relief of his countrymen in the Soubahdar's territories. Towards the English he manifested very different feelings. The passage of a few British sepoy to Cossimbazar was obstructed by the Soubahdar's officers, and the transit of ammunition and stores to the English factory there, forbidden. The execution of the pecuniary provisions of the treaty was reluctant, tardy, and imperfect, and after a time the Soubahdar's dewan endeavoured to obtain an acquittance for the whole of the stipulated sum, though a part only had been paid.

Such was the conduct of Sooraj-oc-Dowlah towards the English. In the mean time a spirit was at work among his own subjects and servants, which exposed his throne to danger more imminent than any arising from causes with which he was acquainted.

In the entire circle of his officers, Sooraj-oc-Dowlah had not a single adherent on whom he could rely. Many were disgusted by his ca-

price, and almost all feared that its consequences might some time be fatal to themselves. The feeling of discontent and the desire of change were not confined to the range of the court or the camp: they had extended even to a class of persons of all mankind the most cautious, and peculiarly liable to loss from political disturbances. Among those who wished to see the throne of Sooraj-oc-Dowlah occupied by another, were the Seits, native bankers, of great influence and great wealth. These portents had not been unobserved by Law, the French commander. He had warned the Soubahdar of the disaffection of many of his servants, had pointed out the consequences which would follow, and on taking leave of the prince previously to his departure from Cossimbazar, had emphatically declared his conviction that they would never meet again. Clive, too, had watched the indications of the gathering storm, and saw in its approach the dawn of British supremacy. When it was determined to attack Chandernagore, he had said that the English, having established themselves in Bengal not by consent but by force, the Soubahdar would endeavour by force to drive them out—that consequently they could not stop where they were, but must go further. The soundness of these views was confirmed by the subsequent conduct of Sooraj-oc-Dowlah. It was obvious that he was resolved to get rid of the English, and that he was ready to use the arms of their European enemy to accomplish his purpose: the state of feeling among the Soubahdar's subjects consequently acquired an increasing interest, and the British agents were instructed to observe it with great care.

On the 23rd April, an officer named Yar Lootief Khan requested a secret conference with Mr. Watts, the British resident at the Soubahdar's court. This applicant commanded two thousand horse in the service of Sooraj-oc-Dowlah. He was, at the same time, in the pay of the Seits, native bankers, already mentioned, whom he was engaged to defend against any danger, even though his arms should be required against the Soubahdar himself. The interview solicited with Mr. Watts it was thought dangerous to grant, but Omichund was sent to ascertain the object of the application. To him Lootief opened his views, representing that the Soubahdar would soon march to the northward to oppose the Affghans—that he intended to temporize with the English until his return, when he had determined to extirpate them, and never again to permit them to establish a settlement in his dominions—that most of his officers held him in utter detestation, and were ready to join the first leader of distinction who should raise the standard of revolt. Upon these alleged facts was formed a proposal that the English, during the absence of Sooraj-oc-Dowlah, should seize Moorsshedabad, and proclaim Lootief soubahdar, in which enterprise he promised them the assistance of some of the most pow-

erful interests in the country, including that of the Seits. Part of Lootief's statement was known to be true, and the rest seemed not improbable. Neither the disposition of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah towards the English, nor that of his officers towards himself, could be doubted: it might readily therefore be believed that the Soubahdar entertained the intention ascribed to him, and that his chief officers would co-operate in a plan for his overthrow. Watts communicated the overture to Clive, who thereupon suspended the movement of a detachment which was about to be despatched in pursuit of M. Law and his men, the march of which would probably have precipitated the commencement of open hostilities with the Soubahdar.

On the day following the conference with Lootief, the proposal made by that person was again made to Mr. Watts, with this difference, that instead of Lootief being raised to the soubahdarship, that honour was claimed for Meer Jaffier, a distinguished commander in the service of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, and related to him by marriage. The rank and power of Meer Jaffier rendered this proposal more advantageous than that of Lootief, it indeed the latter had been seriously intended; but the probability seems to be, that it was only designed to sound the disposition of the English before implicating Meer Jaffier in the intrigue. This revised plan was immediately made known to Clive, and by him to the select committee, who, thinking that a revolution in the government, into whatever hands it might fall, would be advantageous to the English, unanimously determined to entertain the proposal. The Soubahdar had been relieved from apprehension of an invasion from the northward by the arrival of intelligence of the retreat of the Afghans from Delhi. His only remaining anxiety was occasioned by the English, and to keep them in check he resolved to reinforce a large division of his army which lay encamped at Plassy, about thirty miles from Moorshedabad and ninety from Calcutta. The destined reinforcement consisted of not less than fifteen thousand men, and the general selected for the command was Meer Jaffier, the man who was plotting for the destruction of his sovereign, and his own elevation to the throne. His appointment separated the chief conspirator from the British resident, Mr. Watts, who was conducting the negotiation on behalf of his government; but Meer Jaffier was afraid to decline the command, lest suspicion should be excited. He accordingly proceeded to obey his master's orders with apparent alacrity, leaving an agent to conduct the correspondence with the British resident.

While the negotiations were in progress, a letter was received in Calcutta from the Peishwa, offering to invade Bengal with one hundred and twenty thousand men, within six weeks after receiving an invitation from the English government. It was brought by a stranger, who seems to have been unable to

authenticate his mission, and suspicion arose that the letter was an artifice of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah to try the sincerity of the English. It was consequently determined to send the letter to the Soubahdar; a step which, whether the document were genuine or not, would have the appearance of amicable feeling. Further to lull the Soubahdar into security till the moment arrived for striking the meditated blow, Clive broke up the English camp, removing half the troops into Calcutta and the remainder into Chandernagore; and he availed himself of this movement to call upon Sooraj-oo-Dowlah to give similar evidence of pacific dispositions by withdrawing his army from Plassy. This point was pressed by Mr. Scrafton, who was despatched to the Soubahdar's court with the Peishwa's letter. With the transmission of that document, which proved to be genuine, the Soubahdar appeared greatly pleased, but he still hesitated to withdraw his army, and expressed some doubts of Clive's sincerity. These doubts Mr. Scrafton exerted himself to remove, and not without effect. Orders were issued for recalling the army to Moorshedabad. Meer Jaffier consequently returned to the capital, and there gave an audience to Mr. Watts, under circumstances of great mystery and danger. A treaty was then produced, which Meer Jaffier swore on the Koran to observe, and added, in his own handwriting, the words:—"I swear by God and the Prophet of God, to abide by the terms of this treaty while I have life." The treaty confirmed all the articles agreed upon in the treaty of peace with Sooraj-oo-Dowlah; declared the enemies of the English, whether Indian or European, the enemies of the future soubahdar; transferred to the English all the factories and effects of the French in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and proscribed the latter nation from again settling in those countries. A crore of rupees (about a million sterling) was to be given as compensation to the English Company for the plunder of Calcutta and the maintenance of their forces, fifty lacs to the English inhabitants of that place, twenty lacs to the Hindoo and Mahometan inhabitants, and seven lacs to the Armenian inhabitants: the distribution of all which sums was to be made by the British authorities. Certain tracts of lands were given to the British, and the aspirant to the soubahdarship bound himself to pay the charges of the English troops whenever he might require their assistance, to abstain from erecting any new fortifications near the Ganges below Hooghly, and to make the stipulated payments as soon as he should be settled in the three provinces. A treaty embodying the same stipulations was signed by the British authorities, and which contained an additional article, solemnly binding them to assist Meer Jaffier in obtaining the government, and to maintain him in it when called upon, on condition of his observing the articles of the treaty. By a separate arrangement, fifty lacs were to be given to the army and navy.

In Moorsshedabad the state of affairs was rapidly tending to a crisis. Before Meer Jaffier was selected for the command of the troops designed to reinforce the army of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah at Plassy, he had been on bad terms with that prince. The Soubahdar's ill feeling revived with the recall of the army, and Meer Jaffier was deprived of his command. This step was not the result of any knowledge or suspicion of the plot in which Meer Jaffier was engaged; it was merely one of those capricious acts of offence in which Sooraj-oo-Dowlah was accustomed to indulge. Subsequently some confused reports reached his ears of the existence of a conspiracy, of which Meer Jaffier was the head, and in which other of the Soubahdar's principal officers were concerned. For several days fierce messages were interchanged between the prince and the general. On the 11th June, letters received in the city from Calcutta announced that the English were confederated with Meer Jaffier, but the Soubahdar appeared to disbelieve it. Two days afterwards, the sudden departure of Mr. Watts, the British resident, convinced him that the announcement was true. He was then preparing to attack the palace of Meer Jaffier with artillery, but panic-struck by the discovery of the extent of the confederacy organized against him, he abandoned hostilities, and invited his rebellious general to a conference. Influenced either by fear or contempt, Meer Jaffier refused to attend the summons of his sovereign; on learning which, the terror of the Soubahdar overcame his pride, and waiving at once his right to command the presence of his subjects, and the state in which he was accustomed to receive them, he sought at the palace of Meer Jaffier the interview which was denied him at his own, and proceeded thither with a retinue too small to excite apprehension. The result of the meeting to the Soubahdar was perfectly satisfactory; professions of reconciliation, and promises of fidelity, were exchanged with an appearance of sincerity, which seemed to want nothing but the solemn sanction of religion to render it impossible to disbelieve them. This too was supplied—both parties swore on the Koran to adhere to their engagements; and the Soubahdar, relieved from a degree of alarm which had been felt as almost overwhelming, was now excited to the highest degree of confidence and exultation. He forthwith addressed a letter to Clive, couched in terms of indignation and defiance, and in proud anticipation of a victory over his English enemy, ordered his whole army to assemble without delay at their former encampments at Plassy. A portion of the force, upon which his hopes were rested, consisted of the troops of Meer Jaffier, commanded by that officer in person. Such was the reliance placed by Sooraj-oo-Dowlah upon the effect of his recent conference with one whom he so lately suspected of treachery.

In the mean time the English had not been idle. The treaties signed by Meer Jaffier

were received in Calcutta on the 10th June. No time was to be lost in commencing operations, for before this period the secret of his intended movement against Sooraj-oo-Dowlah had by some means transpired, and had become a subject of common talk. It was thus that it became known at Moorsshedabad on the 11th. On the 12th, the troops at Calcutta, with a party of one hundred and fifty seamen from the fleet, marched to join the remainder of the British force at Chandernagore. Here one hundred seamen were left in garrison, in order that every soldier might be at liberty for service in the field; and on the 13th the rest of the force proceeded on their march. It consisted of six hundred and fifty European infantry, one hundred and fifty artillerymen including fifty seamen, two thousand one hundred sepoy, and a small number of Portuguese, making a total of something more than three thousand men. It was accompanied by eight field-pieces and one or two howitzers. On the day of its leaving Chandernagore, Clive despatched a letter to the Soubahdar, reproaching him with his evasions of the treaty, and other instances of perfidy; his correspondence with Bussy; his protection of Law and his troops; and his insolence towards various servants of the British Government. In contrast, Clive dwelt upon the patience shown by the English, and their readiness to assist him against the apprehended invasion of the Affghans. It was added, that the English had determined to proceed to the island of Cossimbazar, and refer their disputes to the arbitration of Meer Jaffier, Roydoolob, the Soubahdar's dewan (who was also engaged in the conspiracy), the bankers (Seits), and other eminent persons: and if it were found that they had deviated from the treaty, they would give up all further claims; but if it appeared that it had been broken by Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, satisfaction would be demanded for the losses sustained by the English, and for all the charges of their army and navy. Clive concluded by announcing, that as the rainy season was near at hand, and many days must elapse before an answer could reach him, he had found it necessary to wait upon the Soubahdar immediately.

The British force continued its march without interruption, and on the 17th of June took possession of the town and fort of Kutwah, where they found an immense store of rice. Clive, however, was kept in great anxiety by the dubious conduct of Meer Jaffier, whose communications were few, and generally of such ambiguous import, that it was not unnatural to infer either that his reconciliation with the Soubahdar was sincere, or that he wanted resolution to aid the accomplishment of his own design. Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, after some altercation with his troops respecting arrears of pay, had succeeded in assembling at and near Plassy his whole force, amounting to fifty thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were cavalry, with upwards of forty pieces of cannon. The Hooghly flowed between the

two armies, and to cross it was to provoke an engagement. Uncertain of the support of Meer Jaffer, and doubtful of the success of an attack unaided by his co-operation, Clive hesitated to take a step which, if it should fail, would be fatal to the British power in Bengal. Had a defeat ensued, said Clive, "not one man would have returned to tell it." In this state of mind he had recourse to an expedient little in accordance with the bold and independent character of his mind. He called a council of war, at which he proposed the question, whether, in the existing situation of the British force, it would, without assistance, be prudent to attack the Soubahdar. Orme remarks, that "it is very rare that a council of war decides for battle; for as the commander never consults his officers in this authentic form, but when great difficulties are to be surmounted, the general communication increases the sense of risk and danger which every one brings with him to the consultation." In this particular case the natural leaning to the side of caution was perhaps strengthened by the unusual order in which the opinions of the members of council were taken. Instead of beginning with that of the youngest officer, and proceeding according to the gradation of rank to him who held the chief command, Clive first declared his own opinion, which was against hazarding an action. The influence of his rank, and the deference paid to his military talents, must be presumed to have had some effect upon the judgment of those who were to follow, more especially when the opinion of one of the most daring of men was given against the course to which his natural temperament would incline him. The result was, that of twenty officers who attended the council, thirteen were favourable to delay. Among those whose voices were given for immediate action was Major Coote, afterwards distinguished in Indian warfare as Sir Eyre Coote.

But the decision of the council was overruled by the man whose influence had in all probability mainly contributed to produce it. Sixteen years afterward Clive observed, that this was the only council of war that he had ever held, and that if he had abided by that council, it would have been the ruin of the East-India Company. On the 22nd of June, the British force crossed the river. An hour after midnight they arrived at Plassy, and took up their position there in a grove of mango-trees.

At daybreak the army of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah was discovered in motion. Countless bodies of troops were seen advancing, with guns of the largest calibre drawn by vast trains of oxen, while a number of elephants, gorgeously clothed in scarlet cloth and embroidery, added greatly to the magnificence of the spectacle, if they contributed little to the strength of the army which they adorned. The cavalry and infantry were disposed in columns of four or five thousand each, and between them

were placed portions of the artillery. They marched as if intending to surround the English force as far as the river would permit; but, as soon as their rear was clear of the camp they halted, and a party of forty or fifty Frenchmen advanced with some guns, their officer, named Sinfray, calling upon some of the Soubahdar's troops to follow him. But his invitation was disregarded; "for such," says Crauford, "was their mistrust of each other, that no commander dared to venture on singly, for fear some other commander, suspected of attachment to us, should fall on him." A general cannonading, however, commenced from the Soubahdar's artillery. This was felt severely by the English, who had quitted the grove where they were sheltered by a bank, in front of which they were now drawn up. Clive accordingly returned with his troops, and they once more took up their position behind the bank. The enemy thereupon advanced their heavy artillery nearer, and fired with greater rapidity than before; but they produced little effect, the English troops escaping the shots by sitting down under cover of the bank. About noon, a heavy shower so much damaged the enemy's powder that their fire became feeble; but the English, who had throughout the day answered the enemy's guns with their field-pieces, continued firing without interruption and with considerable effect. Another disaster befell the Soubahdar's cause in the loss of Moodeen Khan, one of the most able and faithful of his generals, who fell mortally wounded by a cannon-ball. Shortly afterwards the enemy ceased firing, the oxen were yoked to the artillery, and the whole army turned and proceeded slowly towards their camp. The Frenchmen, who seem to have behaved with much gallantry, still kept their post, till a party of the British force under Major Kilpatrick moved forward to attack them; when Sinfray, seeing himself unsupported, retired, but carried off his guns. The detachment which had dislodged the French party was soon joined by the remainder of the British force, and all the field-pieces having been brought up, a vigorous cannonade was commenced on the enemy's camp. Symptoms of confusion after a time encouraged Clive to attack at once an angle of the camp, and an eminence near it. Both were carried. A general rout ensued, and the camp, baggage, and artillery of the enemy became prize to their conquerors. The enemy were pursued for about six miles, and it is supposed lost in the action and during the pursuit five or six hundred men. The loss of the English in killed and wounded was about seventy.

Clive had intended to maintain the cannonade during the day, and to attack the camp at midnight. The retreat of the enemy, followed as it was by the happy movement of Major Kilpatrick, placed victory in his hands at an earlier period. "Sooraj-oo-Dowlah," Clive observed, "had no confidence in his

army, nor his army any confidence in him, and therefore they did not do their duty on the occasion." He might have added, that one half of those who held commands in his army had no intention or desire to do their duty. When Moodeen Khan was killed, the unhappy sovereign sent for Meer Jaffier. Casting his turban at the feet of his servant, he implored him in piteous and almost abject terms to forget the differences which had existed between them, and conjured him, by the respect due to their departed relative Aliverdi Khan, to defend the throne of his successor. Meer Jaffier promised all that the Soubahdar could wish, and, as the best advice that a devoted friend could offer, suggested, in consideration of the advance of the day and the fatigue of the troops, that the conflict should be suspended till the following morning. The Soubahdar objected that the English might attack him in the night, but Meer Jaffier assured him that he would guard against this contingency. Orders were accordingly despatched to the dewan, Mohun Lal, to recall the troops to the camp. The dewan remonstrated; but Meer Jaffier insisted, and his counsel prevailed. The work thus commenced by one of the conspirators was completed by another. On the approach of the English, Roy-loolooob advised the Soubahdar to retire to Moorsshedabad, and the recommendation was too well supported by the fears of him to whom it was addressed to be disregarded. Sooraj-oo-Dowlah fled with the utmost rapidity, and was one of the first to bear to his capital the news of his own disgrace. The disappearance of the Soubahdar rendered hopeless any attempt to rally his troops, and nothing was left for the English to perform but to take possession of the camp and pursue the fugitives.

During the greater part of the day, Clive had remained uncertain of the intentions of Meer Jaffier; it is probable, indeed, that Meer Jaffier himself shared the uncertainty, and that all that he had determined was to shape his course according to circumstances—to watch the turn of events, and join the party for whom victory declared. Late in the day, a large body of troops was observed on the flank of the English, whose object it was not easy to ascertain. This was the division of Meer Jaffier; but, in consequence of the miscarriage of a message despatched by him to the English commander, no signs of recognition had been agreed upon. These troops were consequently regarded with suspicion, and the English kept them at a distance with their field-pieces. When, however, the general retreat took place, they kept apart from the rest of the Soubahdar's army. Clive then became satisfied, not only that they were the troops of Meer Jaffier, but that they would not be employed in support of the Soubahdar, and he was thereby encouraged to the attack upon the enemy's camp, which secured the victory. Meer Jaffier had not intended that

he should remain thus long in suspense. Immediately after his interview with the Soubahdar, when the pathetic appeal of the prince had drawn from the general renewed expressions of duty and attachment, Meer Jaffier had addressed a letter to Clive acquainting him with the advice which he had just given his master. That advice, it will be recollected, was to discontinue the battle for the day, but to renew it on the following; and to secure its adoption Meer Jaffier had undertaken to guard against the chance of a surprise in the night. To Clive, this single-minded man recommended immediately to push forward, or at all events not to delay an attack beyond three o'clock on the following morning. But the messenger to whom the letter was intrusted was afraid of the firing; it was consequently not delivered till the course of the British commander had been in a great measure determined, and it only served to give further assurance of its expediency.

Meer Jaffier was not unconscious that his conduct throughout had been open to suspicion. He had endeavoured to stand well with both parties, so that, whatever the event of the contest, he might be safe; but he felt some doubts whether his treason in the council would be regarded by the English as compensating for his neutrality in the field. In the interview with the English officers which followed the flight of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, he evinced more apprehension than joy; the military honour with which he was received at the English camp, alarmed instead of gratifying him, and he started back "as if," says Sorafton, "it was all over with him." On being introduced to Clive, his fears were allayed by the apparent cordiality with which the colonel saluted him as Soubahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. A few days afterwards he was led by Clive to the musnud, in the hall of audience, at Moorsshedabad, and received the formal homage of the principal officers and dependents of the government.

Sooraj-oo-Dowlah was now a wanderer through the country which lately owned no law but his will. On arriving at his palace, after his flight from Plassy, he found himself in danger of being abandoned by every adherent. To secure the continued fidelity of his soldiers, he made a large distribution of money among them. They readily accepted his bounty, but deserted with it to their own homes. His nearest relatives refused to engage in his support, or even to encounter the danger of accompanying him in the further flight which was now inevitable. That flight was accelerated by the arrival of Meer Jaffier; and, taking advantage of the night, Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, with a very slender retinue, departed, in the hope of being able to join the French detachment under M. Law. In search of shelter and food, he entered the dwelling of a devotee, who in the day of his power had been one of the sufferers from his cruelty. The

person of the applicant was known and the injury was remembered, but the hospitality implored was not withheld. The host received his visitors with courtesy, and placed before them refreshment, availing himself of the time occupied in partaking of it to despatch private information of the arrival of his distinguished guest to Meer Cossim, a relative of Meer Jaffier, who held a command in the neighbourhood. The intelligence was too welcome to be neglected; and Meer Cossim, proceeding to the cell of the hermit, made prisoners of his visitors, and took possession of their effects. The deposed prince was forthwith taken back to Moorshedabad, and, it is said, was treated on the way with great indignity and cruelty. Meer Jaffier felt or affected some compassion for the prisoner. Meerun, his son, a youth whose character strongly resembled that of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, cherished no such weakness. By Meerun the unhappy captive was devoted to death; but, either from the prevalence of respect for the rank of the destined victim, or from a belief that Meer Jaffier would not sanction the deed, some difficulty was experienced in finding an executioner. At length the task was undertaken by a miscreant who had from infancy enjoyed the bounty, first of Aliverdi Khan, and subsequently of his grandson and successor, now a prisoner and destined for death. The favours which had been heaped on him formed no impediment to his undertaking the murder of the man to whom and to whose family the assassin was so deeply indebted. Many there were from whom Sooraj-oo-Dowlah could look for nothing but vengeance: his death came from one of the few on whom he had a claim for gratitude. He had not completed the twentieth year of a profligate and scandalous life, nor the fifteenth month of a weak and cruel reign.

Little now remained but the performance of the pecuniary stipulations agreed upon between the British government and Meer Jaffier. The wealth of the Subahdar's treasury had been greatly overrated, but it was yet able to bear very heavy drafts. After some discussion it was decided that one-half of the stipulated amount should be paid immediately, and the remainder at intervals within three years. The first payment seems to have been the cause of great delight. The money was packed in seven hundred chests, which being placed in one hundred boats, the whole proceeded down the river in procession, with banners waving above, and music pealing around them. Many indeed had reason to rejoice in the advance of the richly-freighted fleet. Those who had sustained losses at the capture of Calcutta were to have compensation; and the army and navy had been encouraged to look for reward. There was also another class of persons who were expecting to participate in the wealth which thus followed in the train of victory. When the negotiation with Meer Jaffier was in progress,

Mr. Becher, a member of the select committee, suggested that, as the army and navy were to have donations, the committee, by whom the whole machinery had been put in motion, were entitled "to be considered,"—and they were considered. Clive received on this account two lacs and eighty thousand rupees; Mr. Drake, the governor, the same sum; and the remaining members of the committee, two lacs and forty thousand rupees each. The generosity of the new Subahdar even extended to those members of council who were not of the select committee, and who consequently had no claim "to be considered" under the original proposal. Each of these gentlemen, it is stated, received a lac of rupees. Clive, according to his own statement, received a further present of sixteen lacs of rupees. Mr. Watts, in addition to his share as one of the committee, obtained eight lacs; Major Kilpatrick, three lacs, besides his share; Mr. Walsh, who was employed in part of the negotiations, had five lacs; Mr. Soraf-ton, two. Others participated to a smaller extent in the profuse distribution that took place. Such transactions are perfectly in accordance with the spirit and practice of Oriental governments; but they are not reconcilable with European ideas. Many years afterwards, when the conduct of Clive was, on this account, impugned, he defended himself with some talent and some plausibility. He maintained his right to avail himself of the munificence of Meer Jaffier, on the grounds that he committed no injustice, and caused no injury to his employers; that his forbearance would not have benefited them; that he had abandoned all commercial advantages to devote himself to a military life; and that all his actions had been governed by a regard to the honour of his country and the interests of the East-India Company. He even claimed credit for his moderation. "The city of Moorshedabad," said he, "is as extensive, populous, and rich, as the city of London, with this difference, that there are individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than in the last city. These, as well as every other man of property, made me the greatest offers (which, nevertheless, are usual on such occasions, and what they expected would be required), and had I accepted these offers, I might have been in possession of millions, which the present Court of Directors could not have dispossessed me of." And he declared that when he recollected entering the treasury at Moorshedabad, "with heaps of gold and silver to the right and left, and these crowned with jewels," he stood astonished at his own moderation.

That Clive never sacrificed the interests either of his country or of the East-India Company to his own is certain; the temptations to which he and his coadjutors were exposed, and the fact that the receiving of presents was then forbidden neither by law nor by the covenants of the Company's servants,

must also be allowed their due weight. Neither must it be forgotten, that the fixed emoluments of the Company's servants were at that time altogether inadequate to remunerate the duties which were required. In some instances they were not sufficient to provide the means of decent subsistence. The result was, that no one ever thought of being satisfied with his pay or salary, and that all were intent upon discovering indirect means of acquiring wealth. Still, all these circumstances tend only to palliate, not to justify, the conduct of Clive and his colleagues.

When these transactions became the subject of parliamentary inquiry, there was another point on which the conduct of Clive and his colleagues was severely arraigned. A wealthy native, named Omichund, has been already mentioned as an assiduous attendant at the court of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, where his influence with the Soubahdar, as well as the information which he had the opportunity of acquiring, had enabled him to render many services to the cause of the English: these were highly estimated by the British resident, whose confidence Omichund appears, at one period, entirely to have possessed. He was aware of the overture made to the English by Lootkief; but, in consequence of his being disliked by Meer Jaffier, or, as it was surmised, by the Seits, who dreaded his influence, he was not at first intrusted with the secret of the conspiracy which ended in the deposition and death of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah. It was difficult, however, long to evade the penetration of Omichund, and impossible to prevent his entertaining suspicions. Mr. Watts, therefore, appears to have thought it the most expedient plan to apprise him of the confederacy of the English with Meer Jaffier, and to secure his co-operation. His friendship might be useful; his enmity would certainly be dangerous.

Omichund knew well that none of the native agents in the proposed change would engage in the attempt without the prospect of gain, and he probably inferred that their European associates had similar views. It was not, therefore, to be expected that he should neglect to stipulate for some advantage to himself. He represented, and certainly with truth, that, connecting himself with the designs of the conspirators, he incurred risk both to his person and his fortune—the latter, very probably, was in his estimation the more dreadful—and he urged, therefore, that he ought to have a sufficient interest in the success of the plan to counterbalance the hazard of its failure.

Had Omichund demanded any compensation of moderate amount, it would perhaps have been bestowed. But his claim was framed on the suggestions of that master passion to which he was a slave, and with reference to the relative situation of the English and himself. He knew that they were in his power—that a word from him might frustrate

the success of the conspiracy, disappoint all the hopes founded on it, and possibly involve the British interests in destruction. Desire and circumstance thus combining to remove all restraint upon the extent of his demand, Omichund required five per cent. on all the money in the Soubahdar's treasury, and a portion of his jewels. This Mr. Watts did not feel justified in promising; but in the articles of treaty, forwarded by him to the committee, was one securing to Omichund thirty lacs of rupees.

The committee were astonished at the vastness of the sum, but dreaded the consequences of refusing it. Omichund might betray the secret, and it is said that he threatened to do so if his claim were rejected. In this emergency, Clive suggested the means of at once disarming his threatened hostility and sparing the Soubahdar's treasury. Omichund's interests were to be protected by a special clause in the treaty. Two treaties were drawn up: one, written on white paper, contained no reference to Omichund; another, written upon red paper, contained all the stipulations of the white treaty, and, in addition, an article in favour of Omichund, to deceive whom was the only purpose for which it existed. But a new difficulty occurred. The select committee had no hesitation in signing both the treaties; but Admiral Watson refused his signature to the mock document, and the absence of his name, it was foreseen, would excite the suspicion of so wary a man as Omichund. Here again Clive had an expedient ready. It was to attach the admiral's name by another hand. The two treaties were accordingly rendered complete, and the red one answered its purpose. Omichund kept the secret of the conspirators, Sooraj-oo-Dowlah was dethroned, and Meer Jaffier elevated to his place.

The sequel of the tale is melancholy. Omichund embodied the very soul of covetousness. In him, avarice had attained that stage when it becomes a disease rather than a passion of the mind. He had passed a long life in unceasing labours to increase his wealth; and he flattered himself that, by one master stroke, he had added to his former accumulations a sum which was in itself a regal fortune. He had not been without fear that some deception might be practised upon him; but he had ascertained that his claim was recognized in a treaty signed by all the English authorities, and that the good faith of the British government was thus solemnly pledged to its discharge. He could not have been without anxiety as to the success of the attempt in which he had so large a stake; but the arms of the English were victorious, and the sovereign of their choice occupied the throne. Nothing, therefore, seemed now to stand between him and the gratification of his desires; and in the full expectation that he was about to receive that for which he had bargained, he attended a meeting of the prin-

cipal parties concerned in the revolution, held for the purpose of considering the state of the Subahdar's treasury, and the mode of carrying out the pecuniary provisions of the treaty. That document was produced and read. Omichund became agitated, and said, "This cannot be the treaty; it was a red treaty that I saw." Clive coolly replied, "Yes, but this is a white one;" and turning to Scrafton, who spoke the native language more perfectly than himself, he said, "It is

now time to undeceive Omichund." The process of undeceiving the miserable man was short and simple. In compliance with the suggestion of Clive, Scrafton said, "Omichund, the red treaty is a trick, you are to have nothing;" and he needed not to say more. The senses of Omichund had fled; he fell back in a swoon, from which he recovered only to linger out the remnant of his life in a state of idiocy.

CHAPTER V.

AFFAIRS OF THE CARNATIC.—NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS.—UNSUCCESSFUL SIEGE OF MADRAS BY COUNT DE LALLY.—VICTORIES OF COLONEL FORDE AND COLONEL COOTE.—SURRENDER OF PONDICHERRY.—ANNIHILATION OF FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

THE despatch to Bengal of a force, large with reference to the means of the British Government, had left the authorities at Madras without the means of displaying much vigour in the Carnatic. The nabob, Mahomet Ali, continued to be embarrassed by the impossibility of collecting his revenues; and, to add to his difficulties, two of his brothers availed themselves of his weakness to raise the standard of rebellion. Colonel Forde with a small force proceeded to Nellore, to aid the nabob's army in reducing one of them to obedience, but returned without success.

To counteract the designs of the other, Captain Calliaud, who then commanded at Trichinopoly, was ordered to march to Tinnevely. After some delay, occasioned chiefly by want of money, he marched to reduce the fort of Madura. An attempt to take the place by surprise failed; and Captain Calliaud was preparing to repeat his attack in the hope of being assisted from within, when he was recalled to Trichinopoly by intelligence that the French were in sight of that place. He did not receive the news till three o'clock on the 21st of May. At six he was on his march. It was commenced without tents, baggage, or artillery. The men bore their own food; a few bullocks were taken to carry ammunition, and persons attached to the commissariat were sent forward to make the necessary arrangements for refreshment at the different places of halt.

The force which menaced Trichinopoly was under the command of M. d'Auteuil. Great exertions had been made to collect it. The French garrisons were drained of their effective men, and the duties left to be performed by invalids, assisted at Pondicherry by the European inhabitants. The entire force thus set at liberty for an attack on Trichinopoly amounted to one thousand Europeans, infantry and artillery, one hundred and fifty European cavalry, and three thousand sepoy, supported by several field-pieces.

The force of the English in Trichinopoly

consisted of one hundred and fifty European infantry, fifteen artillery-men, and seven hundred sepoy. There were also six hundred men furnished by Tondiman, a native chief, and the king of Tanjore, and about four hundred belonging to Mahomet Ali. These added considerably to the number, but little to the strength of the garrison. The greater part of these auxiliaries are represented by Orme as being "only fit for night-watches; nor," he adds, "for that, without being watched themselves." There was within Trichinopoly another body of men, whose absence was, under the circumstances, much to be desired. These were five hundred French prisoners. It was known that they maintained a correspondence with their countrymen without; and the expectation of their being able to emancipate themselves from restraint during the attack and aid its objects, was believed to have encouraged the present attempt against the city.

On the 15th of May the enemy began to throw shells into the town. The bombardment was continued through four successive days, when M. d'Auteuil made a formal demand of surrender. Captain Smith, who held the chief command in the absence of Captain Calliaud, answered by an avowal of his determination to maintain the town. It was believed that this would be followed by an attempt to carry the place by assault on the succeeding night, and some indications of such an intention were made. The arrival of Captain Calliaud and his troops was consequently looked for with great anxiety, and at six o'clock in the evening of the 25th they were only twelve miles distant from Trichinopoly. The march had thus far been performed in safety; but a greater difficulty remained. The troops of the enemy had been so disposed as to command every line by which, in ordinary circumstances, the city could be approached from the direction of Captain Calliaud's advance, and it was discovered that some spies had mixed with the English troops, for the purpose of ascertaining the precise route which would be taken.

These persons Captain Calliaud suffered to pursue their avocations undisturbed, as he designed to make them the instruments of misleading those by whom they were sent. Having, to all appearance, determined upon the road by which he would seek to enter the town, he pursued it for about six miles; it was then becoming dark, and the French spies, satisfied that they were in possession of the intentions of the British commander, dropped off to communicate them to their employers. Captain Calliaud then changed his track, striking off to a direction where the enemy had made no preparation, not anticipating the possibility of any attempt being made to pass that way. The track chosen by Captain Calliaud lay over rice-fields, which being in a state of irrigation were thus converted into one continuous swamp. The march across them occupied seven hours, although the distance to be traversed was only about as many miles, for every step was taken knee-deep in mud. The break of day brought the troops to firmer ground, and gladdened their sight by a view of the city and fort of Trichinopoly at no great distance. Captain Smith drew out a part of his garrison, with two field-pieces, to protect the reinforcement against any attempt to intercept them; but none was made, and the detachment entered the fort amidst the shouts of their comrades, their commander marching at their head. His attention had been diverted to so many points during this extraordinary march, that he had undergone more fatigue than any of his men; and when he led them into the fort, he was obliged, from weakness, to be supported by two grenadiers. The enemy still continued on the watch at the point where the report of his spies had led him to expect the advance of the English party, and it was not till the triumphant discharge of twenty-one pieces of cannon announced their safe arrival within the fort, that the French commander began to suspect that he had been misled. The suspicion was soon heightened into certainty. In the evening the French retired to Seringham, and soon afterwards to Pondicherry. The march of Captain Calliaud thus saved Trichinopoly from an attack, and possibly from capture.

The war now continued to be carried on with little vigour or advantage on either side, but with the perpetration of some excesses on both. The English set fire to Wandewash, and the French in retaliation burnt Conjeveram. By these acts, the European nations did little harm to each other, but inflicted great suffering on the native population, who had but a slender interest in the quarrel. The balance of success was, however, on the whole, in favour of the French, who, after acquiring some minor factories belonging to their rival, obtained possession of the important one of Vizagapatam. The English were greatly dispirited by these events, and the expense of maintaining the campaign appears to have been a cause of embarrassment. To add to

their difficulties, the Mahratta, Bajee Row, made his appearance to demand *chout*, or tribute, from the Nabob of Arcot. After some discussion, the purchase of his departure was settled at the price of two hundred thousand rupees to be paid down by the nabob, and two hundred and fifty thousand more by orders on his polygars and dependants. The agreement being concluded, the nabob transferred the completion of his part of it to his English allies, requesting that they would furnish the money out of the rents which he had assigned to them for the expenses of the war. This was neither convenient nor as a matter of precedent desirable, but it was not easy to evade the demand. Morari Row and some other chiefs tendered their alliance to aid in resisting the claim of Bajee Row, but the English had no greater desire for their presence than for that of the collector of the tribute. Some attempts were made to postpone the settlement of the claim in hope of a change of circumstances, and others to attach certain conditions to its discharge, but all was fruitless. "The English," says Orme, "had no alternative but to pay or fight." They had no troops to spare for the latter duty, and they were afraid of accepting the assistance that was offered by their neighbours; they, therefore, preferred the former branch of the alternative, and the representative of Bajee Row departed laden with coin and bills.

Early in September, a French fleet of twelve ships appeared in Pondicherry roads. By the council of Fort St. David it was mistaken for an English force. A messenger was accordingly sent to bear to the admiral the compliments of the authorities, as well as a letter conveying some information which it was thought desirable to communicate. The messenger did not become aware of the mistake under which he had been despatched until it was too late for remedy. He had, therefore, no choice but to conceal the letter and yield himself a prisoner. For some time the movements of the French fleet were regarded with great anxiety, but the motives by which they were guided appeared involved in great mystery. The fleet had on board a French regiment, under the command of the Marquis de Soupires, who bore a commission giving him the direction and command of all military operations. The command of the squadron was held by M. Bouvet, who had been taken on board at the island of Bourbon, and who had the reputation of being one of the ablest men connected with the French marine. Besides the troops, the fleet had on board some battering cannon and mortars, as well as a large supply of bombs and balls. The troops having been landed at Pondicherry, the squadron suddenly disappeared, leaving the English utterly unable to account for its departure. The cause of it was the discovery of the letter from the Council of Fort St. David, and which the messenger had placed between two planks of the boat in which he had pro-

ceeded. Among other matters referred to in that letter, was the probability of the arrival by the middle of September of Admiral Watson, with the ships under his command, from Bengal; and from the junction of these with the squadron from England great results were anticipated. This intelligence so much disconcerted M. Bouvet, that he determined not to wait the chance of encountering a force superior to his own. He declared that he had done enough in landing the troops, and should immediately sail back to the islands. So great was his haste, that he refused to disembark the artillery and heavy ammunition, on account of the time required to land them, and to take in ballast to supply their place. The capture of the messenger of the Council of Fort St. David and the discovery of his letter were thus the means of relieving the English from the annoyance which was expected from the French fleet.

On the day on which Soupires landed at Pondicherry, Madura surrendered to the English. Captain Calliaud being satisfied that, for a time at least, Trichinopoly was in safety, had returned to Madura in July. Some attempts had been made to reduce the place during his absence, but they failed, and those subsequently made were attended with no better success. It yielded at last to the potent influence of money. About two-thirds of the amount was destined for the liquidation of the arrears of pay due to the troops who had defended the place, the remainder for presents to the commander and principal officers.

In October, the French obtained possession of Chittapet, a place of some strength. It was gallantly defended by the killadar in command, and might probably have been saved had the English Government afforded any assistance; but Mahomet Ali had conceived a dislike to the killadar, and his representations were suffered to influence the conduct of the English. Trinomaly, and some other forts of inferior importance, were soon afterwards added to the acquisitions of the French, who lost no time in taking advantage of their successes by making arrangements for securing the revenues of the districts which fell into their power.

The earlier months of the year 1758 were passed in comparative inactivity; but on the 28th of April a French squadron of twelve sail was descried standing in for the road of Fort St. David. Part of these ships had sailed from France in the preceding year, having on board a military force commanded by the Count de Lally, who had been appointed governor-general of all the French possessions and establishments in India. After encountering much bad weather and suffering severely from contagious disease, the expedition arrived at the Isle of France, where it was strengthened by the addition of some of the ships which the fears of M. Bouvet had, a few months before, so precipitately withdrawn from Pondicherry.

Lally lost no time in proclaiming his authority and establishing means for effecting the objects of the expedition. He proceeded with two of the ships to Pondicherry, and one purpose of his visit was manifested on the following morning, by the entry of a detachment of French troops within the bounds of Fort St. David. They were to have been joined by the troops from the fleet, but this was prevented by the appearance of an English squadron, which had discovered and bore down upon the French ships almost as soon as Lally had departed to Pondicherry. The English squadron was composed of the ships from Bengal which had returned in February under Admiral Pocock, and some others which had arrived under the command of Admiral Stevens. An action ensued, in which the French suffered severely in loss of men, and the English in damage to their ships, but neither party could claim a victory. The French ships, from having sustained less injury in their masts and rigging, were enabled to out sail the English, and with the exception of one, which was stranded, they reached Pondicherry in safety.

Admiral Pocock laboured to bring the French squadron once more to action, but the winds and currents, together with the dilapidated state of one of the English ships, aided the opposite views of the French commander, M. d'Aché, who contrary to the wishes of Lally, was above all things anxious to avoid an engagement. His reluctance to fight received some countenance from the fact of a large number of his men being disabled by sickness. To remove this ground of objection, Lally offered reinforcements to supply the place of the sick, and M. d'Aché was at last compelled to proceed to sea; but, instead of bearing down on the English squadron, which was unable to work up to him, he "kept the wind, plying for Fort St. David." On 1st of June he was observed working into the roads, and this probably influenced the determination of those who defended the English settlement. On the land side, it was attacked by two thousand five hundred Europeans, and about the same number of sepoys. The garrison consisted of sixteen hundred natives and upwards of six hundred Europeans, two hundred and fifty of whom were seamen. A vigorous bombardment had for some time been carried on, and though the enemy had made no breach, they had dismounted some of the guns, disabled the carriages, and inflicted serious injury on parts of the works. The tanks and reservoirs had suffered, and water could only be procured under cover of the night. The stock of ammunition also began to fail, much having been wasted. "The fort continued," says Orme, "to lavish away their fire night and day on everything they saw, heard, or suspected." In addition to these circumstances, the native troops deserted in great numbers, and part of the Europeans are represented to have been drunken, disorderly, and disobedient. On the

2nd of June, terms of capitulation were proposed by the besieged, and on the evening of that day the place was surrendered. Cuddalore had been abandoned almost immediately after the French appeared before it.

The surrender of Fort St. David excited both alarm and indignation at Madras. A court of inquiry was appointed, and their report, while it exonerated the commander, Major Porlier, from cowardice, condemned his arrangements for the defence, expressed an opinion that the place might have held out much longer, and declared the terms on which it surrendered shameful. Certain it is, that the defence of Fort St. David cannot be regarded as among the operations which have shed lustre on the British name in India.

The fall of Fort St. David was immediately followed by that of Devi-cottah, and the success of the French arms appeared to Lally to warrant his indulging in a triumphant entry into Pondicherry, after the manner of his vain and unfortunate predecessor Dupleix.

An attack upon Madras would have been the next step taken by the French governor-general had he not laboured under a deficiency of money, which he was anxious, in the first instance, to supply. A bond for a considerable sum, given by the king of Tanjore to Chunda Sahib, had remained several years in possession of the government of Pondicherry, and, to supply the necessities of that government, it was now determined to demand payment of it. To enforce the demand, Lally took the field, and advanced with a considerable force towards Tanjore; but the arrangements for the campaign were so miserably imperfect, that his troops were often in danger of perishing from hunger. His approach to the capital of Tanjore, however, created alarm, and led to negotiations, conducted in such a spirit as might be expected, where one party was bent upon obtaining money at all events, and the other resolved not to part with any if it were possible to avoid it. The king of Tanjore had, in the first instance, sought assistance from Trichinopoly, and Captain Calliaud had afforded it to an extent proportioned to his ability. Subsequently a treaty was concluded between Lally and the government of Tanjore, by which the former undertook to march immediately against Trichinopoly. This arrangement was in turn frustrated by fresh misunderstandings between the parties to it, and the dispute became so warm that Lally threatened to transport the king and his family to the island of Mauritius as slaves. This revived the affection of that sovereign for the English, and, on his pressing solicitation, additional aid was furnished from Trichinopoly.

Lally erected two batteries, and after five days' firing had made a breach about six feet wide, when it was discovered that the army was nearly destitute both of ammunition and provisions. At this time also Lally received intelligence that the French and English squadrons had again been engaged, and that

the latter threatened a descent upon Karikal, to which place Lally looked for the means of relieving the distress of his army. Like the former naval engagement, this had been indecisive; and it further resembled it, inasmuch as the English had suffered more severely in their ships, and the French in loss of men.

On the 9th August, Lally had recourse to the usual expedient by which men surrounded by difficulties, seek to relieve themselves from the responsibility of choice. He called a council of war, which afforded another illustration of Orme's remark, that such a body rarely decides for action. Lally's council was composed of twelve officers, of whom only two advised an assault, while ten declared for retreat. Lally did not, like Clive, nullify the decision of the council on his own responsibility. Preparations were commenced for breaking up the camp; the sick and wounded were sent away immediately, and the following day was fixed for the march of the rest.

Monackjee, the Tanjore general, was soon apprized of the determination to raise the siege, and he was not slow in ascribing the movement to its real cause—the want of means to carry it on. A reinforcement from Trichinopoly happening to arrive at this time, Monackjee resolved with its assistance to attack the French camp. The attack was characteristically commenced by a piece of treachery. At the dawn of day, fifty horsemen rode leisurely from the city towards the camp. On being challenged by the advanced guard, they said that they were come to offer their services to the French, and desired to see the general. They were conducted to his quarters, and halting at a short distance from the choultry where he slept, their leader advanced to confer with him. Lally left the choultry to receive his visitor, by whose hands he would probably have been dismissed from the cares and toils of warfare, had not the operation of opium led one of the stranger horsemen to commit an act which could not be reconciled with friendly intentions. Quitting his rank, he galloped toward a tumbrel loaded with powder, into which he fired his pistol. The frantic wretch was blown to pieces by the explosion of which he had been the cause, and an alarm being thus raised, the guard at the choultry rushed forward to protect their commander. In performing this duty they were charged by the horsemen, but their steady fire threw the assailants into confusion, and most of them galloped into a tank which they did not perceive till it was too late to avoid it. In the mean time the camp was attacked at various points, but the Tanjoreans were compelled to retire with heavy loss.

The retreat of the French was attended with great suffering, and on the road Lally received information that D'Aché, the commander of the French squadron, had announced to the council of Pondicherry his determination to return without delay to the Isle of France. Lally despatched the Count d'Estaing to dis-

suade him from such a proceeding; but the endeavours of the count were ineffectual to induce D'Aché either to hazard another engagement, or to abandon his intention of returning to the islands. Lally himself, who arrived shortly afterwards, was not more fortunate; D'Aché persisted, and his determination was, it is said, supported by the unanimous opinion of his captains. With some difficulty he consented to leave behind him five hundred seamen and marines, to serve on shore; and on the 3rd September he sailed with all his ships for the island of Mauritius.

Lally was greatly mortified by the ill success of his campaign against Tanjore. To alleviate the disgrace of its failure, and to supply his pecuniary wants, he now projected an expedition to Aroot. In this he was somewhat more fortunate; and after the capture of some places of minor importance, he made a triumphal entry into the city of Aroot, which had yielded not to the force of his arms, but to the effect of large promises made to the officer in command.

But, though the vanity of Lally was gratified, his pecuniary resources were not improved by his success. His conquests did not reimburse the expense of making them, and the treasury of Pondicherry remained in an exhausted state. Lally, too, had made a false step in neglecting to secure the fort of Chingleput, which commanded the country from which, in the event of a siege, Madras must mainly depend for supplies. This place was garrisoned only by a few retainers of one of the nabob's dependants by whom the district was rented, and if attacked must have fallen an easy prize. The anxiety of the council at Madras for the safety of their principal settlement had led them to concentrate there nearly all the force at their disposal: in consequence, several posts had been abandoned to the enemy. The council, however, were duly sensible of the importance of Chingleput, and they took the first opportunity afforded by the arrival of reinforcements from England to place it in a respectable state of defence. The march of the party of sepoys first despatched thither stopped the advance of a French detachment who were in motion to attack the place.

The pressing wants of the French government were at length relieved by a small supply of money. Part of it was obtained from the Brahmins in charge of the pagoda at Tripetty, part was received from the island of Mauritius, and part Lally is said to have contributed from his own resources. This enabled him to put in motion his entire force for the reduction of Madras. It now became a question whether or not the seat of the British presidency should be attacked without previously reducing Chingleput. Lally, with characteristic rashness and impatience, determined to push onward, leaving Chingleput in his rear; and by the middle of December the French army were in sight of Madras. Their force consisted of two thousand seven hundred European and

four thousand native troops. To defend the place the English had nearly one thousand eight hundred European troops, two thousand two hundred sepoys, and about two hundred of the nabob's cavalry, upon whom, however, no dependence could be rested.

The enemy soon gained possession of the Black Town, in the plunder of which a quantity of arrack having been found, the consequences were ere long manifested. The English being apprized of what had taken place, made a sally under Colonel Draper; and such was the state of the French army, that the approach of the English was first made known to them by the beating of their drums in the streets of the town. The fire of the English musketry, aided by that of two field-pieces, was very destructive, and a French regiment, which had been drawn up to oppose them, soon fell into confusion and fled. At this moment Colonel Draper called upon his men to cease firing, and follow him to take possession of four of the enemy's guns, to which he ran up, and discharged a pistol at the head of an officer who remained by them, but without effect. A pistol-shot being returned by the French officer with no better success, he was on the point of surrendering the guns, when Colonel Draper perceived that no more than four of his men had followed him. The French now gaining confidence from the hesitation of their opponents, returned in considerable numbers; and of the four gallant men who accompanied their commander, two were killed, the other two being severely wounded. The fight was, however, protracted for some time; but finally the English retreated with a considerable loss of men as well as that of their two field-pieces. Among those mortally wounded was Major Porlier, the unfortunate officer who commanded at Fort St. David when that place surrendered to the French. Having been blamed, and not without apparent reason, for his conduct on that occasion, he seems to have been anxious to lose no opportunity of showing that he was not deficient in personal courage. Under the influence of this feeling, he had requested permission to accompany Colonel Draper's party as a volunteer, and while thus engaged received a wound of which he soon afterwards died. The loss of the French was not less severe than that of the English; several of their officers were killed, and the Count d'Estaigue was made prisoner.

Though miserably deficient in nearly all the means of conducting a siege with a probability of success, Lally erected batteries, and on the 2nd of January commenced firing. The defence under the governor, Mr. Pigot, was conducted with considerable skill, and in an admirable spirit. Some sallies were made by the besieged, which, however, usually ended in discomfiture; but the communications of the enemy with Pondicherry and the country whence he drew his supplies were greatly impeded by the operations of a body of sepoys under a native commander, named Mahommed

Iscof, aided by a detachment from Chingleput under Captain Preston, some native horse commanded by a brother of Mahomet Ali, and some Tanjorine cavalry. An addition to this force being desired, Major Calliaud had been especially deputed to Tanjore to endeavour to obtain it; but the sovereign was persuaded that the fortune of England was on the decline, and so little value did he now attach to its friendship, that its representative was not even received with ordinary courtesy. With some difficulty, however, Major Calliaud prevailed on him to promise a further supply of cavalry, if their arrears of pay were discharged—a promise given in the belief that the condition could not be fulfilled. Major Calliaud applied to the Tanjore agents of the house of Buckanjee, the principal bankers in the Carnatic, but they peremptorily refused to part with any money in exchange for bills on Madras. This refusal encouraged the king to become somewhat more explicit, and he promised that the horse should be ready in four days if the money were paid. Major Calliaud now applied to the Dutch government of Negapatam, who professed to be willing to grant a loan; but the terms would have entailed on the English a loss of twenty-five per cent., and the offer was declined. The British negotiator then turned to Trichinopoly, where the house of Buckanjee had also an agent. Here his prospects appeared to brighten, and he obtained the promise of a supply; but again was he doomed to disappointment. Mahomet Ali was at Madras when the French appeared before it, but a besieged town not appearing to him the most agreeable place of residence, he was desirous of quitting it. The English authorities had not the slightest desire to counteract his wishes in this respect, and he accordingly departed with his family by sea for Negapatam. On the passage, his wife gave birth to a child. Arriving at Negapatam, the nabob, through his agent at Tanjore, informed the king that he intended to pass through that city on his way to Trichinopoly, anticipating that the usual honours would be offered him. But the flight of the nabob by sea at a season subject to tempest, and when the situation of his wife peculiarly demanded repose, was regarded as indicating a degree of danger at Madras which rendered inexpedient any expression of respect for either the English or their allies. Under this impression, the king refused not only to receive the nabob within his capital, but even to visit him without the walls. Major Calliaud endeavoured, though in vain, to establish the appearance of a better feeling, and he had good reason to exert himself in the cause, for the circumstances under which Mahomet Ali had departed from Madras, combined with the view of them taken at Tanjore, had alarmed the banker's agent at Trichinopoly, who now retracted his promise of assistance, and refused to furnish money upon any terms. The difficulty was at last obviated. Mr. Norris, a

member of the council of Madras who had accompanied Mahomet Ali, was the bearer of a considerable sum destined to defray the expenses of the garrison of Trichinopoly. The urgent want of means to enable Major Calliaud to effect the objects of his mission was held to be a sufficient reason for diverting this sum from its original purpose. The pretext for delay was thus removed, but no horse were furnished. The money, however, which had been obtained was not without effect, for its reputation induced the king to adopt a more friendly bearing towards Mahomet Ali, to whom he now paid a visit with the accustomed ceremonies. To give dignity to the nabob's entrance into Trichinopoly, Major Calliaud put himself at the head of the escort which was to conduct him thither. On quitting that place a few days afterwards, he gave utterance to expressions of strong indignation against the King of Tanjore, in the hope that they might be conveyed to him. Major Calliaud was not deceived in the expectation that his wrath would be reported to the king, nor altogether in the hope that some effect might be produced by it. The king was alarmed, and despatched the promised reinforcement, which, however, proceeded slowly, in consequence of frequent disputes as to the advances to be made to the men, which Major Calliaud was fain to settle as best he might. A far more valuable description of force which accompanied Major Calliaud to the relief of Madras was a body of sepoys from Trichinopoly. With these he arrived at Chingleput on the 7th of February, having been absent on his mission to Tanjore from the 1st of December. His troops requiring rest, he left them there, allowing himself no repose, but proceeding on the evening of his arrival at Chingleput to the Mount of St. Thomé, where he took the command of the force without the walls engaged in harassing the besiegers, and interrupting their supplies.

Lally had seriously felt the annoyances inflicted by this force. They were, he said, like flies, no sooner beaten off one part than they settled on another, and he resolved to make an effort to relieve himself from their presence. On the morning of the 9th of February the British discovered the enemy advancing upon their post in two bodies, the one consisting of twelve hundred sepoys and five hundred native horse, the other of three hundred European cavalry and six hundred European infantry, with eight field-pieces. The whole was under the command of a relation of Lally, bearing the same name with himself. The force available to repel the enemy consisted of two thousand five hundred sepoys and two thousand two hundred native horse, with one hundred and three Europeans, twelve of whom were artillerymen, and ten troopers, under the command of Captain Vasseroet, who had recently come out of the town with treasure. Major Calliaud made the requisite dispositions to resist the attack;

and to receive the French cavalry, who were advancing, he formed his native horse, placing himself with Captain Vaseerot and his ten troopers on their left. The ardour of the horsemen appeared perfectly irrepressible; and anticipating the desire of the British commander for their advance, the whole body, in the words of Orme, "set off scampering, shouting, and flourishing their sabres." The French cavalry advanced to meet them at a rapid pace, but suddenly halting, the first rank discharged their carbines, by which four or five of their opponents were brought to the ground. This had so unhappy an effect upon the enthusiasm of the rest, that they immediately fled, leaving Major Calliaud with no companions but Captain Vaseerot and the ten troopers. These retreated into an inclosure, and the French pursued the flying cavalry until stopped by a discharge from some field-pieces, and by the fire of a party of sepoy. Some loss was subsequently sustained through the indiscretion of an English officer, in rushing with his troops from a post which he had successfully maintained, to push his advantage by pursuing the enemy. The party were attacked in the rear by cavalry, thrown into confusion, and many of them cut down. The contest was maintained with fluctuating success throughout the day, but in the evening the enemy retired, leaving the English masters of the field. Most welcome to the English was this result, and little were the French aware of the value of the relief which their departure afforded. The English were not far from being reduced to a state when, from want of ammunition, it would have been alike impossible to maintain the fight or to effect a retreat in the face of the enemy. Their remaining stock was only sufficient to furnish six cartridges for each musket, and three balls for each of the field-pieces. In the night Major Calliaud moved his force as silently as possible in the direction of Chingleput, leaving fires to deceive the enemy. With his usual activity, he shortly afterwards made an attempt to surprise the Dutch settlement of Sadras. Lally, who appears to have thought that the law of nations was without validity in India, had taken forcible possession of this place, and relieved the Dutch garrison of their duties by transferring them to a French detachment. The design of Major Calliaud was frustrated by the mistake of his guides, in consequence of which he was unable to make his meditated attack, as he had intended, under cover of the night.

But the time was approaching when the British force, both within and without the walls, were to be relieved from the labour and anxiety attendant on their situation. For nearly two months Lally had been carrying on operations against Madras. His batteries had been opened about half that time, and a breach was made which, he believed, justified an attempt to storm. His officers, to

whose judgment he appealed, but with a distinct expression of his own opinion, took a different view, and though they admitted the breach to be practicable, declared it to be inaccessible. Thus far they only complied with the demand made for their opinion on a particular point; but they proceeded to deliver their judgment upon another, on which Lally had not sought their advice, and probably did not wish to receive it: they declared their conviction, founded on a comparison of forces, that the prosecution of the works to quell the fire of the place would only be to sacrifice many lives without the slightest probability of ultimate success. This view of the prospects of the besieging army was extremely distasteful to Lally, who attributed it to intrigue and a spirit of personal hostility to himself. But whatever the value of the opinion of the French officers, and whatever the motives which had led to its expression, it was an adverse stroke which, falling upon Lally at a time when he was surrounded by a variety of discouraging circumstances, overcame even his self-satisfied and arrogant presumption. He was without money, and without the means of raising any. The pay of the troops was several weeks in arrear; the supply of food was scanty and uncertain; the sepoys deserted in great numbers; some of the European troops threatened to follow their example, while the feelings of the officers towards their commander were almost avowedly those of disaffection and hostility.

The arrogant and imperious temper of Lally had indeed surrounded him with enemies, at a time when he needed all the assistance which personal attachment could lend to the claims of public duty; and he saw that to linger before Madras would be but to incur the chance of finding himself universally deserted. He determined, therefore, to gratify his vengeance by burning the Black Town, and then to withdraw from a scene where he had lost whatever portion of the confidence of his army he had ever possessed. The execution of the former part of this determination was prevented, and that of the latter accelerated, by the opportune arrival, on the 16th of February, of a fleet under Admiral Pocock, with reinforcements for Madras. An impression prevailed in the town that an assault would be made that night before the troops from the ships could be landed, and not only every soldier in the garrison, but every inhabitant capable of service, was under arms; but the expectation was unfounded. The enemy kept up a hot fire through the night, and the next day they were in full march towards Arcot. So hurried was their departure, that they left behind fifty-two pieces of cannon (some of them indeed damaged) and a hundred and fifty barrels of gunpowder. They left, also, about forty sick and wounded Europeans who were unable to march, and for whose transport their commanders could make no provision. The

unfortunate men, however, received a degree of attention which is creditable both to those who were compelled to abandon them and those into whose hands they fell. The French commander left a letter recommending them to the humanity of the English governor; and the appeal was answered in a manner which drew from Lally an expression of his satisfaction.

After an interval occupied in the necessary preparations, the English took the field, and followed the retreating army to Conjeveram. Lally had given up the command to M. Soupires, and, in consequence of impaired health, retired to Pondicherry. His instructions to M. Soupires were not to invite a battle, but to wait till he was attacked; and they were strictly followed. The English were not less indisposed to attack, and the two armies remained several days almost in sight of each other, each reluctant to strike the first blow. This state of threatened hostility, but positive inaction, would have ended in the recall of the British troops into cantonment, had not Colonel Lawrence proceeded to the presidency to remonstrate against such a step. There this distinguished officer abandoned a command which ill health rendered him unfit longer to retain; and the same cause incapacitating Colonel Draper, the chief command devolved upon Major Brereton. This officer, in the hope of bringing the enemy to an engagement, or of inducing the French commander to quit his post at Conjeveram, made a movement upon Wandewash, took possession of the suburbs, and opened ground against the fort. Soupires offered no interruption, but retired to Arcot. Major Brereton thereupon made a forced march upon Conjeveram, which he took by assault. The officers engaged in the attack seem to have contended for pre-eminence in exposure to danger, and they suffered severely. A single discharge killed four and wounded five, Major Calliaud being among the latter. The place was defended by Murzafa Beg, a soldier of fortune, who had withdrawn himself from the British service during the siege of Madras. He had surrendered, and was being led to Major Brereton, when he was met by Mahommed Iscof, who, raising his scimeter, nearly severed the prisoner's head from his body, exclaiming—"These are the terms to be kept with a traitor."

Lally, on hearing of the departure of Major Brereton for Wandewash, had left Pondicherry with a party of Europeans, and ordered Soupires to join him at Chittapat. But his movements were paralyzed by want of funds. He advanced to Coverpank, where distress and his personal unpopularity gave rise to a state of feeling in his army which rendered it manifestly imprudent to risk a battle. The result was, that late in May the French went into cantonments, and the English shortly afterwards followed their example.

It is now necessary to turn to the events which followed the recall of M. Bussy from

the court of Salabat Jung. A petty rajah, named Anunderauze, who was dissatisfied with some part of the conduct of that officer, availed himself of his departure to attack Vizagapatam, of which he succeeded in dispossessing the French garrison. He immediately sent advice of his success to the presidency of Madras, accompanied by an offer to surrender his conquest to the English, and by a request for the aid of a large detachment to act with his own troops in the provinces which the French had obtained from the Soubahdar of the Deccan. But the council of Madras were not in a condition to afford any assistance. Fort St. David had fallen, and an attack on the seat of the presidency was expected. Disappointed in this quarter, Anunderauze turned to Bengal, where, but for the predominant influence of Clive, his application would have been attended with no better success than at Madras. Contrary to the opinion of his coadjutors in council, Clive determined to give the required aid; and an expedition was despatched under Colonel Forde, consisting of five hundred Europeans, two thousand one hundred native troops, six field-pieces, twenty-four six-pounders for battery, a howitzer, and an eight-inch mortar. The expedition proceeded by sea, and having disembarked at Vizagapatam, joined the army of Anunderauze, which lay at a short distance from that place. But the progress of the allies was impeded by disputes. The rajah expressed great satisfaction at the arrival of the English force, but manifested a strong disinclination to contribute anything to its support. Affairs were at length adjusted through the interposition of Mr. Andrews, a civil servant of the East-India Company, who had arrived to re-establish the factory of Vizagapatam, of which he had formerly been the chief, and from that circumstance was personally known to Anunderauze. Through his mediation a treaty was concluded, by which it was stipulated that all plunder should be equally divided; that all the countries that might be conquered should be delivered to the rajah, who was to collect the revenues, with the exception of the sea-ports and towns at the mouths of the rivers, which, with the revenues of the districts annexed to them, were to belong to the Company; and that no treaty for the disposal or restitution of the possessions of either party should be made without the consent of both. Finally, the prime difficulty in the way of action was removed by a stipulation that the rajah should supply fifty thousand rupees a month for the expenses of the army, and six thousand for the private expenses of the officers. The united forces now marched against M. Conflans, who had been left in command of a portion of the French force which had not accompanied M. Bussy; and they moved to victory. At Poddapore a battle took place, in which the French, being totally defeated, abandoned their camp to the victors, with many pieces of cannon, a large quantity of ammunition, and a thousand draught bul-

locks. The honour of the victory belonged exclusively to the English force. The rajah's army consisted of five hundred horse, whose value Orme determines by the passing remark, that they were "incapable of fighting;" and about five thousand foot, some of whom were armed with fire-arms of extraordinary fabrication, and the remainder with pikes and bows. Horse and foot are alike included by the historian just quoted, under the term of "rabble;" and Colonel Forde seems to have been anxious for nothing so much as to get them out of the way. The only useful part of the rajah's force was a body of about forty Europeans, whom he had collected to manage a few field-pieces, and who performed the duty very satisfactorily.

The retreat of the French was conducted upon the principle of each man providing for himself. The flying troops took various routes, but most of them towards Rajahmundry. To this place the French commander, M. Confians, bent his way; and if he had gained little reputation as a soldier, he seemed resolved at least to challenge the distinction of being a bold and rapid rider. No instances are recorded of his care to preserve the remnant of his army; but it is related that he traversed the whole distance from the field of battle to Rajahmundry (which is about forty miles) at full gallop, and by obtaining changes of horses, performed the journey in an incredibly short space of time.

Rajahmundry possessed a fort, but it was almost incapable of defence; besides which the French had lost nearly all their cannon. Under these circumstances it was deemed imprudent to linger at that place; and the fugitives, with all possible speed, crossed the Godavery, on the bank of which river the town stands. Colonel Forde advanced to Rajahmundry, and waited some time for the rajah, who had engaged to make the first payment under the treaty as soon as he was in possession of the fort. The rajah, however, did not arrive to seize the prize; and Colonel Forde, with his forces, crossed the Godavery in pursuit of the flying enemy. But his progress was soon stopped by the want of money. He had brought with him a supply from Bengal, but on the faith of the rajah's promises, he had lent that prince twenty thousand rupees, and the loan, with the current expenses of the army, had now left the British commander without the means of proceeding. He consequently recrossed the river, to the great dismay of the rajah, who imagined that the retrograde movement was made for the purpose of inflicting punishment on him, and in this belief fled to the hills. The interposition of Mr. Andrews was again resorted to, but the rajah's fear of Colonel Forde, and his reluctance to part with any money, seemed to have entirely divested him of all interest in the success of the expedition. With some difficulty a reconstruction of the treaty was effected, and it was stipulated that whatever sums the rajah might advance should be con-

sidered as loans, and that the revenues of the countries which might be reduced on the further side of the Godavery, excepting such as belonged to the French, either by occupat on or grant, should be equally divided between the rajah and the English. The rajah then furnished a small amount in money, and a larger in bills, which enabled the British force to resume its march in the direction which had been taken by M. Confians. That officer had recovered so much presence of mind as to collect part of his scattered troops at Masulipatam, where he seemed resolved to make a stand. He had made application for assistance to Salabat Jung, and that prince advanced with a body of troops from Hyderabad; his brother, marching with another, joined him near the Kistna. But the English commander, undismayed by these threatening appearances, steadily continued his march, though greatly embarrassed and delayed by the erratic excursions of his native ally in search of plunder. On the 6th March he was in sight of Masulipatam, and on the same day he received the cheering intelligence that Lally had been obliged to raise the siege of Madras. Yet his situation was surrounded by difficulties. He had begun to construct batteries, and to make preparations for attacking the fort, but his hopes appeared in imminent danger of being frustrated from the exhaustion of his resources. His military chest was empty, and the rajah refused any further supply. Colonel Forde had borrowed of his officers all the money that they possessed, and even used the prize-money of the troops. Some treasure had arrived at Vizagapatam from Bengal, but the interposition of part of the French force rendered its transmission to Colonel Forde impracticable, and it was sent for safety to the Dutch settlement of Cockanarah. While labouring under these embarrassments, the whole of Colonel Forde's European troops suddenly turned out with their arms, and threatened to march away. With some difficulty they were persuaded to return to their tents and appoint a deputation to represent their demands. These extended to an immediate payment of the prize-money then due to them, and to a promise of the whole booty of Masulipatam in case it should be taken; and on any other terms it was declared the refractory troops would not serve in the siege. Colonel Forde, unable to comply with the first part of this demand, was compelled to try the effect of a promise to pay, out of the first money which should come into his hands, the prize-money then due. With regard to the second part of the claim, he represented that, as by the Company's regulations the troops were only entitled to one-half of what is taken, he could not, on his own authority, engage that they should receive more; but he promised to represent their case to the Company at home, and to retain the amount in dispute until the question was determined. The hasty resolves of excited men have

rarely much stability, and these assurances induced the disaffected troops to return to their duty.

But one difficulty was no sooner removed than another started up. Salabat Jung, who was only about forty miles from Masulipatam, sent to Anunderauze, commanding him to quit the English, and repair to the standard of his lawful master. At the same time intelligence arrived that Rajahmundry had again fallen into the hands of the French. These events so alarmed the rajah, that he determined without delay to endeavour to regain his own country on the opposite side of the Godavery. Of this intention he gave no notice to Colonel Forde, but on the night of the 27th March he suddenly decamped, and though not usually remarkable for the rapidity of his motions, he on this occasion marched sixteen miles before break of day. Colonel Forde, as soon as he became aware of the rajah's flight, despatched messengers to endeavour to win him back; and by giving his fears a different direction to that which they had at first taken, they succeeded. They pointed out the danger to which the retreat of Anunderauze was exposed from the cavalry of Salabat Jung on the one hand, and the French troops in the neighbourhood of Rajahmundry on the other; and the vacillating rajah once more rejoined his English ally. To divert Salabat Jung, an attempt was made to open a negotiation; and a civil servant of the Company proceeded to his camp to represent the views of the English, which were stated to be confined to the acquisition of the French ports and factories on the coast, and not to extend to any part of the authority which that nation or its representatives had exercised in the interior. This exposition of the designs of the English was not ill calculated to conciliate the servants and retainers of Salabat Jung, who had entertained great jealousy of the power and influence attained by Bussy.

In the mean time the batteries of the English kept up a hot fire, and on the 6th April the works were so much damaged as to be deemed accessible in three places. On that day the artillery officers reported that only two days' ammunition for the batteries remained in store; intelligence was also received that Salabat Jung was advancing, and that the French force which had been hovering about Rajahmundry, and which he had invited to form a junction with his army, was not far distant. It was now necessary to make a prompt decision; and, notwithstanding great difficulties that presented themselves, Colonel Forde determined to make an attempt to carry the fort by storm. A heavy rain had greatly increased the labour of crossing the intervening ground, but this circumstance was regarded by Colonel Forde as rather an advantage, because it would tend to lull the suspicions of the garrison. He accordingly ordered the firing to be kept up vigorously

through the next day, and all the troops to be under arms at ten at night.

One part of the ground surrounding the fort was a swamp of mud, through which the ditch had not been continued, partly on account of the labour and expense of carrying it on, and partly because, from the nature of the ground, it was believed to be more difficult to pass than the ditch itself. It was reported, however, that the natives occasionally waded through the morass; and on examination it was found to be passable, though not without extreme difficulty. It was resolved accordingly to distract the enemy's attention by a movement on this point, while the main attack was made on another, and the rajah's troops were making a demonstration on a third.

The force allotted to the main attack proceeded in three divisions. Two of these were composed of European troops, and were led respectively by Captain Fischer and Captain Yorke. The third, composed of sepoy, was led by Captain Maclean. The first division was discovered in passing the ditch, and while tearing up a palisade which obstructed their progress, were exposed to a heavy fire of cannon and musketry. They gained the breach, however, and obtained possession of one of the bastions called the Chameleon. Here they were joined by the second division under Captain Yorke. This officer, perceiving a line of the enemy's sepoys moving along the way below the rampart, ran down, and seizing the French officer who commanded them, called upon him to order his men to lay down their arms and surrender. The demand was obeyed with little apparent reluctance. Captain Yorke now pursued his way, displaying the highest gallantry as well as the greatest generosity and clemency towards the enemy. But his men showed some disposition to falter; and at last, taking fright at what they erroneously believed to be a mine, they all ran back. Their officers followed to reclaim them, and Captain Yorke was left alone with two drummers. Returning to the bastion, he found that some of the men were proposing to go out of the breach and quit the fort; but Captain Yorke threatened instant death to the first who should make the attempt; and, shame beginning to operate, a cry was raised that their commander was ill-used, and about thirty-six declared they would follow wherever he would lead. With these he returned, leaving the remainder to follow as soon as their officers should be able to bring them on. The interval, however, had allowed time for the French to load a gun with grape-shot and point it in the direction in which the English party were advancing. It was fired when they were within a few yards of it, and the discharge did fearful execution. Some were killed, and sixteen, among which number was the gallant officer who led the party, were wounded. Captain Fischer in the mean time was advancing along the rampart with his

division of Europeans ; and the sepoys, under Captain Maclean, were gaining entrance at a place called the South Gate, which was in imperfect repair. The two false attacks were also answering the purposes intended, although the rajah's troops were utterly unfit for any real service, and the force under Captain Knox, finding the enemy prepared, did not attempt to cross the swamp, but only fired over it. Both, however, contributed to divert the attention of the enemy and increase the alarm of M. Conflans, who is represented as having remained at his house issuing orders founded on reports brought to him there, which the arrival of the next report induced him to contradict. He at last resolved to make an offer of surrender on honourable terms. The answer of Colonel Forde was, that the surrender must be at discretion, and further, that it must be immediate. M. Conflans neither objected nor hesitated, but gave instant orders to discontinue further resistance.

The fall of Masulipatam was unexpected, and the success of the English was, without doubt, owing to the daring spirit in which the attempt had been conceived and executed. The prisoners exceeded the number of those to whose arms they surrendered. The fort was abundantly provided with stores, and defended by one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon. These, with a rich booty, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

The consequences of this success were immediately apparent. Salabat Jung was within fifteen miles of Masulipatam, but its fall induced him to manifest a disposition to treat ; and Colonel Forde proceeded to his camp, where he was received with marked attention. A treaty was concluded, consisting of four articles. By the first, the whole territory dependent on Masulipatam, as well as certain other districts, was granted to the English, without the reservation of fine or military service. By the second, Salabat Jung engaged that the French force, which still remained in his country, should pass the Kistna within fifteen days ; that, in future, the French should have no settlement south of that river ; that he would thenceforward retain no French troops in his service, and that he would neither render assistance to that nation, nor receive any from it. The third article gave impunity to Anunderauze for the tribute which he had levied in the French possessions, and exonerated him from the payment of his own for one year—his future liability to make the accustomed payments being recognized, as well as the power of the Soubahdar to enforce them, provided he neither assisted nor gave protection to the enemies of the English. The fourth article restricted the English from aiding or protecting the enemies of Salabat Jung. This treaty gave to the English a territory extending about eighty miles along the coast and twenty inland. The provisions were altogether in favour of the English, and

it is not probable that Salabat Jung would have granted so much had he not been under the influence of alarm from another source, in addition to the terror inspired by the capture of Masulipatam. His brother, Nizam Ali, was on terms of enmity with Bussy, whose dewan he had caused to be murdered. Clive, calculating on the influence of this prince's ill-feeling towards the French, had written to him requesting his assistance in support of Colonel Forde's expedition. The precise effect of this communication cannot be ascertained, for Nizam Ali was quite ready, without any stimulus, to undertake any project that promised to gratify his ambition, or promote his interest ; but whatever might be the force of the various motives prompting him to action, Nizam Ali no sooner learned that Salabat Jung was marching against the English, than he took the field and advanced to Hyderabad, for the purpose, as he alleged, of regulating the affairs of the state—in other words, of supplanting his brother and taking possession of his throne. Salabat Jung had hoped to secure the assistance of part of the English force in resisting this attempt against his authority, and he sought to prevail on Colonel Forde to grant it by the lure of personal advantages. But the English commander refused, and the result was that the Soubahdar, on marching to the defence of his capital, took with him that French force which, by an express article of the treaty, he had undertaken to expel. His return dispelled the danger by which he was menaced. Negotiation was commenced between the brothers, and Nizam Ali withdrew ; but not without being restored to the government of Berar, from which he had been removed by the management of Bussy. This arrangement gave offence to Basalat Jung, another brother of Salabat Jung, who forthwith departed to promote his own views in the south, accompanied by the French corps which the Soubahdar, after engaging to expel, had brought to Hyderabad. This movement, and a report which obtained belief that a body of French troops had moved from Arcot, led to the despatch from Conjeveram of an English force under Major Monson. They marched on the 5th of July, and on the 17th appeared before Coverpauk, which was summoned to surrender, though with very slight expectation that the demand would have any effect. Greatly was the English commander surprised by receiving an answer, offering to surrender the place provided the garrison were permitted to retire to Arcot, the soldiers with their knapsacks, and the officers with all their effects. The offer was accepted, and the English thus easily gained possession of a place which was in a condition to have put them to the expense of a siege ; the time occupied from the summons to the surrender being only about an hour. This facile triumph encouraged Major Monson to proceed to Arcot, in the hope of finding the garrison under the influence of a similar spirit to that which prevailed at Coverpauk ; but in

this he was disappointed. A determination was manifested to maintain the place, and the garrison was so much superior to their opponents in artillery, that until a train could be obtained from Madras, the place could not be assailed with any prospect of success. Before this could arrive, the far greater part of the French army might reach Arcot from their cantonments, and Major Monson consequently marched back to Conjeveram, leaving a garrison in Coverpauk.

In April Admiral Pocock returned with his fleet from Bombay, to which place he had proceeded in the month of October of the preceding year, in order to avoid the north-east monsoon. A French fleet was expected from the islands, and the British admiral, in the hope of meeting it, continued to the windward of Pondicherry, and chiefly at Negapatam. Requiring a supply of water, which the Dutch authorities of the latter place refused to furnish, the admiral sailed for Trincomalee, in Ceylon, having a few days previously despatched the *Revenge* frigate in the same direction to look out for the enemy. At ten in the morning of the 2nd of September, some ships were discovered to the south-east, and soon afterwards the *Revenge* appeared chased by one of the strange vessels. The English squadron immediately weighed, but was unable to get within cannon-shot of the enemy before dark; and from various circumstances arising from winds, currents, and the weather, the fleets were kept asunder until the 10th.

The French fleet was that of M. d'Aché, considerably reinforced. It now consisted of eleven sail of the line and three frigates. The crews amounted to five thousand five hundred men, and the greatest exertions had been made to victual and prepare the fleet for sea. The labour had occupied many months, and provisions had been drawn not only from the French islands, but from Madagascar and other places. So great was the anxiety felt on this account, that a fleet had been despatched to procure provisions from the Cape of Good Hope, where a great quantity was purchased at a vast expense. A part of this outlay had, however, been reimbursed by the capture of an English Company's ship homeward bound from Madras.

The English squadron consisted of nine ships of the line, two Company's ships, and a fire-ship. The difference between the two fleets in number of guns and men was very considerable. The action commenced soon after two o'clock in the afternoon, and continued for about two hours, when the enemy's rear, and shortly after their centre, began to give way. Their van then made sail, and, with the entire squadron, bore away. They were pursued, but soon escaped beyond the reach of cannon-shot. The loss of men was supposed to be nearly equal on both sides, but the English, though the victors, appear to have sustained more damage in their ships

than the enemy. None of the English ships after the engagement could set half their sails; all the French ships except one carried their topsails. This, like some other naval engagements about this time, was attended by no decisive results. The fleets met, exchanged some broadsides, and then separated, each having sustained more or less of damage. In this instance the chief effect of the vast preparation made by the French was to inflict some degree of injury on the rigging of a few English ships. On the other hand, the French ran, and the English, therefore, must claim the victory; but it produced nothing.

The English fleet returned to Negapatam, and the French, five days after the engagement, arrived at Pondicherry. Here they landed one hundred and eighty troops, and a small amount of treasure in money and diamonds, the latter having been taken in the English ship captured on the voyage to the Cape of Good Hope. D'Aché, with that yearning for the islands which he never failed to experience when at Pondicherry, declared his intention immediately to return,—a determination confirmed, if not caused, by intelligence of the approach of a reinforcement to the English fleet. Accordingly, on the 19th September the signal was made for weighing, and the ships loosed their topsails. These preparations excited a perfect storm of indignation in the settlement. The military authorities and principal inhabitants assembled at the house of the governor, and unanimously passed a resolution, declaring that the precipitate defection of the squadron could not fail to produce the most dangerous consequences to the state, as holding out to all the country powers a shameful acknowledgment that the French had been defeated in the last engagement and could not sustain another, and that they utterly despaired of success on shore. Founded on this resolution a protest was immediately drawn, declaring M. d'Aché responsible for the loss of the settlement, and avowing a determination to appeal to the king for the infliction of such punishment as his conduct deserved. So great had been the speed of M. d'Aché, that it was only by accident that he became acquainted with this formal expression of the indignation of his countrymen. He was several leagues out at sea, as were all his ships but one, which had been detained from some cause after the others were under sail. To the commander of this vessel the protest was intrusted, with a charge for its immediate delivery to M. d'Aché. He was also furnished with a number of copies, one of which was to be given to every commander in the squadron. For the opinion of either the authorities or the inhabitants of Pondicherry, D'Aché entertained little respect, when yielding to it was likely to place him in a position of danger; but the threats of denouncing his conduct to the government at home made him pause. If there were danger in returning, there was also danger, though more remote,

in flight. D'Aché called a council of his captains, after which he returned to Pondicherry, and went on shore to confer with Lally. Before their deliberations were concluded, the English fleet appeared standing into the road in line of battle. The state of the wind gave the French the opportunity to bear down and engage if they chose, while it deprived the English admiral of this power. The French made their usual choice, and disposed their ships in such a manner as to place them beyond the reach of the English, who kept their line throughout an entire day without exciting any other feeling in the enemy but that of satisfaction at being out of danger. D'Aché yielded little to the remonstrances which assailed him on shore. He peremptorily adhered to his determination of returning to the islands, and all that could be wrung from him was a reluctant consent to leave behind four hundred Africans who were on board his fleet, and five hundred European sailors and marines, which latter body were courteously denominated by Lally "the scum of the sea."

The day of M. d'Aché's departure brought intelligence which in some degree relieved the gloom which hung over Pondicherry. The British Government had meditated an attack on Wandewash, the most important of the enemy's stations between Pondicherry and Madras. Subsequently they appear to have been desirous of postponing this operation, but Major Brereton being most anxious to undertake it, they yielded. The garrison of Trivatore surrendered to this force on the first summons, and on the 28th of September the English army encamped under a ledge of rocks which extended about three miles north-west of the fort of Wandewash. The native governor had declined to admit into the fort any European troops except a few gunners, and the French consequently took up their quarters in the town. There, on the night succeeding the 29th, Major Brereton determined to attack them. The troops by whom the attack was to be made were formed into three divisions: the first, which was led by Major Monson, succeeded in obtaining entrance, and made their way with little loss to a place where it was understood the main body of the French troops were lying; but here they were surprised by finding no enemy, and embarrassed by not meeting with the second division of the English force, which was under the command of Major Robert Gordon. A rocket was to be the signal for the advance of this division to the place to which Major Monson had penetrated, and it was given as soon as they had arrived; but Major Gordon appears to have lost all presence of mind, and after it had been determined to advance, and the party selected to lead the attack had actually gone forward, the commander of the division had disappeared. The second officer in rank, Captain Preston, was a man of unquestionable courage; but he, being ignorant of the reason of Major Gordon's absence, would not venture

to take his place. The consequence was, that the advanced party being left unsupported, were exposed to a galling fire of musketry from the rampart, which, from their situation, they could return only at great disadvantage. This party, which was led by Lieutenant de la Donespe, gallantly stood their ground expecting to be immediately joined by the main body, but in vain; all the support they received was from two field-pieces, which opened a fire on the rampart. Major Gordon did not appear; the African troops in his division soon took to flight; and the Europeans, disheartened by not being led on, and exposed to a fire which they could not effectually return, likewise fled. Still Lieutenant de la Donespe and his brave party kept their ground—where they would probably all have perished, had not Captain Preston run forward and brought them back to the place where the officers of the division were assembled, deserted by all excepting the artillerymen, who still stood by their commandant, Captain Barker, and vigorously plied their guns. The fugitives made their way to the third division, which was the reserve, and was posted on a ridge in the rear. It was commanded by Major Brereton, who, on the first notice of the approach of the fugitives, rushed towards them unaccompanied, and under a strong impulse of indignation, ran the first man he met through the body. Major Brereton then pushed on to the two guns, which Captain Barker and his men were still working; and there being no longer any object to be gained by their perseverance, they were withdrawn to the reserve.

Major Monson, ignorant of the position either of the enemy or of those from whom he expected assistance, had resolved to wait for the day. It broke, and brought upon him the point-blank fire of fourteen of the enemy's guns from the tower and esplanade. This he could only return with the fire of two field-pieces and discharges of musketry. Such a disparity could not long be maintained; but, unwilling to relinquish the hope of support, Major Monson sought the means of protracting the contest as long as possible. Various methods of sheltering the men from the enemy's fire were tried; but the enemy after a time, moving part of their guns, so as to attack the division in flank as well as in front, the field-pieces of the English being disabled, and the men beginning to lose courage, a retreat became advisable, if not inevitable. A singular illustration of the instinct of discipline marked this movement. The grenadiers of one of the Company's battalions were to halt near the gate, but seeing it open, they marched out into the plain, quickening their pace at every step. Sensible that to call after men in such a state of feeling would only have the effect of adding to their fear and driving them into wild and disorderly flight, Major Calliaud followed and passed them, when, stopping suddenly in front, he cried "Halt." The men obeyed the word of command, formed according to order,

turned, and followed the officer who had thus recalled them to duty. The retreat was subsequently conducted in good order.

On the news of this affair reaching Pondicherry, Lally fired a hundred guns in honour of the great victory achieved by the French, and transmitted magnificent accounts of it to every quarter where it was likely to advance his interests.

Bussy arrived at Wandewash the day after the English had left their encampment before that place; he was proceeding with a detachment to join Basalat Jung. He marched to Trivatore, which surrendered to him as easily as but a short time before it had yielded to the English. Thence he advanced to Arcot, from which place he had made one day's march when his progress was stopped by the arrival of unwelcome intelligence from Wandewash. The pecuniary distress of the French had long been extreme. But little money had lately been issued to the troops, and that in place of provisions, which were not supplied with any regularity. More than a year's pay was due to the whole army. Discontent of no ordinary kind was the consequence, and the feeling was aggravated by the soldiers having generally taken up the belief that a great amount of treasure had been brought by the squadron, and that Lally had amassed and secreted much wealth. The success at Wandewash seemed to add strength to the sense of grievance previously existing, and the soldiers complained openly and loudly. Their complaints were uttered with impunity; but some men of Lorraine's regiment having been subjected to punishment for other military offences, the whole regiment turned out and marched from the camp to the spot which the English had lately occupied. The officers of other regiments hearing the drums, turned out also, supposing that the camp was attacked, and this led to an apprehension on the part of the mutineers that they were about to be surrounded. To ascertain the fact, a detachment was despatched, the chief of the party being the foremost man in the mutiny. His exhortations impressed those to whom he was sent with the same spirit which already pervaded those by whom he was deputed, and they forthwith determined to imitate the example of their comrades. The officers expostulated, but in vain; they were peremptorily commanded to retire. Arrangements were now made for supplying the necessities of the mutinous force. Parties were deputed to bring up the field artillery, the tumbrils, oxen, tents, and baggage; and even the market people, to the number of about two thousand, with a multitude of animals, were pressed into the service. When all was prepared, the mutineers proceeded to the spot which they had selected for the encampment, where their first step was to elect a serjeant-major their commander-in-chief. This functionary nominated another serjeant his major-general, and appointed the usual officers to the various

companies. The general issued his orders, which were read to the men in the ordinary way, and every detail of duty and discipline was observed with the greatest regularity.

The intelligence of this movement was communicated with all possible speed to Pondicherry. To allay the feeling which had led to it, Lally produced from his own chest a considerable sum, the members of the council sent their plate to the Mint, and some of the principal inhabitants followed their example. The Viscount Funel was despatched to negotiate with the mutineers; and having succeeded in making some impression on the majority, he left them to deliberate, giving them three hours for the transmission of an answer. The influence of their serjeant-general was exerted in favour of compromise; and they resolved to return to their duty, on condition of receiving a general amnesty, six months' pay immediately, and the remainder in a month. This was agreed to; a pardon and six months' pay were forwarded, and the troops marched back to Wandewash. The news of the discontent had extended to the force under Bussy, and its spirit was rapidly caught. To appease it he was obliged at once to advance a month's pay to his men, and then to wait until a supply could be obtained, to place them on a level with the troops at Wandewash.

The growing necessities of the French, and the fearful intimation which they had received, that their troops would not serve without pay, forced them to the consideration of the means of recruiting their exhausted treasury. In the rich and fertile island of Seringham, the approaching December harvest promised to be unusually abundant, and the government share was estimated to be worth six hundred thousand rupees. This, in the existing situation of the French, was a tempting prize; and it was resolved to make an effort to secure it. The expedition for this purpose was intrusted to M. Crillon, and consisted of nine hundred Europeans, one thousand sepoy, and two hundred native horse. Neither the presidency, nor the commanding officer at Trichinopoly, appear to have been aware of this movement till it was too late to offer an effectual resistance. The approach of the force was only learned from the accidental discovery of an advanced party. A detachment, which was thereupon despatched from Trichinopoly, gained some advantage, and from the prisoners taken in this affair the first accurate information of the strength and object of the enemy was obtained. On the 20th of November, Crillon's force crossed into the island of Seringham, and encamped opposite the west face of the pagoda, within which were stationed three hundred sepoy, five hundred irregular troops armed with lances, and two field-pieces. An attempt was made to defend the gateway by erecting a wall across it with a single opening, in front of which was a trench, and behind a parapet for

the field-pieces. The French, however, advancing their heaviest cannon, soon beat down the wall, and disabled their field-pieces; they then effected an entrance, though gallantly resisted by the sepoys. Their victory was tarnished by a wantonness of cruelly disgraceful to a nation boasting of any degree of civilization. They not only refused quarter after resistance had ceased, but, having turned out all who survived the massacre, fired upon some who were departing, while their cavalry rode after others and cut them down. It is said that these acts were perpetrated by the common men without the sanction of their officers—a very insufficient excuse. If the officers disapproved of the conduct of their men, they ought to have restrained it.

The loss of Seringham was in some degree counterbalanced by success in another quarter. The British force in the Carnatic had been considerably strengthened, partly by exchanges of prisoners, and partly by the arrival from England of two hundred recruits, and a King's regiment containing its full complement of one thousand men, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, who had formerly served in Bengal. He was now nominated to the command there; but the appointment was qualified by permission for him to remain with his regiment on the coast of Coromandel, if circumstances should render it more desirable. The amount of British force at this time in India was quite disproportioned to the demand for their services; and it followed that everywhere the various authorities endeavoured to secure as large a part of it as possible for their own protection. Thus Clive retained the troops which he took with him to Bengal, though aware that Madras was threatened with a siege. He knew the danger of the latter presidency; he also knew the hazard of diminishing his strength in Bengal; and being naturally most anxious for the safety of those interests for which he was peculiarly responsible, he was unwilling to place any part of his force in a position from which he could not recall them in case of necessity. The state of affairs in the Carnatic was now thought to warrant the exercise of the option of detaining Colonel Coote and his regiment. Clive, however, had requested that, if Colonel Coote were detained, Major Calliand might be spared for Bengal; and that officer, with two hundred men, was accordingly despatched thither.

When the presidency of Madras became aware of the movement of the expedition under M. Crillon, they determined that the whole of the British army should take the field. No plan of operations appears to have been decided on, the choice being left to Colonel Coote, who, about the time the French obtained possession of Seringham, arrived at Conjeveram, where the largest division of the army was in cantonment. The troops which had landed with Colonel Coote subsequently

joined, and the best mode of employing the force thus collected was deemed to be in attempting to reduce Wandewash. To divert the enemy, Colonel Coote, with the main body of his army, marched to Arcot; while Major Brereton, with a strong detachment, after traversing the intermediate territory, marched on to Wandewash, and took possession of the town almost without resistance. Intelligence of this success being forwarded to Colonel Coote at Arcot, he made a forced march to join Major Brereton, who in the mean time had been preparing a battery for the reduction of the fort. Another was subsequently constructed, and both were opened on the 29th of November. The enemy had continued to fire from the walls day and night from the time of the arrival of Major Brereton, but with so little effect that only one man in the British force had been wounded, and he but slightly. The fire of the English batteries, which was directed against the tower of the fort, succeeded, before noon on the day on which it was commenced, in silencing the enemy in that quarter and in making a practicable breach. The fort was then summoned to surrender, but the answer was, that it would be defended to the last extremity. The fire of the English was thereupon continued, and various parts of the defences were in succession dismantled. On the following morning the killadar sent officers to treat for his security in the event of his delivering up the place to the English. In the conference that ensued, Colonel Coote pledged himself to continue the killadar in the fort, and in the occupation of the surrounding districts, as a dependent of the Company, if he would deliver up the French whom he had admitted; but the promise was given on the condition of an unequivocal answer being returned by two o'clock in the afternoon. The appointed hour arrived without bringing the expected answer; but shortly afterwards the French soldiers, who seem to have reposed no great confidence in their Mahometan coadjutor, appeared on the walls and offered to deliver up the fort. Colonel Coote immediately ordered a company of sepoys to advance and take possession of the gateway; but having got there, they were told that the key was with the killadar. Against any check in this quarter, however, Colonel Coote had prepared. At the time of sending the sepoys to the gateway, he had himself advanced with another company to the breach, which was passed without opposition. They were followed by others, no resistance being offered; and thus Wandewash fell into the hands of the English without the loss of a single man, and at the expense of only five wounded. The killadar had signed the agreement for surrender to the English before they entered; and it is discreditable to the British authorities that he was not admitted to the advantages which had been promised him. It is true, that the time fixed for receiving his answer had been in a trifling

degree exceeded ; but something should have been allowed for the loose and dilatory character of Oriental diplomacy, and his evident intention of complying with the demand made on the part of the English ought to have secured to him the stipulated consideration.

From Wandewash Colonel Coote marched to Carangoly, distant from the former place about thirty-five miles. He entered the town with little difficulty on the 4th December, erected batteries and cannonaded the fort until the 10th, when his ammunition being nearly expended, he was under the necessity of sending for more to Chingleput ; but before he was compelled entirely to suspend his fire, an offer of surrender on terms was unexpectedly made, and the situation of the British force induced their commander to grant almost everything that was asked. The European part of the garrison, consisting of one hundred men, were permitted to march away with their arms, two rounds of ammunition per man, six days' provisions, drums beating and colours flying. The sepoys also were set free, but without their arms.

The fall of Carangoly was to have been followed by an attack upon the fort of Arcot. While Colonel Coote was on his march to Wandewash, Captain Wood, with a small force, had entered the city of Arcot, and without any opposition taken possession of the nabob's palace and the adjacent streets, although not half a mile from the fort. Here they remained several days, and compelled the French renter to furnish them with a quantity of rice at the market price. Anticipating the early arrival of Colonel Coote, they were engaged in making preparations for an attack upon the fort, when the approach of M. Bussy, returning from his march to join Basalat Jung, warned them to retire. This movement of Bussy had produced nothing worth the labour and expense of making it. Alarmed by the approach of an English force under Captain More to watch his motions, and instigated by the advice of an influential native who was hostile alike to the two European powers, Basalat Jung not only demanded a complete recognition of his authority and the assistance of the French to maintain it, but added to these conditions of obtaining his friendship another, which, under the circumstances existing, was one of the most inconvenient that could be devised. He required that Bussy should lend him four lacs of rupees ; and as the French authorities were, at that moment, in the situation of men who knew not where to turn for the means of defraying charges which could not be diminished or evaded without certain ruin, it was obvious that this condition, if insisted on, must be sufficient to put an end to the negotiation. Bussy tried the effect of personal conference with Basalat Jung, but in vain, and he retired without gaining anything for the French cause but the barren form of a sunnud, enjoining all chiefs and officers in Arcot to yield obedience to Lally.

Their obedience was certain while Lally had the power of enforcing it ; and when he ceased to possess that power, it was equally certain that the sunnud of Basalat Jung would be of no value beyond that of the material upon which it was inscribed. With this document, the only result of his mission, Bussy returned, and having found the French force with Basalat Jung in a state of the greatest destitution, brought it away, and by the influence of his personal credit, managed to hire four hundred native horse to add to the efficiency of the force under his command. He arrived at Arcot on the day on which Wandewash surrendered to the English. On the fall of that place, Colonel Coote advanced in the direction of Arcot, but the ravages of the French cavalry, and a body of Mahrattas, who, after being in treaty with the English, had joined the French, rendered it impracticable to obtain provisions, and the English army being without any stores, were subjected to great privation. The hardship of their situation was further aggravated by excessive rains, which their tents were unable to resist, and the pressure of these circumstances forced Colonel Coote to withdraw his troops into cantonments. They were stationed in the fort of Coverpauk and the adjacent villages.

The main body of the French army soon after advanced from Chingleput to Arcot. Besides the addition gained by the junction of Bussy, reinforcements were obtained from other quarters. Lally had become sensible that he had too far weakened his main body by detachments to the southward, and he sought to repair the error by recalling a large portion of the troops from Seringham and from other garrisons. Colonel Coote had again brought his force into the field, having pitched his camp about midway between Coverpauk and Arcot ; and the new year found the two armies in sight of each other, but both apprehensive of the consequences of an engagement. The French were the first to disturb the temporary calm, by a movement which Colonel Coote imagined to be directed against Wandewash. In this he was mistaken. The object of Lally was to attack Conjeveram, where he supposed that the English had great store of rice ; and the mode in which he contrived to reach the place without exciting suspicion manifested some dexterity. For two days his progress was inexplicably slow ; on the third he amused those who observed him, by putting his troops through a variety of evolutions on a large scale, which appeared to be only intended as practice, but which had the effect of throwing his whole line in the direction to which his views were turned, and to place the horse in the position most favourable for his purpose. As soon as it became dark, he formed his troops into two divisions, and putting himself at the head of the first, he arrived in the morning at Conjeveram. But he was disappointed of his expected prize. The English had no store of provisions there, nor indeed anywhere.

It appears to have been then the common mode of conducting an Indian campaign to leave the day to provide for itself. If a supply could be obtained, it was well; if untoward circumstances intervened, the troops were destined to suffer hunger.

The pagoda of Conjeveram contained some military stores, the loss of which would have been felt by the English; but Lally was without cannon to attack it; and all that he could perform was, to wreak the effects of his disappointment on the inhabitants of the town, by first plundering and then setting fire to their houses. With the booty thus acquired, and two thousand bullocks, the most valuable result of this expedition, Lally joined the other division of his army, and proceeded to Trivatore. Colonel Coote had no suspicion that the views of the French commander were directed to Conjeveram, till informed that he had arrived there by a communication from the British officer in command of the pagoda. It was late in the afternoon when the intelligence reached him; but before sunset his whole force was in motion, and the colonel, advancing with the cavalry, arrived at Conjeveram, a distance of twenty-one miles, about an hour after midnight. In the morning the remainder of the army arrived, but the departure of the enemy had rendered their services unnecessary.

The attack of Wandewash, however, which Colonel Coote had supposed to be the first object of Lally's movement, was to follow his disappointment at Conjeveram. To this attempt Bussy was decidedly opposed. He was of opinion that to retake Wandewash in the face of the whole British force was impracticable, and that, with reference to the circumstances of the two armies, and especially to the superiority of the French in cavalry, a preferable course would be to keep together the regular troops and detach the Mahratta horse to lay waste the English districts. It was anticipated by Bussy that the English would either be compelled to fight at a disadvantage or to fall back upon Madras for supplies; and that, in either case, the easy recovery of both Wandewash and Carangoly might be expected. Decency required that Lally should sometimes ask the advice of so distinguished an officer as Bussy, but the overweening confidence in his own talents, which never forsook him, led him on this occasion, as on many others, to distrust it. Infatuated by self-conceit, he appears to have attributed the advice of Bussy to jealousy of his own superior abilities, and of the probable fame which would flow from their uncontrolled exercise. The consciousness of his own feeling towards his able adviser might dispose him to believe in the existence of a corresponding feeling against himself. Lally indeed was not envious of the abilities of Bussy, for he believed his own to be immeasurably greater; but he was intensely jealous of the popularity of one whom the government had made his subordinate,

but whom nature had formed his superior, and to whose qualities as a soldier and a man the homage of public respect rendered a tribute which Lally himself could not command.

Lally determined to act on his own opinion, and on the 4th of January marched with a part of his force for Wandewash. The main body he left under the command of Bussy at Trivatore; but there they did not long remain. On becoming acquainted with the departure of Lally, Colonel Coote marched and took up a position half-way between Wandewash and Chingleput, being thus within an easy distance of the former place while he secured a communication with the latter, and through it with Madras. The Mahrattas had been ordered to observe the motions of the English army; but the country was not yet quite exhausted, and while the work of plunder remained incomplete, the Mahrattas could spare time for no other occupation. Lally was consequently ignorant of the march of Colonel Coote until the day on which he halted at the position which he had chosen, when a letter from M. Bussy announced the approach of the British army. The headstrong passions of Lally readily led him to doubt of that which he did not wish to be true, and it was with hesitation and difficulty that he yielded credit to Bussy's report. He at first ordered only a part of the force to advance from Trivatore, but the unwelcome news of the movement of the British army being confirmed from other sources, he gave permission to Bussy to exercise his own discretion with regard to the remainder. Bussy immediately marched for Wandewash with his whole force.

Colonel Coote had resolved not to advance upon the enemy till they were ready to assault, and then to make his choice according to circumstances, to attack either the troops engaged against the fort or the army on the plain which covered them. The sagacity of Bussy penetrated the intention of the English commander, and he once more cast away some good counsel in urging Lally to suspend the siege, and keep his whole force concentrated till his opponents either ventured on an engagement or withdrew. Various motives co-operated to insure the rejection of this advice—it came from a man whom Lally hated, it impugned his judgment, and it pointed to a course which was tantamount to an acknowledgment of partial failure. All the predominating feelings of Lally's mind rebelled against it, and he determined to persevere in the siege at all hazards.

On the first arrival of Lally at Wandewash he had attacked the town with all his infantry in two divisions. They were received by a sharp fire from the troops in the town, and some mistakes being committed, confusion resulted. The prosecution of the attack was thereupon deferred to the following day, when the French were observed advancing in a single column against the south side of the town with two field-pieces at their head. This

attempt was near ending in the same manner as that of the preceding day. The fire to which the column was exposed brought the front "to a halt without orders," and but for the timely interposition of their general would have produced something worse. Lally, resembling his predecessor Duplexe in many respects, differed from him in this—that he possessed personal courage. On observing the panic which threatened to frustrate his hopes of success, he rode to the head of the column, dismounted, called for volunteers, and running forward, was himself the first to enter the town. His example produced the intended effect upon those who before were on the point of shrinking. The whole column immediately poured in after him, and the troops who defended the town retired into the fort, where they arrived without loss. The French immediately began to intrench the openings of the streets facing the fort, and to raise a battery against the tower which Colonel Coote had breached, and nearly on the ground which he had occupied for the purpose. The cannon had to be brought from a distance, and it was not till the morning of the 20th January that the battery was ready to open. It was then vigorously worked, and by night had produced some effect. Intelligence of this being conveyed to Colonel Coote, he advanced the next day with his cavalry to reconnoitre, and then receiving a message from Captain Sherlock, who defended the fort, informing him that the main rampart was breached, he retired a short distance, and gave orders to the main body of his army to advance. They joined during the night, and at sunrise Colonel Coote advanced with two troops of European horse, one thousand native horse, and two companies of sepoys, leaving orders for the main body to follow. The march of the British force was interrupted by the French cavalry and by the Mahrattas, who having recently returned from a plundering expedition, were assembled in great numbers; but these annoyances were repelled, and the English drew up in order of battle upon an open plain in sight of the French camp. Within that camp no motion was perceived, and Colonel Coote advancing with some of his officers to reconnoitre, was suffered to approach and return without interruption. Equal inactivity appeared to prevail among those engaged in the attack upon Wandewash, for no firing was heard.

On the return of Colonel Coote, he gave orders for the army to move towards the south side of the mountain of Wandewash, and in the direction of the fort. Arriving at some stony ground which protected them from the attacks of the cavalry, the British infantry again drew up in order of battle opposite to the French camp, and halted for some time in this position. The Mahrattas were spread round the foot of the mountain, but none of them ventured to approach, and some of the French cavalry who came out to reconnoitre were speedily driven back by the fire of two

guns. No other notice was taken of the British force, and its commander proceeded to complete the masterly operation which he had meditated, by moving round the mountain till he had placed his army in a position which secured a free communication with the fort, while at the same time one of his flanks was protected by its fire, and the other by a tract of impassable ground: this position also gave him the opportunity of attacking at his pleasure the batteries of the enemy, their trenches, or their camp, and the latter either on the flank or in the rear. Lally now perceived that he had given an important advantage to the English, and he lost no time in endeavouring to retrieve the error. He formed his troops in order of battle with all practicable expedition, and Colonel Coote, halting his line, prepared in like manner for the conflict.

Before the two armies were within cannon-shot of each other, Lally put himself at the head of his European cavalry, three hundred in number, and taking a large sweep on the plain, came down upon the cavalry of the English. The greater part of this body were native horse, and they, it is said, pretending to wheel in order to meet the enemy, purposely threw themselves into confusion. As soon as this was effected, some went off, and the rest followed after no long interval, leaving the charge of the French to be sustained by the Europeans, of whom there were only eighty. But they were ably supported by two guns under the management of Captain Barker, who, watching the movements of the enemy and directing his own accordingly, was enabled to receive them with a point blank fire just as they were in the act of riding on to the English. In less than a minute they were thrown into confusion, and turning their horses galloped back to the French camp, Lally being the last man to retire.

During this attack the French line had been cannonading the English, but in consequence of the distance, without effect. The English abstained from answering with their guns till they had advanced sufficiently near, when it being obvious that their artillery was much better managed than that of the enemy, they halted to preserve the advantage. Their fire severely galled the French infantry, who sustained it with much impatience till Lally returned from his unsuccessful charge of cavalry, when his own impetuosity concurring with the feeling of his men, he gave orders to advance. The battle now became general. After the discharge of some volleys of musketry, the regiment of Loraine formed in a column twelve in front and prepared to charge the regiment of Colonel Coote. They went forward almost at a run, and at about fifty yards' distance received the fire of those against whom they were advancing. It struck down many, but did not stop their progress, which was so impetuous as to beat down those immediately opposed to it. In a moment

the troops of the two nations were indiscriminately mingled in deadly conflict with the bayonet, and in another their feet were encircled by the dead and the dying. The regiment of Loraine had hitherto manifested a high degree of daring perseverance, but the feeling which had thus far supported now forsook them—they fell back and ran in disorder to regain the camp. An accident contributed to increase the alarm caused by the repulse of Loraine's regiment. A shot from one of the English guns struck a tumbril loaded with powder, which was placed in a tank to the left of Lally's regiment, and about eighty men were killed or wounded by the explosion. All who were near and uninjured fled to the camp, and four hundred sepoys at some distance, who were in no danger, took the same course. Major Brereton immediately advanced to take possession of the tank before the enemy had time to recover from their confusion. Bussey, however, had succeeded in rallying a few of the fugitives, who were again posted in the tank with some additional force. Major Brereton and his men advanced at a rapid pace, suffering little from the enemy till they came close to the tank, which they forthwith assaulted and carried under a heavy fire which did great execution. Among its victims was the gallant leader of the party, Major Brereton. Some of his men on seeing him fall, rushing to render him assistance, he bade them not think of him but follow on to victory. Victory was with them. He who had led them to it lived not to participate in the triumph, but his last breath was employed in the service of his country, and his conduct in death formed a worthy close to an honourable life.

The troops despatched against the tank being more than were deemed necessary to maintain the post, part of them formed without, to counteract any attempt that might be made to regain it. Between them and Lally's regiment the fight continued to be maintained by a brisk fire of musketry; but two field-pieces being brought to bear on the flank of the French, their line began to give way. At this juncture Bussey sought to avert impending defeat by leading to a charge; but his horse being struck by a ball, he was forced to dismount, when he had the mortification of finding that he was followed by about twenty men only. The rest had shrunk from the danger; and Bussey and his more adventurous followers were surrounded by an English party and made prisoners.

The success of Colonel Coote against Loraine's regiment, and that of Major Brereton against Lally, decided the fortune of the day. The French troops in other parts of the field now retreated, and the British entered the enemy's camp without opposition; they also obtained possession of twenty-four pieces of cannon, a large quantity of ammunition, and such stores and baggage as had not been burned by Lally on his retreat. The loss of the English

in killed and wounded was about two hundred; that of the enemy was computed to amount to six hundred. After the cannonading, the action was maintained entirely by the European troops on both sides. Of these, the strength of the French was two thousand two hundred and fifty; that of the English nineteen hundred. Examples of courage were not wanting on either side. In numerical strength the French had the advantage; the superiority of generalship was on the side of the English—and it triumphed. The native officers in the service of the English who had been spectators of the conflict, after complimenting Colonel Coote on the victory which he had achieved, thanked him for the opportunity of viewing such a battle as they had never before seen.

A vague report of the battle and its result reached Madras by sunrise the next morning. At noon it was confirmed by the arrival of a note from Colonel Coote, written on the field with a pencil. Further accounts followed; and at last eye-witnesses, capable of detailing the most minute particulars of the victory. The joy diffused by the intelligence was unbounded.

The French after their defeat marched to Chingleput, and from thence to Gingee. The English followed them to the former place, against which they erected a battery, and cannonaded until a breach nearly practicable was made. The commandant then saved them further labour, by surrendering at discretion. Pursuing his career of success, Colonel Coote proceeded to Arcot. The fort sustained a battery for several days; but on the 10th February the English took possession of it, and the capital of the Nabob was thus once more wrested from the French. It was believed that the fort might have held out some days longer, had not the commandant and garrison abandoned themselves to despair. At one period of the siege the English had completely exhausted their shot, and Colonel Coote sent a message to the commandant for no other purpose but to gain time to pick up what the enemy had fired. When the fort surrendered, the English stock of ammunition was so low, that on the following day the batteries must have ceased till a supply could have been obtained.

Arcot, though the chief, was far from being the only prize which fell to the English arms; many places of minor importance were in rapid succession added to the lists of their conquests, while others were silently abandoned by the French. Among those thus captured or deserted were Trinomally, Permacoil, Alanparvah, and Devi-cottah. The possession of Karikal was regarded as very important, on account of its value as a naval station, as well as because it afforded ready access to Tanjore. An expedition was fitted out against it, which, as the event proved, was almost ludicrously disproportioned to the resistance offered. This, however, was an error little to be re-

gretted. The object sought was attained; the extent to which resistance would be carried could not precisely be estimated; and failure would have cast a shade upon the course of the English arms, detracted from the confidence engendered by recent successes, and renewed the hopes of the enemy. The forts of Villapore, Soolabgur, Tricalore, Trivelanore, Valdore, Chilambarum, and Cuddalore, subsequently came into the possession of the English.

These successes contributed greatly to aggravate the discontent and dissensions prevailing in Pondicherry. Lally, on arriving there after the battle of Wandewash, had been received with a torrent of invective and abuse. Accusations the most absurd and unjust were heaped on him. It was not merely of rashness, arrogance, and presumption that he was accused—to such imputations his conduct was abundantly open,—but he was charged with cowardice and treason, and his return to Pondicherry was said to be a step in the execution of a design which he entertained to betray the city and its inhabitants. Every fresh instance of the success of the English exasperated the enmity which prevailed against Lally—every failure was attributed to him, whether it happened under his management or not. Lally, on his part, made no attempt to conciliate those who were opposed to him: on the contrary, he treated them with haughty defiance, and answered the charges brought against him by counter-charges of corruption and misconduct on the part of his enemies. But these ebullitions of rancour within Pondicherry would not repel the English from its gates, to which they were fast approaching, having shut up the French within a very circumscribed space, where, if able to maintain their ground, they were in imminent danger of perishing by famine. It was necessary, therefore, to take some measures for relief, and it was necessary that they should be taken without delay.

Lally had always manifested a profound contempt for the natives of India, yet he now consented to avail himself of native aid. Through the agency of a Portuguese bishop, he succeeded in concluding a treaty with Hyder Ali, an adventurer who had raised himself to high station in the government of Mysore, for the services of a body of troops from that country. The immediate price to be paid for this assistance consisted of the forts of Thiagur and Elvanasore, one hundred thousand rupees per month for the service of the army, ten eighteen-pounders as a present to the general, and all the artillery and military stores in the two forts, as well as a supply of ammunition while serving for the French. There was also a prospective arrangement, relating to schemes of conquest to be realized when the English were expelled from the Carnatic. The negotiation was conducted with great secrecy, and the English authorities were not aware of it till a few days before the

arrival of the first division of the Mysorean troops. When the danger was known, preparation was made to repel it; but a force under Major More, despatched to act against the Mysoreans, was met by their whole body near Trivadi, and totally routed.

Colonel Coote was at this time engaged in besieging the fort of Villenore. Batteries had been erected and were in operation, when the French army, with the whole of the Mysorean force, appeared in sight. A detachment was sent to check the advanced parties while the line got under arms, and another to maintain the villages in the vicinity of the batteries, which by this time had beaten down the parapet and silenced the fire from the fort. These effects, followed by the advance of a few sepoy, so discouraged the officer in command, that at this critical moment he most unexpectedly held out a flag of truce, and opened his gates to the English. The astonishment of the French may be conceived, when they saw their own colours suddenly hauled down to make way for those of the English, and found the guns on the rampart turned upon themselves and their Mysorean allies. The effect was to paralyze their entire force. All the lines stopped at once and without orders, as though stricken simultaneously by some sudden visitation which deprived them of the power of motion. Lally, when sufficiently recovered from the astounding effect of this surprise, gave orders to retreat. Had the surrender of the fort been delayed a few minutes, its fate would have been determined by the result of a general engagement.

For some time after the capture of Villenore, the war in the Carnatic presents little deserving of notice, except the departure of the Mysoreans, in consequence partly of the indifferent prospects of their French allies, but principally because the situation of Hyder Ali at home required all the force that he could command. In September, Lally made an attack upon the English camp, which was planned with considerable skill, and to a certain extent well executed; but a mistake occurred in the disposition of one of the divisions engaged in it, and the attempt produced nothing but an accession of bitter feeling between Lally and his associates in arms. Lally attributed intentional misconduct to the commander of the division in which the failure occurred, and alleged that he was actuated by envy of the glory which was about to encircle the brows of him by whose genius the attack was suggested, and under whose auspices it was advancing to a successful issue. The French officers and authorities at this time seem to have been remarkably liberal in giving to each other credit for the possession of every evil and contemptible quality.

The officers in the English army kept themselves free from the scandal attached to the open and disgraceful quarrels of the French; but they were not without causes of disunion and discontent. Some ships recently arrived

from England had brought reinforcements, which were highly acceptable; but they also brought commissions from the Crown appointing Majors Brereton and Monson lieutenant-colonels, with priority over Colonel Coote. These officers were not to assume the advantages of their seniority while Colonel Coote remained in the Carnatic; but Major Monson (the only survivor, Major Brereton having fallen at Wandewash) seemed disposed to yield as little as possible of the dignity of his new rank. Instead of offering to serve under his present commander, he proposed to retire to Madras; but Colonel Coote determined to remove the difficulty by withdrawing to the command in Bengal, to which he had been originally appointed. He accordingly delivered over the command to Monson, and proceeding to Madras, demanded permission for himself and his regiment to depart for Bengal. The presidency demurred, and Colonel Monson declared that if the regiment were withdrawn, the hope of reducing Pondicherry must be abandoned. Coote then consented to leave his regiment, and to proceed to Bengal without it. Between Coote and Monson some difference of opinion had existed as to the mode of carrying on operations against Pondicherry. Before the arrival of the new commissions, Coote had ordered a force to march and invest the fort of Arianoopang; but Monson did not approve of the movement, and Coote, who appears to have surrendered his own judgment with great facility to that of his second in command, countermanded the order for the march of the detachment. Monson had in view another operation, which his acquisition of the command enabled him to carry into effect. Pondicherry was surrounded by a hedge of trees and thorns, and this natural defence was strengthened by four redoubts. Against these, and a French post at Oulgarry, the attack was directed. It was in some respects ill conducted. Some mistakes happened: one of them, through the disappearance, at the moment when most wanted, of Major Robert Gordon, the same officer whose inexplicable absence had occasioned so much mischief at Wandewash; but the French abandoned three of the redoubts and several pieces of cannon. This measure of success was not obtained without severe loss on the part of the English. Among the wounded was Colonel Monson, and the chief command consequently devolved on Major Gordon, whose incompetence within a few hours afterwards exposed the main body of his army to a night attack, which was disappointed of success only by the desperate valour of those by whom the English posts were defended. Happily the command was soon transferred to abler hands. Colonel Coote had not yet left Madras, and Colonel Monson, whose wound was so severe as to render it certain that for a considerable time he would be incapacitated for service, strenuously requested that his predecessor would resume the com-

mand. The presidency seconded the request with equal earnestness, and Colonel Coote complied. His military talents were forthwith exercised with the same perseverance and success which had distinguished his former command.

In the mean time the prospects of Lally and the inhabitants of Pondicherry were constantly becoming more gloomy. The troops within were insufficient to the defence of the place; but famine was threatening to assail them, and the absence of a large part of the French force at a distance was actually regarded as an advantage, on account of the difficulty which would have been found in subsisting them in Pondicherry. No forage being procurable, the few cavalry that remained were sent away, although their departure further diminished the strength on which the town rested for defence, and both horses and men were likely to be taken by the English. Distress at length attained that stage when man regards his competitor for bread as an incumbrance from which he must deliver himself, whatever the means. On the 27th December an unwilling train passed out of the town, forced from their homes by the arm of power. They were the native inhabitants of both sexes and of every age. With the exception of a few domestic servants, whose labours ministered to the comfort of the richer and more powerful Europeans, all were expelled. Their number was fourteen hundred, and when the gates of the town closed upon the last, not one of the number knew whither to turn his steps for succour or even for safety. To escape death from famine was to meet it from the sword. The unhappy fugitives wandered in families and companies to various points, but everywhere the challenge of the English sepoy warned them back. They returned to the gates which had voided them forth, and implored to be admitted to the privilege of sharing the common lot of those among whom they had lived—but in vain. The energy of despair prompting some to attempt to force their way, they were met and dismissed from suffering by discharges of musketry and of the cannon of the fort. Through eight days these miserable outcasts continued to traverse the space within which they were circumscribed, repeating their importunities at the gates of the town for admittance, and at the English posts for permission to pass, and finding their petitions rejected alike by friends and foes. During this time the scantily spread roots of grass afforded their only means of subsistence. Their enemies at last yielded to the feeling of pity, which seemed lost among those on whom the sufferers had the strongest claim. The English commander allowed them to pass; and though they had neither home nor friend in prospect, their joy on being delivered from the lingering death by which they were threatened was unbounded. Thanks were tendered for this act of indulgence, and bless-

ings bestowed on those by whom it was granted, with a warmth which bore witness to the horror with which these wretched people regarded the situation from which they had escaped. It is creditable to the character of Mahomet Ali, who had recently arrived in the British camp, that he concurred in the act of mercy extended to the fugitives.

On the 8th of December four batteries were completed, and at midnight they opened against the town. They continued to fire at intervals during several days, but with little effect beyond harassing the garrison, who, suffering greatly from want of provisions, were little able to endure fatigue. From the time of the expulsion of the native inhabitants, the soldiers had been put on famine allowance. A general search for provisions had on one occasion been made; a second, which was threatened, was averted by the interposition of the superior of the Jesuits, who, it is said, "knew all the secrets of the town," and who promised, if the search were relinquished, to produce provisions for fifteen days, beyond which he could give no further hope. On the 30th of December the English suffered severely from a dreadful storm. The sea broke over the beach, and overflowed the country, carrying away the batteries and redoubts. Their tents were destroyed and their ammunition rendered useless, while the soldiers, in many instances, abandoned their muskets in their anxiety for personal safety. Many of the native retainers of the camp perished. The destructive effects of the storm were not unobserved in Pondicherry, and had it been possible to move artillery through the wide-spread waters, a sally would have been made, which probably would have been but feebly opposed. Orme says that three hundred men properly armed would not, for three hours after daylight, have met with a hundred together in a condition to resist them. The squadron which was stationed to prevent the introduction of provisions into Pondicherry by sea felt the effects of the storm. Several ships were stranded, and most of the remaining ones considerably damaged. The repairs of the latter were, however, carried on with great celerity, and within a week Pondicherry was again blockaded by an English fleet. Similar diligence was employed in restoring the works and stations of the army. On the 6th of January an attempt was made to supply part of the loss which had been sustained, by an attack upon a redoubt which still remained in the possession of the enemy, and the command of which, if gained, would more effectually impede the access of supplies to the town than the posts which had been destroyed. Possession was gained by stratagem, and the English applied themselves to making some necessary additions to the works; but on the following morning the post was vigorously attacked by a party from the garrison, and after a very indifferent defence, the officer

in command and the greater part of his men surrendered themselves prisoners. This affair would scarcely deserve notice, did not its conclusion mark the distress which prevailed in Pondicherry. Lally sent back all the prisoners to the English camp under a promise not to serve again—the French being unable to spare food to keep them alive.

On the 12th of January the English began to open trenches. Nearly fourteen hundred men were employed in this work, which was conducted with extraordinary rapidity and great caution. One battery had been at work since the 10th; others were in preparation, when a flag of truce announced the approach of a deputation. They came on foot, having neither horses nor palanquin-bearers. They bore a gasconading memorial from Lally, reproaching the English with breach of faith in the capture of Chandernagore and other proceedings, which conduct on the part of the English, it was represented, put it out of the French general's power to propose any capitulation for the city of Pondicherry. Nevertheless, he and his troops, reduced to extremity by want of provisions, were ready to surrender themselves prisoners of war—the English to take possession of the town on the following morning, and of the fort the day after. For the citizens and religious professors he claimed a cartel, and for the mother and sisters of Rajah Sahib permission to seek an asylum wherever they should think proper, or at least that they should remain prisoners with the English, and "not," said the memorialist, "be delivered over to the hands of Mahomet Ali, still tinged with the blood of the father and husband which he shed, to the shame indeed of those who delivered up Chunda Sahib to him, but to the shame likewise of the commander of the English army, who ought not to have suffered such a barbarity to have been committed within his camp." On the part of the governor and council of Pondicherry another memorial was presented, claiming personal freedom for the inhabitants, security for their property, and protection to the Roman Catholic religion. Colonel Coote gave a short answer to Lally, declining to enter into discussion on the breaches of faith charged against the English, and accepting the offer of surrender at discretion. Accordingly, on the following morning the English were admitted to possession of the town; and as some tumult was apprehended, the citadel was delivered up on the evening of the same day.

When the authority of Lally was at an end, those who had been subjected to it gave unrestrained vent to their feelings of dislike. A crowd assembled to witness his departure for Madras. On his appearance they raised a general shout of derisive execration, and would probably have proceeded to violence, had they not been prevented by the escort. The shout was renewed on the appearance of Dubois, the king's commissary, who stopped

and said he was ready to answer any one. One of the crowd stepped forward and drew his sword. Dubois did the same—he was a man advanced in years, and labouring under the infirmity of defective sight; the second pass laid him dead at his antagonist's feet. No one would assist his servant to remove the body; and the man who had taken his life was regarded as having performed a meritorious act.

On the fourth day after the surrender, Mr. Pigot, the governor of Madras, demanded that Pondicherry should be delivered over to the presidency, as having become the property of the East-India Company. Colonel Coote called a council, consisting of the chief officers both of the army and the fleet, and they decided against the claim made by the governor of Madras. The contest might have occupied considerable time, had it not been cut short by a declaration from Mr. Pigot, that if Pondicherry were not delivered up, the presidency of Madras would not furnish money for the subsistence either of the king's troops or of the French prisoners. This stopped all further argument, and the authority of the presidency was admitted, under protest.

When Fort St. David fell into the hands of the French, its fortifications had been destroyed. The court of France had indeed instructed Lally to destroy all the maritime possessions of the English which might fall into his hands. The Court of Directors of

the English East-India Company had, in retaliation, ordered their governments to resort to similar measures in the case of conquests made from the French. In consequence of these orders, the fortifications of Pondicherry were demolished; and with a view further to embarrass any attempt that might be made by the French to re-establish themselves in India, all the buildings within the works were subsequently destroyed.

From the time when Pondicherry fell, the French power in the Carnatic was virtually at an end. Gingee still remained in their possession, as did also Thiagur, which had been restored by the Mysoreans on their departure: but the former yielded to a force under Captain Stephen Smith; and the latter, after sustaining sixty-five days of blockade and bombardment, capitulated to Major Preston. Mahé, and its dependencies on the coast of Malabar, also surrendered; and early in the year 1761 the French had neither any regular military force in any part of India, nor any local possessions, except their factories of Calicut and Surat, which were merely trading establishments. In that spirit of universal conquest by which they had long been animated, the French had sought to establish a commanding empire in India—vast efforts had been made to effect this object—and after a series of wars, occupying many years, nothing remained to them but the recollection of defeat.

CHAPTER VI.

EMPEROR CONFIRMS MEER JAFFIER IN GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL—HOSTILITIES WITH THE DUTCH—THEIR DEFEAT BY COLONEL FORDE—DEPOSAL OF MEER JAFFIER, AND ELEVATION OF MEER COSSIM—EMPEROR DEFEATED BY MAJOR CARNAO—ABOLITION OF INLAND DUTIES—MEER JAFFIER RESTORED—MASSACRE OF EUROPEANS AT PATNA—BATTLE OF BUXAR—LORD CLIVE GOVERNOR OF BENGAL—MUTINY OF SIR ROBERT FLETCHER AND OTHER OFFICERS—CLIVE FOUNDS THE MILITARY FUND—RETURNS TO ENGLAND—HIS CHARACTER.

THE revolution which placed Meer Jaffier on the throne of Bengal was followed by the usual attendants upon a new and unsettled government—discontent, disturbance, and alarm. A very short time had elapsed when three distinct rebellions were raised in different parts of the country; while Roydoolob, who had been one of the most valuable of Meer Jaffier's friends, and was now one of the most powerful of his dependents, became alienated from his master; and to add to the difficulties of the new sovereign, an invasion of his dominions was threatened from Oude. The aid of Clive was indispensable to extricate Meer Jaffier from his difficulties; but coldness, if not positive dislike, was engendered between them, by the reluctance of the new sovereign to fulfil the pecuniary stipulations to which he had bound himself. Clive, however, applied himself vigorously to remove the difficulties

which surrounded Meer Jaffier, and to procure the discharge of the English claims. His endeavours were not without success. He allayed the intestine commotions by which the new government was threatened, obtained payment of part of the sums due to the English, and security for the rest; and finally accompanied Meer Jaffier to Patna, with a view to overawe foreign enemies by the exhibition of a powerful force on the frontier, and by the same means to facilitate the attainment of that which was an object of strong desire as well as of high importance both to the sovereign of Bengal and his English protectors—a sunnud from Delhi confirming Meer Jaffier in the authority which the English had conferred upon him.

Soon after his return to Calcutta a despatch was received from England, directing the establishment of a new system of administering the government of Bengal. By a despatch

dated some months earlier, but which arrived only at the same time with that by which its provisions were superseded, a committee of five had been appointed, in which Clive, if in Bengal, was to preside. By the later arrangement, a council of ten was nominated. The office of president was to be held by the four senior members in rotation, each for three months; but Clive was altogether passed over. The members of the new council were, however, unanimously of opinion that the state of affairs required that the office of president should be permanently held by some one person, and they were equally unanimous in judging that Clive should be the person selected. In compliance with these views they requested him to undertake the office. He was at first disposed to decline, but finally yielded to the urgent representations of persons of all ranks and parties in Bengal entreating him, by his regard to the public interest, not to refuse his services at so critical a period. He was greatly offended by the apparent neglect of the Court of Directors, and had they manifested an intentional disregard of his services, his anger would not have been without cause; but the probability is, that they believed him to be no longer in Bengal. In naming him president under the previous arrangement, the contingency of his departure from that part of India was referred to and provided for. From his own letters the Court had reason to conclude that he had returned to Madras, and though they were aware of the capture of Calcutta, they were ignorant of the subsequent proceedings against Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, of the battle of Plassy and its consequences. The wisdom of the arrangement which restricted the exercise of the authority of president of council to so short a period as three months may fairly be questioned, but there is not the slightest reason for believing that any intention existed of offering violence to the feelings of Clive, or casting his merits into the shade. The absence of any such intention is indeed placed beyond doubt by the fact that, three months before the council invited Clive to accept the office of president, he had been appointed to it by the Court of Directors on their becoming aware of his protracted residence in Bengal, and of the new claims which he had established to the confidence of his employers.

It was shortly after Clive, in compliance with the unanimous request of his associates, had undertaken the office of president, that the expedition under Colonel Forde was despatched to the Northern Circars. The progress of that expedition, and its brilliant result, the capture of Masulipatam, have already been related.

The court of Meer Jaffier in the mean time continued to be a scene of intrigues, in which the sovereign and his son Meerun were no less active than their inferiors. A detail of them would possess little of either instruction or interest: they may therefore be passed over among the countless number of similar emanations of a tortuous and vicious policy, which,

if it were only for the sake of a reasonable brevity, the historian of India must dismiss without notice. But a new danger menaced the throne of Meer Jaffier, in a threatened invasion of Behar by the Shazada or eldest son of the Emperor of Delhi. He had fled from the capital of his father, and having by the influence of his rank collected a body of military followers, was instigated by the Subahdar of Oude, and, as it was believed, by the governor of Behar, to march against the dominions of Meer Jaffier. The chief promoter of the movement was probably Law, who was unwearied in submitting to the ruler of Oude representations of the unsettled state of Bengal, of the encouragement thus afforded to an invasion of that country, and of the certainty of a large French force soon arriving there. Meer Jaffier was not in a condition to regard this accession to his troubles with calmness. His troops were in a state of mutiny, and refused to march unless their arrears were paid. From Clive he had long been in a state of considerable estrangement; but on this, as on every occasion of difficulty, he turned to him for assistance and protection. Indeed it appears that not only the prince, but all classes of his subjects, including even the mutinous troops, looked to Clive, and to Clive alone, to extricate them from the embarrassments and dangers which surrounded and hung over them. His countenance and support were at the same time sought by the Shazada, and he was assured that the prince "had thoughts of doing great things through his counsel and in conjunction with him." Clive apprehending that a knowledge of these overtures might alarm Meer Jaffier, was careful to send him copies of all the letters.

Meer Jaffier was so much alarmed by the advance of the Shazada, that he had seriously contemplated the expediency of purchasing his retreat. Clive expressed little apprehension of the result, but urged the necessity of a military force advancing in the direction in which the descent was threatened. Putting himself at the head of about four hundred and fifty Europeans, and two thousand five hundred sepoy, he avowed his belief that he should be able to "give a good account of the Shazada, though his army were said to be thirty thousand strong." The invading army were besieging Patna. It was well defended by the governor of the province, who nevertheless was calculating the chances of success on both sides, in order to determine to which he should finally attach himself. The advance of Clive decided the question. The governor redoubled his exertions: the enemy was driven back after gaining possession of some of the bastions, and the repulse was followed by the Shazada abruptly breaking up his camp and retreating with great precipitation. This step was occasioned partly by the approach of Clive's advanced guard, and partly by the sovereign of Oude having seized Allahabad, the capital of Mahomed Kooli, a prince engaged in assist-

ing the shazada. The fugitives hastened to cross the river which divides the territories of Bengal from Oude; but the latter country afforded no asylum to the shazada, its ruler, by whom the invasion of Behar had been encouraged, being now the avowed enemy of those who made the attempt. From his father the wandering prince had nothing to hope. The emperor was kept in a state of pupillage by an ambitious and powerful minister; and it was to escape a similar state of thralldom that the shazada had fled the court. Not knowing whither to turn, the prince sought the protection of the British Government; but the emperor, or his minister acting in his name, had despatched an edict to Meer Jaffier, enjoining him as his vassal to seize and secure the person of his rebellious son. The empire of Delhi was fast approaching to its close; but public opinion still attached high respect to its authority, and it was not desirable to embroil either the English or their native ally with a power which claimed supremacy throughout India, and which, though weak in actual resources, was strong in the recollections of ancient grandeur. Clive thereupon felt compelled to decline complying with the wish of the prince, but he sent him a sum of money, equal to about a thousand pounds, to enable him to make his escape.

The results of this invasion were fortunate both to Meer Jaffier and to Clive. The shazada had previously borne the title (for this was all that he ever possessed) of soubahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. His disobedience to the reputed authority of his father led to the transfer of the titular distinction of soubahdar to the emperor's second son, Meer Jaffier being named as his lieutenant, with a perfect understanding that he should retain the substantial power, of which he was already in possession. Clive, at the solicitation of Meer Jaffier, was made an omrah of the empire—an honour which he accepted without appearing to consider how far he was justified in receiving it without the permission of his own sovereign, or whether the authority which he thereby gave to the emperor to demand his military service might not at some time interfere with his duty to the East-India Company, or his natural allegiance to the crown of Great Britain. A more substantial reward of Clive's services followed. To sustain the honour conferred by his feudal superior, Meer Jaffier bestowed on the fortunate captain who had raised him to a throne, and kept him there, a jaghire or estate. It was the quit-rent of certain lands which had been granted to the East-India Company, and was alleged to be worth thirty thousand pounds per annum. Clive accepted this mark of favour with as little hesitation as the former. He had indeed manifested some feeling of disappointment at its delay, and had taken occasion to remind Meer Jaffier that a competent jaghire was a convenient and almost indispensable appendage to the dignity of an omrah.

It has already been seen that the course of events in India, at this period, was not marked by any pedantic adherence to the principles of international law. A fresh instance is about to be adduced of the looseness with which the political relations of Europe operated in the East. The Dutch, in common with their European neighbours, had suffered from the exactions of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah. On this account they were not displeased with his downfall; but either from jealousy of the power by which it had been effected, or from some other cause, they were slow in acknowledging the authority of his successor. This gave great offence to Meer Jaffier, and on his being suffered to pass their settlement of Chinsura without the usual compliment of a salute, he stopped their trade. The Dutch, always humble when humility could promote their commercial interests, made a submissive apology, and were thereupon admitted to the advantages which they had previously enjoyed. They were now as assiduous in cultivating the favour of the prince as before they had been negligent in offering him even ordinary marks of respect. Meer Jaffier had begun to be weary of his English patrons, and was not indisposed to shake them off. The Dutch were envious of the advantage enjoyed by the English in a monopoly of saltpetre which had been granted them by Meer Jaffier, and further felt aggrieved by the English Government requiring all ships coming into the river to take English pilots—a precautionary measure rendered necessary by the circumstances of the times. Under the influence of a sense of common grievance, Meer Jaffier and the Dutch, it was believed, had entered into a private negotiation, the object of which was to bring into Bengal a Dutch force to act as a counterbalance to that of the English. Some months after the date assigned to this negotiation, it was ascertained that a powerful armament was fitting out at Batavia. Its destination was unknown, but it was rumoured to be Bengal. By this time the adverse feeling of Meer Jaffier towards the English had undergone some change. Their arms were everywhere successful, and the magnificence with which the ruler of Bengal had rewarded the services of Clive in delivering him from the invasion of the shazada, attested the value which he now attached to his friendship. He was, therefore, not prepared to provoke their hostility. The news of the preparations in Batavia was consequently followed by an expression of the displeasure of Meer Jaffier addressed to the Dutch authorities, and by a demand upon the English for the fulfilment of that provision of the treaty which bound them to render assistance to the nabob in resisting the introduction into his country of any foreign force. Soon afterwards a Dutch ship arrived full of troops. Meer Jaffier repeated his remonstrances to the Dutch and his demand for the aid of the

English. The answer of the Dutch was, that the ship came in from accident for water and provisions, having been driven from her destined port of Negapatam by stress of weather, and that both the vessel and the troops should leave the river as soon as their wants were supplied. It is almost unnecessary to say that no credence was given to this statement. Measures were taken to prevent surprise—all Dutch boats were subjected to a rigorous search, and on board of one belonging to the Dutch master-attendant some troops were found, which were forthwith taken back to the ship. These proceedings gave rise to much altercation and remonstrance between the Dutch and English authorities.

About two months after these occurrences, intelligence was received of the arrival of six other ships in the river, and these, in the words of Clive, "crammed with soldiers." This intelligence found Meer Jaffier on a visit to Clive at Calcutta. He was manifestly embarrassed by it, not discerning how he might preserve appearances at the same time with the Dutch, whose assistance he had invited, and with the English, whose power he dreaded and whose alliance it was most desirable for him to maintain. On leaving Calcutta, he professed to be going to reside three or four days at his fort of Hooghly, and declared that from thence he would chastise the insolence of the Dutch, and soon drive them out of the river again. But instead of proceeding to the fort, he took up his residence at a place about half-way between it and the settlement of Chinsura, where he received the Dutch authorities with all the grace and benignity that royal condescension could show to the most favoured friends. In a few days he made a communication to Clive, informing him that he had granted some indulgence to the Dutch in their trade, and that they had engaged to leave the river with their ships and troops as soon as the season would permit. This was an obvious subterfuge, as was at once perceived. Clive, referring to this communication, says: "The season permitting their immediate departure with the greatest safety and propriety, the last condition in the nabob's letter, joined to his whole behaviour, convinced us that leaving the river was no part of their intention; but that, on the contrary, they had his assent to bring up the troops if they could." This view of the subject was confirmed by the event. Instead of leaving the river the ships began to move up; and it was found that the Dutch were enlisting troops at Chinsura, Cossimbazar, and Patna—a process which could scarcely be carried on without the connivance of Meer Jaffier. When their preparations were thought complete, the Dutch addressed to the English authorities a remonstrance of great length and formidable purport. It recorded the grievances sustained from the assumption by the English of the right of search, and the obstructions offered by them to the passage of

the ships of the Dutch up the river, and concluded with denunciations of vengeance if redress were withheld. The English replied with calmness, justifying what they had done as having been performed under the orders of the nabob, and under the colours of his liege lord the emperor of Delhi; recommending an application to the nabob on the subject of complaint; and—in a strain which Clive himself says "may be thought to savour a little of audacity"—tendering the friendly offices of the British Government to mitigate the resentment of the native sovereign. The contending parties were now on the verge of active hostility, and the position of the English governor and council was one of extreme delicacy. If they suffered the Dutch to pass, they compromised the safety of the British settlements and power; if they resisted, they might plunge the two countries into war, and themselves into disgrace and ruin. "In this situation," says Clive, "we anxiously wished that the next hour would bring us news of a declaration of war with Holland." The desired news was not received; but the Dutch relieved Clive and his council from part of their anxiety, by committing various acts of violence, which could not be expected to pass without reprisal. Still to offer resistance to the passage up the Ganges of the vessels of a power nominally friendly, appeared to some timid politicians a strong measure—and the race of timid politicians appears to have been about this time very numerous in Bengal. Some of them endeavoured to imbue the mind of Clive with their own doubts, and to alarm him by representations of the personal danger which he incurred. His reply is said to have been, "A public man may occasionally be called upon to act with a halter round his neck." Clive shrunk not from the responsibility which attended a vigorous course of action, but prepared to vindicate his country's honour and to advance his own.

It was matter of doubt whether the Dutch intended to bring their ships past the English batteries, or whether they would land the troops below and march them through the country. Clive provided, as far as he had the means, against both. Colonel Forde, who had returned from the Deccan, was despatched to the northward with a force designed to alarm the Dutch authorities at Chinsura, as well as to intercept the troops of the enemy if they should proceed by land. Heavy cannon were mounted at Charnock's battery and the fort of Tannas, which places had been occupied for the purpose of enforcing search; while three Company's ships, all that were in the river, were ordered to pass the Dutch vessels and take their station above the batteries, where fire-boats were placed and other preparations were made to destroy the Dutch ships if they attempted to effect a passage.

On the 21st November the Dutch ships came to anchor a little below the English batteries, and on the 23rd they landed on the opposite

shore a large body of European and Malay troops. On the same day orders were sent to the commodore of the English squadron, Captain Wilson, to demand from the Dutch commodore restitution of all the English persons, vessels, and property seized and detained by him; and in the event of refusal he was, in the usual language of such commissions, to "fight, sink, burn, and destroy" the ships of those of whom it would now be absurd to speak otherwise than as "the enemy." The demand was made and refused, whereupon Captain Wilson proceeded to act upon the concluding part of his orders with that spirit in which the marine of England, whether royal or commercial, have rarely been deficient. Undismayed by the inequality of force, he attacked the enemy, and after an engagement of two hours the Dutch commodore struck his colours; five of his ships followed his example, and six out of seven vessels which constituted the Dutch fleet became at once prize to the English. One succeeded in getting away, but was intercepted below, and captured by two other English ships, which had just arrived. The number of prisoners taken by Captain Wilson is said to have been three times the number of the men under his command.

On the same day on which the naval supremacy of England was thus nobly asserted and sustained, Colonel Forde was attacked by the garrison of Chinsura while on his march to take up a position between that place and Chandernagore. They had posted themselves, with four pieces of cannon, amid the buildings of the last-named place. From this cover they were soon dislodged, when they fled to Chinsura, abandoning their cannon, and pursued with some loss to the very barriers of the town.

The following day decided the question of success. Colonel Forde having been apprized of the approach of the troops landed from the Dutch ships, and of their having been joined by part of the garrison of Chinsura, marched with two field-pieces, and met them on a plain, where an action ensued. The force of the Dutch consisted of eight hundred Europeans and seven hundred Malays, besides some troops of the country. They were commanded by Colonel Roussel, a Frenchman. The European force of the English fell considerably short of four hundred; in addition, they had about eight hundred sepoye. The action has been justly described as "short, bloody, and decisive." Its duration was less than half an hour, and the Dutch were entirely routed, leaving dead on the field about a hundred and twenty Europeans and two hundred Malays. About a hundred and fifty were wounded; three hundred Europeans, including Colonel Roussel and fourteen officers, and two hundred Malays were made prisoners. The loss of the English was inconsiderable.

Colonel Forde reported his success, and requested further orders. Had he been directed to march against Chinsura, it must have yielded

on a summons; but this step was prevented by an humble application from the Dutch for a restoration of the relations of peace. A treaty was concluded, by which they disavowed the acts of their naval commander, acknowledged themselves the aggressors, and agreed to reimburse the English East-India Company the amount of damage which they had sustained, and the charges of the war. On this arrangement the ships of the Dutch were delivered up to them.

Three days after the battle, the Dutch learned by the encampment of Meerun, son of Meer Jaffier, with several thousand horse within a short distance of Chinsura, that there was another party besides the English with whom they had an account to settle. They had been defeated, and this rendered it in the eyes of the nabob highly inexpedient to maintain with them the appearance of friendship. The terror of the Dutch was extreme, and they implored the protection of Clive, entreating him, in the most earnest as well as the most abject terms, to stand between them and the threatened infliction of Mahometan vengeance. He consented to give them the benefit of his good offices, and proceeded immediately to a situation near Chinsura, in order to check with more certainty than could be ensured at a distance the conduct of Meerun, of whose cruel and capricious temper some sudden and violent outbreak might not unreasonably be expected. Deputies from the Dutch Government were subsequently admitted to audience by Meerun, and after some altercation the basis of a treaty was agreed upon. The terms were, that the nabob should protect them in their trade and privileges, on condition that they should never meditate war, introduce or enlist troops, or raise fortifications without his consent—that they should never keep more than one hundred and twenty-five European soldiers in the country for the service of their several factories, Chinsura, Cossimbazar, and Patna, and that they should forthwith send away their ships and remaining troops. A breach of any of these conditions was to be punished by entire and utter expulsion from the territories of Meer Jaffier. The treaty being concluded, and the nabob satisfied for the trouble and expense of the march of his troops, the Dutch were delivered from the apprehension caused by their vicinity.

The restoration of peace on the coast was to be followed by the recurrence of hostilities in the interior. Before the arrangement of affairs with the Dutch was completed, it was ascertained that the shazada was again preparing to enter the province of Behar, supported by several powerful zemindars; and that the foudjar of Purneah had taken the field on the eastern bank of the Ganges, about half-way between Patna and Moorshedabad, with the intention, as it was believed, of joining the invader. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty with the Dutch, Colonel Calliaud arrived from Madras, and he was

forthwith despatched with a considerable force to Moorsheadabad, where in a few days he was joined by Clive and Colonel Forde. Both these distinguished commanders were about to quit India. Clive introduced Colonel Calliaud to the nabob, and recommended him to his confidence; but it has been justly said that "confidence is a plant of slow growth," and Meer Jaffer regarded the approaching departure of Clive with much alarm. Invasion threatened him from without, while within, an exhausted treasury, a discontented soldiery, and an oppressed people, afforded abundant grounds for apprehension. In addition to the anxiety generated by these sources of annoyance, Meer Jaffer was subjected to constant fear of the consequences which might arise from the wayward and extravagant conduct of his son Meerun. More especially did he dread that, in conformity with the many precedents which Oriental history affords, the prince might take some measures to quicken the natural course of the succession to the throne. The pride of Meer Jaffer had sometimes revolted at the interference of Clive, and circumstances had occasionally led him to cherish the thought of emancipating himself from his control; but when difficulty arose, he felt himself incompetent to meet it. Weak, timid, indolent, and indecisive, Meer Jaffer looked to a stronger mind than his own for counsel, and the loss of Clive was felt by him as the removal of the mainstay of his throne and safety.

It was not by the Nabob only that Clive's departure was regarded with apprehension: many of the Company's servants augured ill of the results. The nabob was surrounded by persons inimical to the interests of the English, and the influence of their counsel, it was feared, might shake to its foundations the fabric which the genius of Clive had raised. These views were pressed upon him with much earnestness, but his determination was taken. He was dissatisfied with the conduct of the Court of Directors, and the state of his health had long dictated retirement. After passing a few days at Moorsheadabad, Clive returned to Calcutta, whence, in the month of February, he departed for England. The mode of supplying the vacancy thus occasioned had been the subject of violent and vehement disputes at home. A detail of these is unnecessary, and would be uninteresting. It will be sufficient to state, that the continuance or abandonment of the rotation system formed one point of dispute; and when that was disposed of by a resolution of the Court of Proprietors, enforcing a return to the former practice under which the presidential authority was intrusted to a single person, a fresh contest arose on the choice of an individual for the office. An order of succession was finally carried, under which Mr. Holwell was the fifth on the list; but by the death or departure of those above him, he had attained the first place when Clive left India, and consequently succeeded to the office which Clive's withdrawal vacated.

Colonel Calliaud had, on the 18th January, marched from Moorsheadabad for Patna, accompanied by Meerun, with an army which was in point of numbers formidable. The advance of the force was delayed by the necessity of previously appeasing the nabob of Purneah, in order that an enemy might not be left in the rear. This being, to appearance, effected, through the mediation of the English commander, the march of the army was resumed. The prince against whom it was advancing was the same who has already been mentioned as the shazada, but he now claimed a higher character. His father had experienced the fate which rank and power so often have brought upon their possessors—the captivity in which he had long been held had been terminated by his murder. Intelligence of this event reached the shazada soon after he entered Behar, and he therefore assumed the title of emperor.

The governor of Behar, Ram Narrain, was in command of a considerable force, and he had further the aid of a battalion of English sepoy, and a few Europeans which had been left at Patna. On the approach of the invading army he marched out of the city and encamped under its walls. Colonel Calliaud was most anxious that an engagement should be avoided until he arrived, and he wrote repeatedly to the governor, warning him not to come to action. Ram Narrain was a good financier, and his arithmetical ability had caused his elevation; but he was a very indifferent soldier, though his vanity led him to entertain a different belief. Anxious to achieve undivided glory, he disregarded the injunctions of Colonel Calliaud, engaged the enemy, and was totally defeated. The efforts of the English troops enabled him, with some difficulty, to retreat into Patna. On learning what had happened, Colonel Calliaud advanced with the greatest expedition, and on the 22nd February a battle ensued, in which the English and their ally obtained a complete victory over the emperor. The ardent spirit of Colonel Calliaud suggested that the triumph should be followed by pursuit, and he entreated Meerun to give him the assistance of a small body of cavalry for this purpose—but Meerun refused, and without the aid solicited by Colonel Calliaud no pursuit could take place. On the 2nd March it became known that the emperor was in full march for Bengal; Colonel Calliaud followed, and on the 7th was within ten miles of him. The emperor then diverged, to enter Bengal by another route, which lay across mountains which no army had before traversed. His force consisted chiefly of cavalry and was unencumbered by baggage—he also had the advantage of a day's march in advance of Colonel Calliaud; but notwithstanding these circumstances, the latter succeeded in following him at no great distance. On the 4th April he joined Meer Jaffer, who was in the field, and on the 6th proposed to attack the enemy in the night if the nabob would

furnish a body of cavalry. He met with the same success which had attended his application for similar assistance from the nabob's son—the cavalry were refused. On the following day Colonel Calliaud came up with the rear of the emperor's army, a river only interposing between them. He then renewed his request to the nabob to march a body of cavalry to employ the enemy till the British infantry could be brought up. The request was disregarded, and the enemy thus gained an opportunity of marching away unmolested. The emperor returned to Patna, and having been joined by Law, with the remnant of the French force which followed that leader, made two assaults upon the city. He was preparing for a third when he was compelled to withdraw by the arrival of Captain Knox with a detachment sent by Colonel Calliaud to the relief of the place. The next task which demanded the attention of the English commander was to resist the foudjar of Purneah, who, not satisfied that he was safe in trusting Meer Jaffer, was again in arms for the purpose of joining the emperor. Captain Knox left Patna to stop his progress. He was accompanied by the Rajah Shittabroy, a gallant native chief, with a few followers. The rest of the troops in Patna were either occupied in settling important questions relating to arrears of pay, or indisposed to engage in a project which they believed hopeless. One of the principal jemadars endeavoured to deter Shittabroy from accompanying Captain Knox, representing the folly of meeting such a force as that of the foudjar with a mere handful of men, intimating his suspicion that the defeat of the troops of Ram Narrain would not give their master much concern, as thereby he would save payment of the arrears which were due to them, but adding, that the officers had resolved not to risk their lives by joining the rash and infatuated English. These sinister anticipations of defeat were not realized. Captain Knox was attacked by the foudjar, but the latter was defeated, and fled with the loss of the greater part of his baggage and artillery. A few days brought the armies of Colonel Calliaud and of Meerun to Patna. These pursued the flying foudjar, and having overtaken him, a skirmish took place, after which the foudjar continued his retreat, having burned all the heavy baggage and military stores that remained to him. Here again the obstinacy of Meerun rendered success imperfect. Colonel Calliaud had no cavalry, and Meerun, who throughout the action had kept in the rear, would not spare a single horseman for the pursuit. But the follies and crimes of this wretched prince were approaching an awful close. On the night of the 2nd of July was a heavy storm. The tent of Meerun, containing himself, a story-teller to amuse his leisure, and a servant employed in patting his feet, was struck with lightning, and all within it perished. The death of the general is always in the East the signal for the disper-

sion of his army. To prevent this misfortune, and to avert the confusion and plunder by which it would inevitably be attended, it was resolved to conceal from the army, if possible, the fact of Meerun's death. A few of the most trustworthy and influential of the officers were entrusted with the secret, and through their assistance the army was kept together during its march back to Patna, return thither being rendered necessary by the approach of the rainy season, not less than by the fatal accident which had left the troops of the nabob without a leader. The disappearance of Meerun was ascribed to illness, and during seven days, which the march to Patna occupied, the real cause was unknown, except by the few to whom it had been imparted in confidence. When the knowledge of the prince's death became general, the troops took advantage of the consternation excited by it, and became clamorous for their arrears of pay. They surrounded the palace and assailed the officers of the treasury,—reviled the nabob in language the most gross and opprobrious, and even threatened him with death if their demands were not complied with. The storm raged throughout two days, when peace was restored through the interposition of Meer Cossim, the son-in-law of Meer Jaffer. The nabob gave a promise of full payment at a specified time, and Meer Cossim became security for its performance. Meer Cossim contributed still more effectually to calm the excited feelings of the mutinous troops, and put an end to the violence in which they found expression by producing from his own treasury three lacs of rupees, the distribution of which had the effect of inducing the discontented soldiers to retire.

It was about this time that Mr. Vansittart arrived from Madras to assume the office of Governor of Fort William in place of Mr. Holwell, by whom it had been held since the departure of Clive. As the appointment of Mr. Vansittart interfered with the pretensions of the senior servants in Bengal, he could scarcely hope to enjoy his elevation without annoyance. He soon found that the disappointment of his colleagues was not the only cause of disquiet which awaited him. The man who had been placed on the throne of Bengal by the arms of the British Government was surrounded by enemies, secret and avowed—his pecuniary difficulties were great and increasing—his fidelity had long been more than questionable, and the death of his son Meerun had now opened a new fountain of discord in a controverted succession. That event, too, had added to the previous incapacity of Meer Jaffer for government. The blow falling on a man habitually indolent and unstable, somewhat advanced in years, and enervated by a life of indulgence, produced such a degree of dejection as seemed to unfit him altogether for the exercise of any function requiring the slightest degree of mental exertion. Clive, whose vigorous mind had formerly held in captivity

the weaker intellect of Meer Jaffer, was away; and at the time when the ruler of Bengal most wanted a monitor and guide, there was no man on the spot possessing sufficient influence to assume the character with effect. This was not all. The new governor took possession of a treasury so exhausted that the trading investments of the Company were obliged to be suspended, and it was with difficulty that the current expenses of the settlement were provided for. The monthly subsidy for the payment of the Company's troops while in the field in the service of the nabob was, like all similar engagements of that prince, considerably in arrear, and had it been paid with regularity it would have been insufficient for the expenses which it was intended to defray. Certain countries had been assigned for a stipulated time to the English, to afford them the means of recovering the losses sustained on the capture of Calcutta. The time of assignment had expired, but a considerable balance still remained due. The nabob demanded the restitution of the lands, and offered as security for the outstanding amount some jewels. These could only be made available as a resource in pecuniary difficulty by sale or mortgage, and the circumstances under which they were to be held by the British Government would, for a time at least, forbid recourse to such means of conversion. No remittances were made from Europe for the purposes of the Company, an implicit reliance being placed on the vast wealth believed to have been acquired by the recent changes in Bengal, and the government of Calcutta were expected to provide not only for their own necessities, but also for the wants of Madras and Bombay. At the former presidency an army was in the field, engaged in a course of operations which, if successful, would destroy the last remnant of French dominion in India. This army could not be maintained but at a heavy expense; and the cost of defending the British interests throughout India had been im providently cast upon the resources of a single settlement. Such was the financial position of the government of Calcutta, and it was the parent of the policy which that government pursued. Meer Cossim, the son-in-law of Meer Jaffer, aspired to succeed to the throne. The money which he had advanced to allay the claim of the mutinous army had been furnished upon the condition that he should stand in the place of Meerun. Meer Jaffer had indeed two other sons, and the deceased prince had left one, but none of them were of an age to maintain their claim to the succession. That of Meerun's son was weakened, if not destroyed, by the death of his father prior to attaining the throne; and all the three, it has been alleged, laboured under the disqualification of illegitimacy. Circumstances thus conspired to favour the pretensions of Meer Cossim, who was, moreover, so fortunate as to obtain the support of the British Government. The way had been opened for the recognition of his claims before

the arrival of Mr. Vansittart. Mr. Holwell had for some time been bent upon effecting a change in the government of Bengal. His plans were communicated to Mr. Vansittart almost as soon as he arrived; and all of praise or of blame that belongs to the latter, in respect of the transactions that followed, rests upon his having adopted and carried out the plans of his predecessor. He who had laid the snare was judged the most proper person to manage the process by which the prey was to be inveigled within it. Mr. Holwell, notwithstanding he had ceased to be governor, continued to correspond with Meer Cossim. The latter, indeed, occasionally addressed letters to Mr. Vansittart; but the more free and confidential revelation of his desires and hopes was reserved for Mr. Holwell. A sufficient understanding having thus been established, it was judged proper that a closer communication should take place. The permission of Meer Jaffer for Meer Cossim to visit Calcutta was obtained, under the pretence of its being necessary for arranging a plan for the next campaign against the emperor, and for effecting a settlement of certain accounts. Here, again, Mr. Holwell was the principal actor. At the express desire of Meer Cossim, that gentleman was deputed to confer with him; and the aspiring candidate for the throne of Meer Jaffer opened his views with a degree of candour which somewhat startled his English friend. That he should seek to possess himself of all the substantial power of the sovereign was expected—that he should even claim to enjoy the title was not improbable; but Meer Cossim, it appeared, looked to securing his seat on the throne by the death of him who then occupied it; and though the British negotiator does not appear to have been a very scrupulous person, he was not prepared to concur in a premeditated assassination. His delicacy astonished and disconcerted Meer Cossim, who expressed his fear that Mr. Holwell was not so much his friend as he had supposed. But this trifling mishap was not suffered to interrupt the progress of the negotiation. Meer Cossim had little hope of achieving any part of his object but by the assistance of the English; and, after some debate, the basis of a treaty was agreed upon. Meer Cossim was to be invested with the dewanny, or control of the exchequer—a most important power. He was, further, to exercise all the executive authority; but Meer Jaffer was to continue in possession of the title of sovereign: all affairs of government were to be transacted in his name and under his seal, and a suitable revenue was to be allotted for his support. Such were the arrangements affecting the actual and the nominal sovereign. For his own government, Mr. Holwell stipulated for the possession of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, as means of defraying the Company's charges in maintaining the throne of Bengal. The terms were immediately communicated to the select committee, and by them unanimously approved.

A few days afterwards a formal treaty was signed by the British authorities and Meer Cossim; and the arrangement being completed, nothing remained but to communicate it to the man whose power had been thus summarily transferred to one of his servants. Mr. Holwell, who seems to have been in great favour with the governor, was requested to undertake this task, but he assigned various reasons for declining it, the most prominent, and probably the most influential, being that it would have placed him in subordination to Colonel Calliaud, with whom he was to be associated. The conclusion of the treaty with Meer Cossim was the last official act of Mr. Holwell. He immediately afterwards resigned the service.

On Mr. Holwell declining to be a party in the mission to Meer Jaffier, the governor resolved to undertake it himself. It was anticipated that Meer Jaffier would be slow in assenting to a scheme by which he was virtually dethroned; and that no means of persuasion might be wanted, it was prudently arranged that Mr. Vansittart and his coadjutor should be attended by a considerable military force. On the 14th of October the English diplomatists arrived at Cossimbazar, and on the following day the governor received a visit from the nabob. On both sides there was an appearance of friendly feeling. Mr. Vansittart expatiated on the evils of Meer Jaffier's government, and the nabob expressed himself willing to abide by any advice which the English governor might offer with a view to improvement—certainly not anticipating the nature of the advice which he was soon to receive. Other interviews succeeded, and three notes were addressed by Mr. Vansittart to the nabob, the last of which recommends the appointment of some capable person from among "the nabob's children" to retrieve the affairs of the state; but so far from containing any intimation of the bargain which had been made with Meer Cossim, it does not even advert to that disinterested and high-minded person as being fit for the duty required. The plot, however, gradually advanced to its development. The unceasing representations made to the nabob of the disorders of his government, and the continued calls of the British authorities for reform, at length extorted from him a confession that age and grief incapacitated him for struggling alone with his difficulties. This furnished an opportunity for recurring to the recommendation to seek assistance from his relations. The nabob thereupon mentioned several, and among them him for whose name the British representatives were anxiously listening; but their joy on hearing it pronounced was not suffered to overcome their discretion—instead of giving to Meer Cossim the suspicious testimony of their praise, they asked the nabob which of the persons whom he had named was the most fit to assist him. Again the voice of the prince delighted his hearers. Meer Cossim had some reputation for ability, and the nabob without hesitation

declared him to be the fittest man to lend him aid. The English negotiators now thought that they might give expression to their wishes without imprudence; they suggested that the man of the nabob's choice should be sent for. The satisfactory progress which the negotiation had appeared to be making was here interrupted. The rapidity with which the English wished to proceed was disagreeable to Meer Jaffier, who had indeed no wish to proceed at all; he for some time refused to comply, but yielding at last from weariness rather than from any other cause, he defeated the object of the English by intimating before Meer Cossim's arrival, that fatigue rendered necessary his own departure. Meer Cossim was scarcely more anxious for an interview than his rival. He came on the summons addressed to him, but he was under an apprehension, possibly not ill-founded, that instead of trusting him with the management of the state, the nabob would take measures for getting rid of him. The following day passed without any communication with Meer Jaffier, and it was determined at night to resort to force to carry out the views of the English. The necessary preparations were made with great secrecy. Colonel Calliaud, with his troops, joined Meer Cossim without exciting alarm, and marched into the outer court of the palace without meeting interruption. There the colonel formed his men, and before making any attempt against the gate of the inner court, which was shut, despatched to the nabob a letter which had been prepared by the governor. The letter expressed some disappointment at the silence of the nabob throughout the day, denounced the advisers to whom he had surrendered himself, and informed the prince that the English Government had sent Colonel Calliaud with a military force "to wait upon" him. The duty of the colonel was explained to extend to the expulsion of Meer Jaffier's evil counsellors, and the nabob was exhorted to receive and support him—to look upon the governor as his sincere well-wisher, and to "remain satisfied." But Meer Jaffier was not satisfied. The letter threw him into a transport of rage, and he threatened that he would resist to the last and abide his fate. Colonel Calliaud abated from hostility, leaving opportunity for time to work a change in the nabob's mind. He was not disappointed. After an interchange of messages occupying about two hours, Meer Jaffier was content to stipulate only for the preservation of his life and honour, and an allowance suitable to his maintenance. These being readily granted, the desponding prince came out to Colonel Calliaud, whose troops took possession of all the gates of the palace. Mr. Vansittart hastened to the spot as soon as apprized of the result. On seeing him, Meer Jaffier, whose apprehensions were not yet altogether allayed, demanded if his person were safe. The governor answered that not only was the person of the nabob safe, but his government also, if

he so pleased, adding that it had never been intended to deprive him of it. The courtesy of the latter part of this answer is more evident than its veracity: Meer Jaffer, however, was unmoved by it. Aware that Meer Cossim was to be put in possession of all actual power, Meer Jaffer attached little importance to the honour of being called a sovereign. With far more spirit than might have been expected, he declined the name when stripped of the authority of a prince, and asked permission to retire to Calcutta. He set out the same evening. Meer Cossim was seated on the musnud, and the congratulations tendered him by the English authorities were followed by those of the principal natives, offered with all the sincerity which is commanded by success. By the evening all was perfectly quiet, and a stranger might have entered Moorshedabad without suspecting that the city had that day been the scene of a revolution.

Meer Cossim had fully expected that he was to purchase the dignity of nabob by a liberal donation to those who had helped him to attain it. This was quite in conformity with Oriental precedent; and the example of Clive and his associates in the previous transfer of the government of Bengal had shown that Englishmen had no objection to follow it. On the night on which the articles were signed, Meer Cossim had tendered to Mr. Vansittart a paper which, on examination, proved to be a note for the payment of twenty lacs of rupees to the members of the select committee. But either that body happened to be in the mood for indulging the feeling of disinterested patriotism, or the abruptness with which the offer had been made gave it, in their eyes, an appearance of indelicacy. They, one and all, shrunk from the polluted paper, and desired their president to inform the man whose grossness had shocked their moral feelings, that "he mistook their motives." The obtuseness of Meer Cossim led him to repeat the offer, when, to save him from utter despair, Mr. Vansittart was induced to promise, on the part of himself and his coadjutors, that when the affairs of the country were settled, and its finances flourishing, they would accept such marks of the prince's friendship as he might be pleased to bestow. The governor took this opportunity of soliciting a donation of five lacs of rupees for the Company, which was promptly granted, and applied by the English Government in aid of the operations against Pondicherry. The promise which the pertinacity of Meer Cossim had extorted from the committee was faithfully kept; and although it will be an anticipation of the course of events, it will be more convenient to state the manner of its fulfilment here than to return to the subject when, in the order of time, it would require to be noticed. A few months after the elevation of Meer Cossim, Mr. Holwell consented to receive two lacs and seventy thousand rupees, Mr. Sumner two lacs and twenty-four thousand rupees, Colonel Calliaud two lacs,

Mr. M'Guire one lac and eighty thousand rupees and five thousand gold mohurs. Mr. Culling Smith, who was secretary to the committee, had one lac and thirty-four thousand rupees; and Major Yorke, who commanded the detachment immediately attendant on Meer Cossim, benefited to the like extent. Mr. Vansittart, as was befitting his station, had the largest share of Meer Cossim's bounty—five lacs of rupees were appropriated to his personal use. These payments were to be deferred till the nabob's finances were in a condition to bear them. When they became the subject of Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Sumner was questioned as to the circumstances of the country at the time when they were made. His answer was, that "it was a matter he supposed the nabob a proper judge of;"—a reply indicating a most decorous respect for the rights of a sovereign prince, and a laudable desire to avoid any impertinent interference in his affairs.

Money being the sole object of the revolution, Meer Cossim applied himself vigorously to the replenishment of his treasury. The relations and dependants of former princes, as well as those who had acquired wealth by ministering to their pleasures, were severely pressed. The demands of Meer Cossim were not confined to those enriched by his immediate predecessor: the retrospect extended to the reign of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, and even to that of Aliverdi Khan. The mandate to refund reached some who had long since renounced the dangerous and uncertain struggle for courtly favour, and had retired to the enjoyment in security, as they supposed, of the portion of wealth which, by the use of means of various grades of respectability, they had been enabled to accumulate. "In short," says the native historian, "the advice of Zaidée, the poet, 'Why collectest thou not from every subject a grain of silver that thou mayest form a treasure!' Meer Cossim had attentively listened to and now strictly followed." But his course was not perfectly smooth. The emperor was only about fifty miles from Patna. His standard offered a rallying point to the discontented zemindars and petty rajahs, and all were discontented when called upon for payment of revenue. It had been part of the projected policy of Mr. Vansittart to make terms with the emperor, but the execution of it was interrupted by the necessity of immediately removing this source of inconvenience. Major Carnac had taken the command of the British army at Patna on the 1st January. On the 15th he gave battle to that of the emperor, when the latter was entirely defeated. Among the prisoners taken were M. Law and his remnant of French followers. This success prepared the way for negotiation. Major Carnac solicited permission to visit the emperor in his camp. The overture was after some hesitation accepted, and the British commander finally conducted the emperor to Patna. This commencement of friendly in-

tercourse between the emperor and the English was regarded by Meer Cossim with jealousy, and on hearing of it he lost no time in proceeding to Patna. There he was solemnly invested by the Emperor with a khelaut, or dress of honour, and acknowledged his confirmation in the soubahdarship by undertaking to render an annual tribute of twenty-four lacs of rupees from the revenue of the three provinces. This ceremony performed, there was nothing which Meer Cossim so much desired as the absence of his lord, and he was soon gratified. The English, though disposed to support the emperor, were unable from various causes to favour him to the extent of their wishes, and his departure was accelerated by an insurrection in his camp, in which he would probably have perished but for the timely interposition of Major Carnac. He marched in the direction of Oude, where he was to be met by the ruler of that country, who held the office of his vizier.

One ground of jealousy and dispute between Meer Cossim and the English was thus removed, but others were not wanting, and a demand made by Meer Cossim upon Ram Narrain for a settlement of accounts was a fertile source of difference, and eventually of mischief.

Ram Narrain was a wily Hindoo, who having been raised by Aliverdi Khan to the rank of governor of Patna, had contrived to maintain himself there contrary to the wishes of Meer Jaffier, who distrusted him. That prince, on the ground that Ram Narrain would put faith in an English promise, but not in his own, had solicited Clive to write to him, assuring him of the English protection, in order, as the proposer of the scheme did not hesitate to avow, that he might get possession of his person and cut off his head. Clive answered, that such a proceeding would not be consistent with the customs of the English;—that if the nabob was inclined to resort to arms to reduce Ram Narrain to obedience, he was ready to assist him; but that if he made any promises, they must be fulfilled. Meer Jaffier, who possessed no superabundance of energy, preferred a peaceful course, even though shackled by the disagreeable condition of fidelity to a promise. Clive accordingly wrote to Ram Narrain, telling him that if he would present himself to the nabob and acknowledge the authority of the new establishment, he should be continued in the government of Patna, on the terms under which he had held it from Sooraj-oo-Dowlah. Ram Narrain complied, tendered his submission, and was accordingly confirmed in his appointment. When the shazada first menaced Patna, Ram Narrain exercised a prudent care to stand well with both parties in the war till he could ascertain which was likely to prove the stronger. At a subsequent period his ambition to display his zeal and military skill was near producing fatal consequences to the cause in support of which it was indulged. His accounts, like those of most

Oriental financiers, were considerably in arrear, and Meer Cossim demanded a settlement. The demand was evaded, and Meer Cossim thereupon formed designs hostile not only to the power, but to the life of Ram Narrain.

The resources of the province of Behar had suffered greatly from its being the scene of war; and it has been questioned whether Ram Narrain was really indebted to the nabob at all. The presumption, however, lies the other way. If nothing were due, it could have been shown by producing the accounts; but these neither threats nor persuasion could extort. The influence of Mr. M'Guire, chief of the English factory at Patna, was employed, but in vain. Ram Narrain sometimes promised the accounts, but when the time for their production arrived, none were forthcoming. Had the accounts been rendered, and had they been fair and honest, Meer Cossim might not have relaxed in his hostility to Ram Narrain, but the withholding them clearly put the latter in the wrong; and the pertinacity with which his conduct was defended by the officers who successively held the chief military command at Patna, can only be accounted for by their dislike of the policy which placed Meer Cossim on the throne, and their unfriendly feelings towards those by whom it had been adopted.

Nothing could be more unhappy than the state of feeling which prevailed among the different authorities in Bengal. Mr. Vansittart was naturally disposed to support Meer Cossim, the nabob of his own creation, but he was not disinclined to protect Ram Narrain if he would comply with the demand of rendering an account. Meer Cossim, however, was, perhaps from the beginning of the dispute, but certainly soon after its commencement, bent upon the destruction of Ram Narrain, and he offered large bribes to both Major Carnac and Colonel Coote to induce them to aid his purpose. Those officers, however, seem to have determined not only to protect Ram Narrain from injustice and violence, but to uphold him in resisting every claim upon him, however just and reasonable. They were consequently involved at once in disputes with the nabob and with the British council, in which the president had a majority. With the former they were sometimes on the brink of positive hostility, while the correspondence between them and their official superiors was disgraced by the most bitter and unbecoming altercations. The disputes were terminated by the recall of Colonel Coote and Major Carnac to Calcutta: the command of the military force which remained at Patna was intrusted to Captain Carstairs, but its employment was to be entirely at the disposal of the chief of the factory. Those who had stood between Ram Narrain and ruin being thus removed, Meer Cossim proceeded to avail himself of an opportunity which he had long coveted. Accounts were again demanded, and Ram Narrain having no longer any hope from evasion, some were ren-

dered. They were unsatisfactory to the nabob; and had they been perfectly accurate and just they would still have been unsatisfactory. It was declared that embezzlements to a vast amount were detected: the person of Ram Narrain was seized and his effects confiscated. This in the eyes of Meer Cossim was but an instalment of justice. The treasurer of the culprit and his banker shared the fate of their employer. All his dependents were subjected to amercement, and thus, as Gholaum Hossain observes, "the nabob acquired a great treasure." As might be expected, Ram Narrain was eventually murdered. Such were some of the fruits of that injudicious and unjustifiable policy which had treated the sovereignty of Bengal as a commodity for barter.

The governor and council had asserted their authority, and Meer Cossim was in possession of his prey; but peace was not thereby secured. Fresh sources of dispute and disturbance arose before the former were well dried. Shortly before the departure of Clive, a despatch had been addressed by the Calcutta council to the Court of Directors, complaining in no measured terms of the asperity with which some part of the conduct of that council had been noticed. By the Court the despatch was regarded as so offensive as to call for the dismissal of all those who had signed it, and orders to that effect were sent out. In addition to Clive, the offensive letter was signed by Messrs. Holwell, Pleydell, Sumner, and M'Guire. Clive was in England before these orders were despatched, and Mr. Holwell had resigned the service before their arrival in India; their only effect, therefore, was to remove from the service, and consequently from the council, Messrs. Pleydell, Sumner, and M'Guire. All these were supporters of Mr. Vansittart's policy, and their removal gave his opponents a majority in council. One consequence of this change (an "additional misfortune," Mr. Vansittart calls it) was the appointment of Mr. Ellis, one of the most vehement of the governor's opponents, to be chief of the factory at Patna. Here he was not long before he entered upon a course of acts equally disagreeable to the nabob and the English governor. A complaint was preferred by a servant of the English factory against one of the nabob's officers, for obstructing the transit of some opium duly authorized to pass. The military force at Patna was to act under the directions of the chief of the factory, and Mr. Ellis ordered Captain Carstairs to seize the person whose conduct had given offence. But military subordination at that time sat lightly, and Captain Carstairs, instead of obeying the order, which, whether judicious or not, Mr. Ellis had an undoubted right to give, contented himself with transmitting a statement of the complaint to the nabob, accompanied by a request that he would reprimand the offender and release the opium. "The forbearance of Captain Car-

stairs," says Mr. Vansittart, "made no difference in Mr. Ellis's intentions;" and it was not to be expected that it should. The only effect likely to be produced on the mind of Mr. Ellis was to irritate him by the obvious contempt with which his authority was threatened. Captain Carstairs, indeed, not only evaded the performance of his own proper duty, but in addressing the nabob on the subject without instructions, trespassed on that of Mr. Ellis. Other causes of dispute soon occurred. The nabob complained of the conduct of one of the Company's servants in Purneah: Mr. Ellis retorted by complaining of those of the nabob in the same district. At the same time an Armenian in the nabob's service, who had been detected in purchasing some saltpetre, of which the Company possessed a monopoly, was seized by Mr. Ellis, and sent in irons to Calcutta. The council, however, acted with more forbearance than the Company's representative at Patna; they refrained from adding to the violence which had already been offered, and sent the Armenian prisoner back to Patna, with a request that the nabob would punish him. Another opportunity for the exercise of that power which Mr. Ellis was in nowise indisposed to exert, soon occurred. It was reported that two English deserters had taken refuge in the fort of Mongheer. Mr. Ellis applied to the nabob's deputy in Patna for an order to the commander of the fort to give them up, or suffer a search to be made for them. The request not being complied with, Mr. Ellis despatched a party of British sepoy to enforce his wishes. The sergeant claiming admittance to the fort was answered by a warning to keep out of reach of the guns, or otherwise he would be fired upon. The party thereupon withdrew, but remained within sight of the fort for about three months. At length a search was granted. No deserters were found; but this certainly does not prove that the fort harboured none at the time when Mr. Ellis received his information: abundant time and opportunity had been afforded for their escape. An invalid Frenchman, however, who had been in the fort some months, and who was tempted by the offer of reward to reveal all that he knew on the subject, declared that he had never seen a single European there.

"Things," says Mr. Vansittart, "could not stand long upon the point to which they were now brought. Every word and action of the nabob was construed into a declaration of a design against the English, and particularly from the chief and council at Patna suggestions of the kind were frequent; whilst, on the part of the nabob, every ordinary motion of ours was represented to him in such colours as would most add to his apprehensions of our intending to break with him." To endeavour to restore confidence in the mind of the nabob, the governor

proposed a special mission, to be intrusted to Mr. Hastings. The council consented; but when his instructions were under consideration, it was proposed to add to them a clause directing him to apply to the nabob for payment, for the use of the Company, of the twenty lacs of rupees offered by him to the governor and other persons engaged in concluding the treaty with him. This was strenuously resisted by Mr. Vansittart; and his resistance was reasonable, although the interest which he had in the question precluded his obtaining credit for purity of motive. The proposal for the additional instruction was undoubtedly factious, and its effect could scarcely be expected to aid the object of the mission—conciliation; but the private feelings of the governor's enemies overcame their sense of public duty, and they succeeded in carrying their motion.

The answer of the nabob to the demand was sufficiently decisive; it was contained in a written paper delivered by him to Mr. Hastings. He said, "By the grace of God I have completely fulfilled the treaty, and have not in a single instance deviated from it. Yet, gentlemen, notwithstanding this treaty you solemnly made with me, and ratified with the seal of the Company, you now demand a sum of money from me which I have never borrowed of you, nor obliged myself to pay, nor have you in any manner the least claim upon me. I owe nobody a single rupee, nor will I pay your demand."

While engaged on this mission, Mr. Hastings took occasion to call the attention of the government to certain abuses connected with trade, which were perpetrated under the authority of the British name and flag. The Company had long enjoyed the privilege of carrying on their trade clear of customs duty, but this immunity was well understood to be confined to goods imported or exported by sea: such, in fact, was the only trade in which the Company had ever engaged. The internal trade of the country was in the hands of the natives. The exclusive right of dealing in some articles was claimed by the government, and by being farmed was converted into a source of revenue. All other articles, in accordance with the absurd and vexatious system then universal in the East, were subjected to duties levied at various stations, so that goods could scarcely be removed at all without rendering their owner liable to make some payment to the state, and could not be transferred to any considerable distance without subjecting him to many such payments. The influence acquired by the English from the revolution in Bengal encouraged the servants of the Company to enter on their private account into the internal, or what was called the country trade. At first, they appear to have paid duties, but before long they claimed the privilege of carrying on their trade free. As between traders burdened with the payment of heavy duties and those who paid none, no

competition could be maintained, it was obvious that the ultimate and not very distant result of the course taken by the Company's servants must have been to throw all the trade in the country into their hands, and it was equally obvious that the virtual abolition of both transit duties and monopoly profits, which must accompany the change, would be seriously felt in the nabob's treasury. Both prince and people, therefore, were interested in opposing the claims of the English. The assertion of those claims on the one side, and the resistance offered to them on the other, gave rise to innumerable disputes. Each party accused the other of resorting to violence. The nabob complained that the illegal trade was upheld by the exercise of force—the residents at the English factories alleged that even the lawful trade of the Company was interrupted by the nabob's servants—and on both sides there was some truth. Mr. Vansittart was well disposed to abate these evils, but he possessed no influence with his council, and was moreover inclined to regard the period of five or six years, during which the Company's servants had been largely engaged in the private trade, as having given to their claim to retain it something of the force of prescription. Thus, powerless in his own government, and not fully prepared to exercise power had he possessed it, he applied himself to bring about a compromise; and in the hope of effecting this object, he proceeded to Moorsshedabad to try whether his personal influence with the nabob were greater than it was among his own countrymen. He found the prince greatly incensed, but not altogether intractable, and a body of regulations for the government of the inland trade was agreed upon. The main provision related to the amount of duty to be levied, which was fixed at nine per cent., to be paid on the first moving of the goods, and no further demand was to be made either during transit or at the place of sale. Most of the other provisions were directed to the suppression of abuses, the existence of which could not be denied. Had this arrangement been adhered to, it is probable that neither party would have had much reason for dissatisfaction; but by the cupidity of one of the parties, between whom the governor stood as a mediator, and the precipitancy of the other, the good effects which its author had anticipated were frustrated. It had been agreed to postpone the publication of the regulations till after the arrival of Mr. Vansittart at Calcutta, when copies of them were to be transmitted from the council to the different factories, accompanied by the orders of the nabob, with which the governor was furnished. Slow as for the most part is the progress of business in the East, the prospect of pecuniary advantage sometimes quickens it wonderfully. The tardy process by which the regulations were to be carried into effect accorded not with Meer Cossim's impatience to realize the gratifying vision of a nine per cent. duty, and he resolved

to anticipate the proposed communication from Calcutta. Scarcely had Mr. Vansittart left him, when he despatched to all parts of the country copies of that gentleman's letter embodying the proposed regulations; the nabob's officers were ordered to act upon them, and all English gomastahs or agents who refused obedience were to be turned out of the country. The regulations being received at Dacca, the council of the English factory there lost no time in transmitting them to Calcutta with a letter of remonstrance against the new plan. This missive found the minds of the council well prepared to insure its effect. They had previously informed their president that the subject required consideration, and that they had consequently ordered his communication to lie on the table till his return. The news from Dacca converted dogged discontent into active hostility. The council forthwith resolved that their president, in concluding the agreement with Meer Cossim, had assumed a right to which he was not entitled; that the regulations were dishonourable to Englishmen, and tended to the destruction of all public and private trade; that the president's conduct in acting independently of the council was an absolute breach of their privileges; that the regulations should be resisted; and that the absent members of council—excepting such as were at an inconvenient distance—should be immediately called to Calcutta, that the whole might be consulted on a matter of such "high consequence,"—for thus did they characterize a measure which the chief and council of the factory of Dacca had represented as affecting "all" their "privileges," all their "fortunes and future prospects."

In this spirit did Mr. Vansittart's colleagues meet his views of accommodation. Whether or not he was empowered to make a final arrangement is a point which seems not to have been clear even to himself; but it is quite certain that the motives of his European opponents were entitled to no respect, and for the hasty and ill-judged enforcement of the regulations by the nabob he was in no way accountable, that step having been taken in violation of a positive agreement. The spirit in which it was followed was calculated to add to the existing troubles and embarrassments, and as an amicable arrangement was previously a matter of great difficulty, it now became almost hopeless. "The views of the violent party in Calcutta," says Mr. Vansittart, "were but too well seconded by many of the nabob's officers." Armed as they were with their master's authority, and, as they supposed, with that of the English governor, they not only executed their duties in the most offensive manner, but proceeded to use their newly-acquired power for other purposes than the protection of the revenue. These abuses gave rise to fresh complaints from the factories—complaints the more difficult for the president to deal with because they had some foundation in justice. In this state of things the resolution of the council

for convening a full board was carried into effect. The number assembled (including two military officers, whose right to attend, except on the discussion of military questions, the president disputed) was twelve. Excepting the president and Mr. Hastings, all were of opinion that the Company and its servants had a right to carry on the inland trade duty free, but some indulged a spirit of liberal concession so far as to be willing to pay a trifling duty on certain articles. Finally, it was determined that salt only should be subjected to duty, and that the amount should be two and a half per cent. The resolutions of the board on this subject, with others subsequently passed for regulating the conduct of the gomastahs, were conveyed to the nabob in a letter from the governor; but some of his enemies insisted upon the insertion of a paragraph, explaining to the nabob that the authority of the English government was vested in the entire council, and that the governor on such occasions was only the channel of making known their will. As a further annoyance to the governor, it was proposed also to demand from the nabob the return of Mr. Vansittart's letter assenting to the former regulations for the private trade. Both points were carried.

Meer Cossim, anxious to adorn his newly acquired crown with the wreaths of conquest, had engaged in an expedition against Nepal, but his success was not equal to his confidence, and in place of gaining, as he had hoped, both glory and wealth, he returned under the shame of defeat. Almost the first news that greeted him was that of the members of council being summoned from the outlying factories to take part in the consultations at Calcutta; and he seems to have inferred from this unusual proceeding, that it was in contemplation to make provision for his immediate descent from the throne. He next learned that his orders for carrying into effect Mr. Vansittart's regulations were disregarded at the English factories, and that until orders from the council were given, obedience would not be yielded. He complained heavily of these grievances in various letters addressed to Mr. Vansittart, and his complaint led to the extraordinary determination of the board to enlighten him on the extent of their powers in relation to those of the governor. While affairs were in this unsettled state, serious affairs took place at Dacca and other places. The council of Patna employed a military force in the defence of their trade, and made one of the nabob's collectors prisoner. The nabob despatched a body of horse to release him, but arriving too late to effect their object, they attacked a party of British sepoys in charge of some salt-petre at Tagépore, killed four and made prisoners of the rest, with the Company's gomastah. The nabob, however, feared to countenance this movement, and after reprimanding the gomastah he dismissed all the prisoners. Wearied with a contest which he

saw little prospect of terminating with any degree of satisfaction, he now resolved to put in execution a plan which he had previously threatened to adopt. He ordered the collection of all customs duties to cease.

Before the nabob's decision was known at Calcutta, it had been resolved that a deputation should be despatched to explain in personal conference the views of the council, and endeavour to prevail upon the nabob to adopt them. Mr. Amyatt tendered his services, which were accepted, and at his request Mr. Hay was associated with him. The nabob showed some disinclination to receive them, and observed in a letter to the governor, that if the business of Mr. Amyatt was to dispute about customs, he had better not come, as the point was already settled by the abolition of those duties. But as this was a mode of settlement very distasteful to the majority of the council, it was determined, nevertheless, that the deputation should proceed; and an addition was made to their instructions, requiring them to demand the revocation of the obnoxious immunity. The result of their earlier interviews with the nabob seems to have been a hope that he would yield to their demands: but he had no such intention; and an opportunity soon offered for manifesting his real feelings. Some boats laden with arms for the British troops at Patna were stopped at Mongheer by the nabob's guards. Messrs. Amyatt and Hay demanded their release, but the nabob refused, unless the British force assembled at Patna were withdrawn, or that Mr. Ellis were removed from the office of chief of the factory there, and his place supplied either by Mr. Amyatt, Mr. M'Guire, or Mr. Hastings. While demanding the removal of the troops from Patna, the nabob was taking measures to diminish their number by holding out to the men inducements to desert. Acts of positive hostility followed; and there being no longer any doubt as to the course which events would take, the presidency began in earnest to make preparations for war. Messrs. Amyatt and Hay demanded their dismissal from the nabob. It was accorded to the former, but Mr. Hay was detained as a hostage for the safety of some agents of the nabob, who were in confinement at Calcutta. These events gave opportunity for the commencement of hostilities at Patna. Mr. Ellis, the chief of the English factory there, was not indisposed to the work, nor was he without provocation to enter upon it. The immediate result of a sudden attack upon the city placed it in the possession of the English; but unable to maintain the advantage which they had gained, they were driven, not only from the city, but from their own factory; and failing to make their escape, were all either destroyed or made prisoners. Mr. Amyatt, too, was intercepted in his way from Moorsshedabad to Coosimbazar, and with all his companions murdered in cold blood.

When it became evident that hostilities

with Meer Cossim could not long be deferred, the question, who should occupy the throne, naturally presented itself. With regard to the feelings which actuated the majority of the council, it will excite no surprise to find that they determined on the restoration of Meer Jaffier, and on the 7th July, 1763, a proclamation issued under the seal of the East-India Company declared that personage once more sovereign of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and invited all persons within those countries to repair to his standard and maintain his claims. The act of the same authority only three years before was thus nullified, and all that had been done for the support of the pretensions of Meer Cossim rendered unavailing. The president offered no opposition to the will of the majority. He consented to sign the proclamation and all other public deeds, with a reservation, that he did not mean thereby to "prejudice his former declarations and opinions." He could scarcely, however, look back to those declarations and opinions with much confidence in the expediency of the former, or the justness of the latter; he could scarcely refer to them without some feelings of regret, unless the consolation afforded by the five lacs of rupees which they had procured him was sufficient to banish all unpleasant recollections.

When the proclamation restoring Meer Jaffier was issued, the terms upon which his restoration was to be effected were not settled. It was possible, therefore, that the governor and council might have had occasion to recall the act by which they had acknowledged him as sovereign, and transfer the throne to another. Some differences occurred in the arrangement, but they were slight, and the council were not indisposed to yield to the new nabob in slight matters, seeing that he yielded to them in some points which they regarded as of the highest importance—the native traders were again to be subjected to duties, while the servants of the Company were to carry on trade duty free, with the exception of two and a half per cent. upon salt. Thus, whatever might be the situation of the settled inhabitants of the country, those who sojourned among them for a brief period, for the purpose of amassing as much wealth and with as much speed as possible, had reason to rejoice. In addition to the important provisions respecting the inland trade, the treaty with Meer Jaffier confirmed to the English the possession of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong. The restored nabob also agreed to maintain twelve thousand horse and twelve thousand foot, and more in case of emergency; to receive an English resident; to enforce within his dominions the receipt of the coinage of Calcutta without batta, or allowance; to give thirty lacs of rupees to defray the expenses and losses of the Company from the war and from the suspension of their investment (a measure which had become necessary by the failure of their funds); to reimburse the losses of private

persons duly proved before the governor and council ; to renew his former treaty with the Dutch, which limited their power of erecting fortifications and raising troops, and to restrain the French, should they ever appear again in the country, from erecting fortifications, maintaining forces, holding lands, or undertaking the management of land rents.

The treaty being signed, Meer Jaffer left Calcutta on the 11th July to join the British force which had been put in motion to effect his restoration to the throne. It was commanded by Major Williams, a king's officer. On the 19th, an engagement took place, which terminated in favour of the English, and compelled the enemy to abandon the fort of Kutwal. On the 24th, the British force stormed the lines of Mootejil, and thus obtained possession of Moorsheadabad and about fifty pieces of cannon. Pursuing their victorious course, the English, on the 2nd August, crossed a ravine in the face of the enemy, who waited for them on the plain of Geriah, near Sootee. Here a general engagement took place. The battle was obstinately fought, and for a time victory seemed to oscillate between the combatants. At one period the enemy had succeeded in breaking part of the British line, and taking possession of some of their cannon ; but the advantage was soon recovered, and, after a desperate conflict of four hours, the precipitate flight of the enemy transferred to the English possession of all their cannon, and of one hundred and fifty boats laden with grain. The defeated army fled to Outahnulla, a fort situate between a chain of hills and the river, and defended by an intrenchment, on which were mounted a hundred pieces of cannon. The ditch was deep, about fifty or sixty feet wide, and full of water. The ground in front was swampy, and there was no apparent mode of approach but on the bank of the river where the ground was dry for about a hundred yards ; upon this spot the English commenced approaches and batteries, but the design was only to deceive the enemy, and draw off their attention from the point which was seriously menaced. On the 5th September, while the enemy were amused by a false attack on the bank of the river, the real attack was made at the foot of the hills, and after an obstinate resistance on the part of the enemy, attended by great slaughter, the English obtained possession of the fort and cannon. It was said, that Meer Cossim had sixty thousand men in arms within the intrenchment. The English force, Europeans and sepoy, did not exceed three thousand.

The victorious army advanced to Mongheer. This place Meer Cossim had made his capital, and had strengthened it as far as time and circumstances would permit ; but, as he had no inclination to sustain a siege in person, he quitted it on the approach of the English, leaving a garrison for its defence. He had previously signalized his temporary residence there by a characteristic act of cruelty, in

putting to death several prisoners of distinction, some of them his own relations, of whose fidelity he did not feel entirely satisfied. Among them was the unfortunate Ram Narain, a victim to his own avarice and the unhappy divisions in the British Government. It is said that he was drowned with a bag of sand fastened round his neck. On the way to Patna, to which place he was returning, Meer Cossim further gratified his disposition for blood by putting to death the two bankers, Seit, whom he had some time before compelled to attend him, lest they should give assistance to the English. Their bodies were exposed, under the care of a guard of sepoy, to the voracity of beasts and birds of prey, that they might not be disposed of in conformity with the practice of their country ; and on the advance of the English army their bones were found secreted in an apartment of a house.

Mongheer was regularly attacked, and, after a practicable breach had been made, capitulated to the English. The news of this reached Meer Cossim at Patna, and inflamed him to such a pitch of fury, that he resolved on the perpetration of an act of wholesale slaughter, exceeding in enormity even the atrocities of the Black Hole. While the English army were on their march towards Mongheer, he addressed a letter to Major Adams, threatening to put to death his European prisoners, and concluding thus : "Exult not upon the success which you have gained, merely by treachery and night assaults in two or three places, over a few jemadars sent by me. By the will of God you shall see in what manner this shall be revenged and retaliated." He was threatened with the utmost vengeance of the British nation if the prisoners sustained harm ; but neither the desperate guilt of the act which was meditated, nor the fearful consequences which might follow to its perpetrator, deterred Meer Cossim from giving orders for its execution. He found a fit instrument in a renegade European named Sumroo. The prisoners were of course unarmed, and in order that this murder might be accomplished with the greater facility, a previous search was instituted for knives and forks, which were seized and sent away.

The 3rd of October was the day of slaughter. Some of the victims were surrounded and fired upon ; others were cut to pieces by the swords of the soldiers employed in the dreadful work. It is said that they made all the resistance in their power by throwing bottles and stones at their murderers. Among the murdered was Mr. Ellis, whose impatience for hostilities had been so conspicuously displayed, and Mr. Hay, who had accompanied Mr. Amyatt on the mission from the English Government to Meer Cossim. One Englishman only was excepted from the sentence of general massacre. He was a surgeon, named Fullarton, and the value of his professional knowledge probably was the cause of his preservation. The English prisoners in other places shared the fate of

those at Patna. Mr. Fullarton, notwithstanding the favour which had been shown him, feeling some misgivings as to his own security, succeeded in effecting his escape about three weeks after the slaughter of his companions. It is said that the total number of Englishmen murdered in various places amounted to two hundred.

Patna, where the principal scene of this tragedy had been acted, was soon to pass out of the hands of the miscreant by whom it had been thus polluted. On the 6th of November it was taken by storm, and from this period the fortune of Meer Cossim was decided. His army was pursued by that of the English to the banks of the Caramnassa, which river he crossed to seek refuge in the territories of the soubahdar of Oude, with whom he had previously concluded a treaty.

This campaign was most honourable to the British force and to those by whom it was commanded. Their numbers would bear no comparison with those of the army of Meer Cossim, which a military witness declared to be better appointed and better disciplined than any he had seen in India before. Meer Cossim, though possessed of little military talent and less courage, had been very anxious to improve his army by the introduction of European discipline, and he had to a considerable extent succeeded.

When Meer Cossim crossed the Caramnassa, the emperor and the vizier were in camp at Allahabad. Thither the fugitive proceeded, and was honoured with a most gracious reception; but the desire of Meer Cossim that the vizier should march against the English was evaded, on the ground that he was about to employ his army in reducing to obedience some refractory dependants in Bundelcund, who had refused payment of revenue; Meer Cossim offered to undertake the task, and his services being accepted, he performed the duty entirely to the satisfaction of the vizier, who on his return to the camp agreed at once to march into Behar in support of the claims of the exiled nabob. The English authorities had been led, by communications from both the vizier and his master the emperor, to believe that Meer Cossim would be surrendered, or at least stripped of his wealth and power; but in case of the failure of this expectation, Major Carnac (who had succeeded to the command of the army) was instructed to advance his army to the banks of the Caramnassa to oppose the entrance of the enemy into the country. Unhappily the services of the army could not be depended upon. A spirit of disaffection had widely spread; some of the troops went off to the enemy's camp, and the fidelity of those who remained was very doubtful. The mutiny was incited and kept alive principally by a body of French troops, which, in the exercise of a very questionable policy, had been taken into the English service. The alleged object of the movement was to obtain a donation in recompense of the extraordinary

labours to which the troops had been subjected, but the distribution of money only partially allayed the discontent. The prevalence of this feeling in the army, the scarcity of provisions, and the disinclination of Meer Jaffier to commence hostilities, all tended to compel the British commander to confine himself to acting on the defensive, instead of adopting the bolder line which was repeatedly pressed upon him from Calcutta. On the enemy's approach an advance had been resolved upon, but it was subsequently found necessary to retire upon Patna. There, early in the morning of the 13th May, the British force was attacked. The conflict lasted till sunset, when the enemy was compelled to retire. Overtures for accommodation were at this time made both by the emperor and the vizier, but the English authorities insisted, with great propriety, upon the delivery of Meer Cossim, the ruffian Sumroo, and the English deserters who had fled to the enemy; and on the other hand, the vizier proposed to diminish the territory of Meer Jaffier, by severing from it the province of Behar. Nothing resulted from these attempts, real or pretended, at negotiation; and late in the month of June the enemy returned into Oude, a movement accelerated by a demonstration made by Major Carnac of carrying hostilities beyond the frontier.

In the action on the 13th May the British troops had behaved most creditably, and from this the council at Calcutta inferred that there was no reason to apprehend any return of insubordination. Major Carnac's opinion was less favourable; and as his opportunities of observation were better, this circumstance might have shielded an officer of his experienced character from the censure with which he was visited by the council for not entering upon a more adventurous course than he thought fit to pursue. The name of Major Carnac was not unknown in Indian warfare, and those under whom he served must have been aware that he was not a man likely to evade encountering the enemy without good cause. He had avowed his opinion that the army under his command, "if stanch, was a full match for the enemy;" but he had added an expression of his fear, that the open display of disaffection had only been kept down by the fear of punishment and the want of opportunity; and that numerous desertions would have taken place had not desertion been rendered exceedingly difficult by "the position he had taken, and the good look-out that was kept." While he held the command solitary instances of insubordination were not of unfrequent occurrence; and his successor, Major Munro, found the army, on his arrival to assume the command, in a state which, in his judgment, called for the infliction of punishment, extensive, summary, and severe. The latter officer, who was in the king's service, had been called from Bombay with as many troops, both king's and Company's, as could be spared from that presidency, in consequence

of the alarm created by the invasion from Oude. Arriving at Calcutta, he lost no time in proceeding with the troops which had accompanied him to Patna. The army previously assembled there, Europeans and sepoys, were in a state of mutiny. Desertions were frequent, and the mutineers soon went to the extent of threatening to carry off their officers and deliver them up to the enemy. Not only did they clamour for payment of a donation alleged to have been promised by the nabob, but an augmentation of pay was demanded; and the entire force of the British which had been assembled in the neighbourhood of Patna seemed on the point of breaking up. Such being the situation of the army, Major Munro, to use his own words, "determined to endeavour to conquer that mutinous disposition in them before" he "would attempt to conquer the enemy." In the spirit of this determination, he proceeded with a detachment and four field-pieces to one of the cantonments at a short distance from Patna. On the day of his arrival a battalion of sepoys marched off with their arms and accoutrements to join the enemy. A party, consisting of a hundred Europeans and a battalion of sepoys, whose officers reported that they might be depended upon, was despatched with two field-pieces in pursuit of the deserters. They came up with them in the night, surprised them while asleep, made them prisoners, and marched them back to the cantonment. The officer commanding the detachment sent forward an express, announcing the precise hour at which his arrival with the prisoners might be expected, and Major Munro was prepared to receive them with the troops under arms. He immediately ordered their officers to pick out from the deserters fifty of those who bore the worst character, and who were likely to have been authors of the movement, or chief actors in it. This being done, a further selection of the twenty-four reputed to be the worst men in the fifty was made, and these were immediately placed upon trial before a field court-martial composed of native officers assembled on the spot. They were found guilty of mutiny and desertion, and sentenced to suffer death, the mode of carrying the sentence into effect being left to the direction of the commander-in-chief. He ordered them forthwith to be bound to the guns, and blown away. The order was no sooner made known than four grenadiers represented, that as they had always enjoyed the post of honour, they were entitled to suffer first. Their desire was complied with, the four men bound to the guns were released, the grenadiers fastened in their places and executed. The officers of the native troops in the field then informed the major that the sepoys were resolved not to permit any more men to suffer. He immediately directed the four field-pieces to be loaded with grape-shot, and the Europeans to be drawn up with the guns in intervals between them. The officers who had made the communication were commanded

to return to the heads of their battalions, and the men were ordered to ground their arms under pain of being fired upon in case of disobedience or attempt at flight. The order was complied with—sixteen more of the offenders were blown away, and the remaining four carried to another cantonment where considerable desertion had taken place, there to suffer in like manner. From this time mutiny and desertion were at an end. Such measures can only be justified by strong necessity, and though it is impossible to regard them without a feeling of horror, we must not, under the indulgence of such a feeling, forget the paramount necessity of upholding military loyalty and subordination, and the direful mischief of which an insurgent army might be the cause.

The army being once more in a state in which it might be trusted to meet an enemy, Major Munro prepared to take the field as early as possible after the rains; the 15th September was fixed for the rendezvous of the troops from the different cantonments. Before the army was put in motion, intelligence was received that the enemy had advanced several parties of horse, and thrown up some breast-work on the banks of the Soane to impede the passage of the English. To remove this obstacle, Major Champion was despatched with a detachment and four field-pieces to cross the river some miles below the place where the main body were to pass, and advance on the opposite bank for the purpose of dislodging the enemy and covering the landing of the British troops. It was important that Major Champion should arrive on one side of the river at the same time that the main body reached the other. The movements of both parts of the British force were regulated with a view to secure this—and with so much precision were they executed, that Major Champion's detachment began to fire on the enemy at the moment when the van of Major Munro's army appeared on the opposite bank. The enemy was soon dislodged—the English force was thus enabled to cross the river without molestation, and in four hours the operation was completed. Major Munro then continued his march towards Buxar, where the enemy lay. On the 22nd October he arrived there, and encamped just beyond the range of the enemy's shot. He found them intrenched with the Ganges on their left and the village of Buxar in their rear. The first intention of Major Munro was to attack them before day-break on the morning after his arrival. Some spies were sent out to ascertain in what part of their encampment the force of their artillery lay, where the tents of the vizier and Meer Cossim stood, and whether the British artillery could be brought to bear on the enemy's right, Major Munro being resolved to avoid attacking them on their left, in order, said he, "that we might have a better chance to drive them into the Ganges than they should us." Midnight arrived without bringing back the spies. The British commander concluded

that they had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and he resolved to postpone the attack till the following morning. As the day broke, two of the spies returned, and reported that the enemy had been under arms all night, that they had been moving their artillery, and that the women and treasure had been sent away. A *reconnoissance* took place, and many of the enemy's troops were perceived under arms, but not beyond the intrenchments; and it was the opinion of Major Munro and all the officers who accompanied him, that the bustle apparent in the enemy's camp was a feint. "In this belief," said the major, "I returned to our camp, wishing they would come out and attack us, for our army was encamped in order of battle." His wish was gratified. At eight o'clock the field-officer of the day announced that the enemy's right was in motion, and that he was confident that they were seriously resolved on making an attack. The drums were immediately ordered to beat to arms, the troops advanced from their encampment, and in a few minutes were ready to receive the approaching enemy. The action commenced at nine and raged till twelve, when the enemy gave way. They retired, however, leisurely, blowing up several tumbrils and three large magazines of powder as they went off. The British army broke into columns to pursue; but pursuit was frustrated by the vizier sacrificing part of his army to preserve the remainder. Two miles from the field of battle was a rivulet, over which a bridge of boats had been constructed. This the enemy destroyed before their rear had passed over; and through this act about two thousand of them were drowned or otherwise lost. Destructive as was this proceeding, it was, says Major Munro, "the best piece of generalship Shoojah-ad-Dowlah showed that day; because, if I had crossed the rivulet with the army, I would either have taken or drowned his whole army in the *Carannassa*, and come up with his treasure and jewels, and Cossim Ali Khan's jewels, which, I was informed, amounted to between two and three millions."

The British force engaged in this memorable battle consisted of eight hundred and fifty-seven Europeans, five thousand two hundred and ninety-seven sepoy, and nine hundred and eighteen native cavalry, making a total of seven thousand and seventy-two men. They had a train of artillery of twenty field-pieces. The force of the enemy, according to some reports, amounted to sixty thousand men, and the lowest estimate fixes it at forty thousand. Of this vast number two thousand were left dead upon the field of battle, exclusive of those who perished from the destruction of the bridge; the enemy also lost one hundred and thirty-three pieces of cannon of various sizes. The loss of the English in killed and wounded was severe, amounting to no less than eight hundred and forty-seven. The situation of the wounded enemy was pitiable, but they received all the attention which it was in the power of

the victors to afford. Surgical assistance could not be rendered, for all that was available was insufficient to meet the wants of the wounded of the English army; but for five successive days the field was traversed in search of those in whom life was not extinct, and rice and water bestowed on all who would receive it. To ensure the due discharge of this humane provision, it was personally superintended by the commander-in-chief, who thus shewed that, although when circumstances required severity he would not shrink from its exercise, he was not less prompt in executing the gentle offices of charity than in enforcing obedience to the demands of military law.

On the day after the battle the emperor addressed a letter to Major Munro, congratulating him on the victory which he had gained over the vizier—by whom the emperor alleged he had been treated as a prisoner—soliciting the protection of the English, and adding, that though he had been in camp with the vizier, he had left him on the night before the battle. The British army remained several days at Buxar, making provision for the wounded and burying the dead. Major Munro then marched in the direction of Benares. The emperor marched with his guards in the same direction, and every night pitched his tent within a very short distance of the British encampment. Subsequently to the transmission of the letter, the Emperor had sought an interview with Major Munro, in which he renewed his request for British protection, and offered to bestow in return the dominions of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah, or any thing else which the British government might please to demand. Major Munro had referred the subject to those under whom he was acting, and declined giving any countenance to the emperor's wishes until authorized by instructions from Calcutta. At length instructions arrived. They were favourable to the emperor, and he was thenceforward regarded as under British protection.

The emperor was not the only person who had reason to complain of the friendship of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah. Meer Cossim had become anxious to enjoy his alliance at a greater distance, and in the hope of escaping had proposed to depart for a season under pretence of collecting revenue. The wary vizier was not to be thus deceived. Suspecting that the real purpose of the proposed expedition was not that which was professed, he objected to its being undertaken, and Meer Cossim was compelled to submit. But though the vizier thus refused to allow his friend an opportunity of collecting his revenues, he was not disposed to forget that Meer Cossim had purchased his alliance by an engagement to pay a monthly subsidy. Payment was demanded, but Meer Cossim pleaded his inability to comply. The vizier then called to his aid the name of his master the emperor, who, he affirmed, was pressing for the Bengal tribute, and that if it were not forthwith paid, the effects of Meer Cossim would be seized by the imperial

officers. Meer Cossim, as was natural, besought the friendly offices of the vizier to avert this extremity; but the vizier declared that he could not interfere, and that the accounts must be settled with the emperor. Meer Cossim felt, or affected to be in despair; and to shame the vizier into greater consideration, he relinquished the state which he had been accustomed to maintain, and assumed the mortified habit and bearing of a devotee. The vizier, hearing of the change, appeared greatly shocked; he lost no time in visiting the desponding prince, and by repeated assurances of the undiminished warmth and sincerity of his friendship, at length induced him to abandon the dress and deportment by which his feelings of disappointment and dejection were expressed, and reassume his princely habiliments and mode of life. But Meer Cossim had yet to gain further experience of the character of his friend. His troops became clamorous for their pay, and surrounded the tent of their master, demanding a settlement. Meer Cossim was unprepared with the ordinary silver currency of the country; and to appease them he was obliged to have recourse to a cherished hoard of gold. This, however, was not a process to be repeated, and to avoid the necessity of again resorting to it, Meer Cossim resolved to get rid of an army which he was no longer able to pay without trenching upon resources that were reserved for the last pressure of extremity. The riotous troops were headed by Sumroo, the wretch who had been the willing instrument of executing the murderous orders of the Nabob at Patna. To him Meer Cossim communicated his intention of dispensing with the services of the force which he had commanded, and he requested that the cannon, as well as the arms and accoutrements of the men, might be returned to one of his officers. Sumroo was not prepared to recognize the justness of the demand; he had a strong opinion of the right of possession. He answered that the articles belonged to those who had them in their keeping, and his practice illustrated his principle. He immediately tendered the services of himself and his battalions to the vizier, by whom they were most graciously accepted. Such an accession to the vizier's army was valuable; and it is not recorded that the prince entertained any scruples on account of the arms and equipments of the men having been furnished at the expense of his friend. This transfer had taken place before the battle of Buxar. Sumroo had there acted on behalf of the vizier; but, as has been seen, he gained for his new employer neither honour nor advantage. The day after the discharge of the troops by Meer Cossim his tents were surrounded by the troops of the vizier, who, suspecting that his friend's stock of gold was not exhausted, was desirous of transferring it into his own coffers. Meer Cossim was mounted on an elephant, and carried to the camp of his ally. A rigid investigation was made as to the

extent of his effects, and all that could be discovered were appropriated by the vizier. Meer Cossim, however, was able to secrete a number of valuable jewels, which were despatched by one of his followers to the Rohilla country.

In the plunder of his friend, the vizier observed neither moderation nor mercy. He would have taken the last rupee which Meer Cossim possessed, if he had been able to discover where it was deposited. But while thus indulging his rapacity without restraint, he steadily refused—and his conduct in this respect was certainly creditable—to surrender Meer Cossim into the hands of the English. The demand had been made before the battle of Buxar and rejected; it was repeated afterwards with no better success. When Major Munro arrived at Benares, the vizier despatched to him an envoy, named Beny Bahadur, to make proposals of peace. The major insisted, as a preliminary, upon the delivery of Meer Cossim and Sumroo. Beny Bahadur declared the concession of this demand to be impossible, but said, that, if it were abandoned, the vizier would give twenty-five lacs of rupees to the Company towards the expenses of the war, twenty-five lacs to the army, and eight lacs to the British commander. The manner in which the proposal was received by Major Munro is thus related by himself:—"My answer was, that if he gave me all the lacs in his treasury, I would make no peace with him until he had delivered me up those murdering rascals; for I never could think that my receiving eleven or twelve lacs of rupees was a sufficient atonement for the blood of those unfortunate gentlemen who were murdered at Patna." This decisive declaration silenced the vizier's envoy, and he departed. He returned after a time, in the hope of softening the British commander, but the latter refused to vary his determination in the slightest degree. Beny Bahadur then requested that an officer, named Captain Stables, might accompany him back, as the captain was familiar with the country language, and the vizier wished to make a proposal to him. The officer whose presence was thus sought was left by his commander at perfect liberty to accept or decline this invitation according to his own discretion. Major Munro told him that he neither advised nor wished him to go, as he might perhaps meet the fate of the sufferers of Patna. Captain Stables, however, resolved to incur the danger, and he proceeded to the vizier's camp. A compromise was now proposed. Shoojah-ad-Dowlah would not deliver up Meer Cossim, but he was ready to withdraw from him his protection (if protection it were) and connive at his escape. With regard to Sumroo, the vizier was prepared to go further. He would not surrender him, though his scruple was inexplicable, inasmuch as the course which he proposed as a substitute for this measure was more dishonourable than the surrender would have been. His plan was that two or three gentlemen from

the English camp who were acquainted with Sumroo's person should visit the camp of the vizier. Sumroo was then to be invited to an entertainment, and amidst the festive rites was to meet his death, in presence of the English witnesses. The vizier supported his plan by an argument seldom neglected in the field of Oriental dialectics—he offered Captain Stables a large sum to use his influence with his commander to get the terms accepted; but the project was not one likely to meet the countenance of Englishmen, and its framer was still doomed to find his proposals rejected.

All hope of making terms with Shoojah-ad-Dowlah being at an end, the British army continued its march towards Allahabad. Chunarghur was besieged and a practicable breach effected, but the assault failed through the bad behaviour of the sepoys, and the success of a second was frustrated in like manner by the failure of the European troops who led the van: these running back, the whole gave way. In the meantime Shoojah-ad-Dowlah was endeavouring to get into the rear of the British army, and one object of this movement was to carry off the emperor. But the attempt was unsuccessful. Major Munro converted the siege of Chunarghur into a blockade, and leaving a sufficient force to maintain it, retired with the rest of the army to Benares. Shoojah-ad-Dowlah continuing to approach, the English commander concentrated his force by withdrawing the detachment from Chunarghur in expectation of a general action. The two armies, however, long remained in a state of quiescence, and before activity was again manifested, Major Munro had relinquished his command and quitted India.

The death of Meer Jaffier, which occurred in February, placed the throne of Bengal once more at the disposal of the English authorities. The competitors were Noojum-ad-Dowlah, the second son of Meer Jaffier (but the eldest surviving), and the infant son of Meerun. The former was on the verge of manhood, the latter was only about six years of age. As both were illegitimate, neither had any legal right to the succession; but both had enjoyed the advantage of having been publicly recognized by the former nabob as entitled to it. The British Government determined in favour of the candidate of riper age. Their decision appears to have been influenced by a regard to the public feeling in his favour, and by a prudent desire to avoid giving to the succession the appearance of a new revolution. Previously the new nabob seems not to have stood high in their esteem. They avowed that they had no favourable opinion either of his abilities or his character; but, barring his illegitimacy, Noojum-ad-Dowlah was the successor to whom the Mahometan law pointed. The son of Meerun was an infant, as were the younger children of Meer Jaffier, and though the elevation of one of these might have contributed to increase the actual power of the Company, it would also have rendered that

power more conspicuous than was desired; and to remove the succession out of the family of the late nabob might, as the council observed, "create troubles." But though the new nabob apparently ascended the musnud according to ordinary rules, he was, in effect, but the creature of the British power, and in bestowing on him the throne, the opportunity afforded for adding to the stability of that power was not neglected. The tendency of events for some years past had been to throw on the Company's government the military defence of the three provinces. They were now to be formally invested with this office. The nabob was to be relieved from the expense of keeping up any greater military force than might be necessary for purposes of state, for the maintenance of internal peace, and for enforcing the collection of revenue. To meet the increased expense that would thus be thrown on the Company, a monthly payment of five lacs, which Meer Jaffier had made for a short time, was to be continued. In adverting to the incapacity of the new nabob, the council had promised to take care that proper officers were appointed for the management of the affairs of the government. To ensure this was the next object of anxiety. The old nabob had been madly attached to a man named Nuncomar, one of the most faithless and profligate politicians that could be found even in an Eastern court; to him all the power of the state had been committed almost without control. Nuncomar was an enemy, and a treacherous enemy, to the English. The diminution of his power was consequently indispensable to the security of their interests, and this it was proposed to effect by transferring the exercise of the chief authority in the state to one believed to be better entitled to confidence. The man selected for the office of chief minister was named Mahomed Reza Khan, and the favour shewn him by the English gave Nuncomar an opportunity of insinuating that it was intended to place him on the throne. Nuncomar's station gave him great influence, and his cunning and activity enabled him to make the best use of it for advancing his own ends. Without concert with the English authorities he had applied to the emperor for sunnuds confirming Noojum-ad-Dowlah in the succession; and they arrived before the formal recognition of the nabob by the British government had taken place. But the power of that government was in the ascendant. The influence of the objections raised by Nuncomar to the terms proposed by them had been removed—a treaty founded on those terms had been signed, and Mahomed Reza Khan had been acknowledged as naib or chief manager. Besides the military defence of the country, and the recommendation or appointment of the chief minister of the nabob, the council had stipulated for such a degree of influence in the appointment of officers of revenue as should be sufficient, it was thought, to guard against any flagrant abuses in that

important branch of the public service. All these arrangements may fairly be supposed to have had their origin in an honest zeal for the benefit of the Company by whose servants they were made, and of the country to which they belonged. The same favourable view cannot be taken of their conduct in another instance. They renewed with Noojum-ad-Dowlah the agreement contained in the last treaty made with his father for continuing to the English the privilege of carrying on the inland trade free from duties, excepting the two and a half per cent. paid on salt. Not only was this unreasonable and unjust in itself, but it was in direct contravention of positive orders from the Company at home. The Court of Directors, by letter dated 8th of February, 1764, had required the inland trade to be discontinued. The Court of Proprietors shortly afterwards recommended a reconsideration of the subject with a view to its regulation in such a manner as should "prevent all further disputes between the soubahdar and the Company." The Court of Directors accordingly, in a letter dated the 1st June, 1764, desired the council of Fort William to form, with the approbation of the nabob—in the language of the dispatch, "with his free will and consent, and in such a manner as not to afford any just grounds of complaint"—a proper and equitable plan for carrying on the private trade: but it is to be remarked, in giving these directions, the Court took occasion to express their disapprobation of those articles in the treaty with Meer Jaffier which provided for the immunity of the Company's servants from customs duties except on salt, while the general exemption granted by Meer Cossim was to be reversed. The Court write, "These are terms which appear to be so very injurious to the nabob and to the natives, that they cannot, in the very nature of them, tend to any thing but the producing general heart-burnings and disaffection; and consequently there can be little reason to expect that tranquillity in the country can be permanent: the orders therefore in our said letter of the 8th of February"—the orders directing the entire abandonment of the inland trade—"are to remain in force, until a more equitable and satisfactory plan can be formed and adopted." In the face of these orders, the council of Calcutta inserted in their treaty with Noojum-ad-Dowlah an article, reserving to the servants of the Company the privilege of continuing to trade upon the same terms as had been granted by Meer Jaffier—terms which the Directors declared injurious to both prince and people, and incompatible with the tranquillity of the country. Well might the authority whose orders were thus set at nought address those by whom the new treaty was framed and concluded, in language of severe and indignant reproof. In expressing their opinion upon the treaty, the Court, after adverting to this article and to their previous orders, say, "we must and do consider what you have done as

an express breach and violation of our orders, and as a determined resolution to sacrifice the interests of the Company and the peace of the country to lucrative and selfish views. This unaccountable behaviour puts an end to all confidence in those who made this treaty."

While the private trade was thus secured for the benefit of the Company's servants in general, those who had been instrumental in placing the new nabob on the throne had the usual opportunities of promoting their own special interests. Presents of large amount were tendered, and though for a time the members of council displayed a decent coyness, they were not unrelenting: as usual on such occasions, their scruples gave way before the arguments of their tempters. The nabob dispensed his wealth with a liberality becoming his rank. The gratitude of Mahomed Reza Khan was manifested by the earnestness with which he pressed a participation in his good fortune upon those who had bestowed it on him; and Jugut Seit, anxious for the support of the British council in aiding his influence with the nabob, was ready, in the spirit of commercial speculation, to purchase it. Mr. Vansittart had retired from the government before the death of Meer Jaffier, and the chair was occupied by Mr. Spencer, a gentleman who, most opportunely for himself, had been brought from Bombay just in time to improve his fortune to the extent of two lacs of rupees. Among other large sharers in the shower of wealth were Messrs. Johnstone, Leycester, Senior, and Middleton. These gentlemen had formed a deputation, to whom was entrusted the arrangement with the nabob of the terms of the treaty. Mr. Johnstone had formerly laid down the principle that money bestowed in reward of service rendered by the representatives of the Company, and by their power and influence, rightfully belonged to the Company; he had expressed a tender regard for the reputation of Mr. Vansittart and his colleagues, by recommending the diversion of Meer Cossim's bounty into another channel, lest suspicion should attach to their motives; and he had manifested some disappointment, that when a bond of large amount was offered them, it had not been immediately placed to the credit of the Company. His views had undergone a change, neither the cause nor the process of which is anywhere explained; but he accepted (and did not place to the credit of the Company) two lacs and thirty-seven thousand rupees—his share thus considerably exceeding that of the governor. Mr. Senior received one lac twenty-two thousand five hundred rupees; Mr. Middleton one lac twenty-two thousand five hundred; Mr. Leycester one lac twelve thousand five hundred. Messrs. Pleydell, Burdett, and Gray, members of council, received one lac each. How the money had been merited in the case of Mr. Burdett does not appear, as he had voted alone for calling the infant son of Meerun to the throne. Perhaps it was to prevent trouble arising from his

discontent. A scarcely less remarkable object of the nabob's generosity was Mr. Gideon Johnstone, who was not in the council, nor at the time had ever been in the Company's service; he received fifty thousand rupees for no reason that can be discovered, except that he was the brother of the gentleman who was chief of the deputation.

While the arrangements consequent on the death of Meer Jaffer were in progress, the war in the northern provinces continued to be carried on to the advantage of the English. The council being, however, anxious to bring it to an end, made a very extraordinary proposal towards accommodation. The demand for the surrender of Meer Cossim and Sumroo being the principal obstacle, they expressed their willingness to recede from it on one condition, and the condition was, that the vizier should put Meer Cossim and Sumroo to death "as an act of justice." The Court of Directors, when informed of the proposal, declared it impossible to believe that this experiment on the vizier's regard for his friends was seriously meant, adding very justly, "if the law of hospitality forbade his delivering them up, surely it forbade his murdering them."

Chunarnghur and Allahabad surrendered to the English in February. In the latter place the emperor took up his residence. The vizier fled to Lucknow, and from thence to seek refuge among the Rohillas. Meer Cossim had made his escape from the protection of the vizier, and followed the jewels which he had preserved from the plunder to which he had been subjected. Sumroo, having no affection for a falling cause, was seeking a new service.

The power of the vizier had indeed been completely broken, and the English were in a condition to strip him altogether of dominion, or to tolerate his retention of it upon any terms which they pleased to dictate; but before his fate was determined, Mr. Spencer had ceased to be the head of the British government in Bengal, and Clive, who during his residence in England had been created an Irish peer, arrived on the 3rd of May to supply his place.

The new governor was accompanied from England by two civil servants of the Company, Mr. Sumner and Mr. Sykes; and these, with Mr. Verelst and General Carnac, were to form a select committee, vested with extraordinary powers, to pursue whatever means they should judge most proper to restore peace and tranquillity to the country. Whenever it could be done conveniently, the council at large were to be consulted; but the power of determining was to rest in the committee alone. As soon as peace and tranquillity should be "restored and established in the soubahdarship of Bengal," the extraordinary powers of the committee were to cease, and the committee itself to be dissolved. At the time of Clive's arrival, the son of Meer Jaffer was in peaceful possession of the throne of Bengal, under the protection of the English Govern-

ment, before whose victorious arms the vizier was flying; while, with the emperor, relations of friendly alliance had been established. Clive seems to have been disappointed that there was so little left for him to achieve; and he felt more especially aggrieved by the government having provided a successor to Meer Jaffer before his arrival. The promptitude of the council might have been influenced by views of personal advantage; but the dissatisfaction of Clive was unreasonable, and must be referred to a feeling more lofty, perhaps, than that of his rivals, but not more disinterested. The ardour of the council might be stimulated by cupidity, while the complaints of Clive were the fruits of disappointed ambition.

The committee lost no time in entering upon their duties; but, as might have been expected, the members of the council showed no alacrity in recognizing their authority. Mr. Leycester and Mr. Johnstone were desirous of obtaining some explanation from the committee as to the meaning and intent of their powers, which were especially limited to the restoration of peace and tranquillity; but Clive answered that he would not discuss such points—that the committee themselves were the sole judges of their own powers, and were resolved to carry them into execution. The fierce and haughty bearing of Clive silenced his opponents, if it did not satisfy them.

A subject which was among those that first occupied the attention of the committee was one which the council would gladly have postponed. The enormous presents, by which many of the Company's servants had enriched themselves at the expense of opulent and powerful natives, had attracted attention at home. The danger and the scandal of permitting such practices to be continued without restraint had been felt, and it had been resolved to prepare forms of covenant to be executed by the civil and military servants of the Company, binding them not to accept the gift of any land, rents, or revenue whatever, nor of any other property, beyond a small amount, without the consent of the Court of Directors. The covenants had arrived at Calcutta in January, but the council had not taken any steps towards procuring their execution; and, indeed, as the death of Meer Jaffer and the accession of his eldest surviving son immediately followed the arrival of the covenants, it is obvious that a hasty execution of those documents would to the council have been exceedingly inconvenient. It appears, also, that they disapproved of them on principle; they thought them too unreasonable and absurd to be adopted or acted upon. One of their own body stated that he had heard from his brethren that the regulation appeared to them so new and extraordinary, and seemed liable to so many objections, that they proposed sending home a remonstrance against it, setting forth their reasons for judging the measure inexpedient and improper. The select

committee took a different view. They peremptorily required that the covenants should be executed; and the demand met with little resistance, though it excited much discontent.

A very unfavourable report of the conduct of those who had been engaged in placing Noojum-ad-Dowlah on the throne was made by the select committee to the Court of Directors. Some of Clive's opponents were men of energy scarcely inferior to his own; but he had the power to crush them, and was not indisposed to exert it. Some of the discontented, to avert worse consequences, retired; some of the more refractory were suspended, and no inconsiderable number were ultimately dismissed the service. Mahomed Reza Khan was exonerated from the charges preferred against him, but he was not permitted to enjoy his vast power unimpaired. The nabob had manifested great dislike to the arrangement by which it had been placed in his hands, and it was reduced by admitting Juggut Seit and Roydoolob to a participation. The nabob gained nothing by this division of power; but it might possibly in some degree soothe his irritated feelings, and it had the additional recommendation of annoying Clive's opponents.

More important matters remained to be adjusted—the conclusion of the war with the vizier, the settlement of the relations of the Company with the emperor, and a new arrangement with the nabob; for this, too, formed part of the plans of Clive. The vizier, with his allies, the Mahrattas, having on the 3rd of May been defeated by the English, he signified, a few days afterwards, his desire of peace, upon any conditions which the victors might think fit to prescribe. Clive proceeded to the English camp to arrange the terms; and the vanquished prince had no reason to complain of their harshness. The transfer of the entire dominions of the vizier to the emperor had been seriously contemplated; but the design was regarded by Clive (as well as by the Court of Directors at home, when they became aware of the project) as impolitic and dangerous. The vizier was therefore restored to the possession of all the territories which he had previously governed, with the exception of Korah, and such parts of the province of Allahabad as were then actually occupied by the emperor. A defensive alliance was to subsist between the vizier, the nabob, and the English; the latter were to carry on trade duty free; but the vizier objected to granting them permission to establish factories within his dominions, and the claim was not pressed. The surrender of Meer Cossim and Sumroo was no longer within the vizier's power—one impediment to peace was thus removed, and the prince evinced no reluctance to stipulate that he would never entertain, receive, or countenance them. As an indemnification for the expenses of the war, he agreed to pay fifty lacs of rupees within thirteen months. This

amount Clive and the select committee allowed to be inadequate; but the reasons which they urged against pressing for more were creditable both to their liberality and prudence. The vizier's "circumstances," they represented, "would not afford more without oppressing the country, and thereby laying the foundation of future contention and trouble." This explanation was followed by pointing out that no money had been granted "for any other consideration whatsoever." The intent of this remark is obvious; but as some of the select committee were not distinguished for shunning the favours of fortune, its good taste is less palpable.

The emperor was less fortunate than his rebellious officer. Not only was his expectation of establishing himself in the place of the vizier disappointed, but in the settlement of his recognised claims to tribute from Bengal, more regard was shown to the convenience of those who had to pay than to the right of him who had to receive. The emperor demanded the amount, in money and jaghire, which had been fixed by engagements with Meer Jaffier and Meer Cossim. Clive successfully objected to the jaghire, and five lacs and a half of rupees were thus annually saved to the revenues of Bengal. This point being yielded, the emperor applied for the arrears which were due, amounting to thirty-two lacs. Clive answered that it was impossible to pay one rupee, on account of the impoverishment of the treasury from various causes, more especially the war, which he did not fail to remind the emperor had been maintained partly on his majesty's account. The emperor resisted this attempt to confiscate the arrears of his tribute, and the "obstinacy" of the English negotiators (so it is termed by themselves) drew from him expressions of "warmth and displeasure;" but the descendant of the emperors of Delhi had no choice but to abandon his claim with a good grace, or to continue to assert it without any hope of profiting by his pertinacity. He took the former course, and the thirty-two lacs of arrears were numbered among things to be forgotten. The negotiation proceeded, and in its progress the English government gained an important accession to its power and influence. The emperor had some years before offered to bestow upon the Company the dewanny, or collection of the revenue, of the three provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, but it was then declined. It was now solicited, bestowed, and accepted. The English East-India Company was acknowledged as the representative of the throne of Delhi in the three provinces; and the nizamat, or the executive functions of government, being at the same time confirmed to the nabob, the British authorities were fortified by the sanction of that power which not long before had been paramount in India, and which still commanded respectful homage, even when unable to enforce obedience.

The way to render the gift of the dewanny available had been previously prepared. Clive,

by representing to the nabob the financial difficulties by which he was surrounded, had prevailed upon him to accept of an annual allowance of fifty-three lacs of rupees for the support of his dignity and contingent expenses, leaving the remainder of the revenues to be disbursed by the English government. The grant of the emperor entitled the Company to any surplus that might remain after the stipulated payments were made; and they now lacked nothing of sovereignty but the name.

In the arrangements made at this time with Clive, the nabob seems to have had little reason for complaint. His title to the throne was not the clearest, and it is admitted alike by the testimony of friends and foes that he was altogether unfit for the active duties of government. There is no evidence that he evinced any unwillingness to accept the name of sovereign and a large revenue, as a full satisfaction of his claims; and as he was one of the weakest, if not one of the worst, of Oriental princes—utterly sunk in intemperance and sensuality, incapable of rational thought or vigorous effort—an arrangement which provided him the means of unbounded indulgence, and relieved him from the cares of state, offered as the price of power that which a mind like the nabob's might be presumed to value more. Towards the emperor Clive scarcely showed equal liberality. It might not be expedient to gratify his wish to employ the English as the instruments of making conquests for his benefit; but the mode in which his pecuniary claims upon the three provinces were disposed of was not that which the emperor of Delhi had a right to expect at the hands of those to whom he was giving a place among the states of India.

Among the various questions of which Clive had to dispose, during this his third period of residence in India, was that of the private trade. The Court of Directors, it will be recollected, had forbidden their servants engaging in that trade, till some plan should be devised more equitable than that conceded by Meer Jaffer and confirmed by his weak successor. Clive, when at home, had strenuously urged the necessity of restraining the servants of the Company from trading in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, articles which were among the chief objects of internal commerce, and with which the interference of foreigners had been felt as peculiarly vexatious. In a letter to the Court of Directors before he left England, he said, "The trading in salt, betel, and tobacco, having been one cause of the present disputes, I hope these articles will be restored to the nabob, and your servants absolutely forbid to trade in them." Again, in another letter: "The odium of seeing such monopolies in the hands of foreigners need not be insisted on." It could scarcely, therefore, have been doubted that Clive would have been zealous in carrying out the orders of the Court of Directors, consonant as they were to his own avowed opinions: yet, within a month after his arrival at Calcutta, Clive entered into a partnership

with his colleagues in the select committee, Messrs. Sumner, Verelst, and Sykes, for the purpose of dealing in salt. An attempt has been made to excuse Clive, on the ground that his share of the profits of the speculation (which were enormous) was not appropriated to his own benefit, but was distributed among certain friends and dependents. This cannot alter the character of the proceeding. Clive had declared that the trade ought not to be permitted to the servants of the Company, and the Court of Directors had forbidden them to engage in it. Under these circumstances, he could no more be justified in entering upon the trade in salt for the benefit of others than for his own. Clive, too, at the very time he was thus acting, was claiming the character of a reformer, and addressing the Court of Directors in such language as the following: "Is there a man anxious for the speedy return of his son, his brother, or his friend, and solicitous to see that return accompanied by affluence of fortune, indifferent to the means by which it may have been obtained—is there a man who, void of all but selfish feelings, can withhold his approbation of any plan that promises not sudden riches to those, his dearest connections—who can look with contempt upon measures of moderation, and who can cherish all upstart greatness, though stigmatized with the spoils of the Company—if there is such a man, to him all arguments would be vain—to him I speak not. My address is to those who can judge coolly of the advantages to be desired for their relations and friends, nor think the body corporate wholly unentitled to their attention." Yet Clive at this time was engaging in a trade forbidden by the orders of his superiors, for the purpose of enriching suddenly several persons, some of whom, at least, had small claims upon the Company or the country. One of them, Captain Maskeylyne, was a near relation of Lord Clive; he had been in the service of the Company; his good fortune had been far inferior to that of his patron, but it seems, from the testimony of a witness not indisposed to speak favourably, that it was tolerably proportioned to his merits. Another of the fortunate sharers in the salt profits was the private surgeon of Lord Clive; and another appears to have contributed to his comfort in a humbler capacity—he is stated to have been his lordship's footman. On the inconsistency of such conduct with either the public duty or the public professions of Clive it is unnecessary to dwell.

Clive, however, found employment of a different nature to that of bestowing fortunes on his friends, and carrying out the inland trade among the Company's servants. Whatever might be thought of these acts at home, they could not fail to be popular in India. Not so the reduction of the emoluments of the army, which was one of the duties imposed upon Clive by his instructions, and one which he was resolved to perform.

After the battle of Plassy, the Nabob Meer Jaffier had granted to the English troops whom he was to support double batta, or field allowance. When the mode of defraying the expenses of the army was changed, by the assignment to the Company of certain districts for the purpose, the Court of Directors ordered that double batta should be abolished. These instructions, though often repeated, had never been carried into effect; and, as in the case of the covenants against the receipt of presents, it remained for Clive to enforce orders which apathy, fear, or inclination had previously permitted to slumber. The select committee accordingly issued an order, directing that, from the 1st January, 1766, double batta should cease, except at Allahabad, where, on account of the distance from Calcutta, the allowance was to be continued while the troops were actually in the field, but was to be reduced to single batta when they retired into cantonments. At Patna and Mongheer the troops were to have half batta when not on service. At the presidency they were to be placed on the same footing as at Madras; they were to draw no batta, except when actually marching or serving in the field. Against this order remonstrance was offered, but in vain. The order was enforced; and the enforcement led to a wide-spread conspiracy among the European officers, organized with much care and great secrecy, the object of which was the simultaneous resignation of their commissions on a given day. The details of this discreditable business would afford neither instruction nor pleasure; the subject may, therefore, be passed over with more than ordinary brevity. Clive exerted himself vigorously to repress the mutinous movement; he was ably supported by Sir Robert Barker and Colonel A. Smith, who commanded two of the three brigades into which the army was divided. The remaining brigade was commanded by Sir Robert Fletcher; and he, it was discovered, though not until the mutiny was very far advanced, was the contriver and instigator of the guilty proceedings. He was brought to a court-martial, convicted, and cashiered—a lenient punishment, considered with reference to his aggravated guilt, and to the fatal consequences that might have followed his treacherous desertion of duty. A few officers of inferior rank were also brought to trial, and sentenced to punishment; the remainder were permitted to enjoy the benefits of timely penitence, by restoration to their commissions.

At the time that Clive was engaged in recalling the army to their duty, he had an opportunity of evincing his regard for that body by a liberal donation for its benefit. On his arrival from England, he was informed that Meer Jaffier had bequeathed to him five lacs of rupees, which were in the hands of Munny Begum, the mother of the reigning prince. He at first hesitated as to receiving the legacy, on the ground, as he stated, that he had pledged his word that he would not benefit himself,

directly or indirectly, by the government of India. But at the time of enforcing the order for the discontinuance of double batta, he determined to accept the bequest, and apply it to the formation of a military fund for invalid officers and soldiers, and their widows. This legacy formed one of the subjects of inquiry when Clive's conduct in India was submitted to parliamentary investigation. The fact of any such bequest having been made by Meer Jaffier was denied; and, supposing it had, the right of Clive to benefit by it, after the prohibition of the receipt of presents, was disputed. The bequest was certainly involved in some mystery: but those who had to pay the money do not appear to have objected; and if they had any personal object in heaping wealth upon Clive, they shewed great disinterestedness in renouncing the credit of their own liberality, and placing it to the account of a dead prince. In itself, moreover, the bequest was not altogether improbable. Meer Jaffier owed every thing to Clive; and when he reflected on the treatment which he had met from Clive's successors, as contrasted with that which he had experienced from the great European soldier, he might naturally be desirous of marking his sense of the difference by some indication of his gratitude to Clive. There seems nothing, therefore, in the circumstances of the case that could render the acceptance of the legacy dishonourable; and a covenant prohibiting presents could not, according to the letter, be applied to a testamentary bequest. There was little reason, however, for raising any question on the subject, as the acceptance and appropriation of the money were sanctioned by the Court of Directors, and as no part of it was applied by Clive to his own use, or to the benefit of his personal friends. If all his pecuniary transactions had been equally free from reproach, his memory in this respect would have stood clear of any imputation that could cast a shade upon it.

In April, 1766, in conformity with ancient custom, the nabob held his poonah, or annual court for the adjustment of the zemindary accounts. The forms proper to this anniversary were rigidly observed, and nothing was wanting of its accustomed state and splendour. The prince sat as nazim, and Clive, as the representative of the Company, appeared as dewan, or collector of the imperial revenues. Noojum-ad-Dowlah never assisted at another ceremony of like nature. In May he was seized with malignant fever, which his constitution and habits were little adapted to overcome, and which in a few days put an end to his life. His brother, Syef-ad-Dowlah, was placed on the throne, and the opportunity was embraced of effecting a considerable reduction in the royal expenditure.

Clive had regarded his mission to India as an extraordinary one, and from the first had meditated returning at no remote period. He had found less occasion for exertion than he could have anticipated, and the little that

remained for him to perform had been accomplished. Peace had been concluded with the vizier; the position of the Company and the nabob towards each other had been fixed, as well as that of both with regard to the emperor; the covenants against the receipt of presents had been enforced, and the inland trade—not prohibited, indeed, till the pleasure of the Court of Directors could be known—but regulated, according to Clive's views, with some regard to equity. There was thus little left for him to perform, and the state of his health rendered him anxious not to protract his stay in India. He had renewed the arrangements for carrying on the inland trade for a second year, in spite of the denunciations received from home; but at length the orders of the Court of Directors became too peremptory to be disregarded by a man whose friends were about to solicit for him further favours from the East-India Company; to whom, consequently, the influence of the governing body was important, and who could not decently appear as a candidate for reward in the character of a contumacious servant. One of the latest acts of Clive's government was to give orders for the abolition of the society of private trade from the period when the existing contracts expired. The despatch reporting this tardy act of obedience was dated the 24th January; and before the month expired, Clive quitted Bengal for ever. He had no reason to complain of the reception which awaited him at home. On being introduced to the Court of Directors, he received from the chairman a warm assurance of the approval and satisfaction of the court. In the general court his merits were acknowledged by a recommendation to grant to him and his representatives the enjoyment of his jaghire for an additional period of ten years, to commence from the expiration of the former term. The recommendation was adopted, and the grant formally made. As this gift must be regarded in the light of a reward for Clive's services during his last government, it is difficult to understand how he reconciled his acceptance of it with his often-repeated determination not to derive any pecuniary advantage from the appointment.

The public life of Clive may now be regarded as at an end. He was subsequently called upon to answer for much in which he had been culpable; and for some things in which he was blameless. These inquiries, for the most part, originated in factious and discreditable motives; neither the accusers nor the accused appear in a favourable light—personal hostility and political intrigue prompted the charges—while Clive, in repelling them, is no longer the soldier whose cannon had shaken the thrones of Hindostan to their foundations, nor the statesman who had raised a goodly edifice of British power upon their ruins—but occupies the undignified position of a man who, having amassed boundless wealth by means not always defensible, is resolved to struggle to the death

for its preservation. In India the very magnitude of Clive's errors gave them something of greatness—at home, apart from the imperishable wreath of military renown, which faction could not tear from his brow, there appears little to distinguish him from the mass of successful Indian fortune-hunters.

The reader who looks back upon the scenes through which he has been conducted, will at once perceive that it is on his military character that Clive's reputation must rest. All the qualities of a soldier were combined in him, and each so admirably proportioned to the rest, that none predominated to the detriment of any other. His personal courage enabled him to acquire a degree of influence over his troops which has rarely been equalled, and which in India was before his time unknown; and this, united with the cool and consummate judgment by which his daring energy was controlled and regulated, enabled him to effect conquests which, if they had taken place in remote times, would be regarded as incredible. Out of materials the most unpromising he had to create the instruments for effecting these conquests, and he achieved his object where all men but himself might have despaired. No one can dwell upon the more exciting periods of his history without catching some portion of the ardour which led him through these stirring scenes; no one who loves the country for which he fought can recall them to memory without mentally breathing "Honour to the name of Clive." In India his fame is greater even than at home, and that fame is not his merely—it is his country's.

Well had it been for Clive, well had it been for the country which he so nobly served, if his brilliant qualities as a soldier had not been alloyed by any base admixture. It was not to be expected that he should be exempt from all touch of human weakness, but his failings were such as could scarcely have been believed to co-exist with the admirable military virtues which he possessed and exercised. They were not the splendid infirmities of an aspiring spirit, but the mean propensities which might be thought incompatible with greatness of mind. In the field, daring, self-denying, and self-devoted, Clive seemed a miracle of chivalrous valour—but the hero was assumed and cast off with the occasion; and he whose noble bearing fixed the admiration of nations, and decided the fortune of thrones, could descend to the exercise of trickery and rapacity equal to that of the banyan, so accurately and powerfully depicted by himself in one of his parliamentary speeches. While history preserves the name of Omichund, the reputation of Clive must labour under a foul and fearful blot; while men remember the means by which his princely fortune was accumulated, their admiration of his genius and courage will be qualified, in gentler minds by a feeling of pity for his weakness, in those of sterner cast by indignation and scorn. Clive spoke of the love of wealth as one of the master passions of the

human heart, and his conduct leads to the belief that, in this instance, he was no cold rhetorician—that he spoke as he felt. He was enslaved by the demon to whose power he bore witness, and the effects of his thralldom are discernible in almost every action of his life. Grasping in India gold, jewels, and jaghire, with more than Oriental avidity—communicating secret intelligence to his agents at home to enable them to make favourable bargains in India stock—every where private interest and plans for self-aggrandisement are mixed up with the highest public objects. Yet while truth requires that his undue appetite for wealth be noted, justice demands that it be at the same time recorded that this passion, powerful as it was, never interfered with his duty to his country. When his personal interest and the honour of the British name were opposed, he could, apparently without an effort, expel from his breast the ravening spirit which usually possessed it, and cast the darling passion of his soul a willing offering at the shrine of patriotism. When he determined to resist by force the hostile demonstrations of the Dutch, the greater part of his fortune was in their hands. He thought not of this; or, if the thought occurred, it was only to be despised. Clive, indeed, loved wealth too well,

but he loved his country better. A mind sometimes soaring so far above the level of human nature, and sometimes sinking so much below it, is rarely to be found.

As a statesman, Clive's vision was clear, but not extensive. He could promptly and adroitly adapt his policy to the state of things which he found existing; but none of his acts display any extraordinary political sagacity. Turning from his claims in a field where his talents command but a moderate degree of respect, and where the means by which he sometimes sought to serve the state and sometimes to promote his own interests give rise to a very different feeling, it is due to one to whom his country is so deeply indebted, to close the narrative of his career by recurring once more to that part of his character which may be contemplated with unmixed satisfaction. As a soldier he was pre-eminently great. With the name of Clive commences the flood of glory which has rolled on till it has covered the wide face of India with memorials of British valour. By Clive was formed the base of the column which a succession of heroes, well worthy to follow in his steps, have carried upward to a towering height, and surrounded with trophies of honour, rich, brilliant, and countless.

CHAPTER VII.

EXPEDITION TO MANILLA—RISE OF HYDER ALI—HOSTILITIES BETWEEN HYDER ALI AND THE ENGLISH—ALTERNATE SUCCESSSES AND DEFEATS—DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENGLISH—HYDER ALI APPEARS BEFORE MADRAS, AND GRANTS PEACE ON FAVOURABLE TERMS.

SOON after the British possessions on the coast of Coromandel had been placed in some degree of security by the reduction of Pondicherry and the annihilation of the French interests in the Carnatic, the ministers of the crown projected an expedition against Manilla, a Spanish settlement, and the capital of the Phillippine Islands. The East-India Company were invited to aid in this object, and the government of Madras, in consequence, furnished about two thousand men for the purpose. General Lawrence remonstrated against the draft of so large a force, which he thought inconsistent with the safety of the British interests on the coast; but his opinion was overruled. Part of the force left Madras at the latter end of July, 1762, and the remainder in the beginning of August, several civil servants of the Company accompanying, to take possession of the anticipated conquests. The land forces engaged in the expedition were commanded by General Draper, the naval force by Admiral Cornish. The operations against Manilla occupied twelve days, when it was taken by storm with very trivial loss. Articles were subsequently signed by the British commanders and the Spanish authorities, by which the private property of the inhabitants was secured, and the Spanish officers admitted to parole. On the other hand,

all the dependencies of Manilla were to be surrendered, as well as all military stores, and a sum amounting to about a million sterling to be paid by way of ransom, one-half immediately. Manilla was restored to Spain at the general peace in the following year, and neither the East-India Company nor the British derived much advantage from the capture. That peace also restored to the French their former possessions on the continent of India—a most unwise concession on the part of the British negotiators, who ought to have been more alive to the interests of their own countrymen in the East than to suffer their intriguing and restless neighbours to regain the means of assailing them.

In the meantime the government of Madras had been engaged in assisting Mahomed Ali in reducing several rebellious vassals to obedience. The object was effected with a tolerable degree of ease, except in the case of Madura, which was held in opposition to his master by Mahamed Iscoof, formerly a distinguished, and it was believed an attached, follower of the English. The siege of Madura was both tedious and expensive; but it ultimately fell, and Mahomed Iscoof paid the ordinary penalty of rebellion in the surrender of his life.

Another subject, which threatened to disturb

the peace of that part of India, was a dispute between Mahomed Ali and the sovereign of Tanjore, relating to the repairs of a mound by which the waters of the river Cavery were protected. By the mediation of the British government the quarrel was arranged, and this cause of hostility removed.

But the energies of the British government were not long to be expended solely in reducing dependent chiefs to obedience, or arranging personal disputes between princes of greater dignity and dominion. A man of comparatively obscure origin was rising into notice, and gradually increasing that power which subsequently swept over a large portion of the south of India with the rapidity and withering influence of a destructive meteor. Hyder, the new candidate for conquest and dominion, has already been mentioned as affording temporary assistance to the French cause at Pondicherry. He was the son of a man who had held the dignity of a foudjar, but who, in one of those revolutions which are of such frequent occurrence in India, had lost his life—an event followed by the plunder of his family of all that they possessed. At this time Hyder was not more than seven years of age. His advance towards manhood gave little indication of future greatness, and for some time after he had reached the period of maturity his life was totally devoted to pleasure. The sports of the field occupied a large portion of his time, the remainder was surrendered to voluptuous enjoyments. He had an elder brother, who at an early period of life had obtained military employment in the service of Mysore. It was not till Hyder had completed his twenty-seventh year that he entered upon a similar course of life, by joining his brother's corps as a volunteer. Here he soon distinguished himself by the display of extraordinary courage, and of a degree of coolness and self-possession not less admirable. In time he advanced to the command of a body of freebooters whom he had collected around him, who might, says Colonel Wilks, "well be characterised as brave and faithful thieves. In the ordinary circumstances of a campaign," it is added, "they more than realized the charges of their establishment by a variety of plunder and simple theft from friends, when the enemy did not offer convenient means." Hyder thus commenced his march to empire in the same manner as the distinguished founder of the Maharrattas, and his little band followed their avocation with a zeal, spirit, and success, not inferior to that displayed by the adherents of the illustrious Sevajee. In the confusion that ensued on the death of Nazir Jung, these adventurers, bold, faithful, and furtive, managed to mix with the crowd near the treasure of the deceased prince, which the treasurer had begun to load on the first alarm. But the caution and promptitude of the officer did not prevent the separation of two camels loaded with gold coin, which before order was restored were clear of the outposts, and considerably advanced on their way towards the

head-quarters of Hyder. Horses, muskets, and other spoil, of inferior note, travelled in the same direction. Subsequently the number of Hyder's predatory troops was considerably increased, and with the aid of a brahmin, distinguished by his proficiency alike in calculation and in all the arts of crooked policy, a plan was devised for the regular organization and government of this extraordinary force, so as at once to promote their active devotion to the service and to secure to their chief a great proportion of the fruits of their ingenuity and daring. The men, besides their direct pay, were to receive one half the booty which was realized; the remainder was appropriated to Hyder, and its faithful delivery secured by a system of checks which rendered it nearly impossible to defraud the captain of his due. Under these excellent arrangements the trade of Hyder flourished wonderfully; his power and his resources increased; his stock of elephants, camels, tents, and equipments, enabled him to vie in this respect with the great chiefs in the state of Mysore; and finally he was admitted to rank with them by being nominated foudjar of Dindigul, with a right to all the incidents attendant on the appointment. Hyder proceeded, at the head of a considerable force, to suppress a confederacy formed by the Polygars in the neighbourhood to resist the payment of tribute, and he succeeded. The news of his success was conveyed to court in terms which did not diminish its importance, nor veil the difficulties which the victorious commander had surmounted; and the despatch was closed by a formidable list of killed and wounded. So satisfactory was the intelligence, and so great the admiration felt for the commander and his troops, that a special messenger was despatched, with rich presents for the officers who had distinguished themselves, and a sum of money to be applied to the relief of the wounded men. To guard against imposition (for it was felt that precaution was not unnecessary), an inspection was to take place. The actual number of wounded was sixty-seven. Hyder thought that the honour of his arms required that the return which he had made should be supported. To effect this he caused to be mingled with the real sufferers seven hundred men, whose limbs, though uninjured, were enveloped in bandages of formidable size, and these passed muster just as well as the rest. The allowance which the commissioner was authorized to distribute was at the rate of fourteen rupees per month for each man till cured. An estimate was made by the surgeons in attendance of the probable time that the cure of each would require, and according to the estimate and the muster the money was paid. The liberality of Hyder bestowed on each of the really wounded seven rupees per month, being one half of the amount which he received—what he gave to those who masqueraded for his honour and profit is not stated, but it may be hoped that he did not leave them altogether without reward. The

distribution of the presents to the officers was made on the same principle as the donation to the wounded. While Hyder was thus employed, his faithful brahmin remained at court, sometimes sounding the praises of his master, sometimes dwelling on the difficulties of his situation, and urging the necessity of increasing his force. Augmentations were accordingly authorized from time to time, and assignments of revenue made for the support of the new levies. Special commissioners were always deputed to watch the musters, but the adroitness of Hyder frustrated their vigilance. On one occasion he performed a manœuvre termed, by a native who witnessed it, "a circular muster," the result of which was, that ten thousand men were counted and passed as eighteen thousand.

Hyder continued to rise, and circumstances favoured his elevation. A mutiny broke out in the Mysorean army, and he was the instrument of suppressing it. On this occasion he made the opportune discovery that some of the richest chiefs were among the ringleaders. Their wealth, by a severe but necessary act of justice, was declared forfeited; and it need not be doubted that the coffers of Hyder benefited by this act, as well as the treasury of his master. An opulent chief, named Herri Sing, had been despatched to collect revenue in Malabar. Failing to effect his object, and entertaining a rooted dislike to Hyder, now one of the most powerful persons in the court of Mysore, Herri Sing was negotiating to enter the service of Tanjore. While thus engaged, he was unexpectedly attacked in the dead of night by a body of about three thousand men despatched by Hyder. The chief and a large portion of his men fell, and the plunder was of great value. Hyder presented to his sovereign three guns and fifteen horses—the remainder he bestowed on himself. About the same time, by pressing his services on the notice of the court, Hyder obtained the district of Bangalore as a personal jaghire. A demonstration on the part of the Mahrattas afforded opportunity for the further display of Hyder's talents for rising in the state. The army was ordered to march to resist the incursion; but most of the chiefs represented that they were unable to obey the order, in consequence of the arrears of pay. Hyder, who knew that the amount of arrears due to the men was very small, liberally offered to become responsible for it; he was thereupon nominated to the chief command of the field army. The appointment was so disagreeable to the chiefs of ancient family, that many of them resigned their commands. Hyder was successful in reducing the Mahrattas to propose terms. The payment to them of a sum of money, in redemption of some districts formerly ceded in pledge, was one of the conditions; and Hyder, with the aid of his confidential brahmin, procured the means of fulfilling it. He then returned in triumph to Seringapatam, where he was received with a degree of distinction far from usual, and with a demon-

stration of enthusiasm perhaps unprecedented in an Oriental court. "Nunjeraj," says Colonel Wilks, "paid him the novel compliment of rising on his approach and embracing him, apparently proud of this public justification of his own discernment in the elevation of Hyder."

But neither the warmth of the minister's friendship, nor the favours which he had bestowed upon Hyder, precluded the latter from intriguing against his benefactor. Nunjeraj had long exercised uncontrolled all the authority of the state. The rajah and his family were disgusted by his arrogance, but distrustful of their own power to remove him. The means were suggested by the widow of a deceased relative of the royal house, in conjunction with Hyder's wily brahmin: Hyder, it will be justly concluded, was to play an important part in the project, and derive the greater share of the advantage in the event of its success. The grievance, ever occurring in Oriental armies, of unliquidated arrears of pay, was to afford the means of accomplishing the object. Some chiefs were admitted to such a portion of the confidence of the conspirators as was necessary to render them proper instruments of their wishes, but no more; and their troops in consequence proceeded to Hyder's quarters, and demanded payment of their arrears. Hyder, with great mildness and apparent sympathy, replied, that his own corps, for which he possessed fixed resources, was regularly paid, but that he had no concern with the funds out of which the pay of the rest of the army ought to be defrayed. The applicants then requested that he would obtain payment for them from the person whose duty it was to see their claims discharged—that person being Nunjeraj. Hyder could not refuse his good offices to procure justice to his companions in arms, but nothing followed. The visits of the troops were repeated till their patience was at an end; when they insisted on Hyder going at their head to perform a superstitious ceremony called *dhurna*, with a view of extorting from the fears of Nunjeraj that redress which they were unable to obtain by other means. Hyder expressed great repugnance; but fear of the mutineers, or some other motive, induced him to comply. Nunjeraj had gained some knowledge of the interviews between the dowager and the brahmin. The presence of Hyder as chief actor in the *dhurna* unlocked the mystery; and Nunjeraj shrunk from a contest with a man whose greatness he believed was destined to be raised on the ruins of his own. An interview between the late friends took place, and the descent of Nunjeraj from the seat of power was arranged. The vanquished minister presented himself to the troops, and informed them that the misfortunes of his government had determined him to bow to the decrees of fate; that the rajah had accordingly assumed the principal direction of his own affairs, with the express view of permitting the retirement of his servant; that all his arrangements were made for

rendering his accounts and resigning his office, and that under these circumstances it was unjust to hold him responsible for any pecuniary claim upon the rajah's treasury. The effect of this explanation had not been left to chance. Some of the soldiers, duly trained, called out to remove the *dhurna* to the gate of the rajah. The proposal was received with acclamations; the steps of the discontented troops were directed to the palace, and Hyder, less unwilling than before, was compelled to lead them.

At the palace the business of the scene had been pre-arranged with much attention. A messenger came out and requested that Koonde Row, the ever active brahmin, might be sent to communicate with the rajah. The brahmin went, and returned with a promise from the rajah to find means of satisfying the demands of the troops, on condition that Hyder should take a solemn oath to renounce all connection with the usurper, Nunjeraj. Hyder, deeply affected by the command to abandon his friend, pretended not to conceal the pain which it gave him; but he took the oath, and thereupon was admitted to an audience of the sovereign. He returned and informed the troops that to complete the arrangements for satisfying their claims would require a few days, but in the mean time he tendered his personal responsibility as security. This was readily accepted, and the tumultuous crowd disappeared. To enable Hyder to discharge the obligation thus incurred, additional assignments of revenue were made to him, and the territories under his administration thus came to exceed half of the entire dominions of the rajah.

It was soon after he had reached this elevation of power that he despatched a force to assist the French at Pondicherry, as already mentioned. The main cause of the precipitate retirement of that force, was the danger which threatened his newly acquired greatness from the jealousy and discontent of those by whose aid he had acquired it. The female contriver of the plot perceived that the only effect of the removal of Nunjeraj had been to invest a more dangerous man with the same plenitude of power which had been exercised by the deposed minister. The brahmin, who had been appointed to the office of dewan, began to regard the encroachments of his late patron with some degree of distaste. The two persons who not long before had raised Hyder to his lofty position, now conspired to pluck him down, and advantage was taken of the absence of a large part of his troops. Hyder was cantoned under the fire of the garrison of Seringapatam, with about one hundred horse and fifteen hundred infantry, and notwithstanding his usual caution, was unsuspecting of the storm that was gathering around him. He was only awakened to a knowledge of it by a tremendous cannonade from all the works that bore on his position. His first impulse was to send for his friend the brahmin—he was informed that the person whose presence he

sought was on the works directing the fire of the artillery. The attack upon Hyder was to have been aided by six thousand Mahrattas, but they, "according to custom, did not arrive at the appointed time." Some communications took place between Hyder and the rajah's dewan, and it is said that the brahmin pointed out the way to retreat, and left the spot unguarded, that Hyder might retire in safety. However this may be, Hyder did retire with his cavalry and a portion of his treasure. His family were left behind, and these with the infantry and considerable property fell into the hands of his enemies. The soldier of fortune was now again thrown upon the world. It would be inconsistent with the design of this sketch to follow in detail his various movements, but one was too extraordinary and characteristic to be passed over. Having been defeated by a force commanded by his former friend the brahmin, he suddenly presented himself alone and unarmed as a suppliant at the door of Nunjeraj. Being admitted to the presence of the retired minister, Hyder threw himself at his feet, and in strains of grief and penitence besought of him forgiveness. All the misfortunes that had thronged on him he professed to regard as the just punishment of his ingratitude to his kind and generous patron, whom he implored to resume his place at the head of the state, and to receive his old servant once more under his protection. Nunjeraj was not without experience of the value of such protestations, and of the sincerity of his friend; but he afforded a fresh instance of the influence which men's wishes exercise over their understanding. He consented to make common cause with Hyder, to aid him with a considerable body of horse and foot which he had collected during his seclusion, and to give to the man to whose treachery he owed his descent from power all the benefit of his name and influence. Hyder made use of the former without reserve. Some time after his reconciliation with Nunjeraj, being closely pressed by the brahmin Koonde Row, he forged letters in the name and with the seal of his ally addressed to the principal leaders in the army of his enemy. These referred to an engagement assumed to have been made for the delivery of Koonde Row into the hands of Nunjeraj, promised on the part of the latter the reward alleged to be agreed upon, and intimated that nothing now remained but for the conspirators to earn it. The bearer of these letters was made prisoner, as was intended, and his charge placed in the hands of the general. The success of the forgery was equal to that of Hyder's feigned penitence. Koonde Row was completely deceived; he mounted his horse and rode at full speed to the capital, without deigning to hold any intercourse with the suspected chiefs. The flight of the general under any circumstances is calculated to spread panic through his army; it was in this case the more alarming, as the cause could not even be conjectured. The thoughts of every one were

turned to his own safety, and when dismay and confusion had attained a sufficient height, Hyder fell upon his enemy's army in front and rear and gained a complete and easy victory.

Hyder now vigorously applied himself to destroy the remnants of the royal army and to strengthen his own. He was soon in a condition to dictate terms to the rajah. The arrangement actually concluded gave to the successful adventurer every thing but the title of sovereign. Districts sufficient to provide a moderate revenue for the personal expenses of the rajah and Nunjeraj were reserved for those purposes; the entire management of the remainder of the country and all the functions of government were transferred to Hyder. Koond Row was surrendered to the conqueror, who imprisoned him in an iron cage.

Hyder's honours now flowed thickly upon him. For some services rendered to Basalat Jung in the reduction of a small fort, and in consideration of a present of no great amount, that potentate created Hyder nabob of Sera, although he had neither possession nor right in respect to the country bestowed. The new nabob was designated as Hyder Ali Khan Bahadur, and thenceforth used those appellations. Having asserted his right to the dignity conferred upon him, by reducing the countries from which his title was derived, he engaged in an invasion of Bednore, for the alleged purpose of restoring to the throne a youth who pretended to have been unjustly excluded from it. In his progress he rarely met resistance, and when so unusual a circumstance occurred it was requited by severity calculated to discourage its repetition. A hundred men occupying a small fort ventured to fire on his troops. They were surrounded and taken, and so far nothing occurred which they might not have expected; but after being made prisoners their temerity was punished by cutting off their noses and ears, and in this state they were dismissed to spread the terror of the invader's army. Four, twelve, and eighteen lacs of pagodas were successively offered to purchase Hyder's retreat, but in vain. He penetrated to the capital of the province, a place which it is said previously formed a happy exception to the common lot of India, in having no experience of the horrors of war. The palace and treasury were set on fire by their inmates, and the inhabitants of the town fled to the woods and mountains for security. The flames of the palace were subdued in time to save much that was valuable to the victor, and the troops, who had begun to pillage the city, were taught to respect the superior claims of the giant plunderer whom they served. In a few hours the door of every dwelling above the condition of a hovel was secured by the official seal of Hyder Ali, and respect for this stamp of authority maintained by a suitable guard. Within the town, which was about eight miles in circumference, were stored the accumulations of many years of extensive and profitable commerce, and the most moderate

estimate of the amount of plunder realized by Hyder Ali fixes it at twelve millions sterling. This vast treasure secured, the conqueror dropped the mask under which the war had been carried on, and assumed his natural character. A former rajah had left the throne to an adopted son, constituting the ranees or queen his guardian during the period of his minority. The widow formed a criminal attachment, which was manifestly so publicly as to outrage decorum not less than morality; and the young rajah having remarked on her frailty somewhat too freely, his reproofs were silenced by the hand of an assassin. The person whom Hyder had taken under his protection pretended to be the rajah who had been thus removed, and ascribed his escape to the mercy of the man employed to dispatch him, by whom he represented himself as having been secreted during five years. It is not probable that Hyder Ali ever gave credence to the tale, but it suited his purpose to affect belief in it. That purpose being answered by the conquest of Bednore, the pretended prince was sent a close prisoner to a fortress a hundred and eighty miles to the eastward of the capital. His confinement was solaced by the company of the ranees, her paramour, and a child, whom they had placed on the throne after the murder of its lawful occupant. Hyder Ali did not enjoy his conquest without molestation. While labouring under an attack of ague, a disorder common in the country, a confederacy was formed to dispossess and assassinate him. It was detected, and three hundred of the conspirators hanged. After this operation, it is stated that Hyder Ali's health visibly improved.

Subsequently, Hyder Ali suffered severely in contests with the Mahrattas, and was at length shut up within the lines of Bednore. He succeeded in obtaining peace on terms not unfavourable, considered with regard to his situation; and having quelled various manifestations of insurrection, which his late unprosperous circumstances had encouraged in different parts of his dominions, his restless and aggressive spirit was turned to the conquest of Malabar. The operations of Hyder Ali were there marked by the same character which distinguished the course of his arms elsewhere—the most odious perfidy, the most oppressive extortion, and the most intolerable cruelty. He succeeded in overrunning the country and procuring a nominal submission to his authority, after which he returned to Seringapatam. The rajah had died while Hyder was absent in Malabar, but this was too trivial a circumstance to interrupt the conqueror in his career. He sent orders for securing the succession to the eldest son of the deceased prince, with as much indifference as if the subject of his instructions had been the appointment of a domestic servant. On his return, he went through the form of rendering homage to the prisoner, whom he called his sovereign; but, at the same time, he resumed

the districts which had been allotted for the support of the rajah, and plundered the palace of all the money and articles of value which it contained. So complete was the latter operation, that nothing worth carrying away escaped the hands of the pillagers, except such of the ornaments of the female inmates as they happened to have upon their persons when the clearance took place. As the rajah was now a pensioner upon Hyder Ali, his establishments were subjected to a rigorous revision, so as to reduce the expenditure to the lowest possible amount, and none were permitted to have access to the prince but the creatures of his keeper.

The politics of the Deccan at this period, and for some years preceding the return of Hyder Ali to Mysore, present an entangled web, of which it is scarcely practicable to render a clear account.

Some intercourse had taken place between Hyder and the government of Bombay, which on the whole was not of an unfriendly character. On his return to Seringapatam, however, he found the government of Madras in league with Nizam Ali against him. The principal events connected with this alliance may be related in a few words; the appropriation of a volume to the object would not afford the means of giving a satisfactory and lucid exposition of their causes, or of the motives of the actors engaged in them. It may be doubted whether the persons then forming the British government of Madras understood their own policy; and it is quite certain that to all others it must ever remain inexplicable.

The possession of the districts called the Northern Circars was an object, for various reasons, desirable to the English. Salabat Jung, Nizam Ali, and Basalat Jung, the three brothers who contended for sovereignty in the Deccan, had all tendered these provinces as the price of assistance; but a desire not to enter into Indian politics further than necessary rendered the government of Madras unwilling to accept the proffered gift from any of them. In the contest for supreme power in the Deccan, the fortune of Nizam Ali finally prevailed, and Salabat Jung became his prisoner. With the reigning prince the British government continued to maintain a negotiation singularly vague in its character, till they were assured that the title of Nizam Ali had been confirmed by the emperor. They then ventured to take an assignment of the management of the Circars from the former on the terms of a division of the profits. When Nizam Ali concluded this arrangement he was in fear of the Mahrattas; having concluded a truce with those troublesome enemies, he proceeded unceremoniously to annul the agreement with the English government, who patiently submitted. Negotiation was renewed, but without effect, and the coveted districts were committed to the charge of a person named Houssein Ali, by whom they had before been rented. The circumstances

in which the country had for some time been placed had naturally produced the greatest anarchy and confusion. The authority of Houssein Ali was, therefore, little more than nominal; and to prevent the intrusion of the French, the British government, in 1765, agreed to aid him in establishing his authority. Part of the detachment destined for this service was sent; the march of the remainder was stopped by the advance of Nizam Ali with a considerable force to attack the nabob. But the resolution of the invader failed on learning that the English were preparing to meet him, and after indulging himself in some plundering operations he retired, dispatched a friendly letter to the British governor, and sent him a present of an elephant. The letter and the elephant effected their object, and the government of Madras proceeded to extend their promised aid to Houssein Ali as if nothing extraordinary had happened. This took place in the year that Clive last returned to India, and in the course of the negotiation conducted by him with the emperor, he, at the request of the Madras authorities, obtained sunnuds, bestowing on the Company the Northern Circars, to be held immediately of the imperial government. The sunnuds were transmitted to Madras, but the government of that presidency hesitated to use them till Bengal should be "quiet," unless under Nizam Ali's confirmation of them, alleging that it was not material to enter on possession till the following year, as Houssein Ali had anticipated the revenues, and that little more could be obtained than he had secured to the Company. Of the validity of the last reason for forbearance, it is impossible to judge; but no difficulty exists with regard to that by which it is preceded. Bengal had not for many years been so "quiet" as it then was, and the project of calling upon a dependent to confirm the gift of his superior is too absurd to merit even exposure. At length, in March, 1766, the government of Madras took courage to give publicity to the grant from the emperor, and General Calliaud was dispatched with a military force to support the authority of the grantees. Still they could not divest themselves of the impression that it was necessary to secure the consent of Nizam Ali. They were finally gratified by the conclusion of a treaty, by which the occupation of the Northern Circars by the English was made subject to the payment of a considerable tribute: one of the Circars being bestowed as a jaghire on Basalat Jung, was not to be occupied till his death. By the same treaty the English government became bound to support Nizam Ali against his enemies; and as, at the time when it was concluded, it was well understood that he was about, in conjunction with the Mahrattas, to attack Mysore, the careful and sagacious diplomatists who then administered the government of Madras, in their anxiety to avoid giving offence, actually plunged their country into difficulties and dangers far greater

than were likely to be incurred by a bolder and more consistent policy.

The Mahrattas were foremost in advancing to the attack of Mysore. To stop their progress, Hyder Ali gave orders to lay waste the country, to break down the embankments of the reservoirs, to poison the wells, to burn the forage, to bury the grain, and to drive off the cattle. The dreadful devastation thus caused did not, however, stop the progress of the invaders. They advanced to Sera, where Meer Sahib, the brother-in-law of Hyder Ali, was stationed with a considerable force. The Mahrattas proposed terms to this officer, which he accepted, and surrendered, together with his own character for fidelity, the fort and district which it was his duty to have defended. Alarmed by his defection, Hyder Ali had recourse to negotiation; and, as the retreat of the Mahrattas is always purchasable, he was relieved from their presence by submitting to a considerable draft upon his treasury.

While the negotiations between Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas were going on, the army of Nizam Ali and that of the English were advancing to form a junction on the northern frontier of Mysore. The junction was effected; but, from the moment of its taking place, the English commander, Colonel Joseph Smith, saw much to excite suspicion. Like the Mahrattas, Nizam Ali was bought off by Hyder Ali: and, not content with deserting the English, whom he had ensnared to his support, he united his forces with those of Hyder Ali in hostility to them. The government of Madras were slow in giving credit to the defection of their ally, and their infatuation seems to have been unaccountable. "Although," says Colonel Smith, "it was as plain as noon day to every person except the council that" Hyder Ali and Nizam Ali "were preparing to enter the Carnatic jointly, no measures were taken to establish magazines of provisions in proper places, nor any steps to supply our army in time of need;" and only three days before the invasion actually took place, that officer was directed to pass to the enemy a supply of provisions, of which his own troops were in the greatest want.

Although Colonel Smith had no doubt of the intentions of Hyder Ali and the nizam, his want of acquaintance with the country subjected him to surprise. On the 26th August, some cattle belonging to the English army were driven off, and the cavalry hastily moving out to recover them, found themselves attacked by very superior numbers, who charged them into the very lines of the encampment. The loss of men was considerable, and the loss of cattle was a severe misfortune to a force very insufficiently provided with the necessities of a campaign.

A corps of British troops from Trichinopoly, under Colonel Wood, was advancing, and Colonel Smith's movements were directed towards forming a junction with this body. On his way he was attacked, on the 3rd September, by Hyder Ali, with a large force; but the attack was ill conducted, and ended in the complete

rout of the confederates. Colonel Smith estimated the loss of the enemy at two thousand; his own was not more than one hundred and seventy killed and wounded. The victory was complete; but the want of provisions previously felt had been exaggerated by the loss, during the action, of the small quantity of rice in store. Apprehensive of another attack while in this desperate condition, Colonel Smith moved with all speed towards Trinomally, where he arrived on the day after the battle, his troops having been without either refreshment or rest for twenty-seven hours. Here, on the 8th September, he was joined by Colonel Wood.

At Trinomally, Colonel Smith had been led to believe that he should find abundance of stores. The expectation was miserably disappointed, and he was almost immediately obliged to remove his troops to the eastward in search of food, leaving his sick and wounded and his military stores in Trinomally. The enemy made a show of attacking that place, but withdrew on the return of Colonel Smith, on the 14th, with a small supply of provisions. These were exhausted in two days, and another excursion for food became necessary. While the English army was thus depending for its daily bread almost on the chance of the day, the difficulty of procuring it was increased by the ravages of above forty thousand horse in the service of the enemy, and the suffering of want aggravated by the inclemency of the weather. In these gloomy circumstances, a council of war unanimously declared their conviction of the expediency of withdrawing the troops into cantonments, but the authorities of the presidency refused their consent. Indeed, nothing but the most dire necessity could have justified such a step; but it had been well if the government, who insisted upon the army remaining in the field under circumstances of so much discouragement and distress, had made some slight provision to render it effective.

The enemy were aware of the distress which prevailed in the English army, and they deferred an attack till the effect of long-continued and aggravated privation should increase the probability of success. Colonel Smith, however, had succeeded in discovering some considerable stores of grain which had been subterraneously concealed. This happy accident increased the efficiency of his troops for the conflict which was approaching. On the 26th of September the enemy ventured to commence a distant cannonade upon Colonel Smith's left from sixteen of their heaviest pieces. Colonel Smith made a movement from his right, round a hill which concealed the great body of the confederated army from his view, for the purpose of turning or coming in contact with their left. The enemy observing this movement, and concluding that it was made in retreat, put their troops in motion, for the purpose of crossing and intercepting the English column. The two armies were thus marching round the hill at the same time, each concealed from the view of the other, although in a very short space of

time their meeting was inevitable. When it took place the surprise was reciprocal. The first struggle was for the possession of the hill. It was secured for the English by the exertions of Captain Cooke; and some rocks, forming a position of considerable strength, were wrested from a large body of the enemy's infantry. When the troops were drawn up in order of battle, the contrast between the numbers was striking. The English force consisted of fourteen hundred European infantry, thirty European cavalry, nine thousand sepoye, and fifteen hundred exceedingly bad native cavalry belonging to Mahomed Ali. The numbers of the enemy cannot be ascertained with equal accuracy, but they have been computed at seventy thousand, of which more than half were cavalry. These were drawn up in a crescent, half encircling the British force, and seemingly sufficient to overwhelm them. The enemy had about one hundred pieces of cannon, but not more than thirty could be brought into action. The English had about the latter number, which being steadily and skilfully served, nearly silenced those opposed to them. The guns were then turned upon the dense and frowning masses of the enemy's cavalry. For a few minutes the fire was sustained with a sullen calmness, and the horsemen appeared to be in expectation of orders to charge. None were given—to sit inactive and unmoved amidst the deadly havoc produced by the well-directed fire of the English was beyond their power of endurance, and myriads of flying cavalry soon covered the field in every direction. Hyder, who had for some time perceived that all was lost, now drew off his cannon, and urged Nizam Ali to take the same course; but the courage of the soubahdar at this moment raged at more than fever heat, and he declared that he would meet the death of Nasir Jung, rather than save his life by dishonourable flight. The advance of the British army in line abated his energy, and he gave orders for the guns to be withdrawn. The elephants bearing the women of his establishment were in the rear, and these too were ordered to turn. A soft voice from the covered vehicle borne by one of them exclaimed, "This elephant has not been taught so to turn, he follows the standard of the empire." The English shot fell thick and heavy around, but the feminine champion of the honour of the empire would not suffer her elephant to be turned till the standard had passed, when she withdrew followed by her train. Nizam Ali was less fastidious in reference to such minute points of honour. True, he had invoked the fate of Nasir Jung in preference to dishonourable retreat; but within an hour after this burst of chivalrous feeling, he and a select body of cavalry were galloping to the westward, the superintendence of the retreat of his army being a duty unworthy of his royal attention. On the following day the confederated army was observed at a distance in full retreat; but a train of forty-one pieces of artillery was thought

not too far advanced to be beyond the possibility of capture. The attempt was made, and succeeded. Nine pieces had been taken on the preceding day, and fourteen more were subsequently secured. The loss of the English was one hundred and fifty men; that of the enemy was believed to exceed four thousand. The defeat of the allies had the effect of clearing the country of various parties which had been employed in ravaging it, and had plundered almost to the gates of Madras.

The rainy season approaching, the British troops were withdrawn into cantonments. Hyder Ali, however, allowed not any repose to himself or his troops. Having gained possession of Tripatore and Vaniambaddy, two places of inconsiderable value, he proceeded to attack Amboor, a place of some strength, situated on the summit of a mountain of smooth granite. It was defended by Captain Calvert, an officer of distinguished bravery. In five days, Hyder Ali had so completely dismantled the lower fort, that it was no longer tenable; and Captain Calvert, with a garrison of five hundred sepoye and a few Europeans, retired to the citadel. The native governor being discovered to be in correspondence with the enemy, was placed in confinement, and his men disarmed. This proceeding disconcerted Hyder Ali's plans. He still, however, prosecuted the siege, and effected a practicable breach, but, fortunately for the besieged, in a part which was inaccessible. After many abortive attempts to surprise the place, Hyder Ali sent a flag of truce to summon the garrison, and the opportunity was taken of bestowing a florid eulogium on the brave defence which had been made. The answer of the blunt soldier to whom it was addressed was, that Hyder Ali had not yet offered him an opportunity of deserving the compliment. Another flag arrived, with the offer of a large bribe and the command of half Hyder Ali's army as the price of the surrender of the citadel. Captain Calvert, in reply, advised Hyder Ali to respect the lives of his servants, as the future hearer of any similar message would immediately be hanged in the breach. Hyder Ali had commenced operations against Amboor on the 10th November. His movements had called the British army from their cantonments; and when Colonel Smith, on the 7th December, arrived in sight of Amboor, he had the satisfaction of perceiving the British flag still flying there. The government marked their approbation of the conduct of the garrison, by directing the rock of Amboor to be borne upon their colours.

On the approach of the British army, Hyder Ali retired, followed by Colonel Smith, when that officer was not compelled to halt by the want of provisions. Colonel Wood, who had advanced from Trichinopoly, joined Colonel Smith, without an effort on the part of the enemy to prevent it. Hyder Ali however made some occasional demonstrations of activity. He moved in person with four thousand horse, two thousand foot, and five guns, to attack a

convoy, under Major Fitzgerald, at the pass of Singarepatta. The object of the movement was discovered in time to admit of strengthening the English force, and the attack failed. At the close of the year, he ascended the Ghauts with his numerous force, having left a body of cavalry to watch and annoy the British army. At this time the English force, having been two days without rations, was compelled to move in an opposite direction in quest of supplies.

Depressed by the reverses which had attended his arms, and alarmed by an expedition despatched from Bengal, which threatened the safety of Hyderabad, Nizam Ali had, early in the month of December, opened a secret communication with Colonel Smith. In the department of intelligence, the arrangements of Hyder Ali were perfect, and he was soon apprized of what had taken place. Intimating to Nizam Ali that he was not unacquainted with his advances to the English, Hyder Ali affected not to be displeased, but to consider the step as a necessary measure of the temporizing policy it was desirable to maintain, till a favourable opportunity should arise for reuniting the Mussulman interests in strength sufficient to expel the infidels from the Deccan. He suggested, however, the expediency of separating the two armies. Nizam Ali immediately acted on the suggestion, by moving to the northward, and on the same day he sent an officer openly to the English camp. Colonel Smith recommended a mission to the presidency, and eventually a treaty was concluded, to which the Nabob, Mahomet Ali, was also a party. The weakness of the government of Madras was here again visible, for, after they had reduced their enemy to sue for peace, they consented to become his annual tributaries to no inconsiderable amount. On the other hand, Hyder Ali was denounced as a rebel and an usurper; and, as a just punishment of his misdeeds, the dewanny of Mysore was transferred to the English, upon the easy conditions of conquering the country, and rendering to Nizam Ali a large additional tribute.

The situation of Hyder Ali had tempted some of the Malabar chiefs to make an effort to throw off his yoke, and the government of Bombay had fitted out a formidable expedition against him. Mangalore being left with an insufficient garrison, fell into the hands of the English without material resistance, and the commander of Hyder Ali's fleet, from pique, it is said, at the appointment of a cavalry officer to be his superior, surrendered his charge to the same power. Buswaraj Drooj, or "fortified island," and some other places, were also captured; but in an attempt upon part of the works of Cananore the English were defeated with considerable loss. Indeed their temporary success soon deserted them. Hyder Ali not only despatched troops to support his interests on the western coast, but proceeded there in person. The greatest care was taken to withhold from the English force intelligence of his

approach, and by apparent inactivity to deceive them into a fancied security till the moment arrived for striking an effective blow. Not a soldier of Hyder Ali was visible till an overwhelming army, led by himself, suddenly appeared before Mangalore early in the month of May. The place was forthwith quitted by the English, and in attempting to embark the garrison in boats, severe loss was sustained through the mismanagement of those by whom the operation was conducted. All the artillery and stores were abandoned to the enemy, and what was worse, the sick and wounded, consisting of eighty Europeans and one hundred and eighty sepoys, were left to their mercy. Little remained to be accomplished on the coast, and that little was soon performed. Hyder Ali then proceeded to Bednore, where he had summoned the principal landholders to meet him. His exactions had made him very unpopular with this class of persons, and they had manifested a disposition to favour the English cause to the extent of readily supplying the invaders with provisions. This was an offence not to be overlooked by Hyder Ali; and in the punishment which he determined to inflict, he contrived at the same time to gratify his vengeance and his avarice. He announced to those who had attended his summons that their treason was known to him, and that he was about to visit it in a manner better adapted to the existing state of his affairs than by sentencing them to death. A list of the criminals was then produced, and against the name of each an enormous fine appeared. The conduct of Hyder Ali's affairs was marked by great precision; for every purpose there was a distinct provision. Among other establishments nicely contrived so as to contribute to the progress of the great machine of his government was a department of torture. To this the offenders present were immediately consigned, till their guilt should be expiated by payment of the sums in which they were respectively mulcted, and orders were issued for taking similar proceedings with regard to those whose fears had kept them away.

So miserably defective were the arrangements of the Madras government and their ally the nabob, in obtaining intelligence, that nearly three months after Hyder Ali had departed for the westward they were uncertain as to the course he had taken. The English arms were however successful in reducing Eroad, and many places in the districts of Baramahal, Salem, Coimbatore, and Dindigul. Colonel Wood deemed it practicable to maintain the countries which thus fell into the hands of the English, by occupying the passes which connected them with Mysore, and these he believed and officially reported to be only three. Not many days after he had made this report, he was astonished by the advance of bodies of horse by unsuspected roads, and he then avowed his conviction that no force could prevent their access through the difficult and secret passages of the hills.

The division of the army under Colonel Smith was occupied more to the northward. Kistnagherry surrendered to him on the 2nd May. In June, possession was obtained of the fortress of Mulwagul, in a manner little creditable to any of the parties engaged in the transaction. Colar surrendered shortly afterwards. In July, Osoor was taken, and some other places to the south and west of it. A body of Mahrattas, which had been taken into the English service on the suggestion of Colonel Smith, joined in August. On the day on which the junction was effected, Hyder Ali, having returned from his western expedition, entered Bangalore with the light troops of his advance. He was foiled in an attack upon the camp of the Mahrattas, in which he sustained a loss of about three hundred men. The lead in the attempt was assigned to the cavalry, who were to penetrate to the tent of Morari Row, and possess themselves of his head. The infantry were to follow, and complete the victory which was anticipated as the result of the attack. Morari Row no sooner learned that the attack was made by cavalry, than, to prevent friends and enemies being mistaken, he gave orders that not one of his men should mount, but each stand at the head of his horse, and cut down without distinction every person on horseback. These orders were strictly executed. From the irregular construction of a Mahratta camp, the advance of cavalry is subjected to numerous impediments, and confusion soon ensued. It was increased by an accident. The state elephant of Morari Row having received a wound, broke loose from his picquets and rushed wildly through the camp. He carried with him the chain by which he had been attached. This he seized with his trunk, and hurled furiously against a mass of cavalry which he met, throwing them back headlong over a column of infantry who were behind them. These, ignorant of the cause of the shock, retired in dismay; and before order could be restored, the symptoms of motion in the English camp discouraged a renewal of the attack.

Early in September, Hyder Ali made a circuitous march in a southern direction, for the purpose of cutting off the division of Colonel Wood, who was ascending from Baramahal to join Colonel Smith. The route of Colonel Wood lay through a long defile, and Hyder Ali had made the requisite dispositions to be prepared to open on his troops an enfilading fire, on their arrival at a particular spot favourable to the object. The advance of Hyder Ali, as well as that of Colonel Wood, was reported to Colonel Smith by scouts whom he had sent out to collect intelligence; and the latter officer, perceiving that he had time to anticipate Hyder Ali, and post his division so as to receive him with advantage, advanced with accelerated speed, and despatched messengers across the hills to apprise Colonel Wood of his intentions. The success of the plan was frustrated by Colonel Wood firing a salute in

honour of the approach of his coadjutor in arms. This imprudent mark of respect and exultation warned Hyder Ali to retire, and he lost no time in acting upon the intimation. Colonel Smith gave orders for pursuit, but nothing was gained by it.

The incidents of war were at this time relieved by an attempt at negotiation; but the British authorities demanded more than Hyder would yield, and the only result was that which ordinarily follows unsuccessful attempts at negotiation—an aggravation of hostile feeling.

Mulwagul returned into the hands of Hyder Ali by means similar to those by which it was lost to him. Colonel Smith had occupied it with a party of his own troops. Two members of council, who were with the army under the name of field-deputies, thought fit to remove them, and to supply their place by a company of Mahomed Ali's troops. Hyder Ali, by tampering with the Mussulman officer in command, prepared the way for its yielding at once to an apparent surprise. Colonel Wood made a movement to relieve it, but was too late. He succeeded in recovering the lower fort, but was repulsed with loss in an attempt to carry the rock by escalade. The day after this unsuccessful attempt a body of light troops appeared in view, and their object, it was conjectured, was to cover a convoy for the garrison. Colonel Wood moved out with two companies and a gun to reconnoitre, and when at the distance of two miles from his camp perceived three thousand horse, followed by a heavy column of infantry, approaching to surround him. He galloped back to the nearest picquet, and having sent forward orders to place the baggage in safety and form the line, he returned with the picquet guard, consisting, like the force which had accompanied him, of two companies and a gun. He found the first party completely surrounded, but he forced a passage through the enemy and joined it. Hyder Ali's whole army, however, appeared on an eminence about a mile in front, and the British commander saw that he had no course but to retreat with all speed. He accordingly abandoned his two guns, and prepared to force a passage in the direction from which he had just advanced. His object was aided by a battalion detached from the line to support him, and which attacked in flank the body through which he had to pass. With some difficulty the retreating force reached a point where they could receive further assistance from the line, and the battle was maintained with vigour, but decidedly to the disadvantage of the English force, who gradually receded before the well-directed guns and impetuous charges of the enemy. The unfavourable circumstances under which the action had commenced had never been overcome, and the fortune of the day seemed to be irreversibly lost to the English. It was retrieved by a stratagem. The baggage guard was commanded by Captain Brooke. This officer had

suffered severely in the escalade on the preceding day, and his strength amounted only to four companies and two guns. With this insignificant force he conceived the idea of turning the tide of victory in favour of his country. The sick and wounded were under his protection; as many of them as were able to move were drawn out to add to the apparent strength of his force; the two guns were dragged by volunteer followers, and manned by wounded artillerymen. The summit of a flat rock was chosen as the scene of operation, and was approached by a circuitous and concealed route. Immediately on its being attained, the two guns opened a fire of grape on the enemy's left flank, and the voice of every individual in the little band, sound or sick, joined that of their commander in shouting, "Hurrah! Smith! Smith!" Throughout the field the impression was conveyed alike to friends and enemies, that the division of Colonel Smith had arrived; and the effect was almost magical. The delusion, indeed, could not long be maintained; but the temporary advantage which it gave the English allowed Colonel Wood an opportunity of making a better disposition of his force; and when Hyder Ali, after discovering the deception, resumed the attack, he found his opponents well prepared to receive him. Repeatedly foiled in his attempts, he returned again and again, but still in vain; and when darkness put an end to the combat, the English remained in possession of the field. The loss of Hyder Ali was reported to amount to a thousand men; the loss of the English was less than a quarter of that number.

After various marchings and countermarchings unworthy of relation, Hyder Ali laid siege to Oosoor. Colonel Wood moved to relieve it, but so precipitately and incautiously, that he effected little for the benefit of the garrison at Oosoor, while he exposed Bangalore to an attack from the enemy. Bangalore was garrisoned by part of Mahomed Ali's troops under the command of a British officer. The force of Hyder Ali approached in several distinct columns, preceded by cannon, and attended by all the auxiliaries necessary to the conduct of a siege. The enemy gained possession of the pettah, or town, within the walls, but made no attempt upon the fort; content with loading all the carts and tumbrils that could be spared with the stores and baggage of Colonel Wood's division, which had been left in the pettah for safety, and with the capture of some eighteen-pounders which were without the gate. A dreadful scene occurred on this occasion. The entrance of the enemy had caused a rush of men, women, and children towards the fort for safety, some of them driving camels, horses, or oxen. The gate was suddenly shut, but the masses behind continuing to press on those in front, two thousand human beings, it is said, perished, in common with a larger number of beasts of various kinds, the whole being forced together in an

indiscriminate mass. Hyder Ali leisurely retired, after appropriating everything movable, and was nearly out of sight when Colonel Wood returned from Oosoor. He appeared again four days afterwards, intercepting the march of the English army towards Colar, to which place they were proceeding in search of supplies, drove in the outposts, and commenced a cannonade from a battery of twelve of his heaviest pieces, including among them those which he had taken at Bangalore. The cannonade was returned by the English, and maintained by both sides through the whole day. At night the enemy apparently retired, and Colonel Wood resumed his march, but had scarcely cleared the ground on which the former attack took place, when he was again assailed by the fire of Hyder Ali's infantry, which continued to annoy him throughout the night. In the morning an attempt was made to intersect the English columns, and destroy them in detail. This was frustrated. The march recommenced, and continued for about two miles, when another attack rendered it necessary to halt. The conflict thus resumed was kept up for some time, when Hyder Ali suddenly withdrew, without any motive discernible by the English. The cause was soon explained, by the arrival of the other division of the English army, now commanded by Major Fitzgerald, Colonel Smith having proceeded to the presidency. Major Fitzgerald having heard of the disaster at Bangalore, had concluded that Colonel Wood's division would be distressed for provisions and equipments. Recalling all the detachments that could be summoned in time, and collecting a large supply of rice, he made a forced march in the direction in which the suffering division was likely to be found, and the sound of the firing in the last affair with Hyder Ali had guided him to the exact spot where his assistance was required. Colonel Wood was in such a state of despondency as, in the eyes of Major Fitzgerald, rendered him incompetent to the duties of command; and the latter transmitted a representation to the commander-in-chief, Colonel Smith, of the necessity of placing the troops under some other direction for the recovery of the lost honour of the army. Colonel Smith laid this document before the government, and Colonel Wood was ordered to proceed under arrest to Madras. This proceeding appears to have been somewhat harsh. Colonel Wood had displayed little military talent; but he had courage approaching the verge of rashness, if it did not pass it. In his later engagements with Hyder Ali this quality was not manifested; but the cause probably was that, like many other men of sanguine temperament, he was subject, on meeting with reverses, to excessive depression. In Coimbatore, the English were gradually dispossessed of their posts, which appear to have been arranged with little regard to sound military principles. Fuzul Oolla Khan, one of the ablest generals of Hyder Ali, entered

the province with seven thousand men and ten guns, and proceeded vigorously, but cautiously, to effect the object of his advance. Near Caveriporam he received a check from an insignificant force led by a man of very humble station. An English serjeant, named Hoskin, commanded an advanced post of two companies and one gun in a mud fort, which he defended with a spirit that entitles him to remembrance. Reporting to his officer the success of his resistance to the attempts of the enemy, he added, "I expect them again to-morrow morning in two parties, with guns: I will take the guns from them, with the help of God." The success of the gallant serjeant was not equal to his noble confidence. In a subsequent attempt the fort was carried, but not until it had become a heap of ruins, nor then without a sanguinary conflict. The fate of its brave defender is unknown; he probably met a soldier's death on the spot where he had so eminently displayed a soldier's spirit. Another post at Gujelhutty was well defended by Lieutenant Andrews. It sustained two assaults, in the second of which the English commander fell, and the post was surrendered. Coimbatore and Denicancota were lost by treachery; and the officer commanding at Palagaut was obliged to save himself and his garrison from massacre by secret flight. In December, Hyder Ali entered Baramahál, and the English posts in that province fell with the same celerity as in Coimbatore. In marching for the reduction of Eroad, Hyder Ali encountered an English party, consisting of fifty Europeans and two hundred sepoys, commanded by Captain Nixon. Two deep columns of infantry, supported by twelve thousand horse, moved to their destruction. Captain Nixon and his little force remained firm while the enemy were advancing, and, when the latter had arrived within twenty yards of them, gave fire. The Europeans then rushed forward, and their fifty bayonets spread instant confusion among the enemy's infantry, who broke and fled. This, however, was all that their gallantry achieved. The cavalry of the enemy at the same moment charged the sepoys in flank and rear; and the return of the killed and wounded of the English party included every man, European and native, with the single exception of an officer named Lieutenant Goreham. His life was saved by his knowledge of the country language, of which in the last extremity he availed himself, to request the humanity of a native of rank. Hyder Ali lost no time in advancing to Eroad; and to make his victory known, on arriving there he sent a flag of truce to request the attendance of an English surgeon to attend to the wounded prisoners. An extraordinary proceeding followed. Hyder Ali, on learning the extent of Lieutenant Goreham's lingual acquirements, enjoined him to translate into English a summons, demanding the surrender of Eroad, and inviting the commander, Captain Orton, to repair in person to Hyder Ali's tent, under an assurance that,

if terms of capitulation should not be arranged, he should be at liberty to return. With an infatuation for which it is not easy to account, Captain Orton trusted the promise of Hyder Ali. The result will readily be conjectured. Captain Orton was detained, and atrocious as this breach of faith at first appears, Hyder Ali was not without excuse. The officer second in command in the English garrison was a Captain Robinson, who had surrendered at Vaniambadly under parole not to serve again during the war. He was now serving, not only to his own disgrace, but to that of the government which sanctioned the dishonourable act. Hyder Ali declared that the violation of parole by Captain Robinson absolved him from observing his promise to permit the departure of Captain Orton; but as a proof of his placability, he professed himself willing, if the latter officer would write an order for the surrender of the place, to permit the entire garrison, with their property, to retire unmolested to Trichinopoly. Captain Orton refused—on the following day he consented. How the change was effected does not appear. "The modes," says Colonel Wilks, "cannot be distinctly traced, but may well be imagined." That Captain Orton should have walked into the pitfall prepared for him by Hyder Ali is astonishing; that he should then have sought to extricate himself by an act which, in the eye of strict military justice, merited death, is astonishing; and not less astonishing is the fact that Captain Robinson obeyed the order extorted from Captain Orton, and surrendered the place. The garrison were removed, not to Trichinopoly, but to Seringapatam; and in a dungeon within that city the recreant Captain Robinson perished. This officer's breach of faith afforded Hyder Ali a pretence for a further act of deception. Captain Fassain, who had resisted at Caveriporam till resistance was vain, capitulated on condition of himself and his garrison being released on parole. Like the garrison at Eroad, they too were marched to Seringapatam.

Darkly and heavily did the year 1768 close upon the prospects of the British government on the Coromandel coast. A few weeks had wrested from them nearly all that they had previously gained, and Fuzul Oolla Khan was sent to visit Madura and Tinnevely, while his master ravaged the country in the neighbourhood of the Cavery—flaming villages and a flying population everywhere marking his progress. The government of Madras became alarmed, as well they might, and made advances for accommodation. Hyder Ali requested that an English officer might be sent to confer with him, and Captain Brooke was despatched thither in compliance with his wish. Hyder Ali expatiated on the aggressions of the English, and on his own desire for peace; on the exertions he had made to promote that object, and on the unreasonable manner in which his overtures had been re-

jected; on the wrongs which he had received from Mahomed Ali, and on the evil effects of that prince's influence in the councils of the English. He referred to the advantage of maintaining Mysore as a barrier to Arcot against the Mahrattas, and, adverting to a threatened invasion by that power, intimated that he could not oppose both them and the English at the same time, and that it remained for the latter power to determine whether he should continue to shield them from the former as heretofore, or whether he should unite with the Mahrattas for the destruction of the English. Captain Brooke, in reply, pointed out the superior advantages of an alliance with the English to one with the Mahrattas, to which Hyder Ali assented, and expressed a wish that Colonel Smith should come up to the army invested with full powers of negotiation. Captain Brooke suggested that Hyder Ali should send a vakeel to Madras. This he refused, on the twofold ground, that it would give umbrage to the Mahrattas, and that at Madras all his efforts for peace would be frustrated by Mahomed Ali. Before taking his leave, Captain Brooke suggested to Hyder Ali that there was one proof of his friendly and pacific disposition which might readily and at once be afforded: the discontinuance of the excesses by which the country was devastated, and the defenceless inhabitants reduced to the extremity of wretchedness. The proposal met probably with all the success which the proposer expected. Of friendly professions Hyder Ali was profuse, but of nothing more. He answered, that his treasury was not enriched by the excesses complained of, but that he had been compelled to accept the services of some volunteers whose conduct he could not control. The report of this conversation was forwarded to Madras, and Mr. Andrews, a member of council, was deputed to negotiate. He arrived in the camp of Hyder Ali on the 18th of February, and quitted it on the 21st, with proposals to be submitted to the governor and council, having previously concluded a truce for twelve days. The governor of Madras had every reason to desire peace: so great was their distress that the Company's investments were entirely suspended, and it was stated that their resources were insufficient to carry on the war more than four months longer. Hyder Ali's proposals were, however, rejected, and hostilities recommenced. Colonel

Smith, who had returned to the field, watched the movements of Hyder Ali with unceasing vigilance, and frequently counteracted them with admirable skill. The manoeuvres of the two armies had brought them about a hundred and forty miles to the southward of Madras, when suddenly dismissing nearly the whole of his infantry, the greater part of his cavalry, together with his guns and baggage of every description, Hyder Ali, with six thousand horse, advanced rapidly towards that place, and on the 29th of March appeared before it. A small party of infantry joined him on the following day. He immediately caused a letter to be addressed to the governor expressing a desire to treat for peace, and requesting that Mr. Dupre, a member of council and next in succession to the chair, might be deputed to attend him. The character of the man who made this demand, the place from which it was made, and the circumstances under which he had arrived there, all contributed to secure attention to the message. Mr. Dupre proceeded to the camp of Hyder Ali on the morning of the receipt of his letter, and, after a series of conferences, the terms of a treaty were agreed upon. The treaty was executed by the governor and council on the 3rd of April, and by Hyder Ali on the 4th. With reference to the circumstances under which the peace was concluded, Hyder Ali may be regarded as having displayed much moderation. A mutual restoration of captured places was provided for, and Caroor, an ancient dependency of Mysore, which had been for some time retained by Mahomed Ali, was to be rendered back. After the conclusion of the treaty, difficulties arose from a demand of Hyder Ali for the liberation of some persons kept prisoners by Mahomed Ali, and of the surrender of some stores at Colar. With much persuasion the nabob was induced to comply with the former demand, and the latter was yielded by the British government, probably because it was felt to be vain to refuse.

Thus terminated the war with Hyder Ali—a war needlessly and improvidently commenced, and conducted, on the part of the Madras government, with singular weakness and unskillfulness. Its conclusion was far more happy than that government had any right to expect, either from their own measures or from the character of their enemy.

CHAPTER VIII.

PARLIAMENT PASSES A BILL FOR REGULATING THE DIVIDENDS OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY
—APPOINTMENT OF SIR JOHN LINDSAY AS ROYAL COMMISSIONER — CONQUEST OF TANJORE
—ADMINISTRATION OF CLIVE'S SUCCESSORS—WARREN HASTINGS, GOVERNOR OF BENGAL—
TREATMENT OF THE EMPEROR—DEFEAT OF THE ROHILLAS—COMPANY APPLY TO GOVERNMENT FOR A LOAN—CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMPANY.

THE dividends of the East-India Company, like those of other mercantile bodies, had been accustomed to fluctuate accordingly as circumstances were prosperous or adverse. In 1766, the dividend had for some time been made at the rate of six per cent. per annum. The news of the acquisition of the dewanny of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, impressed the proprietors with a belief that more might reasonably be expected; and at the same general court in which the success of Clive's negotiation was announced, a motion was made to raise the dividend to eight per cent.; but the Court of Directors having delivered an unanimous opinion that the proposal was premature, the motion, in deference to their judgment, was withdrawn. At the next general court, however, the subject of increase of dividend was again brought forward, and an augmentation of still greater amount was called for. It was moved that the next dividend should be made at the rate of ten per cent. per annum. The Court of Directors, anticipating that a proposal for increasing the dividend would be made, had prepared a report, the result of an investigation of the Company's affairs, with special regard to the subject of debate; and their conclusion was, that the circumstances of the Company were not such as to warrant any increase. Notwithstanding this, the motion was pressed to a division, and was finally determined by a ballot, the result of which gave a victory to the advocates of the proposed increase. This was followed by a proposal to make overtures to Government for an extension of the duration of the Company's charter, on consideration of their admitting the State to participate in the advantages of their recent acquisition. The proposal, however, was met by a motion for the previous question, which was carried. This result was followed by a motion, recommending the Court of Directors to take measures for obtaining from parliament further powers for extending the trade of the Company, and securing to them the benefits of the grants and acquisitions recently obtained. An amendment upon this was moved, embodying the views of those who had supported the first motion, but without specially referring to them; motions of adjournment *sine die*, and of adjournment to a future day, were made, and, after a protracted debate, the court broke up, with an understanding that the subject should be resumed at the quarterly court, which was approaching.

But the successful results of Clive's policy had attracted the notice of others as well as of the proprietors of East-India stock. Several months before the discussion last noticed, the Duke of Grafton, then prime minister, had intimated to the chairman and deputy-chairman that the affairs of the East-India Company would probably occupy the attention of parliament in the approaching session, and that it might be expected to meet before Christmas. It had met on the 11th November; and on the 25th, a motion was made in the House of Commons, for a committee to inquire into the state and condition of the Company. It was carried, upon a division, by one hundred and twenty-nine against seventy-six; and it was then further resolved, that the committee should consist of the "whole House."

On the 10th December, the court received orders to lay before the House of Commons a variety of papers, including copies of all treaties and grants from any native powers between 1756 and 1766, both years inclusive; as well as of all correspondence relating thereto, and an account of the state of the Company's territorial revenues. At the time of making these orders, the House also called for a statement of all expenses incurred by Government on account of the East-India Company during the period to which the order for copies of the treaties and grants applied. These proceedings of parliament were made known to the general court held a few days after the service of the orders, and the effect was to create a general impression that, under the circumstances, it was not advisable to make any application to parliament. With reference to the order for a statement of expenses incurred by Government on behalf of the Company, it was suggested that a counter-statement should be prepared, of charges thrown upon the Company by the acquisition and preservation of their possessions, the reduction and temporary retention of Manila, and other similar causes; but the Court of Directors, it was intimated, had already anticipated the wishes of the proprietors on this point, by giving orders for the preparation of such a statement. The general court adjourned till the 31st December, on which day a motion, recommending the Court of Directors to treat with the ministry and report their proceedings, was carried unanimously.

The House of Commons had called for a variety of papers, but the committee did not

proceed to business till the latter end of March. It sat at intervals through the month of April and part of May. In the mean time the desire of the proprietors for an increase of their dividend continued, but the ministers and the Court of Directors were alike opposed to its gratification. At a general court, held on the 6th May, the chairman reported the results of the negotiations between the Court of Directors and the advisers of the Crown, and apprised the proprietors of the feeling entertained by the latter against an increase of the dividend. It was, notwithstanding, moved, that the dividend for the ensuing half-year should be at the rate of twelve-and-a-half per cent. per annum, and the motion was carried. On the following day, the House of Commons called for the proceedings of the court at which this vote was passed; and at another general court, held on the 8th, the Court of Directors recommended that it should be rescinded. After a debate of great length, a resolution was passed, to the effect that, in the arrangement with the ministers of the Crown, four hundred thousand pounds per annum should be secured to the proprietors. This did not differ substantially from the former resolution, as that sum would have furnished a dividend of twelve-and-a-half per cent. On the day on which this court was held, Mr. Fuller, the chairman of the committee of the House of Commons, moved for leave to bring in a bill for regulating the Company's dividends, and the motion was carried. The bill was brought in on the 11th, and read a first time. On the 12th it was read a second time, and ordered to be committed on the 19th. The object of the bill was to restrain any increase of dividend beyond ten per cent. till the next session of parliament.

On the 18th May, the chairman reported to a general court then held, that copies of the resolution passed at the preceding court, had been delivered to the Duke of Grafton, premier, Mr. Townsend, chancellor of the exchequer, and General Conway, one of the secretaries of state. An interview with the Duke of Grafton had been sought, but the answer of that nobleman seemed to offer little encouragement to the hopes of the proprietors. The Court of Directors, however, had deemed it expedient to try the effect of a personal conference: the chairman and deputy accordingly availed themselves of the expressed readiness of the minister to receive them; but all that they obtained was a reference for his views to his written message. Under these circumstances, the Court of Directors recommended the presentation of a petition to the House of Commons, pressing the claims of the company, but modifying them in some degree so as to meet the views of the administration. One of the main points in which modification took place, was that of the period during which the proposed agreement between the crown and the company should remain in force. The proprietors had required a considerable addition to the term of their charter, and the expectations expressed as to

the extent of such addition had varied from thirty-seven to fifty years. Ministers would conclude no agreement for more than three years, and the first clause of the proposed petition expressed acquiescence in this arrangement. The fourth, fifth, and sixth clauses proposed that the trading profits of the company, and the residue of the territorial revenue, after deducting the expenses of administration, should form a fund out of which the company should receive four hundred thousand pounds per annum as a dividend, and that the surplus should be equally divided between the Company and the public, the share of the Company being appropriated to the discharge of their debts. The remaining clauses related to various points, fiscal, military, and commercial, but of inferior importance with reference to the existing circumstances of the Company. The debate of this day was fierce and long. At a late hour, a motion being made for a petition to the House of Commons, praying that the petitioners might be heard by themselves or their counsel against the bill for regulating the Company's dividends, a ballot was demanded; and, as the bill was to go into committee on the following day, it was suggested, contrary to usual practice, that the ballot should take place forthwith. At nine o'clock in the evening it was moved and carried, that the ballot should then commence, and continue open till eleven. Against this decision several proprietors delivered a protest. Another protest was signed by the Court of Directors, who also refused to appoint any scrutineers. Scrutineers were accordingly chosen by the proprietors, who reported that the motion was carried by one hundred and thirty-eight against two. The debate was then resumed on the petition proposed by the Court of Directors. It was conducted with no less vehemence than that which had preceded the ballot. It was finally determined to instruct the Court of Directors to alter the petition, by suggesting the payment of four hundred thousand pounds per annum to the public in place of the proposed participation in the Company's profits; and a few minutes before four o'clock in the morning of the 19th May, this memorable court adjourned. The petition praying to be heard by counsel against the dividend bill was presented to the House of Commons on the same day. A motion, to refer it to the consideration of the committee being opposed, the debate was adjourned till the following day. A motion succeeded for a return of the names of the proprietors who had balloted on the day before under such extraordinary circumstances, and of the amount of their stock. It was opposed; but, on a division, carried. The petition originally prepared by the Court of Directors, and which submitted the proposals of the Company for an arrangement with the State, was presented on the 20th, and referred to the committee. The adjourned debate on the former petition was then resumed, and the petition was ultimately rejected. On the 25th, it was ordered that it be an instruction to the

committee to insert in the bill a clause regulating the mode of balloting in the general courts of the East-India Company. On the 27th, the bill came out of committee; and on the 28th was read a third time and passed. On that day it had been determined by a ballot again to petition parliament against the bill, and praying to be heard by counsel; but from the fact of the bill having passed the House of Commons, it was no longer of any avail to petition there. The Company, therefore, addressed their prayer to the House of Lords; and, with a view to aid its success by a pledge of moderation, passed a resolution against any increase of dividend beyond twelve-and-a-half per cent. for two years. But they were not more successful in the upper than they had been in the lower house. The bill was passed, though not without a protest against it signed by nineteen peers. Among the most powerful opponents of the bill was the chief justice of the king's bench, the Earl of Mansfield; and his lordship is represented to have condemned the proceeding as an exertion of arbitrary power of which there was no precedent—as an attempt to set aside a legal act of private men, legally empowered to dispose of their own property, in doing which they had violated neither the general principles of justice nor the by-laws of the Company. Against public clamour and parliamentary influence it was, however, vain to contend; and throughout the discussion which took place among the proprietors of East-India stock, the admission of the state to a participation in the profits of the dewanny was assumed to be a necessary concession. A bill, providing for the payment for two years of four hundred thousand pounds per annum by the Company to the Crown, was accordingly brought in, and passed into a law, without opposition, and almost without notice.

The operation of the act for limiting the amount of the Company's dividends was restricted to one year. Before the expiration of that period considerable changes had taken place in the ministry, but no change in the policy maintained towards the East-India Company. A bill was brought in to continue for another year the operation of the former act. The Company resisted this, as they had resisted the former act regulating the dividends; but it passed both houses by considerable majorities, although, like its predecessor, it was the subject of a protest in the Lords. In the month of August following, it was intimated that the king's ministers were ready to receive proposals from the Company with respect to the territorial acquisitions and revenues. The proceedings connected with the passing of the bill restricting the amount of dividend have been detailed at some length, because they relate to the first instance in which Parliament interfered with the property of the Company. It is unnecessary, and would be uninteresting, to pursue the subsequent negotiations so minutely, and it will be sufficient to state, that an agreement for five years was effected be-

tween the Government and the Company; that the latter were permitted to add to their dividends, provided the addition did not exceed one per cent. in any one year, nor increase the entire dividend to a rate exceeding twelve-and-a-half per cent. per annum; and that the payment of four hundred thousand pounds annually into the exchequer was to be continued, subject to a reduction, should the state of the Company's affairs compel a diminution of their dividend below ten per cent.

But this agreement did not remove all grounds of difference between the Government and the Company. The state of affairs in India was once more unsatisfactory. The stoppage of investments in consequence of the want of means to make them—the ill success attending the war with Hyder Ali, and other circumstances calculated to excite alarm, had determined the Company to send out commissioners vested with extraordinary powers; and further, for the protection of the British dominions and settlements in the East, they had solicited from the Crown the assistance of some ships of the line. To the former project the king's ministers objected; and though not disposed to refuse compliance with the request for maritime assistance, they wished to attach to it a condition to which the Court of Directors and the proprietors were alike hostile. They desired that the officer who should command in the Indian seas should be invested with the functions of a plenipotentiary. This being objected to, it was required that, in the political arrangements that might be made between the Company and native states, that officer should have a large and ostensible share, and this upon the ground that the British crown was bound by the treaty of Paris to maintain the rights of certain Indian princes. To Sir John Lindsay, who was to proceed to India in command of a frigate, the Court of Directors had readily granted a commission to act in the Gulf of Persia. The question of granting to him further powers was submitted to a general court, and, after warm and long-continued debates, decided in the negative. Ministers did not press the matter further, nor did they persevere in resisting the proposed commission. Two frigates were despatched for Bengal, and in one of them the new commissioners, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Sraffton, and Colonel Forde, proceeded. But their commission was not opened—the ship in which they sailed never reached its destination, and was supposed to have foundered at sea.

A most disgraceful act of the ministry must now be noticed. They had appeared to acquiesce in the decision of the East-India Company to withhold from the officer commanding in the Indian seas all power of interfering with the native states; but, notwithstanding this, they secretly gave to Sir John Lindsay a royal commission, conferring the powers which the Company had refused. The political inexpediency of this act was its lightest fault. The incapacity of the ministers who committed it sinks

into insignificance, when compared with the crime of dishonouring the name of their master by associating it with a miserable and scandalous deception.

Sir John Lindsay, on arriving at Madras, proceeded to assume the exercise of the high powers with which he was invested. He announced to the governor and council that he was the bearer of letters and presents from the Crown to the Nabob of Arcot, and invited them to grace the delivery by giving their attendance on the plenipotentiary. This was declined, and an angry correspondence commenced, which was subsequently continued on subjects of more grave importance. Hyder Ali was attacked by the Mahrattas, and both the belligerents were desirous of the assistance of the English. The government of Madras wished to maintain neutrality, but had they felt at liberty to join either party in the war, their inclinations would have led them towards Hyder Ali. On the contrary, the nabob was disposed to favour the Mahrattas; and he succeeded in enlisting the king's plenipotentiary on his side. On this discreditable portion of the British history of India it is unnecessary, and would be uninteresting, to dwell. The Court of Directors, on becoming acquainted with the powers bestowed on Sir John Lindsay—the first intimation of which was derived from Madras—remonstrated against the course taken by the ministry, of which, it may be presumed, the latter were in some degree ashamed. The powers, indeed, were not withdrawn, but a change was made of the person to whom they were intrusted. Sir Robert Harland was appointed to succeed Sir John Lindsay, and the Court were informed that such instructions had been given him as left “no reason of apprehension to the Company.”

In the mean time the government of Madras had become involved in hostilities with Tanjore. These arose out of disputes between the rajah of that country and Mahomet Ali. The fortress of Vellum was attacked, and taken; the city of Tanjore was besieged, and would probably have fallen, had not a premature peace been concluded by the son of Mahomet Ali. The conditions agreed to by the Rajah of Tanjore not being performed within the stipulated time, hostilities recommenced. They terminated in the surrender by the rajah of the fortress of Vellum, and the districts of Colladdy and Elangad.

The new plenipotentiary, Sir Robert Harland, had arrived in August, 1771. Notwithstanding his alleged instructions were such as to leave “no reason of apprehension to the Company, his conduct was even more officious and dangerous than that of his predecessor. He entered into negotiations with the Mahrattas, and involved himself in endless disputes with the governor and council. He finally departed, in great wrath, having neither offered to the governor nor received from him the courtesies usual on such an occasion.

The annoyance which the governor and

council received from the conduct of Sir Robert Harland was not the only source of disquiet to them. Sir Robert Fletcher, it will be remembered, had been concerned in the mutinous proceedings in Bengal, and for this offence he had, under the sentence of a court-martial, been most justly dismissed the service. The proprietors, however, had thought proper to restore him—a most ill-judged exercise of lenity. Sir Robert Fletcher could not plead want of experience in extenuation of his guilt, and that guilt was greatly aggravated by his rank. It was particularly his duty to set an example of military obedience to those whom he commanded. When that duty was forgotten, and the influence of his rank given in aid of the cause of mutiny, neither the crime nor the danger was of ordinary character. These obvious truths were, however, forgotten or cast aside in the zeal of personal friendship. Sir Robert Fletcher, on his restoration, was appointed to the chief command, and to a seat in council at Madras. There he soon became involved in violent disputes with the governor. Being ordered to Trichinopoly, he applied for a passage to England, in order, as he represented, to attend his duty in parliament, of which body he was a member. He was informed, that when he had set an example of military obedience, any representation from him would receive due attention. The lesson which he had already received was probably not lost upon him—he proceeded to Trichinopoly, and took charge of the fortress. The council then passed a resolution, that out of respect and veneration for the House of Commons and their privileges, no impediment should be offered to the immediate return of Sir Robert Fletcher to the discharge of his duty in that assembly.

Before this transaction, the government of Madras had been engaged in aiding Mahomet Ali to punish certain Polygars who had offended him. They soon afterwards gratified him by making war upon Tanjore. The country was subdued, and the rajah made prisoner. Space cannot be afforded for a minute inquiry into the justice of this war, but it was at least questionable. Mahomet Ali had long thirsted for the possession of Tanjore, and the English government at length indulged him by its conquest. The Dutch had purchased of the rajah the town of Nagore and its dependencies; but their retention of the purchase was alike disagreeable to the English and the nabob, and an arrangement was made for its surrender.

It is now necessary to glance at the affairs of Bengal subsequently to the departure of Clive. The government of Mr. Verelst, who succeeded to the chair, affords little deserving of notice. He interfered to protect the emperor and the vizier from a menaced invasion by Abdalee Shah, projected an unsuccessful expedition to Nepal, and concluded a new treaty with the vizier. Mr. Verelst was succeeded by Mr. Cartier, the principal events of whose administration were a dreadful famine,

and the death of the Nabob Syef-al-Dowlah of small-pox. The nabob was succeeded by his brother, Mobarik-al-Dowlah, a boy about ten years of age. On the departure of Mr. Cartier, his place was occupied by Warren Hastings, who had been brought from Madras for the purpose of succeeding to the chair, of which he took possession in April, 1772. Among the earliest acts of his government was one little calculated to secure, either to himself or his country, the confidence of natives of rank. For this act, however, he was not responsible; it was forced upon him by the orders of his superiors. The Court of Directors were dissatisfied, and not without cause, with the financial results of their government in Bengal; and they had resolved to discontinue the use of the machinery through which the office of dewan had hitherto been exercised—to dispense with the native agency, which it had been deemed necessary to maintain at the head of the revenue department, and to commit to European servants the discharge of the functions with which the Company had been invested by the emperor. But this was not all. Reports prejudicial to the character of Mahomed Reza Khan had reached the Court of Directors. They had travelled through no regular or respectable channel, and originated, it is believed, in the intrigues of Nuncomar. Unhappily, the Court of Directors listened to them; and orders were sent out to seize Mahomed Reza Khan, his family, partisans, and adherents, and detain them in custody till his accounts should be duly examined. Hastings lost no time in executing these orders; and among the parties apprehended was the gallant native Shitabroy, whose services to the English might have saved him from such an indignity. Although the Court of Directors seem to have been aware of the character of Nuncomar, they relied in a great degree upon evidence which he was expected to produce for establishing the charges against his rival. His zeal, indeed, could not be questioned; and Hastings enlivened it by appointing his son, Goodias, treasurer of the nabob's household. This appointment Hastings defended, upon the ground that the young man thus favoured was of a character opposite to that of his father—placid, gentle, and without disguise; and that Nuncomar had no authority but that arising from his ascendancy over the mind of his son. There can be no doubt that the honour bestowed on the son was virtually bestowed on the father; and that the influence of an able, intriguing, and unscrupulous man like Nuncomar, would be unbounded over the mind of one in whom the habit of filial respect had prepared the way for the ready surrender of his judgment, and who possessed no share either of the ability or the guile of his parent.

Hastings, however, could be little disposed to trust Nuncomar, and there is no reason to conclude that he then entertained any hostile feeling towards Mahomed Reza Khan. As far as can be discovered, he was actuated only

by a desire to carry out the views of his employers; and in the means which he adopted to conciliate Nuncomar, without, as he believed, trusting him, his judgment was probably more to be blamed than his intentions. The inquiry into the conduct of the deposed Naib advanced slowly, and the confinement of himself and his associate Shitabroy, in consequence, was protracted. Hastings alleged the vast influence of the chief prisoner, and the necessity of breaking it before any efficient proceedings could be adopted, as the reasons for postponing them. Though tedious, the inquiry was probably fair—for Mahomed Reza Khan was acquitted. Shitabroy participated in the acquittal, and was dismissed with extraordinary marks of honour. But these were ineffectual to their intended object of soothing his wounded spirit. He died shortly afterwards, and his death is attributed to the combined influence of grief and of the debilitating effects of the climate of Calcutta.

The nabob was a minor, and in the abolition of previous authorities it became necessary to make provision for his guardianship. The choice made by Hastings of a guardian for the infant prince was certainly an extraordinary one. In such a state of society as that which prevails in India, where women of rank never emerge from seclusion, excepting under very extraordinary circumstances, it could scarcely have been anticipated that a female would be selected for an office of state, and still less such a female as was chosen for the guardian of the nabob. The object of the governor's choice was Munny Begum, a favourite inmate of the harem of Meer Jaffier, the mother of Noojum-ad-Dowlah, but not of the reigning prince. Hastings defended this step, on the ground that the only man who could pretend to the trust was the brother of Meer Jaffier; and that, as he had a numerous family, the influence of his own ambition or that of his sons might be dangerous to the life of the young nabob. There is undoubtedly force in this objection; but if a regard to the safety of the young nabob rendered it advisable to seek a guardian from the gentler sex, there seems to have been no reason for excluding from the trust the prince's mother, who was yet living, and against whom no exception appears to have existed. The character of the person actually chosen was not such as to justify the irregularity of setting aside the superior claims of the nabob's mother. Previously to obtaining the favour of Meer Jaffier, Munny Begum had been a public dancing-girl, and in the exercise of this occupation had attracted the notice and won the affections of the master of Bengal. Her reputation, it is not to be presumed, was either better or worse than that ordinarily maintained by the class of persons to which she belonged—and the character of the dancing-girls of India is too well known to need description. It is not surprising that, when the annals of the Indian government were afterwards assiduously searched to find

matter of accusation against Hastings, this extraordinary appointment should have given rise to one of the charges preferred against him. It has never been satisfactorily explained, and seems incapable of reasonable explanation. If honestly made, it was most discreditable to Hastings's judgment: in whatever light contemplated, it is a blot upon his administration, and it was one of the main sources of the disquiet of his after-life.

But it was not matter of internal regulation only that called for the attention of the governor. The emperor had repeatedly pressed for the assistance of the English to enable him to march to Delhi, but had invariably been refused. In the Mahrattas he found more complaisant allies. By them he was conducted to the place where his ancestors had indeed been sovereigns, but where, however his situation might be disguised, he was but the shadow of a prince. The Mahrattas never work without their price; and part of the payment of their services to the emperor was the transfer to them of the districts which had been assigned for his support in his arrangement with the British government. That government now resumed the districts—a measure not unjustifiable, as they had been transferred to their enemies. It was, at the same time, resolved to discontinue the payment of the annual tribute to the emperor. This, too, as a temporary expedient, while the emperor was leagued with a power dangerous to the British government, or rather was entirely at the mercy of that power, was a measure of ordinary precaution. But it was not as a temporary expedient that this measure was adopted. It was laid down by the governor and council as an express condition of any future arrangement with the Company, that the emperor should be required to renounce his claim both to the arrears of the tribute and to all future payments for ever. This, it was urged, would be only a just recompense for defending against the Mahrattas his possessions in Korah and Allahabad, in the event of their being restored to him. Another reason was assigned for this proceeding, and, in the opinion of the governor and council, one of even greater weight than the former. "We are justified," said they, "by the stronger plea of absolute necessity, in insisting upon it, as our revenues are utterly unable to support any longer so ruinous an expense." No minute scrutiny into the motives of the discontinuance of the Company's stipend will be necessary. That which had dictated the policy of Vansittart, decided also that of his successor, Hastings. An empty treasury had led to the dethronement of Meer Jaffer, and the same cause deprived Shah Allum of that by which thrones are supported.

The Bengal government had assigned as one reason for depriving the emperor of his stipend, the expenses incurred in defending his territorial possessions. They had recorded his opinion, that if the emperor should make

overtures for renewing his alliance with the Company, his right to reclaim the districts formerly assigned to him could not be disputed. Notwithstanding the avowal of these views, the territory was disposed of with no greater ceremony than the stipend. The motive which was the most powerful in leading to the discontinuance of the latter prompted also to the transfer of the former. The emperor's districts of Korah and Allahabad were ceded to the vizier in consideration of fifty lacs of rupees, twenty of which were to be paid without delay, and the remainder within two years. In addition to these payments, better terms than had previously been obtained were secured for the use of the British troops to be subsequently employed in the service of the vizier. This advantage was important to the British government, and the service of a British force was at that time ardently desired by the vizier. He entertained designs of invading the Doob, and attacking the Rohillas, and was desirous of obtaining the assistance of the English government in these attempts. They declined giving him any assistance towards the former, but were not indisposed to aid him in the latter.

The ground of the proposed invasion of the Rohilla territory was the non-fulfilment of certain pecuniary stipulations entered into by the Rohilla chiefs with the vizier in consideration of his intervention to drive away the Mahrattas. The Rohillas were backward in completing their arrangements, and the vizier had thus a plausible cause for war. But his designs extended beyond the mere enforcement of his pecuniary demands upon the Rohillas: he meditated the conquest of the country, and its annexation to his own dominions. In this project the governor of Bengal was desirous of engaging, although he felt that the question involved very heavy responsibility. It appears not, however, that a regard to the justice of the project at all embarrassed his consideration of its expediency. This is no uncharitable surmise, for his reflections on the subject are upon record. He thought that the Rohillas were dangerous to the vizier, "the only useful ally of the Company;" that they could not be relied on to oppose the Mahrattas, but, on the contrary, were likely to join with that power in attacking Oude; that the acquisition of the Rohilla country would be very beneficial to the vizier and the Company, inasmuch as it would strengthen the frontier of the former, without rendering the country less accessible to the forces of the latter—would give the vizier wealth, of which the Company might expect to partake, and security, without dangerous increase of power. Lastly, he thought of forty lacs of rupees, which the vizier had promised as the immediate reward of the desired service, and of the advantage of having a large portion of the Company's army supported at the expense of their ally, which while thus ceasing to be a charge upon the Company's finances, would be "employed usefully for their inter-

rests, and conveniently for keeping up its own discipline and practice in war."

Still he hesitated: the circumstances of the times seemed to demand caution. He reminded the board of the public clamour which prevailed at home, of the notice which Indian affairs obtained in parliament, and of the avidity with which the ministers of the Crown would seize upon any false step, in the approaching negotiations for the renewal of the Company's charter. With reference to all these considerations, it was finally determined not to decline the invitation of the vizier, but to give such an answer as would probably induce him to withdraw it. The conduct of the vizier was nearly as undecided as that of the British Government. For a time he refrained from further calling on them; but, after a brief interval, he laid claim to their assistance. The English brigade, under Colonel Champion, was accordingly put in motion; and on the 23rd April, 1774, gave battle to the Rohillas, and gained a complete victory over an army of about forty thousand men, commanded by Hafiz Rehmüt Khan. About two thousand of the enemy fell on the field; more than fifty pieces of cannon were taken, and standards without number. The vizier manifested the most dastardly pusillanimity. The night before the battle, he refused Colonel Champion the use of some pieces of cannon for which he applied, and urged him to decline the fight. Finding the British commander inexorable on the last point, he promised to support him with all his force, and especially with a large body of cavalry, to act under Colonel Champion's directions. Instead of this, he remained inactive at some distance from the field, surrounded by his cavalry, and with a large train of artillery unemployed, till the news of the enemy's defeat reached him. His cavalry then moved with admirable celerity, pushed into the enemy's camp, and carried off immense plunder, in treasure, elephants, camels, camp equipage, and other effects. The Company's troops, justly indignant at the conduct of those of the vizier, are said to have exclaimed—"We have the honour of the day, and these banditti the profits."

The contest was now virtually decided. The obstinate determination of a chief, named Fyzoola Khan, occasioned the united armies to make a movement against him; but the business was settled by negotiation, and the vizier was placed in quiet possession of his new territory. His acquisition cannot be regarded in any other light than as an unrighteous conquest, and the English government must bear their share of the guilt attending it. In extension, it has been urged that the Rohillas formed but a small portion of the inhabitants of the country; that their possession of it was not of long standing, and that it had been acquired by the same means by which it had been lost. All this is true: the Rohillas were enterprising Afghan adventurers, who had reduced to subjection a comparatively feeble Hindoo population, who still constituted a vast

majority of the inhabitants of the country. Before the invasion of the vizier, these were victims of Mahometan usurpation; and after its success, they remained the same. But it does not appear that they invited foreign assistance to rid them of their first oppressors, nor that they were in any way benefited by the change. Consideration for their welfare certainly formed no element in the calculations of either the vizier or his European ally.

While these transactions were taking place, the affairs of India were discussed at home with an unusual degree of interest and excitement. The Company were unable to meet their engagements with the public, and were even compelled to apply to government for a loan. Borrowers are seldom regarded with much favour; their errors never escape condemnation, and not unfrequently their misfortunes are converted into crimes. In this case, too, the public disappointment was great. The riches of India was a phrase which had passed into a proverb, and the possession of a large portion of a country, which was supposed to overflow with wealth, was looked to as an infallible restorative of the dilapidated finances of Great Britain. It was astounding, therefore, to learn that, from some cause, the countless treasures of India did not find their way home—or, at least, not into the coffers of the Company; for it was a startling fact, that while the Company was needy and embarrassed, many who had entered their service poor, quitted it, not merely with competent means of support, but with fortunes rivalling those of the most opulent members of either the aristocracy or the monied interest. These instances of well-requited service confirmed the belief in Indian wealth—to the popular mind it was still evident that India abounded in riches, though, from some extraordinary ill-fortune, or ill-management, the Company did not succeed in obtaining their share. The envy excited by these sudden acquisitions of opulence and grandeur added to the unfavourable feeling engendered by the embarrassments of the Company; and the parliament, the press, and the conversation of men of all ranks and parties found a never-failing supply of matter for discussion and invective in the alleged mismanagement of the affairs of India, and the enormous wealth brought from that country by those who had been officially connected with it. At no period before or since has the subject attracted so much interest. India, for the most part, has been a word that has fallen on the public ear almost unheeded. It was then invested with a spell which commanded universal attention, and converted it into the means of universal excitement.

About the time that Hastings took possession of the seat of government at Calcutta, two committees were appointed by the House of Commons to inquire into the affairs of the East-India Company—the one secret, the other open. The Company proposed to send out a superintending commission, but a parlia-

mentary negative prevented the accomplishment of their purpose. The ministers were ready to relieve the embarrassments of the Company by a loan, but they were not less ready to take advantage of their position and that of the Company by prescribing their own terms. The claim of the crown to four hundred thousand pounds per annum was to be suspended till the loan was repaid; but, in other respects, the Company regarded the proposed conditions as harsh, and even as inconsistent with their corporate rights. They resisted, but with the usual fortune of those who resist a ministerial majority. The minister declared that though the Company should decline the loan, parliament would, nevertheless, interfere for the regulation of their affairs. Parliament did interfere, and most extensively. The plan for a superintending commission had been rejected, but it was not the intention of the minister to permit the government of India to remain as before—that which he had refused the Company the power to do, he meant to do himself. The Company had been occupied in preparing a plan for the improvement of the administration of justice in Bengal. This task, too, was seized by the minister. The question of territorial right he expressed himself unwilling to agitate; but a series of resolutions, proposed in the House of Commons by General Burgoyne, chairman of the select committee, were carried, the first of which declared “that all acquisitions made under the influence of military force, or by treaty with foreign princes, do of right belong to the state.” The views of the ministry were finally embodied in a bill presented to parliament. By this bill the government of Bengal was to be vested in a governor-general and four councillors; and to this authority the other presidencies were placed in subordination. A supreme court of judicature was to be established at Calcutta, to consist of a chief justice and three puisne judges, who were to be nominated by the Crown, but paid by the Company. The first governor-general and members of council for Bengal were to be named in the act; they were to hold office for five years, and during that period to be irremovable, except by the Crown, on representation of the Court of Directors. Vacancies were to be supplied by the Court subject to the approbation of the Crown. Other provisions affecting the constitution of the Company and the rights of proprietors were introduced. Every proprietor of £500 stock had one vote in all proceedings of the Company, and no amount of stock entitled the holder to more. It was now proposed to raise the qualification for voting to £1,000, and to give to holders of larger sums a plurality of votes—£3,000 was to entitle the possessor to two votes, £6,000 to three, and £10,000 to four.

These proposals were received by the Company with a storm of indignation. A petition to the House of Commons, complaining, in

strong terms, of various provisions in the bill, was submitted to the proprietors, and, on a ballot, adopted by four hundred and forty votes against fourteen. It denounced the bill as destructive of every privilege which the Company enjoyed under the most sacred securities, and as affording a precedent dangerous to the property of the people at large; complained of the appointment of officers by parliament, vested with the whole civil and military authority of Bengal, and with a power of superintending the other presidencies, which officers the Company had no means of recalling, and over whom they could exercise no real control, while the territorial possessions were, notwithstanding, declared to be still vested in the Company, and prayed the House not to give its sanction to an act which, under the colour of regulating, would “annihilate at once the powers of the Company, and virtually transfer them to the Crown;” it represented the bill as destructive of the rights and interests of the Company in many other respects, and at the same time defective in many of the purposes for which it was declared to be framed, and as tending to destroy the liberties of the subject by making an immense addition to the influence of the Crown; deprecated the forfeiture of franchise without proof of delinquency; and prayed to be heard by counsel against the bill. The corporation of the city of London also petitioned against the bill, representing it as of dangerous consequence to the franchises of every corporate body in the kingdom; professing to be alarmed by such proceedings, inasmuch as the privileges of the city of London stood on the same security as those of the East-India Company; and alleging that the bill had been brought into the House with a degree of secrecy incompatible with the principles of the constitution in matters of such public concern. Another petition was presented from the proprietors holding a less amount of stock than £1,000, and who would be disfranchised by the bill if it should pass into a law. They urged the hardship of depriving them of a valuable right without just cause, and denied that their disfranchisement would have the effect of suppressing collusive transfers. The Company were heard by counsel against the bill as they had prayed, but the eloquence of the bar seldom shakes the influence of the Treasury bench. The bill passed the Commons, and was sent to the Lords. The Company again petitioned,—were again heard by counsel, but with no greater effect than in the lower house. The bill became law, but the hostile sentiments of a considerable number of peers were recorded in two protests.

Besides the provisions already noticed, the act contained many others of greater or less importance. Among them was one requiring twelve months' possession of stock, instead of six, as a qualification for voting in general courts. By another it was enacted that the directors should be elected for four years, in

place of one, and that one-fourth part of the entire number should be renewed annually. It also provided that all the Company's correspondence relating to civil and military affairs, the government of the country, or the administration of the revenues, should be laid before one of his Majesty's secretaries of state. The receipt of presents by servants, either of the Crown or the Company, was prohibited; and the governor-general, councillors, and judges, were restrained from entering into trade, or deriving profit from it.

With this act begins a new era in the history of the East-India Company. The proceedings of the new government will be detailed in another chapter. Here it is only necessary to observe, that Warren Hastings, then the actual governor of Bengal, was named as the head of the new government. Mr. Barwell, a civil servant of the Company, and then in India, was nominated one of the council. The remaining councillors were, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Philip Francis, all of them at the time in England.

CHAPTER IX.

DISPUTES BETWEEN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES—NUNCOMAR HANGED FOR FORGERY—HASTINGS'S PROCEEDINGS DISAPPROVED OF AT HOME—COLONEL MAOLHAN DECLARES HIMSELF AUTHORIZED TO TENDER HASTINGS'S RESIGNATION—REPUDIATED BY HASTINGS—DISPUTES BETWEEN HASTINGS AND GENERAL CLAVERING—CONTEST BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE GOVERNMENT—DUEL BETWEEN FRANCIS AND HASTINGS.

THE members of council who had to proceed from England, as well as the chief justice and puisne judges of the supreme court of judicature, arrived at Calcutta in October, 1774, and on the 21st of that month the new government was publicly proclaimed. The Court of Directors had framed, for the guidance of the governor-general and council, a very long and minute code of instructions, commencing with an injunction to preserve harmony. But from the moment at which the voyagers set foot on the shore of Bengal, it was evident that there was but small ground for hoping that the good advice of the Court would be followed. The reception given by the governor-general to his new associates was in their judgment deficient in respect, for though they received a salute from the battery, it consisted of only seventeen guns, whereas they were of opinion that they were entitled to twenty-one. The minds of all parties were probably well prepared for hostility. The voice of Hastings had previously been all-powerful, and he could scarcely expect to retain in the new council the commanding influence which he had previously enjoyed. He consequently regarded his new coadjutors with little good-will, while of their capacity for office he formed no favourable judgment. "He seems, without doubt," says his biographer, "to have entertained but an indifferent opinion of the fitness of the individuals selected to work out the new system: he more than insinuates as much in his confidential communications with his friends." On the other hand, the new members of council were impressed with a high sense of their own dignity, selected as they had been by no less an authority than the voice of parliament to assist in restoring to order and prosperity the embarrassed affairs of Great Britain in the East. Their minds, too, appear to have been filled

to overflowing with the prevailing impression of universal misgovernment in India, and the elements of discord were thus abundant. They soon began to ferment. Mr. Barwell was in the interior, and till his arrival the public business and the angry passions of the members of the government alike had rest. The accession of the absent councillor set both in motion. The governor-general laid before the board a minute, containing a relation of the principal events of his own administration, and an exposition of the existing state of the Company's affairs. The Rohilla war and the Company's relations with the vizier necessarily formed prominent topics in this paper, and out of these arose the first explosion of ill-feeling. Hastings had prevailed upon the vizier to receive at his court a British resident, and a gentleman named Middleton had been appointed to the office. Between the resident and the governor many communications had passed, which the latter had not submitted, and did not intend to submit, to his colleagues. General Clavering called for this correspondence, as well as for any of a similar nature between the governor and Colonel Champion. Hastings answered, that he would lay before the board extracts of all parts of the letters, both of the resident and Colonel Champion, which related to public affairs; but as the letters might, and he believed did, contain things not proper for public record, he declined submitting them entire. The general persisted, and was supported by Colonel Monson and Mr. Francis. Hastings recorded a dissent from the decision of the majority—his three opponents protested against his dissent, and within a week after the proclamation of the new government its members were engaged in bitter strife and fierce recrimination. The governor-general continued immovable in his determination not

to lay before the board the whole of the correspondence. His opponents no less obstinately adhered to their demand for its production; but as they had no means of enforcing the demand against the will of Hastings, they of necessity were forced to submit. They had, however, an expedient by which they could annoy the governor-general, if they could not conquer him. Colonel Monson suggested the recall of Mr. Middleton. General Clavering and Mr. Francis supported the proposal; Mr. Barwell took part with the governor-general; but the former three constituting a majority of the board, their views necessarily prevailed, and a resolution for the recall of the resident at the court of the vizier was passed. Another resolution followed, directing Mr. Middleton to bring with him the whole of his correspondence during his residence at the court of Oude, including all that the governor-general had refused. The next subject of discussion was the choice of a successor to Mr. Middleton. Hastings was requested to nominate some person, but declined. General Clavering then proposed that the duties of the resident should be transferred to Colonel Champion, the officer commanding the brigade on service in Oude. Mr. Barwell objected to the office of resident being united with the chief military command, and the governor agreed in the objection; but Colonel Monson and Mr. Francis supporting General Clavering, his resolution was carried. Hastings was subjected to the mortification of being instructed to write to the vizier, apprising him of the removal of a resident whom the writer wished to countenance, and of the appointment of a successor to whom he had objected; but he had the satisfaction of again recording his dissent. The next movement of the opposition party in the council was to propose an immediate demand for the forty lacs which the vizier had engaged to pay, and for such further sums as might be due from that prince. This demand was to be made by Colonel Champion, and it was proposed to instruct him, that if all the money could not be had, he was to obtain as much as possible, and security for the remainder; that if the demand should be resisted, he was to protest, and within fourteen days retire into the Company's territory, unless there were difficulty or danger in such a step; that in any case, after the negotiations should be concluded, he should withdraw his force within the limits of the province of Oude, and, unless its continuance should be required for the defence of the original dominions of the vizier, or of Korah and Allahabad, return with it to cantonments at Dinapore. These proposals were opposed by the governor-general and Mr. Barwell, and a war of minutes ensued, consuming much time and covering a vast mass of paper, but ending, as it must have been foreseen by all parties that it would end, in the triumph of Hastings's opponents. The combatants now resolved to appeal to their superiors. On the 30th November, only forty-one days after the landing

of the new councillors had been announced by what they regarded as the stinted measure of honour conveyed by seventeen discharges of artillery, they laid before the board a letter which they had prepared for transmission to the Court of Directors. It consisted of no less than seventy-four paragraphs, some of them of considerable length, and all full charged with denunciations of the governor-general's policy. This document was prepared with a view to its being perused by other parties than those to whom it was addressed. In a note which accompanied the delivery of the letter to the board, the framers of it observe, "the whole of the papers, as they apprehend, must, in obedience to the act of parliament, be transmitted by the Court of Directors to one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state."

The members of the council of Bengal could not directly address the ministers of the Crown—at least, they could not officially address them; but there can be little doubt that this letter was intended for the ministry, though ostensibly addressed to another authority. The governor-general, like his adversaries, laid his case before the Court of Directors in a separate communication, and the Court were thus enlightened by three sets of despatches on the same subject—one from the governor-general and council in the usual form, another from the governor-general only, and a third from three members of the council. Mr. Barwell, though agreeing with the governor-general, declined to become a party to his appeal. Regarding such communications as irregular and improper, he contented himself with recording a minute expressing that opinion, and stating his general concurrence in the views of the governor-general.

Whatever opinion might be formed of the justice or policy of the Rohilla war,—whatever views might be entertained of the disposition of the vizier to fulfil his engagements—the course forced upon the governor-general by the majority of the council was obviously unwise. It was the dictate, not of a cool and deliberate consideration of the circumstances of the case—not of an honest judgment, sound or unsound—but of blind passion and headlong wilfulness. Had the measures of the council been acted upon in the temper in which they were conceived, and had they been encountered by the vizier in a like temper, there would have been no choice but to abandon so much of the debt as the vizier might decline to pay, or to enforce the demand by the sword. A variety of circumstances combined to avert such an extremity. The vizier had begun to diminish his debt. Mr. Middleton, on obeying the call for his return, brought with him fifteen lacs. Eight more were obtained through other channels; the remainder of the account was to be settled, not with the vizier, but with his successor. The health of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah had for some time been declining, and early in February, 1775, he died. He was succeeded in the possession of his dominions by his son,

Azoff-al-Dowlah, who also, after much negotiation and with some difficulty, was ultimately recognized by the Emperor as his Vizier. This honour, however, was not attained by the prince till fourteen months after the death of his father.

Various minor disputes in the council must be passed over. The death of the Vizier gave occasion to a quarrel of greater dignity and importance. The majority in the council—General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis—chose to consider all the obligations by which the British Government was connected with the late Vizier as merely personal—consequently as terminated by the death of the party with whom they were contracted; and they regarded that event as affording an opportunity of making a better bargain with the Vizier's successor. Mr. Bristow was appointed resident at the court of Oude, and by him a treaty was concluded, by which the new Subahdar agreed to surrender to the British Government Benares and certain other districts, which the three members of council reported would produce an annual revenue of twenty-two lacs; and also to pay for the aid of the English brigade, when stationed with him, fifty thousand rupees per annum more than his predecessor had undertaken to pay. The framers of this treaty evinced a tender regard for their successors in office by relieving them from any difficulty as to the duration of the engagement. The obligation of the English authorities to respect the provisions of the treaty was expressly limited to the life of Azoff-al-Dowlah. This considerate provision is the more remarkable, as the majority of the council under whom the treaty was concluded do not appear to have felt any difficulty in relieving themselves from all regard to the treaty concluded by the government which preceded theirs with the Vizier.

Hitherto the differences between the two parties in the council had reference to matters of public policy. The rancour of their animosity was now to be influenced by the investigation of charges affecting the personal integrity of the governor-general. His accusers were many, his enemies in the council well disposed to listen to them; but Hastings denied their right to institute such inquiries, and claimed the privilege of dissolving any meeting of council in which such questions were entered upon. This claim his opponents resisted, and on his quitting the chair on such occasions, they placed in it one of their own number, and continued their inquiries. Charges were preferred by the Ranees of Burdwan involving the governor-general, his banyan, and several other European and native functionaries. These accusations appear to have been supported by little or no evidence deserving of credit, and almost the only ground for attaching any weight to them was furnished by Mr. Graham, a servant of the Company, and one of the accused parties, who, as a preliminary to inquiry, demanded that the Ranees should give security for the payment of a penalty in case

she should fail in establishing her charges. From another quarter, a charge was made of corruption in the foudjarry of Hooghly, in which it was alleged that the governor-general participated. The party by whom the charge was brought forward was anxious to obtain the office of foudjar for himself, and offered to undertake it at half the salary then paid. The foudjar was summoned to answer for his conduct; but either from conscious guilt or personal scruple, he objected to be examined on oath. The governor-general defended him; but this, probably, only furnished an additional reason for visiting his contumacy with severity. He was dismissed from his office, but his accuser did not benefit, as he had hoped, by the result.

One of the charges which press most heavily on the character of Hastings, arose out of the extraordinary appointment of Munny Begum to the guardianship of the infant nabob. In the examination of her receipts and disbursements, a large sum was discovered to be unaccounted for. The Begum was placed under restraint, and an inquiry instituted into the defalcation; when she stated that a considerable sum had been paid to the governor-general. That something was given and received was not denied, but it was alleged to have been paid on account of extraordinary expenses incurred by the governor-general's residence at Moorshedabad, and to be sanctioned by custom. It had for some time been clearly the intention of the Court of Directors that their servants should receive nothing beyond their regular and authorized emoluments, and the plea of custom is a poor one when placed in opposition to duty. The transaction acquires a darker hue from the extraordinary character of the appointment in which it originated. Opinions may, indeed, differ as to the extent of Hastings's culpability, but he must be a warm partisan indeed who will go the length of declaring that the hands of the governor-general were altogether clean. If he were entitled to any extra allowance while at Moorshedabad, he should have drawn such allowance openly, and brought it to account in the ordinary way; while the sum received from Munny Begum, if the receipt were proper, should have been carried to the credit of the Company. If he had no claim to additional allowances, there is nothing to discuss, and his conduct is without even the shadow of excuse.

The charge of taking money from Munny Begum was originally preferred by the acute and profligate Nuncomar. On the 11th March, 1775, Mr. Francis informed the board that he had that morning been visited by this extraordinary person, who had delivered to him a paper, addressed to the governor and council, and demanded of him, as a duty belonging to his office as a councillor of the state, to lay it before the board. Mr. Francis added, that he thought he could not, consistently with his duty, refuse to receive a paper from a person of Nuncomar's rank, but that he was unacquainted with the contents of it. He had,

however, some suspicion as to its tenor. It accused the governor-general of receiving bribes to a vast amount; among other instances, he was charged with taking two lacs and a half of rupees from Munny Begum, and something more than a lac from Nuncomar himself, as the consideration for the arrangement which placed his son Goodias in office. On a future day, another communication from Nuncomar was produced and read, but it contained nothing but assurances of the writer's veracity. Colonel Monson then moved that Nuncomar should be called before the board to substantiate his charge. The motion was opposed by Hastings, and his reasons for opposing it were recorded in a somewhat angry minute. "Before the question is put," he said, "I declare that I will not suffer Nuncomar to appear before the board as my accuser. I know what belongs to the dignity and character of the first member of this administration. I will not sit at this board in the character of a criminal, nor do I acknowledge the members of the board to be my judges." The motion that Nuncomar be called before the board, was, however, carried. The governor-general declared the council dissolved, and departed. Mr. Barwell followed his example. The remaining members denied that an adjournment could take place but by a vote of the majority. General Clavering took the chair, and the three associates proceeded to examine Nuncomar. After he retired, a messenger was sent to Hastings, apprizing him of the fact, and inviting him to resume the chair. Hastings refused to reply to this, as a message from the board; but sent his compliments to General Clavering, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis, and begged to decline meeting them in council at so late an hour, and when it was not possible to assemble a full board, from Mr. Barwell being gone into the country; but expressed a hope of meeting them in the revenue department on the following day. The next step of the majority was to pass a resolution declaring that it appeared that money to the amount of three lacs and fifty-four thousand rupees had been received by the governor-general in the manner described by Nuncomar, and that such money of right belonged to the East-India Company—a resolution naturally enough followed by another, calling upon the governor-general to pay the amount into the Company's treasury for their use. The secretary conveyed these resolutions to Hastings, who refused to receive or to give any answer to them. Another resolution was thereupon passed, that the proceedings should be transmitted to the Company's attorney, for the purpose of being submitted to counsel for their opinion how to proceed for the recovery of the money. On a future day it was resolved to summon certain witnesses; Hastings advised them not to attend. The majority resolved that the refusal was a high indignity to the board. The governor-general once more declared the board dissolved, and retired; where

upon those who remained passed a resolution, declaring that the board was not dissolved. The secretary was ordered to summon the contumacious witnesses, but they were not to be found. One of them subsequently appeared, but was not subjected to any punishment.

The struggle now assumed a more serious character. Proceedings were instituted in the Supreme Court against Nuncomar and some other persons for conspiring to cause a native, named Camul-oo-Deen, to write a petition to the council, reflecting falsely and injuriously on the governor-general, Mr. Barwell, Mr. George Vansittart, and some natives. The inquiry occupied twelve hours; and its result was, that Nuncomar and another person, a European, were required to give security to appear to take their trial at the next assizes. On the day after this took place, the "gentlemen of the majority," as Hastings called them, expressed their sympathy with Nuncomar by a visit of ceremony. What might have been the result of the prosecution for conspiracy is left to conjecture; for, before it could be brought to trial, Nuncomar was the object of an accusation far more grave in its character and more fearful in its consequences. He was apprehended on a charge of forgery. The majority of the council, as might be expected, ranged themselves on the side of the prisoner; and circumstances conspired to afford them an opportunity of manifesting their regard for him, by elevating his son to an office of the highest trust and dignity. About the time of the apprehension of Nuncomar, the discovery was made that of the sum appropriated to the support of the nabob, a part only had been applied to its professed object. Munny Begum was forthwith suspended from the exercise of her functions of guardian to the prince, and the charge was conferred on Goodias.

Nuncomar was committed, tried, found guilty, and hanged. This was the first instance in which the punishment of death had ever been inflicted in India in retribution of the crime of forgery. The excitement produced by it was proportioned to the novelty of the event. Nuncomar, too, was a man of great wealth—he had been possessed of extraordinary power: the subjecting such a man to an infamous punishment was scarcely less startling than the disproportion which, in native judgment, existed between the offence and its consequences. Above all, Nuncomar was a Hindoo of the highest caste. As a Brahmin, his person was regarded as inviolable. Had he committed all possible crimes, banishment, mitigated by the privilege of carrying away all his property, was the severest penalty to which he could be subject; and, by his countrymen, forgery was scarcely deemed a crime at all. Under the influence of all the feelings excited by this unprecedented case, no native expected that the sentence of the court would be carried into effect. The approach of the day of execution, without any intimation of the postponement of the fatal punishment, scarcely

affected their belief. It came, and with it the awful preparation for inflicting the last penalty of the law. Nuncomar met it with even more than Hindoo apathy. He took solemn leave of his friends; but neither his countenance, deportment, nor intervening occupations indicated any internal conflict. After the departure of those on whom his eyes were never again to rest, he engaged himself in writing notes and examining accounts, as though transacting ordinary business under ordinary circumstances. He entered with a calm step the palanquin which was to bear him to an ignominious death, and ascended the steps of the scaffold with equal firmness. The crowd collected was immense. The Hindoo portion of it was convulsed by conflicting feelings of doubt, rage, despair, shame, and pity. The Mahometan spectators, it is said, felt joy at the downfall of the artful and unrelenting enemy of Mahomed Reza Khan. The feelings of the one party were soon to be outraged, and those of the other gratified, by the conclusion of the spectacle which had brought them together. The signal was given—the platform on which the criminal stood prepared for death sunk from beneath his feet, and the spirit of Nuncomar was on its way to a more awful tribunal than that before which he had lately appeared. The effect upon the Hindoos, who formed the great mass of the assembled crowd, resembled that of an earthquake. Uttering a wild and piercing cry, they fled from the spot—force and panic carried with them the rest of the multitude, so that none remained near the place of execution but the servants of the law, and the few Brahmin followers whose duty it was to take charge of the culprit's body.

The trial and execution of Nuncomar have given rise to discussions almost without number. The legality of the proceedings has been questioned—their justice denied—and the motives of those engaged in them impugned. The supposed illegality rests upon the assertion that the criminal law of England does not extend to its outlying possessions, unless they be specially named. This is a question purely technical, and far too important to be discussed incidentally. For these reasons, it may here be passed by. The question of the justice of the proceedings, which ended in the execution of Nuncomar, stands on different grounds; and, with reference to the violent and long-protracted controversy to which it gave rise, it would not be excusable to pass it over without notice.

In India, the crime of forgery, as has been observed, had never been punished with death. Notwithstanding its dangerous character, it was regarded there as a slight and venial offence; and it may be feared that, if dexterously performed, those who were uninjured by the crime would be more ready to admire the ingenuity of the perpetrator than to condemn his want of honesty. The English law, with its severe provisions against forgery, was unknown to the mass of the people within the

circle of the Supreme Court, and its sudden application, without preparation and without notice, appears similar in effect to that of an *ex post facto* law. The execution of Nuncomar has further been alleged to partake of the odious and unjust character of such a law, on the ground that the imputed forgery was committed about four years before the erection of the court which took cognizance of it. In opposition to the first of these positions, it has been urged, that ignorance of the law is never held to afford an excuse for the breach of it, and that all parties subject to its operation are supposed to be acquainted with its provisions. To the second, it is answered, that although the Supreme Court of judicature was not in existence till 1774, there was previously in Calcutta a court administering English law, and which had in one instance convicted a native of the same offence as that with which Nuncomar was charged. It has been doubted whether that court ought to have exercised any criminal jurisdiction with regard to natives; but such jurisdiction had been exercised by it, and the Supreme Court was the legitimate successor to its functions.

This objection, therefore, may be dismissed. It might not have been an improper one to urge in arrest of the judgment of the court which condemned Nuncomar, but it cannot be admitted to influence the opinion of those who have now to review the proceedings in his case.

The answer to the first objection is less satisfactory. It is true that ignorance of the law is not permitted, and cannot be permitted, to operate as a bar to the conviction of an offender; but a merciful judge will always take note of such ignorance, if real, in apportioning punishment. Neither must it be forgotten, that the ignorance of a Hindoo of that time of the provisions of English law is altogether different from the ignorance which exists in any country of the law under which the people of that country and their ancestors have lived. Not only was the law of comparatively recent introduction, but it was in many respects so much at variance with all their previous experience, knowledge, habits, and modes of thought, that while the best-informed among them must have found difficulty in understanding it, it was to those less advantageously situated a collection of strange things, of which their imaginations could embody no lineament or feature. Under such circumstances, the harshness of inflicting upon ignorance the same punishment which is assigned to deliberate and conscious disobedience, is of an aggravated character. It is true, indeed, that the offence punished in the person of Nuncomar was not like offences against the revenue and some others—the pure creation of the law. No man whose moral perceptions are sound can doubt that in resorting to forgery to deprive another of his property he is doing wrong; but the moral perceptions of those among whom the English

law was thus suddenly introduced were not sound; they were corrupted and debased by the false medium through which successive generations had been accustomed to contemplate their rights and duties, and to some of the plainest dictates of morality they were insensible. To men thus surrounded by contaminating influences—men who had never enjoyed the benefit of a pure moral atmosphere, extraordinary consideration was due. The single instance which had occurred of a conviction for forgery in the mayor's court of Calcutta was probably known to few except the parties immediately interested in it. The case of Nuncomar had from various causes attracted unusual attention, and it offered a fitting occasion for making the law known—while the court, by exercising their power of respiting the convict, with a view to the extension of the mercy of the Crown, might have relieved themselves and the law that they administered from the imputations of injustice and cruelty, which, from their pursuing a different course, have been freely cast upon both.

The death of Nuncomar was succeeded by a comparative calm. The state of feeling in the council remained unaltered, and the majority continued to determine and to act without reference to the views of the governor-general and the single member who supported him. But the stream of accusation, which had set so strongly and so formidably against Hastings, ceased to flow. Men were appalled by the fate of the chief accuser, and the governor-general enjoyed a degree of peace, in this respect, to which he had long been a stranger.

Soon after the intriguing life of Nuncomar had been closed by an ignominious death, his old rival, Mahomed Reza Khan, attained a triumph. The Court of Directors, having become satisfied of his innocence, and of the infamy of his accuser Nuncomar, had directed his restoration to office. There was some ambiguity in the orders of the Court, and the two parties in council, in conformity with what was now long-established custom, adopted different constructions of them. The will of the majority was, that Mahomed Reza Khan should be restored to his former charge, which involved the duties which had been assigned to Goodias. The latter, however, was consoled in some degree for his loss, by appointment to another office; but inferior in trust, dignity, and emolument to his former post.

Little occurred at the board to disturb the monotony of eternal bickering till the death of Colonel Monson, which took place in September, 1776. This event reduced the two parties in council to an equality in point of numbers; but as the governor-general had the casting vote, its effects were to reverse the former position of the combatants, and to throw into the hands of Hastings all the power which his opponents had previously exercised. What followed may readily be anticipated. Hastings exercised his long-lost authority in the same spirit which actuated its former possessors;

and he proceeded without ceremony to annul such of their acts as were most offensive to him. When the council insisted on the recall of Mr. Middleton from Oude, the functions of the resident had been temporarily vested in the officer commanding the brigade. After a time, the board agreed to appoint a civil servant to the office of resident; but they were far from agreeing as to the person who should be selected for the purpose. The governor-general proposed the Honourable Frederick Stuart. The opposing majority refused to concur; they proposed a gentleman named Bristow; and holding the power in their own hands, their proposal, as a matter of course, was carried. Shortly after the death of Colonel Monson, Hastings retaliated by proposing the recall of Mr. Bristow, and the re-appointment of Mr. Middleton. General Clavering and Mr. Francois stoutly resisted; they talked loftily of the injustice done to Mr. Bristow, in removing him from a situation which he had filled with credit to himself and advantage to the Company, and for no other avowed reason than to give his place to another; but argument and declamation were alike vain. The foot of the governor-general was upon the necks of his opponents; he remembered how they had employed their power while power rested with them, and seemed resolved that they should have some experience of the mortification which he had endured. He persevered, and it was decided that Mr. Bristow should give way to Mr. Middleton. Both parties agreed in declaring that there was no objection to either Mr. Middleton or Mr. Bristow—that both were well fitted for the duties of the office of resident. They thus alike admitted that their motives were to a great extent factious. Hastings, indeed, cannot be greatly blamed for restoring a man of acknowledged competency to an office from which he had been somewhat capriciously removed; but, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, in this instance at least, the contest had been in some degree provoked by the pertinacious refusal of Hastings to submit the unmutated correspondence of himself and the resident to the board. A still less excusable act of retaliation was perpetrated with regard to a civil servant, named Fowke, who had been appointed under the ascendancy of the late majority to a situation at Benares. This gentleman and his father had taken part with the opponents of Hastings, and under the pretence that the duty assigned to Mr. Fowke was special, and had been performed, he was removed. Immediately afterwards, another civil servant was appointed to reside at Benares, with an assistant bearing the name of Hastings's constant supporter, Barwell. If in the removal of Mr. Bristow, and the re-appointment of Mr. Middleton, Hastings had some grounds of justification, in the case of Mr. Fowke there were none. It was, as described by General Clavering, "a vindictive measure couched under the appearance of a public service." In

this spirit was the business of the Indian government conducted till the authority of Hastings was once more shaken by the arrival of intelligence of a new arrangement for carrying on the government, in which the name of Hastings did not appear. General Clavering was to be governor-general, and Mr. Wheeler, formerly a director, was nominated to the vacant seat in council.

To explain these changes, it will be necessary to refer to the course of events by which they were brought about.

Wearied with the annoyances of his situation, Hastings formed the determination of resigning his office; and two gentlemen, Mr. Graham and Colonel Maclean, seem to have been intrusted with authority, under certain circumstances, to tender his resignation. The latter only appears to have acted in the business, and his proceedings partake, in no small degree, of that mystery which hangs over almost everything connected with the name of Hastings. On Colonel Maclean's arrival in England, he found the state of feeling in almost every quarter unfavourable to his principal. The administration were decidedly hostile, actuated partly by the representations which they had undoubtedly received from the members of council opposed to the governor-general, and partly by a desire to bring the entire government of India within the sphere of their patronage. The Court of Directors had passed resolutions condemning the policy of the Rohilla war, and expressing an opinion that the whole of the correspondence between the governor-general and Mr. Middleton, resident at Oude, ought to have been laid before the council. These resolutions were subsequently adopted by the general court; a prefatory clause being, however, introduced, recognising the services and integrity of the governor-general, and acquitting him of all suspicion of corruption. On some other subjects, the Court of Directors visited the conduct of Hastings and his associate Barwell with censure. On the 8th May, 1776, a motion was made and carried for an address to his Majesty, praying their removal from office.

On hearing of the intention to bring forward the motion, Hastings's agent made overtures both to the ministers and to influential directors, with a view to accommodation. They appear to have been nugatory, and the friends of Hastings having, as one of them observed, "nothing to lose by a defeat," determined to try the result of a general court. To that tribunal they accordingly appealed, with a view to reversing the decision of the Court of Directors. A requisition being obtained, a general court was summoned for the 15th of May; and on that day it was moved that it be recommended to the Court of Directors to reconsider their resolution for procuring the removal of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell from office; and that they should report to the general Court of Proprietors, as speedily as possible, their proceedings on such recommendation,

before any further steps should be taken in the business. The court, on this occasion, was thronged by peers, privy councillors, and adherents of the administration. Treasury influence is said to have been employed to a great extent against Hastings; and the first lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich, is represented as having been unusually active in aiding the cause with which the ministry had connected itself. The debate was protracted till the approach of midnight, when the friends of Hastings proposed to adjourn to the following day. The ministerial party opposed, and, on a division, the motion for adjournment was lost. Hastings's supporters then demanded, that the question which had been the means of calling the court together should be determined by ballot. The result was victory to the cause of the governor-general, the motion of his friends being carried on the ballot by a majority of one hundred and six.

On the 10th July, the resolution for removing the governor-general and Mr. Barwell was rescinded by the Court of Directors with regard to Mr. Barwell, and on the 16th the like indulgence was extended to the governor-general. Notwithstanding this, some of the friends of Mr. Hastings seem to have entertained little hope of maintaining him in the chair at Calcutta in opposition to the powerful interests arrayed against him. Colonel Maclean appears to have been engaged in a long and somewhat complicated series of intrigues, the object of which was to enable Mr. Hastings to quit office with some degree of credit. Honours from the Crown were talked of, but these, it was intimated, could not be conferred. A series of propositions seem, however, to have been at length agreed upon by Colonel Maclean and Mr. Robinson, a confidential servant of the ministry, which were to serve as a basis for peace.

The minister being propitiated, Hastings's agent turned to the Court of Directors. At a court held on the 11th of December, a letter from him was read. It stated that Mr. Hastings, seeing the necessity of unanimity in the supreme council of Bengal for conducting the affairs of the Company there, and for establishing any permanent system of government for the good and prosperity of the country, finding from the unhappy divisions which have occurred in the supreme council that such was not likely to subsist, and having anxiously on every occasion studied to promote the welfare of the Company, a course which he would ever continue, had, from these motives, authorized the writer, Colonel Maclean, to signify his desire to resign the office of governor-general, and to request the court to nominate a successor to the place which would thereby be vacated in the supreme council. On the 18th the letter was taken into consideration. On this day, also, Colonel Maclean was called in, and a question was proposed to him as to his authority. This was certainly a natural and proper inquiry, but it appeared

that the agent was not prepared to answer it unconditionally. He professed to be quite ready to give the court satisfaction, but intimated, that in the papers to which he must refer, the subject of his powers was mixed up with other matters "of a nature extremely confidential;" and he therefore proposed, instead of laying them before the court, to submit them to the inspection of three of the directors specially deputed for the purpose of examining them. The court agreed to the proposal, and Mr. Roberts, the chairman, Mr. James, the deputy-chairman, and Mr. Becher were empowered to make the requisite inspection. They reported that Colonel Maclean had shown them certain papers relating to his powers, and had informed them that he had more. On a future day they further reported that, from the purport of Mr. Hastings's instructions, contained in a paper in his own handwriting, given to Colonel Maclean, and forwarded by him to them, Mr. Hastings declared that he would not continue in the government of Bengal unless certain conditions therein specified could be obtained, of which they saw no probability; that Mr. George Vansittart had assured them that he was present when these instructions were given to Colonel Maclean, and when Mr. Hastings empowered that gentleman to declare his resignation to the court, and that this had been confirmed by Mr. Stuart, who stated that Mr. Hastings had informed him that he had given instructions for this purpose to Colonel Maclean. The court determined the evidence of the colonel's authority to be sufficient, and a resolution that the resignation be accepted was carried unanimously; the friends of Hastings supporting the resolution, because they thought it in accordance with his interests and wishes; his enemies, because it gratified their long-cherished desire to be rid of him. Mr. Wheeler was then nominated to succeed to the vacant place in council, and a petition to the Crown praying the appointment of that gentleman agreed upon.

The consent of the Crown gave effect to the nomination of the court, and the new appointment was formally announced to the Government of Bengal. The news raised a storm exceeding in violence any that had previously occurred. Hastings repudiated the acts of Colonel Maclean, and determined to retain his post at the head of the government: General Clavering was equally bent on assuming the dignity, to which he conceived himself entitled. Both proceeded to exercise the functions appertaining to the disputed office, both issued summonses for meetings of council, and each found a follower. Mr. Barwell answered the summons of Hastings, and Mr. Francis that of General Clavering: there were thus two councils sitting at the same time under the authority of two different persons, each claiming to be governor-general.

The effects of these contests might have been seriously disastrous; the manner in which

they were carried on almost partakes of the ludicrous. Mr. Barwell, on taking his place at the council called by Hastings, informed the "board" (consisting of Hastings and himself) that on his way he had received a note requiring his attendance at the council at which General Clavering was to preside. Before the minute which was to record this fact was completed, a letter, addressed to "Warren Hastings, Esq.," without further appendage, was put into the hands of the person thus designated. It was from General Clavering. After recapitulating the steps by which the assumed change in the government had been effected, Hastings's competitor required that the keys of Fort William and of the Company's treasury should be delivered to him, and intimated his intention of being at the council-house at a specified hour to receive them, unless Hastings should prefer any other method of complying with the requisition; one condition only being insisted upon—that the surrender should take place in the course of the day. The answer of Hastings and Barwell was that they knew of no act or instrument by which the office of governor-general had been vacated, nor by which it had devolved upon General Clavering; and that they would maintain, by all legal means, the authority and trust conferred by the act under which the existing government was constituted.

The rival council in the mean time had met.

General Clavering had taken the usual oath as governor-general, and, in concert with Mr. Francis, had framed a proclamation announcing the change in the government, publication of which was ordered to be made without delay. It was also to be translated into the Persian and Bengalee languages, but the Persian translator refused to perform his office. The secretary was less scrupulous; he had readily obeyed the instructions of General Clavering, but subsequently received orders from the other party not to summon any council without the order of Hastings as governor-general, nor to perform any official duty without his authority, or that of a majority of council assembled under it. He was also required to send to the council convoked by Hastings the despatches from Europe which had excited this ferment. His answer to the former of these instructions was an apology for having acted under the orders of General Clavering in summoning a council in his name; to the latter he replied by stating that the despatches had been delivered to the party whose authority he had thus recognized. Scarcely had the secretary made report of these circumstances to General Clavering and Mr. Francis, when Mr. Barwell presented himself before them. He was asked whether he meant to take his place as a member of council; but on this point he maintained an obstinate silence. His business was to obtain possession of the fatal despatches which had thrown the government into confusion, and he requested that they might be delivered to him. General

Clavering replied, "The council is sitting; I cannot part with them." The applicant, without arguing the right of the alleged council, inquired at what time he could have the letters. This produced a question as to the authority by which he demanded them. Still Mr. Barwell refrained either from impugning the authority of those whom he addressed, or asserting that of Hastings. He replied that he required the despatches as a member of the Council of Bengal, in which capacity he was entitled to peruse and take copy of any public papers. This privilege it did not suit the schismatical board at that moment to recognize. General Clavering answered, "You have heard them read once; you may hear them read a second time." Mr. Barwell demanded to know whether the papers would be delivered to him or not. The general replied that he was not there to answer interrogatories, and repeated his former intimation, that the inquirer might hear the despatches read. The demand for the delivery was then made in a more formal manner. General Clavering refused to vary his answer. Mr. Barwell ordered the secretary to send him the papers in dispute as soon as they came into his possession; and thus this extraordinary conference ended.

Hastings, however, remained firm in the assertion of his authority. The commandant of the garrison of Fort William, the commanding officers at the various stations, the provincial councils and collectors, were all formally reminded that their obedience was due only to Hastings, as governor-general, and the majority of the council, and warned against yielding it to any other authority. To strengthen his claim by the sanction of the accredited interpreters of the law, Hastings appealed to the judges of the Supreme Court; his opponents acquiesced in the appeal. They appear, indeed, to have possessed little confidence in their own views; for, with reference to the appeal to the judges, they resolved to suspend the execution of all the orders which they had passed. The decision of the judges was in favour of Hastings, who used his victory in a manner as little creditable to his character for discretion as for good-feeling. With the aid of his steady adherent, Barwell, he passed a series of resolutions singularly intemperate, vindictive, and absurd. After reciting the acts performed by General Clavering, under his assumed authority, they declared not only that by those acts he had usurped the office of governor-general—a proposition which the decision of the judges would have justified—but that the general "had thereby relinquished, resigned, surrendered, and vacated the office of senior councillor of Fort William," as well as the place of commander-in-chief of the Company's forces in India; that Mr. Barwell had thereby become senior councillor; that the office of commander-in-chief no longer existed; and that, for "the preservation of the legality of" their "proceedings, General Clavering should not in future be summoned

or admitted as a member of council." These proceedings seem to have excited considerable alarm in the enemy's quarters. Mr. Francis attended the next meeting of council, and presented a motion for reversing the resolutions respecting General Clavering, with a representation of the dangers which surrounded the government, of the evils which had arisen from passion and precipitancy, and of the necessity for recurring to a more moderate and prudent course. He claimed for himself credit in regard to his immediate and implicit submission to the decision of the judges, and implored that he might be allowed to act the part of a mediator. In this character he urged the reversal of their late proceedings; he referred to the origin of the existing government; contended that there were only four ways by which the right of General Clavering to the place which he had previously occupied in council could be voided—by death, resignation, removal by the Crown, or succession to the office of governor-general; and that none of these events had taken place. On the claims of General Clavering to hold the office of commander-in-chief of the Company's forces in India, he held a similar line of argument, varied only with reference to the different circumstances of the appointment. Mr. Francis was answered by Mr. Barwell, who expressed his belief in the legality of the resolutions passed on General Clavering, and his determination to uphold them, but did not sustain his opinion by any redundancy of argument. The governor-general, in the unrelenting spirit which he so frequently manifested, maintained the legality and necessity of excluding General Clavering from council. But General Clavering and Mr. Francis had appealed to the judges of the Supreme Court. The judges unanimously decided that the council had no power to remove one of its members, or declare his seat vacant; nor could they, indeed, have decided otherwise, without publicly exhibiting themselves as unfit to occupy the seat of justice.

In looking back upon these events with the calmness of feeling which the actors in them could not maintain, it is impossible not to be struck with the violence and precipitancy manifested by all parties. General Clavering in assuming the government had a pretence barely colourable, and it is scarcely conceivable that he could have believed it more than colourable. The instrument under which General Clavering claimed to take upon himself the office of governor-general did not supersede Hastings. Anticipating the retirement of the governor-general, the Court of Directors nominated a new councillor, and the Crown confirmed the nomination; but the operation of these acts was contingent upon an event which depended on the judgment or the caprice of the person whose removal was to create a vacancy in council. There is therefore no difficulty in determining that General Clavering, in assuming the office of governor-general,

and Mr. Francis, in abetting him in the assumption, acted illegally as well as unwisely.

The conduct of Hastings is free from the imputation of illegality: he had a right to retain his office if he so pleased; the question remains whether he was morally as well as legally justified. The precise powers which he conveyed to his agents cannot be ascertained. He gave them two papers, one laying down certain conditions as indispensable to his retention of the government, the other explanatory of one of those conditions. Whether there were any further instructions in writing, Hastings professed to be unable to recollect, and there are no satisfactory means of supplying the deficiency of the governor-general's memory. More than these two papers appear to have been shown to the select three appointed by the Court of Directors to confer with Colonel Maclean, for it is recorded that Hastings's agent had laid before them "several papers," and "had acquainted them that he had more to produce relative to the powers with which he was invested." It seems, however, that the acceptance of the supposed resignation, as far as it rested on documentary ground, was based on Hastings's declaration, that unless his conditions were complied with he would not continue in the government; and upon this, aided by the avowal of Colonel Maclean that he had authority for what he did, and the testimony of Mr. George Vansittart and Mr. Stuart, the court proceeded. Hastings affirmed that Colonel Maclean had exceeded his instructions; and to discredit the evidence by which the alleged authority of his agent was confirmed, he observed, that he had never called upon the parties from whom it proceeded to be witnesses to any transactions, nor ever authorized them to give testimony. These statements might be true; but if Mr. Vansittart was, as he stated, present when the instructions were given to Colonel Maclean, and Mr. Stuart received a confirmation of them from the lips of the governor-general at a future period, their evidence was nothing the worse because they had not been formally invested with the character of witnesses. Hastings himself acknowledged that he knew one of these gentlemen to possess judgment and probity, and believed the same of the other: as men of judgment they were not likely to misunderstand the governor-general—as men of probity they would not misrepresent him. It is remarkable, too, that Hastings never denied having given the alleged instructions, but only disavowed all recollection of them, and added plausible reasons to show how unlikely it was that he should have given them. "I can only say," he observes, "that I do not retain even the faintest idea of having given such a commission; nor can I conceive the necessity of empowering others to do, in my name, an act which must have waited for my ratification, and which it was at all times in my own power to perform for

myself without agency." But it is incredible that a matter of such vast importance should pass from his mind like an idle subject of casual conversation, and that his resignation of the office of governor-general should have been felt to be of so little moment, that he could not recollect whether the man whom he had avowedly intrusted with some power was commissioned to tender it or not.

It has been said, that the power given in this respect was subsequently withdrawn. This statement rests upon a letter addressed by Hastings to Mr. Graham and Colonel Maclean, in which he professes to retract the resolution communicated to them in a former letter. That resolution was to leave Calcutta and return to England by the first ship of the ensuing season, if the advices from that country should convey disapprobation of the treaty of Benares and the Rohilla war, and should "mark an evident disinclination towards" him. The knowledge of Hastings's intention in this respect was stated to be confined to his agents, who were to use it according to their discretion. This resolution it is that he retracted; and it is clear that the retraction of the governor-general's intentions to take his departure from India at a particular time, if certain circumstances occurred, is a very different thing from the withdrawal from his agents of the discretionary power of tendering his resignation previously given. The powers claimed by Colonel Maclean, and vouched for by Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Stuart, are not referred to in the supposed retraction. It is scarcely possible to doubt that such powers were given. Why they were not in writing, like the conditions upon which Hastings insisted if he continued in the government, it is not so easy to say.

It is no part of the duty of the historian to vindicate the character and conduct of Hastings's agent, Colonel Maclean. He was obviously an intriguing man, and there is abundant reason to believe that he was an unscrupulous one; but it being presumed that Hastings had given him the authority which he claimed, there does not appear any ground for accusing him of either mistaking or neglecting the interests of his principal. One point, however, in this strange series of transactions must strike every one who examines them—it is the extreme facility with which the Court of Directors yielded belief to the representations of Colonel Maclean, that he was authorized to tender the governor-general's resignation. This assertion, indeed, was supported by corroborative testimony, the truth of which there was no reason to suspect; but a verbal authority, though confirmed by respectable evidence, was not sufficient to justify the grave and important step of putting in motion the power of the Crown to fill up the place in council presumed to be vacant. In this case, as in many others, an inclination to be satisfied supplied the want of formal and authoritative proof. The Court of Directors wished to avoid

a collision with the ministry on the one hand, or with the majority of the proprietors on the other. The measure suggested by Hastings's agent seemed to afford the means of effecting this; it moreover gave the opponents of Hastings all they wanted, without subjecting his friends to the mortification of defeat; it was consequently eagerly embraced. Could the party hostile to Hastings have foreseen the consequence of their conduct, he would not have enjoyed the opportunity of disappointing their wishes by disavowing his agent. But they were too much pleased with the prospect of attaining their object by compromise to examine very scrupulously into the authority on which the arrangement rested, or into the probability of the governor-general performing that which had been promised on his behalf. Hastings found it convenient to abandon his agent, or he had forgotten the instructions which he had given, or Maclean had exceeded his authority. The result was a convulsion which might have uprooted the new-founded empire of Great Britain in India, had it not subsided almost as soon as raised. In allaying the storm, the judges of the supreme court did good service to the state; and it must not be denied, that while General Clavering and Mr. Francis had by their violence placed the British Government in danger, they subsequently evinced a far more conciliatory spirit than was shown by their opponents.

Hastings, fixed in his seat by the decision of the judges, continued to exercise his power as absolutely as before, and to be subjected to the same annoyances from the unrelenting opposition of those leagued against him. In August, 1777, Sir John Clavering followed his ally, General Monson, to the grave; his death being, it is believed, accelerated by the irritation of mind in which he had long been kept, and the vexations to which he had latterly been subjected. Hastings and Barwell had now a numerical majority in council, and for a few months the casting vote of the former was not necessary to the success of his measures. Mr. Wheler arrived not long after Sir John Clavering's death, and took his seat in council as the successor of General Monson. The news of General Monson's decease had reached England before Mr. Wheler's departure, and, in consequence, the previous appointment of that gentleman to succeed on the vacancy occasioned by the retirement of Hastings was revoked, and its place supplied by a new one, nominating him to the place in council actually vacant by the death of General Monson. Mr. Wheler affected to maintain a neutral part between Hastings and Francis; but, as might have been expected, he almost invariably supported the latter, and thus reduced the contending forces to that equilibrium which had prevailed before the death of Sir John Clavering, and which required the interposition of the governor-general's casting vote to prevent the machine

of government from coming to a dead stand. To Hastings this state of things was perhaps not disagreeable, although it placed him in a situation of extraordinary responsibility. He liked power, and he liked the appearance of it not less than the reality. He had great confidence in himself and a strong disposition to annoy his opponents. The additional responsibility incurred by his peculiar position was therefore little felt; and if it ever sat unusually heavy on him, its presence was lightened by the gratification which he derived from the reflection that those who hated him, and whom in turn he hated, were under his rod, without power of moving hand or foot in the exercise of their public duties, except so far as he pleased to permit them.

Among the subjects which at an early period after the arrival of Mr. Wheler occupied the attention of the council, was a letter addressed to the governor-general by Mobarikul-Dowlah, complaining bitterly of the conduct of Mahomed Reza Khan in the management of his affairs, and alleging, that as that person was not connected with the prince either by the ties of nature or attachment, his continued possession of the high degree of power with which he was invested was oppressive and dishonourable to the family. The nabob observed, that he had now attained that age when, by the law and usage of Mahomedanism, he ought to take the management of his own affairs; and he added, in no very elevated strain of self-laudation, that he was not so devoid of understanding as to be incapable of conducting them. He reminded the governor-general that the power of the Company was derived from the support of his ancestors, and on these grounds claimed to be emancipated from the tutelage of Mahomed Reza Khan, and admitted to the personal management of the affairs of the nizamat and of his household. The letter was laid by the governor-general before the council, and it is unnecessary to say that it gave rise to great differences very warmly expressed. Mr. Wheler proposed to do nothing till the decision of the Court of Directors could be ascertained. The governor-general opposed; but it happened that Mr. Barwell was absent, and Mr. Francis supporting Mr. Wheler, the motion was carried. At the next meeting of council Mr. Barwell was at his post: the resolution of the previous meeting was summarily reversed, and the nabob's request complied with. After the lapse of a few months, the governor-general produced another letter from the nabob, suggesting a plan for disposing of the salary of Mahomed Reza Khan. In the distribution a considerable share was allotted to Munny Begum. Another portion was to be enjoyed by the nabob's mother, Baboo Begum. It happened, too, that the amount of money proposed to be distributed exceeded that formerly enjoyed by Mahomed Reza Khan by eighteen thousand rupees per annum, and the Company were invited to make up the excess.

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler objected to this, as they did to the entire arrangement, and recorded minutes assigning reasons for their opposition. The governor-general and Mr. Barwell embarked in no strife of words. The former moved that the requisitions of the nabob should be complied with; the latter simply wrote, "I assent to the governor-general's motion." That motion was necessarily carried.

This part of Hastings's conduct was severely animadverted upon by the Court of Directors, who ordered their wish for the restoration of Mahomed Reza Khan to be signified to the nabob, and an assurance of their continued favour to be conveyed to Mahomed Reza Khan himself. These orders were obeyed; but in the letter, not in the spirit. In communicating the desire of the court, Francis and Wheeler proposed to call upon the nabob to comply with it. Hastings and Barwell contended for a simple communication of the wish of the court, leaving the intelligence to produce its own effect. It did produce all that could be expected—a remonstrance from the nabob; and but for an event which will soon be noticed, the restoration of Mahomed Reza Khan might have been postponed till the power of thwarting it had departed from Hastings.

The Court of Directors had also ordered the restoration of Mr. Bristow, whom the governor-general had removed from the residency at Oude, and of Mr. Fowke, whom he had displaced at Benares. These orders were treated with the same degree of respect which was accorded to those relating to Mahomed Reza Khan, they were received, read, and coolly set at naught.

A few months, however, wrought a change, and in a manner calculated to excite surprise. From the temper which had been manifested both by Hastings and Francis, the expectation of an accommodation being effected between them must have appeared one of the most extravagant that could be entertained; but little as it was anticipated, such an event was about to take place. The motives of the parties are not perfectly clear. Both, indeed, professed to be weary of controversy; but few persons who have studied the characters of the combatants will be disposed to give either of them credit for the feeling. Each had a confidence in his own judgment amounting to presumption; and the change in their conduct is probably to be ascribed to circumstances rather than to any abatement either of their arrogance or of their mutual hatred.

The period of office secured by the act of 1773, to the persons therein named as governor-general and council, had expired before Hastings and his coadjutors had notice of any provision being made for such an event; they consequently continued to exercise their functions, and were in course of time apprised that an act had passed, continuing the existing governor-general in office for one year. Sir Eyre

Coote had been appointed to succeed General Clavering in the command of the army, and to a place in council. In the latter capacity he usually supported Hastings, but not with the undeviating constancy of Barwell. Barwell had passed twenty-three years in India, during ten of which he had been a member of council. He had enjoyed abundant opportunities of acquiring wealth, and, having improved them, was desirous of retiring to the enjoyment of his fortune at home. This event Francis, it may be presumed, was not indisposed to accelerate. It would relieve him from a steady opponent, and deprive Hastings of a friend, whose vote was never denied to any measure which he chose to recommend. In proportion, however, as the retirement of Barwell was desired by Francis, it was dreaded by Hastings. He discerned in it the downfall of that absolute power which he had for some time exercised; and though Barwell's feelings of friendship might render him reluctant to abandon the governor-general and his measures to a council where two would always vote against him, and the third could not be depended upon for steady or permanent support, it could not be expected that he would from this cause defer for any long period the gratification of his own yearnings for ease and home. Regarding the departure of Barwell, therefore, as an event that could not be far distant, Hastings was not indisposed to soften the asperity of an enemy whose power of opposing him was about to be greatly increased. He could not hope to convert him into a friend—probably he did not wish it, but he might expect to diminish both the vigour and the frequency of his attacks, and to secure, by a surrender of some points on which Francis had been most pertinacious, the liberty of pursuing unmolested those plans in which his own mind was most deeply interested. Such is the best account that can be given of the probable motives of those concerned in the negotiation. The overture appears to have proceeded from Francis, and to have been made on his behalf by a Mr. Ducarel to Major Scott, a great favourite of the governor-general, and his agent in various important and confidential transactions. The principal conditions required by Francis appear to have been explained at the meeting. The result was communicated to Hastings, and the two principals subsequently met to complete the pacification so happily commenced by their agents. The value which Hastings attached to the success of the negotiation may be estimated by the sacrifices which he made to secure it. A man more unrelenting in his hostility never lived; yet he consented to purchase peace on the condition of immediately restoring Mr. Fowke to the office which he had formerly enjoyed, from which Hastings had removed him, and to which he had shortly before refused to restore him, though his restoration was required by the express orders of the Court of Directors. Mr. Bristow, who had been removed in like

manner, whose restoration had in like manner been ordered by the Court of Directors, and in like manner deferred by Hastings, was also to be restored, though not immediately. Further, to propitiate his rival, Hastings agreed to conform to the orders from home respecting Mahomed Reza Khan. These concessions were so many virtual acknowledgments that Hastings had acted factiously in his previous dealings with the parties whose return to employment was thus provided for. He had not only removed, but had persisted in excluding them from office, in opposition to the deliberate judgment of those whom he served. Nothing but the strongest public necessity could justify such a course; but such necessity, if it ever existed, continued in full force at the time when he consented to replace them. The inevitable conclusion is, that personal aversion dictated their removal, and personal convenience led to the engagement to restore them.

The conclusion of the truce with Francis was to be followed, at no great distance of time, by another compromise, scarcely less remarkable. Almost from the period when the judges of the Supreme Court entered on their functions, serious differences had existed between them and the government. The court seemed resolved to press its jurisdiction to the very extent of the limits prescribed to it by law, if not a little beyond them. The jurisdiction of the court had been restricted to British subjects resident, or having been resident, within Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, or having debts, effects, or estate there, and to persons employed directly or indirectly in the service of the Company, or of British subjects; these words being intended to exclude the natives generally, they being regarded as subjects of the nabob: with regard to these, the jurisdiction of the court, with the exception already mentioned, could only be exercised with consent of parties. The court, however, adopted such principles of construction as threatened to bring within its power every inhabitant of the three provinces on whom any one might desire to inflict the vexation and expense of a law-suit. No man could calculate on being able to escape its meshes, and all regarded it with horror. To the poor the expense attending its proceedings was frightful; to the rich its forms of process were so offensive as to be more dreaded than even death. In a country where the tendency to litigation is so strong as it is in India, where revenge is so long cherished and so remorselessly gratified, the Supreme Court became a frightful instrument of injustice and oppression. Its lower retainers were among the vilest and most abandoned inmates of a crowded Indian city, and the manner in which they exercised their unpopular calling may readily be conceived. The government was not less hostile than the people to the assumptions of the Supreme Court; for the judges were charged with exceeding their authority by interfering with the

collection of the revenue; and further, they had claimed the right of calling for the production of the records of government in their court. Having advanced thus far, it was not to be expected that the judicial institutions of the country would meet with much respect. In one case a verdict, with heavy damages, was given against several parties concerned in certain proceedings before the provincial council of Patna, including some Mahometan functionaries employed by that council. Another verdict passed, at the suit of the same plaintiffs, against the members of the council. It would be difficult to show that it was any part of the duty of the Supreme Court to control and regulate the courts subsisting under the authority of the local government; but in this case they assumed the power, and they decided the question before them, moreover, upon a maxim of English law, *delegatus non potest delegare*, of which, however sound and rational it may be, the parties thus visited with punishment in the shape of damages which they were unable to pay, had never heard.

The time when mutual and long-cherished discontent was to issue in an open conflict at length arrived. An opulent native, named Cossinaut Baboo, had given security to the government for certain rents payable by the rajah of Cossijurah, in his capacity of zemindar. Cossinaut had also acted as manager of the zemindary, the accounts of which were involved in much difficulty. There were disputed questions between Cossinaut and the government; there were others in which the claims of Cossinaut were opposed by those of the rajah or of the cultivators. Government had proceeded to vindicate its claims by an appeal to the law, but an arrangement subsequently took place, and a further examination of the accounts was entered upon by mutual agreement, Cossinaut depositing the sum in dispute. Before the examination was completed, Cossinaut commenced an action against the rajah in the Supreme Court, and in order to entitle him to its interposition, made oath that the zemindar was employed by the East-India Company in the collection of the revenues. Upon this a *capias* issued, with a clause authorizing the sheriff to take bail to the amount of 300,000 rupees.

An officer proceeded to execute the writ, and the zemindar, having obtained information of the approach of the unwelcome visitor, disappeared. The governor-general and council, on being apprized of the facts, had recourse to their legal advisers. The Company's advocate-general gave his opinion that the legislature did not intend to subject zemindars to the authority of the Supreme Court; and after adverting to the peculiar position of the English in India, as well as to the difficulties which had arisen and were likely to arise from the imprudent and extravagant assumptions of the judges, he advised that the zemindar should have notice that, not being subject to

the jurisdiction of the court, he should not appear, or plead, or do, or suffer any act which might appear on his part to amount to a recognition of the authority of the judicature, as extending to himself. The advocate-general further advised, that in all similar cases, as well as in that before him, the power of the government should be withheld from affording aid to the judicature of the court; that the court should be left to its own means of executing its process; and that the judges should (in the language of the advocate) "thus render themselves responsible to the state for having, should such be the event, unnecessarily hazarded the dignity and authority of the king's judicature, by exposing its process to contempt and its officers to resistance and repulse." The advice of the advocate-general was followed. The European collector at Midnapore was instructed to apprise the zemindar of the views of the governor-general and council, and if applied to by the sheriff for military assistance, to refuse it.

The writ of *capias* was returned unexecuted; and a writ was thereupon issued to sequester the lands and effects of the zemindar in order to compel his appearance to the action. To enforce this writ the sheriff's officer was attended by a body of about sixty sepoys and European seamen; the former furnished by Cossinaut, who, in accordance with a common practice among wealthy natives, kept in pay an armed force; the latter consisting of sailors discharged from ships in the river. The whole were armed and provided with ammunition. On this preparation becoming known to the governor-general and council, they ordered Colonel Ahmuty, the officer commanding at Midnapore, with a view to preserve the peace of the country, to despatch a sufficient force to intercept and apprehend any body of men answering the description of those understood to be employed for executing the work of sequestration. These orders did not arrive in time to prevent an attempt to execute the writ. A sergeant, with part of the sheriff's force, effected an entrance into the house of the zemindar and endeavoured to pass into the zenana. They were resisted, and for the time overpowered; but the sheriff's party being reinforced, possession of the house was obtained, the sanctity of the zenana violated, the zemindar's dewan seized and detained as a prisoner. The state of affairs was soon changed by the arrival of a party of troops despatched by Colonel Ahmuty under the orders which he had received from the government. The sheriff's men were made prisoners and marched off to the presidency. These proceedings were followed by the issue of a government notice addressed to all zemindars and landholders, advising them that they were not subject to the Supreme Court, except under particular circumstances, which were pointed out, and warning them not to plead to any action brought therein, nor to do or suffer any act which should amount to a

recognition of its authority over them. This was transmitted to all the provincial councils and collectors, with orders to give it publicity; and those authorities were, at the same time, directed not to afford any aid to the service of the process of the Supreme Court in cases where, by the terms of the notice, the parties against whom such process was directed were declared to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the court. These events occurred in the months of November and December, 1779.

On the 18th January following, rules were granted in the Supreme Court, calling upon certain persons alleged to be connected with the resistance offered to the process of the court, to show cause why attachment should not issue against them. Those persons were Lieutenant Bamford, the officer commanding the party by which the sheriff's followers were dispossessed and made prisoners; Mr. Swanson, assistant to the collector at Midnapore; and Mr. North Naylor, the Company's attorney. The principal offences charged on the last-named gentleman were his having made inquiry at the sheriff's office as to the means taken for executing the writ, and being privy to the despatch of the military force by which the execution was frustrated. Application was at the same time made for rules against the governor-general and Mr. Barwell; but the chief justice was under the influence of a remarkable degree of discretion, and he declared that the court would not grant a rule which they "could not enforce," but he directed copies of the rule to be served upon both, in order that they might answer the matters sworn to if they chose. The leniency with which the chief justice treated the members of the government was not extended to their attorney. On a future day the rule against Mr. Naylor was made absolute, and he was required to answer a string of twenty interrogatories. Mr. Naylor regarded compliance with this order as inconsistent with his professional duty; and, with a view to the influence of meditation in effecting a change in his judgment, he was committed a prisoner to the common gaol of Calcutta. The governor-general and council were, about the same time, served with a summons from the Supreme Court, to answer to Cossinaut Baboo in an action of trespass. There could be little doubt as to the ground of this action, but as it did not appear on the summons, and might, "by bare possibility, have relation to questions of a private or personal nature," appearance was entered for all the parties. The plaintiff confirmed the suspicion which had been entertained; and it being evident that the action related to matters done by the governor-general and council in their public capacity, they directed their council to withdraw their appearance. The wrath of the court was thereupon roused to fury. The conduct of the government was declared to be "a clear contempt of his Majesty's law, and of his court;" but the indignation of the judges sub-

sided on recollecting from whom the contempt proceeded. The counsel for the Company had tendered a paper containing the resolutions of the government. The court ordered this paper to be recorded, "but," says Sir Elijah Impey, "as it was in the case of the governor-general and council, did no other act in consequence of it." The judges, however, determined that the defendants could not withdraw their plea without leave, and that if they applied for such leave, it would not be right to grant it; that both as British subjects, and as being employed by, and in the service of the East-India Company, they were subject to the jurisdiction of the court as individuals, and that there was no distinction between their concurrent and individual acts; and, finally, that the court would proceed in the case before them as in any other where there was a default of appearance. The plaintiff had previously applied to the court to have the cause set down to be heard *ex parte* for default of plea, and the application had been granted. But this affair, which had threatened consequences scarcely less serious than those dreaded at an earlier period from the conflict of rival claims for the first place in the government, terminated in a manner as extraordinary as it was unexpected. Cossinaut Baboo suddenly discontinued his actions against the governor-general and members of council, and also that against the zemindar, out of which the others had arisen. His motives are unknown. It has been surmised, and with strong probability, that Hastings could have thrown some light upon them. A still more remarkable event was to follow at the distance of a few months from the discontinuance of Cossinaut's actions. Sir Elijah Impey, chief justice of the Supreme Court, was made judge of the Sudder dewanny adawlut, the highest court of justice existing under the authority of the Company. To this appointment a salary of sixty thousand rupees per annum was annexed.

Thus terminated the conflict between the government of Bengal and the Supreme Court, provoked by the judges, and carried on by them with a lamentable disregard of their own duty and of the public interest. Their infatuation led to resistance from the power which was bound to lend its support to their authority. The course taken by the government cannot be defended upon any ordinary principles, but the circumstances under which they were called upon to act were not of an ordinary character. The judges acted under the authority of an act of parliament, and the governor-general and council had no legal right to interpret that act. According to strict law the court might determine its own jurisdiction, subject to appeal to the king in council; but the assumptions of the court were so monstrous, and the consequences likely to flow from them so fearful, that the government had only to choose between resisting the power of the court, on the one hand, or, on the other, calmly witnessing the total ruin of the country com-

mitted to their care. The land was passing out of cultivation under the terror of the Supreme Court; the people flying from their habitations to escape the outrages offered by its myrmidons to their persons and their feelings; and, if its course had not been timely arrested, the country would have become a desert—the bailiffs of the Supreme Court its lords. The governor-general and council could not have been justified in suffering this state of things to ensue. The violence of the remedy was warranted by the extreme wrong which gave rise to it. The judges usurped powers which the legislature did not intend them to possess, and the government resisted them. The one party strained the law, to extend their own authority; the other resisted the process of the law, in order to protect the people from oppression. In the performance of this duty, for a duty it was, Hastings cordially joined with that party in the council with which he was usually at enmity. His friend, Mr. Barwell, was far less decided in his conduct. The most devoted supporter of the policy of Hastings, he wished not to separate himself from the governor-general; the attached friend of Sir Elijah Impey, he recoiled from giving offence to the chief justice; vacillating, under the influence of these contending motives, from one side to the other, defending the legality of the acts of the Supreme Court, and at the same time perfectly convinced that their acts were destroying the sources of the revenue, Mr. Barwell seems to have been anxious in this dispute to stand well with all parties. Hastings did not thus temporize: he chose his part, and he acted vigorously upon the choice which he had made. But here approbation must end: the means by which the dispute was terminated, though very characteristic of Hastings's policy, were very discreditable to all parties concerned in the accommodation.

To the reputation of the chief justice the appointment was more injurious than even to that of Hastings—it was deadly. Had Sir Elijah Impey died before accepting this fatal gift, he would by impartial observers have been regarded as a man of narrow mind, headstrong passions, and overbearing temper; but no imputation, based on sufficient evidence, would have shaded his judicial integrity. His own act effected that which all the ingenuity of his enemies would have failed to accomplish. He inscribed on his own brow the record of his disgrace in characters deep, broad, and indelible. The temptation was so undisguised in its approach, the scandal of accepting it was so glaring, that the slightest feeling of judicial decency would have repelled it with something approaching to scorn. What could his contemporaries, what could posterity think of a chief justice, found, in the words of a distinguished member of his own profession, "one day summoning the governor-general and council before his tribunal for acts done as council, and the next accepting emoluments

nearly equal to his original appointment, to be held during the pleasure of the same council!"

Before the completion of the arrangement by which the chief justice was to be rendered supple and accommodating, the slumbering embers of discontent within the council had burst into renewed life; and so powerful was the reaction of hostility, after the temporary calm, that the pen became too feeble an instrument to express the feelings of the two chief combatants. Among the articles of agreement between Hastings and Francis was one, it was stated, securing to the former the management of the Mahratta war, the details of which will be related in a future chapter. According to Hastings's view, this article was violated, and he produced in evidence an alleged copy of the stipulation in the following words:—"Mr. Francis will not oppose any measure which the governor-general will recommend for the prosecution of the war in which we are supposed to be engaged with the Mahrattas, or for the general support of the present political system of this government: neither will he himself either propose or vote with any other member who shall propose any measure that shall be contrary to the governor-general's opinion on these points." Francis denied that he ever was a party to such an engagement, and, referring to a conversation with Hastings, in which the governor-general produced a memorandum containing, as he believed, the article in question, Francis affirmed that he returned it with a declaration that he did not agree to it. Between the truth of these conflicting statements there are but slender materials for determining. The balance of probability, however, somewhat inclines in favour of the assertion of Hastings. He had given up to Francis many points on which his

personal wishes would have led him to withstand a surrender; it is inconceivable that he should not have bargained for something in return. If everything were to be conceded to Francis, and nothing to the governor-general, the latter might as well have risked the consequences of Mr. Barwell's possible retirement. He probably would not have retired, if his friend and leader had not believed himself secure of a satisfactory share of power. Hastings, too, at the time when the arrangement was concluded, seems to have been convinced that the provision relating to the Mahratta war was part of it. It has been suggested that both parties were guiltless: that Francis had declined to assent to the disputed article, but that Hastings had not understood him. This seems incredible. On a subject of so much interest to both, care would be taken that the main provisions of the compact were understood; and it is not easy to evade the conclusion that either Francis was guilty of a gross breach of faith, or Hastings of the assertion of a scandalous falsehood. The presumption, on the whole, lies against Francis, and his character will, probably, never be relieved from the imputation. But whoever was the guilty party, the dispute was near finding a tragical termination. A challenge given by Francis was accepted by the governor-general: the parties met, exchanged shots, and Francis was wounded. The previous language of the disputants was so violent, that such a result, however reprehensible, was far from unnatural. On the indecency of such a mode of determining disputes existing in a council intrusted with the care of vast and important interests, no remark can be necessary.

Francis quitted India in December following, and Hastings was thus left to pursue his own views almost uncontrolled.

CHAPTER X.

HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT AND THE NABOB OF BROACH—ENGLISH TAKE POSSESSION OF SALSETTE—ROUT OF COLONEL EGERTON'S FORCE—CAPTAIN POPHAM'S ACHIEVEMENTS—COLONEL CAMAC DEFEATS SCINDIA—PEACE CONCLUDED.

ON the western side of India were certain places which the East-India Company had long been desirous of possessing; these were the island of Salsette, the port of Bassein, Kenery, Hog Island, Elephanta, and Aurajee. They were occupied by the Mahrattas; and with the view principally to taking advantage of any opportunity that might occur of securing those places by negotiation, permission had been sought and obtained for the residence of an English agent at Poona. It was sometime before any event favourable to the views of the English Government occurred; but, at length, the success of the Company's arms against the nabob of Broach seemed to afford an opening for attaining the desired object.

With the nabob of Broach the government

of Bombay had formerly concluded a treaty; but it being alleged that he had levied a higher rate of customs' duty on the goods of merchants under English protection than his engagements warranted, an expedition was fitted out against him, in conjunction with the nabob of Surat, who claimed from the government of Broach a certain amount of tribute, a large portion of which was to be made over to the English, in consideration of the expense which they incurred. But this step was undertaken under imperfect information; and on the expedition arriving before Broach, it being obvious that the attempt must fail, the nabob was prevailed upon to save the honour of the British arms, by requesting that the troops might be withdrawn. Negotiation followed, and a new

treaty was concluded. The expedition against Broach was strongly condemned by the Court of Directors, but this did not prevent the government of Bombay from despatching another with the same object, their disobedience being defended by allegations of the continued deceitful and perfidious conduct of the nabob. The second expedition was more successful than the first, the city of Broach being taken by storm; but the Court of Directors again expressed their disapprobation of the attack.

It was part of the plan of the Bombay government to offer Broach and a place called Fort Victoria to the Mahrattas in exchange for those which it was desired to obtain from them. The British resident took care to intimate that such an exchange might be effected; but the Mahratta government received the communication coldly, and without any movement towards accepting the offer.

At a later period circumstances seemed to favour the views of the English, and negotiations were entered into with a personage named Rugonath Row. He was the brother of a former Peishwa, and the uncle of two succeeding ones, the latter of whom was assassinated. Rugonath Row enjoyed the reputation of having contrived his nephew's death; a more indulgent opinion, supported by respectable authority, regards him as intending only to seize the power of his relative, and acquits him of conspiring against his life. Rugonath Row, on the death of his nephew, succeeded to the office of Peishwa, and to a multiplicity of foreign and domestic troubles. He was engaged in a war with Nizam Ali, which he contrived to bring to a conclusion, but without advantage to himself. He meditated an expedition into the Carnatic, which was to cripple at once the power of Hyder Ali, Mahomet Ali, and the English. But these great designs came to an abortive conclusion; Hyder Ali, taking advantage of the pecuniary distress of Rugonath Row, which was great, made peace with him on his own terms. Rugonath Row had proposed to himself to rescue from that wily adventurer certain districts which he had acquired from the Mahrattas. Hyder Ali induced him to surrender his claim to part of them, in consideration of the payment of a small sum of money, and the promise of a larger. The intelligence of some events threatening the stability of his power, compelled Rugonath Row to relinquish his further designs on the Carnatic; but he prevailed upon Hyder Ali to recognize his title as Peishwa, and to engage to pay tribute to him.

The news which had arrested the progress of Rugonath Row was that of the alleged pregnancy of Gunga Bye, the widow of the late Peishwa. Rugonath Row thereupon commenced his march towards Poona, and met with some success; but the want of funds prevented his pursuing it, and he suddenly turned his course to the northward. Shortly afterwards, the widow of the late Peishwa gave birth to a son, who, at the age of forty days,

was formally invested with the office he was destined to bear. The investiture took place in May, 1774.

Had Rugonath Row abandoned his usurped authority in deference to the rights of an infant, he would have departed widely from the principles which govern Mahratta policy, whether national or individual. He did not thus discredit the people to which he belonged, but, amidst many difficulties and much distress, continued to maintain his pretensions to the office of Peishwa, and to seek allies to assist him in supporting them. Among others, he had recourse to the English, and the desire felt by the authorities at Bombay to obtain possession of Salsette and Bassein led them eagerly to encourage his overtures. They were rendered the more anxious by an apprehension that the Portuguese were about to forestall them in the possession of these much coveted places. The negotiations with Rugonath Row, however, proceeded unsatisfactorily. On the point which the government of Bombay regarded as most important he was obdurate; he peremptorily refused to give up Salsette and Bassein; and in despair of accomplishing their object by any other means, the English authorities had resolved to accept an offer made by the killadar in command of the garrison at Tannah, the principal fort on the island of Salsette, to put them in possession of the place for a sum of money. The bargain, however, was not carried into effect. By the time that the governor and council of Bombay had decided upon closing with the offer, the killadar alleged that it was no longer in his power to perform that which he had proposed, the Mahrattas, alarmed by the movements of the Portuguese, having reinforced the garrison. But the British authorities were not thus to be disappointed. Negotiation having failed, they had recourse to arms: Tannah was taken by storm, and the island of Salsette, together with that of Caranja, passed into the hands of the English. Immediately after the despatch of the armament against Tannah, a Portuguese fleet appeared off Bombay, and the commander delivered in a protest against the conduct of the British authorities.

Before the capture of the island was effected the new government of Bengal had entered upon its functions. By the act under which that government was constituted it was invested with a controlling power over the other presidencies. The government of Bombay were aware of the passing of the act, but were ignorant of the arrival of the new councillors, and their formal assumption of authority, until after the expedition against the islands had been despatched. Its success was communicated without delay to the government of Fort William.

In the mean time negotiations with Rugonath Row were renewed, and, finally a treaty was concluded, by which former treaties with the Mahratta state were ratified; both parties

engaged to abstain from assisting the enemies of the other; the East-India Company agreed to aid Rugonath Row with a considerable force, and he in return agreed to surrender to them Bassein and certain other places. Rugonath Row was also to procure from the Guicowar a grant for the Company of the share of revenue collected by that prince in the town and pergunnah of Broach. He further stipulated to pay to the Company annually seventy-five thousand rupees from the revenues of Oklaseer, and a lac and a half of rupees monthly for the military assistance which he was to receive, or a proportionate share for so much as might be furnished, as security for which payment he made temporary assignment of several districts. Six lacs of rupees were to be immediately deposited with an agent of the Company; but as Rugonath Row had them not, and knew not where to obtain them, it was agreed that he should deposit jewels in their place. Rugonath Row was to defray all expenses that might be incurred in taking possession of any of the places ceded to the Company; he was not to make war in the Carnatic, and he was bound to assist the ships of the Company, or of persons under their protection, if wrecked, and to protect the cargoes.

This treaty was greatly disapproved at Bengal. The governor-general, Hastings, recorded a minute of considerable length, and certainly marked by great ability. He maintained that the treaty was unseasonable, because formed at a time when Rugonath Row appeared to have been abandoned by his former adherents; that it was impolitic, because the Company was subjected to the whole burden of the war, without a force at Bombay equal to the undertaking, without money or certain resources, and because it was undertaken without regard to the general interests of the other British settlements in India; that it was unjust, because the English had received no injury from any part of the Mahratta state which could authorize an interference with their mutual dissensions, and were under no actual ties to Rugonath Row, but, on the contrary, were in positive negotiation with the very powers against which they had since declared war; and that it was unauthorized, because the law precluded the subordinate governments from commencing hostilities, declaring war, or negotiating any treaty of peace without the consent of the governor-general and council, except in cases of imminent necessity, where it would be dangerous to postpone the commencement of hostilities or the conclusion of treaties, and except when the subordinate government might have received special orders from the Company—which exceptions did not apply to the treaty concluded with Rugonath Row. On these grounds, the governor-general proposed to direct the government of Bombay to cancel the treaty, and withdraw the detachment sent in pursuance of it, unless some decisive advantage should have been gained

over the enemy, or that the detachment should be in such a situation that it would be dangerous either to retreat or to pause, or that a negotiation should have been commenced between Rugonath Row and his opponents in consequence of the support afforded by the English. The council, seldom agreeing in anything but in annoying each other, were unanimous in approving the first part of the proposed orders to Bombay: with regard to the exceptions by which the order was modified, there was a difference of opinion. Barwell, as usual, supported the governor-general altogether—the three remaining members of the council thought that the order for the withdrawal of the troops should be made subject to no exception but that of the impracticability of their retiring in safety, and thus the instruction to the government of Bombay was framed.

The government of Bengal resolved at the same time to open a negotiation with the authorities at Poona. The choice of the person who was to represent the British government at the capital of the Peishwa gave rise, as usual, to a contest. Hastings proposed Colonel Dow; General Clavering recommended Colonel Upton; and the latter officer, being supported by the majority, was appointed.

The command of the British force destined to act in conjunction with Rugonath Row had been intrusted to Colonel Keating. It arrived at Camba about the middle of March, 1775, and in April effected a junction with all that remained of the army of Rugonath Row, that chieftain having been defeated some time before, and his forces dispersed. After some considerable delay, arising from various causes, the combined body moved in the direction of Poona. Nothing of importance occurred till the 18th May, when an action took place, which terminated in favour of the English, though they sustained dreadful loss. The British commander does not appear to have displayed any great military skill, and an alleged mistake of the word of command by a body of European grenadiers nearly led to the loss of the battle.

The government of Bombay were not in a condition to maintain the burden of the war without assistance from the other presidencies, and an application was made to Bengal for men and money. The governor-general was disposed to comply with the request, on the ground that the question then to be decided was not whether the government of Bombay had acted properly or not, but by what means were the Company's affairs to be extricated from the danger in which they were involved by a war precipitately undertaken. It is unnecessary to say that the governor-general was supported by Barwell, and opposed by the other members of council. The latter party positively refused to send any men, but, as the pecuniary necessities of the Bombay government were urgent, they were willing to forward a small supply of money. About a month

after this determination, Mr. Tayler, a member of the council of Bombay, arrived at Calcutta, specially to represent to the government of Bengal the necessity of giving to the Bombay government such support as would enable them to avert the consequences likely to arise from an abrupt termination of the engagement with Rugonath Row, but his representations were not more successful than those of the governor-general. The majority in council were fixed in their determination to put an end to the war at once. General Clavering, indeed, had expressed an opinion that such a step was likely to assist the progress of the negotiation at Poona. "We have reason to hope," said he, "that the Mahrattas, seeing the justice and moderation of this government, and that our intentions are finally to put a stop to that spirit of conquest, encroachment, and injustice, which seems hitherto to have prevailed too much in India, will listen to the proposals that we have made to conclude a firm and lasting peace with them."

The soundness of these views was soon brought to the test. Colonel Upton, having reached Poona with great difficulty, entered on the business of his mission, but found the ministers of the Peishwa little disposed to cordiality. He was instructed to stipulate for the possession of Salsette and Bassein. The Mahratta authorities refused compliance. In accounting for this refusal, Colonel Upton says, "I conceived it owing to their imagining that I must treat with them at any rate;" and it appears that they proposed questions to the British negotiator which it would have required great ingenuity to answer satisfactorily. They asked him why the government of Bengal made such profession of honour, and how it happened that, while they disapproved of the war commenced by the Bombay government, they were so desirous of availing themselves of the advantages of it. After much discussion, Colonel Upton demanded of the ministers what was their final determination, and they answered that they knew of none but war. The government of Bengal now withdrew the restriction which they had imposed on the hostile operations of the government of Bombay; they addressed a letter to Rugonath Row, offering him the assistance of the British arms in all parts of India, to place him with full authority in the seat of the government at Poona; they resolved to write to Nizam Ali, Hyder Ali, Morari Row, the Rajah of Berar, Holkar, and Scindia, with a view of engaging their assistance for Rugonath Row, or at least of securing their neutrality; they directed the British resident at Oude to prevail on the vizier to permit the removal of the Company's brigade to the frontier of Korah, next Calpee, with a view to promote the interests of Rugonath Row; they wrote to the government of Madras for reinforcements in aid of the same cause, and they requested the officer in command of the squadron on the coast of Malabar to give it all the support in his power. These

measures were taken by the Bengal government on the 7th March, under an impression that the negotiations at Poona were at an end. On the 1st April they received a letter from Colonel Upton, informing them that the differences with the Peishwa's ministers had been arranged, and that a treaty was in progress. The treaty was concluded, and, with some modifications, accepted by the government of Bengal. By this treaty Rugonath Row, on condition of disbanding his army, was to have an establishment at Kopergoam, on the banks of the Godavery. This he refused to accept, and hence arose new difficulties. The government of Bombay fiercely attacked the treaty, and maintained that Rugonath Row should have been allowed the option of residing in one of the Company's settlements; that the ministers at Poona were not have objected if their intentions were honest; that thus placed, Rugonath Row would have been a useful instrument for operating on the fears of the other party in the Mahratta state, and would have afforded the best security for the preservation of peace. Rugonath Row had expressed a determination to appeal to the Court of Directors, and, till the result should be known, to seek an asylum at Bombay. The government of that presidency were quite ready that he should find a home there, but that of Bengal interfered and forbade it. He finally retired, with about two hundred adherents, to Surat.

The treaty with the Mahrattas confirmed the Company in the possession of Salsette and the islands which they actually occupied. Bassein, not being in their possession, was excepted. It is a fact strikingly illustrative of the imperfect information possessed by the Bengal government when they undertook, through the agency of Colonel Upton, to negotiate a treaty with the Mahratta state, that they actually believed that Bassein was in the possession of the English, and it was at Poona that Colonel Upton first learned that such was not the case. Another remarkable circumstance attending this series of transactions is, that immediately after the conclusion of the treaty with the minister of the infant Peishwa at Poona, orders were received from the Court of Directors approving of the treaty of Surat—the treaty concluded by the Bombay government with Rugonath Row—and directing that possession should be kept of all the places thereby ceded. These orders it was impossible to obey without renewing the war, for part of the cessions had been abandoned by the latter treaty concluded by Colonel Upton.

The terms of the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton were so vague, that, after they were nominally fixed, the labour of adjusting them had to be performed. Even after Colonel Upton's retirement from Poona the work was continued by Mr. Mostyn, who was appointed resident there, an office which he held before the breach caused by the alliance with Rugonath Row. The resident, too, found other occupation in the intrigues of a Frenchman, bearing

the authority of his own government to negotiate with the Mahrattas. This person, who bore the appellation of the Chevalier St. Lubin, was not unknown in India. He had obtained the confidence of the government of Madras, and had been a main cause of producing the disasters which had attended their war with Hyder Ali. He subsequently introduced himself to the ministry of France, ever jealous of the extended empire of the English, and ever ready to annoy them in their distant possessions. To them the chevalier boasted of his influence with the most distinguished potentates of India, of the services which he had rendered Hyder Ali, and of his intimacy with the Mahratta rajah. The gross ignorance which at that time prevailed in Europe on all matters relating to India led to his being believed and employed. His intrigues excited the alarm of the Bombay government, and that of Bengal was apprized of their feelings. The governor-general immediately proposed that a large military force should be assembled at Calpee, to march to Bombay, or to such other place as subsequent events or the will of the government of that presidency might determine. The proposal was the subject of long and vehement debate, and had it been made somewhat earlier, it would have been defeated. But General Monson and General Clavering were dead: Hastings's influence predominated in the council, and the proposal was carried. The force, consisting of six battalions of infantry, a company of artillery, and a corps of cavalry, was placed under the command of Colonel Leslie.

The councils of Poona were distracted by complicated intrigues. The ministers there had separated into parties, one of which espoused the cause of Rugonath Row. With them the government of Bombay was well disposed to co-operate, and their views were in accordance with those of the court of directors, who had expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, and intimated that if a fitting opportunity should arise for its abandonment, it ought to be embraced. Some articles of the treaty were unfulfilled, and the answer given to a demand, whether the ruling party intended to fulfil its provisions, was regarded as evasive. A new agreement was thereupon formed with Rugonath Row, differing in one important point from the former. Rugonath Row was to be regent only; all the acts of government were to be performed in the name of the infant Peishwa; and its entire powers surrendered to him on the expiration of his minority. The government of Bengal had authorized that of Bombay to take such a course if the terms of the treaty with the ministers at Poona were not complied with.

The detachment from Bengal was a long time on its march, and, unfortunately, the government of Bombay were too eager for the commencement of active operations to wait its arrival. They prepared and put in motion an expedition under Colonel Egerton,

who is stated to have been an inefficient officer, and whose powers were controlled by a committee of field deputies. The force placed under this anomalous control was about four thousand strong. It advanced slowly, was subjected to great annoyances from the enemy, and in a few days was deprived of Lieutenant-Colonel Kay and Captain Stewart, two of its best officers. Sickiness soon compelled Colonel Egerton to relinquish the command, a circumstance in which the army probably suffered no loss. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn; but that officer's talents for command were not subjected to long trial. Rugonath Row, to stimulate the activity of his European allies, had suggested to them that no power of consequence would declare for him till some advantage had been obtained. The communication had the opposite effect to that which he had intended; the committee became despondent, and they took the extraordinary resolution of simultaneously opening negotiations with the authorities of Poona and commencing a retreat towards their own territory. It was suggested that it would be well to wait the result of the negotiation before retreating, but in vain. Rugonath Row joined his voice to those who invoked the committee to pause before deciding on a step which was certain ruin, but his efforts were as fruitless as those of others. The night of the 11th January, 1779, constitutes a dark epoch in the history of British India. On that night the British detachment, which had not long before moved in the proud hope of shortly giving a ruler to the Mahratta state, turned its back in flight upon the men whose power it had so recently defied: the heavy guns were thrown into a tank, the stores burnt, and, without an effort to achieve the object for which the army had advanced, without an act that could in the slightest degree soften the disgrace which involved this ill-fated expedition, the British force commenced its retrograde march. It was fondly believed that this movement was secret, but those who thought this knew little of the enemy with whom they had to contend. Three hours after the commencement of the march the advanced guard was fired upon by horsemen, and the fugitives then became aware that they were not unobserved. They were soon afterwards attacked in the rear, and by break of day were completely surrounded. Throughout that day and the following the English army were sorely pressed, and the fearful effects of ill success in an Indian army began to be manifested in numerous desertions. On the 13th further retreat was deemed impracticable, and it was determined to trust solely to the effect of negotiation. The Poona ministers demanded the surrender of Rugonath Row, and his panic-stricken allies would have complied had they possessed the power. Rugonath Row had, however, taken care of his own safety, and this additional disgrace was spared them. As the case was, there was quite enough of

shame. A convention was concluded, by which the peaceable return of the British army was secured by the Mahrattas, the English, in return, agreeing that Salsette and all the recent acquisitions from the Mahratta states should be restored, and that the Bengal detachment should be ordered back to Calcutta. By a separate agreement with Scindia, whose influence was considerable, the fort and government of Broach were to be delivered up to that chief, and two English gentlemen were to be left as hostages for the performance of the engagement. This arrangement cost forty-one thousand rupees, distributed in presents. Thus disgracefully terminated the hostile purposes of the Bombay government with regard to the Mahrattas. Morbidly anxious for war with that people, they had commenced hostile operations imprudently, conducted them without skill, and abandoned them without honour. "Success," says Captain Duff, "that grand apology for statesmen's blunders, had not attended the schemes which they had been labouring to be permitted to attempt." From the time the supreme council exercised their fresh authority by a precipitate interference, the majority of the members of the Bombay government endeavoured, by argument and artifice, to bring about their own designs; and instead of taking an enlarged and dignified view of the national interests and government in India, which would have been an honour to themselves and a reproach to their opponents, they lost the commanding ground on which they stood by following a course which brought about its own undoing." "Their contracted policy," says the same author, "was directed merely to carry their point in favour of Ragoba, and to aggrandize their own presidency. In sending off the expedition, it would seem as if they had been actuated by the puerile desire of showing the Bengal government what Bombay could do without their assistance." "In short," he adds, "the Bombay government neglected opportunity, they overlooked changes of circumstance, they desperately sent a handful of men against the strength of the Mahratta empire, and committed the conduct of an enterprise, practicable only by celerity, address, and resolution, to men unfit for such a charge."

The slow progress of Colonel Leslie with the Bengal detachment had been owing partly to unfavourable weather, but principally to his engaging in negotiations and disputes with the chiefs of the country through which he had to pass. In five months he advanced only a hundred and twenty miles; and his progress was so unsatisfactory as to lead Hastings, whose confidence he had previously possessed, to acquiesce in his recall. Colonel Goddard was appointed to succeed to the command; but before the order for effecting this change was passed, death had removed Colonel Leslie from the possibility of being affected by it.

The character of Colonel Goddard's movements was widely different from that which

had marked those of his predecessor, and he displayed extraordinary tact and judgment under very embarrassing circumstances. He had been exempted by the government of Bengal from the necessity of yielding obedience to that of Bombay; still an acquaintance with the views and wishes of the latter government might often be desirable. In taking the field in favour of Rugonath Row, the Bombay government had written to Colonel Goddard, urging him to advance. On concluding the memorable convention with the Mahratta state, the field deputies again wrote, advising him that "the face of things was so materially altered, as to occasion their marching back to Bombay," and directing that he should in like manner march back with his army to Bengal. Three days afterwards they again wrote, intimating that, upon recollection, they did not think themselves authorized to give the orders which they had sent for his return, and desiring him to pay no attention to them. He did pay no attention to them; his march was pursued with extraordinary celerity. He thus avoided twenty thousand horse which had been sent from Poona to intercept him, and arrived with his army in safety at Surat. His reception by the government of Bombay was honourable to all parties. He was requested to join in the deliberations of the council, and recommended for the appointment of commander-in-chief.

Mr. Hornby, the governor of Bombay, was resolved not to recognize the convention concluded by the field committee with the Mahrattas, nor to make the stipulated cessions of territory; and as the Poona authorities had been distinctly informed that the committee had not power to conclude any definitive treaty, there was scarcely even the appearance of injustice in this determination. The government of Bengal, on becoming apprized of the transaction, took the same view of the subject as did Mr. Hornby. That gentleman was of opinion, moreover, that the agreement with Scindia should be ratified, and in this view also the government of Bengal coincided. The conduct of Hastings—for to him the chief merit is to be attributed—in relation to the gross errors committed by the government of Bombay, was singularly moderate, dignified, and judicious. It was most fortunate that at the time he possessed the power, which he had sometimes wanted, of carrying his own views into effect. His language in reference to the course which, under the circumstances, it behoved the government of Bengal to pursue, deserves to be quoted—it deserves to be remembered on all similar occasions, if similar occasions should ever occur. "Whatever our resolutions," said the governor-general, "I hope the board will see with me the propriety of conveying them in such a form and temper as may give encouragement and confidence to the presidency of Bombay, instead of adding to their depression. They are the immediate guardians of the Com-

pany's property on that side of India ; and it is by their agency that we must defend and support the general rights of the Company and the honour of the British nation, unhappily involved, as they appear to be, in the consequences of their past miscarriages. In the emergency so critical and important, we have, as I conceive, but this alternative—either to transfer the power (if we can do it) into fitter hands, or to render it as complete and efficacious as it can be made in theirs. To mark our want of confidence in them by any public act would weaken theirs in us ; to load them with harsh and unoperating reproaches would indispose them to our authority, at the same time that it would absolve them from its effect ; and to bind their deliberations by absolute and unconditional orders might eventually disable them from availing themselves of any fortuitous advantages which the confusion of the Mahratta government is more likely to offer them than any plan which we could prescribe to them, or which they could form on the letter of our instructions. In a word, such a conduct, by inflaming the passions of men whom we are not to regard as exempt from the common infirmities of humanity, would prove the surest means of converting the powers which were still left in their hands into the instruments of opposition, and even of the defeat of the very measures which require their agency, and cannot be accomplished without it ; let us rather excite them to exert themselves for the retrieval of their past misfortunes, and arm them with means adequate to that end—restricting their powers when the object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal extension of them in cases which are too variable and uncertain for positive injunctions. Their admission of Colonel Goddard to a deliberative seat at their board, and the request which they have made to us to allow of his being appointed to the chief command, if it should be vacant, of their military establishment, which would give him an effective voice in the select committee, present to us an occasion of their adopting the principle which I have recommended, with the most ample caution for the safe application of it." These remarks reflect honour on Hastings's judgment and being made while under the influence of the bitter disappointment created by the defeat of objects for which he was more than usually anxious, and with which his reputation was deeply involved, they exhibit a degree of good feeling of which he did not always afford an example ; they possess one of the most striking marks of practical wisdom ; called forth by a particular occasion, they are capable of general application wherever circumstances exist even remotely resembling those under which they were delivered.

The confidence expressed by the governor-general in the government of Bombay, and the forbearance which he had extended to their errors, were not without effect in producing correspondent feelings on their part.

There were several points connected with the mission of Colonel Goddard which were offensive to them ; but though they remonstrated against them, their feelings on these subjects neither diminished their respect for the distinguished commander of the Bengal detachment, nor deprived him of their cordial co-operation.

Colonel Goddard was intrusted by the government of Bengal, in addition to his military powers, with authority to negotiate a treaty with the Mahratta state on the basis of the treaty of Poorunder, the name by which the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton was distinguished. He entered on his task, and several months were consumed in negotiations ending in nothing. Rugonath Row, in the mean time, had escaped from Scindia, with whom he had taken refuge, and was received, though with little cordiality, by the English commander.

In the beginning of the year 1780, General Goddard put his army in motion. After some minor successes Ahmedabad was taken by assault. This was followed by intelligence that Scindia and Holkar were approaching with a large and hostile force. General Goddard advanced to give them battle, but their retirement defeated his intention. Scindia, it appeared, professed friendly views towards the English, and, in proof of his sincerity, he set at liberty the two gentlemen who had been left as hostages for the performance of the agreement with him. This act of generosity was succeeded by the despatch of a vakeel from Scindia with assurances of friendship. General Goddard professed the like feelings on the part of the English, and some attempts to negotiate ensued ; the object of Scindia at that time being to secure to himself the chief power in the Mahratta state. General Goddard thought these overtures evasive, and he treated them accordingly. The negotiation, which it was the wish of Scindia to protract, was, by the decision of General Goddard, soon brought to an end, and it was followed by an attack upon Scindia's camp. The attack was successful, and the enemy retired, but immediately returned and took up the same position as before.

In another quarter the arms of the British government were directed against the Mahrattas with signal success. An alliance had been formed with the Rana of Gohud, a district in the province of Agra. The Rana, being attacked by the Mahrattas, demanded aid from his British ally, and a body of troops, under Captain Popham, which had been intended to reinforce the army of General Goddard, was assigned for the required service. The labours of the troops placed at the disposal of the Rana were not confined to the defence of that prince's territory. Captain Popham entered some of the Mahratta districts, and ventured upon undertakings which the commander-in-chief, Sir Eyre Coote, regarded as altogether disproportioned to the strength of his force. The first of these was

an attack upon Lahar, a fortified place, about fifty miles west of Calpee. The place was stronger than had been anticipated, but Captain Popham, having summoned it to surrender, would not withdraw without an effort to gain possession of it, although he was unprovided with the requisite means of conducting a siege. The guns were too light to have much effect; but a very imperfect breach having been made, it was resolved to storm. Both the leading officers, Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardener, fell before they arrived at the top of the breach; but their place was worthily supplied by Mr. Odell, a volunteer, who mounted the walls, followed most gallantly by the rest of the party. They were exposed to a murderous fire; but, notwithstanding, succeeded in driving the enemy before them. Dreadful slaughter ensued on both sides. The enemy defended themselves with desperation; and it was not until the garrison, which had consisted of five hundred men, was reduced to their killadar and a mere handful of his dependants, that quarter was demanded. The triumph of the English was brilliant; but it was purchased with the loss of a hundred and twenty-five of the brave men to whose gallantry it was attributable.

A still more splendid prize was soon to reward the enterprising spirit of Captain Popham. Gwalior had been regarded by the native military authorities as impregnable. Such a belief has existed with regard to so many places which have afterwards yielded to European skill, that little regard is due to Indian opinions of impregnability. Gwalior, notwithstanding, was a place of considerable strength, and it was so situated as to render it both difficult and dangerous to make the observations necessary previously to undertaking an attack. Captain Popham did not proceed hastily or rashly. He devoted considerable time to the purpose of ascertaining the weak points of the fortress. It was built upon an exceedingly high rock—was scarped nearly round, and was garrisoned by a thousand men. The part selected for attack was sufficiently formidable. The scarp was about sixteen feet high; from thence to the wall was a steep ascent of about forty yards, and the wall which was to be escaladed was about thirty feet high. Having made choice of his point, Captain Popham determined upon an attempt which to himself appeared not unlikely to end in defeat; but "the object," said he, "was glorious," and he took all the precautions in his power to frustrate the disastrous consequences of a repulse, should such be the fate that awaited him. At midnight, on the 3rd of August, ladders and all other auxiliaries for scaling being prepared, the party for the attack was formed. Two companies of grenadiers and light infantry led the van; Captain Popham followed with twenty Europeans and two battalions of sepoy. A battalion, two guns, and the cavalry were ordered to march at two o'clock to cover the retreat of the English

party, in case of premature discovery, or, in the event of success, to prevent the garrison from escaping. At break of day the van arrived at the foot of the scarped rock. The spies ascended by wooden ladders, and, having made fast ladders of ropes, the troops followed. Some resistance was offered, but the garrison were intimidated by the unexpected attack, and the assailants, with little trouble and small loss, were soon masters of the boasted stronghold of Gwalior. The arrangements made for intercepting the garrison, in case of their attempting flight, were less successful than those which had led to the capture of the fortress, for the greater part of them succeeded in effecting their escape. Captain Popham was rewarded for his gallant services by being promoted to the rank of Major.

Before the fall of Gwalior, Hyder Ali had invaded the Carnatic with a force one hundred thousand strong. This incapacitated the government of Bengal from rendering any assistance to that of Bombay. The latter had, consequently, to depend on its own efforts, and with very limited means the war with the Mahrattas in that quarter continued to be carried on with considerable vigour. General Goddard marched in October to attack Bassein, and arrived before it by the middle of November. Finding the place very strong, and defended by a numerous garrison, he determined to carry on his operations with regularity and precaution. On the morning of the 28th of November, he had completed a battery of six guns and six mortars within nine hundred yards of the place, and, under cover of their fire, carried on his approaches to a spot where he erected a grand battery of nine 24-pounders, which was opened on the 9th of December within five hundred yards of the wall. Besides these, he had a battery of twenty mortars of various sizes, which opened upon one of the flanks of the parapet. These preparations were formidable, and they were used with such effect, that on the day after the opening of the grand battery, an offer of surrender was made. Some difficulty in the arrangements occurred, and the firing recommenced; but, on the 11th, the place surrendered at discretion.

The operations of the besiegers were covered by a force under the command of Colonel Hartley. The Mahrattas had hoped to be able to throw succours into Bassein, but finding their attempts abortive, they sought vengeance in the destruction of Colonel Hartley's army. They attacked him with a force of about twenty thousand horse and foot, but were unable to gain any advantage over him. This army had been engaged for nearly six weeks in almost daily skirmishes. It had suffered severely from sickness as well as from other causes, and if military renown could be apportioned precisely to merit, the army under Colonel Hartley would enjoy a very large share. In reference to this subject Captain Duff makes the following remark: "The fact is, that military service in India seems always to have been commended

rather in proportion to the result, than to the duty performed; and this trying and well-fought campaign is scarcely known even to the gallant army by whom it was maintained."

The operations of the British arms on the western side of India had for some time been eminently successful; but the governor-general was, nevertheless, most anxious for peace. This feeling was not unreasonable. In the Carnatic the war had been unskillfully conducted; great disasters had been sustained, and the utmost despondency prevailed at Madras. The government of Bengal, too, naturally contemplated with alarm the extent of the confederacy with which they had to contend. Hyder Ali, Nizam Ali, and nearly all the Mahratta powers, were either openly or secretly engaged against them. Hastings had expected to secure the rajah of Berar as an ally; but the rajah's friendship cooled in proportion as the success of the English declined, and it became obvious that he could not be depended upon even for neutrality. Amidst all these difficulties, Hastings had to contend with that which had so often pressed heavily on his predecessors—the want of funds. He was at this time, too, more than usually annoyed and thwarted in council by violent—and probably, with regard to one, at least, of his colleagues, there would be no breach of charity in adding dishonest—opposition. Sir Eyre Coote was absent from Calcutta—when present, indeed, his temper does not appear to have been always such as was calculated to smooth the troubled waters upon which he was cast; but his absence left Hastings without a supporter against the combined attacks of Francis and Wheler. The governor-general had taken upon himself the responsibility of conducting the Mahratta war to a successful issue, but those who should have aided were anxious only to embarrass him. The conduct of his colleagues, the circumstances by which he was surrounded, all conspired to make him desirous of peace; and the wish of the Bengal government being communicated to Bombay, the government of that presidency were instructed to discontinue hostilities, on being duly apprized that they were suspended on the part of the Peishwa, but in the mean time to prosecute the war with vigour. The latter part of these orders was scarcely fulfilled. General Goddard marched to threaten Poona. The Bhoré Ghaut was gallantly attacked and easily carried by Colonel Parker, at the head of an advanced party. The main body followed, and the head-quarters of General Goddard were established at the foot of the Ghauts. But this demonstration failed in producing the effect anticipated, and no attempt was made to push on to Poona. The minister of the Peishwa amused General Goddard for a time with pretended negotiations, and these being broken off, the general, whose army had been greatly harassed, prepared for retreat. This was effected with considerable difficulty, and with great loss of men, stores, and equipments.

In the conflicts which took place the British troops lost nothing of honour, but the spirits of the Mahrattas were greatly elevated by the success which they had gained.

While these events were in progress, the British government had been endeavouring to strike an important blow at the power of Scindia, who had the reputation of being the chief fomentor of the war. A detachment under Colonel Camac had been dispatched, with the primary object of reinforcing General Goddard; but its march was subsequently countermanded, and the force under Major Popham being incorporated with it, the whole was placed under the command of Colonel Camac. The instructions to that officer empowered him, if he thought it practicable and expedient, to carry the war into the territories of Scindia and Holkar. To this, Francis and Wheler objected. The governor-general alleged that he could perceive no objection to the proposal, except on the ground of expense, and to obviate this, he offered to furnish the requisite amount from his own resources. His opponents, however, still resisted, and it was this subject of dispute which gave rise to the duel between the governor-general and Francis. The proposed instructions to Colonel Camac were variously modified, in the course of the discussions which took place; but finally, Hastings, by the accidental, or professedly accidental, absence of Francis, was enabled to carry his point. His views were afterwards confirmed by the judgment of the commander-in-chief. But the expedition was soon involved in great difficulties. Colonel Camac had penetrated into Malwa, in expectation of assistance from some neighbouring rajahs, of which he was disappointed. While encamped at Seronge, Scindia's army approached with a large train of artillery. The English army at this time began to be in want of provisions, and the country being laid waste by the enemy, there was no prospect of procuring a supply. In this situation the English camp was cannonaded during some days, when Colonel Camac determined to retreat. He effected his purpose in a soldier-like manner; but having been for several days harassed by the desultory annoyances of the enemy, he resolved to become the assailant, and attacking Scindia's camp, he gained a complete victory, carrying off several pieces of cannon, with the greater part of the enemy's stores, ammunition, and baggage. This defeat greatly abated the martial propensities of Scindia, and he made overtures of peace. After some months, a separate treaty was concluded with him, and he at the same time undertook to interpose his influence to promote an amicable settlement of the differences between the English and the other belligerent power. Indeed, the English at this time evinced rather too great an anxiety for peace. All the presidencies were at once pressing it; and General Goddard, who had been intrusted with powers to negotiate, was pursuing the same course. A treaty was ulti-

mately concluded by Mr. David Anderson, agent of the governor-general. As may be supposed, it was little favourable to the English. All the conquests made since the treaty of Poorunder were renounced, and all the blood and treasure expended in making them consequently thrown away. But if the Mahrattas were indisposed to acquiesce in the conquests made by their enemies, they at the same time evinced a laudable impartiality by consenting to stipulate for surrendering those made by an ally. All the conquests made by Hyder Ali from the Nabob of Arcot, as well as from the English, were to be restored.

Both parties to the treaty stipulated that the allies of each should maintain peace with the other; and the English were solaced for the loss of their conquests by the exclusion of all European traders, except themselves and the Portuguese, from forming establishments within the Mahratta dominions. Scindia, who was surety for the due performance of the treaty on both sides, as well as one of the Peishwa's negotiators, was rewarded for his mediation and his guarantee by the confirmation of the cession of Broach to him. Some delay took place at Poona, but the treaty was finally ratified there as well as at Calcutta.

CHAPTER XI.

DISPUTES BETWEEN LORD PIGOT AND THE COUNCIL OF MADRAS—HIS ARREST AND DEATH—CAPTURE OF PONDIOHERRY—INCOMPETENCE OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT—DESTRUCTION OF COLONEL BAILLIE'S DIVISION BY HYDER ALI—SUCCESSSES OF SIR EYRE COOTE—LORD MACARTNEY GOVERNOR OF MADRAS—CAPTURE OF DUTCH POSSESSIONS—DESTRUCTION OF COLONEL BRAITHWAITE'S FORCE—NAVAL ENGAGEMENT—DEATH OF HYDER ALI—PROGRESS OF HOSTILITIES—PEACE CONCLUDED WITH TIPPOO SULTAN.

BEFORE passing to the events which more immediately connect the Madras presidency with the transactions related in the last chapter, it will be necessary to revert to some which occurred in the period that intervened between the subjugation of Tanjore and the irruption of Hyder Ali into the Carnatic. The conquest of Tanjore and the deposition of the rajah had been condemned by the Court of Directors, and their displeasure was manifested by the removal of Mr. Wynch, the governor under whom these acts had taken place. His successor was Lord Pigot, who had formerly held the office, and had therein acquired considerable reputation, more especially by his conduct when Madras was besieged by the French under Lally. His instructions were to restore the rajah of Tanjore, under certain conditions; an act extremely distasteful to Mahomet Ali, and which he opposed with all the argumentative power and rhetorical artifice which he could summon to his aid. He resolutely asserted his own right to continue in possession, vilified the character of the rajah, pathetically appealed to the services which he had rendered to the Company, and to his own declining years, and urged the assurances of the King of Great Britain, conveyed to him by Sir John Lindsay. As a last resort, he implored delay, till he could bring his case once more before the Company in England, but in vain. The governor, resolved to carry out his instructions, proceeded to Tanjore, and issued a proclamation announcing the restoration of the rajah.

At this time, a man memorable, or rather notorious, in the history of the British connection with the Nabob of Arcot, first became conspicuous. The nabob had hinted that if he were dispossessed of Tanjore, his ability to discharge the debts owing by him to British subjects would be seriously affected. Imme-

diately after the proclamation of the rajah, a civil servant of the Company, named Paul Benfield, intimated that he held assignments on the revenues of Tanjore for sums of vast amount, lent by him to the Nabob of Arcot, and other assignments on the growing crops for large sums lent to individuals. These allegations were more than suspicious. It was not to be supposed that Benfield brought with him to India any wealth, and he had there enjoyed no opportunity of honestly amassing any. The scantiness of his means had not been assisted by parsimony, for the habits of Benfield were expensive and ostentatious, beyond those of most men at the presidency. The governor properly demanded some evidence that the claims were just, but none was offered that could satisfy any one who was not previously prepared to be satisfied. A majority of the members of the government determined against the claims, on the ground that those against individuals were not sufficiently made out, and that the claim against the nabob could not be entertained. The means by which Mr. Benfield succeeded in shaking the opinion of some of the persons constituting the majority cannot be told; but to whatever cause it may be attributed, a change took place—the subject was reconsidered, and the board, which had just resolved against the claims, reversed their own decision, by determining that the crop sown during the nabob's possession was his property—a proposition not deficient in plausibility, more especially as the government of Madras had recognized his right by assisting him to take possession of Tanjore; but it was followed by another, more startling and much more to Mr. Benfield's purpose, namely, that the alleged assignments of the nabob to that person gave to his demands the character of public claims. The governor had strenuously opposed these

conclusions, but his opinion was disregarded, and even his customary and recognized claim to precedence in the conduct of the public business denied and invaded.

This struggle was succeeded by another. A British resident was to be appointed for Tanjore. Lord Pigot proposed Mr. Russell, a civil servant; the majority of the board supported Colonel Stuart, who held the second military command at Madras, and who was destined by the same party for the appointment of commandant at Tanjore. The question was violently debated at several meetings, the governor refused the formality of his signature to the papers necessary to carry into effect the will of his opponents, and at length the latter determined to act without it. The governor was equally bent upon maintaining his own rights, and upon two members of the board affixing their signatures to a paper to which his had been refused, he charged them with acting in a manner subversive of the authority of the government. This charge was formally made, and as it was irregular for members of the government against whom a charge was pending, to deliberate or vote on questions arising out of such charge, the governor was able, by his casting vote, to pass a resolution suspending the accused parties, Messrs. Brooke and Stratton. This gave rise to proceedings not dissimilar to those which shortly afterwards took place in Bengal. The persons constituting the former majority seceded, and having forwarded a protest against the conduct of Lord Pigot, assumed to themselves the rights of the government, and claimed the obedience due to a lawful authority. This was followed by the governor and his friends declaring all the refractory members of the board suspended, and ordering Sir Robert Fletcher, the commander-in-chief, into arrest, for the purpose of being brought to trial by a court-martial.

The adverse party followed the example of their chief with no slow or indecisive steps. They determined to arrest his person, and on the 24th of August, 1776, the governor of Madras became the prisoner of certain members of his own council. He appealed to Sir Edward Hughes, the admiral commanding the squadron in the roads, for protection, and the admiral demanded that safe-conduct to the ships should be given him. The ruling body inquired whether Sir Edward Hughes would be responsible for Lord Pigot if the request were complied with. The admiral answered that he tendered the requisition in the king's name, and would make no terms. The acting council replied that they had no proof that the Crown empowered its officers to require the removal of any servant of the Company, in such a situation as that of Lord Pigot, from under the authority of the Company's government; and the admiral rejoined that the case was unexampled, that he had done his duty in making the requisition, and must leave those who had resisted it to meet the consequences. One of these consequences was

lamentable; the constitution of Lord Pigot, impaired by age and an Indian climate, sunk under the irritation to which he had been exposed and the restraint to which he was subjected, and he died the prisoner of those over whom he had been appointed to preside.

It being recollected that the government of Bengal now possessed a controlling authority over the other presidencies, an authority which it was not indisposed to exert, it will naturally be asked how, in the case of the revolutionary proceedings at Madras—for such they were—that power was exercised? The answer must be, that it was not exercised at all; the Supreme Government remained inactive, while one of those subordinate to it was falling into anarchy. If ever there was a time when the superintending authority of Bengal should have been called into action, it was this. General Clavering and his party might be disposed, it may be thought, to sympathize with the malcontents at Madras, whose conduct bore so strong a resemblance to their own; but Hastings could have no such feeling, and where, it must be asked, was his wonted energy, at a time when it was so much required? Did he propose interposition, and was he foiled by the perverseness of his colleagues? Not so—he and they were unanimous in declining to interfere, and his friends claim for him the credit, or the shame, of having given the tone which, on this occasion prevailed in the council of Bengal. Hastings had always maintained his own rights as governor-general with unyielding pertinacity; why was he so blind or so cold to the rights of the governor of Madras? Though with more of moderation than some of his colleagues, he had been quite ready to interfere to restrain the lawful government of Bombay; how came the unlawful government of Madras to find such favour in his eyes? If his previous conduct convicts him of inconsistency, his subsequent acts abundantly support and justify the judgment. He endeavoured to expel from the council of Bengal certain members, on the ground of their having usurped powers which did not belong to them, and Lord Pigot did no more; indeed, he did not attempt so much, for he only suspended his disobedient councillors, while Hastings declared that his opponents had absolutely forfeited their right to sit in council. It has been seen that Hastings did not hesitate to join in controlling the government of Bombay; it will hereafter appear that he suspended the governor of that very presidency, Madras, with which he now declined to interfere, though rebellion held sway over it. Into the motives of this tenderness it were vain to inquire. It would be difficult to assign one that could confer honour on Hastings, and his forbearance but furnishes an additional proof that he was without any fixed or determinate principles of action—that he had no rule but expediency—and that even his expediency was not of that enlarged and lofty character which regards indirect and

remote consequences as well as immediate convenience—that it was of that kind which looks not beyond the moment, and defies the scruples of a far-seeing prudence not less than the rules of abstract right.

At home the proceedings at Madras excited a strong sensation, and gave rise to much discussion. The Court of Directors appear to have been greatly divided. On the 28th March, 1777, the subject was brought forward in a general court, when it was moved, “that it be recommended to the Court of Directors to take such measures as shall appear to them most effectual for restoring Lord Pigot to the full exercise of the powers vested in him by the commission from the Company, as governor and president of the settlement of Madras, and for inquiring into the conduct of the principal actors in imprisoning his lordship, and dispossessing him of the exercise of the legal powers wherewith he was invested.” A ballot was demanded, which took place on the 31st, when the motion was carried by 382 votes against 140. In the Court of Directors, the feeling in favour of the deposed governor was much less strong. It was proposed to send out to Madras a commission of inquiry and supervision; but a motion to that effect, made on the 9th of April, was lost. On the 11th, it was moved to restore Lord Pigot and the members of council who had adhered to him—to pass a censure on the members who had assumed, without authority, the entire powers of the government, and to suspend them the Company’s service: but with the view of conciliating the opposite party, it was proposed to qualify these acts by placing the restored members of council at the subordinate settlements, and by declaring that the governor’s proceedings appeared to have been, in several instances, reprehensible. A series of resolutions, embodying these points, was put to the vote, and the numbers on each side were equal. In conformity with the rule which then prevailed, the question was referred to the decision of the lot, and by that process was carried in the affirmative. Still the question was not set at rest. The annual change in the Court of Directors took place, and at the first court after that event, the chairman, Mr. Wombwell, intimated his intention of submitting a series of resolutions on the recent events at Madras. At a subsequent court he moved, and the court resolved, that the powers claimed for and assumed by Lord Pigot were “neither known in the constitution of the Company, nor authorized by charter, nor warranted by any orders or instructions of the Court of Directors.” The chairman followed up this blow by another. He moved, “that the proposition to send Mr. Russel to Tanjore as resident was not warranted by the orders of the Company, nor necessary for the carrying them into execution;” but here success deserted him: the motion was lost. The consideration of the other propositions of the chairman was then postponed; and at a court held on

the following day, both parties enjoyed some degree of triumph. The friends of Lord Pigot successfully resisted the passing of a resolution, declaring the exclusion of Messrs. Stratton and Brooke from council arbitrary and unconstitutional; and they carried two other resolutions, condemnatory of the violence offered to his lordship, and of the suspension of those members of council who supported him. On the other hand, the enemies of the unfortunate governor proposed and carried a resolution condemning the conduct of Lord Pigot in receiving certain presents from the Nabob of Arcot. This act of the governor was clearly contrary to law, and is incapable of defence. The presents were, indeed, of very trifling value—not exceeding a few hundred pounds—their receipt was openly avowed in a letter to the Court of Directors—they were bestowed by the Nabob of Arcot, towards whom Lord Pigot certainly manifested no undue partiality; but these circumstances cannot remove the illegality of accepting them, and it is to be lamented that Lord Pigot should have given his enemies an opportunity of reproaching him on this ground. On the 23rd of April the subject again occupied the attention of a general court, when it was resolved to adjourn for a fortnight. On the 7th of May the court again met, and, after much debate, it was resolved to refer to the decision of a ballot a series of resolutions of an extraordinary character. They censured the invasion of his lordship’s rights as governor, and acquiesced in his restoration; but recommended that such restoration should be immediately followed by his recall, in order that his conduct might be more effectually inquired into: for the same reason they recommended the recall of the councillors who had supported Lord Pigot, and also of those who had opposed him. These resolutions were carried, on the ballot, by 414 against 317. On the 21st of May, the case of Lord Pigot was brought before the House of Commons, and a series of resolutions favourable to him proposed. They were opposed by the ministry, and lost. The Court of Directors, on the 30th of July, passed resolutions designed to give effect to the recommendation of the general court; but before the question was decided, the party principally interested was beyond the reach of either additional injury or tardy redress. Two years afterwards the House of Commons addressed his Majesty, praying that the attorney-general might be ordered to prosecute Mr. Stratton (then a member of the House), and three other members of the council of Madras, who had concurred in the arrest of Lord Pigot. A prosecution was accordingly instituted, and the parties were convicted. With reference to the enormity of the offence, the judgment of the court was singularly lenient: the defendants, all of them men of great wealth, were sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand pounds each.

When the Court of Directors determined to

recall Lord Pigot and his council, provision was made for the appointment of what was called a temporary government, to act pending the proposed inquiry. It consisted of six members, and Mr. Thomas Rumbold, a director, was to be president and governor. The English had for some time been engaged in hostilities with their colonies in America. The French monarch made common cause with the revolted colonists, and war between England and France ensued. Its operations were extended to India with extraordinary promptitude and vigour; and most of the minor French settlements having been previously secured, General Munro, early in August, 1778, advanced with a considerable force against Pondicherry. The attack was to be aided by a small fleet under Sir Edward Vernon, consisting of one ship of sixty guns, one of twenty-eight, one of twenty, a sloop, and a Company's ship. He was opposed by a French squadron under Monsieur Tronjolly, whom he brought to action on the 10th of August, and, after a conflict of some duration, put to flight. It was expected by the English that the fight would be renewed on the following day, but the French commander, who had taken refuge in Pondicherry, entertained no such intention; and after eluding for several days the attempts of Sir Edward Vernon to bring him again to action, he followed the example of some of his predecessors under similar circumstances, by escaping from the coast with his ships, and abandoning Pondicherry to its fate. In the mean time General Munro had taken possession of the bound hedge, and cut off all communications with the surrounding country. On the 6th of September he broke ground, and on the 18th opened a vigorous fire from twenty-eight pieces of heavy artillery and twenty-seven mortars. The garrison, under M. Bellecombe, made a gallant defence, and their efforts, aided by the state of the weather, considerably retarded the progress of the assailants: but point after point was lost, and the English commander, having surmounted many of the difficulties with which he had to contend, determined on a general assault. This was prevented by a proposal to capitulate on terms made on the day preceding that destined for the attack. The proposal was accepted, and Pondicherry thus passed once more into the possession of the English. The terms granted were extremely favourable to the besieged. The European part of the garrison was to be sent to France, and the sepoys to be disbanded. The whole were permitted to march out with the honours of war, and the regiment of Pondicherry was allowed to retain its colours.

An expedition despatched under Colonel Braithwaite against Mahé, on the coast of Malabar, was not less successful than that against Pondicherry, and the conquest was far more easily attained. Mahé surrendered before a gun was fired against it. But Colonel Braithwaite, being ordered to join General

Goddard, the place was, after a few months' possession, abandoned; the guns were shipped off to Bombay, and the fort blown up.

Hyder Ali had formally protested against any attack upon Mahé, and its capture was consequently very offensive to him. This was not the only cause of dissatisfaction afforded by the English. The attempt of a British force to pass through part of his territories tended to increase his displeasure. The circumstances which led to this attempt require to be briefly narrated.

In the arrangement made with Nizam Ali for the transfer to the English of the Northern Circars, it was provided that one of them, named Guntoor, should remain in possession of the Nizam's brother, Basalat Jung, during his life. Basalat Jung subsequently gave uneasiness to the Madras government by receiving a body of French troops, and a reference was made to Bengal for instructions on the subject. The answer authorized the Madras government to demand the dismissal of the French troops, and to prepare to support the demand by the presence of an armed force on the frontier of Basalat Jung's territory. If compliance with the demand were refused, that prince was to be informed that possession would forthwith be taken of Guntoor, and a negotiation opened with the nizam for its immediate cession to the Company upon such terms as might be agreed upon. The government of Madras hesitated, and, after some consideration, determined, instead of applying to Basalat Jung, to address the nizam, calling upon him to compel his brother either to dismiss the French from his service, and trust for the protection of his country to the English, to whom the reversion belonged, or to allow them to occupy the circar at an annual rent. The determination to negotiate with the nizam appears to have been taken on the ground that Basalat Jung was no party to the treaty; but before carrying it into effect, it was thought proper to communicate the intention of government to the nabob of Arcot. Mahomet Ali strongly objected to negotiating with the nizam, and proposed to send a vakeel from himself to manage the business with Basalat Jung. The government of Madras, however, persevered in applying to the nizam, and his answer was most courteous. He alleged that the force entertained by his brother was not exclusively French, though a Frenchman might have the command, but contained Germans, Dutch, English, and Portuguese, who had deserted from various places. He assigned as reasons for employing them, that the dependents of Basalat Jung were disobedient and powerful, and that his country was bordered by the territories of Hyder Ali Khan; but he added, that as the retention of these foreigners in the district of Guntoor seemed to give uneasiness to his British ally, he had sent a person of distinction to get them removed, and to stop the revenue appropriated to their support. "Every article and condition of the treaty

between us," said the gracious prince, "shall remain fixed and unaltered, even in a hair's breadth." This letter was received soon after Lord Pigot's second assumption of the government.

The diplomacy of the "person of distinction," if such person were sent by the nizam to his brother, produced no satisfactory results; for nearly three years after the period of the nizam's communication, Mr. Rumbold, who then held the office of governor, complained that French troops were still entertained in Guntoor, and that they were recruited under the protection of the governor of Pondicherry. The commencement of the war between England and France naturally quickened the observation of the Madras government, which, till a very short time before, had been so distracted by disunion as to leave its members no time to spare from the care of their personal interests for those of the public. About this time, too, Basalat Jung felt, or affected, some alarm at the strength of the French party. Both parties were thus prepared to negotiate, and a treaty was concluded, by which the Company were to rent Guntoor of Basalat Jung during his life, for the sum which he had previously realized from it, to be ascertained from his accounts. He on his part was to dismiss his French troops, and the Company were to assist him with such a force as might be necessary for the purposes of defence, revenue, or dignity, the charges to be defrayed by Basalat Jung. Soon after the conclusion of this treaty, fears were entertained that Hyder Ali, who had made some conquests in the vicinity, was about to add to them the territories of Basalat Jung, and the English government, in consequence, resolved to send three battalions of sepoy, a company of artillery, and some field pieces, for their protection. This force was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Harpur, and was to proceed from Guntoor to Adoni, the capital of Basalat Jung's other dominions in the Deccan. Basalat Jung expressed great joy at its approach, and took the pains of pointing out a particular route as the most eligible. This route Colonel Harpur subsequently discovered led him several days' march through the territories of Hyder Ali, and the servants of that potentate forbade his advance. One of them, in answer to an application from the English commander, wrote—"I have received your letter, in which you acquaint me, that as a sincere friendship exists between the nabob Hyder Ali Khan and the Company, you propose marching the troops under your command to Adoni, through Durnall and Ateour, which I understand. It is as manifest as the sun, that a sincere friendship exists between his Excellency and the Company, and that they have no separate interests; it is, therefore, my duty to pay a regard to the friendship they have for him; yet you will march your troops by another road, that this friendship may be preserved; for there are sepoy stationed in that

country, and some disputes and quarrels may take place between your men and these sepoy, who are of a very quarrelsome disposition. I have so much regard for our friendship that I would not wish this to happen." Another of Hyder Ali's officers informed Colonel Harpur that their master had given express orders that the English force was not to march through his dominions. Notwithstanding these intimations, Colonel Harpur was instructed by his government to advance, and he continued to do so till his detachment was in danger of being surrounded, when he retired within the circar of Guntoor.

While these affairs were in progress, the government of Madras had been maintaining a mission at the court of the nizam, under the management of Mr. Holland, a civil servant of that presidency. One of the objects of this mission was to ascertain the precise views of the nizam with regard to the distracted politics of India; another to endeavour to remove unfavourable impressions as to the conduct of the British government in supporting Rugonath Row, to whom the nizam was violently opposed. In subordination to these primary purposes, he was to give such explanations as might be necessary in relation to the negotiation with Basalat Jung, and the occupation, by the English, of Guntoor. He was also to explain the cause of an act which had taken place of a nature likely to be very offensive to the nizam—the withholding of the peishcush, or tribute, due from the Company to the nizam on account of the Northern Circars. This was to be ascribed to the encouragement given by Basalat Jung to the French, and the nizam was to be assured of punctual payment for the future. Such were the instructions issued to the English agent on the 22nd of February, 1779. On the 5th of June following, the governor of Madras recorded a minute, in which he declared that he "had always considered the peishcush paid by the Company to the nizam as disgraceful to them, and an acknowledgment which" that prince "had no right to demand. The grant from the Mogul," continued the governor, "was free and unconditional for the five circars, and the receiving them afterwards as a grant from the soubahdar nizam Ali Khan, on paying him an annual peishcush, was a sacrifice of the Company's rights." The governor's view of the subject was supported by reason, but his practical application of it can only be characterized as dishonest and disgraceful. "The time," said he, "seems favourable to throw off so heavy a burden," and accordingly he proposed that it should be thrown off, altogether, if possible; but if this could not be effected, a strenuous effort was to be made to reduce the amount. The governor's colleagues entirely approved of the recommendation of their chief, and Mr. Holland was instructed accordingly. The governor had observed that the opening of the business to the nizam would require much management on the part of Mr. Holland,

"who must," said he, "by turns soothe and work upon his apprehensions as occasion may require." The agent did as he was required; but Nizam Ali was neither to be soothed nor alarmed into the surrender of his peishcush. He declared that, if denied, he should forthwith prepare for war; and, in desiring that Mr. Hollond would immediately report at Madras the result of the application, he observed that, if there were any delay in forwarding an answer from the English government, he might possibly advance upon Colonel Harpur. The nizam had previously expressed great dissatisfaction with the negotiations entered into between the British government and Basalat Jung, and however soothing the mode of advance, the demand for the surrender of the peishcush was not calculated to restore the prince's equanimity, or to dispose him to regard the other acts of the English government with favour.

On these proceedings of the Madras government becoming known at Calcutta, the government of Bengal deemed it necessary to exercise their controlling authority. A letter was addressed by the latter government to the nizam, lamenting that "the negotiation had been imperceptibly carried beyond the limits originally prescribed to it," and that some propositions had been made to his "highness which he had received as demands, and misconstrued them into an intention to depart from the treaty subsisting between" him "and the Company." These suspicions it was sought to remove by an assurance that the government of Madras had never entertained such an intention; and that, as a proof of the friendly feelings of the Supreme Government, Mr. Hollond had been directed to suspend the business of his commission till he should receive from that government further instructions. These acts of the government of Bengal were communicated to that of Madras, where they excited the strongest feelings of indignation. They determined to recall Mr. Hollond from the court of the nizam. This was proposed by Sir Thomas Rumbold. That governor soon afterwards quitted India, leaving behind him a minute, recommending that the recall of Mr. Hollond should be followed up by his suspension from the service. The recommendation was adopted by the new president, Mr. Whitehill, and carried into effect. Mr. Hollond, however, did not quit the court of the nizam, being retained there by the government of Bengal as their representative.

In the mean time Basalat Jung, intimidated by Hyder Ali and the nizam, had stopped the march of Colonel Harpur, for whose advance he had previously been so anxious, and demanded the restoration of Guntoor. The government of Madras refused to comply with the demand; but on this subject, as well as on that of the peishcush, the government of Bengal took a different view, directing that the treaty with Basalat Jung should be annulled and Guntoor restored.

These orders found the government of Madras surrounded by difficulty and dismay. Sir Thomas Rumbold had quitted India, assuring the Court of Directors, "that everything was quiet in the Carnatic;" "that he was inclined to think they should remain in peace;" and that "he could speak with confidence, that there was no likelihood, at that time, of any troubles on that side of India." Long before the date of these soothing assurances, both the language and the acts of Hyder Ali had manifested his hostile intentions towards the English. The governor himself had felt anxiety; he had despatched a special messenger to ascertain the feelings of Hyder Ali, and the result had not left them doubtful. Another mission followed, and this was treated with contempt and contumely. Yet Sir Thomas Rumbold, in the last minute which he ever recorded, congratulated himself that all was tranquil, and that no disturbance of the calm was to be apprehended. Thus, by his last act of authority giving countenance to a delusion which he could not believe, the governor divested himself of the cares and responsibilities of rule, and bent his course homeward in search of ease and enjoyment. His successor, Mr. Whitehill, slumbered on, luxuriating in those dreams of peace and safety which the retired governor had shadowed forth. They were sometimes invaded by reports of the gathering of Hyder Ali's force, and of their approach to ravage and destroy; but the governor still slept. The Nabob of Arcot had intelligence of what was approaching, and communicated it to the British government, but without effect. Time flowed on, and the sources of alarm multiplied. From every quarter, reports of threatened invasion and complaints of inefficient means of defence rushed in; but no measures of precaution were taken. Some of the colleagues of the governor would occasionally suggest the necessity for a more active course; but the torpor of their chief was not to be overcome. At last, in the middle of June, some symptoms of reviving sensation, feeble as they were tardy, began to appear, and the governor coolly informed the select committee, that, as there were various reports concerning Hyder Ali's movements and intentions, he thought it a proper measure, in case of any disputes in the Carnatic, that the detachment sent, with a view to the protection of Basalat Jung, formerly commanded by Colonel Harpur, then by Colonel Baillie, should recross the Kistna.

More than a month passed, and Lord Macleod, who commanded a king's regiment, deemed it his duty to represent to the governor that the report of Hyder Ali's invasion might be true, and that, at all events, some measures ought to be taken to oppose him. Mr. Whitehill, with philosophic calmness, replied, "What can we do? we have no money;" but, to console the impatient soldier, he added, "We mean, however, to assemble an army, and you are to command it." The design of assembling

an army without money seems on a level, in point of rationality, with the postponement of such a measure till the enemy was almost at the gates of the British presidency. On the evening on which this conversation was held, intelligence arrived which deprived the governor of the power of speaking hypothetically of the existence of "despoilers" in the Carnatic. It was ascertained that Porto Novo, on the coast, and Conjeveram, not fifty miles from Madras, had been plundered by the enemy. Hyder Ali commenced his irruption with all those circumstances of horror with which his appearance as an enemy was invariably attended. Around every place which he destined to fall before him he drew a circle, within which all was consigned to desolation. The towns and villages were soon wrapped in flames, and the inhabitants peremptorily required to depart with their flocks and herds. If by the influence of local attachments, so powerful in the breast of the natives of India, any houseless wanderer presumed to linger near the spot where recently he had a home, and where his fathers had resided from a period anterior to all record, his disobedience was punished by the mutilation of his person.

By the government of Madras some feeble efforts were made to procure money, to secure the possession of important forts, and to combine an army much too scattered to act effectually. But weakness, or something worse, continued to paralyze their measures. It was determined that the commander-in-chief, Sir Hector Munro, a general who had gained some fame in India, should not quit the presidency. The command was to be intrusted to Lord Macleod, who appears to have been an intelligent and meritorious officer, while Sir Hector Munro was to remain at Madras to secure to the select committee the benefit of his military judgment. It was the opinion of the commander-in-chief that the army should assemble near Conjeveram. Lord Macleod, admitting that this might have been a proper arrangement before the invasion took place, maintained that, for various military reasons, it was then inexpedient, and shrunk from the responsibility of executing plans widely at variance with his own judgment. Sir Hector Munro, thereupon, consented to take the field. He arrived at Conjeveram on the 29th of August, and took the command of a force about five thousand strong. The detachment in Guntur, under Colonel Baillie, was to join him there. To frustrate this junction, Hyder Ali despatched a force under his son Tippoo, and he soon afterwards broke up his camp before Arcot, which place he had previously invested, and posted his own force about six miles to the westward of that of Sir Hector Munro. On the day on which Hyder Ali took this position, the force under Tippoo Sultan attacked Colonel Baillie, though without success. But the enemy continued to harass him; and Colonel Baillie informed Sir Hector Munro that he doubted of his being able to effect a

junction. To aid in removing the difficulties in the way of this object, Sir Hector Munro, on the night of the 8th of September, despatched, under the command of Colonel Fletcher, a detachment amounting to one thousand men, and forming the flower of the army. This measure has been severely condemned by military authorities, as imprudently weakening the main army, and exposing the most valuable part of it to be cut off in detail. That such a result did not follow will excite astonishment, when it is known that the intelligence department of Hyder Ali's army was so perfect, that he was informed of every particular connected with the movements of the British force; while all those on whom the English relied for information were in the pay of their enemy. Nearly everything connected with the march of the English detachment was as well known to Hyder Ali as to those by whom it was planned, and the watchful ruler of Mysore prepared to intercept it. The sagacity of Colonel Fletcher disappointed the expectant chief of his prey, and insured the safety of the detached party. Suspecting, with good reason, the integrity of his guides, he suddenly changed his route, and escaped the fate which had been prepared for him. Early on the morning of the 9th of September he joined Colonel Baillie, thus giving to the troops under the command of the latter officer an increase of confidence, of which they stood greatly in need.

Hyder Ali was not less astonished than displeased at the successful passage of Colonel Fletcher. It still more confounded the officers of the French party, which had been dismissed by Basalat Jung, and who, after sojourning for a time with the nizam, were now in the service of Hyder Ali. By them the movement of Colonel Fletcher was regarded as part of a series intended to bring Hyder Ali's army between those of Sir Hector Munro and Colonel Baillie, and they advised immediate retirement. Hyder Ali took a different and more correct view, and determined to maintain his ground.

In the evening the force under Colonel Baillie began to march. Hyder Ali had prepared for this step. He had sent off the greater part of his infantry and guns, remaining himself with his cavalry, ready either to protect his camp or to aid any attack that might be made upon Colonel Baillie. Very soon after the British force was in motion it was challenged by the enemy's videttes, and the challenge being answered by a platoon from the advance guard, its march became known to the enemy. For several miles its progress was interrupted only by rockets and a few irregular troops, but the flanking parties prevented much mischief arising from these attacks. At length a heavy body of horse was observed approaching in the direction in which the baggage was placed, and some guns which they had covered, opened. A halt took place for the purpose of making

a better disposition for the security of the baggage, and a party was despatched to seize the guns; its progress was intercepted by a deep trench, which had been cut with a view to the irrigation of the land, but which now formed a defence to the enemy's troops and guns. The latter, were, however, silenced by the superior execution of the English artillery; and all reason for delay being at an end, everything was prepared to continue the march. Colonel Baillie, however, determined to prolong the halt. The reason of this has never been explained, and it has generally been regarded as the master error of the day. Had he continued his march, there seems little doubt that he would either have actually joined Sir Hector Munro, or at least have advanced so near to him, as to have insured all the advantages expected from the junction. The delay enabled the enemy's cannon to be withdrawn to a point where they could again be employed in embarrassing the English force; it allowed time to Hyder Ali to become apprized of their situation, and to take his measures accordingly.

Soon after the march recommenced, the enemy opened a fire from a few guns at a considerable distance. The British commander again halted, and despatched a body of sepoy grenadiers to attack the guns. They gained possession of some of them, and put to flight the party by whom they were defended, when the cavalry of Hyder Ali appeared in sight, covering the plain like a cloud, and threatened to cut off the return of the British party, which thereupon retired. Hyder Ali had left his camp without striking his tents. The movement of his cavalry was only designed to mask the advance of his infantry and artillery, and Colonel Baillie found himself exposed to an attack from the whole force of the enemy. More than fifty pieces of cannon opened on the British corps, while cavalry and infantry almost innumerable pressed it on every side. Ten British field-pieces indeed returned the more numerous fire of the enemy with powerful effect while ammunition lasted; but this at last failed—a result accelerated by the explosion of two tumbrils which were exposed to the enemy's shot. Repeated charges of the enemy were met and sustained with a steadiness highly creditable to the troops, and the Europeans cried out to be led on. To the last these gallant men maintained their order. The sepoys gradually fell into confusion, some preparing for flight, others keeping up a desultory fire without object or effect. All being lost, Colonel Baillie went forward waving his handkerchief as a demand for quarter, and supposing his request complied with, he ordered his troops to lay down their arms; but the savage host arrayed against them continued long afterwards to slaughter their now unresisting foes. Colonel Wilks says, "Hyder's young soldiers, in particular, amused themselves with fleshing their swords and exhibiting their skill on men already most inhumanly mangled, on

the sick and wounded in the doolies, and even on women and children; and the lower order of horsemen plundered their victims of the last remnant of clothing."

Nothing remained to relieve the gloom of this ill-fated day but the recollection of the gallant conduct of the defeated corps, and more especially of the European part of it. Colonel Baillie displayed few of the qualifications of a commander except courage; but in this he was not deficient. Eighty-six British officers were engaged in the conflict; of these, thirty-six lay dead on the field at its termination, or subsequently died of the wounds which they received; thirty-four more were wounded, but not mortally, and sixteen only surrendered unwounded. Among the killed was the gallant Colonel Fletcher.

The worst was yet to come. The soldier knows that his profession calls him to privation, fatigue, danger, suffering, and possibly to death. In camp and field he looks on these as ordinary contingencies; but when the deadly strife has ended, and the sword of the conquered has been lowered in submission to the victor, the usages of all civilized countries entitle him to expect that the offices of humanity will be interposed to alleviate the sorrows of his situation, and, as far as practicable, to render even captivity tolerable. With the usages of civilized nations Hyder Ali was little acquainted, and he was uninfluenced by that natural generosity which has sometimes thrown a lustre over barbaric conquest more brilliant than the conquest itself. Seated in his tent, the ruffian conqueror regaled his eyes by having his prisoners paraded before him, while from time to time the heads of the slain were deposited at his feet. The sequel was worthy of the commencement: every indignity that malice could devise, every privation that cruelty could inflict, awaited the unhappy Europeans, who were destined for years to remain the prisoners of Hyder Ali.

The memory of these atrocities is preserved in the personal narratives of some of the sufferers; and the general character of the treatment sustained by the English prisoners will be shown by a brief extract from one of these, written by Lieutenant Melvill, a king's officer, whose left arm was shattered during the engagement, and the muscles of his right severed by a sabre-cut after the surrender. After lying many hours on the field, exposed to all the suffering inseparable from such a situation, he was carried to the camp of the conqueror, where the wounded were crowded together in one tent, without succour, and without hope. From thence, with his companions, he was marched forth to Arnee, and afterwards to Bangalore. "We had looked forward," says Lieutenant Melvill, "to the close of our long and painful journey, with the cheering expectation that it would cause some mitigation of our woes. But great was our disappointment, or rather our horror, on entering a wretched shed, pervious

to wind and weather, the destined place of our captivity, and on beholding the miserable objects by whom it was already tenanted—our brother-officers in chains, whose meagre countenances and squalid forms revealed at once the secrets of the prison-house, and disclosed the welcome provided for its new inhabitants. Our misery, indeed, exceeded theirs, in proportion as our bodily pains were greater, and our wants more numerous. The party of British whom we now joined in the prison of Bangalore had been taken either unwounded, or so slightly hurt, as to be capable of bearing a speedy removal into Hyder's territory. The wounds we had suffered were more severe, and required surgical aid. Some were maimed and helpless. All medicine was denied, and it was very difficult to procure it clandestinely, under the strict prohibitions of introducing it which prevailed, and the danger of punishment if detected; and while our bodies were racked with pain, and enfeebled with sickness, our minds became a prey to gloom and despondency. If, in consequence of any favourable rumour, as of peace, or the success of our arms, a ray of hope entered our dismal abode, it was soon dispelled by reports of a contrary nature, and thus conspired with everything else to confirm and aggravate our despair. We were sometimes visited as objects of curiosity by men of rank; but the contempt and abhorrence with which, in general, they regarded us, were exceedingly mortifying, and hurt us more than the ignominy of our chains. Our unfeeling guards, in imitation of their superiors, and to gratify the same malignant passions which influenced them, insulted and tyrannized over us with a brutality suitable to their low birth and condition. Applications for redress were heard at best with contemptuous indifference; and we were often told, in plain terms, that it was not intended we should survive our imprisonment, unless we complied with the infamous requisition of bearing arms against our country. Those who know from experience the high feelings of a British officer, accustomed to command the sons of liberty, may judge of the bitterness of our degraded, abject state, when, even within the narrow bounds of our prison, we were controlled, threatened, and sometimes struck, by the lowest menial who guarded us. Like slaves, or rather felons, we were mustered and examined twice a day; and the severest and most ignominious scrutiny of our persons followed a suspicion that we corresponded with our friends confined in other prisons, or that we received supplies of money or of necessaries from any quarter. Upon these occasions, we were conducted separately into places apart from the prison, and searched by the principal officers of the fort. This separation from each other was needlessly prolonged, and never failed to excite in our minds the most lively apprehensions that we were selected to fall by poison or the sword, like many of our unhappy brethren, who had

been removed from one prison to another for that execrable purpose. The tyrants who guarded us were apprized of our fears, and calculated their measures so as to increase them. The slightest advantage gained by their troops was magnified to a decisive victory, and announced to our trembling ears by the fire of the artillery planted round our prison; each flash, each report of which struck horror to our hearts and affected us like the knell of a dear departed relative or bosom friend. We were often told, and through other channels we knew it to be a fact, that actual force had been used on the persons of many of our countrymen in other prisons, with the expectation that when they bore the indelible mark of Mahometanism they would apostatize from God and abjure their earthly sovereign. The same abhorred expedient recurred to our minds as intended for us whenever a stranger of rank visited the prison, especially if he seemed to cast a scrutinizing eye on our persons. In such a state of complicated mental distress nearly four years of the prime of life were consumed; and during this sad period our corporeal sufferings were not inferior in their degree to those of our minds. Our couch was the ground, spread with a scanty allowance of straw; the same wretched covering which shielded our limbs from nakedness by day, served to enwrap them also by night. The sweepings of the granary were given us in any dirty utensil or broken earthen pot. Swarms of odious and tormenting vermin bred in our wounds, and every abomination to the sight and smell accumulated around us, till its continuance became intolerable to our guards." Such was the treatment of the prisoners of Hyder Ali, as attested by a witness of unquestionable veracity and honour, himself one of the sufferers. If the extension of British influence in India had no other effect than to put an end to horrors like these, who would be found to regret it? It is a gratifying fact that the French officers retained by Hyder Ali, had not forgotten in his service the courtesies of civilized warfare. They did much to mitigate the sufferings of the wounded prisoners, and would have done more had they not been restrained by the tyrant whom they served. "No pen," says another of Hyder Ali's victims, "can do justice to the humanity of those officers, without whose assistance many of our officers must have perished; but their merit will for ever be embalmed in the hearts and minds of all who felt or who witnessed their beneficence."

It is natural to ask, where was Sir Hector Munro while the destruction of Colonel Baillie's force was in progress? On the day on which it took place, discovering that Hyder Ali had departed, he marched about four miles, fired three signal guns, and observing the smoke from the action on his left, marched about a mile and a half farther in that direction, repeated his signals, but had no return. He then observed an increased smoke, occasioned

by the explosion of the tumbrils, and suddenly, he says, the firing ceased. He continued his march to the right in expectation of meeting Colonel Baillie, "not doubting," he observes with great *naïveté*, "but that he had repulsed the enemy." After marching about two miles, his confidence was somewhat shaken by meeting with a wounded sepoy, who reported that Colonel Baillie was entirely defeated. He consoled himself, indeed, by determining that this information was not to be depended upon; yet the non-appearance of the detachment, and the cessation of the firing, he admits, gave too much reason to suspect some disaster. He accordingly returned to Conjeveram, where the appearance and reports of other wounded stragglers confirmed the news of Colonel Baillie's defeat. Still the general could not bring himself to believe it. His incredulity was all but invincible. "The reports of the sepoys," says he, "differed so much as to particulars, that no credit could be given them."

Another question arising out of the extraordinary nature of these transactions is, why did Sir Hector Munro defer moving to the support of Colonel Baillie till it was too late? His own explanation is, that when he first learned that Colonel Baillie was in danger, his only resource for provisions was a stock of paddy collected in the pagoda of Conjeveram; that if he had then moved, Hyder Ali would have occupied his ground, and cut him off from all provisions, whereby his army would have been starved. He returned to Conjeveram, after his tardy and fruitless march in search of Colonel Baillie, and then learned, apparently for the first time, that the stock of provisions, for the protection of which he had left Colonel Baillie's detachment to its fate, was barely sufficient for one day's consumption; that he had not, therefore, by the sacrifice of so large a portion of his army secured the means of feeding the rest, and that, if he remained where he was, he should be surrounded by Hyder Ali's cavalry. He, therefore, resolved to proceed to Chingleput, where he hoped to find supplies; but on reaching it, after a harassing march, attended by the loss of a large portion of his stores and baggage, he was destined to the disappointment of learning that here, too, as at Conjeveram, one day's consumption was all that could be procured. At Chingleput he was joined by a considerable detachment from the westward, under Captain Cosby; but increase of numbers, where there was before a deficiency of food, was but an increase of weakness, and Sir Hector Munro was compelled to make a forced march to St. Thomas's Mount, only a few miles from Madras, where he arrived on the 14th of September. On the 15th, the English army removed to a more secure position at Marmalong, with a river covering its front. Sir Hector Munro had quitted the presidency on the 25th of August—twenty days only had passed before his return to St. Thomas's Mount; but within that brief space, how much

of misconduct and of suffering, of disaster and disgrace, had been crowded!

At Madras, fear, indignation, and sorrow, pervaded the minds of the inhabitants. Some sought opportunity of returning to England, others prepared for flight to Bengal. All joined in lamenting the brave men whose lives had been so uselessly sacrificed and whose departing spirits were ungladdened by the reflection that the pouring out of their blood was the purchase of victory to their country. All joined in bitter condemnation of the counsel which had led to such fatal results. The authorities of the presidency were in a state of inexpressible alarm, and a fast-sailing vessel was despatched to bear to Bengal the intelligence of their mismanagement and its consequences. The danger of the Carnatic was previously known at Calcutta, but the governor-general and council had waited for further information before interposing in any way in regard to it. When the fatal news of the destruction of Colonel Baillie's force and the retirement of Sir Hector Munro arrived, they were not without abundant employment for their time and resources. The Mahratta war was raging, and the proceedings of the Rajah of Berar were of a very equivocal character. He had sent an army into Cuttack ostensibly for the purpose of invading Bengal. It was pretended that this step had been taken solely for the purpose of maintaining appearances with the nizam and the authorities at Poona, and the governor-general, in consequence, had been induced to supply this force both with provisions and money. Still there was abundant ground for distrust, and, under circumstances of less alarm, the presidency of Madras would probably have been left to its own resources. But the emergency was great, and was so felt at Calcutta. It was resolved, therefore, to assist Madras with the immediate advance of fifteen lacs of rupees, and with reinforcements of troops, both European and sepoy, as soon as possible. Sir Eyre Coote was also invited to proceed to Madras to take the command of the army, and he forthwith departed for that purpose. These measures were accompanied by another, which only very extraordinary circumstances could justify. The governor-general and council determined to suspend Mr. Whitehill from the office of governor of Madras, on the grounds of disobedience to the superior government in various matters connected with the negotiations with Basalat Jung, and more especially in the non-restoration of the Guntoor circar, in compliance with the orders of the governor-general and council. The restoration had been delayed on various grounds, but more especially because a lease of the circar for a term of years had been granted to the Nabob of Arcot; but the circar had been relinquished before the resolution of suspending Mr. Whitehill was adopted by the governor-general and his council, though not sufficiently long for them to become aware of the fact. There had been, however, enough

of delay to justify the expression of their displeasure; and had the governor of Bengal been more lenient, Mr. Whitehill's hold of the reins of power would not have been greatly lengthened. The date of his suspension by the governor-general and council preceded that of his dismissal from the service by the Court of Directors by exactly three months. His incompetency as a governor needs no proof, and charges far more serious than mere incompetency were freely made against him. In truth, for several years preceding this period, the most monstrous corruption appears to have existed at Madras, and the entire time of the principal servants of the Company seems to have been employed in endeavouring to turn the current of dishonourable gain into their own coffers. Clive, in Bengal, had acquired imperial wealth, but he had never sacrificed the interests of his country to its acquisition. Even among those who followed him there was found some decent attention to current business, and some regard to the preservation of the Company's authority and dominion. But at Madras, for some years, there is reason to believe that to earn the wages of corruption was the sole employment of many of the Company's servants, and that the pursuit of their private interests was never shackled or impeded for an instant by the slightest regard to those of the Company or their country. The intriguing Mahomet Ali impoverished himself by purchasing the services, or pretended services, of Europeans; and among the servants of the Company, as well as beyond their circle, he was so fortunate as to find many ready to accept with thanks his gold or his bonds. His army was ever inefficient and mutinous for want of pay, but his European parasites were rewarded with true princely munificence. Lord Pigot opposed himself to the torrent of corruption, and it swept away his power. The usurped authority before which he fell yielded to that of the councillors sent out from England, and some of the members of the new government were, after no long period, ignominiously dismissed from the service of the Company for acts believed to have been corrupt. The moral atmosphere of Madras appears at this time to have been pestilential; corruption revelled unrestrained; and strong indeed must have been the power which could effectually repress it while Mahomet Ali had purposes to gain, and either money or promises to bestow. It is not wonderful that, where public spirit and public decency were alike extinct, the government should have been neither wise nor strong. It is a fact more calculated to excite surprise that it should have been able to maintain itself—that amid the storms which raged around it, every vestige of British dominion did not disappear from the coast of Coromandel.

After the defeat of Colonel Baillie, Hyder Ali had resumed the siege of Arcot. The fortifications of this place were good, but not perfect. Hyder Ali commenced a series of

operations, and erected batteries under the management of his French officers. At the end of six weeks two practicable breaches were made, and on the 31st October the place was simultaneously assaulted by two columns; one under Hyder Ali's son, Tippoo Sultan—the other under an officer named Maher Mirza Khan. The former was repulsed; but the latter having succeeded in effecting an entrance, the column under Tippoo Sultan made a second attempt with better success. The garrison retired to the citadel, the spot where Clive laid the foundation of his imperishable fame. It was not, however, destined to sustain another fifty days' siege. The governor, a brahmin, had been taken prisoner in the assault; but instead of being subjected to the hardships and insults inflicted by Hyder Ali on his European prisoners, he was treated with extraordinary consideration, and declared to be invested with the same office under Hyder Ali which he had recently held under the nabob of Arcot. The desired effect followed; the pliant brahmin readily renounced his allegiance to his former master, and entered cordially into the objects of his new one. By his influence over the native troops forming the garrison, such a spirit was generated as left to the officers who commanded them no choice but to surrender; and the possession of the citadel of Arcot thus crowned the capture of the town.

Two days after its surrender Sir Eyre Coote arrived at Madras. He took his seat in council, and the letter from Bengal announcing the suspension of Mr. Whitehill, as well as another entering into the reasons for that act, were read. Mr. Whitehill protested very vehemently against the exercise of the authority of the government of Bengal, and called upon his colleagues to support him, but with little effect. Sir Hector Munro proposed delay, and Mr. Davidson, another member of council, consoled his chief by declaring that he did not approve of his suspension, though he acknowledged the power of the supreme council, and voted accordingly. This was all the encouragement afforded to the unfortunate governor; and a majority of the council voted Mr. Smith, the next senior servant, acting president.

More than three months had elapsed since Hyder Ali entered the Carnatic, more than ten weeks since Sir Hector Munro left Madras to take the command of the army, and more than seven since his disastrous return to St. Thomas's Mount; yet, with an enemy so active and acute as Hyder Ali almost at the gate of the presidency, no preparation had been made for its defence. Nothing had been done towards adding to the remnant of an army which was left for service; and the severe loss which had been sustained by the destruction of Colonel Baillie's corps was aggravated by daily desertions; the despondency and disaffection of the sepoys having been greatly increased by the fall of Arcot. The field artillery was useless for want of carriages,

the construction of which was only just commencing; while the supply of beasts of draught and burden was inadequate, and of the few which were ready for service, but a small portion were fit for it. Provisions were so scarce, that the troops in camp could with difficulty procure a supply from day to day; and Hyder Ali's cavalry prowled over the country within five miles of Madras. Application was made to the nabob of Arcot; he answered that he had neither men, money, nor influence, but trusted to the Company for everything. Sir Eyre Coote found, consequently, that he had proceeded to Madras not merely to take the command of the army there, but also to make the requisite preparations to enable him to possess an army to command. Happily it was the rainy season, and this circumstance afforded a reasonable excuse for the troops remaining in their quarters. Time for preparation was thus afforded, without necessarily revealing how much it was needed.

The interval thus gained was well employed, as far as circumstances would admit, and on the 30th December, Sir Eyre Coote called a council of war, to deliberate on the plan of operations. It consisted, in addition to the commander-in-chief, of Sir Hector Munro, General Stuart, and Lord Macleod. The result of their deliberations was, a unanimous opinion that the army should march in relief of certain garrisons which were severely pressed by the enemy; and this object being accomplished, return to Madras. One of the garrisons proposed to be relieved, that at Amboor, surrendered before the English army was able to take the field, which was not till the 17th January. On the 19th, Sir Eyre Coote succeeded in relieving Chingleput, in which only fifteen days' provisions remained. The fort of Carangoly, in the occupation of Hyder Ali, lay about thirteen miles to the south-west, and Sir Eyre Coote having been led to believe that the enemy were quitting it, and carrying off the store of provisions, resolved to make an attempt to relieve them from their charge. For this purpose, at midnight on the 20th of January, a detachment of one thousand men, under Captain Davis, was despatched, the main body following some hours after. The intelligence, however, under which the force had been detached, was erroneous, and so far from the place being deserted, Captain Davis found the garrison perfectly ready to receive him. He determined, notwithstanding, to execute his orders; and the place being unprovided with a draw-bridge, a twelve-pounder was rapidly run up to the first gate, which, at the second discharge, was blown open, so as to allow passage for a single man. Passing this, a second and a third gate presented themselves, and these were ultimately forced, though with greater difficulty, the assailants being during the whole period of operation exposed to the enemy's fire from above. The third gate being carried, the garrison escaped by ladders on the opposite side,

and the English were in undisputed possession of Carangoly. The loss of the victors was severe; but the effect of so brilliant a stroke at the opening of the campaign was highly beneficial, more especially after the shadow which had so recently passed over the power of the British arms. One main object of the attack was also secured, in the capture of a quantity of grain.

Wandewash was about twenty-three miles further, and this was the next object of anxiety. When Hyder Ali entered the Carnatic he found no great difficulty in obtaining possession of the forts, where the officers of Mahomet Ali had the actual command. A short negotiation with the killadar saved a long siege. To avert such consequences, English officers, with small bodies of Company's troops, were despatched to various places, and among others to Wandewash. The officer to whom the charge of defending this place was allotted was Lieutenant Flint, who arrived before it with a force of about a hundred men. Having ascertained that the place was still occupied by Mahomet Ali's troops, he sent a message to the killadar announcing his approach. The killadar answered that the British officer would be fired at if he should come within range of the guns. Not deterred by this threat, Lieutenant Flint persevered, and at the verge of the esplanade met a picket sent to stop him. The native officer representing that he could not be permitted to pass, Lieutenant Flint answered that the officer must have misapprehended his orders, which could only have been to stop the approaching party till satisfied that they were friends, of which there could no longer be any doubt; and he succeeded in shaking the faith of the officer in his own conviction of the meaning of his orders, so far as to prevail on him to seek an authoritative explanation of them. In the meantime the English party continued to advance, all messages of warning, several of which followed the first, being met by Lieutenant Flint with a further request for explanation. Arrived within musket-shot of the ramparts, it was perceived that they were manned with troops, and that the gates were shut. Here Lieutenant Flint halted, and demanded admission for himself and a few attendants, to deliver a letter from the nabob to the killadar. This the killadar refused; but, after some parley, agreed to receive the letter between the gate and the barrier of the fortress. Here he took his place on a carpet, attended, for state, by several men of rank, and, for protection, by thirty swordsmen and one hundred sepoy. Lieutenant Flint advanced to the conference with four sepoy only, and, after the usual compliments, avowed that he had no letter from Mahomet Ali; but added, that he possessed that which under the circumstances was to be considered as equivalent—the order of his own government, written in communication with the nabob. The killadar took a much lower estimate of the value of the docu-

ment, which he was disposed to treat with contempt, and, after some slight discussion, was about to retire, when Lieutenant Flint suddenly sprung on him, and declared that his death should instantly follow if a hand were raised to rescue him. The bayonets of the four British sepoys were at the same moment pointed at the breast of the killadar, while the powers of his own guards seemed suspended by consternation. Before they recovered their self-possession, the remainder of the British detachment rushed in, and Lieutenant Flint then explained that no harm to the killadar was meditated; that, on the contrary, if no resistance were offered, he should still retain the honour of the command, which was to be actually exercised by his English captor. Little time was spent in negotiation; the gates were opened, and the whole party entered as friends. But for the extraordinary means adopted by Lieutenant Flint, the place would have passed into the hands of Hyder Ali. The bargain had been made, and the act of surrender was to receive the seal of the killadar on the very day on which he so unexpectedly found himself within the grasp of the English lieutenant. The former avenged himself for the loss of his anticipated reward by endeavouring to excite disaffection in the garrison to the English cause; but the vigilance and address of Lieutenant Flint rendered his efforts ineffectual.

Wandewash had been invested by Hyder Ali late in the preceding year, and on the 16th of January the enemy had entered the ditch by galleries in two places, while another gallery from the south was nearly ready for the same operation. The garrison were now anxiously looking for relief, and at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th, a heavy fire of cannon and musketry was heard in the direction whence relief was expected. The firing continued till day-break, when a column of about three thousand infantry, having the appearance of British sepoys, with English colours flying, appeared and drew up behind a village near the east face of the fortress, and discharged their cannon at bodies of horse making demonstrations as though preparing to charge. At the same time the troops in the town engaged in the lines of attack on Wandewash abandoned their trenches with precipitation, and marched off in the direction of Arcot. The garrison were persuaded that succour had arrived; but there were some circumstances in what was passing which rendered Lieutenant Flint somewhat more than sceptical. He observed that the fire of the guns was from a distance not usual in the practice of British artillery, and that the shot discharged at the approaching bodies of horse grazed in directions clear of their apparent object. He found some difficulty in impressing his own belief on his men; but the hesitation of the pretended relief at length began to shake even their confidence in its approach. He ventured, however, to avail himself of the opportunity to detach a large

portion of the small garrison into the works of the western attack, which they entered unperceived, destroyed the galleries, and set on fire the materials accumulated for filling the ditch. The smoke from this operation was the first intimation to the enemy of what was in progress, and large bodies of men, who were placed in ambush in every direction, immediately rushed to recover the works. The signal for the return of the party from the garrison was thereupon made and promptly obeyed, and the party, after scouring the trenches of the southern attack, and killing or making prisoners every one who had been left concealed either there or in the lines of the western attack, rejoined their comrades without the loss of a man. During three or four days succeeding the defeat of this notable scheme, the enemy was assiduously employed in repairing the damage which his works had sustained; but on the 22nd of January the batteries and trenches were evacuated, and the tents and baggage sent off in the direction of Arcot. The enemy had learned the capture of Carangoly, and on the 23rd they most opportunely disappeared, leaving the garrison of Wandewash with only one day's consumption of ammunition. On the 24th Sir Eyre Coote arrived, and had the satisfaction of still seeing the British flag flying on the ramparts. Twenty-one years before, on the same day of the same month, the veteran commander had raised the siege of Wandewash by one of the most memorable of his victories, and he now encamped on the same spot which he had then occupied.

A French fleet at this time appeared off Madras, but it brought no land force. Sir Eyre Coote having relieved Permaoili, one of the fortresses invested by Hyder Ali, proceeded to restore order at Pondicherry, which had been shaken by the removal of the garrison to other duty. His next object was to protect Cuddalore, which was likely to be a source of annoyance in the hands of the enemy. Here he was greatly pressed by want of provisions, and a long interval passed undistinguished by anything worthy of record in a history not exclusively military. Happily the commander of the French fleet had not suffered the example of his predecessors to be lost upon him. About three weeks after his arrival he had suddenly departed for the Islands, and thus afforded opportunity for the English army to receive supplies by sea.

The first occurrence which broke the monotony of repose took place about the middle of June. The fortified pagoda of Chilambrum was reported to be garrisoned by only a few hundred irregular troops, and as there was no considerable body of the enemy in its vicinity, Sir Eyre Coote hoped to be able to carry it by a *coup de main*. The attack was conducted by the commander-in-chief himself, but it failed. Some intention existed of renewing it; but better information of the state of the garrison, which was far more numerous than had been supposed, and comprised, contrary to Sir Eyre

Coote's belief, a large number of regular troops, led to the abandonment of further attempts against the place.

During the inactivity of the British army, Hyder Ali had been characteristically employed in a variety of minor enterprises, of which the acquisition of booty formed one principal object. On hearing of the attack on Chilamburum, he made a forced movement of a hundred miles in two days and a half, placed himself between the English army and Cuddalore, and began to fortify a position not more than three miles from the British encampment, at the same time covering the whole country with his cavalry. The situation of the English army was now most critical; its possible destruction was contemplated, even by its own commander; and while part of the squadron under Sir Edward Hughes was to cover Cuddalore, the remainder was to watch the operations of the army, and to receive, if necessary, the remnant that might be left from defeat, should that result await it. The battery-guns were embarked; and, divested of every impediment to rapid motion, an attempt was to be made, either to turn or force the enemy's position, or to bring on a general action.

At seven o'clock on the morning of the 1st July the British army had passed out of its encampments. At this time the commander-in-chief was utterly ignorant of the nature of the enemy's works, and was not even aware of their precise position, for Hyder Ali's cavalry had closed all avenues of intelligence. After marching about a mile and a half, the works became clearly distinguishable, and Sir Eyre Coote spent considerable time in a careful *reconnaissance*. His army was during this period exposed to a distant but continuous cannonade, but the English artillery did not return a single shot. The accidental discovery of a road which Hyder Ali had made for some purpose of his own, facilitated the attack of the English, which was made in two columns. The battle raged for six hours, and every inch of ground was fiercely contested. "Every individual in the Company's service," says one chronicler of the battle, "fought as if the fate of the day had depended on his single efforts." Their energy met its reward in a brilliant victory. At four o'clock the enemy's line gave way, and a precipitate retreat followed. Hyder Ali had throughout the day viewed the battle from a small eminence, where, seated cross-legged on a low stool, he witnessed the gradual yielding and ultimate flight of his vast army. That which he saw was so much at variance with that which he had anticipated, that he could scarcely believe his senses; and at last, when some of his followers suggested that it was time to move, the intimation was met by a torrent of that vulgar abuse which always constituted the staple of Hyder Ali's eloquence. A groom whose long service had conferred on him the privilege of disregarding

ceremony when danger was at hand, saved his master from the fate which he seemed determined to invite. Seizing the feet of the chief, he forced on his slippers, observing as he thus equipped him for flight, "We will beat them to-morrow: in the meanwhile, mount your horse." The advice of the faithful menial was followed, and Hyder Ali was soon at a distance from the impending danger.

The English army engaged on that day amounted to about eight thousand men. The army of Hyder Ali was at least eight times that number. The enemy had forty-seven pieces of cannon of heavy calibre; the English guns were lighter, but rather more numerous—they were fifty-five in number. A small schooner from the British squadron opened her fire upon a mass of Hyder Ali's cavalry when they were wavering, and the broadside was fatal to a distinguished commander and a considerable number of men. This unexpected attack, magnified by the fears of those upon whom it was made, led them to believe and report that the fire of the entire squadron was turned upon them.

The loss of the English in the battle of the 1st of July was comparatively trifling. About three hundred was the total amount of both killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy cannot be stated with certainty, but it is believed that in estimating it at ten thousand the truth is not exceeded.

On the 22nd of June Tippoo Sultan had renewed the siege of Wandewash. On the night of the 16th of July an attempt was made to carry the place by an escalade at all accessible points. It failed: each column, as it approached, was received with a discharge of grape, and irretrievable confusion followed. Orders to renew the attempt at escalade on the ensuing day produced indications of mutiny, the moral influence of Hyder Ali's late defeat coming in aid of the discouragement occasioned by the failure which Tippoo's attempts had already experienced. On the 18th of July Sir Eyre Coote arrived at Carangoly, on his way to effect a junction with a detachment which had arrived from Bengal; and on the same day Tippoo Sultan decamped from Wandewash, leaving the garrison the employment of destroying a number of works which had been constructed with vast labour before the design of attack by escalade had been entertained. Hyder Ali had made preparations for intercepting Sir Eyre Coote by the route which it was expected he would take. The British general avoided them by taking another road, which enabled him to arrive safely at Pulicat, where he was joined by the expected reinforcement.

Thus strengthened, Sir Eyre Coote was still unable to attempt either of two objects of great importance, the relief of Vellore or the siege of Arcot. Tripassore, a fortress of some importance, seemed to offer an easier acquisition, and on the 19th of August he appeared before it. On the morning of the 22nd, a

breach having been effected, a flag of truce appeared, proposing a surrender, upon terms that had previously been offered, but which were now refused, and unconditional surrender within a quarter of an hour demanded. The instant after the answer was despatched, it was reported that large bodies of the enemy were in sight, and on reconnoitering, the advanced guard of Hyder Ali's army was perceived in full march. There was now not a moment to lose—Sir Eyre Coote issued orders to storm instantly; and the troops had just emerged from the trenches, when the flag of truce returned with the declaration of surrender, and the assailants ascended the breach without opposition. On perceiving this, the enemy withdrew. The question which had protracted the surrender was, whether the garrison should or should not be prisoners of war. The result had left them prisoners; but to provide food for one thousand four hundred men was an additional difficulty, which the exhausted state of the British commissariat was little able to bear. Sir Eyre Coote proposed to Hyder Ali to exchange them for an equal number of British troops; but the Mysorean chief did not set on his garrison at Tripassore sufficient value to induce him even to wish to preserve their lives. In answer to Sir Eyre Coote's proposal, he said, "The men taken at Tripassore are faithless and unworthy; they know that they dare not approach me; they are your prisoners, and I advise you to put every one of them to death speedily."

Hyder Ali had taken up the same fortunate position which he had formerly occupied when opposed by Sir Hector Munro, and there, on the 27th of August, a battle was fought, the result of which was, that the enemy were driven from their position, and the English left in possession of the field. But the victory thereupon claimed by the English was not very decisive, and the claim is contested by the Mysoreans, who allege the battle to have been a drawn one. It rather tended to restore to the enemy a portion of the confidence which had been lost by the battle of the 1st of July; and when, two days after the engagement, Sir Eyre Coote returned to Tripassore, he did not possess a day's provisions for his fighting men, while the non-military persons attached to the camp had been without food for two days. Under these dispiriting circumstances, Sir Eyre Coote, "feeling the conviction," says Colonel Wilks, "that he was wasting his large store of character and what little remained of life, by continuing in command of troops unprovided with all but arms," proceeded to the presidency to represent the inutility of keeping together an army incapable, for want of stores, of effecting anything, and to express his own desire to be relieved from the command of it. A new governor, Lord Macartney, had arrived at Madras; his advice prevailed on the veteran soldier to make further trial of the practice

of keeping the army together, and rendering its services beneficial. Sir Eyre Coote returned, and on the 27th of September, near the hill of Sholingur, once more put Hyder Ali to the rout, having taken him in a great degree by surprise. The loss of the enemy was believed to be not less than five thousand, that of the English was not more than a hundred. By sacrificing a large number of his cavalry in charges having no object but to gain time to secure the guns, Hyder Ali was enabled to carry off nearly all his artillery. The English took three cavalry standards and one gun, all which, together with the honour of the victory, Sir Eyre Coote professed himself willing to have parted with for five days' supply of rice. The English army kept the field for some time after this battle, principally occupied in endeavours to procure the means of subsistence, and continually misled on this and other points by false intelligence. Late in November it returned into cantonments, near Madras.

The English were now at war with the Dutch as well as the French. Sadras and Pulicat, both Dutch possessions, had been taken soon after the arrival of Lord Macartney, and to these were added, in October 1781, the more important settlement of Negapatam. This capture was effected by a military force under the command of Sir Hector Munro, aided by the fleet under Sir Edward Hughes. The army commanded by Sir Hector Munro included a detachment under Colonel Braithwaite, which had been employed with some success in Tanjore. Towards the close of the year, Trincomalee and Fort Ostenburgh, Dutch possessions in Ceylon, were added to the conquests of the English.

Sir Eyre Coote had proposed to proceed to Bengal, to concert, if possible, with the governor-general, some plan for relieving the army from the embarrassments and privations which deprived it of efficiency and wasted its energy in an unremitting search after food. The state of his health, too, which had sunk under the fatigues to which he had been subjected, suggested the expediency of change; but the dangers which threatened Vellore, and the necessity of relieving it, determined the general to remain to perform this duty in person. He rejoined the army on the 2nd of January. On the 5th he was seized with apoplexy, and remained insensible two hours. He recovered sufficiently to be able to march the next day, and on the 11th arrived with supplies under the walls of Vellore; this being the very day which had been declared by the commandant to be the last to which he could protract the defence unless relieved. Sir Eyre Coote commenced his return to Madras on the 13th, and arrived there on the 16th, after encountering some opposition from Hyder Ali, which was promptly overcome.

On the coast of Malabar the cause of Hyder Ali had not prospered. The native chiefs exerted themselves vigorously, and the Eng-

lish settlement of Tellicherry was for two years bravely defended by means apparently very inadequate. Early in 1782, reinforcements arrived under Major Abington, and not only was the siege raised, but the whole of the enemy's cannon, amounting to sixty pieces, as well as the whole of their baggage, fell into the hands of the English. But this success was counterbalanced by a misfortune which overtook the corps of Colonel Braithwaite in Tanjore. This, like many other mischances which befel the English, was attributable to the fact of those who furnished the British commanders with intelligence being the servants and spies of the enemy. Colonel Braithwaite, with about two thousand men, encamped upon a plain, where his pretended emissaries assured him that he was secure. An intelligent native, unconnected with the army, warned him of his danger, but in vain: it was impossible to shake the colonel's faith in his ordinary channels of information; and the man who would have saved him, having protested against the rejection of his advice, mounted his horse and sought his own security in flight from the spot which was shortly to be devoted to carnage. Wrapt in the confidence of fancied security, Colonel Braithwaite awoke not from his delusion till he found himself surrounded by the army of Tippoo Sultan. Retreat was impossible, and nearly the whole of the English corps was cut to pieces. The kindly attentions of the French officers attached to the army of Tippoo Sultan were, on this occasion, again exerted to stop the indiscriminate slaughter, and to minister to the relief of the wounded.

An expedition had been despatched from England under Commodore Johnston and General Meadows, of which one object was to attack the Dutch settlement at the Cape. Another expedition had been despatched from France, partly for service in the East, but designed in the first instance to protect the Cape from attack; and arriving before the English expedition, this object was attained. Commodore Johnston having made prizes of some Dutch vessels, thereupon returned to England with three frigates: the remaining ships, together with the troops, proceeded to India. The French having left some troops to reinforce the garrison at the Cape, proceeded to the Islands, and there having added to their strength, they pursued their course to their ultimate destination.

The French fleet, under Mons. Suffrein, was encountered by Sir Edward Hughes, who captured six vessels—none of them ships of war, but one a transport, full of troops, the loss of which was a severe blow to the French force. The French admiral, however, succeeded in landing at Porto Novo three thousand men, two thousand of them Europeans, the remainder Africans. This being performed, he departed in search of a fleet of English merchantmen, the arrival of which on the coast was reported. Sir Edward Hughes soon afterwards sailed to relieve Trincomalee,

and happily fell in with the fleet for which the French commander was seeking. It consisted of seven Indiamen and two line-of-battle ships. The latter the English admiral took with him, and pursuing his course, came up with the French fleet about fifteen leagues from Trincomalee. A sanguinary battle ensued, and terminated without any decisive results, both fleets being too much crippled to renew the contest. The English fleet retired to Trincomalee to repair damage; the French, for the same purpose, to Bathiolo, a port of Ceylon, still in the possession of the Dutch.

On land, the progress of events was less favourable to the English. The French force had joined the army of Hyder Ali, Cuddalore had fallen to them, and the loss of that place was followed by that of Permacoil. The allies then presented themselves before Wandewash; but Sir Eyre Coote approaching, they did not choose to await his arrival, but withdrew towards Pondicherry. There they were followed by the veteran commander of the British forces, who came in sight of them encamped in a strong position in the neighbourhood of Kellinoor. A movement by Sir Eyre Coote, menacing Arnée, drew upon him an attack which ended in the discomfiture of the enemy with severe loss. A negotiation had been in progress for the purchase of Arnée, but the vicinity of Hyder Ali rendered the killadar afraid to complete it. A few days afterwards the grand guard of Sir Eyre Coote was drawn into an ambuscade and destroyed. The English army was now pervaded by sickness to an alarming degree. Its next march was to Wandewash, from whence it returned to the vicinity of Madras.

The subsequent naval operations are little more interesting than those which took place on land. The French meditated an attack upon Negapatam, but the design was frustrated by the appearance of Sir Edward Hughes. A battle took place, ending, like so many of the naval engagements of the time, without a capture on either side, and leaving the claim to victory doubtful. Mons. Suffrein was more successful in an attack upon Trincomalee, which he compelled to surrender. The English admiral arrived immediately afterwards, and, from the state of the light, being unable to perceive the symptoms of change, stood in to the harbour. In the morning, the French colours flying on shore, as well as in the anchorage, told distinctly by whom the place was garrisoned. An action between the two fleets followed, but concluded in the usual indecisive manner—the French returning to Cuddalore, and the English to Madras. As a naval commander, the French admiral, Mons. Suffrein, appears in a far more respectable light than most of his predecessors in India; but one of his acts casts upon his memory a stain for which no professional merit can atone. He had proposed to Lord Macartney a cartel for the exchange of prisoners. Some delay took place in consequence of the necessity

of referring to Sir Eyre Coote. The English general wished the English prisoners in the custody of Hyder Ali to be included in the exchange; but this proposal, it is believed, was rejected by M. Suffrein. To whatever cause, however, the failure is attributable, it is certain the negotiation ended without any arrangement being completed. M. Suffrein thereupon landed his prisoners at Cuddalore, and deliberately transferred them to Hyder Ali, by whom they were marched in chains to Mysore. M. Suffrein was not ignorant of the fate to which he consigned his wretched prisoners. Several of his countrymen, greatly to their honour, interposed their endeavours to shake the determination of the French admiral, by depicting the horrors to which Hyder Ali's English prisoners were subjected. Their efforts were fruitless, and M. Suffrein doomed his prisoners to captivity in Mysore, and his own character to universal reprobation. "The whole civilized world," says Colonel Wilks, "must unite in its abhorrence of delivering to the custody of a barbarian notorious for his contempt of" the customary laws of war among civilized nations, "prisoners entitled to honourable treatment from an honourable enemy."

Sir Eyre Coote's health was now too much shaken to permit of his continuing longer in the state of mental and corporeal excitement in which he had been placed since his arrival on the coast of Coromandel. In aggravation of the toils of war, he had been engaged in a series of disputes with the governor of Madras. Sir Eyre Coote had been invested by the government of Bengal with extraordinary powers, very properly entrusted, with reference to some of the parties in the government of Madras, but which the general was disposed to maintain pertinaciously, and somewhat offensively, against the claims of Lord Macartney, a man neither tainted with the corruption in which his immediate predecessors were steeped, nor deficient, as they had been, in ability for his high office. The governor was greatly annoyed; but, having much the advantage of his opponent in point of temper, no direct breach took place. On the contrary, Lord Macartney invariably treated the general with the most punctilious respect, though he occasionally suffered some fragments of blame to escape him, clothed, however, in the most courtier-like terms. Occasionally, too, he ventured to act without consulting the commander-in-chief. He thus acted in the attack on Negapatam, the result of which was honourable to his judgment. But such insubordination was very disagreeable to Sir Eyre Coote, who was disposed to exercise his powers in a manner which would have rendered the maintenance of a governor at Madras a piece of useless expense and pageantry. These broils were suspended by the departure of Sir Eyre Coote for Bengal, the command of the army devolving on General Stuart.

Early in the year 1782, a British force, com-

manded by Colonel Humberstone, being part of that despatched from England under General Meadows, had landed at Calicut. They joined the troops previously under the command of Major Abington, and Colonel Humberstone took the command of the whole. The reinforcement had been destined to assist in the operations in progress on the eastern side of India and at Ceylon; but the officers, with that independence of authority which was not then unusual in India, took the course which has been described. Some success at first attended the operations of this force; but it was, after a time, compelled to make a rapid retreat before the army of Tippoo Sultan. Colonel Humberstone returned to the coast with about three hundred men, the remnant of one thousand with which he had landed a short time before. Colonel Macleod had been sent by Sir Eyre Coote to take the command, and he resisted a night attack on his position by Tippoo Sultan with spirit and success. Further attacks were apprehended, and Sir Edward Hughes, who now appeared off the coast with his squadron, joined Colonel Macleod with a reinforcement of four hundred and fifty Europeans, when circumstances were unexpectedly changed by the sudden departure of Tippoo Sultan to the eastward. This retrograde movement was caused by the receipt of intelligence of the death of Hyder Ali, who closed his ruffian life at an age not falling short by many years of that of Aurungzebe. To avert confusion, it was important to conceal his death till his successor was on the spot to maintain his claim. The body was accordingly deposited in a chest filled with aromatics, and sent from the camp under an escort in a manner similar to that in which valuable plunder was conveyed. All the business of the state went on as usual, and inquirers after the health of the chief were answered that, though extremely weak, he was in a state of slow but progressive amendment. Of the few persons entrusted with the secret, one only, named Mahomed Ameen, proved faithless. This person, who commanded four thousand horse, formed a project, with some others, to take off by assassination those who provisionally administered the government, and to assume their power in the name of Hyder Ali's second son, a young man of weak intellect, in whose hands empire would have been but an empty name. The plot was detected; the conspirators seized and sent off in irons; the belief that Hyder Ali still lived being encouraged by these acts being represented as the consequences of his personal orders. The army marched in the direction of Tippoo Sultan's advance, and the palanquin of Hyder Ali occupied its accustomed place, care being taken to restrain too close approach, lest the repose of the royal patient should be disturbed and his recovery impeded by noise or interruption. At length the illusion was dispelled by the arrival of Hyder Ali's successor, who assumed the sovereignty which

awaited him with an extraordinary affectation of humility and grief.

The death of Hyder Ali afforded a favourable opportunity to the English for striking a vigorous blow, but it was not improved. The government pressed upon General Stuart the expediency of the immediate march of the army; but the answer of the general was, that he did not believe that Hyder Ali was dead, and if he were, the army would be ready for action in proper time. The recommendation to march was repeated, and General Stuart then declared himself astonished that there could be so little reflection as to talk of undertakings against the enemy in the actual state of the army and the country. Thus was opportunity thrown away; when it was lost, the army was put in motion. On the 15th January, thirteen days after the arrival of Tippoo Sultan in his father's camp, and his unopposed accession to the government, the English army made its first march, for the purpose of conveying provisions to Tripassore, its first intermediate depôt; and it was not till thirty-four days after the arrival of Tippoo Sultan, and sixty days after the death of Hyder Ali, that any step of importance was taken towards the attainment of the objects of the campaign.

General Stuart was well disposed to assume the extraordinary powers which had been exercised by Sir Eyre Coote; but he had no pretence for claiming them, and Lord Macartney was naturally indisposed to yield to his desire for absolute authority. He accordingly assumed the direction of all military measures, leaving to the general only the duty of executing them. In one of the plans most early acted upon, both the governor and General Stuart concurred. It was that for the destruction of the forts of Carangoly and Wandewash; a proceeding severely condemned by the government of Bengal, and by almost every individual who has passed a judgment upon it.

Two events now occurred, calculated to dispirit the English and give confidence to their enemies. Sir Eyre Coote, having improved in health, returned to Madras in the Company's armed ship *Resolution*, which bore also a large supply of money. Towards the close of the voyage, the *Resolution* was chased during two days and nights by a French ship of the line. The anxiety of the general kept him constantly on deck, where the excessive heat of the day and the heavy damps of the night, combined with the agitation consequent on the circumstances of the voyage, gave to his enfeebled frame a shock from which nature was unable to recover. The ship arrived in safety at Madras, and two days afterwards Sir Eyre Coote expired.

The other event referred to was the arrival of M. Bussy, to take the command of the French troops in India, accompanied by reinforcements from the Isle of France. General Stuart had taken up a position to the south of

Cuddalore: M. Bussy took his on a spot not far distant, and began to erect field works with great skill and rapidity. Here he was attacked by the English on the 13th of June, with success, part of the French works being carried, and several of their guns taken. On the day on which this conflict took place, the fleet under M. Suffrein made its appearance, and a few days afterwards, having received on board twelve hundred men from the force under M. Bussy, an action with the English fleet took place. The fight was maintained with much spirit, and closed at night in the accustomed manner; both parties being severely crippled, while neither had gained any decided advantage. On the following day Sir Edward Hughes sought to renew the battle, but in vain, and being unable, from the state of his ships and the want of water, to remain where he was, he reluctantly bore away for the Madras roads. M. Suffrein now returned the twelve hundred men who had been furnished by M. Bussy, and landed on the fleet two thousand four hundred more. Thus strengthened, the French general, on the 25th of June, made a vigorous sortie with his best troops. The attack on the English trenches was pushed with vigour, but not a single point was forced, and the French sustained a heavy loss.

A brief retrospect of the progress of the war on the western side of India, during the year 1783, will now be expedient. On the news of the advance of Tippoo Sultan, the government of Bombay had despatched General Mathews with a force for the relief of Colonel Humberstone, at Paniani. Tippoo Sultan had withdrawn before his arrival, and several places of some importance fell, almost without resistance, into the hands of the English. On becoming acquainted with the death of Hyder Ali, the government of Bombay sent positive orders to General Mathews to discontinue all operations on the coast, and make an immediate push for Bednore. According to almost invariable practice, the general and the government under which he acted took different views. He protested against the orders which he had received, but proceeded to execute them with promptness, almost amounting to precipitation. Bednore surrendered on terms; Mangalore, and some other places, also yielded on capitulation; but a few it was necessary to carry by the sword. Among the latter was Anantpore, where the English assailants were accused of having acted with great barbarity. A large part of the enormities ascribed to them were absolutely false; a portion, which seems, unhappily, to be true, is ascribable to a conflict of authorities, arising out of the unsettled circumstances of the times, which led the English to believe that they were subjected to treachery.

Bednore was retained by the English about three months. Tippoo Sultan returned from the Carnatic with a force which General

Mathews was in no condition to resist; and on the 3rd of May the English garrison marched out of Bednore, on conditions dictated by the conqueror. These conditions Tippoo Sultan found a pretext for violating, and having charged the English officers with enriching themselves by the plunder of the public treasury, he marched them off in irons to distant places.

The next effort of Tippoo Sultan was directed to the reduction of Mangalore. It was ably defended by Colonel Campbell, and after sustaining a protracted siege, was unexpectedly relieved from a part of the besieging force by the arrival of news of the conclusion of peace between England and France. It is said that the communication of this intelligence was deferred for ten days, during which the siege was hotly pressed. Tippoo Sultan was bewildered by the loss of his European friends, and not knowing what to do, consented to an armistice extending to Mangalore, Onore, and the British forts in Malabar.

On the eastern side of India, the intelligence of peace in Europe arrived immediately after the unsuccessful sally made by M. Bussy on the English. But peace between the conflicting authorities at Madras there was none. General Stuart, always anxious to possess the extensive powers enjoyed by his predecessor, had requested that a corps under Colonel Fullarton should be placed under his orders. The application was complied with reluctantly, and the general was enjoined not to use the discretionary power with which he was invested, except in case of urgent necessity. Such a case, he alleged, occurred, and he instructed Colonel Fullarton to move towards him. The government at the same time issued orders directing Colonel Fullarton to move in a different direction. Embarrassed by these contradictory instructions—one set emanating from the civil authority, which he was at all times bound to obey; another from the chief military authority, who had a right to command him in case of emergency—Colonel Fullarton had only to make choice of whom he should disobey. He chose to violate the instructions of his government; and probably he did well, acting on the presumption that General Stuart would not require his services if they were not necessary. But the conduct of General Stuart, on this and various other occasions, had given great offence at the presidency, and he was summoned to repair thither to explain or justify his disobedience. He manifested no more alacrity in obeying this than former orders from the same authority, but at last proceeded to Madras, where the various points of dispute were fiercely discussed. Finally, the governor proposed the dismissal of the general, and the other members of committee concurred. The denounced officer, however, avowed his determination to retain the command of the king's troops, notwithstanding the decision of the government; and Sir John

Burgoyne, the second officer in rank, declared that he should obey the orders of General Stuart. The dispute was out short by the government arresting General Stuart, and detaining him as a prisoner till an opportunity offered for his proceeding to England. It is remarkable that the officer against whom the government of Madras felt necessitated to adopt a measure so severe, should have been the same who, some years before, had executed the revolutionary orders of the majority in council, by arresting the then governor of Madras, Lord Pigot.

By the terms of the armistice concluded with Tippoo Sultan, on the western side of India, arrangements were made for the periodical supply of Mangalore with provisions. These arrangements were rendered ineffective by the most scandalous evasions on the part of the besiegers, who continued moreover to carry on their works without respect to the engagements subsisting between them and the besieged. Relief was anxiously expected in Mangalore from Bombay; but from some causes which it is difficult satisfactorily to explain, nothing effective was done. This supineness has been ascribed to respect for an article in the preliminaries between England and France, in which it was stipulated that four months should be allowed to the belligerent powers of Hindostan to accede to the pacification. The government of Madras gave notice of this article to Tippoo Sultan's political agent, and thought fit to date the commencement of the period of four months from the 2nd of August. A singular liberality was displayed in fixing this date, as Tippoo Sultan had acknowledged being acquainted with the peace twenty-four days before the 2nd of August, and it was believed that his knowledge might have been dated ten days earlier without inflicting on him any wrong. But it is of little importance to argue when the four months allowed to the Indian belligerents for consideration ought, in reason, to have commenced, for Tippoo Sultan did not at any time abstain from hostile proceedings—he disregarded alike the general stipulation contained in the preliminaries between England and France, and the special convention concluded with himself. It was absurd to suppose that one party should be bound by conditions which the other set at naught—that the English were to abstain from means of defence as well as of offence during four months, while Tippoo Sultan was at liberty to prepare, unchecked, measures for their destruction; but into this absurdity the British authorities on the western side of India fell. Even when the sacred four months expired, they were not prepared effectually to relieve Mangalore. On the day which, according to their own view, found them at liberty to act vigorously, they were unprovided with the means of succouring the place. On the 1st of December a squadron was off Mangalore, but they were destitute of water, and all but one ship departed on that

day; that solitary one, on board of which was Brigadier-general Macleod, following on the 2nd. Some inadequate supplies were subsequently thrown in, but they appear to have passed under the provisions of the armistice with Tippoo Sultan, which he was every hour breaking. At length the distress of the garrison became extreme. The salt meat was uneatable, the biscuit swarmed with vermin, and sea scurvy, the consequence of this loathsome and unwholesome food, raged throughout the garrison. The sepoys had neither salt nor condiment of any kind; blindness, alleged to proceed from the consumption of rice without any antiseptic addition, seized vast numbers. Two-thirds of the garrison were in hospital, and it was not unusual for the men to drop down on parade in the vain endeavour to shoulder arms. On the 23rd of January it seemed impossible longer to protract this state of suffering with any adequate advantage. Negotiation was opened: on the 26th, articles of capitulation were agreed upon, but not signed till the 30th. In the interval, Colonel Gordon arrived with two ships containing a month's provisions. Had these arrived earlier, the siege might have been prolonged; but now the articles were agreed upon, though not signed, and Colonel Campbell would not recede from that to which his faith was pledged. The garrison were permitted to march to Tellicherry with arms, accoutrements, and the honours of war. The gallant officer, who, after nobly defending for many months a place of no great strength against a vast army, had, on its surrender, obtained for himself and his men terms rarely granted, did not long survive the fatigues and anxiety to which he had been subjected: he died on the 23rd of March in the same year.

About the middle of October, Colonel Fullarton, who, after his march in the direction of General Stuart's army, had returned to the southward, received intelligence of the insolent violation of the convention of Mangalore, and he in consequence moved on to Paligaut, with a view to effect a junction with a force commanded by General Macleod. Paligaut sustained a short and vigorous siege, but fell suddenly and unexpectedly. Captain Maitland, being on duty in the trenches, took advantage of a heavy fall of rain to drive the enemy from the covered way, which was not palisaded; and pursuing the fugitives through the first and second gateway, the garrison were struck with panic and immediately surrendered.

The anticipated co-operation of General Macleod in the relief of Mangalore it was found could not be obtained. Tellicherry, which was relied upon for provisions and stores, could afford neither; the troops under General Macleod could not be furnished with field equipage in less than two months, and the state of the country presented insurmountable difficulties in the way of a rapid advance. Colonel Fullarton had therefore to determine on a new course, and with a view

to the ultimate expediency of advancing on Seringapatam, where it was understood disaffection prevailed, he proceeded to the capital of Coimbatore. Here his progress was arrested by instructions from commissioners proceeding to the court of Tippoo Sultan to negotiate. These instructions required the colonel not only to suspend his operations, but to abandon all his conquests, and to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the 26th of the preceding July. Such instructions were, to say the least, prematurely given—they were founded on an assumption "that the cessation of arms appeared to have been disturbed in partial instances by accidental circumstances, and without any authority from government on either side," when it was notorious that it had been systematically violated by Tippoo Sultan himself. It is inconsistent with the ordinary duty of a soldier to inquire whether he will obey lawful orders or not, and to exercise a discretion which is not entrusted to him. Colonel Fullarton departed so far from general rule as to determine, while yielding obedience to that part of his recent instructions which required him to suspend further operations, to abstain from carrying into effect the remainder, and he expressed his intention to retain all his conquests till the receipt of farther orders. In extenuation of this irregularity, it is to be urged that he knew the orders which had been conveyed to him to have originated either in a gross ignorance of facts or in gross weakness.

The commissioners entered on their duties, and there was apparently not much difference in the views of the opposite negotiators. Mutual restitution was to be the basis of peace, but the order in which the restitutions were to take place gave rise to much discussion. The English proposed that all places captured by either party to the eastward of the Ghats should in the first instance be restored; that the release of all the English prisoners should then follow; and, finally, on the English being satisfied that this condition had been faithfully executed, that exchanges of all places captured on the western coast should be made. Mangalore had not yet fallen, and the agents of Tippoo Sultan demanded that its surrender should precede the release of the English prisoners, pledging their faith for the due fulfilment of the latter provision. The first commissioner, Mr. Sadleir, was ready to assent to this arrangement; the second, Mr. Staunton, had no such confidence in the good faith of Tippoo Sultan, and he refused to comply. In this situation, the question could only be decided by a reference to government, and its decision was most properly given in favour of the opinion of Mr. Staunton. At the same time, a third member, Mr. Huddleston, was added to the commission. In this instance the government acted wisely; they subsequently acted weakly. They resolved to enforce the orders of the commissioners for Colonel Fullarton to abandon his conquests,

and retire within the limits prescribed by his previous instructions. Colonel Fullarton obeyed. On his march he met the celebrated missionary, Swartz, who had been requested to assist the commissioners in the capacity of an interpreter, and was on his way for the purpose of entering on this duty. Even this single-minded and peaceful man could not refrain from expressing his astonishment at the orders given to Colonel Fullarton. "And is the peace so certain," said he, "that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage the beast?" The colonel could only answer, "I cannot help it." It yet remained for the government to bear witness against its own folly, credulity, and precipitancy, and this was done. Colonel Fullarton had not entirely fulfilled his former orders, when he received counter-orders, requiring him to retain possession of all that had not previously been given up, until he received further instructions.

The commissioners had hitherto treated only with Tippoo Sultan's servants at a distance from their master. In their progress towards the camp of the Mysorean chief, they were subjected to every inconvenience and indignity which could be devised. They were conducted by routes almost impassable, and several of their camels perished. Their journey was so regulated as to keep pace with the progress of famine at Mangalore, and when only twenty miles distant from that place, they were met by a letter from the Sultan, informing them that, at the earnest desire of Colonel Campbell, he had agreed to take charge of the fort. Arrived in the camp of the insolent Mahometan, the tent of each of the commissioners was graced by the erection of a gibbet in its front. Their communications with their countrymen in the ships lying in the roads were placed under restraint; and the commissioners learned that several British prisoners, including General Mathews, had been murdered by the tyrant into whose power they had fallen. It was not unnatural that they should become apprehensive that the gibbets were erected with intentions beyond that of mere insult.

It would be both tedious and useless to pursue the course of the negotiation through all its tortuous windings. It may suffice to say that, as the arrogance and insolence of Tippoo Sultan had been encouraged by the timid submission of the Madras government, so the indications of a bolder policy led to different results. On the 11th of May the long pending treaty was signed. It was based on the principle of a restitution of conquests, but no compensation was obtained for the atrocious

treatment of the English prisoners by Tippoo Sultan. Hyder Ali had treated them with a cruelty which manifested an utter disregard to the preservation of their lives; Tippoo Sultan did not hesitate to employ direct means to deprive them of existence. Captain Rumley, who led the charge against Tippoo's guns on the fatal day of Colonel Baillie's defeat; Lieutenant Fraser, one of that officer's staff; Lieutenant Sampson, a gallant officer, whose name is yet remembered among the Mahrattas; General Mathews, and many of the officers taken at Bednore, all perished in captivity, and not from natural causes. But the British government were too eager for peace to inquire rigidly into such matters, and too weak to protract hostilities in the hope of avenging them.

Between the governor-general and Lord Macartney there had never been much cordiality of feeling, and the difficulties in which the government of Madras was placed tended to multiply the points of difference. The governor-general had a plan for surrendering to the nizâm the northern circars, in consideration of a body of cavalry to be furnished by that prince. This was opposed by Lord Macartney, and was never carried into effect. Lord Macartney had, with much difficulty, obtained from the nabob of Arcot an assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic for the support of the war. This was disapproved by the government of Bengal, and the assignment ordered to be rescinded. Before these orders were received at Madras, orders of a contrary character arrived from the Court of Directors. The government of Bengal, however, stubbornly refused to yield, and Lord Macartney was equally immovable. The treaty with Tippoo Sultan afforded other grounds of difference. It was disapproved by the government of Bengal, among other reasons, because it did not include the nabob of Arcot; and a new ratification, declaring it to extend to that personage, was directed to take place. Lord Macartney again resisted; and had the governor-general possessed confidence in the stability of his own authority, some violent measures might have resulted from these disputes. But Hastings was now tottering in his seat—heavy charges were in circulation against him in England, and he had despatched an agent thither for the defence of his character and interests. The influence of Lord Macartney at home appeared to be rising as that of Hastings was declining; he continued to exercise his authority without impediment, until, in consequence chiefly of the revocation of the orders of the Court of Directors relating to the assignment from Mahomet Ali, he voluntarily relinquished it, and was ultimately appointed to succeed to the office of governor-general.

CHAPTER XII.

DISPUTES WITH CHEYT SINGH, RAJAH OF BENARES—DANGER OF HASTINGS—TREATY WITH THE VIZIER OF OUDE—HASTINGS PROCEEDS TO LUCKNOW—HIS DEPARTURE FOR ENGLAND.

It is now necessary to return to the affairs of Bengal, for the purpose of adverting to some important acts of Hastings's government not hitherto noticed.

During the war waged with Meer Cossim and the Vizier of Oude, the English had received some support from the Rajah of Benares, named Bulwunt Singh. His conduct had been sometimes regarded with suspicion; but, on the whole, it had afforded so much satisfaction, that it was deemed right to secure his peaceful possession of the country which he administered by a special provision in the treaty concluded with the vizier. On the death of Bulwunt Singh, the British government again interfered to procure a continuance of the zemindary to his son, Cheyt Singh; and this object was effected, the young rajah being subjected to the charge of a considerable present to the vizier, and a small increase of his annual tribute. On these conditions, the vizier granted sunnuds confirming Cheyt Singh in the rights exercised by his father. Subsequently, by virtue of a treaty concluded between the East-India Company and Azoff-al-Dowlah, the territories administered by Cheyt Singh passed into the hands of the former authority. New sunnuds were granted to Cheyt Singh by the British government, confirming him in the exercise of the powers and rights which he had previously held under the soubahdar of Oude, subject to the payment of the same amount of tribute, and to an additional sum of about ninety thousand rupees levied under the title of nuzzerana.

When the war with France rendered it necessary for the Company's government to make additional preparations for defence, it was determined to call upon Cheyt Singh to contribute to the object, and he was required to consent to the establishment of three battalions of sepoy, to be raised and maintained at his expense. The rajah did not object, and his vakeel at Calcutta proposed that the amount of the annual charge should be fixed at three lacs of rupees. This was deemed insufficient by the British authorities, who determined that the sum of five lacs was not excessive, and required that it should be paid without delay. The rajah, in conformity with the usual practice of Oriental debtors, endeavoured to procrastinate, and the English resident was directed to assume a threatening tone; but, ultimately, that sum was paid as the first year's subsidy.

The second year brought a fresh demand from the British government, and fresh evasions on the part of the rajah. After many attempts

to elude payment altogether, he furnished part of the required sum, but declared himself unable to complete it. His inability was not removed until two battalions had been put in motion against him. He then paid the balance of the subsidy, as well as the military expenses incurred by his resistance. The proceedings of the third year differed little from those of the second. After the ordinary delays, a military force was ordered to advance, but the timely submission of the rajah rendered their presence unnecessary. In addition to the subsidy, the British government now demanded from Cheyt Singh the assistance of a body of cavalry, to be continued during the war. The rajah did not comply, and fresh cause of irritation was thus created. Shortly afterwards the time arrived for demanding the fourth year's subsidy. It was reported and believed, that the rajah had inherited great wealth from his father, which he had secured in two strong fortresses, and to which he continued to make yearly additions. To these accumulations the eye of the governor-general was directed for a twofold purpose. He deemed the conduct of the rajah contumacious and disaffected, and on these grounds deserving of punishment. The punishment of the rajah might conveniently be combined with the relief of the necessities of the British government by the infliction of a large pecuniary fine; and this plan he resolved to adopt. Having secured the consent of his coadjutors, he departed on a journey to Benares. At Buxar he was met by Cheyt Singh, with a large fleet of boats. Several interviews took place between the governor-general and the rajah, at one of which the latter placed his turban on Hastings's lap. The governor-general, however, continued to prosecute his journey to Benares, at which place he arrived on the 14th of August. Here he declined personal conference with the rajah, but despatched a letter to him, stating at length the grounds of the dissatisfaction of the British government, and requiring an answer. The answer, as must have been expected, was unsatisfactory, and Hastings chose to regard it as offensive. His next measure was a strong one. He ordered the British resident, Mr. Markham, to proceed to the house of the rajah, and put him under arrest. The resident executed the order without difficulty, the rajah calmly submitting.

While the governor-general was preparing to carry out the design to which the seizure of the rajah's person was preliminary, he was informed that large bodies of armed men had arrived from Ramnaghur, and had proceeded to

the rajah's house. The guard placed over the rajah consisted of two companies of grenadier sepoy, who were stationed in an enclosed square which surrounded the rajah's apartments. By some extraordinary neglect, these troops had been sent without ammunition. To supply the want, another company of sepoy was subsequently despatched, but on their arrival they found their passage disputed by a multitude of armed men, who had surrounded the house and blockaded all the avenues. The British party were thus unable to advance to the succour of the troops in the square, who were attacked by the rajah's men, and, being unprovided with the means of resistance, were speedily cut to pieces. In the confusion, the rajah left the house by a wicket which opened to the river, and by means of turbans tied together, descended the steep bank to a boat, which was waiting to convey him to the opposite shore. Those to whom he owed his escape followed him; and the company of British sepoy, who had arrived too late to aid their companions, took possession of the place where they had been slaughtered. The departure of Cheyt Singh's men in the train of their master delivered the governor-general and his attendants from apprehensions which it was by no means unreasonable to entertain. Had they proceeded to the governor-general's quarters, he and every Englishman with him must have fallen an easy prey. This catastrophe was averted, and the escape is probably to be attributed to the irregularity and disorder which marked the entire proceedings ending in the rescue of the rajah.

Hastings now found himself involved unexpectedly in actual warfare. An attack was planned upon Ramnaghur, one of the principal strongholds of the rajah. This failed through the perversity of the commander of a detachment, who, by a premature and ill-judged movement, brought his party into a situation where, in the language of Hastings, they were "annihilated rather than defeated." In the mean time, Hastings became alarmed for his own position, which there was reason to believe was intended to be attacked. The opinion of a council of officers coincided with that of the governor-general, that retreat was desirable, and the party in consequence moved to Chunarghur. The rajah continued to solicit peace, but Hastings did not condescend even to answer his communications.

At Chunarghur, however, he continued to be dreadfully distressed for money and provisions. Supplies and reinforcements at length arrived, and after some minor successes, it was resolved to attack the fortresses of Cheyt Singh. Pateeta was taken by Major Popham by storm; and on the same day Major Crabb defeated a party who endeavoured to intercept his advance to the pass of Sackroot, on which an attempt was to be made simultaneously with the attack on Pateeta.

Cheytt Singh had not expected that the English would venture to attack him, and the

concurrent success of Major Popham and Major Crabb filled him with alarm. He fled in the direction of Bidzoghur, where a principal part of his treasure was deposited, and thither he was pursued by Major Popham. In the mean time the governor-general returned to Benares, to make arrangements for the administration of the country, a duty which it was declared Cheyt Singh had forfeited the right to perform. The zemindary was bestowed on the son of a daughter of Bulwunt Singh. His age was nineteen, and it might have been presumed that he would have been held competent to exercise the duties of his office in person. But from some cause which does not appear, this did not meet the views of the governor-general, and the actual management of the country was committed to the father of the new zemindar, under the title of Naib. Contemporary with these arrangements, the annual payment from the zemindar to the Company was considerably raised.

Major Popham advanced towards Bidzoghur, and on his approach Cheyt Singh withdrew, taking with him as much wealth as he could secure. His wife and mother remained, and in their names the fortress was defended with considerable resolution. A surrender was proposed, on condition of securing to the widow of Bulwunt Singh the possession of her property and the administration of a specified pergunnah. The latter condition was obviously objectionable; and as the ranees claimed all the property within the place, alleging that her son had carried away all that belonged to him, compliance with the former would have left the captors nothing but the barren possession of the fortress. The conditions were accordingly refused, under the orders of the governor-general, and the place finally surrendered on the single stipulation of personal protection to the prisoners. Some treasure, though far less than was expected, was found within the fortress; but no part of it was destined to recruit the Company's exhausted treasury. It was seized and appropriated by the military as prize. Major Popham, it is said, was not disposed to approve of this act, but he was overawed by the clamour of his officers. This was a serious disappointment to Hastings. He had calculated on raising a large sum by way of fine on Cheyt Singh—the resistance offered on behalf of the zemindar had rendered it necessary to incur expense in military operations, and when a portion of treasure was secured, it was diverted to private benefit, the finances of government being burdened instead of relieved by the operations in Benares. Foiled in the principal object of his visit to Benares, the governor-general sought to obtain an advance from the officers by way of loan for the use of government; but those who had so promptly seized the spoil were too careful to place any part of it in danger.

The spirit which Hastings manifested towards Cheyt Singh was so intensely bitter as almost to force an inquiry whether the public

delinquency of this man could be the sole cause of the governor-general's hatred. This is a question which could not have been satisfactorily answered had not Hastings himself afforded the means. In enumerating the crimes of the rajah, Hastings accuses him of having entertained an intention to revolt. "This design," says he, "had been greatly favoured by the unhappy divisions of our government, in which he presumed to take an open part. It is a fact, that when these had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence, by an attempt to wrest from me my authority, in the month of June, 1777, he had deputed a man named Sumbonaut with an express commission to my opponent, and the man had proceeded as far as Moorshedabad, when, hearing of the change of affairs which had taken place at the presidency, he stopped, and the rajah recalled him." Here, then, is the key, furnished by Hastings himself, to the feelings under which he carried on his proceedings against Cheyt Singh. While the contest between himself and General Clavering was raging, the presumptuous rajah had ventured to despatch a messenger to the opponent of the man who was eventually to be master of his fortunes. For four years the hatred engendered by this act had burned in Hastings's heart, when an opportunity occurred for gratifying at once the claims of public justice and of private revenge. Such an opportunity Hastings was not the man to pass by. It is not necessary to ascribe the whole of his proceedings with regard to Cheyt Singh to personal hatred. Independently of this feeling, he would probably have called upon the rajah for assistance towards carrying on the war, and he would have been justified; he would probably have visited his numerous failures with some punishment, and in this, too, he would have been justified; but in the absence of the dark passion which had so long rankled in his breast, he would have proceeded with more calmness, more dignity, and more regard to the courtesy which the rank and position of the zemindar demanded. To humble to the dust the man who had offended him, was a triumph which it was not in the nature of Hastings to forego, when circumstances threw in his way the opportunity of enjoying it. He set his foot on the neck of his enemy, and was happy.

In reviewing Hastings's conduct through the remarkable transactions in Benares, it is pleasing to be able to pass from one portion of it, which certainly reflects no honour on him, to another, where it would be a breach of justice to withhold the meed of praise. For a time, Hastings was in imminent danger, and no man under such circumstances could have displayed greater intrepidity. His attention was never diverted from public business to personal safety; and, surrounded by sources of alarm, he continued, as far as was practicable, to carry on the correspondence of government, not only with regard to the affairs of Benares,

but to distant objects—to the negotiations with the Mahrattas and other important affairs. He could not fail to be anxious, even on public grounds, to be relieved from his perilous position; but the consciousness of it neither distracted his thoughts nor impaired his judgment. When at Chunarghur, in hourly expectation of an attack from the enemy, he seems to have discharged his duties with as much coolness and self-possession as if he had been in the council-room at Calcutta. This trait of character has been thought to merit some especial notice, inasmuch as Hastings had not enjoyed the advantage of a military education. Much of the calmness displayed by military men under circumstances calculated to excite or distract the mind, is, without doubt, to be attributed to the effects of habit and discipline. Hastings seems to have inherited from nature this valuable gift, and at no part of his life did he manifest it more eminently than when surrounded by the difficulties in which his visit to Benares had involved him.

The punishment of the zemindar of Benares was not the only, nor indeed the principal, object of Hastings's visit in that quarter. He was to proceed from thence to Oude, the affairs of which country were in a most distracted state. The vizier had proposed to meet Hastings at Benares; but the unexpected occurrences which had taken place rendered Hastings reluctant to receive him there, and a letter was despatched to the vizier dissuading his advance. The vizier, however, persisted in coming to meet the governor-general, who had thus no resource but to receive him with a good grace. The result of the visit was the conclusion of a new treaty between the Company's government and the vizier. Before noticing its provisions, it will be proper to advert to a fact connected with the negotiation, not in itself very remarkable, but rendered of importance by the extraordinary conduct of Hastings in relation to it. In the East presents are indispensable auxiliaries of negotiation, and at the period under review the natives had little reason to expect that European diplomatists would manifest any objection to conforming in this respect to the custom of the country. The vizier was in a state of the greatest pecuniary embarrassment, but this did not prevent an offer to the governor-general of a sum amounting to ten lacs of rupees, as a private present. Hastings took the money, and applied it to the public service. Thus far, therefore, he may be thought not deserving of great blame, although it cannot be denied that, for his own honour and that of his country, it would have been far better that he should have refused to accept of anything offered as a private advantage to himself, and which the donor could not fail to believe was to be so applied. This was, indeed, not the first transaction of the kind in which he had been involved. On one occasion Cheyt Singh had tendered a small sum as a private mark

of his respect for the governor-general, which was accepted. This, too, was applied to public purposes; but, at the same time, it afforded opportunity for the employment of a series of disguises and misrepresentations on the part of Hastings, for which, as the money was employed properly, though obtained dishonourably, it is difficult to find a motive, except in the governor-general's unconquerable love of mystery.

Hastings has been accused of intending to appropriate it to himself, but the evidence does not sustain the charge. The gift of the vizier, however, he certainly destined to his personal benefit, and, in this instance, he entered on the purpose which he had in view in a manner far more direct than was usual with him. He did not advise the Court of Directors of the transaction until four months after it had taken place. A part of the sum only had then been paid, for the vizier's treasury did not overflow with money. For the remainder, bills had been given, the amount of which was eventually realized, though tardily, and with difficulty. Having stated the fact to the Court, and promised to render a faithful account, Hastings, without any preparation, or the suggestion of any reasons in support of the request, coolly added, "If you shall adjudge the deposit to me, I shall consider it the most honourable appreciation and reward of my labours, and I wish to owe my fortune to your bounty." The gift of a hundred thousand pounds has not often been asked with so little ceremony. The application was not complied with.

The visit of the vizier to Hastings was, however, productive of more important results than the transfer of ten lacs of rupees from that prince to the Company, or their governor-general. A new treaty was concluded between the British government and the ruler of Oude, one main object of which was to relieve the latter from burdens which he declared himself unable to bear. His stipulated payments to the Company had fallen greatly into arrear; the maintenance of the British troops in Oude was thrown upon the government to which they belonged; and though the charge was regularly carried to the account of the vizier, there seemed little or no prospect of the respective entries ever being neutralized by a record of corresponding payments on the opposite page. Under these circumstances, the continuance of the British force in Oude to its existing extent was, not without reason, regarded by Hastings as desirable for neither party; the British government making an outlay which it could ill afford; the vizier adding to a debt, already large, which there was but little probability of being speedily reduced. It was therefore provided by the new treaty, that a portion of the British force should be withdrawn. Other reasons were assigned by the governor-general in justification of this part of the treaty. He alleged, and most probably with truth, that the

distance at which the troops were placed from the government to which they were responsible exempted the officers from due control, afforded opportunity for unwarrantable emoluments, and diffused the contagion of peculation and rapacity throughout the army. Further, he represented that the number of British officers, civil and military, at the court and in the service of the vizier, their vast influence and enormous emoluments, were not only injurious to the revenue and authority of the prince, but exposed the British nation and government to the envy and resentment of the people of the country, by excluding the vizier's native servants and adherents from honours and rewards to which they might reasonably aspire. In proof of the purity of his motives in consenting to a reduction, Hastings appealed to the facts that he was thereby diminishing the patronage of himself and his colleagues, and incurring the resentment of those injuriously affected by the arrangements, as well as of their long train of friends and connections.

The second article of the treaty, after reciting that great distress had arisen to the vizier from the military power and dominion assumed by the jaghiredars, provided that the vizier should be at liberty to resume such jaghires as he might find necessary, with a reserve that, in all cases where the Company was guarantee, the amount of the net collection should, on the resumption of the lands, be paid in ready money to the dispossessed jaghiredar, through the British resident.

The third article related to Fyzoola Khan. This was the chief whose protracted resistance had for some time deferred the final termination of the Rohilla war. More fortunate than some of his companions in arms, he obtained by treaty the grant of certain districts of considerable value, binding himself, in return, to retain in his service not more than five thousand troops, and in time of war to assist the vizier with two or three thousand, according to his ability. To this treaty Fyzoola Khan was very anxious to obtain the guarantee of the British government, and he finally succeeded. On the breaking out of the French war, the English sought assistance from Fyzoola Khan. Some was afforded, but not enough to meet their necessities or wishes, and the vizier was requested to demand from Fyzoola Khan the aid of five thousand horse. The answer of the chief was to the effect that his force consisted of only two thousand horse and three thousand foot; that the former were at the service of the British government, and that part of them were actually so employed; but that the three thousand foot were wanted at home, and that without them the collections could not be made. The governor-general thought fit to regard this answer as evasive, and, with the concurrence of his council, directed the British resident at Lucknow to demand three thousand horse from Fyzoola Khan. The demand was made and refused; but the refusal was softened by an offer to furnish two thousand horse and

one thousand foot; an offer which the instructions of the British negotiator did not permit him to accept. The vizier, therefore, proposed the resumption of the jaghire of Fyzoola Khan; and the third article of the treaty of Chunarghur declared that the chief had, by his breach of treaty, forfeited the protection of the English; a declaration followed by a provision permitting the vizier, "when time should suit," to resume the jaghire, paying to the chief its value as recognised by the treaty, after deducting the charges of the troops which he stood "engaged to furnish by treaty," the amount of which was to be paid to the Company.

In quitting this subject it is only necessary to state, that Fyzoola Khan was not dispossessed of his dominions—that his military service was ultimately commuted for a pecuniary payment, on which occasion Hastings gave a true version of the treaty between the vizier and his dependant, and represented the great advantages of thus getting rid of "an article of a treaty, which was of such a tenor and so loosely worded, that the vizier could never have derived any real advantage from it."

The fourth article of the new treaty with the vizier related to the withdrawal of the British resident from Furruckabad, and requires no notice here. All these articles were suggested by the vizier, and conceded for his gratification. In return, the governor-general demanded nothing, but offered to the vizier an abundance of good advice with respect to the reduction of unnecessary expense, and the regular and orderly management of his finances, to which the prince engaged to attend.

The second article of the treaty, that which related to the general resumption of jaghires, was the most important in its consequences. Among those affected by it were two females of high rank—one the mother of the reigning prince, the other his grandmother. These ladies were endowed with jaghires for their maintenance, which were now doomed to confiscation; thus leaving them dependant for their future support on the good pleasure of the vizier, or on the power and inclination of the British government to compel him to perform his engagements. The begums knew the character of their miserable relative too well to place any confidence in him, and the recent conduct of the governor-general was not such as could lead them to entertain much respect for English faith.

In addition to the jaghires with which they were endowed, the begums possessed considerable treasure. The vizier had long coveted the possession of this; and Hastings, feeling that nothing could be more convenient to the finances of the British government than a transfer to the vizier of wealth which would immediately undergo a second transfer to the treasury of Bengal in liquidation of his debt, strenuously recommended the execution of the

vizier's long-cherished wish. It is true that to the younger begum the good faith of the British government had been pledged for the protection of her property. In consideration of sums amounting to more than six hundred thousand pounds, advanced by her to meet the exigencies of her son, the Company had solemnly guaranteed to her the full and entire enjoyment of her estates, effects, and jaghires. Subsequently to this agreement, both ladies had occasion to seek the protection of the British government against their relation, and its interference was afforded in a manner which evinced a just appreciation of the respective positions of all the parties concerned. In favour of the elder begum, who had no claim of right upon the Company's government, the resident at Oude was directed simply to remonstrate. With regard to the younger begum, whose property that government had bound itself to defend, a higher tone was assumed. The resident was directed to afford her support in all the rights she possessed in virtue of the treaty concluded between her and her son, under the guarantee of the Company. Notwithstanding this treaty—notwithstanding the subsequent formal recognition of its binding force, Hastings had, by an equally solemn instrument, consented to the deprivation of the begum of her jaghire, and to the confiscation of her movable property. It was necessary to find reasons for the spoliation. The two following are those assigned by Hastings and his friends:—First, that the wealth of the younger begum belonged of right to the reigning prince; that it had either been improperly alienated from him by his father and predecessor, or fraudulently appropriated by his mother, and that her retention of it was at variance with the Mahometan law. Secondly, that both the begums were actuated by feelings of hostility to the British government; that they had encouraged the rebellion of Cheyt Singh, and had excited disturbances in other places. The first of these reasons is not very formidable. If the begum had really no right to the wealth which she possessed, how came the British government to recognize the existence of her right, and formally engage to defend it? The objection, if valid, came too late. The governor-general and council were precluded by their own acts from taking advantage of it.

The second head of justification—the charge of hostility to the English—rests on a vast mass of documentary testimony, the analysis of which would fatigue without enlightening the reader. It must suffice to observe, that it consists of hearsay evidence of the loosest and most unsatisfactory character, scarcely meriting any sort of notice, and certainly far from sufficient to justify such a measure as the plunder of two women of high rank of all that they possessed. An extraordinary effort was made to give importance to this evidence by the mode in which it was taken. It consisted of a vast number of affidavits, which were

sworn before the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta and the judge of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut. It will be recollected that the two titles do not designate two persons: Sir Elijah Impey, charged with the administration of justice in two courts subsisting under two different authorities, found time, notwithstanding, to exercise magisterial functions which do not appear to have devolved upon him in virtue of his connection with either. His stormy contests with the governor-general lulled into the most soothing calm, he was now ready to lacquey the heels of the same governor-general, for no higher purpose than that of hearing affidavits sworn at a place where this Leviathan of judicial dignity could not, either as a King's or Company's judge, pretend to any jurisdiction. The plan originated with the chief justice himself. Hastings was preparing a narrative to vindicate his own conduct in relation to Benares and Oude. Tenderness for the reputation of the governor-general induced the learned judge to suggest, with more zeal than politeness, that the people of England would not believe Hastings on his own word, and that it would be advisable to support his statement by affidavits. The governor-general thereupon inquired whether Sir Elijah Impey would receive the necessary affidavits, and the ever-ready judge promptly complied. The resident and his assistant appear generally to have procured the depositions, the chief justice swore the party offering them, and thus was this remarkable body of evidence collected.

The execution of the design which Hastings had thus prepared to justify was, however, more tardy than he had either wished or expected. From timidity, or some other cause, the vizier was slow in carrying out the views which he appeared to entertain in common with the governor-general. On the part of the begums there was neither timidity nor vacillation. They remonstrated against the impending alienation of their property. They prepared to follow up remonstrance by resistance; and so formidable did their preparations appear to the British resident, that he requested a regiment of sepoys to support the vizier's officers. It is here necessary to observe, that Mr. Bristow, who had been reluctantly re-appointed to the office of resident at Oude, in consequence of the compact with Francis, had been again removed, and his place supplied by Hastings's attached follower, Mr. Middleton. This was in open disregard of the orders of the Court of Directors; but such acts on the part of the governor-general had become so frequent, that they scarcely call for notice, except where it is necessary to enable the reader properly to understand the events presented to him.

The governor-general, resolved that the designs of the vizier should not miscarry for want of a sufficient force, proposed to answer the call of Mr. Middleton with an extraordinary degree of liberality. Instead of one

regiment, he directed the march of four, with a field train; but the resident was apprehensive that the approach of so numerous a force would be disagreeable to the vizier, and on his suggestion its march was countermanded. In the mean time Mr. Middleton applied himself to quicken the flickering energy of the vizier, and at length obtained his authority to seize the kella at Fyzabad, in which the younger begum resided. This was effected without bloodshed by a regiment of British sepoys, supported by a portion of the vizier's troops; the force which had been collected for the defence of the dwelling retiring, and drawing up in front of another house belonging to the elder begum, to which the younger lady had previously withdrawn. The vizier thereupon issued an order, requiring all armed men, except his own troops, to depart beyond the precincts of the town, under pain of being attacked. Some delay took place in yielding obedience to the order; but the two principal eunuchs attached to the establishment of the younger begum surrendering themselves, the town was soon evacuated by their armed followers. After an interval of a few days, an arrangement was made, the begum undertaking to surrender all the treasure which had belonged to the former vizier.

The process of surrender commenced, but proceeded with a tardiness proportioned to the repugnance with which it was undertaken. To quicken its progress, the two confidential advisers of the begum were put in irons and restrained from food. To relieve themselves, these persons entered into an engagement for the payment of a large sum; but, in fulfilling its terms, the usual proportion of oriental delay and evasion was not wanting. After various attempts to extort payment by appeals to the fears of the prisoners, they were removed to Lucknow. The following letter was addressed to the officer of the guard there by Mr. Johnson, the acting resident:—"The Nabob having determined to inflict corporal punishment upon the prisoners under your guard, this is to desire that his officers, when they shall come, may have free access to the prisoners, and be permitted to do with them as they shall see proper; only taking care that they leave them always under your charge." It is not clear whether the infliction of direct torture was actually intended, or whether this letter was only a new expedient to work upon the fear of the miserable prisoners, in the expectation of drawing forth a little more money. There is no proof that the order was ever acted upon, and as the prisoners do not appear to have complained of any severities exceeding those that they had previously suffered, the presumption is, that imprisonment, fetters, and deprivation of food, constituted the sum of their sufferings. Still it is lamentable to find the name of a servant of the British government attached to a letter avowedly sanctioning the use of torture as the means of extorting money. Nor can it even be denied

that, to a certain extent, the practice had been previously employed, and without resorting to the vizier's authority as a screen. The irons fixed on the limbs of the prisoners were not imposed for the purpose of security, but because it was judged that the pain and inconvenience produced by them would render the wearers anxious to purchase ease by the surrender of treasure, and it cannot be even pretended that the withholding of food could have any other object.

While the begums' servants were trembling in captivity at Lucknow, the palace of the begums at Fyzabad was blockaded. But these violent measures being found at last to fail of producing any adequate effect, the begums were relieved from the presence of their besiegers, and their long-suffering servants set at liberty.

The joy of the latter at their deliverance is represented as being deeply affecting: weak, timid, and considerably advanced in years, these persons were little calculated to meet the trials to which they were exposed. It seems impossible to exempt those to whom they owe their sufferings from the charge of cruelty, or to deny that the series of transactions of which those sufferings form part, present a very discreditable passage in the history of the connection of England and India. The precise share of the discredit which is due to the governor-general has been questioned; but it would be difficult to exonerate him from any portion of it. To the seizure of the jaghire, which had been guaranteed to the younger begum by the British Government, he gave his deliberate assent. The seizure of the treasures seems to have been an after-thought, and it was suggested by the vizier that it should be regarded as a substitute for the intended confiscation of the jaghires. Hastings entirely approved of the design of appropriating the hoarded wealth of the begums, but not as a ransom for their lands. He insisted that both should be taken, and, with some reluctance, the vizier yielded. Hastings, it must be added, expressed great disapprobation of the conduct of the resident, Mr. Middleton; but it was not on account of his rigour, but of his moderation. He was too slow in fulfilling the orders of the governor-general to place the begums entirely at the mercy of the vizier. Such was the language of Hastings; such were his views with regard to the parties against whom the proceedings were mainly directed. The cruelties inflicted upon the unhappy servants of the begums are not attributable to any positive orders of Hastings, but he was apprised of them shortly after they commenced, and it does not appear that he even expressed any disapprobation of them. He was resolved that money should be obtained, and he was never scrupulous as to the means by which an object upon which his mind was fixed was to be achieved.

The meeting of Hastings and the vizier at Chunarghur took place in September, 1781. The rest of the year was consumed in endeav-

ouring to force the courage of the vizier to the point necessary for executing the views of the governor-general. The first part of the year 1782 was occupied in the violent proceedings for obtaining possession of the wealth of the begums, which have been related. Violent as they were, they appeared to the governor-general too tame; and his displeasure on this occasion, as has already been noticed, was intimated in no equivocal terms to the resident, Mr. Middleton. At last, this long-patronized favourite of Hastings relinquished the office in which Hastings had pertinaciously maintained him, and his place was supplied by Mr. Bristow, a man towards whom the governor-general had always manifested the most bitter hostility, and in whom he had repeatedly declared he could place no confidence. Two years before this extraordinary appointment took place, Hastings had thus expressed himself in a private letter:—"The wretch, Bristow, is gone to Lucknow. If he attempts to do mischief there, I will recall him. For God's sake, help to rid me of so unworthy an antagonist, and to gain me the privilege of employing my own instruments, if the future salvation of the Company is to be left to my care. I will not employ Bristow, though my life should be the forfeit of my refusal." He did, however, at no great distance of time, employ the man whom he had stigmatized as "a wretch," and at the very place where he had expressed an apprehension that he might do mischief; this too, although there was apparently no prospect of his life being endangered by refusal. To unravel the mystery which hangs over this appointment would be difficult, if not impossible, and the subject is of so little public interest, that the result, if attainable, would not repay the necessary labour. Hastings appears to have ascribed the appointment to a desire to gratify one of his colleagues in council; but his habitual dissimulation renders this doubtful. One point, at least, is clear; it would argue little acquaintance with the character of Hastings, to suppose that he was influenced by the opinion of the Court of Directors in favour of Mr. Bristow. To whatever his conduct might be owing, it was certainly not to this.

As might be expected, Mr. Bristow gave no greater satisfaction than his predecessor, and a few months after his appointment the governor-general proposed his recall. The proposal was rejected by his colleagues, and Mr. Bristow was permitted to retain his office a little longer. Hastings, however, never yielded a purpose, if it were possible to carry it; if foiled in one attempt, he had recourse to another, differing somewhat in character or in the means of making it. He now proposed the abolition of the British residency at Oude, and the restoration of power to the native authorities. This proposal was discussed by the members of council through several days, towards the close of the year 1783, and Hastings triumphed. He subsequently tendered

his own services to proceed to Lucknow, and, though opposed in council, he succeeded in carrying this point also. On the 17th of February he departed on his journey, and, passing through Benares, had an opportunity of witnessing the wretched state of the districts formerly administered by Cheyt Singh. The manager first appointed to act for the rajah had been dismissed, because he did not make his payments with punctuality. His successor, acting upon the principle that the sum fixed for the revenue must be collected, had subjected the inhabitants to terrible exactions, which, together with a long-continued drought, had reduced the country to devastation. At Lucknow, where he arrived on the 27th March, the principal business of Hastings was to make arrangements for the payment of the vizier's debt to the Company, but he also took the opportunity of restoring to the begums a portion of the jaghires of which they had recently been violently deprived. This act is more difficult to be accounted for than that by which the ladies were despoiled. It

is true that the treatment of the begums had been severely animadverted upon at home, but Hastings was not in the habit of paying much attention to such circumstances; and it is somewhat remarkable that, after denouncing the princesses as the inveterate enemies of the British government, watching for opportunities of undermining it and anxiously desiring its destruction, he now spoke of both ladies as being entirely in his interest, and expressed his belief that their influence with the vizier would be exercised beneficially for the country which he represented. The reader who has followed the history of Hastings to this period will, however, have become accustomed to these sudden changes, and have ceased to feel any surprise at them. On the 27th of August Hastings quitted Lucknow, and on his way through Benares endeavoured to restore some degree of order, the country being almost without a government. He arrived in Calcutta early in November, and in February following embarked for England.

CHAPTER XIII.

INDIAN QUESTIONS BEFORE PARLIAMENT—MINISTERIAL CHANGES—INDIA BILL OF THE COALITION MINISTRY—MR. PITT'S BILL—AFFAIR OF THE NABOB OF ARCOT—IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS—HIS ACQUITTAL AND CHARACTER.

By an act of parliament passed in the year 1779, the powers of the existing government of Bengal were continued for one year: by another act, passed in 1780, they were renewed for one year more. In 1781 an act was passed, by which the right of the Company to their exclusive trade and to the territorial possessions of India was confirmed to them until the expiration of three years' notice, to be given by parliament after the 1st of March, 1791. In the same session an act was passed to remedy the abuses of the Supreme Court. This session also produced the appointment of a select and a secret committee of the House of Commons on Indian affairs, the one proposed by the opposition, the other by the minister. Each committee made numerous and voluminous reports.

India, indeed, continued to occupy, in an unusual degree, the attention of parliament. In May, 1782, a resolution, condemnatory of the conduct of Hastings, was voted by the House of Commons, and the Court of Directors resolved to recall him. In the general court Hastings was more fortunate, a considerable majority declaring against his recall.

Other resolutions subsequently passed the House of Commons, affecting various persons, and among them the king's chief justice, the Company's chief judge of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, and the governor-general's taker of affidavits, Sir Elijah Impey. The House

addressed the Crown, praying for his recall, and an order to that effect was transmitted. Impeachment was threatened, but not carried into effect.

A period was approaching when the excitement previously existing on Indian affairs, great as it had been, was to be increased. The ministry of Lord North had fallen early in the year 1782. The feeble and short-lived administrations of the marquis of Rockingham and earl of Shelburne followed in succession. The latter was destroyed by the force of the united parties of Mr. Fox and Lord North, whose triumph introduced a cabinet famous in the history of British party as the Coalition Ministry. The two sections of which this ministry was composed had been long engaged in determined hostility to each other. The habitual urbanity of Lord North had restrained him from indulging in the furious invective of his opponents, but the violence of their language towards him had been unmeasured: yet they were now his allies—a common desire to storm the seat of power having brought together men whose differences appeared irreconcilable. They had succeeded: the seals of office were theirs, but not the confidence of the Crown, nor the good-will of the people. By the king they were hated. Mr. Fox and his party he had long disliked, and his late favourite, Lord North, by his union with that party, had lost for ever the confidence of his

majesty, which he had before so largely enjoyed. With the people the new ministry was eminently unpopular, the monstrous sacrifice of principle which had been made for its formation having disgusted honest and consistent men of all parties. Still the ministry was strong; it had the support of a vast majority of the great and powerful families of the country, and on this ground it hoped to defy the united hostility of king and people.

At this time every man could declaim on the misgovernment of India, and every man was prepared with a remedy; it would have been strange, therefore, if a ministry so bold and, in their own belief, so strong, should have shrunk from the task of reforming Indian affairs. The Coalition Ministry entered office in April, 1783. On the 18th of November following, Mr. Fox, one of the secretaries of state, moved for leave to bring in a bill "for the better government of our territorial possessions and dependencies in India." Having prepared the way, by attacking the East-India Company and all persons connected with it, Mr. Fox proceeded to expound the plan which himself and his colleagues had prepared for its annihilation. All power, commercial as well as political, was to be taken from the Company and transferred to two boards: one to consist of seven persons, to hold office for a term of years, under whose control the whole government of India was to be placed; the other to be composed of a larger number of persons, to be called assistants, who were to manage the commercial business, but subject to the control of the chief board of seven. The members of these boards were to be appointed in the first instance by parliament—that is, they were to be appointed by the Coalition Ministry. Subsequently, vacancies in the supreme board were to be supplied by appointment of the king; in the inferior, by election by the proprietors of East-India stock. These regulations exposed the objects of the contrivers of the plan, and proved them to have been, power and patronage. The members of the supreme board, it has been seen, were to be nominated by the minister, either in parliament or in the closet. The members of the inferior board were, after the first appointments, to be elected by the proprietors of East-India stock. Why were the first appointments excepted? There can be but one answer. Because the ministry wanted the power of providing for some hungry dependents. The whole patronage of India, too, was, directly or indirectly, transferred to the ministry. It was to be exercised by seven persons, nominated in the first instance by a parliament in which the voice of the minister was predominant, and subsequently by the minister for the time being, in the name of the king. It was to be transferred from a quarter where it could rarely, if ever, be used for political purposes, to hands by which it would never be employed for any other purpose. From one section of the cabinet this, perhaps,

might have been expected. Lord North and his friends had been charged, whether justly or unjustly, by their former opponents and present colleagues, with a disposition to favour arbitrary principles; but how was the plan to be reconciled to the doctrines of the other section of the administration—of the men who had always professed to dread the extension of ministerial influence, and who avowed a belief "that the power of the Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished!"

—how could they support a project for adding a vast mass of the most desirable patronage to that already possessed by the ministry, and thus increasing an influence which they represented as threatening to overwhelm the liberties of the country? The answer is, when they indulged in denouncing the growing influence of the Crown or the ministry, they were out of office, and with no immediate prospect of dispensing that influence which they professed to abhor—they were now in office, and their new position was so agreeable, that they were anxious to retain it as long as possible. Mr. Powys, a county member who took a conspicuous part in the debate, imagined the great leader of the popular section of the cabinet to express himself in this manner:—"I have now forced myself into a most exalted station; the people, by whose means I reached it, begin, however, to think less of me than before. But still I have great influence in the country. I have formed connections with many of the first families in the kingdom—families of the highest rank and most distinguished character, who are all combined to support my administration. I have joined a party which I had driven two years ago from the helm of government, by my unremitting exertions for years together. But as my popularity is on the wane, I will make good use of my time: the whole Indies shall, for this reason, contribute to the splendour and permanence of my power. I will take advantage of the zenith of my power to build me a golden fortress in the midst of the land of promise. That fortress I will not only render impregnable, but garrison with a select number of picked friends and chosen adherents, on whose zeal and attachment I can safely rely—a fortress which no contingency shall be able to assail with success—which will neither yield to the call of the people nor the inclination of the sovereign."

The ministry, however, relying on their numerical strength, felt that they could defy alike general reasoning and personal attack, for on every division they commanded a majority of about two to one; and the bill being passed through all its stages in the House of Commons, was finally transferred to the Lords.

The East-India Company had petitioned the Commons against the bill, and been heard at its bar by counsel. The same course was taken in the upper house, though probably with but slender expectations of success. On the 15th December, Mr. Dallas, one of the

Company's counsel, having called some witnesses to establish the case which he was intrusted to support, requested that the house would indulge him by adjourning to the next day. This was opposed—especially by Earl Fitzwilliam, who was named in the bill as the first commissioner of the superior board. The duke of Portland, the nominal head of the administration, followed, and adverted to an extraordinary rumour which had been circulated pretty generally, in which, he said, the name of the most sacred character in the kingdom had been aspersed, and the name of a noble lord, he hoped, abused. The duke of Richmond spoke more distinctly, and read from a ministerial newspaper an article announcing the prevalence of a report, that his majesty had withdrawn his approbation from the East-India Bill, and his confidence from those by whom it was framed, in consequence of an interview with Earl Temple, but treating the rumour as a fabrication. Earl Temple thereupon rose, and admitted that the king had honoured him with a conference, in which he had given certain advice. What that advice was, he would not state; but he was ready, he said, to tell their lordships what it was not—it was not friendly to the principle and object of the India Bill. After some further discussion, a motion to postpone the further hearing of evidence till the following day was carried. On that day the business was resumed, and on the day after, the motion that “the bill be committed” was lost by a majority of nineteen. This was the result of the interview of Earl Temple with the king, and of the ascertained fact that his majesty disapproved of the bill. Many peers who had intrusted their proxies to ministers, withdrew them, and the prince of Wales, who two days before had voted with ministers on the question of adjournment, on this occasion absented himself from the house. The fate of the ministry, as well as the fate of the bill, was now sealed. They had still an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons; but, encouraged by the decision of the upper house, the sovereign resolved to dismiss them. The mode in which this was effected was singularly expressive of the royal disapprobation. At twelve o'clock on the night of the 11th of December, a messenger delivered to the two secretaries of state an order from the king, “that they should deliver up the seals of their offices, and send them by the under secretaries, Mr. Fraser and Mr. Nepean, as a personal interview would be disagreeable to him.” The seals, as soon as delivered, were given to Earl Temple, who by letter announced to the remaining members of the cabinet their dismissal from office.

A new ministry was forthwith formed, of which Mr. William Pitt, then only twenty-three years of age, became the head; but he found an intractable House of Commons, against whose opposition he for several weeks contended without effect. On the 14th of

January, 1784, he moved for leave to bring in a bill for the better government and management of the affairs of the East-India Company. Its leading provision was, “that a board should be instituted, to be appointed by his majesty, consisting of one of the principal secretaries of state, the chancellor of the Exchequer for the time being, and a certain number of the privy councillors,” to which board the despatches of the Company were to be submitted for approval. The bill was brought in, passed through the earlier stages, and then, on a division, lost. Mr. Fox immediately moved for leave to bring in a bill on the same subject, but no progress was made with it. The contest between the two parties found other matter of excitement, which kept the House of Commons in a perpetual heat till the 24th March, when parliament was dissolved.

In the new parliament the balance of parties was reversed, and the minister had a powerful majority. On the 2nd July he introduced an India Bill, resembling in its principal provisions that which had been lost in the preceding session. It was opposed vehemently by the coalition party, but passed the House of Commons on the 28th July. It passed the Lords with far greater ease, and ultimately became law.

Pursuing the train of home affairs, we find the debts of the nabob of Arcot occupying the attention of the Court of Directors, the government Board of Commissioners, and the House of Commons. By the act of 1784, an inquiry into this subject had been required.

The Court of Directors proceeded to carry into effect the intention of the act, and framed a despatch, addressed to the governor and council of Madras, requiring them to enter upon a full investigation. But the authority with which the court had to co-operate took a different view. The newly constituted Board of Commissioners, at the head of which was Mr. Dundas, declared that no such inquiry as that proposed by the Court of Directors, was necessary, and, dividing the alleged debts into three classes, they resolved that the account of the whole should be made up with interest, and that a portion of the revenues of the Carnatic should be annually set apart for the liquidation.

This was either a lamentable error of judgment or a culpable breach of duty. The claims of the alleged creditors of the nabob of Arcot were surrounded by circumstances of the highest degree of suspicion. If ever there were claims which called for minute and searching inquiry, such were these. The course taken by the ministry upon this question tended to cast great discredit upon them, and to afford to the opposition favourable ground of attack. On the 28th of February, 1785, Mr. Fox called the attention of the House of Commons to the subject, and moved for the papers connected with the inquiry. The motion was lost, as were two similar motions in the House of Lords; but opportu-

nity was taken to impugn the motives of the ministry, and to adduce plausible reasons for believing that the decision was attributable to parliamentary influence. It will be recollected that a person named Paul Benfield was one of the chief creditors of the nabob of Arcot, and that he represented several other creditors. Much jugglery had been subsequently practised, and the name of Benfield had disappeared from the list of creditors, and been restored to it, as circumstances suited. At length, Benfield had procured himself to be elected to parliament, together (according to Burke) with seven other persons, of like principles and views with himself. He soon afterwards departed for Madras, leaving as his representative Mr. Richard Atkinson, a gentleman whom the ministry delighted to honour, on the ground, it was alleged and believed, of the pains which he had taken to promote the return of members of parliament favourable to their interests. The defence of ministers was weak, but their majority was large. The papers were refused, partly on the ground that the public interests might suffer from giving them publicity. It is not easy to suppose that ministers were influenced by this fear, for a bookseller had obtained a copy of the papers, and published them.

In this instance it must be admitted that the advantages of the revised system for administering the government of India were not fully realised, and that the power of the board of commissioners was used to perpetrate a foul job. Yet even here some advantage over the more simple system is apparent. The Court of Directors had the power of remonstrating against what they considered an act of gross injustice and improvidence, and they did remonstrate. Their resistance attracted the attention of the party opposed to ministers in parliament, and though the evil was not redressed, it was exposed.

The stage of Indian politics was now about to be occupied by a drama of greater dignity, though, perhaps, of less importance. For several years, the administration of Hastings had been violently attacked in parliament, and nearly every party in the state had joined in condemning him. In a series of reports, of which Burke was the framer, his principal acts had been assailed with great talent and great severity. Threats of further proceedings had been held out, and on the return of Hastings to England, Burke declared, that if the task were undertaken by no one else, he should stand forth as the accuser of the returned governor-general. There can be little doubt that he was well disposed to execute the office which he thus undertook; but there is reason to believe that his own ardour was not shared by some of his parliamentary friends, without whose assistance the attempt must fail. The ministry, though some of the members were the pledged accusers of Hastings, were notoriously indisposed to proceed against him; and had Hastings been willing to accept

the boon with which Sir Thomas Rumbold and others were content — had he been satisfied with retirement and impunity, it is possible, as the pledges of statesmen are soon forgotten, that he might have been permitted to sink undisturbed into obscurity. But Hastings was ambitious. He had come back, not to throw himself upon the forbearance of his foes, but to challenge honours and rewards. He was aware that his enemies were numerous, and, both from their abilities and political influence, powerful; but he knew also, that he was not without supporters, some acting from principle and feeling, some stimulated by the liberality with which he distributed his funds. In addition to this source of encouragement, he felt strong in the consciousness that he deserved what he sought. Looking back to the many equivocal, and more than equivocal, acts of his administration, this may appear strange, but it was undoubtedly the fact. Hastings's extravagant self-esteem would not allow him to believe that he could do wrong, or at least that he could err to any serious extent. The proudest pontiff that ever boasted the power of the keys had scarcely a higher opinion of his own infallibility than had Hastings. He expressed astonishment that acts which all mankind condemned, should draw forth reprobation — and his astonishment was not always affected. In some cases, there is no doubt that he really felt it: the acts were his — therefore they were right. Under the influence of such feelings and hopes, Hastings was prepared to dare his opponents to the combat. It is not unlikely that in this course he was influenced by the conviction that they would not have the courage to proceed, and he could not but feel that if they declined his challenge, they would leave him in possession of the vantage-ground.

Accordingly, at the commencement of the session of 1786, Burke was reminded of his promise to proceed by Hastings's agent, Major Scott, who, the better to carry on the business of his principal, had, in conformity with the precedent set by the nabob of Arcot's attorneys, procured a seat in parliament. If Burke and his friends were wavering, this determined their course, and on the 17th February the preliminary proceedings against Hastings commenced by a motion for papers relating to the presents and other moneys privately received by the late governor-general. In the speech by which this matter was introduced, Burke announced his intention to proceed further; and after adverting to the various modes of effecting his purpose — a prosecution in the ordinary courts of law, a bill of pains and penalties, and an impeachment before the House of Lords — declared his preference for the last. It will be unnecessary to pursue in detail the steps taken by Hastings's accusers. They continued to collect and bring forward various matters of charge till the 26th of April, when Major Scott presented a petition from Hastings praying to be heard in his

defence. Leave was granted, and on the 1st May the accused party appeared at the bar of the house, where he commenced reading a paper of great length, which he concluded on the following day.

Up to this period, and for some weeks afterwards, the influence of the ministry had been given to Hastings. On the 2nd June the House of Commons negatived a motion made in committee by Burke, on the conduct of Hastings, in relation to the Rohilla war, and Mr. Dundas, who a few years before had moved and carried a resolution condemnatory of that conduct, now voted in the majority. On the 18th of the same month Mr. Fox made a motion in committee, to the effect that there was ground for impeaching Hastings, in reference to his treatment of Cheyt Singh. By this time a revolution had taken place in the sentiments of the ministry; and Mr. Pitt, after a speech in which he maintained that Cheyt Singh was a dependent of the British government, that he might reasonably be called upon for additional expenditure on extraordinary occasions, that the occasion on which Hastings desired assistance was such as to justify the demand, and that the amount required was not excessive, declared his intention to vote with the accusers of the governor-general, on the ground that the fine which he levied was exorbitant. The friends of Hastings were astonished at this sudden change in the minister's views, which has never yet been adequately accounted for. It was now evident that, with ministers and opposition united against him, Hastings had nothing to hope from the House of Commons—that impeachment was inevitable, and that to the House of Lords he must look for the sentence which should finally deliver or condemn him.

Of the session of 1787 the charges against Hastings constituted the main business. On the 3rd of April a committee was appointed to prosecute an impeachment at the bar of the House of Lords. It included the celebrated names of Burke, Fox, Sheridan, and Windham. An attempt was made to introduce that of Hastings's old enemy, Francis, but it failed. At a later period it was renewed by a motion of Mr. Fox for adding Mr. Francis to the committee, which motion received the cordial support of Mr. Francis himself, in a speech of considerable length; but the House did not agree with the mover and his independent supporter, and rejected the proposal by a large majority. The managers consoled the disappointed candidate by a flattering letter, in which, notwithstanding his defeat, they requested that he would attend their meetings, and aid them by his information and counsel.

On the 10th of May the House of Commons proceeded to the bar of the House of Peers, and Mr. Burke, in their name, formally impeached Hastings of high crimes and misdemeanors. Hastings was subsequently committed to the custody of the serjeant-at-arms, from

which he was discharged on finding bail, himself in two thousand pounds, and two sureties in one thousand pounds each. There was little reason to believe that Hastings meditated escape; but if such an intention were apprehended, the amount of security required was ludicrously inadequate.

The trial did not commence till the 18th of February in the following year. The excitement was extraordinary, and Westminster Hall, which was fitted up for the occasion, was crowded by groups of fashionable persons of both sexes, as though to witness a public spectacle. Two days were spent in reading the articles of impeachment and Hastings's answer, an exercise from which it is to be presumed the motley crowd of listeners derived but indifferent amusement. On the third day the great orator appeared, with all the advantage which the dry and tedious occupation of the preceding days could afford him. The duty assigned to Burke was to explain the grounds upon which the impeachment had been undertaken, and give a general view of the charges against the prisoner; an extensive field, no part of which the orator seemed willing to neglect. His speech was continued through four days, and, as an appeal to the passions, was pre-eminently successful. Ladies were carried out of the hall in a fainting state, and even in the sterner sex Burke's descriptions produced visible agitation. These facts attest the power of the speaker; but had the effect of his eloquence been permanent, its exercise would have been most unjust to the prisoner, and greatly in opposition to the wise and salutary principle, that, in deciding on the guilt or innocence of an accused person, the verdict should be determined by evidence, not by declamation. It may be doubted, however, whether Burke's extraordinary display was not calculated to defeat his object. After being borne aloft on the wings of his impassioned eloquence, the judges had to listen to the cold and dry statements of the living witnesses that might be called to prove the alleged facts, or, what was still less exciting, to the reading of long extracts from official papers. Even if no facts were overstated in the opening address, the contrast between the fervour with which it was composed and delivered, and the long and monotonous supplement by which it was to be sustained, could scarcely fail to diminish the effect of the evidence below that which under other circumstances it would have produced. Had Burke been summing up after the evidence had been gone through, the splendid lights of his fancy might have succeeded in surrounding ordinary facts with a colouring not natural to them, and he might have carried the minds of the ardent and susceptible willing captives to the conclusion to which he was desirous of conducting them. As it was, he delivered a magnificent oration, which was listened to with delight, and eulogized with enthusiasm—and these were all the effects produced.

Burke having concluded his task, Fox rose to state the course which the managers, on behalf of the Commons, proposed to pursue. It was to treat each charge separately; to open it, and then await the prisoner's defence before proceeding to another. The Lord Chancellor inquired whether this course would be agreeable to the counsel for the accused; they objected, as it must have been anticipated that they would. The Lords withdrew to consider the point, and determined that the entire case for the prosecution must be opened before the prisoner was called on for his defence. This decision was obviously just and reasonable. The mode of proceeding proposed by the managers was contrary to the practice of all courts of justice, and its adoption would have been an act of cruelty towards the prisoner, by subjecting him to the chance of being entangled in snares and pitfalls from which neither discretion nor innocence might be able to preserve him.

The first charge opened against Hastings related to his conduct towards Cheyt Singh, and the court was addressed on this subject by Mr. Fox and Mr. Grey. In the examination of witnesses which followed, a fresh difference arose between the managers and the counsel for the prisoner. A witness called by the former having answered a question put by one of them in the negative, was asked whether he had not, on a former occasion, answered the same question in the affirmative. Hastings's counsel objected, on the known principle that a party must not discredit his own witness. The point was decided by the Lords against the managers.

The second charge brought forward related to the begums of Oude. It was opened by Mr. Adam, who was followed by Mr. Pelham. Sixteen days were spent in hearing evidence, after which Sheridan summed up in a speech inferior only to the opening speech of Burke in its exciting effect. No further progress was made during this session. The trial had occupied thirty-five days, and two charges, out of a list containing ten times that number, had been entered upon. Further proceedings were adjourned till the next session of parliament.

The illness of the king and other causes prevented the resumption of the trial until the 21st of April, when a charge of receiving presents was opened by Mr. Burke. Having occasion in his speech to refer to Nuncomar, he used expressions of which Hastings complained by petition to the House of Commons. He said that "Hastings had murdered Nuncomar by the hands of Sir Elijah Impey." The language was strong, and its use could be justified only by reference to the extraordinary latitude of exaggeration in which advocates are accustomed to indulge. In the House of Commons the matter was treated in a great degree as a party question, and a motion submitted by Mr. Pitt, declaring that the House had given Mr. Burke no authority to impute the death of Nuncomar to Hastings, was carried.

In the prosecution of the charge relating to the receipt of presents, various questions arose as to the admissibility of evidence; the managers continually claiming an exemption from the ordinary rules of the courts, and the Peers invariably deciding that they were bound by them. In this manner the session of 1789 was consumed; and when half only of the charge relating to the receipt of presents had been proceeded with, the consideration of the remainder was postponed to a future session. Hastings complained of being subjected for so great a length of time to the anxiety of remaining on trial. His complaint was just, but it was couched in a tone of affected and overstrained humility, ludicrously contrasting with the arrogant character of the man. The next session was wasted in the same manner as the preceding. Parliament was then dissolved, and a question arose, whether the impeachment did not abate by the dissolution. After much delay, both houses determined that it did not; and, on the 23rd of May, 1791, proceedings were renewed in Westminster Hall. Another charge, imputing corruption in various forms, was opened, and with this the managers intimated their intention of closing their case. On the 2nd of June Hastings read his defence, and with this the proceedings of the session closed.

Two succeeding sessions, those of 1792 and 1793, were occupied by the speeches of counsel and the examination of witnesses in defence of Hastings. In that of 1794, the managers proceeded to reply to the case of the accused, and to adduce evidence in disproof of it; and their labours occupied all the time allotted by the House of Lords to the trial during that session. In 1795, the long-protracted proceedings were at last brought to a close. On the 23rd of April, in that year, Hastings was acquitted on most of the articles of charge by large majorities, and on some unanimously. Thus terminated this most extraordinary trial, after a duration of seven years.

Of the four charges on which the Commons proceeded, the first afforded no just or reasonable ground for impeachment. Cheyt Singh was regarded by the accusers of Hastings as an independent prince, liable only to the payment of an annual tribute, which under no circumstances was to be increased. This was not his position. He was a disobedient dependent, and Hastings erred only in meditating the infliction of a punishment disproportioned to the offence. This deserved blame, but it did not deserve impeachment. The charge respecting the begums was far better founded. Here the conduct of Hastings merited something more than mere censure. The charge relating to presents would also have justly subjected him to punishment, could it have been proved; but though there were many suspicious circumstances, there was nothing amounting to legal evidence. The same remark will apply to the fourth charge, implying various acts of a corrupt

character. The managers of the House of Commons appear, indeed, to have been sensible that they could not maintain their charges without they were permitted to emancipate themselves from rules of evidence which have been long established and are universally recognized in English courts of law—a most arrogant and mischievous attempt. If the rules be good, they ought to be maintained in all cases; if evil, they ought to be abandoned; but to maintain them where private individuals are concerned, and relieve the House of Commons from their operation, would be equivalent to saying that where the House of Commons appeared as a prosecutor, it should be at liberty to employ any means, however unjust, to procure conviction. If any difference should be made, it certainly should not be in favour of the House of Commons. Its vast power needs not undue addition, and the party spirit which clings to its acts, even as a public prosecutor, would suggest the propriety of a diminution of ordinary power, rather than the addition of any of an extraordinary character.

Attaching no greater importance than they deserve to the whining appeals of Hastings, it is but just to admit that he had great reason to complain. It was alleged, indeed, that the delay was in a great degree attributable to the pertinacity with which his counsel resisted the introduction of matter which in the eye of the law is not evidence. But in this they were exercising an undoubted right, and the charge of occasioning delay may justly be retorted on the managers for persisting in offering that as evidence, which they knew to be inadmissible.

Hastings survived the termination of his trial more than twenty years; but his days were passed in comparative obscurity, his retirement being only occasionally broken by some feeble attempts to grasp those honours to which he held himself entitled, and which, even to the last hour of a very long life, he does not appear altogether to have despaired of attaining. When the question of the renewal of the Company's powers was, in 1813, under the consideration of the House of Commons, Hastings was called upon to give the house the benefit of his evidence. He was received with marked respect, and on his retirement the members simultaneously rose to render him honour.

No man has been more bitterly reviled, or more extravagantly praised, than Hastings; nearly all who have spoken or written of him have been fierce partisans—the calmness of unbiassed judgment has rarely been brought to the examination of his character. On one point friends and foes must agree—that he was a man of extraordinary talents—that, as far as intellectual qualifications constitute competency, he was eminently competent to the high duties in the discharge of which so large a portion of his life was passed. He was not only able but laborious; his time and thoughts were given to the business of his

station without reserve, and almost without intermission. Few of his successors have equalled him in ability—none have surpassed him in industry.

He was among the first to see that England could not maintain her position in India as an isolated power. He was among the first to discern the necessity of the British government forming alliances with the native states, and gradually advancing to that commanding situation which it has since attained. These views were in his time greatly unpopular in England; but experience, both evil and good, has since proved their soundness.

Hastings, too, did much to reform the internal administration of the British provinces. He found the country suffering from the consequences of a series of revolutions and a succession of weak governments. The revenue and judicial establishments were utterly ineffective, and he had to make provisions for their reform. He did not render them perfect, nor even reasonably good, but he gave them some degree of efficiency, and his labours formed the groundwork on which subsequent endeavours for their improvement have been based.

Hastings was sincerely desirous of promoting the prosperity of the country which he governed, and upholding the interests of those whom he served. But his moral constitution was defective, and the means by which he sought to promote worthy and laudable objects were often utterly indefensible. If the state wanted money, he appears to have thought himself at liberty to supply the want without inquiring as to the justice of the modes resorted to. His whole policy was based on the loosest expediency, and he never suffered himself to be fettered by a principle for a moment after it was convenient to cast it aside. With a mind of extraordinary power, he seems to have been incapable of understanding the plainest obligations of justice, and the defects of his moral judgment were not corrected by any delicacy of feeling. His sympathies were weak. Stately, cold, and artificial, he manifested little of human passion, except in its darker forms. His hatred was intense, and its violence was aggravated by the lofty opinion which he entertained of himself. He had a right to think of himself highly; but no man can be justified in entertaining that contempt for the opinion of his fellow-men which he cherished, and which was manifested in so many acts of his life.

An absurd love of mystery for its own sake—a powerful tendency to dissemble his thoughts and purposes, and appear what he was not—a perverse fondness for accomplishing his purposes by indirect and crooked means, even when no perceivable advantage could be gained by their use—these were not less striking, and scarcely less unamiable parts of his nature. In conclusion, it may be said that in the character of Hastings we may discern much to be admired—much to be condemned—nothing to be loved.

CHAPTER XIV.

LORD CORNWALLIS APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL—WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN—ALTERNATE SUCCESES—LORD CORNWALLIS TAKES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY—OBLIGED TO RETIRE FROM BEFORE SERINGAPATAM—FURTHER HOSTILITIES—BRITISH ARMY APPEARS A SECOND TIME BEFORE SERINGAPATAM—TREATY WITH TIPPOO—PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF BENGAL—JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS—LORD CORNWALLIS SUCCEEDED BY SIR JOHN SHORE—VIZIER ALI OF OUDE DECLARED ILLEGITIMATE—DEPARTURE OF SIR JOHN SHORE.

WHEN Hastings resigned the government of Bengal, the next member of council was Mr. John Macpherson, formerly agent to the nabob of Arcot, in which character he had been received some years before by the duke of Grafton, then prime minister. Mr. Macpherson, it will be recollected, had at that time given some advice to the minister too agreeable to be refused. The gratitude of the nobleman induced him to recommend the nabob's agent to the favour of the Court of Directors of the East-India Company, and in consequence he was appointed a writer on the Madras establishment. By some means not explained, the governor of Madras, Lord Pigot, obtained a copy of a memorial, believed to have been transmitted to the nabob of Arcot by Mr. Macpherson, recounting various services rendered to the prince in England. It being deemed improper that such a paper should be addressed to a native prince by a servant of the British government, an inquiry into the alleged authorship took place. Mr. Macpherson's answer was evasive: the governor moved that he should be dismissed the service, and the motion was carried.

At home, Mr. Macpherson's offence was regarded with greater leniency, and a case was submitted to the Company's standing counsel, requiring his opinion, whether he could be restored by a mere majority of the Court of Directors only; or whether, in conformity with the provisions of an existing act of parliament with regard to dismissed servants, the concurrence of three-fourths of the directors and three-fourths of the proprietors would be necessary for his restoration. The opinion of the Company's counsel was to the effect that the dismissal was informal, but that, nevertheless, Mr. Macpherson could not be restored by the vote of a simple majority of the Court of Directors; and he added, "it is worth while considering, if Mr. Macpherson should be restored, whether he is a proper person to be continued in the Company's service. He had, in my opinion, too much connection with the nabob of Arcot; and when the Company's interests and the nabob's are affected, as they will often happen, they will greatly disturb a man of honour and integrity." This opinion seems not to have been satisfactory, for, about a month after its delivery, another was obtained from the solicitor-general, afterwards Lord Loughborough, determining that Mr. Macpherson

was still in the Company's service, the dismissal having been irregular. Upon this opinion the majority of the Court of Directors resolved to act, and the government of Madras was apprised that Mr. Macpherson remained in the Company's service with his proper standing; but it was added, "as his behaviour was disrespectful to your board, and in other respects very reprehensible, we direct that you give him a severe reprimand, and acquaint him that a like conduct will meet with a severer punishment."

The reprimand was never received, nor the danger of the severer punishment incurred. Mr. Macpherson was declared still in the service; but either he evinced no anxiety to enjoy the emoluments thus reopened to him, or his masters hesitated to complete the measure of their indulgence by sanctioning his return to his presidency. Mr. Macpherson remained in England three years and a half, how engaged it is unnecessary to inquire. At the end of that period he was appointed a member of the council, not of Madras, to which presidency he belonged, but of Bengal, to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Mr. Barwell. The appointment under the existing state of the law required the confirmation of the Crown. This was granted without objection, and the agent of Mahomet Ali thus became the coadjutor, and eventually the successor, of Warren Hastings.

At this time, when the eyes of all political parties were intently fixed on India, such an appointment was not likely to pass without notice. The select committee of the House of Commons instituted an inquiry into the facts, and honoured Mr. Macpherson with an elaborate report of some length, solely devoted to the illustration of his history. Mr. Macpherson was young in the Company's service; but this objection to his appointment was of comparatively trifling importance. His previous conduct ought to have been regarded as an insuperable obstacle to his admission into the service at all, and his selection, by the body against whose rights and interests he had conspired for a seat in the supreme council with a chance of eventual succession to the office of governor-general, is one of those extraordinary facts which secret history alone can adequately explain. The chairman and deputy chairman of the Company were examined before the select committee, but with little advantage to the object which the committee had in view.

To questions relating to the peculiar motives which had dictated the appointment, they were dumb. It is said, that when Mr. Macpherson returned to England from Madras, he afforded secret information respecting the designs of France which was highly useful, and which led, in the succeeding war, to the early and easy capture of Pondicherry. This service undoubtedly merited reward; but if it could not be avowed as the ground of the appointment, some mode of acknowledgment less open to suspicion ought to have been found. Upon the case, as related in the report of the select committee, opinions could scarcely differ. The appointment appeared utterly indefensible, and no attempt was made to defend it.

While the means by which Mr. Macpherson first raised himself to distinction cannot be too severely condemned, it is justly due to him to state that his exercise of the chief power in India was entitled to much praise. He applied himself vigorously to enforce necessary reforms, and to restore the credit of the Company's government. To him, in a great degree, belongs the merit of introducing order and regularity into the administration of the finances of India, which previously received little more attention than was necessary to provide for the exigencies of the passing hour. His character appears to have been that of an able and unscrupulous man—of one caring little in whose service his talents were exercised, so that they were duly rewarded, but who left his employers, whoever they might be, no ground for complaint that the interests intrusted to him had suffered either through incapacity or negligence.

During the administration of Mr. Macpherson, Lord Macartney arrived at Calcutta from Madras, the government of which presidency he had recently resigned. His principal object in proceeding to Bengal was, to endeavour, by personal representation, to impress upon the superior government a sense of the difficulties in which that of Madras would be placed, in consequence of the orders from England, directing the restoration of the assignment granted by the nabob of Arcot. While in Calcutta, he received a despatch, announcing his appointment as governor-general of Bengal. The distinction was flattering, as it had not been solicited; it was the more flattering as Lord Macartney was unconnected with the political party then in power, and had not been supposed to possess any large share of their confidence. The honour was, however, declined, though, as may be gathered from the statement of his lordship's biographer, not without some anticipation of its future enjoyment. The writer observes, "he had many and strong reasons for declining at this time to take upon himself the government of Bengal. The ill state of his health, broken down by the fatigues and vexations which he had undergone in his late government, required a speedy removal to his native climate. The general situation of

affairs in India likewise pointed out to him the propriety, and indeed the necessity, of submitting to his majesty's ministers certain regulations which he considered indispensable for the salvation of this part of the empire, and of laying before them those conditions on which only he felt himself able to fulfil the purposes of his appointment with advantage to the public and reputation to himself. Other circumstances, which applied peculiarly to himself, rendered every precaution on his part, if not necessary, at least expedient." These circumstances appear to have been his dislike or distrust of the associates with whom, if he had accepted the office of governor-general, he would have been obliged to act; and, under the influence of all these motives, Lord Macartney determined to leave Mr. Macpherson in continued possession of the seat of power. On his lordship's arrival in England, he entered into immediate communication with the chairman and deputy-chairman of the East-India Company, with the view, as it would appear, of preparing the way for his appointment to the office of governor-general, under conditions which would remove his previous objections to accepting it. Lord Macartney alleged that the necessary subordination of the military to the civil authority was not sufficiently provided for; he represented that great abuses still existed in the civil service, and complained especially of the power possessed by the majority of council of thwarting the designs of the governor-general. To the parties then exercising the highest civil and military authority in Bengal he had personal objections, which he thought rendered it inexpedient that they should be members of a government of which he was to be the head. The views of Lord Macartney on these points having been communicated to the ministers of the Crown, he was invited to an interview with Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas. No important difference appears to have existed on the points which had been previously discussed with the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company, but a difficulty arose from Lord Macartney intimating that it would be necessary, for his own reputation and the benefit of the public service, that he should receive some distinguished mark of the favour of the Crown, and that he had hoped that Mr. Pitt had been prepared to anticipate the expression of his desire for an English peerage. This desire the minister was not willing to gratify; and three days after the conference, Lord Cornwallis was appointed governor-general of Bengal. This nobleman had some years before been referred to by name in the House of Commons as eminently fitted for the situation.

Lord Cornwallis found in the administration of the Bengal government much that required immediate correction. Hastings had made some provision for the maintenance of the public peace, and for the management of the revenue, but corruption and abuse pervaded every department of the state. Some of the

existing evils Hastings had, perhaps, little inclination to correct. As an instance, may be mentioned, the prevailing practice of gratifying followers and dependents by lucrative agencies, which was a mode of purchasing friends and supporters too convenient to be despised by a man who needed all the strength which he could enlist in his service to stem the current of opposition which not unfrequently set against him in India, and shield him from the dangers which he was conscious awaited him at home. When no such motives interposed, the evils which were allowed to increase and multiply, derived impunity, not from the disinclination of Hastings to correct them, but from his want of power or of opportunity. Placed, during a great part of his career as governor-general, in conflict with his colleagues, engaged in vast and wide-spread military operations requiring constant thought and giving rise to constant anxiety, it is rather surprising that he should have found time to do anything for the improvement of the internal administration of the country, than that he should not have done more or better. The government of Lord Cornwallis was not free from the distractions of war, but in one respect his position had a decided advantage over that of Hastings. The unavoidable difficulties of administering the affairs of the country were not aggravated by the infusion of faction. In combating with the evils, which circumstances had allowed to attain a gigantic stature, he feared no unreasonable opposition either at the council-board or at home. The earlier years of his administration being undisturbed by war, opportunity was found for considering such changes as appeared to be necessary in the administrative system of the country. Whether or not these were in every instance judiciously effected, has been matter of debate. Some notice will be taken of the more important of them before the history of the government of Lord Cornwallis is brought to a close.

Among the external relations of the Company's government, those subsisting with Oude soon claimed Lord Cornwallis's attention. The ever unsatisfactory state of that unhappy country was certain, indeed, of furnishing subject of appeal to a new governor-general. Lord Cornwallis made some modifications in the existing arrangements, but declined to comply with the vizier's request for the withdrawal of part of the English force stationed for the protection of his dominions. The relation now established between the two states was that which has since been so widely extended—a subsidiary alliance; and its nature is thus described by the governor-general:—"We undertake the defence of his country; and, in return, he agrees to defray the real expenses incurred by an engagement of so much value to himself. The internal administration of his affairs is left to his exclusive management."

With Nizam Ali there were some differences to be adjusted, and these not unattended by

difficulties. Basalat Jung, the brother of the nizam, who, it will be recollected, had a life interest in Guntoor, one of the Northern Circars, was dead, but Guntoor had not been surrendered to the English, to whom the reversion belonged, though possession had been demanded. It remained for Lord Cornwallis to repeat and enforce the demand. An agent of the British government was accordingly despatched to the court of the nizam; and that his mission might want no auxiliary to success, a military force was put in motion in the direction of the circar claimed. Nizam Ali made little opposition to the demand for its transfer, and this part of the negotiation was brought to a conclusion with greater ease than was expected. But so long as the circar had been withheld from the English, after the event which gave them a claim to possession, they had neglected to pay the nizam's peshcush, or tribute, while he, for the same period, had received the revenues of Guntoor. To settle these accounts, one of the ministers of the nizam proceeded to Calcutta. Besides the ostensible motive for his journey, there was another—the desire of concluding such engagements with the English as should secure their aid, in case the nizam should be attacked either by Tippoo Sultan or the Mahrattas. He had not long before been engaged, in conjunction with the Mahrattas, in war with Tippoo Sultan, but had little cause to be proud of his success. Peace had been restored, and Nizam Ali proposed an indissoluble union between the Sultan and himself. The answer of Tippoo was favourable, but he required that the connection should be cemented by intermarriage between the families. The pride of Nizam Ali recoiled from this proposal, and thus the effect of his overture for a political alliance tended to alienate rather than to unite the two great Mahometan powers of the south of India. Instead of conciliating the friendship of Tippoo, he felt that he had increased the enmity of that potentate. His increased danger added to his ardour for an English alliance, but the manacles which bound the hands of Lord Cornwallis seemed to preclude him from compliance. The English in India had been involved in some unjust wars, and with that headlong wilfulness with which popular opinion tends to rush to extremes, the English parliament and the English people seem to have concluded that every war waged by Europeans in India must be unjust. Parliamentary speeches, parliamentary resolutions, and parliamentary reports, denounced the pursuit of conquest, and thus far no objection can be taken to the views which they embodied. But when those who thus cheaply earned popular applause proceeded to deprive Indian statesmen of the power of effectually serving their country and maintaining the security of its dependencies, they manifested either a total ignorance of the position of the British nation in India, or a culpable disregard of its interests. By an act of parliament, passed not long before the departure of Lord

Cornwallis for his government, after reciting that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation," it was declared that it should not be lawful for the governor-general and council, without the express command and authority of the Court of Directors or the Secret Committee, to declare war, or commence hostilities, or enter into treaty for making war, or guaranteeing the possessions of any country powers or chiefs, except in cases where hostilities should actually have been commenced or preparations made for their commencement against the British nation in India, or some power or state whose territories the Company were bound to defend. This enactment seemed to preclude the gratification of Nizam Ali by any new engagements, and what were those actually subsisting between the two states it was by no means an easy task to determine. In 1768 the English government had concluded a treaty with Nizam Ali, in which they accepted from that prince the dewanny of part of Hyder Ali's dominions, subject to their conquest, and the payment of a certain amount of tribute. But in the following year they had negotiated with Hyder Ali as the lawful master of the territories which he governed, and in that character had concluded a treaty with him; and fifteen years afterwards they had, in like manner, recognized the claims of Hyder Ali's son, Tippoo Sultan. Did these engagements with the successive rulers of Mysore nullify their former agreement with Nizam Ali, which acknowledged his right to dispose of Hyder Ali's dominions, and accepted a free gift of them? Lord Cornwallis decided that they did not—that the treaty of 1768 was yet in force. What then became of the arrangements with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan? The English might abandon their own claims to the dewanny, but they could not abandon those of Nizam Ali to the sovereignty, if any claim he had. The difficulty was attempted to be met by a declaration that circumstances had totally precluded the execution of the article relating to the dewanny, and a promise that if it should happen that the Company, with the nizam's assistance, should gain possession of the country, the claims of that prince should be respected, as well as the right of the Mahrattas to *chout*; for this the British government, by the treaty of 1768, undertook to pay, although the Mahrattas were no parties to the treaty. The governor-general thus recognized the cotemporary operation of two treaties, to both of which the Company was a party; one acknowledging the right of Tippoo Sultan to certain territories, the other transferring those territories to the English.

This was not all. By the treaty with the nizam, the English were bound to furnish that prince with a certain amount of military force. An explanation of this article was afforded by the governor-general, in which it was declared that the stipulated assistance

should be granted whenever the nizam might apply for it; but it was not to be employed against any powers in alliance with the Company. To guard against mistake, these favoured allies were named, and the list comprehended every power of any importance in the south of India except one—the exception was Tippoo Sultan. The views of that restless and unprincipled tyrant afforded just ground for apprehension, but the governor-general was precluded by act of parliament from entering into any treaty which should place the British government in a condition to contend with him effectually. An evasion was therefore resorted to. It was thought desirable to conciliate the nizam, and secure his co-operation as an ally; and to attain this object, an old treaty, portions of which had been virtually rescinded by the treaties made by the English with Hyder Ali and Tippoo, was declared still to be in full operation, and a letter was written to the nizam, confirming and explaining it. This letter, it was explicitly declared, was to be equally binding as a treaty. If it had been an object to devise means to embarrass the British government in India, to divest it of the power of defending the Company's possessions, or compel a recourse to pitiful subterfuges to avert their loss, no means more efficient could have been found than the ill-considered and absurd enactment by which the governor-general was required to defer preparation for war till preparation would probably be vain.

The exception of Tippoo Sultan from the number of princes against whom the English battalions furnished to the nizam were not to act, marked the point from which the governor-general apprehended danger. The course of events proved that the apprehension was not groundless. By the treaty of 1784, the peace concluded with Tippoo Sultan was to extend, not to the English alone, but to their allies; and among these the rajah of Travancore was specially named. Tippoo Sultan, however, meditated the conquest or dismemberment of Travancore; and, to save appearances, made repeated attempts to attain his purpose through the instrumentality of others. He had endeavoured to prevail on the zamorin of Calicut to invade Travancore, in prosecution of some antiquated claims; and would probably have succeeded, had he not offended the Hindoo prince by his furious zeal for making compulsory proselytes to the Mahometan faith. He next sought the assistance of the rajah of Cochin, whom he instigated to reclaim the territory on which the lines of Travancore were formed. These lines had been constructed principally upon a strip of land ceded many years before by the rajah of Cochin to the rajah of Travancore, in compensation for assistance rendered by the latter prince in resisting an invasion of the territories of the former by the zamorin of Calicut. Alarmed by the intelligence of the hostile views of Tippoo Sultan, the rajah of Travancore applied to the government of Madras for

assistance; and Sir Archibald Campbell, who had succeeded Lord Macartney as the head of that presidency, promptly granted it. He at the same time addressed a representation to Tippoo Sultan, warning him that any act of aggression upon Travancore would be regarded by the English government as a violation of the treaty of 1784, and equivalent to a declaration of war against that government. To this Tippoo responded by professing a desire to maintain relations of amity with the English state. His acts, however, did not correspond with his professions; for a few months afterwards he commenced his march in the direction of Travancore, with a force of about thirty-five thousand men.

On an estuary at one extremity of the lines of Travancore were situate two forts belonging to the Dutch, named Cranganore and Ayacottah. On the approach of Tippoo, the Dutch, under the provisions of a treaty of long standing, called upon the rajah of Travancore to assist them in the defence of these places. With this requisition he was ready to comply; but Mr. Holland, who, by the departure of Sir Archibald Campbell, had become acting governor of Madras, informed the rajah that the English battalions could not be permitted to be employed, except upon such parts of the line of defence as actually belonged to Travancore. To overcome this difficulty, the rajah resumed a negotiation, which had been commenced some time before, for the purchase of the two forts from the Dutch, and a bargain was concluded. Against this transfer Tippoo Sultan remonstrated; alleging that the Dutch had no right to sell the forts, inasmuch as they were but tributaries to the rajah of Cochin, who was himself the tributary of Tippoo, and that consequently they had assumed the right of alienating part of the possessions of Mysore. Mr. Holland appears to have yielded a very willing ear to the representations of Tippoo Sultan; he condemned the purchase, and encouraged the sultan to expect that the places would be restored. The assertions of the Mysorean prince were, however, monstrous falsehoods. The Dutch had originally obtained the disputed possessions by conquest from the Portuguese; they had held them for more than a century; they had never paid tribute to the rajah of Cochin, or acknowledged his superiority; and the dependence of that prince upon Mysore, so far from preceding the acquisitions of the Dutch, had its origin in the conquest of Hyder Ali, and had not continued more than twelve years. The right of the Dutch to sell, it was reported and believed, had also been recognized by the man who now impugned it. Tippoo Sultan, it was alleged, had offered to become a purchaser; and had the rajah of Travancore delayed the completion of the treaty, his enemy, it was probable, would in this way have possessed himself of increased means for his destruction.

Tippoo found various other grounds of complaint, which were the subject of long and

fruitless discussion. The English government proposed the appointment of commissioners for the investigation of the points of dispute; but Tippoo Sultan had resolved to submit the question to a different and more decisive arbitration. He had for some time been gradually approaching the lines, part of which formed the principal subject of dispute. On the night of the 28th of December, 1789, he marched to attack them, and gained a considerable extent of rampart. The Travancore troops retreated before him; but his leading corps having suffered severely, an attempt was made to relieve it by another. Before this movement was completed, the fire of a party of about twenty men, posted under a thick cover, fell heavily on the corps about to be relieved, and killed the commanding officer. The whole were immediately thrown into inextricable disorder, and rushing wildly back upon the corps advancing to their relief, threw them also into confusion.

Panic now became general; and the living torrent was borne on to a ditch, over which some of the fugitives leaped, while others were forced into it by the resistless masses which pressed on them from behind. The bodies of these formed a road, over which their comrades passed, and thus miserably did numbers of Tippoo's troops perish. The sultan was thrown down in the struggle—the bearers of his palanquin trampled to death—himself rescued from the same fate only by the vigorous exertions of some active and faithful followers, and this not until he had received injuries from the effects of which he occasionally suffered till his death.

Contemplating the probability of war, Lord Cornwallis had instructed the Madras government to be prepared for it. The instruction was disregarded; and even after the attack on the lines of Travancore, the same course was pursued, with alleged reference to economy. The value of this motive was duly appreciated by Lord Cornwallis. Referring to it at a period when the governor guilty of this inexplicable folly had no longer the power of doing good or harm, he said, "So far am I from giving credit to the late government for economy in not making the necessary preparations for war, according to the positive orders of the supreme government, after having received the most gross insults that could be offered to any nation, I think it very possible that every cash of that ill-judged saving may cost the Company a crore of rupees." Another distinguished authority, Sir Thomas Munro, then a subaltern in the Madras army and a very young man, but manifesting the germs of that talent and judgment which subsequently raised him to rank and power, passed a similar sentence upon the ill-judged parsimony of the Madras government. In a private letter written at this period, he says, "It will require some time to assemble an army able to face the enemy, and before such an army can be put in motion, Tippoo may be

in actual possession of Travancore and all the southern countries. We have derived but little benefit from experience and misfortune. The year 1790 now sees us as unprepared as the year 1780 did for war." "We shall commence the war," he subsequently observes, "under the disadvantage of a want of magazines, for we have none at present but at Madras. Since the conclusion of the late war we have acted as if we had been to enjoy a perpetual peace. The distresses and difficulties which we then encountered from the want of them has not cured us of the narrow policy of preferring a present small saving to a certain though future great and essential advantage." The same miserable policy which had disgraced the Madras government before the attack of Tipoo on the lines of Travancore, continued to be pursued after that event. Towards Tipoo they maintained a friendly, and even obsequious deportment; and, instead of making any endeavour to remedy the evils resulting from their past errors, they vigorously contested the propriety of the views entertained in Bengal, and defended the right of Tipoo to restrain the sale of the Dutch fortresses. Lord Cornwallis was about to proceed himself to assume the administration of the government of Madras, but the supercession of Mr. Holland by the arrival of General Meadows, recently appointed governor, led to the postponement of his visit.

The British government must now be regarded as at war with Tipoo Sultan. The actual commencement of hostilities relieved them from the difficulty imposed on them by the law, which, though it forbade the government to prepare for war, did not proceed so far in absurdity as to restrain them from seeking the means of carrying it on when actually commenced. The ridiculous pretence of upholding the engagements concluded with Nizam Ali in 1768 was now dropped, and a new treaty of offensive and defensive alliance concluded with him. A similar treaty was made with the peishwa. The accession of both powers to the alliance was accelerated by the expectation of recovering from Tipoo the possessions of which they had been deprived by himself and his father.

Before these arrangements were completed, a British army, under the command of the governor of Madras, General Meadows, of about fifteen thousand men, formed into six brigades, was assembled on the plains of Trichinopoly. There, on the 24th of May, it was joined by the governor, who, on the 26th, marched in the direction of Caroor, the nearest frontier post of the enemy. General Meadows, some time before, had addressed a formal letter to Tipoo Sultan, announcing his arrival and assumption of the office of governor of Madras. The answer of the Mysorean prince was not received until the general was on his march. Its tone was greatly subdued in comparison with that of the sultan's communications with Mr. Hol-

land. In answer to the proposal of the latter for appointing commissioners to settle the matters in dispute with regard to Travancore, Tipoo had declared that he had himself ascertained the facts, and that there was no need of commissioners; but he added, that, nevertheless, if Mr. Holland wished it, he might send commissioners "to the presence." It was now the lot of Tipoo to make a similar offer to the English governor. In his letter to General Meadows, after congratulating that officer on his arrival and appointment to the government, he remarked, with a tone of concern, that, "notwithstanding the bonds of friendship" were "firmly established, in consequence of the intervention in certain necessary and important concerns, and the representations, contrary to the fact, of certain short-sighted persons to" the governor, they had "caused an army to be assembled on both sides. As this event is improper," continued the sultan, "among those who are mutually at friendship, I therefore wish, in order to clear it up and to have certain important matters represented, to send to you a person of dignity, together with some other persons, that the vakeel of the circar, having arrived with you, may explain the whole circumstances to you, and that the dust which has obscured your upright mind may be removed." The answer of General Meadows was short and decisive. Its purport was, that the English, equally incapable of offering an insult and of submitting to one, had always looked upon war as declared from the moment of the attack upon their ally, the rajah of Travancore, and upon that issue the dispute now rested. The sultan received the answer of the governor at Coimbatore, and as soon as it reached him he retired with his main army to his capital, Seringapatam. He had provoked war without being prepared to meet it. He had calculated on passing the lines of Travancore with ease, and then overrunning the country. After his unexpected failure, the obsequiousness of the government of Madras had led him to believe that he was still an object of dread, and his tone rose proportionately in self-confidence and haughtiness. The assembling of the English army, and the decisive conduct of General Meadows, showed him that the new governor was ready to assert with the sword the rights of his country and those of its allies; and Tipoo Sultan, having tried to gain some advantage by procrastination, acknowledged his weakness by a retreat which left a large tract of country almost undefended. All this was highly characteristic of Tipoo Sultan. His father, Hyder Ali, was master of his passions, and to this cause his success is mainly to be ascribed. Tipoo, on the contrary, was the slave of his passions. Intoxicated with pride, he seems, on many occasions, to have thought that he had only to will in order to obtain. Reverses produced on him their usual bitter effects, but unaccompanied by any portion of that wholesome

change of spirit which, in better natures, they have a tendency to effect. Unaffected by misfortune, except during its actual pressure, Tippoo Sultan recovered from it only to launch into fresh extravagances, and thus prepare for himself fresh disappointment and humiliation.

The British army advanced to Caroor, which was abandoned on their approach. From the defects of the commissariat department, their progress to this place was slow; but they met with no annoyance, except from the desultory attacks of parties of the enemy's horse, and from the weather. Their course lay over arid plains, under the operation of a powerful wind raising clouds of dust which obscured the face of day, and which, being inhaled with every act of respiration, laid the foundation of serious disease. From this cause, on the arrival of the army at Caroor, no less than twelve hundred men were placed in hospital there.

The capture of Caroor was followed by that of Aravacourchy, a weak place, which offered no resistance beyond the discharge of two guns on the approach of the British advanced guard. The killadar, on being summoned to surrender, earnestly requested permission to save his credit with the sultan by a few more discharges, kindly promising that no damage should arise to the British party. Notwithstanding this pledge, and the danger in which the killadar's honour was placed, his request was refused, and the English took possession of Aravacourchy without any further resistance, either real or pretended. The surrender of Daraporam, another weak place, followed. Here a dépôt was formed; a number of sick were left in hospital, and some heavy stores and camp equipage deposited, to enable the army to move with as little incumbrance as possible. A brigade was left for their protection, and the army marched to Coimbatore, where they arrived on the 21st of July.

From this place an advanced force, under Colonel Stuart, was detached to attack Paligaut; but the route taken was nearly impracticable from the effects of heavy rains, and Colonel Stuart fell back without effecting his object. An attack on Dindigul, conducted by the same officer, was more fortunate. Against this place batteries were opened on the 20th of August, and by the evening of the 21st a breach, though a very indifferent one, was effected. Imperfect as it was, Colonel Stuart resolved on risking an immediate assault—a determination taken with reference to the remaining stock of ammunition. The continuance of the firing for two hours longer would have consumed all the shot of the English, and a fresh supply could not have been obtained in less than a week. The assault was made with great gallantry, and repelled by the killadar at the head of his men with equal vigour and spirit. The English were foiled, and compelled to retire; but at this moment, greatly to their surprise, a white flag was displayed on the breach, and an offer was made

to surrender, on condition of security to persons and private property. This was the more extraordinary, as the killadar had met an invitation to surrender on favourable terms, by threatening, if any similar message were subsequently sent, that he would blow the messenger from a cannon. The change in his resolution is attributed to his having been abandoned by part of his garrison. It was fortunate for the English that neither the killadar nor his men were aware of the cause which led to the premature assault.

On his return to Coimbatore, Colonel Stuart was again despatched to attack Paligaut, but with augmented means, and by a more practicable route. Batteries were opened at daylight on the 21st of September. In less than two hours the fort was silenced, and by the evening a practicable breach was effected. But the necessity for an assault was spared. Some English officers, engaged in reconnoitring, observed a defenceless part of the works, of which possession was immediately taken; and on the following morning the place capitulated on conditions, one of which was, protection against the fury of the Nairs, who had joined Colonel Stuart, and were serving in the siege. These were natives of Malabar, on whose countrymen Tippoo Sultan had exercised great cruelties. It was apprehended that they would rejoice in an opportunity of taking revenge on the troops of their oppressor, and it required some effort to restrain them.

Erroad had previously surrendered to an English detachment under Colonel Oldham. The greater part of the troops employed in this service subsequently joined a corps commanded by Colonel Floyd, whose general operations were confined to the south of the river Bahvany. By a detachment from that corps Sattimungul was taken, with little trouble and no loss. Sattimungul is but a few miles distant from the foot of the pass of Gugehutti. Through that pass Tippoo Sultan and his army began early in September to descend. Rumours of his approach were soon afloat, which appear at first to have received little credit; but their accuracy being confirmed by testimony that could scarcely be doubted, Colonel Floyd forwarded the intelligence to General Meadows, and accompanied the communication by a suggestion that the advanced corps of the army should fall back upon head-quarters. Either from the report of Tippoo's descent being disbelieved, or from some other cause, the suggestion was rejected, and Colonel Floyd was ordered to maintain his position. On the 13th of September, a large body of the enemy's army passed the ford of Poongar; and the British pickets, which had been sent out to patrol, were driven in by Tippoo's force. A regiment of horse, which had been despatched to support them, was surrounded, and compelled to take post among some inclosures till relieved by the rest of the British cavalry.

The English now became the assailants; several hundred of the enemy were put to the sword; and, the field being completely cleared, the victors returned to camp. They had scarcely dismounted, when the enemy's columns were discovered advancing in great force. The line was instantly formed, and a cannonade commenced on both sides, which lasted throughout the day. At sunset the enemy drew off their artillery, which left Colonel Floyd opportunity to deliberate on his future course.

Tippoo had withdrawn his army to a position about six miles from the place of action; but from the inaptitude of a native force to execute movements by night, and from the fall of torrents of rain, which had not extended to the British position, a large part of the troops had failed to find their places in the line, and great disorder prevailed. Colonel Floyd was not aware of these circumstances, or he might have been tempted to renew the conflict; and by taking the enemy unprepared, he might probably have defeated them. As it was, he had recourse to a council of war, and the opinion of the majority being in favour of retreat, preparations were made for withdrawing the garrison from Sattimungul, and proceeding to join General Meadows. Some reprehensible delay took place in evacuating the fort, and the retreat was thus retarded. When it commenced, the infantry proceeded in one column, the cavalry in another, and the baggage in a third; but the nature of the country soon compelled a change, and the whole was formed into a single column, the cavalry leading.

On hearing of the march of the British force, Tippoo ordered his troops to be put in motion for immediate pursuit; but the order was obeyed with little promptness, and the day was considerably advanced before the progress of the English was seriously interrupted. The cavalry were two or three miles in advance of the infantry, against whom the whole force of Tippoo was directed. The firing brought them back to the succour of their companions, and by a fortunate mistake, similar to that which once disappointed Hyder Ali of the success which seemed within his grasp, the son of that conqueror was now induced to desist from an attack in which he had greatly the advantage in point of numbers. A troop of cavalry was mistaken for the personal guard of General Meadows, and a report of his arrival spreading rapidly through the British ranks, was received with enthusiastic cheers, with the cause of which the enemy were not long in becoming acquainted. The sultan, giving credit to the report, which reached him just at the moment when he had received intelligence of the death of Burkar-oo-deen, a favourite relative, and one of his bravest officers, drew off his army, and left the corps of Colonel Floyd at liberty to pursue its march unmolested. On the 16th of September a junction was effected with the army under General Meadows, which was soon after-

wards further reinforced by the arrival of Colonel Stuart's division after the capture of Paligaut.

The object of General Meadows was to bring Tippoo to a general action. The sultan was most anxious to avoid this, and for several weeks he evaded the endeavours of the English commander. During this period Tippoo repossessed himself not only of Sattimungul, but of Erood and Daraporam. At length, alarmed by the progress of an English army in Bramahal, he despatched thither the greater part of his force, the residue being left to watch the motions of General Meadows. The army whose operations drew Tippoo's attention to Bramahal was distinguished by the name of the central army, and had originally been commanded by Colonel Kelly. The death of that officer had transferred the command to Colonel Maxwell, who found himself at the head of nine thousand five hundred men. He entered Bramahal on the 24th October, and early in November he fixed his head-quarters near Caveripatam. The appearance of considerable bodies of light cavalry soon indicated the approach of the sultan's army, and by the middle of the month it appeared in full force. In the mean time General Meadows had marched to form a junction with Colonel Maxwell; and his purpose was effected about three days after Tippoo's appearance. The remainder of the campaign was occupied in marches, occasionally varied by skirmishes of no importance, the detail of which would be tedious without being instructive. Some overtures for negotiation proceeded from Tippoo; but they were made without sincerity, and ended in nothing. Lord Cornwallis had determined to assume the command of the British army, on the alleged ground that his presence in the scene of action would be to the native allies a pledge of sincerity and of confident hope of success against the common enemy.

In the conduct of the war up to this period, little of military skill had been displayed, and little advantage gained to the cause of the allies. General Meadows arrived with his army at Velout, eighteen miles from Madras, on the 27th January, and on the 29th Lord Cornwallis assumed the command. On the 5th February he commenced his march from Velout, and on the 11th the army was concentrated near Vellore. Tippoo Sultan had been engaged in negotiating with the French governor at Pondicherry for assistance; but on receiving intelligence of the march of the British army, he moved rapidly to the defence of the passes into his territories. By a series of judicious feints, the sultan was deceived as to the point at which it was intended to penetrate; and a large British force, completely equipped and provisioned, was thus enabled to gain the table-land of Mysore without firing a shot.

The first object of the English general was the reduction of Bangalore. The pettah, or town, which was of considerable extent, lay to

the north of the fort, and this was the primary object of attack. It had several gates, one of which being selected for assault, the requisite preparations were made, the field artillery and six battery guns being placed under Colonel Moorhouse, a highly distinguished officer. The first barrier was gallantly carried, and it was expected that the application of a field-piece would soon force the gate. This was found ineffectual, and some eighteen-pounders were brought up, which slowly performed the desired work. In the mean time a vigorous fire of musketry and rockets from the turrets galled the English troops; it was borne, however, with the greatest steadiness: the shattered fragments of the gate were torn away after each discharge; and an opening, though a small one, being at length made, Lieutenant Ayre, of the 86th regiment, who is represented as being of very diminutive size and stature, was raised on the shoulders of some grenadiers, and passed through. General Meadows, who was present, called on the troops to "support the little gentleman;" they responded to the call, and the place was carried.

Tippoo Sultan, who with his army was in the immediate neighbourhood, was alike astonished and irritated at this result, and orders were given to the killadar of the fort to recover possession of the pettah at all risks. They were obeyed with great spirit and gallantry, and the streets of the town were, for a lengthened period, the scene of a determined and doubtful conflict. So long as it was maintained by firing, little advantage was gained on either side. It was finally decided by the bayonet, with which the Mysoreans were driven from every post, and compelled to seek refuge in the fort, with a loss of two thousand in killed and wounded. The loss of the English was not great; but among the killed was Colonel Moorhouse, who fell at the gate. He had risen from the ranks; "but nature," says Colonel Wilks, "had made him a gentleman—uneducated, he had made himself a man of science; a career of uninterrupted distinction had commanded general respect, and his amiable character universal attachment." His memory was honoured by a public funeral and a monument erected at the expense of the Company in the church of Madras.

The capture of the pettah was followed by preparations for obtaining possession of the fort. Batteries were erected, a breach made, and, on the night of the 20th of March, a storming party advanced in silence to the attack. They had made some progress before the garrison took the alarm; but the resistance offered to the assailants, though late, was fierce and powerful. The killadar, Bahadar Khan, a distinguished soldier, in whom the pressure of seventy years had not quenched the fire of military ardour, nor seriously diminished his personal ability to obey its suggestions, was in a moment at the head of

his men. But his courage was unavailing: the assailants established themselves on the ramparts, and, after a contest of an hour, the fort of Bangalore passed from the hands of Tippoo Sultan into those of the English. The loss on the part of the garrison was severe: more than a thousand of the bodies of their fallen enemies were committed to the grave by the victors. Among the slain was the brave killadar, who, having in vain endeavoured to collect a party to make one more stand, fell sword in hand, without a single supporter near him. It was thought that Tippoo might desire to retrieve from the hands of strangers and enemies the remains of one who had served him so faithfully, and an intimation that they would not be withheld was conveyed to him; but either the merits of Bahadar Khan were obliterated by his ill-fortune, or Tippoo really entertained the feeling which his answer is said to have expressed—that the killadar could be buried nowhere with greater propriety than in the neighbourhood of the place in defence of which he had fallen. By the English authorities all the respect that could be shown to the dead was manifested; and the body of the veteran soldier was attended to its final resting-place by the most distinguished members of the Mussulman part of the British army.

The English were now fixed in the heart of Tippoo Sultan's dominions; but before pursuing further the campaign under Lord Cornwallis, it will be convenient to notice the operations of other armies up to the period when the governor-general obtained possession of Bangalore.

When General Meadows marched in the direction of Madras, Colonel Hartley was left with a force consisting of one regiment of Europeans and two battalions of sepoy, with some field artillery, to act against a body of the sultan's troops amounting, at the lowest estimate, to six thousand, left under the command of an officer named Hussein Ali. This officer, disdaining the cautious policy of his master, took up a strong position near Calicut, and resolved, if challenged, to abide the result of a regular action. He was not disappointed, except in the result of the engagement: he was attacked and utterly defeated, with the loss of a thousand killed and wounded; the general himself and nine hundred men were made prisoners on the field, and the flying remnant of the army being hotly pursued, fifteen hundred more laid down their arms.

A few days before this action, General Abercromby, the governor of Bombay, arrived with a respectable force at Tellicherry, advanced to Cananore, which surrendered unconditionally, and in a very short time occupied the whole of the province of Malabar, where the name and authority of the sultan were odious beyond the power of description.

The army of Nizam Ali began to assemble in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad about the time that General Meadows took the field. It

was joined by a detachment of English sepoys and a company of European artillery, and, after considerable delay, marched to lay siege to Copool. This was a protracted and tedious operation. The situation of Copool is upon a lofty and precipitous rock. The cannon employed against it were disabled by a week's firing, and the efforts of the besiegers were suspended for a long interval, until a new battering train could be collected from various points. They were resumed, but with little prospect of a speedy termination, till the alarm caused by the unexpected news of the fall of Bangalore led to a surrender, after a resistance of several months. Bahandur Bundur, a fort about three miles to the northward of Copool, in a like manner yielded to the good fortune of the allies.

With the Mahrattas, as with Nizam Ali, an English detachment was destined to act. It consisted of two battalions of sepoys and three companies of artillery, two native and one European. It was despatched from Bombay, and proceeded in boats up the river Jaigur as far as navigable. The period of debarkation was the very height of the monsoon; the ascent of the Ghauts was performed under the most discouraging difficulties; but by perseverance they were surmounted. At Coompta the detachment joined the Mahratta army, consisting of twenty thousand horse and ten thousand foot, under the command of Purseram Bhow. The first blow was to be struck against Darwar; and the whole Mahratta army, with the English detachment, moved to the attack of this place, which they reached by very slow marches. The Mahratta forces were of little use in the conduct of a siege, and the means of reduction were found inadequate. Application for reinforcements was made to Bombay, and a regiment of European infantry, a battalion of sepoys, and a considerable number of European artillerymen, were despatched, under the command of Colonel Frederick. An assault prematurely made ended in repulse; and shortly afterwards Colonel Frederick died from the effects, as it was believed, of disappointment. The siege continued to be languidly prosecuted, till the fall of Bangalore became known; an event which produced at Darwar the same effect as at Copool—an offer to surrender.

The garrison were permitted to march out with their arms and ammunition, and with colours flying; but four days after their departure their camp was attacked and plundered by the Mahrattas, many of the party killed, and the commander, covered with wounds, sent as a prisoner to a Mahratta fort. Such an exploit would be perfectly in accordance with the Mahratta character if undertaken solely with a view to plunder; but it was alleged, and it is believed not without ground, that the commander had provoked the attack by a virtual breach of the conditions of the capitulation. One of these conditions was, that the guns and stores were to become prize

to the captors. The guns and stores were accordingly left by the retiring garrison; but it was said that the powder had been wilfully rendered useless by damping, and the other stores destroyed to the extent which the time and means of the commander allowed.

The surrender of Darwar was followed by that of the strong fort of Khooshgul, eleven miles distant, and by the early possession of every place north of the Toombuddra.

Lord Cornwallis marched from Bangalore on the 22nd March, and a few days afterwards unexpectedly encountered the army of the sultan. Tippoo's only anxiety was to escape from a situation in which he might be compelled to fight, and with some difficulty he effected his object. The army of Lord Cornwallis was now strengthened, or at least numerically increased, by the junction of about ten thousand of Nizam Ali's horse. To effect this junction was one object of the governor-general's march; another was to meet a valuable convoy, with a reinforcement of between four and five thousand men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Oldham. These were met at Venitathery, and both objects of the movement having been attained, Lord Cornwallis returned to Bangalore, where he arrived on the 28th of April.

Notwithstanding the success which had thus far attended the British arms, the governor-general was not in a condition to prosecute the war with vigour. He was especially distressed by a deficiency of the means of transport for provisions, camp equipage, ordnance, and stores; and this deficiency might have appeared to justify some cessation of active exertion. The love of enterprise scarcely entered into his character; yet, while placed in circumstances which seemed to excuse inactivity, he resolved on a step which, with reference to his position, may be regarded as a bold one: it was to march at once upon Tippoo's capital, Seringapatam. One obvious motive for this decision was a desire to bring the war to a speedy termination; but there was another, not without weight—the apprehension of a rupture with France, from which country Tippoo might then expect to derive assistance, which would render the difficulties of the contest far greater than those with which the governor-general had now to contend.

To make the best use of the limited means of transport possessed by the British army, all superfluous equipage was to be left in Bangalore. The officers were requested to reduce their claims for accommodation to the lowest practicable degree, as well as to assist the public service by any means which they could command; and they cheerfully sacrificed their own convenience to the demands of the state. On the 4th of May the army was put in motion. It advanced by a circuitous route, interrupted by jungles, rivers, and ravines. From these causes the inadequate supply of cattle for transport became still further re-

duced. Numbers died from exhaustion, and, large quantities of stores were destroyed because they could not be carried forward. With the usual policy of Hyder Ali and his son, the country traversed by the invaders had been divested of all power of affording relief to their necessities. Conflagration had done its work—the grain not burnt had been buried; and not an inhabitant remained through the expanded waste to recount the story of its devastation, or guide the steps of those who now traversed its blighted fields. Their march seemed to be over a country where some great convulsion of nature had at once swept away every human being, and everything by which human life could be supported. At length, at a stone fort called Malavelly, some grain was found; but the quantity lost on the march was so great that even this opportune and happy discovery did not preclude the necessity of reducing the daily issue of rice to one-half of the usual allowance. Thus, struggling with difficulties, and amid the terrors of famine, the British army reached Arikera, about nine miles east of Seringapatam, on the 18th of May.

Its approach was regarded by Tippoo with no common apprehension. From the moment of the fall of Bangalore, the attack upon which place he had regarded as mad and hopeless, he became alarmed for the safety of his capital. Under the first impulse of fear he had ordered the removal to Chittledroog of his treasure, his harem, and the families of his officers, whom he retained in pledge for the fidelity of those to whom they belonged; but by the advice of his mother, who exercised a powerful influence over him, and who represented that such a proceeding, being imputed to despondency, would have a bad effect on the minds of his troops and subjects, he abandoned his intention. The parent to whom he was indebted for this service rendered him another. Tippoo had given personal offence to the family of the nizâm. In the hope of detaching that prince from the confederacy, the mother of the sultan wrote to him, imploring his forgiveness of an act which she attributed to the intoxication of youthful pride, and which she declared the sultan deeply regretted.

But though Tippoo allowed himself to be dissuaded from one manifestation of fear, he gave way to others, which distinctly showed the state of his mind. His hatred of the English had been gratified by causing the walls of the houses in the principal streets of Seringapatam to be decorated with caricatures of the people whom he abhorred, of enormous size, and, in some instances, of disgusting character. These were now by royal command obliterated, and the walls of Seringapatam no longer spoke the sultan's contempt and aversion for his European enemies.

The capital of Mysore contained other proofs of Tippoo's feelings towards the English, and these too were to disappear. The enfranchisement of prisoners under the treaty of 1784 had

even at this time not been perfectly carried out, and among the victims of the Sultan's perfidy were twenty English youths, who, having received the same kind of education which is given to the dancing-girls of the East, were destined to delight the ear and eye of their enslaver by the graces of song and gesture. To relieve himself from the inconvenience to be apprehended from these witnesses to his treachery, assassination offered the easiest and most effectual means; consequently, according to the moral code of Tippoo, the best. The youths were murdered, and the course of crime was followed up by the secret murder of other prisoners, who like them had been unlawfully detained.

Such were the results of the alarm produced by the fall of Bangalore, and the anticipation of an attack upon Seringapatam. An English army was now within a few miles of the capital, and the anxiety of Tippoo increased with the apparently increasing danger. He had hitherto cautiously avoided a general action, and he defended this course by reference to the example of his father, who had gained little or no advantage from general actions, but whose chief success arose from striking at detachments. Stimulated partly by his fears and partly by the representations of his officers, which were aided, it is said, by the remonstrances of the women of his harem, who expatiated on the discredit of suffering his capital to be menaced without an effort to repel those by whom it was threatened, he now resolved to depart from the policy which he had hitherto steadily pursued.

On the arrival of the English army at Arikera, a considerable body of the enemy was visible at the distance of about six miles in front. This force was drawn up with its right to the river Caverry, and its left to a rugged hill a short distance from the bank. It was at first supposed to be only a large detachment sent to observe the motions of the British army, and Lord Cornwallis proceeded to take measures for ascertaining the best point for crossing the river, with a view to a junction with General Abercromby, who, with the Bombay army, was posted at Peripatam, about forty miles westward of Seringapatam, and whose co-operation was deemed necessary to the reduction of the latter place. The English general, however, soon learned that though only a small part of the enemy's army could be seen, the whole was encamped between his position and Seringapatam; its right protected by the Caverry, its left by a chain of hills, with a deep swampy ravine, the passage of which was defended by batteries running along the whole of the front. The distance between the river and the hills nowhere exceeded a mile and a half, and within cannon-shot of Tippoo's line was not more than a mile. The difficulties in attacking an enemy in such a position were obviously great; but the result of such information as could be obtained of the country seemed to show that

it would be practicable to cross a ridge on the right of the English army from the high road to Seringapatam, where they were encamped, to another road leading to the same place; and Lord Cornwallis thereupon resolved to attempt by a night march to turn the enemy's left flank, and by gaining his rear before daylight, cut off the retreat of his main body to the capital. To effect this object, six European regiments, twelve battalions of native infantry, with three field-pieces, one European, and three native regiments of cavalry, were ordered to be in readiness to march at eleven o'clock on the night of the 13th May, leaving their pickets and camp guards behind, and their tents standing. Nizam Ali's cavalry were to follow in the morning; but the order was not to be communicated till the moment of moving, lest the plan should be frustrated by treachery.

The ground occupied by the British army was intersected by ruined villages, inclosures, and deep ravines, and from this cause much time was lost in forming the troops in the prescribed order of march. Before they moved, a terrific storm arose, and the march was performed under a deluge of rain, accompanied by thunder and lightning of the most awful character. Exhausted by fatigue, scared by the lightning, and benumbed by the chilling effects of the rain, the cattle could scarcely be made to move; and the night, except when temporarily irradiated by the vivid flashes, being impenetrably dark, several regiments lost their way, and portions of the British force were moving in almost every variety of direction. Repeated halts thus became necessary. On one of them, Lord Cornwallis found himself with no more than one company and one gun. A staff-officer, who made the discovery that the general had thus outmarched the greater part of his force, or had become, in some other way, separated from them, attempted to find the column by tracing, with the aid of the lightning, the marks of the gun-carriage wheels; but the tracks, though so recently made, had been completely obliterated by the unceasing torrents of rain, and he narrowly escaped riding into the enemy's encampments.

The dawn of day removed one of the difficulties which had retarded the progress of the British force; but it destroyed the hope of executing the original plan, which required the cover of night: still, as the most arduous part of the march had been accomplished, Lord Cornwallis determined to persevere, and to endeavour to force Tippoo to action on ground believed to be less advantageous to him than that which he had chosen. The sultan did not decline the challenge. The approach of the English was unobserved till they had begun to descend the heights on the eastward of the ravine. Their first object was to gain possession of a hill commanding the left of the enemy. This was perceived by Tippoo, and he made arrangements for defeating it, which have deservedly received the approbation of eminent military authorities.

He despatched a considerable body of cavalry and infantry, with eight guns, to seize the hill towards which the views of the English were directed, and sent out some cavalry to hover on the right of the English, and to take advantage of any opportunity to charge—thus impeding their progress, and giving to his troops advancing to the hill time to take possession of it. Tippoo also very promptly changed his front to the left, covering one flank by a steep hill previously in his rear, and the other by a ravine which had run along his former front.

From the nature of the ground, the weak state of the cattle, and the annoyances of the enemy's horse, the passage of the British infantry to the same side of the ravine with the enemy was slow. It was at length accomplished, and the requisite disposition for action made. Opposite to the enemy's main body, nine battalions were posted in a first line under General Meadows and Colonel Stuart, and four in a second line under Colonel Harris, while five battalions, under Colonel Maxwell, were destined for an attack upon the enemy's corps on the hill. This attack might have been made at an earlier period, but it was judiciously postponed till the other parts of the disposition were complete, in order to deter Tippoo from making any attempt on the flank or rear of the troops moving forward to drive his detachment from the hill.

With the attack on that detachment the action commenced. On the approach of Colonel Maxwell, the enemy's eight guns were drawn off. The infantry kept their ground, and maintained a heavy, though ill-directed, fire of musketry. Colonel Maxwell had no guns, but he had made provision for covering both his flanks against cavalry. Thus unencumbered and unapprehensive of interruption, he advanced with a rapidity and impetuosity which speedily broke the line of the enemy's infantry, and even overtook some of the guns on the opposite descent of the hill. The infantry made a struggle to defend them, but in vain; the possession of the guns followed the possession of the hill. The rapid success of Colonel Maxwell on the hill was the signal for the advance of the two lines below against the main body of the enemy. The battle now became general along the entire front. The enemy's cavalry, who had greatly annoyed the British army while advancing to take up their ground, made no stand after they were formed in line of battle; the fire of Tippoo's artillery even began to relax. His infantry behaved in a manner far surpassing any expectation that had been formed of them; but the near approach of the first line of the British army caused them to waver. Colonel Maxwell had been ordered, after carrying the hill, to leave there only a sufficient force to retain possession, and with the remainder of his corps to advance and possess himself of the hills which covered the left flank of the main army of the enemy. He was rapidly performing this duty, when Colonel Floyd, with the British cavalry, who

had been kept out of the range of the enemy's shot, ready to take advantage of any opportunity that might occur for their services, charged the rear-guard of the enemy's retreating infantry, and nearly destroyed them. Their progress was checked by a larger body of infantry, which rallied and made a stand on a space of broken ground extremely disadvantageous for cavalry. Colonel Floyd accordingly prepared to withdraw his men from a position where they could not act effectively; but at this moment the cavalry of Nizam Ali, which had followed the English cavalry, threw themselves in an unwieldy mass in front of the left wing of the British army, the advance of which they impeded, while from the nature of the ground they could prove of no service had they been disposed to perform any. For some time they could neither be brought to advance nor recede. "And thus," said the governor-general, "an invaluable though short space of time was lost, which enabled the enemy to avail themselves of the vicinity of the batteries upon the island, and by retreating to their protection in the utmost confusion, to save their army from entire destruction."

Lord Cornwallis, while complaining of this extraordinary conduct, charitably gives the actors the praise of "good intentions." Colonel Wilks takes a less favourable view. "It is asserted," he says, "by many officers in the Mysorean army, that this impediment was designed; that a horseman, with a particular badge from Asud Ali, was seen at this moment to deliver a message to Tippoo, who was in the rear anxiously urging the escape of his guns, of which many had been actually abandoned, but were recovered during this delay, and one only fell into the hands of the English in this branch of the attack; and that another messenger attended Tippoo on the same night."

Adverting to the good conduct of Tippoo's infantry on this occasion, Sir Thomas Munro says:—"They stood the fire of musketry till our troops were within a few yards of them; they defended every point; they rallied wherever the ground was favourable; and when at last driven from the field, they retreated without confusion. All this change of behaviour," he adds, "was, however, less owing perhaps to the improvement of their discipline than to other causes—the strength of the ground, which, being full of rocks and ravines, afforded them everywhere shelter, and made it difficult to follow them; and their proximity to the island, the batteries of which covered them from pursuit." Lord Cornwallis attributes the good behaviour of Tippoo's infantry to his presence and exertions among them; whatever the cause, it is evident that the difficulty of putting them to flight was greater than had been anticipated. But the task had been performed—victory sat upon the banners of the British army; yet the fruits of victory were to be abandoned—the object for which so much fatigue, so much loss, and so many perils had been incurred, was to be renounced; the prize,

for which so many public and private sacrifices had been made, was within sight, but it was not to be grasped.

In great distress for provisions, and with intolerable labour to the troops, from the want of cattle, the British army by two marches reached Caniambaddy, the ford at that place being regarded as an eligible spot for crossing the river; and there, on the 20th of May, exactly a week after his arrival at Arikera, Lord Cornwallis determined to relinquish, for a time at least, all attempts against Seringapatam, and to retrace his steps to Bangalore. On the 21st, orders were despatched to General Abercromby to return to Malabar; on the 22nd the whole of the battering train and heavy equipments of the army were destroyed; and on the 26th the governor-general commenced his retrograde march.

Neither party in the war had at this time much cause for exultation. Tippoo had discarded his usual caution—had ventured on a general action, and had been defeated, the bitterness of defeat being aggravated by its having occurred within sight of his capital. The English commander had provoked a battle in which he had been victorious; but with reference to the object for which the enterprise had been undertaken and the battle fought, he was beaten. "As a mere evidence of superiority," says Colonel Wilks, "the victory was complete; and had there been no movement of the cavalry, would probably have been very decisive. But the observation of Sir Eyre Coote, on a parallel occasion, was applied by an old officer to the present: 'I would gladly exchange all these trophies and the reputation of victory for a few days' rice!'" "We gained nothing by the victory," says Sir Thomas Munro, "but the liberty of looking at the island,"—a privilege scarcely worth the price that had been paid for it.

The British army commenced its retreat, and before the conclusion of the first day's march, a large body of horse made their appearance on the left of the principal column, near its rear. This was not a point from which an attack had been apprehended; but from knowing the rapidity with which the cavalry of Tippoo moved in all directions, no doubt was entertained that the approaching horsemen belonged to his army, and that they would immediately fall on the stores and baggage. Colonel Stuart, who commanded in the rear, instantly prepared to resist the attack; and the British had begun to fire, when one of the horsemen rode towards a staff-officer who was giving some orders, and shouting that he was a Mahratta, entreated that the firing might cease. Similar communications were made at the head of the column, and the British commander found himself suddenly reinforced by two Mahratta armies, one under Hurry Punt, commander-in-chief, the other under Puseram Bhow, who, after the fall of Darwar, had marched towards Seringapatam

to join the English army. A British detachment accompanied the army of Purseram Bhow. The Mahrattas were believed to have been not less than a hundred and fifty miles distant from the army which they so suddenly joined. Above a hundred messengers had been sent forward to announce its approach, but every one of them had been intercepted by the light troops of Tippoo.

Had the junction of the Mahrattas taken place somewhat earlier, some heavy sacrifices made by the British army might have been averted. As it was, their accession was most welcome. They brought a supply of bullocks, large stores of all necessary articles of consumption, and of some which were not strictly to be regarded as necessary. The march of the confederates was slow, in order to afford opportunity for the arrival of large convoys of provisions and plunder coming up in the Mahratta rear. On the 18th of June the army was within three miles of Hooliordroog, a fort established on a small rock, of great strength. At the foot of the rock was a town, which being occupied without difficulty, the killadar surrendered the fort on a promise of security to private property, and of special protection against the Mahrattas. The inhabitants, who had taken refuge in the fort, proceeded in the direction of Madoor, under the care of an English escort, the commander of which had orders to accompany the travellers the entire distance to Madoor if required. All, however, appeared quiet, and not a single Mahratta was visible on the route. Fear was thus dispelled, and when about half the march was accomplished, the leader of the retiring party intimated to the English officer that, as there was no reason to apprehend danger, it would be unnecessary to subject the escort to further trouble. It accordingly returned, but was no sooner at a sufficient distance to permit the manifestation of Mahratta enterprise, than the freebooting allies of the British, in conformity with established custom, fell upon the unfortunate fugitives, and plundered them of everything they possessed.

Hooliordroog contained many state prisoners, and there the captors found new evidence of the sultan's cruelty. "Among a number of captives," says an historian of the period, "that were bound in chains of various construction at Hooliordroog, several, who had their ankles fastened asunder by a heavy iron bar of about eighteen inches in length, had from habit acquired a straddling gait, which, when liberated, they could not for a length of time alter or amend; some, from having been closely pinioned, could move neither arm; others had acquired a stoop, from which they were unable to stand erect: in short, as most of them had been confined in this wretched state for a period of about ten years, there were few indeed who had not lost the power of some limb or other."

Hooliordroog was dismantled, and the army proceeded on its course. Oostradroog was

summoned to surrender, but the killadar sent a refusal, and it was not thought prudent to enforce the demand by arms. Savandroog was reconnoitred, but appeared so formidable, that even the ceremony of a summons was in this instance waived. The army reached Bangalore on the 11th June. Before the arrival at that place, a plan of future proceedings had been arranged. The continued co-operation of the Mahrattas it was necessary to purchase by a loan of nearly a hundred and fifty thousand pounds, the means of making the advance being secured by stopping the commercial investment of dollars in transit from England to China. To the English the campaign had been a cause of heavy loss. The Mahrattas, on the contrary, had, by the assiduous use of their usual practices, been greatly enriched, both individually and nationally. Yet the latter thought it fit that the English should pay for their continued services against a common enemy, and the governor-general did not feel himself in a situation to refuse. This important preliminary being arranged, Purseram Bhow, with his army and a detachment of Bombay troops, proceeded by Sera to commence a series of operations in the north-west. The greater part of the nizam's cavalry, under Assud Ali, were to operate to the north-east. The army of Lord Cornwallis was to be interposed between the enemy and the Company's territories, as well for the protection of the latter, as for the convenience of bringing forward supplies, for reducing such of the intermediate fortresses as might be necessary, and for establishing a chain of tenable posts from Madras to Seringapatam, by which the transit of supplies might be facilitated when the army should be called to assemble before the enemy's capital.

The first movement of Lord Cornwallis was in a south-eastern direction to Oossore. On his approach the garrison evacuated and blew up the fort. A train had been laid for the magazine, intended to explode after the entry of the English troops; but by a happy accident it did not take effect. Here again the perfidy and cruelty of Tippoo were brought conspicuously to notice. Three Englishmen had been confined in Oossore; one of whom, named Hamilton, having given up all hopes of recovering his freedom, had reconciled his mind to the circumstances in which he was placed, and apparently contemplated Oossore as his final abode. As in other instances, the fall of Bangalore had led to the murder of these unhappy men, whose graves were now pointed out to their indignant countrymen.

From Oossore the English army moved in the direction of the Policode and Ryacootah passes, and took possession of various forts, some of them without resistance. Ryacootah was not so easily obtained: it was defended by successive ranges of works, and garrisoned by eight hundred men; and so confident was the killadar in the strength of his works and his

garrison, that he not only rejected the summons to surrender, but fired on the flag that brought it. The task of reducing this place fell to a brigade under Major Gowdie, who sent a detachment of about three hundred and fifty men, with guns, to attack the pettah. The gate was soon blown open; but the garrison, aided by the inhabitants, kept up a brisk fire on the assailants from the upper and central works. Major Gowdie led the succeeding attacks in person, and carried several successive gates, but did not venture to attempt the summit. On the appearance of the main body of the army, however, the place surrendered.

The capture of other forts of inferior importance demands no especial notice; but the attack on Nundedroog is entitled to some attention. This fort was situated on a granite rock of tremendous height, and no labour had been spared to add to its strength. Major Gowdie, who had reduced many of the minor forts, found his means inadequate to an attack upon Nundedroog. Reinforcements were obtained, and the guns having with incredible labour been carried part of the way up the hill, batteries were constructed, and began to fire with visible effect. The fire was vigorously returned from the fort; but at the end of twenty-one days two breaches were effected by the besiegers—one in the exterior rampart, the other in an outwork. Lord Cornwallis now advanced his army within a few miles of the place, and orders were given for a night assault. It took place soon after midnight of the 19th of October, and was made simultaneously by two parties upon the two breaches. The enemy were prepared to receive the assailants with a heavy fire of musketry and rockets; but more injury was inflicted by stones of immense size and weight rolled down upon those who were ascending. The resistance, however, was not long protracted; and Nundedroog was added to the acquisitions of the British army under Lord Cornwallis. Before the attack was made, a portion of the garrison were clamorous for surrender; and on its taking place, some descended the wall by ladders of ropes, and escaped through the jungles; others, abandoning their posts, fled for shelter to the principal pagoda, where they were subsequently made prisoners. The commanding officer was in despair. His name was Luft Ali Beg; he was a man of high rank, and had stood well in the esteem of Hyder Ali. At the battle of Arnée he had been ordered to make a charge with a large and select body of cavalry on the rear of the English, with a view to facilitate the retreat of Hyder Ali's artillery. He attempted to execute his orders, but was checked by the active and well-directed fire of the horse artillery of the English, which his troops refused to face. The wrath of the capricious barbarian whom Luft Ali Beg served was extreme; and his unfortunate servant was committed to the custody of another Mahometan officer, with instructions to inflict upon him severe corporal punishment, the marks of

which were to be exhibited to two Brahmin witnesses, in proof that the sultan's orders were carried into effect. The ingenuity of Luft Ali Beg and his gaoler contrived to evade the actual execution of the sentence by the use of a caustic, which produced the appearance necessary to satisfy the witnesses, without subjecting the sufferer to any serious inconvenience; and as under an Eastern despotism such incidents are soon forgotten, Luft Ali Beg, after a time, became again an important personage in the court and camp of the Mysorean sovereign. By Tippoo he was associated with three other of his servants in an embassy to Constantinople, which was to have proceeded from thence to Paris; but the ambassadors never got beyond the former city, where their reception was cold and unsatisfactory; and after an absence of nearly five years they returned, without any result but the expenditure of about twenty lacs of rupees, the loss by contagious disease of several hundreds of their followers, and the contribution to the state papers of Mysore of a journal of vast extent. To his former failings, Luft Ali Beg had now added that of having suffered one of the strongest and most important places in his master's dominions to fall into the hands of the English.

The reduction of Nundedroog was followed by the despatch of a detachment under Colonel Maxwell into Baramahal, to counteract the depredations in progress there by a force under Bakir Saib, son of the gallant killadar of Darwar, slain in the capture of that place. The business assigned to this force was to devastate the whole country, so as to incapacitate it from contributing to the supplies of the English army, and its chief post was at a mud fort named Penagra. The fort was speedily taken, and Bakir Saib withdrew from the country which he had been sent to ravage. Colonel Maxwell then proceeded towards Kistnaghery, with the intention of destroying the pettah, so as to leave the enemy's predatory parties no cover there. Possession of the pettah was soon gained; and an opportunity seeming to offer for a successful attack upon the upper fort, the attempt was made and failed. The British detachment sustained considerable loss, but retired in good order, after setting fire to the pettah.

In Coimbatore, the defence of the fort bearing the same name with the province, and of Paligaut, with their reciprocal communications, had been intrusted to Major Cuppage. That officer deeming Coimbatore incapable of sustaining a siege, removed the heavy guns, ammunition, and stores to Paligaut. Lieutenant Chalmers, who was left at Coimbatore, on examining the guns which had been cast aside as unserviceable, found three which stood proof. By collecting and joining wheels and fragments of carriages which lay scattered about the fort, he found the means of mounting them. With these and a few swivels, a quantity of damaged powder, and five hundred shot, obtained from Major Cuppage, he hoped

to make a stand for a few days, in the event of the fort being attacked.

The apprehension of attack was soon converted into certainty. The place was invested by a force of two thousand infantry, a considerable body of cavalry, eight guns, and a number of irregular troops. The garrison consisted of a hundred and twenty topasses, literally, wearers of hats, partially of Portuguese origin, and about two hundred Travancoreans, half of whom ran away when they found a siege was expected, while those who remained were extremely insubordinate.

The enemy pitched on the north-west of the pettah, and summoned the place to surrender, under pain of death to every person within it, not excepting women and children. The summons was disregarded; it was repeated after the expiration of two days without effect. On the third day a battery was completed, and the fort was once more summoned, but with an offer of favourable terms. The offer was rejected, and in the evening the besiegers began to fire from the battery. The shot did considerable damage to the works, which it gave the garrison abundant employment to repair. Another battery was completed on the following day, and a vigorous fire of guns and rockets was maintained. A third battery was soon in a forward state. In the mean time Lieutenant Chalmers had prepared several casks, filled with combustibles, which were placed on the ramparts, to be used against the enemy should they attempt an escalade, which, from their preparation of ladders, seemed to be intended. The enemy prepared a fourth battery, and the besieged opened three mines. As the danger increased, the mines were loaded and the gates blocked up with earth and stones. The store of shot beginning to fail, the hammermen were actively employed in making iron slugs, to supply the deficiency of balls. The works of the besiegers continued to be carried on till they were advanced within fifty yards of the ditch; and as it was known that large reinforcements were proceeding to their assistance, a general attack was now hourly expected. At this time the store of ammunition within the fort was nearly exhausted; the wounded, who were numerous, were without medical assistance; and the Travancoreans who remained were clamorous for surrender. Still the gallant commander, who was nobly supported by a young French officer named De la Combe, in the service of the rajah of Travancore, refused to succumb.

Two months, within two days, had passed before the enemy ventured on a general assault. They advanced with great steadiness, planted their ladders, and mounted the parapet at five distinct places. The first struggle took place at a point defended by De la Combe, whose personal gallantry communicated its influence to those whom he commanded, and prepared for the assailants a fierce resistance. The enemy had avoided the mines, and resort to the combustible barrels was delayed till not

only was the ditch filled by the assailants, but numbers of them were actually on the ramparts, fighting hand to hand with the besieged. De la Combe would have been overpowered had not a timely reinforcement been sent to his relief; and Lieutenant Chalmers, who was personally engaged in defending the weakest point of the works, was in danger of a similar fate. At a moment when successful resistance seemed scarcely longer practicable, one of the barrels, being thrown amongst a crowded mass of the enemy, exploded, and the fortune of the day was turned. The besiegers gave way, and as party after party retired from the ramparts, their discomfiture was increased by hurling down on them vast pieces of rock. The conflict lasted two hours, and the number of the enemy's dead left on the ramparts and within the ditch exceeded the entire strength of the garrison by whom they had been so bravely repulsed.

It was not fitting that such men should be abandoned; and though a due regard to the safety of Paligaut prevented Major Cuppage from doing much for their relief, he afforded some assistance, and with the aid of some revenue troops under the direction of Mr. Macleod, a gallant and enterprising civil servant, the enemy were driven from the pettah, which they had continued to occupy, and chased to the Bewany, a distance of about twenty miles, with the loss of a large quantity of their stores. To add to the permanent strength of the garrison, a company of sepoy, commanded by Lieutenant Nash, was ordered in, and by some further additions it was increased to about seven hundred men.

Scarcely had Lieutenant Chalmers time to repair the breaches in the works and make other dispositions for defence, before the enemy reappeared. The force now arrayed against Coimbatore consisted of eight thousand regular infantry, with fourteen guns, four mortars, and a large body of irregulars and horse. It was commanded by Kummer-oo-Deen. The enemy took possession of the pettah without opposition, erected batteries, and opened approaches, under the cover of a heavy fire, which the besieged were able to return very inadequately. But the spirits of the garrison were cheered by intelligence that Major Cuppage was advancing with three battalions of Company's sepoy, two of Travancoreans, and six field-pieces, to compel the enemy to raise the siege. To divert this force from its object, and probably at the same time to strike a serious blow at the efficiency of an important portion of the English force, Kummer-oo-Deen, leaving a strong body in the trenches, marched with the remainder of his force a distance of about ten miles, to the vicinity of a pass where the woods of Arivaly terminate and the plain commences. A large convoy of oxen, intended for the western army, was assembled at Paligaut, and Kummer-oo-Deen made a demonstration of getting into Major Cuppage's rear, for the purpose of occupying the pass. This

would have enabled him to cut off the passage of the convoy, and by the force of numbers to embarrass Major Cuppage's return to Paligaut. That officer accordingly fell back, and the occupation of the pass was decided by a severe action, in which Major Cuppage was victorious. He immediately returned to Paligaut, while Kummer-oo-Deen proceeded to resume the siege of Coimbatore, relieved from the fear of interruption.

The fate of that place was now sealed. All hope of relief was cut off, the ammunition, from the first, bad, was nearly expended, a wide breach had been made perfectly practicable, and the sap had been carried to the covered way. Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash were both wounded in one day; and the most determined of the gallant defenders of this miserable fort saw the necessity of surrender. Negotiations for this purpose were commenced, and soon brought to a conclusion, the enemy being quite ready to grant the besieged favourable terms. The place was first invested on the 13th of June; one hundred and forty-three days afterwards, on the 3rd of November, the conquerors took possession of it. In reference to its strength or importance, Coimbatore has little claim to occupy a large space in the history of the war with Tippoo Sultan; but the gallantry with which it was defended has removed the siege from the list of ordinary occurrences.

It was a condition of the capitulation, that the garrison should be permitted to march to Paligaut; but, after the actual surrender of the place, it was pretended that this condition could not be acted upon without the sultan's ratification. The sequel of this tale of perfidy need scarcely be told. After a detention of thirteen days at Coimbatore, the prisoners were marched to Seringapatam, where they were subjected to the cruelties and indignities which were the ordinary lot of those who fell into the hands of the barbarian Tippoo Sultan. Comment upon a fact of such frequent occurrence would be alike tedious and vain.

While these events were in progress, the attention of Lord Cornwallis had been constantly directed to the establishment of such means for the transmission of supplies as might prevent the necessity of abandoning the meditated attack upon Seringapatam from the cause that led to the relinquishment of the former. One of the most serious impediments to success was the possession by the enemy of the strong fortress of Savandroog, situated about eighteen miles west of Bangalore. It consisted of an enormous mass of granite, of greater height than Nunddroog, rising from a base eight miles in circumference, and separated by a chasm, at the distance of about two-thirds of its total elevation, into two citadels, each independent of the other. It had not long before been reconnoitred, and was deemed unassailable; but the capture of some other hill forts, and more especially of Nunddroog, had tended to diminish the reverence

of English officers for the reputed impregnability of Indian fortresses; and it was determined to test the claims of Savandroog in this respect.

The conduct of the siege was intrusted to Colonel Stuart, and the force assigned to him, in addition to a powerful artillery, consisted of two European and three native regiments. The remainder of the army was disposed so as to watch every avenue from Seringapatam by which the operations of the siege could be disturbed. On the 10th of December Colonel Stuart pitched his camp within three miles of the north side of the rock, the point from which the chief engineer, after reconnoitring, proposed to carry on the attack. The first operation was one of vast labour and difficulty—it was to cut a gun-road from the encampment to the foot of the mountain, over rocky precipices, and through a thick forest of bamboos, and when made, to drag the guns over it. A noxious and pestilential atmosphere added to the dangers of the besiegers, and Tippoo, on hearing of the attempt, is reported to have congratulated his officers on the infatuation of the English in engaging in an enterprise that could not fail to terminate in defeat and disgrace. According to the sultan's belief, one half of the Europeans employed were destined to die of sickness, the other half to be killed in the attack. Not daunted by this royal prediction, the besiegers, on the 17th December, opened two batteries, one at a thousand yards, the other at seven hundred yards' distance, by which the defences of the wall were much damaged; but the effect was scarcely equal to the expectations which had been formed. The wall was built with stones of immense size, those of the lower tier being riveted to the rock by iron bolts. On the 19th another battery was erected, which it was found necessary to advance to within two hundred and fifty yards of the wall. In the course of that and the succeeding day a practicable breach was effected, and orders were given to storm on the following morning.

The bamboo forest, which had been a source of difficulty in the construction of the gun-road, was found of some service in the close approaches of the attack. Under its cover, and that of crevices and rugged parts of the rock, a lodgment was made for the troops within twenty yards of the breach. The storming party, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Nesbitt, was directed to four different attacks, and parties were detached round the mountain, to draw the attention of the enemy from the main object, and prevent their escape, should any attempt for that purpose be made.

The hour fixed for the assault was eleven o'clock, and it was to commence on the discharge of two guns from the batteries. At the appointed hour the expected signal was given, and the party advanced to the storm, while the band of one of the English regiments pealed forth the inspiring air of *Britons strike home*. A large body of the enemy had been

observed running down from the western hill, for the defence of the breach, which was a little below the eastern hill; but on the appearance of the English they were seized with panic, and fled. The eastern hill was completely carried, without meeting or even overtaking the enemy.

The attack on the western hill was thought to be a work of greater difficulty, and Captain Monson, to whom it was intrusted, was instructed either to advance or not, as circumstances might render expedient. The officer in command of the citadel having witnessed the abandonment of the eastern hill and the ascent of the English party, made a sally for the purpose of taking them in flank, when he was unexpectedly met among the rocks by the party of Captain Monson. He retreated with precipitation, followed with great vigour by the English. An attempt was made to shut the first gate against the pursuers, but the man who was performing the duty was killed by a shot fired from some distance by a sergeant of the 71st regiment. The English then rushed in, and entering every succeeding barrier with the enemy, were soon in possession of the top of the mountain. Thus, in less than an hour, and in open day, the stupendous fortress of Savandroog was carried by storm, and the boast of its impregnability for ever silenced. The English had not a man killed, and only one wounded.

The next place attempted was that which was next to Savandroog in strength and importance. Ootradroog had some time before been summoned, and the answer of the killadar was, that he would not surrender his post till the English had taken Seringapatam. It was supposed that the fall of Savandroog might have made him less scrupulous, and a flag of truce was despatched, offering liberal terms. The staff officer who accompanied it was beckoned from the fort to advance; he complied with the invitation, and when within sixty yards of the gate, a fire of musketry was opened on him and the non-commissioned officer who bore the flag, but from which, happily, both escaped unhurt. On the following day the fort was attacked in a manner for which the governor was not prepared. A number of field-pieces were run down to appointed stations, and under cover of their fire an escalade commenced.

The side of the rock assaulted rose at an angle of about thirty-five degrees, and was defended by seven ramparts, rising above each other, including that of the pettah, which was first stormed. The orders given to the artillery officers were, as fast as one wall should be carried, to point the guns, over the heads of the assailants, against the next wall in succession, for the purpose of keeping down the fire of the garrison. The pettah was carried so rapidly as to astonish the killadar, and induce him to demand a parley. It was granted; but it soon becoming apparent, from the movements of the garrison above, that the

only object was to gain time for preparing more efficiently for defence, the assault recommenced, and wall after wall was carried, till the assailants reached the summit. Some of the gateways were forced by the pioneers, but most of the ramparts were carried by escalade. The astonishment and confusion of the enemy were so great, that their fire, though heavy, was for the most part thrown away, and as soon as a single European was seen above any of the walls, they fled precipitately. The killadar was made prisoner, and many of the garrison killed. Many more, terrified at the sight of the European bayonets, precipitated themselves from the rock—thus blindly rushing on one mode of death in their anxiety to escape another. The terror of the garrison had commenced before the actual danger. On the appearance of the detachment before the place, they had mutinied, and four hundred men had deserted in the night. To the prevalence of fear the English were unquestionably indebted for the ease with which they obtained possession of this fortress. "Although," says Major Dirom, "such was the steepness and narrowness of some parts of the road in the ascent, that a few resolute men might have defended the place against an army, it was only at the last gateway that they attempted any resistance, and that only by firing a few musket-shot, by which two soldiers were wounded." The total number of wounded in the English detachment was very small; and, like Savandroog, Ootradroog was carried without the loss of a single life. Some other forts of inferior importance were taken with little trouble.

The army of the nizam had long been engaged in besieging Goorumconda, but with a very indifferent prospect of bringing their operations to a successful ending. The nizam's artillery was unable to breach the lower fort, and to supply their deficiency some guns were despatched by Lord Cornwallis after the fall of Nunddroog. Still nothing was effected till Captain Read, who commanded the English detachment serving with the nizam's army, rendered weary and indignant by the clumsy proceedings which he had been compelled to witness, offered, if intrusted with the exclusive management of the attack, to put the nizam's officers in possession of the lower fort, which commanded the only access to the hill, and having effected this service, to leave them to conduct the further operations in their own way. The offer was accepted; and Captain Read, having constructed a battery of two twenty-six and two eighteen pounders within four hundred yards of the wall, in two days after it commenced firing, had effected a practicable breach.

The night of the 7th of November was fixed on for the attack; and the small party of artillerymen, who were the only European troops with the detachment, volunteered to quit their guns and lead the assault. Measures having been taken to divert the attention of the

enemy, the assailants advanced, and with little opposition mounted the breach. Having cleared the obstacles by which their progress was impeded, they advanced along the rampart till they met a body of the enemy, who made a stand at the second bastion. The artillerymen charged them, and they instantly gave way. No further resistance was offered, and the greater part of the garrison took refuge in the upper fort. The lower fort was delivered to the charge of Nizam Ali's troops, but they were not destined to retain undisturbed possession of it. A large reinforcement, soon after the capture, arrived from Hyderabad, under the command of the minister, Moosheeroo-Moolk, who, on his departure with the main body of his forces and the English detachment to take part in the operations of Lord Cornwallis, left the charge of the lower fort to an officer of some reputation, known by the name of Hafiz Jee. In December, the eldest son of Tippoo Sultan appeared before Goorumconda, with an army amounting to about twelve thousand horse and foot. Their approach was quite unlooked for; and Hafiz, supposing the party to consist but of a few plunderers, mounted an elephant and went out to reconnoitre, accompanied by only a few horsemen. He was speedily surrounded, and, descending from his elephant, was about to mount a horse and endeavour to force his way back, when he was made prisoner. The troops, who issued from the fort in small parties, were destroyed in detail, and panic seizing the rest, the recent acquisition was precipitately evacuated with considerable loss. Hafiz Jee was an object of peculiar hatred to Tippoo. He had been employed on an embassy from the nizam to the sultan, by whom he had been treated with that disrespect which the despot of Mysore was in the habit of exhibiting to the accredited servants of other states. He had afterwards, in his capacity of minister of the nizam, been associated with the refusal of that prince to connect his family with that of Tippoo by the tie of marriage; and this offence had never been forgiven. Aly Reza, the man through whom the rejected proposal of matrimonial alliance had been made, was now with the army before Goorumconda, and in his hands rested the fate of Hafiz Jee. The prisoner had soon the means of judging of the spirit in which he was regarded by those into whose power his imprudence had thrown him. He was plundered of everything about his person, even to the last article of clothing; and, but for the charity of some one who bestowed on him an old quilt, he would have been left altogether destitute of covering. In this forlorn condition he was visited by his old antagonist, Aly Reza, who reproached him with his conduct respecting the proffered marriage. Hafiz answered, that he and Aly Reza were then serving their respective masters, and that the day was past. The remembrance of it was, however, not past. The victim was in the power of a prince who never forgot an

injury—in the presence of one of his minions ready to perform any act which he believed would be gratifying to his master, and who in this instance was influenced by feelings of personal hatred. Hafiz was carried to a concealed situation, fitted for the execution of dark and bloody deeds, and there murdered with circumstances of extreme barbarity, Aly Reza feasting his eyes with the vengeance inflicted on his opponent. The success of the attack upon Goorumconda was further signalized by the murder of a French officer in the service of the nizam; and thus the triumph of Tippoo's army was celebrated by acts of treachery and cruelty which Tippoo himself need not have disdained to superintend. The advantage, whatever it might be, resulting from these murders, was nearly all that Tippoo gained by the recapture of the lower fort of Goorumconda, which was speedily restored to the nizam by the English detachment.

The Mahratta army under Purseram Bhow, with a British detachment under Captain Little, had, on leaving Lord Cornwallis, proceeded to attack a fort named Dooradroog. The Mahratta general had anticipated that it would surrender without opposition; but, after repeated attempts, its reduction was found impracticable, and the army continued its march towards Chittledroog. That place was reconnoitred, but deemed too strong for attack. Purseram Bhow entertained some hope of buying over the killadar; but either that officer's honesty, or the fact that his family were detained in Seringapatam as hostages for his fidelity, forbade the conclusion of a bargain. Purseram Bhow consoled himself for the disappointment by plundering whenever opportunity presented. The illness, real or pretended, of the Mahratta general delayed for a time the progress of the army; but on the 18th of December they arrived near Hooly Onore, a fort which Captain Little immediately proceeded to reconnoitre. It was thought that it might be attacked with a prospect of success. The pettah was gained with little difficulty, and thence some guns opened on the fort, at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. A breach having been effected, the fort was stormed with success, and without the loss of a man, on the same day which, with similar immunity from loss, transferred the important fortress of Savandroog into the possession of the English. The garrison was reported to be a thousand strong, but Lieutenant Moor, who was one of Captain Little's detachment, concludes that they did not exceed half that number. Assuming their strength at this reduced estimate, that officer, however, makes a remark, the truth of which is in no degree invalidated by the colloquial simplicity with which it is conveyed, that "they ought to have been ashamed of themselves for making so pitiful a defence." It was the intention of the stormers not to allow any of the Mahratta plunderers to enter the place; but the news of its capture was soon carried

to their camp, and though the gates were shut, the ladders removed from the breach, and every precaution taken to exclude access, these marauders found means to penetrate, and, like noxious and destructive insects, to spread themselves over the place. They set fire to the houses, and the work of devastation and plunder soon became general. Seeing no other chance of securing anything, the English commander permitted his people to disperse and plunder also. But this was soon stopped by the arrival of orders from the Mahratta general for the English party to quit the place, and as they were placed under his control, the orders could not be disobeyed. The English troops, who had won the prize, were thus deprived of all participation in it, while the Mahrattas, who had not contributed in even the slightest degree to the fall of the fort, were left to gratify, without restraint, their insatiable appetite for plunder. Purseram Bhow, however, indulged in the luxury of a speculative admiration of virtue, though he left the practice to others. A family of some note in the town had received the protection of an officer of the English detachment; but though their own safety was thus provided for, they were deeply distressed by the loss of a youthful daughter, who, in the confusion, had been separated from her parents. Through the exertions of the officer by whom they had been protected, the girl was found and restored to her relatives. These circumstances reached the ears of Purseram Bhow, who, says Lieutenant Moor, "mentioned them in full durbar, in a manner highly honourable to himself and the British character;" further, he recommended the example to the imitation of his own servants, and there can be little doubt that the recommendation was received with a degree of respect equal to the sincerity with which it was given.

After the fall of Hooly Onore, the Mahratta army and Captain Little's detachment proceeded in a south-western direction towards Simoga. Tippoo had strengthened his provincial troops in Bednore by the addition of a division under his relation Reza Saib, and that officer was thus enabled to take the field with a force of eight thousand men and ten guns. This force was posted in the jungle, with the intention of making an attack on the rear of the confederates, as soon as they should be engaged in the siege of Simoga, simultaneously with a sortie to be made from the fort. This being known, it became an object of importance to dislodge them previously. The position of Reza Saib was strong; his right rested on the river, his front was covered by a deep ravine, and his left by jungle, deemed impenetrable there, but which became somewhat lighter at a distance.

The force destined to the attack upon Reza Saib was composed of about a thousand English sepoy, with four guns and five hundred Mahratta infantry. Three thousand Mahratta horse were posted near the place of attack,

but from the nature of the ground they could be of little use. The enemy's position being strongest in front, it was thought expedient to detach parties to attack them on the right and left; but the main attack, led by Captain Little, was directed to the centre. On the part of the English, the contest was maintained, under great disadvantages, with distinguished spirit. The Mahratta infantry sometimes charged, when they saw the enemy appearing to give way, but they were invariably beaten back, and their disorderly return increased the difficulties with which the British officers had to contend. At length the enemy, being driven from their posts on the left, and three of their guns taken, began to retreat; and Captain Little, collecting all the force that could be mustered, set forward in pursuit. There was but one road through the jungle, and before five miles had been traversed, the English commander came up with the enemy's remaining guns, seven in number, which he captured; but so far from relaxing in the pursuit, he continued it through the whole of the following day, and the result was the entire dispersion of the corps of Reza Saib. The departure of Captain Little and his troops left the enemy's camp to the care of the Mahrattas; and here those warriors, who shrunk from the fire of retreating men, found a field precisely adapted to their genius. The amount of plunder was enormous, and such a quantity of arms fell into the hands of the captors, that in the bazaar good muskets were offered for sale at two rupees each. By some accounts, the force of Reza Saib is stated at ten thousand infantry and a thousand horse, and the lowest estimate fixes the number of infantry at seven thousand. This, posted in a most advantageous position, was defeated by about a thousand English sepoy, for the Mahratta troops cannot be regarded as having contributed anything to the success of the day; they were rather an incumbrance than a support. By military writers this action has been regarded as one of the most brilliant of the war.

The army of Reza Saib being dispersed, Captain Little prepared to prosecute the siege of Simoga. A battery of five guns, after a day's firing, effected a practicable breach. All was ready for the storm, when an offer of capitulation upon terms was made and accepted. The commander of the fort duly appreciated the value of the Mahratta faith, for it was thought necessary to stipulate, not only that private property should be respected, but that the inhabitants should be considered under the protection of the British, who were to guarantee the treaty and take possession of the fort. These conditions were to continue in effect only until the English detachment retired from the vicinity. On its march to the southward, the custody of the fort was transferred to the Mahrattas, and also the charge of some prisoners of rank, who, within the English camp, had been treated with marked attention and kindness, and been totally

exempted from restraint. A short time after the change, these prisoners were seen by some officers who had known them in the English camp. Their condition was wretched: they had been plundered of everything valuable, and, receiving neither money nor subsistence, they had been compelled to sell their clothes to procure the means of sustaining life. Some officers of inferior rank were in one respect better treated—they received an allowance, but to counterbalance this advantage they were kept in irons. Such is Mahratia faith and Mahratia humanity.

Purseram Bhow was to have joined Lord Cornwallis with all despatch before Seringapatam. Instead of this, he preferred a plundering expedition into Bednore; but being alarmed by the approach of a force sent against him by Tippoo, who had the command of Kummer-oo-Deen, who had retaken Simoga, he determined to perform his engagement with the British governor-general, since no advantage seemed likely to accrue from taking any other course.

It is now necessary to return to the British army under Lord Cornwallis, which was at Ootradroog, awaiting the coming up of some artillery, some stores, and a battering train, as well as the expected junction of the army of the nizam. These objects being accomplished, the combined army commenced its march, and on the 5th of February Lord Cornwallis was once more in sight of Seringapatam, and of Tippoo's army encamped under its walls.

On both sides of the river, opposite to the island of Seringapatam, a large space is inclosed by a bound hedge, which marks the limits of the capital, and affords a place of refuge from the incursions of cavalry. On the north side, the inclosure was occupied by Tippoo's army. Within it were several redoubts, one of which, erected on a commanding eminence, was a post of great strength. There were other works calculated to shield his troops from attack, or facilitate retreat in case of necessity, and his front line was defended by a hundred pieces of heavy cannon. In the fort and island which formed his second line there were not fewer than three hundred pieces of cannon. Reconnaissance having been made, Lord Cornwallis determined to attack the enemy on the night of the 6th February, an event quite unexpected by Tippoo, and the apparent temerity of which, seeing that it was to be performed by infantry alone, without guns, filled the allies with astonishment. The attack was made in three columns. Between ten and eleven o'clock the central column, on its advance, encountered the enemy's grand guard, a body of cavalry, who were approaching with rockets to disturb the English camp, which annoyance they had practised on the preceding night. The horsemen immediately galloped off to their lines, leaving the bearers of the rockets to harass the column and endeavour to impede its march. Many rockets were thrown, but they had little effect beyond that of announcing to the enemy

the approach of the British column. The front division, on being discovered, pushed briskly forward, reached the hedge, and entered the enemy's lines about a quarter of an hour after their approach became known.

The left column, when the rocketing commenced, was ascending the Carigaut Hill, an eminence on the right of the enemy's camp, near the termination of the bound hedge. The hill is steep, and of great height; it commands one of the fords and the eastern part of the island, and protected the right wing of the sultan's camp. This post was justly regarded as of great importance, and proportionate care had been taken to strengthen it: it was defended by a double breastwork in front of a stone redoubt, but the work was not entirely completed: a considerable body of infantry, but without artillery, was stationed upon it. The Carigaut Hill terminates the range over which Colonel Maxwell had chased a corps of the enemy at the battle in the month of May preceding. The same officer now commanded the column directed to this point, and the works were scaled by the flank companies of the 72nd, the regiment by which the hill was stormed on the former occasion.

The right column, under General Meadows, was to attack the left of the enemy's position. From some mistake, it was led to a more distant point than was intended, and was consequently later in reaching the hedge than the central column; but about half-past eleven this column also entered the inclosure, and proceeded to attack a redoubt within the enemy's lines, but not included in the course of operations contemplated by Lord Cornwallis, and which, after a severe conflict, was carried. It was intended that the right column should advance to meet the central column, and then await further orders. General Meadows, accordingly, having left a sufficient force for the defence of the captured post, proceeded to move in a direction which he expected to bring him to the spot marked out for him; but the occurrence of rice swamps compelled him to make a larger circuit than had been anticipated, and thus the track of the central column was missed. No firing being heard, it was conceived that all was past, and that, whether the other columns had gained a victory or sustained a defeat, it was too late to render them any assistance.

The central column, the advance of which has already been noticed, was subdivided into three parts. The front subdivision, after forcing the enemy's line, was to pass into the island with the fugitives. Orders were issued to the captains of the leading companies not to suffer themselves to be delayed in the camp, but to push with all possible expedition to the great ford near the north-east angle of the fort. Each captain was held responsible for his own company, as success was more dependent upon the celerity than the solidity of the movement. The second, or central subdivision, after clearing the right of the camp, was to follow into

the island. The third, in the rear, formed a reserve under Lord Cornwallis, who took up a position where he might support the other parts of the column, and wait the co-operation of the right and left divisions under General Meadows and Colonel Maxwell.

The front subdivision, having forced the bound hedge under a heavy but ill-directed fire of cannon and musketry, advanced steadily, the enemy receding before them. The leading companies pushed for the river, passing the sultan's tent, which appeared to have been abandoned with much precipitation. The advanced companies, partly from the badness of the ground, partly from the nature of the duty which they had to execute, were soon separated into two bodies. The first that reached the river crossed under the very walls of the fort without opposition; and "had it not been found," says Major Dirom, "that the east gate of Seringapatam was shut and the bridge drawn up, that night might have put an end to the war; as Captain Lindsay pushed into the sortie (the entrance which leads through the glacis into the fort), in hope of entering the gates with the fugitives." This party proceeded along the glacis through an extensive bazaar, destroying numbers of the enemy, and dispersing several bodies of horse; they then took post, part at a bridge over a canal running nearly across the island, part at a redoubt commanding the southern ford.

The second body crossed by the same ford which their companions had passed a few minutes before. Their passage was considerably impeded by the rush of the enemy towards the island, but no attempt was made at resistance. On reaching the opposite bank they turned to the left, and advanced for about a mile to the western gate of the pettah. It was shut, but was soon forced open; the troops stationed for its defence having, on the first alarm, rushed out to man the lines and batteries on the river. The firing from these lines and batteries informed the British party that the right of the enemy's camp had been penetrated, and it was concluded that the assailants were probably attempting to force their passage into the island. Three parties were detached to aid the operation, by taking the batteries in reverse, while Colonel Knox, who commanded this portion of the advanced companies, having taken possession of the street which led to the batteries, remained at the gateway with about thirty men, either to support any of the parties who might receive a check, or to resist any attempt by the enemy to recover possession of the pettah. But the enemy were too much confounded even to maintain what was still in their possession. The lines and batteries, which were all open to the rear, were abandoned, and those by whom they should have been defended dispersed in confusion. From one of the terrified fugitives who was made prisoner, Colonel Knox received information that some Europeans were confined in a house at no great

distance; and to this circumstance twenty-seven miserable, half-starved men, some of whom had passed years of captivity in heavy irons, owed their release.

Seven battalions of Europeans and three of sepoys passed the river at a period subsequent to the passage of the two parties whose course has been detailed, and by another ford, which brought them to the sultan's garden; they forced the gate, and entered. Captain Hunter, who commanded this party, was not aware that any other troops had passed into the island; he therefore took post, resolved to wait for intelligence or orders to direct his movements. He remained for two hours without learning anything. The dawn of morning was not far distant, and after daylight he knew that his post would not be tenable; he perceived, also, a body of the enemy on the opposite bank, with two field-pieces, which he apprehended they intended to open on his party. This decided his course; and quitting the garden, he rushed with his men into the river, which he passed under a heavy fire, attacked the party with the guns before they had time to unlimber them, and thence made his way through the camp to the reserve under Lord Cornwallis.

The second subdivision of the central column passed to the left, as intended, for the purpose of breaking the right wing of the enemy's army. On approaching the sultan's redoubt, its progress was opposed by a large body of horse. They were received by a volley, delivered with great steadiness and precision; and when the smoke cleared away, the horse were seen at a distance scattered over the field. The sultan's redoubt was found abandoned; and this being occupied by a party detached for the purpose, the remainder moved on to co-operate with the column under Colonel Maxwell.

The rear division of the central column, which was under the immediate command of Lord Cornwallis, was formed near the sultan's redoubt, and there it waited in anxious expectation of being joined by General Meadows. He came not; but, at a moment when a reinforcement was most desirable, the troops under Captain Hunter, who had just recrossed the river from the sultan's garden, made their appearance. They had scarcely time to replace their ammunition (their cartridges having been damaged by the water) before a large body of troops, forming part of Tippoo's centre and left, having recovered from their panic, advanced to attack the force under Lord Cornwallis. The attack was vigorously made and bravely resisted. The fire of the enemy was well returned, and on a nearer approach, they were met and driven back by the bayonet. Their numbers, however, were overwhelming; and, in the confidence that from this cause victory must finally be theirs, they repeatedly renewed the attack, and were as often repulsed. The danger to which the small force with the governor-general was exposed in-

creased his anxiety for the arrival of the aid which he had so long expected; and he is reported to have said, "If General Meadows be above ground, this will bring him." General Meadows was above ground, but he did not arrive in time to render any service to the commander-in-chief. The repetition of the enemy's attacks continued for nearly two hours, when they finally withdrew. To secure his troops from being surrounded, Lord Cornwallis then moved to the Carigaut Hill, at the foot of which he was met by the division of General Meadows.

The progress of the left column remains to be noticed. After gaining the Carigaut Hill, and occupying the works upon it, this column continued its course towards the enemy's camp, under a galling fire from a party sheltered by a tank. Passing through the camp, it was met by the central portion of Lord Cornwallis's division, under Colonel Stuart. It was now desired to find a convenient spot to pass the river. A small party crossed at a point where the water reached to the necks of the men, and where they were exposed to a heavy fire from the lines and batteries on the island. Their ammunition was unavoidably damped in the passage, and when they gained the opposite bank they were without a single cartridge fit for use. Happily they were not in immediate necessity, for at this moment the enemy were driven from the lines and batteries by the parties despatched by Captain Knox from the pettah. A more practicable part of the river having been discovered, the remainder of the column passed over, and a junction was effected with the detached companies from Lord Cornwallis's division which had crossed at an earlier period. The morning of the 7th of February thus found within the pettah of Seringapatam the left column and part of the central column of the British force, which had moved on the preceding night; the right column, and the remainder of the centre, being on the Carigaut Hill.

It is natural to inquire, where was the sultan while his camp was traversed by a hostile force? He had just finished his evening meal when the alarm reached him: he hastily rose and mounted, but waited the arrival of accurate intelligence as to the nature of the attack, before taking any measures to repel it.

The first precise information was received from a mass of fugitives, who, rushing from the bayonets of the English, announced to the astonished sultan that his centre had been penetrated. The terror of the informants but too well attested the truth of their report; of which, moreover, the sultan was soon assured by the evidence of his own senses. In the pale moonlight he perceived a lengthened column of the English army passing through the heart of his camp, and making their way to the main ford, the possession of which would cut off his retreat. There was not a moment to be lost; and Tippoo, departing with all

practicable speed, had just time to clear the head of the English column, many of his attendants being killed by the advanced company. Tippoo gained the ford, passed it, and making directly for the east gate of the city, was once more in safety within the walls of his capital. It will be recollected that Captain Lindsay made a push to enter this gate, but found it shut. When Captain Lindsay appeared before the gate, only a few minutes could have elapsed from the entrance of the sultan.

Next in importance to the danger to which he was personally exposed, Tippoo, in all probability, estimated that in which a large amount of treasure was placed. The 6th of February was the day for issuing pay to the troops. The required amount had been counted out to each buckshee, or paymaster, but the issue to the men was not to take place till the following day; and in the mean time the respective sums remained in the custody of the treasurer, in bags bearing his own seal and that of the buckshee to whom they belonged. On the first alarm of an attack, the treasurer began to load his charge upon camels with all possible despatch. Musket-balls soon began to pass around him, and by one of them he was severely wounded. He continued, however, to proceed with his work, and completed it. The camels were loaded, and driven across the ford, intermingled with the British troops and the flying servants of Tippoo. They reached the bank in safety; and the undaunted treasurer, conducting his caravan for a considerable distance along the glacis, entered the city by the Mysore gate, and had the satisfaction of depositing his charge in security, without the loss of a single rupee.

The spirit of this courageous and persevering man was not shared by all the followers of the sultan. As is usual when misfortune overtakes an eastern army, a great number of the troops deserted. They passed away in crowds, and the reports of the morning after the attack presented a total of twenty-three thousand killed, wounded, and missing—the last class contributing in by far the largest proportion to swell the amount. The treasurer, who had so perseveringly protected his master's chest, recommended the proclamation of a further issue of pay, as a probable mode of bringing the fugitives back. The suggestion showed a perfect acquaintance with the character of his countrymen, but the plan was not successful. Fear was more powerful than cupidity, and very few of the wanderers returned. While the native followers of Tippoo were thus deserting him by multitudes, a number of Europeans, principally Frenchmen, who had long served him and his father, took the opportunity of quitting a service of which they were weary. Among them was a man named Blévette, whose departure was a serious loss to the sultan, as he possessed considerable skill in fortification, and had actually constructed the redoubts the credit of which was claimed and enjoyed by Tippoo.

Discouraging as were the circumstances under which Tippoo had to renew the contest, he could not decline it. As the day advanced, the guns of the fort opened on such of the British troops as were within their range, and portions of the scattered remains of the enemy's force began to reassemble. Colonel Stuart, who, as the senior officer, had assumed the command of all the British troops on the island, had taken advantage of the daylight to remove to a position better adapted than that which he had occupied during the night, for keeping up a communication with the force which remained with Lord Cornwallis. He had scarcely effected this change, when his men were fired upon by a body of the enemy's infantry, which had advanced under cover of some old houses and walls. The British troops were in a considerable degree sheltered, but part of their ammunition having been damaged in passing the river, and much of the remainder expended during the night, they returned the fire but faintly, till the arrival of a supply of ammunition and a reinforcement of men, which Lord Cornwallis despatched to their assistance. The enemy then drew off.

This attack was no sooner repulsed than the attention of the English on the island was directed to the sultan's redoubt, which the enemy were now making the most determined efforts to regain. The party within it consisted of somewhat less than a hundred Europeans and about fifty sepoy, commanded by Captain Sibald, of the 71st regiment. In defence of the redoubt, the first object was to shut up the gorge, which was open towards the fort. An attempt to effect this was made by throwing across some broken litters and the carriage of a gun. This being perceived from the fort, three guns immediately opened from thence upon the gorge, and two field-pieces were sent to some adjacent rocks, the fire of which was directed to the same point. By these means the inefficient barrier was soon shattered into splinters, and considerable injury done to the works. The gorge being clear, the enemy, about ten o'clock, advanced to assault. They were beaten back, but with considerable loss; and soon after they had retired, a cannon-shot deprived the party in the redoubt of their commander, Captain Sibald. Major Skelly, one of Lord Cornwallis's aides-de-camp, who had been despatched to this spot on some special duty, now took the command, but found the probability of protracting the defence greatly diminished by the prospect of an approaching want of ammunition. While meditating the best means of husbanding the small stock that remained, Major Skelly was informed that two loaded bullocks had wandered into the ditch, and that it was supposed they were part of those which had been appointed for the carriage of spare ammunition. The conjecture was right. The animals were soon released of their lading; and these stray bullocks, with their unsightly burdens, "were," says Major Dirom, "more precious

to the major and his party at this juncture, than if they had been loaded with the richest jewels in Tippoo's treasury."

Scarcely had the men filled their cartridge-boxes from this unlooked-for supply, when a fresh attempt was made on the redoubt. The sultan had been greatly disappointed by the ill success of the former attack, and had passionately demanded if he had no faithful servants to retrieve his honour. There was little alacrity in responding to the sultan's call; but, after some hesitation, a body of cavalry was found to volunteer their services in fulfilment of the wishes of their prince. About one o'clock they advanced towards the redoubt in compact order, two thousand strong. At first it appeared as though they intended to charge at once into the gorge; but they suddenly stopped, just beyond musket-shot, and four hundred of them dismounting, rushed impetuously forward, to force the entrance with their sabres. The gorge had been necessarily kept clear during the continuance of the cannonade; but when it ceased, by reason of the approach of the assailants, the garrison formed across the opening, while the portion of the parapet which bore on the enemy was also fully manned. Their fire was coolly reserved till it could be given with effect, and by the first discharge the leading part of the column was completely brought down. Recovering from the momentary hesitation caused by the fall of their comrades, those behind again began to advance; but the steady and rapid fire of the garrison threw them into confusion, and, regardless of the sultan's appeal and their answer to it, they fled to their horses and soon disappeared, their retreat being covered by the firing from the fort and the rocks.

After the repose of an hour the garrison were threatened by another attack. It was led by the sultan's European corps, commanded by M. Vigie. This corps had been engaged in part of the operations of the preceding night, and being brought into a situation of some danger, it broke, and officers and men alike sought safety in disorderly flight. Their object was facilitated by the uniform of the corps being red; and M. Vigie himself rode quietly through one of the British columns, no one interrupting him, in consequence of his being mistaken for a British officer. The behaviour of this corps at the redoubt did not tend to obliterate the disgrace of their previous flight. The garrison were prepared for a conflict far more severe than those which they had already sustained; but the expectations founded on the supposed superiority of this corps to the native troops were not realized. M. Vigie and his men advanced but a little way from the rocks, when two or three of the foremost falling, the rest came to a stand, fell into great disorder, and went off.

No further attempt was made on the redoubt; and never was relief more welcome than that afforded to the garrison by the

cessation of the enemy's attacks. The day had been oppressively sultry, and within the narrow limits which bounded the efforts of the garrison two officers and nineteen privates lay dead; while three officers and twenty-two privates, miserably wounded, were passionately imploring water, which their companions had not to bestow, there not being within the place a single drop. Thus, surrounded within by death and suffering, exposed without to the attacks of a vast army supported by the guns of a well-appointed fort, did this gallant band maintain, not their post only, but their own honour and that of the country which they served. Great were their labours and their difficulties, but brilliant and unfading is the glory by which they were compensated.

So long as the enemy's attention had been directed to the redoubt, no attempt had been made upon any other of the British posts. But about five o'clock two heavy columns entered the pettah, and driving before them some followers of the British camp who had dispersed in search of plunder, advanced in the direction of the lines of Colonel Stuart, throwing rockets as they proceeded. A detachment being sent to meet them, they retired for a short distance; but their numbers were greater than had been anticipated, and the officer commanding the British detachment applied for further assistance. A reinforcement being obtained, the work of clearing the pettah of the presence of the enemy was not of long duration. They were rapidly driven from street to street, and finally forced to retire altogether. A prisoner taken in the course of the conflict, reported that Tippoo had convened his principal officers, and exhorted them to make a bold effort to drive the English from the island, and recover the tomb of Hyder Ali; that the chiefs had thereupon placed their turbans on the ground, and sworn to succeed or perish in the attempt. The attack, the prisoner added, was to be made that night, and the march of the assailants was to be directed along the bank of the northern branch of the river to turn the right flank of the British line, and to cut off the communication with the camp. The account was so circumstantial that it appeared deserving of credit—at least, it would have been imprudent to disregard it. Arrangements were accordingly made for effectually repelling an attack, should any be made. The force in possession of the pettah was strengthened by the addition of four field-pieces to their means of defence, and the troops lay on their arms throughout the night. It passed, however, without alarm; and the morning showed the whole of the redoubts north of the river abandoned. The English camp was thereupon advanced as near to the bound hedge as was practicable, pickets were sent into the deserted redoubts, and a chain of posts completed along the north and east faces of the fort, converting the enemy's fortified camp and works into lines of countervallation for

the attack of his capital. "The proud city of Seringapatam," says Major Dirom, "which we could scarcely discern from our first ground, was now in forty-eight hours strongly and closely invested on its two principal sides; the enemy's army broken and dispirited; ours in perfect order, and highly animated by their success."

Preparations for a siege were commenced without delay. A little to the eastward of the pettah was a garden of great extent, containing the tomb of Hyder Ali and a new palace erected by Tippoo. It was filled with magnificent trees, now destined to fall beneath the axes of the English pioneers, and to be employed in operations directed against the last retreat of the man to whom their spreading branches had formerly afforded shade, and their fruits refreshment. Throughout the 8th of February, while the English were actively engaged in preparing for the meditated blow against the citadel, Tippoo showed no symptom of energy, beyond wasting a large quantity of ammunition in a fruitless cannonade directed to the island, to the redoubts, to every scattered English party, and sometimes to their headquarters; but the distance on all sides was considerable; and the pleasure of maintaining a continuous noise, and darkening the atmosphere by masses of smoke, was the only advantage derived from the exercise. In the evening he resolved to renew his attempt at negotiation. No intercourse of a pacific character had taken place for more than a month, and to the last overture from the enemy Lord Cornwallis had indignantly answered, that when the prisoners taken at Coimbatore, and unjustly detained in breach of the capitulation, should be sent back, he would, in concert with the allies, make arrangements for the commencement of negotiation. Two of these prisoners Tippoo now determined to employ as instruments of a new appeal to the governor-general. Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash were unexpectedly summoned to an audience of the sultan, and on their attendance were informed that they were about to be released. After communicating this welcome intelligence, Tippoo inquired if the former officer were not related to Lord Cornwallis. Receiving an answer in the negative, he then asked if he were not an officer of high rank. Lieutenant Chalmers having disclaimed this supposed ground of influence with the British commander-in-chief, Tippoo next inquired whether the emancipated prisoner, on his return, would have any personal intercourse with the governor-general; and having learned that he expected to be admitted to an interview, the sultan requested that he would take charge of letters making overtures of peace, and lend his aid towards attaining the object. The charge was accompanied by a present to the officer receiving it of two shawls and five hundred rupees, and a promise that the baggage of both himself and his companion should be sent after them. Lieutenant Chalmers undertook to gratify the sultan's

wishes by the delivery of the letters; but at the same time warned him, that beyond this it might not be in his power to promote his views.

In the communication thus transmitted, Tippoo, with his habitual disregard of truth, asserted that the terms of the capitulation at Coimbatore had been misrepresented—that Kummer-oo-Deen did not engage positively for the liberty of the garrison, but only promised to recommend it. The counterpart of the articles of capitulation, signed and sealed by Kummer-oo-Deen, had been retained by Lieutenant Chalmers; and had he been able to produce this with the letters of which he was the bearer, the veracity of Tippoo would have required no further illustration. But the sultan was too tender of his reputation to expose it to such hazard; and before the English officer was permitted to depart, he was forcibly dispossessed of the document which would have furnished so unseasonable a commentary on the letters. Lieutenant Chalmers, however, was able to speak to its contents, and to the manner in which it had passed out of his keeping; but notwithstanding this—notwithstanding that the demand for the surrender of the prisoners taken at Coimbatore had been but partially complied with, Lord Cornwallis, with that degree of moderation which verges on weakness, if it do not actually pass the line of separation, yielded to the sultan's request, and consented to admit his vakeels to confer with those of the allied army.

Coincident with the pacific mission to the English camp of Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, Tippoo was preparing another of a very different character. His object was the death of the English commander-in-chief; and on an expedition directed to this purpose, a select body of horse moved on the same day on which the two British officers were released, and crossed the river at Arikery. The movement was observed, but no particular importance was attached to it. The following day was employed by the detached party of the enemy in collecting information. On the third day their advanced guard interposed itself between the camp of Nizam Ali and that of the English, not unobserved, but without exciting suspicion, the intruders being mistaken for a party of Nizam Ali's horse. So similar were they to that body in appearance, that they were allowed, without interruption, to advance to the British park of artillery. Arrived there, they carelessly asked of some natives in attendance on the guns, which was the tent of the burra Sahib—the principal commander. Even yet no suspicion was excited, but the question was misapprehended. The inquiry was supposed to apply to the tent of Colonel Duff, the commandant of the artillery, which was, without hesitation, pointed out. The horsemen then suddenly drew their swords and galloped towards the tent which they supposed to be that of Lord Cornwallis, cutting down the few

persons whom they met on their way; but before they reached the tent towards which they were furiously riding, their ardour received a check. On the alarm of their approach, a small body of sepoy's turned out, whose fire soon changed the course of the horsemen, and sent them towards the hills in flight, at the same headlong speed with which they were previously rushing to the tent of Colonel Duff. Although, from the mistake that had occurred, Lord Cornwallis had been in no danger, this attempt was justly thought to call for some additional precautions for securing the safety of his person.

While the army of Lord Cornwallis was engaged in preparing for the siege of Seringapatam, it was joined by that of General Abercromby. That officer, on the former retreat of the governor-general from before Tippoo's capital, had, in conformity with his orders, withdrawn his army to Malabar. He had himself proceeded to Bombay, where his duties as governor required his presence; but returning to Tellicherry after a short absence, with a new battering train, a supply of ammunition and stores, and a body of recruits, the army of Bombay thereupon quitted its cantonments and reassembled at Cananore. Its subsequent march lying through a mountainous country, the transport of the artillery stores was attended with great difficulty; but it had been surmounted, when, late in January, General Abercromby received orders from Lord Cornwallis to leave his battering train and advance with his field artillery only. The heavy guns and stores were accordingly sent back to the top of a ghaut which the army had just descended, and there placed in batteries erected for the defence of the pass. On February 11th General Abercromby crossed the Cauvery about thirty miles above Seringapatam, and after meeting with some annoyance from the enemy's cavalry, who took part of his baggage, joined Lord Cornwallis on the 16th.

The vakeels of Tippoo had arrived, in accordance with the permission given by Lord Cornwallis, and the process of negotiation was carried on simultaneously with the most vigorous preparation on one side for the prosecution of the siege—on the other, for the defence of Seringapatam. The fort was of a triangular figure, covered by branches of the river on its two largest sides. The third side, which was towards the island, was covered by strong outworks. Two broad and massy ramparts, the second at a considerable distance within the first, and both having good flank defences, a deep ditch with drawbridges, and various advantages derived from the skill of Tippoo's European servants in the modern principles of fortification, enhanced the difficulty of approach on this side. Notwithstanding these circumstances, it was, in the first instance, selected as the point for the main attack, and the ground of the choice appears to have been an expectation that, as there were no impediments but those of art to encounter, the superiority

of the British troops and artillery would secure success. More careful observation led to the adoption of a different plan, the change being accelerated by intelligence and suggestions from Tippoo's European servants—who were now quite as ready to exercise their skill and knowledge for his destruction as they had previously been assiduous in using them for his defence—and it was resolved to make the principal attack across the river against the north side of the fort. The curtain there was perceptibly weak, and by extending close to the bank of the river, left no room for out-works. The flank defences were few, and of little value—the ditch excavated from the rock was stated to be inconsiderable, and was moreover dry. The stone glacis built into the river was in two places imperfect. The walls, it was concluded, might be trenched to the foundations, and the probable effect would be the filling up the greater part of the ditch. The main objection was the intervention of the river; but this was not thought sufficient to counterbalance the advantages of the plan.

The works constructed by the English advanced with great rapidity and great secrecy. When their design became fully visible, Tippoo, despairing of success in the endeavour to repel the invaders by the fire of the fort, attempted to distress them by turning the water from a large canal by which the English camp was principally supplied. The attempt was discovered in time to prevent its completion, and the small damage which had been done to the bank of the canal was speedily repaired. On the 22nd of February, General Abercromby advanced his posts for the purpose of aiding in the operations of the siege. On the same day Tippoo made a new effort to drive the English posts to a greater distance from his capital, but was defeated. Through two succeeding days the besiegers steadily proceeded with their preparations; in four days more it was expected that two breaching batteries, one of twenty, the other of twelve guns, would be ready to open, together with an enfilading battery of at least ten pieces. These were to be assisted by a cross fire from the island, but more especially from the redoubt formerly called the Sultan's, but which had most properly received from the English the name of Sibald's redoubt, in honour of the brave officer who fell while commanding the gallant band who so nobly defended it. Colonel Duff had his park fully provided and arranged. Even furnaces had been prepared for heating shot, and from the combustible nature of the materials of which many of the buildings within the fort were composed, it was anticipated that the fire of the batteries would not long be opened before the place against which it was directed would be wrapped in flames. To add to the embarrassments of the enemy, Purseram Bhow, with the Mahratta army and Captain Little's brigade of English sepoy, was now approaching, as was Major Cuppage, with a

force from Coimbatore. While the allied armies were thus concentrating their force around Tippoo's capital, they were exempted from the difficulty which had formerly driven Lord Cornwallis from before Seringapatam when victory seemed to be within his reach: the supply of provisions was abundant. Such was the condition of the armies of the allies—numerous, well appointed and well supplied; the thunder of their cannon was about to be poured upon a fort, the last hope of the enemy, within which sat the prince whose aggressions had brought to his gates as a foe the head of the English government of India, bound by the most imperative instructions to preserve peace if practicable, and disposed by his own wishes to maintain the same course. On the head of the man who had so wantonly protracted the calamities of war was the storm now approaching about to burst. The English army almost looked upon themselves as in possession of Seringapatam, when, on the 24th of February, orders were sent to the trenches that the working should be discontinued, and all hostile demonstrations cease. The orders were received with that feeling which accompanies the hearing of any sudden and inexplicable communication. It was at first supposed that there must have been some mistake—but it was soon ascertained that this belief had no foundation. The orders became intelligible when it was known that, after several days' conference between the agents of the respective governments, those of the allies had delivered their ultimatum—that the conditions therein laid down had been assented to by the sultan, and the preliminaries signed. The discussion had been brought to a conclusion on the 22nd, and the demands of the allies forthwith submitted to Tippoo. They were embodied in five articles to the following effect:—First, that one-half of the dominions of which Tippoo was in possession before the war should be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent to theirs; secondly, that Tippoo should pay three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, one-half immediately, and the remainder by three instalments, at intervals not exceeding four months each. Six crores had been originally demanded; but the sultan's vakeels denied the ability of their master to pay more than the sum finally agreed upon, and offered to confirm their denial by the solemnity of an oath. After the tender of such a proof of their veracity, who could disbelieve them? Lord Cornwallis, it would seem, did not. The third article stipulated that all prisoners taken by the four powers—the English, the Nizam, the Mahrattas, and Tippoo—from the time of Hyder Ali, should be restored; the fourth, that two of Tippoo's sons should be given as hostages for the due performance of the treaty; and the fifth provided that when the hostages should arrive in the camp with the articles of the treaty, under the seal of the sultan, a counterpart should be sent from the three powers, hostilities should entirely cease,

and the terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual friendship should be agreed upon.

On reading these articles, Tippoo assembled his principal officers in the great mosque, and having laid before them the Koran, adjured them by its contents to answer sincerely the question he was about to propose to them. Having read the articles, he said, "You have heard the conditions of peace—you have now to hear and answer my question. Shall it be peace or war?" The assemblage thus appealed to were loud and unanimous in professions of devotion to their sovereign, and of their readiness to lay down their lives in defence of his person and capital; but they were equally unanimous in declaring—softening, however, the repulsive truth so as to render it not quite unfit to reach the ears of an Oriental despot, but still without disguising it—that the troops were altogether dispirited, and that no confidence could be placed in them. The reed to which the fast-sinking hopes of Tippoo clung was now broken. The men who never before had ventured to intrude upon the royal ear any unwelcome sound, now dared to speak that which was true in preference to that which was agreeable. The extremity of danger had made them sincere, and for once their master had received counsel that was above suspicion. He felt that it could not be disregarded. The articles were signed and despatched to Lord Cornwallis, but indulgence was solicited with regard to that which stipulated for the transmission of the preliminaries by the youths who were to be detained as hostages. They were not thus transmitted; a short delay was asked to allow of due preparation for the departure of the princes, and the governor-general, with a very laudable feeling, granted it.

The liberality of Lord Cornwallis was not met with any indication of a similar nature on the part of the enemy. Even the stipulation for the immediate cessation of hostilities, to which the sultan's seal had been affixed, was disregarded. Immediately on receiving the preliminaries, Lord Cornwallis had issued those orders for the cessation of all warlike operations which excited in his army so much surprise, not unaccompanied by something of despondency and something of indignation. It was not without difficulty that the men could be restrained from proceeding with the works which they had anticipated were to put them in possession of Seringapatam, and enable them to effect the triumphant deliverance of those victims of Tippoo's tyranny and perfidy who still remained within his power. But discipline prevailed—the wishes of the army yielded to the demands of duty, and all offensive operations ceased. Not such was the conduct of Tippoo and his garrison. For several hours the fire of cannon from the fort, and of musketry from the advanced parties of the enemy, was kept up more vigorously than before; a British officer and several men were wounded in consequence of this audacious contempt of an engagement so recently con-

cluded. Most just would the retribution have been, had the governor-general revoked his former orders, recommenced the construction of his abandoned works, and prosecuted the siege to the point when the possession of Tippoo's capital should have been decided by the comparative valour or the comparative numbers of those who assailed and those who defended it. Lord Cornwallis, however, contented himself with a series of messages, the earlier of which produced no effect. It may be doubted whether the latter were more efficacious than those which preceded them, or whether the discontinuance of the firing is not attributable to the influence of that caprice to which Tippoo was accustomed to surrender himself; but from some cause the firing came to an end, and the irritation which it occasioned in the minds of the British troops, who found themselves placed on unequal terms with the enemy, subsided. On this instance of the sultan's folly and perfidy the observations of Major Dirom, deserve notice, from their justness and force. "This extraordinary conduct in the enemy," says he, "was supposed in camp to arise from a mistake in the vakeels not having acquainted their master that hostilities must cease; but the sultan could not be ignorant of the articles he had signed and sealed the preceding night; nor was this any great testimony of the sincerity of his wishes to terminate the war. Indeed, his conduct could bear no other construction than an insolent and revengeful bravado, to fire upon us when he could with impunity, and to impose upon the ignorant part of his own subjects, and our allies, and leave their minds impressed with an idea that his superior fire (for we had opened no guns upon the fort) and his resolute defence had been the means of his obtaining peace."

On the 26th of February, the fourth article of the preliminaries was carried into effect by the departure of the hostage princes from Seringapatam to the British camp. The elder of the princes was about ten years of age; his brother two years younger. Each was mounted on an elephant richly caparisoned, and their dresses glittered with numerous and valuable jewels. They were attended by the Mysorean vakeels who had conducted the negotiation; several messengers mounted on camels, and seven standard-bearers, carrying small green flags suspended from rockets, preceded the princes; a hundred pikemen, with spears inlaid with silver immediately followed them; and a guard of two hundred sepoy with a party of horse brought up the rear. Great crowds were collected to witness the scene, whether actuated by the desire of beholding an imposing spectacle, or by some higher motive. The sultan himself was on the rampart above the gateway through which his sons passed. They departed under a salute from the fort; and as they approached the British camp, twenty-one discharges from its park of artillery greeted their coming, while the part of the British

line which they passed was turned out to receive them. On arriving at the tents prepared for their reception, they were met by the governor-general's agent, Sir John Kenaway, and the vakeels of the nizam and the Mahratta state. The governor-general had proposed to meet them here; but at the express desire of Tippoo this mark of attention was omitted, and it was arranged that they should proceed to the British head-quarters. The procession accordingly advanced, with the addition which it had received from the accession of the diplomatic agents of the allies and their attendants, and was met by Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by his staff and some of the chief officers of the army, at the door of his lordship's principal tent. On the princes alighting, the governor-general embraced them; and then extending to each one of his hands, led them into the tent and seated them by his side. The duty of Tippoo's head vakeel, who had been placed in charge of the boys, was now at an end; and he signalized its conclusion by a graceful appeal to the feelings of Lord Cornwallis. "These children," said he, "were this morning the sons of the sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your lordship as their father." The governor-general made an appropriate reply, assuring the vakeel, and the princes themselves, that all possible care would be taken for the protection of their persons, and the promotion of their happiness. The promise was religiously fulfilled; and the transfer of the paternal character announced by the vakeel, "ceased," says Colonel Wilks, "to be an Oriental image, if determined by the test of paternal attentions." A strong interest for the captive youths was indeed prevalent throughout the British army; a feeling which, with regard to the younger, was increased by the affecting circumstance of his mother having recently died from fright, occasioned by the attack on Tippoo's lines. So fully was the sultan contented with the reception of his sons, that he ordered a royal salute to be fired in testimony of his satisfaction.

In partial payment of the sum stipulated by the preliminaries, a crore of rupees was forwarded by Tippoo to the British camp. The vakeels continued to meet for the arrangement of the definitive treaty; but their progress was embarrassed by the usual arts of Indian negotiators. The cessions to be made by Tippoo were to be determined with reference to revenue; but the sultan's vakeels pretended that the revenue accounts of many districts were lost, and proposed to supply their place by statements which, as might be expected, invariably over-rated the resources of the provinces to be surrendered, and underrated those which were to be retained by their master. The vakeels of the nizam and the Mahrattas produced counter-statements, which in all probability were not less unfairly exaggerated or diminished than were those of

Tippoo. This was not the only source of difference. The value of the sultan's coins was fixed by public regulation; and it was not unreasonable to expect that, in the payments to be made by that prince to the confederates, this valuation should be followed. Tippoo's vakeels, however, affirmed that it was applicable only to the receipt of money into the treasury; and that when issued from thence, it was always at a rate much more favourable to the sovereign. This was probably true; but the allies were not readily to be persuaded to receive payment at the rate at which the sultan had been accustomed to liquidate the debts due from him to his subjects. A middle course was at length adopted: the vakeels of the allies agreed to divide the difference in their respective modes of estimating the value of the coins, and thus to allow to the sultan one-half the advantage which he obtained in dealing with those who could not resist him. A similar compromise was effected with regard to the estimated value of the different provinces constituting his dominions, and the labours of the negotiators seemed in a fair way of coming to a speedy conclusion.

But a new difficulty arose. Among the cessions demanded on behalf of the allies was Coorg, a mountainous country of considerable extent, but yielding only a very moderate tribute. The people of Coorg were Hindoos, and in their habits not very dissimilar from the Nairs of Malabar. They were warlike, and averse to foreign dominion. They had, however, been subdued by Hyder Ali; and though frequent insurrections had taken place, they were speedily suppressed, and the country continued to be an appendage to the throne of Mysore. The rajah, when a youth, had been imprisoned by Tippoo; but, effecting his escape, he succeeded in collecting round him a band of followers, by whose assistance he was enabled to assert his authority, and gradually to dispossess the foreign population which, in conformity with a frequent practice of the house of Hyder Ali, had been settled in the country. Not satisfied with this measure of success, he retaliated on his enemy by levying contributions on the territory adjoining his own frontier, and by these predatory excursions he retrieved the resources of a country exhausted by the oppression of foreign conquerors. On the commencement of hostilities between the English and Tippoo, he gave passage to the army of General Abercromby through his dominions, and greatly facilitated their operations by the supply of provisions, the communication of intelligence, and the extension of every species of aid which he could command. He had, therefore, a strong claim to the protection of the British government, which could only effectively be exerted by the transfer of his tributary dependence from Tippoo to the power whose interests the Coorg Rajah had so zealously promoted. Were he given up to the discretion of the Sultan of Mysore, no question could exist as

to the use which would be made of the liberty. The honour of the British government seemed, therefore, involved in the assertion of the demand for the transfer of Coorg; but, on the other hand, as that country was not properly adjacent to the territories of any of the allied powers, the demand was not in strict accordance with the terms of the preliminaries.

The rage of Tippoo, on learning the demand made on behalf of the English, was unbounded. "To which of the English possessions," he asked, "is Coorg adjacent? Why do they not ask for the key of Seringapatam?" To these passionate inquiries he added a declaration, that his enemies knew that he would sooner have died in the breach than consent to the cession, and that they dared not bring it forward till they had treacherously obtained possession of his children and treasure. It is certain that the possession of Coorg was most important to the English, as enabling them to hold Tippoo in check. For this reason, as well as in regard to the just claims of the rajah upon their protection, it is deeply to be lamented that the preliminaries were not so framed as to allow of the demand for its surrender without giving the sultan even a colourable pretence for complaining of bad faith. The importance of Coorg, and the services of the rajah, could scarcely have been overlooked when the preliminaries were drawn. If such were the fact, the case was one of most reprehensible negligence. But the more probable opinion seems to be, that, from the weak anxiety of the governor-general for peace, it was judged expedient to frame the preliminaries in such a manner as to keep out of sight any point likely to be peculiarly startling or disagreeable to the sultan's feelings. The result was, that the English were ultimately compelled either to assert a claim in which their right was, to say the least, suspicious, or to abandon a meritorious supporter to the mercy of the tyrant of Mysore.

In this choice of evils, the governor-general made his election in favour of that which perhaps was, on the whole, the less. He refused to recede from the demand, ordered some guns which had been sent away, to be brought back to the island and redoubts, and preparations recommenced for prosecuting the siege. Tippoo, with equal vigour, began to prepare for defence. Indeed, he had scarcely, if at all, discontinued the work. For some time after the cessation of all active labours on the part of the English, the stir of preparation was observable within the fort. This, being contrary to the rules of an armistice and the custom of war, no less than to the conduct of the besiegers, was made the subject of remonstrance. Tippoo, in a tone of insolence thinly disguised under an appearance of extreme humility, answered, that Lord Cornwallis must have been misinformed; but for his lordship's satisfaction, if he desired, one of the bastions should be thrown down, that he might see into the fort. The unexpected

demand of the Coorg country furnished the sultan with a sufficient excuse for pursuing his operations without disguise, and he lost no time in availing himself of the opportunity.

The ability of the English to carry on the siege was greatly impaired by the delay which had taken place. The greater part of the materials collected for the purpose had become unfit for use, and fresh supplies could be obtained only from a considerable distance, and with considerable labour. The trenches had suffered much injury, and required repair—and worse than all, the army, especially the European part of it, by confinement to a fixed spot, in an unhealthy situation, during the most unhealthy season, had become greatly enfeebled by the encroachments of disease. So rapidly was sickness extending, that there was some reason to fear that by the time the necessary preparations for assault were completed, the requisite number of men for making the attempt, with a fair probability of success, would not remain effective. In other quarters there was ground for apprehension. Differences existed between the nizam and the Mahratta allies of the British, and but little reliance could be placed on the fidelity of either, while Scindia was in motion with views believed to be not friendly to British interests. Thus circumstanced, every hour of delay diminished the strength of the British army and increased its danger, while it enabled Tippoo to add something to the difficulties with which it had to contend. To gain time by protracted negotiation was obviously the interest of the enemy, while to the English it was important to bring the point in dispute at once to a close. With a view to expediting such a result, on the return of the vakeels with the report of Tippoo's refusal to assent to the surrender of Coorg, the two hostage princes were apprized that they must prepare to move the next morning towards Coromandel, and their Mysorean guards were disarmed and placed under restraint. The youths, who were much affected by the intimation, were, in accordance with it, conducted to the rear of the army, but were there permitted to halt and await the result of a further attempt on the part of Tippoo's vakeels to induce their master, as they said, "to hear reason." These officers were desired to intimate that unless the signature of the sultan were affixed without delay to a definitive treaty, based on the arrangements concluded between them and the vakeels of the allies, hostilities would be immediately resumed. Purnearam Bhow had now arrived, and, according to Mahratta custom, felt little disposition to respect any suspension of arms which interfered with the acquisition of plunder. His horsemen set vigorously to work, and carried off a number of camels and cattle belonging to the enemy. Against this breach of the armistice Tippoo remonstrated, but it perhaps had some effect in influencing his final deter-

mination. After various excuses, the vakeels, on the 18th of March, once more appeared with the treaty duly ratified in triplicate, and on the following day it was formally presented to Lord Cornwallis by the captive sons of the sultan.

The effect of this treaty was to bring the frontiers of the Mahrattas to the river Toombuddra, which was their boundary about thirteen years before; to restore to Nizam Ali his territories north of that river, and the possession of Kurpa on its south; while the English obtained Malabar, Coorg, Dindigul, and Baramahal, all of them cessions of considerable importance in adding to the strength and compactness of the Company's territories.

In judging of the proceedings of Lord Cornwallis, due allowance should undoubtedly be made for the influence of the delusive state of feeling with regard to Indian affairs which was all but universal in England, and for the desire which the governor-general may be supposed to have entertained to offer to that feeling as little offence as possible. But one of the preliminary articles was so shamelessly and scandalously evaded, that no consideration of expediency ought to have been permitted to restrain the British Government from expressing its indignation, and, if necessary, compelling by force the due execution of the provision thus atrociously violated. It was provided that all prisoners from the time of Hyder Ali should be set at liberty. Tipoo had carried off a great number of prisoners from Coromandel, whom he had detained in violation of the treaty of 1784, and who, notwithstanding the conclusion of the subsequent treaty, were unable to regain their liberty except by stealth. These persons fled in considerable numbers, and were received by the English, but in a manner which seemed as though they were ashamed of performing this duty, and no means were adopted to ascertain how many of these unhappy persons still remained within the tyrant's power. Some inquiry was made respecting the officers and soldiers taken during the war, but with regard even to them the English authorities appear to have been satisfied with whatever explanation it pleased the vakeels of Tipoo to give, although there was strong ground for suspecting that in several instances the missing parties had fallen victims to the sultan's vengeance. Some of the followers of the English camp who had been made prisoners returned after a time, each mutilated of a hand. These unfortunate men were shown to the vakeels, who said, that they had been caught plundering, and that the barbarous punishment inflicted on them was without the sultan's knowledge. The ignorance of the sultan was indeed always pleaded to exonerate him from responsibility for the cruelties exercised under his authority. He, it was said, did not sanction them, and could not inquire into all the details of his government. With such ready apologies as these the governor-general was content.

If, however, Lord Cornwallis failed in some points in which the national honour was materially concerned, he manifested great personal disinterestedness, by relinquishing for the benefit of the army his share of booty. The example was followed by General Meadows; who, though he had proved himself unfit for the exercise of an independent command of importance, appears to have merited the character of a brave soldier and a generous man.

As soon as the arrangements between the belligerents could be regarded as finally concluded, Lord Cornwallis became anxious to remove his army with all practicable speed from the pestilential spot which was rapidly consuming its strength. The governor-general arrived at Madras late in May, and in Bengal in July following. After his departure from Seringapatam, Tipoo assembled the chiefs of his army and the heads of departments, and informed them, that the contribution of three crores and thirty lacs, by which he had purchased the absence of the invaders, must be provided for at the joint cost of himself, the army, and the people at large. His own share was, in the exercise of his royal grace and benignity, fixed at one crore and ten lacs—one third of the entire amount. Sixty lacs were to be furnished by the army, as a nuzzerana or gift—a donation bestowed as freely and with the same degree of goodwill as was formerly in England the "benevolence," so called, in aid of the sovereign's necessities. The remaining one crore and sixty lacs were to be provided by the civil officers and the inhabitants generally. The mode of distributing this last share of the burden was left to the heads of the civil departments, who prudently endeavoured to relieve themselves as far as possible from its pressure. The accounts, however, were made up with all the strictness which was due to public decorum, and to the characters of the responsible parties who exercised control over them. Each civil officer was debited with the sum which in fairness he might be called upon to pay, and a corresponding entry of the discharge of the claim was made with due precision. Had the sultan condescended to examine those records, he must have been delighted, not only by the accuracy with which they were made up, but by the severe exactness maintained by those who prepared them, in regard to their own contributions. But the books were false witnesses, and those by whom they were compiled paid nothing. Their shares were paid by an extra levy upon the inhabitants of each district beyond the amount of the nominal assessment. There was one inconvenience attending this ingenious operation. The great men, with whom it originated, could not conceal the process from their official inferiors; the latter were not to be persuaded that those above them possessed any exclusive claim to the exercise of fraud and extortion—and it followed that, to secure impunity to themselves, the higher officers were obliged to

connive at conduct similar to their own in every person engaged in the collection. It is not difficult to conceive what was the situation of a country thus plundered at the discretion of every revenue officer, from the chief who stood in the royal presence, to the lowest runner who conveyed to the miserable inhabitants the unwelcome order to deliver their cherished hoards. Under such a system, it is obviously impossible to ascertain how much was extorted from the suffering people; but it was generally believed that the sum far exceeded the whole amount which, according to the allotment made by the sultan, they were called upon to pay. Yet, at the end of several years, a balance of sixty lacs still stood on the books of the treasury against the country. Torture in its most horrible forms was resorted to; but from utter destitution even torture could extort nothing; and that obstinate determination, which in the East so often accompanies and fortifies the love of money, not unfrequently defied the infliction. Such are the ordinary incidents of native governments; and it must be remembered, that of such governments, that of Tippoo was by no means the worst. With regard to the fulfilment of the pecuniary engagements of that prince with the allies, it will be sufficient, without entering into details, to state, that at the end of about two years its progress permitted the restoration of the two hostage princes to their father. They were accompanied by Captain Doveton; and Tippoo, in the exercise of that hatred to the English which long indulgence had rendered almost uncontrollable, hesitated whether he should admit the British officer to his presence. The question was submitted for the opinion of his councillors. They represented that the sultan's refusal might excite suspicion, and that the Englishman might be amused with professions of friendship, while "whatever was in the heart might remain there." This sage and honest advice the sultan followed. Captain Doveton was received with great courtesy, and personally surrendered his charge to the sultan. Tippoo exhibited no emotion on recovering from captivity two persons who might be supposed so dear to him. His reception of them was far less warm and affectionate than that which they had met from Lord Cornwallis on being placed under his care.

The war with Tippoo was the great event of Lord Cornwallis's administration; and nothing of a similar nature occurred to deserve notice, except the capture of the French settlements in the year following that which had terminated the disputes with Mysore. The French revolution had lighted up the flames of war throughout Europe, and England had embarked in the struggle to chain the demon, whose avowed object was the destruction of all existing thrones, institutions, and forms of government. The attention of the British governments in India was thus

directed to the reduction of the possessions of France in that country, and they fell almost without an effort to maintain them. Lord Cornwallis hastened from Bengal to undertake the command of an expedition against Pondicherry; but no such difficulties or labours as were encountered by Sir Eyre Coote fell to the lot of the English when again the capital of the French possessions in India was summoned to surrender. No protracted siege—no formidable array of lines and batteries were required. Before the arrival of the governor-general the place had yielded to a British force under Colonel Braithwaite. This event took place in August, 1793. The reduction of the minor French settlements was effected with equal ease and celerity; and again, as had happened thirty-two years before, not a staff throughout the wide expanse of India was surmounted by the French flag; nor did a French soldier remain in the country, except as the servant of some native prince or the prisoner of the British government.

It now remains only to advert to the changes effected by Lord Cornwallis in the internal administration of the territories subject to the presidency of Bengal. It will be recollected that the dewanny or administration of the revenue and financial departments of the state had been bestowed on the East-India Company by the Mogul, and that the power had been formally assumed, although the condition on which it was granted was not implicitly observed. From the weakness of the native governments, the nizamat, or remaining powers of the state, passed at first covertly, and afterwards ostensibly, into the hands of the English, who thus became the sole rulers of a very extensive and eminently ill-governed territory. In all native states abuse is the rule, not the exception; and Bengal, under its later nabobs, might be taken as a type of the worst-ordered. During the period of transition, when the old authority was rapidly falling into decay, and gathering round it the ordinary concomitants of weakness, contempt, and opposition—while that which was supplanting it had as yet neither the physical power nor the moral respect which are the growth of time—when no one precisely knew with whom any particular portion of authority resided, nor in what manner the rights and duties of government were apportioned between the tottering, sinking mummy of an indolent, effeminate, powerless prince, and the council chamber of the stranger merchants whom the course of events had so wonderfully associated with the destinies of Hindostan—when all was unsettled, indefinable, and precarious, the native policy, which prescribes that each man should secure to himself as large a portion as he can of the objects of human desire, without regard to the means employed or the personal claims of others, received an extraordinary measure of acceleration and strength. The state of the

country with regard to the two great branches of administration, revenue and law, was briefly but comprehensively described in two short passages of a letter addressed, during an early period of Hastings's administration, by the president and council of Bengal to the Court of Directors. With regard to revenue, it was observed, that "the nazims exacted what they could from the zemindars and great farmers of the revenue, whom they left at liberty to plunder all below, reserving to themselves the prerogative of plundering them in their turn when they were supposed to have enriched themselves with the spoils of the country." On the morality of this it is unnecessary to say a word; the misery engendered by it stands not in need of illustration; but the infatuation with which avarice sought to gratify its insatiate appetite by plundering all within its range, though sure that nothing could be retained—that equal avarice, armed with greater power, would compel a full surrender of the fruits of rapine, might afford opportunity for instructive remark were there place for it. All grades of revenue officers engaged in the work of plunder with an avidity which seemed to imply a conviction that they were working for their own benefit; yet none but the highest were able to keep what they gained. Such is the power of a passion which appears to defy not more the restraints of justice than the dictates of common sense—such is a picture of society in an Indian state, where the exercise of extortion is universal, but the enjoyment of its profits confined to a select and powerful few—where the plunderer of to-day is the victim of to-morrow—where the minor oppressor plies his craft but to enrich his more dignified brethren, and endures a life of anxiety and guilt without recompense or alleviation.

With respect to the administration of justice, the situation of Bengal at the period alluded to was not less wretched than with regard to the collection of the revenue. The government reported that "the regular course was everywhere suspended; but every man exercised it who had the power of compelling others to submit to his decisions." What it was that, in such a state of society, every man who had power dispensed to his neighbours, may readily be imagined. It will not be suspected that it was either justice or law. The administrator in this case, like the revenue officer, had no object but to promote his own interest. "Decisions," like other commodities, were marketable, and, in conformity with the custom of trade, were sold to the best bidder. Where any exception occurred, the volunteer administrator of what was called justice was actuated by personal motives of favour or revenge. These enormous abuses were tolerated too long; but at length a movement was made for their suppression, and, under the authority of instructions from home, Hastings exerted himself vigorously to introduce improvement. A board of revenue was

established at the capital; European collectors, with native assistants, were appointed in the provinces; and certain members of the council were deputed to make circuits for the purpose of carrying the new arrangements into execution. In the judicial department, two principal courts, called the *Sudder Dewanny Adawlut* and the *Sudder Nizamut Adawlut*, were created, and civil and criminal courts of inferior jurisdiction were established throughout the provinces. Various changes took place subsequently, some of them at a very early period; but these it would be impossible even to mention without extending the notice of these transactions to an inconvenient length. One of the most important measures of Hastings's government was the effecting a revenue settlement for five years. Some excellent rules were at the same time propounded—it would be too much to say that they were enforced. *Nuzzars*, or free gifts, as they were called, were prohibited, and revenue officers were forbidden to hold farms. At the expiration of the five years the practice of annual settlement was again resorted to, and continued till the time of Lord Cornwallis.

That nobleman, soon after undertaking the office of governor-general, was furnished with copious instructions from the Court of Directors on the internal management of the country committed to his care. These instructions were marked by a decided leaning towards the class of functionaries called zemindars, the precise nature of whose connection with the land and the people has afforded subject for much dispute. The court censured the employment of farmers and persons having no permanent interest in the land in place of the zemindars; adverted to great defalcations which had taken place; and expressed their opinion that the most practicable method of avoiding such occurrences in future would be, to introduce a permanent settlement of the revenue on reasonable principles, such settlements to be made, in all practicable instances, with the zemindar; and in cases where he might be incapable of the trust, with a relation or agent of the zemindar, in preference to a farmer. But though it was proposed that the assessment should be ultimately fixed in perpetuity, it was determined that at first the settlement should be made for a term of years only; and in order that the views of the court might be carried into effect with precision, it was recommended that inquiry should be made into the rights and privileges of the zemindars and other landholders under the institutions of the Mogul or Hindoo governments, and the services they were bound to perform. The crowning measure of endowing any plan of settlement with perpetuity was reserved to the court. These instructions were issued in consequence of a clause in an act of parliament passed a few years before, by which the Court of Directors were required to give orders for redressing the wrongs of "rajahs, zemindars, polygars, talookdars, and other native land-

holders." It is not unworthy of remark that the act only prescribes the establishment of permanent rules, for the regulation of tributes, rents, and services; but by the mode in which the requisition was carried out in Bengal, the actual amount of tribute or rent assessed upon the land was permanently and unalterably fixed. This was obviously more than the act demanded.

If the home government construed somewhat liberally the intentions of the legislature, their governor-general was not slow in imitating their example in his method of dealing with his instructions. A settlement for ten years was made, preparatory to the irrevocable step which was to deprive the government for ever of any future claim upon the land. In the mean time some inquiry was instituted in obedience to the commands of the court, into the rights and duties of the zemindars; but a very slight examination was sufficient to satisfy the governor-general. At the threshold of the inquiry lay the question, to whom did the property of the soil belong? On this point different opinions have ever been maintained, and all of them with some degree of plausibility. By some it has been held that in India the land has always been regarded as the property of the sovereign; by others, that in most parts of the country the persons called zemindars are the rightful proprietors; while by a third party it has been contended, that the great majority of cultivators have a permanent interest in the soil, and that the zemindar was only the officer through whom in many cases the claims of government were settled. These theoretical differences of opinion have given rise to others of a practical character, as to the parties to be recognized by government in levying its claims upon the land—whether a settlement should be effected with a person called a zemindar, who is responsible for the whole assessment upon a given district, generally of considerable extent; with an association of persons occupying lands within a particular locality, termed a village, the inhabitants of which are connected by peculiar institutions; or with the individual cultivators, known in the language of the country by the name of ryots. These three modes of settlement are respectively described as the zemindary, the village, and the ryotwar systems; and the presumed advantages of each have been maintained with great zeal. But no difference on this point embarrassed the government of Lord Cornwallis. All the influential servants of the presidency appear to have agreed with the governor-general in the preference expressed by the home authorities for the zemindary system of settlement. On the right in the soil, the same unanimity did not prevail; but the governor-general cut short all inquiry by determining, certainly with great precipitancy, to recognize the right as residing exclusively in the zemindars. He not only affirmed his belief that it actually belonged to them, but declared that if it did

not, it would be necessary to confer it upon them, or upon some other persons; as nothing, in his judgment, would be more pernicious than to regard the right as appertaining to the state. Lord Cornwallis either entirely overlooked, or chose to appear ignorant of, the possibility of other rights existing in connection with the land besides those of the government and the zemindar. Mr. Shore, an able civil servant, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, recommended caution and further inquiry; but the governor-general seemed to think that his duty was not to inquire, but to act. The sanction of the home authorities for declaring perpetual the decennial settlement which had recently been made was asked and obtained; and on the 22nd of March, 1793, the assessments made under that settlement were authoritatively proclaimed to be fixed for ever.

The provinces permanently settled have undoubtedly prospered: being among the richest and most fertile portions of the British dominions in India, it must be a perverse system of government indeed which could materially check their prosperity; but a vast mass of inconvenience and suffering is directly traceable to the haste with which the important measure of a permanent settlement was carried out. The rights of hereditary cultivators were sacrificed. From the default of the zemindars, from their incompetence, and from other causes, the office often became vested in the hands of persons whose character or position in society commanded no respect, and who used it only as an instrument of extortion. Lawuits in consequence of these circumstances abounded, and the privations and penalties which follow in the train of litigation were frightfully multiplied.

Changes affecting minor branches of the revenue were made by Lord Cornwallis, but the land so far transcends in importance all other sources of income, that a particular reference to those of inferior value may be spared. Some notice, however, is demanded of the new machinery created for dispensing civil and criminal justice. One of the most decided changes was the severance of judicial authority from that connected with the revenue. The power heretofore exercised by zemindars was taken away, and the European collectors were also deprived of their judicial character. For the administration of civil justice the governor-general and members of council were to form one chief court, called the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, which was to hear appeals and control the exercise of the power of the inferior courts. No appeal could be made to the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut unless the sum in dispute amounted to one thousand rupees. The courts immediately under this were called provincial courts. Like that above them, they were courts of revision and appeal with relation to the courts below; but they were also, to a certain extent, courts of primary jurisdiction.

In each of these courts were to be three judges, chosen from among the covenanted servants of the Company. They were empowered to try, in the first instance, such suits as should be transmitted to them for the purpose by government or the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, and to order their decision in such cases to be executed by the judges of the zillah or city courts; to receive original suits or complaints which any judge of the zillah or city courts had refused or neglected to entertain or proceed with, and to cause such judge to hear and determine such case; to receive petitions respecting matters depending in the courts below, and give directions therein to the judges in such courts; to receive any charges which might be preferred against the zillah or city judges for corruption, and forward them to the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, as well as to report to that court on any negligence or misconduct of such judges. They were also to hear appeals from the zillah courts if preferred within three months from the passing of the decree appealed against, or after that period, for sufficient reason. Whenever it should appear to a provincial court that a suit had not been sufficiently investigated in the zillah court, they might either take such further evidence as they might deem necessary, and give judgment thereon, or remit the suit back to the zillah court with instructions. The decisions of the provincial courts were to be final for sums not exceeding one thousand rupees.

The next class of judicial establishments consisted of the zillah (or district) and city civil courts. Over each of these a European judge presided. He was assisted by a register, also a European covenanted servant, and in some cases by an assistant similarly qualified. As all questions relating to succession, inheritance, marriage, caste, and all usages and institutions of the like character, were to be decided by the Mahometan law with respect to Mahometans, and by the Hindoo law with regard to Hindoos, each court was provided with a native officer of each persuasion, presumed to be well versed in the principles of law as expounded in their respective creeds; these persons acting as assessors to the judge, who received their written opinions, and regulated his judgment accordingly. The pleadings were directed to be in writing, and to consist of, first, a plaint; secondly, an answer; thirdly, a reply; and fourthly, a rejoinder. If anything material to the suit had been omitted, either in the plaint or answer, one supplemental pleading of each kind, but no more, was to be admitted. The pleadings might be written, at the option of the parties, either in Persian, Bengalee, or Hindoostanee. The pleadings being completed, the courts were to proceed to hear evidence, either written or oral, and the latter was to be reduced to writing in one of the languages previously mentioned. The decree followed, and this it was provided should contain the

name of every witness examined, the title of every paper read, and a statement of the amount or value of the property in dispute. These courts were empowered to take cognizance of all suits and complaints respecting the succession or right to real or personal property, land, rents, revenues, debts, accounts, contracts, marriage, caste, claims to damages for injuries, and generally all suits of a civil nature, if the property sought to be recovered, or the defendant against whom the suit was brought, were actually within the limits of the court's jurisdiction. Those limits were the same with the boundaries of the zillah or city in which the courts might be established. The power of these courts extended to all persons not British subjects, in the sense in which those words were then legally applied. European subjects of the King of Great Britain were consequently exempted; but it was provided that none excepting officers of the King's or the Company's army, or civil servants of the Company, should reside within the jurisdiction of any zillah or city court, at a greater distance than ten miles from Calcutta, without executing a bond rendering themselves amenable to the court for sums not exceeding five hundred rupees. European officers of the government, as well as native officers, were also declared amenable to the courts for acts done in their official capacity in breach of the regulations or laws enacted by the local government. Those regulations formed the code by which the decisions of the courts were to be guided, save in cases where the native law was permitted to operate. Where no specific rule might exist for their guidance, the judges were directed to act according to equity, justice, and good conscience. An appeal lay to the provincial courts in all suits without exception.

To relieve the zillah and city courts from part of the business supposed, from the inferior value of the matter in dispute, to be of inferior importance, the registers of those courts were empowered to hear and decide causes in which the amount or value of the thing at issue did not exceed two hundred rupees; liberty of appeal to the court to which the register was attached being in all cases reserved.

Still further to relieve the zillah and city courts, as well as in the expectation, which in other countries has been so often held out and so seldom realized, of bringing substantial justice to every man's door, inferior judicatures were constituted, called courts of native commissioners. These commissioners were to exercise their functions in three different characters: as aumeens, or referees; as salis, or arbitrators; and as moonsiffs, or judges exercising original jurisdiction. Their authority was restricted to suits in which the value of the thing in litigation did not exceed fifty rupees. They were to be nominated by the judges of the zillah and city courts, and to be approved by the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut. To the latter court alone was given

the power of removing them. The native commissioners were to be sworn to the administration of their duties, and to be liable to prosecution for corruption, or for oppressive and unwarranted acts of authority—an important provision in a country where judgment had been so long bought and sold. In their character of referees, the native commissioners were to try such causes as might be remitted to them by the zillah courts, proceeding in the manner prescribed for the conduct of suits in those courts. As arbitrators, they might decide disputes not brought before the court, provided the parties executed bonds, engaging to abide by the decision of the commissioners, and to make the award a decree of court. In no case were these commissioners to have the power of enforcing their own decrees. Monthly reports of causes decided, such reports being accompanied by all original documents, were to be made to the zillah court to which the commissioner was immediately subject, and that court was to enforce the decision reported, if not appealed against within thirty days; the power of appeal being subject to no other limitation.

In addition to the establishment of courts of various grades, and the distribution of business among them, it was attempted to improve the character of the vakeels or agents who might be employed in them. Previously, all that a suitor did not perform in his own person was committed either to some servant or dependant, or to men who were ready to transact any business for any person who would employ them, but who were not recognized by the courts, nor subject to any regulations. In the former case, the suitor was represented, and his interests maintained, by persons for the most part entirely ignorant of law of any description. In the latter, the amount of the advocate's knowledge seldom extended beyond a slight acquaintance with the ordinary forms of proceeding, and a familiarity with all the arts of chicane. It was proposed, therefore, to introduce a better class of vakeels, by insuring the possession of some measure of qualification for the office which they undertook, and by subjecting them to due control. The appointment of these officers was vested in the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut. They were to be selected from the students in the Mahometan college at Calcutta and the Hindoo college at Benares. If these establishments were unable to supply the requisite number, any natives of good character and competent ability might be appointed. They were to be sworn to the due discharge of their duties, and to be remunerated according to a regulated table of fees. A small retaining fee was to be paid on the engagement of the vakeel; his subsequent emoluments were deferred till the termination of the suit, when he was to receive a commission on the amount involved, varying from five per cent., upon the smaller sums, to one-half per cent., upon those of larger amount. They were liable to suspension by the court in which

they practised for promoting or encouraging litigious suits, for fraud, or for gross misbehaviour of any kind. The suspension was to be reported to the Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, by whom the vakeel might be either deprived of his privilege or fined.

Such were the main provisions for the administration of civil justice. In one respect the task of legislating for the exercise of criminal judicature was less embarrassed by difficulty. There was little or no conflict of laws, criminal proceedings having been almost universally conducted on the principles of the law of Mahomet. The Koran was necessarily the chief authority; the sayings of the Prophet, stored up in the memory of his followers and handed down by tradition—perhaps occasionally invented to answer existing emergencies—supplied some of the deficiencies of the Koran, which were neither few nor unimportant; the opinions and judgments of learned Mahometans, contemporaries with the Prophet, and who enjoyed the benefit of personal communication with him, formed another resource; and lastly, came reports of decided cases by judges of later date, who had ventured to exercise their own judgment where that of their predecessors afforded no guide. The law thus obtained was not of the best description, and its administration, it is unnecessary to say, was corrupt and venal. Hastings endeavoured to correct some of the evils which existed both in the law and the judges, by subjecting both to the control of the British government. For eighteen months he personally exercised this control, but at the end of that period, the numerous demands upon his time and attention rendered it impracticable to continue the labour which he had imposed on himself, and the duty of watching and superintending the administration of criminal justice once more passed into Mahometan hands. Some years afterwards, the principal European officers in the revenue and civil departments were invested with a portion of magisterial authority, but the greater and more important portion of the duties connected with the restraint and punishment of crime was vested in the naib nazim and his subordinate officers. No further alteration was made till Lord Cornwallis submitted to his council proposals for amending both the law and the courts by which it was administered. The alterations proposed in the law were three:—First, that the criminality of homicide should be judged of not by the weapon or means used, but by the intention of the slayer, however discoverable. By this, a variety of curious and mischievous distinctions were got rid of. The second proposal was, that the heirs of a murdered person should not be permitted to prevent the punishment of the murderer—a privilege which the Mahometan law allowed. The third suggested the abolition of the barbarous punishment of mutilation, which the light of Mecca also tolerated, and the substitution in its place of imprisonment, hard labour, or pecuniary fine. Chris-

tian and European feelings were thus brought to the improvement of the code of Mahomet in various important particulars. The proposals of the governor-general were adopted and embodied in regulations, which, however, manifested a singular tenderness towards the law which they were designed to improve. The authority of that law was still recognized—the native officer still expounded its decree for the information of the European judge; but the latter was forbidden, in certain cases, to act upon the opinion thus given. If the law of Mahomet prescribed mutilation of person for any offence, the officer declared that such was the will of the Prophet; but the punishment was not inflicted. It was commuted for a term of imprisonment, varying according to the degree of severity maintained by the law which was thus superseded. The threatened mulct of two limbs subjected the convict to double the term of imprisonment incurred by him whom the law of Mahomet would have deprived but of one. Again, in cases where the heir of a murdered person refused to prosecute, the native law officer was to be called upon to state what would have been the decree of the law had the heir been of sterner mind, and then the same sentence was to be passed as though the right to prosecute had not been waived. Further, the rules of evidence, according to the Mahometan law, were not altogether such as the British government approved. It did not, however, venture to interfere with the integrity of the holy code—the rules were left to be still solemnly enunciated by the native adviser of the court; but where the evidence of a witness was impugned by reason of his religion, the officer was called upon to say what would have been the decree of the law had this defect not existed, which being done, sentence was to be passed precisely as though it did not exist.

To put in motion this remarkable combination of Mahometan and European law, the means resorted to were nearly the same as those employed for civil proceedings. The governor-general and council formed a high court of revision and control, called the *Sudder Nizamut Adawlut*; the provincial courts were constituted courts of circuit within their respective localities, throughout which they were to make two gaol deliveries in each year; the *zillah* and city judges were to be magistrates exercising the usual authority of the office, both in regard to preliminary proceedings in criminal cases of importance and in the cognizance and punishment of petty offences.

Zemindars, and persons of similar condition, had formerly been responsible for the peace of the country, and whatever of police authority existed was exercised by them. From these duties they were now relieved. Each *zillah* was divided into police jurisdictions, superintended by a *darogah*, a native officer, who was empowered to receive charges of criminal offences, and to remit the accused to a magistrate, taking security for the appearance of the pro-

secutors and witnesses. The *darogah* was also authorized to apprehend vagrants and suspicious persons. The village watchmen were declared subject to the orders of this functionary, and were required to give him all the assistance and information which they could afford.

The above sketch of the judicial arrangements of Lord Cornwallis may appear to possess little either of interest or instruction; but some notice of them was called for, first, because they were the earliest arrangements which could aspire to any higher character than that of temporary expedients; and, secondly, because it is upon the improvement of the internal government of the country that the reputation of Lord Cornwallis has, in a great degree, been rested. The effects of the important revenue change effected under his administration have been briefly noticed; the judicial changes could scarcely aggravate the evils previously existing, but they had perhaps little effect in abating them. The amount of power was altogether unequal to the labour to be performed—the number of European functionaries was too small—in many cases their acquaintance with Indian character too limited to allow of their doing much good, while the native agents were often, it is to be feared, too corrupt to effect anything but evil. If it were an object of the change in the mode of administering civil justice to increase litigation, the plan certainly succeeded. Suits multiplied, till those who should have decided them looked at the files of their courts in despair, convinced that the life of man was insufficient to clear off the overwhelming mass of arrears. Parties who felt aggrieved, and who saw themselves partially excluded from redress by law, sought it in a more summary manner, and breaches of the peace from this cause were frequent. It would be unjust to charge the whole of these evils upon the judicial plans of Lord Cornwallis. In a country which had long been without any settled or well-ordered judicial tribunals, wrongs would multiply, causes of complaint abound. If in connection with this consideration reference be had to the love of litigation which forms so prominent a part of the native character, it will be seen that the governor-general had no easy task to perform. His great error appears to have been that he did not duly appreciate the difficulty of that which he undertook to effect. Like most Indian reformers, he expected to do at once that which required a long series of years, and like most Indian reformers also, he evinced an unwise and an unwarrantable disregard of native institutions. His police arrangements were thought to be inferior to those which they superseded, and in spite of all the provision made either for the punishment or the prevention of offences, crime continued to flourish with a luxuriance which showed at once how deeply it had struck its roots in the soil, and how inadequate were the means provided by the governor-general for its eradication. Year after year some

change was made in the system established by Lord Cornwallis: experiment succeeded experiment, each tending to confirm a truth of which European innovators have so often been forgetful, that it is impossible by a stroke of the pen to change the character of a people, or to render either useful or popular, institutions not framed with due regard to national habits and peculiarities.

Lord Cornwallis did not return to Bengal after his visit to Madras, undertaken with a view of reducing the French settlements on the coast of Coromandel. He quitted India in August, 1793, and was succeeded as governor-general by Sir John Shore, a civil servant of the Company, who had been a member of council at Bengal, and who, it will be remembered, when the permanent settlement was in contemplation, had offered some suggestions for securing the rights of the inferior landholders, which Lord Cornwallis had disregarded. Sir John Shore was not a man of brilliant abilities, but he enjoyed, and justly, a high degree of the confidence of those whom he served. His reputation for knowledge in matters of Indian revenue was great, and his upright and honourable character universally admitted.

The attention of the new governor-general was soon directed to the circumstances and position of the two powers in concert with whom his predecessor had undertaken the reduction of Mysore. By the treaty concluded by the three powers—the English, the nizam, and the Mahrattas—previously to the commencement of the war with Tippoo, it was provided, that if, after the conclusion of peace with that prince, he should molest or attack either of the contracting parties, the others should join to punish him; but the mode and conditions of effecting this object were left for future settlement. On the termination of the war, Lord Cornwallis had proposed the reduction of this conditional stipulation into a formal treaty of guarantee; but he was desirous of clogging the engagement with a condition which would without doubt have left either party at liberty to evade the performance of the treaty, and without much danger of incurring the imputation of bad faith. If one of the allies were attacked, the others were not to be bound to render assistance until they were convinced that justice was on their side, and that all measures of conciliation were fruitless; and, as no one can estimate the degree of conviction which operates on the mind of another, it must be obvious that such a treaty would have been to all practical purposes a nullity. If the allies of the party attacked thought it their interest to assist their neighbour, they would assist him, and this might be relied upon without any treaty. If their interests inclined them to take another course, they could deny the justice of the cause of their ally, and refuse to aid him. Still Lord Cornwallis must not be too hastily blamed for insisting upon an article which

would have had the effect of neutralizing the engagement into which it was introduced. One of the parties with whom he had to deal was the Mahratta state, and Mahratta notions of right and wrong are endowed with such convenient flexibility, that it is quite impossible to estimate, with any approach to accuracy, whither a positive engagement to defend them may lead. The Mahrattas had some demands for chout, both on Tippoo and the nizam, which they did not mean to abandon; and the proposal of Lord Cornwallis was met by counter proposals—the Mahratta chiefs being anxious to obtain the assistance of the British to carry out their own views, but averse to any alliance which should impose upon them a necessity for peace and moderation. These proposals were distasteful alike to the nizam and the British government; and the latter, after some protracted discussion, desisted from pressing the execution of any treaty whatever. The nizam did not share in the reluctance of the Mahrattas to execute the proposed treaty; his interests and his wishes disposed him to seek British protection, however vague the conditions on which it was to be rendered. He represented that the failure of one of three parties to fulfil its engagements afforded no justification to the other two for the violation of theirs, and he urged the conclusion of the projected treaty before the departure of Lord Cornwallis from India, but in vain. That nobleman left the relations of the British government in this respect in a most unsatisfactory state, and Sir John Shore had to contend with difficulties from which his predecessor seems to have been glad to escape.

The long-impending storm at length burst. The Mahrattas attacked the nizam. According to existing engagements, the British were not required to take arms in this case; both parties were their allies, and though generally bound to assist either against Tippoo, they were under no obligation to assist one against the other. But Tippoo was about to join the Mahrattas, and the nizam had, therefore, to all appearance, a claim to call for the assistance of his British allies. He did call for it, but without success. Sir John Shore on this occasion, while he evinced no extraordinary aptitude for the government of a great state, displayed a talent for casuistry which, if he had devoted himself to the legal profession, must have obtained for him a high reputation in the science of special pleading. He determined that, the alliance being tripartite, the secession of one party put an end to all obligations which it imposed upon the remaining two. He accordingly resolved to surrender the nizam to the combined power of the treacherous Mahrattas, with whom fidelity is a word destitute of meaning, and of Tippoo, infuriated by recent degradation, and burning for revenge on those who had aided in subjecting him to it. The result, in one respect, was less disastrous than might have been antici-

pated. Tippoo was too much occupied at home to render active assistance to the Mahrattas; but the latter were sufficiently strong without his aid to reduce the nizam to purchase peace on ignominious terms. Such was the policy of Sir John Shore—a man distinguished by many excellent qualities, but altogether out of his place in society as governor-general of the British possessions in India. He maintained an insecure and unstable peace, and the price paid for the equivocal advantage was the honour of the country which he represented.

The nizam was greatly incensed by the conduct of the British government; and, on his return to Hyderabad, he intimated a desire to dispense with the services of two English battalions, which he subsidized, and which, being precluded from taking any part in the war with the Mahrattas, had been employed, while it continued, in maintaining the internal tranquillity of the nizam's dominions. The effects of the ultra-peace policy of the governor-general now began to appear. The English corps, at the request of the nizam, was withdrawn, and that prince, with a view to supply their place, immediately applied himself to increase and improve a large body of regular infantry, which constituted the main strength of his army, and was commanded by French officers. His attachment to the French was naturally strengthened by the hostile feelings engendered by the defection of his English ally, and the influence of the former power was aided by constant and exaggerated statements of the wonderful progress of the French arms in Europe. The British resident endeavoured to impress the nizam with a sense of the inexpediency of the course which he was pursuing, but without effect. What effect, indeed, could have been expected from such representations under such circumstances? The governor-general himself addressed the nizam, but to no better purpose; and Sir John Shore now found that the result of his policy had been to hand over the nizam, his power and resources, from the English to the nation with which, in Europe, they were waging a war of unparalleled difficulty. Whatever may be the faults of the French people, it is certain that indifference to the power and glory of their country is not among them. M. Raymond, who commanded the force which has been referred to, was indefatigable in labouring to increase the influence of the French in the Decan. His battalions carried the colours of the republic one and indivisible, and the cap of liberty graced their buttons. A detachment was moved to Kurpa, near the British frontiers, and through the agency of its officers a mutiny was excited in a battalion of sepoys on the Madras establishment. A correspondence was opened with the French prisoners at Pondicherry, and no probable means neglected of once more establishing the French interest in India on the ruins of that of the English. All

appearances boded ill for the latter power, and a crisis was obviously approaching when even the argumentative dexterity of the governor-general might be useless. It was averted by the occurrence of an event, unexpected alike by the nizam, by the party which had foolishly lost his friendship, and by that which had succeeded them in possession of it. This was a rebellion excited by Ali Jah, the nizam's son. The alarm this occasioned led not only to the recall of the detachment from Kurpa to be employed in suppressing the rebellion, but to an earnest appeal for the co-operation of the English government for the same object. The governor-general did not now hesitate. Assistance was promptly despatched, but before it reached the scene of action M. Raymond had put down the rebellion and taken prisoner its author. Ali Jah released his father from all further apprehension on his account, by taking poison.

The judicious improvement of the opportunity afforded for manifesting a regard to the interests of the nizam was not without effect, and the English influence at the court of Hyderabad might have been greatly strengthened, had not Sir John Shore been rendered insensible to every other consideration by his fear of offending the Mahrattas. Some English adventurers were encouraged to enter the nizam's service, in the hope that they might be useful in counteracting the views of the French; but the scheme entirely failed, and the British government derived from this project little of either credit or advantage.

The progress of events, however, continued to be rather beneficial to the interests of the nizam, and not unfavourable to those of the English. The Peishwa, in whose name several chiefs had so long carried on their own plans of personal advantage and aggrandizement, terminated his life by an act of self-destruction. A series of intrigues followed, in the course of which the nizam had an opportunity of recommending himself to several of the parties engaged, and, in consequence, his principal minister, who had been given up as a hostage for the performance of some of the disgraceful conditions of the late peace, was set at liberty, and some territorial cessions extorted from the nizam were relinquished. The passions and divisions of the Mahratta chieftains thus interposed in favour of the nizam, whom his British ally would have left to be crushed by the powerful and unprincipled confederacy to which they belonged.

The year 1795 was marked by the death of the notorious Mahomet Ali, and the question how the affairs of his ill-governed dominions should in future be administered, gave rise to a sharp dispute between the government of Madras, at the head of which was Lord Hobart, and the controlling government of Bengal. Lord Hobart, without previous communication with the governor-general, proposed to the successor of Mahomet Ali the cession of certain territories, with a view partly to the

security of the Company's claims, and partly to the relief of the country from the frightful mass of oppression and abuse to which, under Mahomet Ali, it had been subjected. The views of the government of Bengal went further. They were desirous of obtaining the cession of the whole of the nabob's territories. Thus far the object of the two governments differed only as to degree. But Lord Hobart was disposed to employ some degree of force to effect his object, while the government of Bengal were determined to carry it by negotiation, or not at all. The details of the dispute would now possess little interest. It may suffice to say, that the nabob resolutely refused to comply, and compliance was not enforced. The prevailing abuses, therefore, not only continued but increased. It was indeed impossible for such a system to be stationary. If not abolished, it would inevitably grow and extend itself. Every form of rapine and extortion, every device by which usury could heap interest upon interest, every cruelty by which avarice could realize its golden hopes was practised, till the wretched inhabitants might almost have rejoiced in the irruption of a powerful enemy, and hailed as a deliverer any invader who would have relieved them from the weak, perfidious, and profligate government by which they were borne down. The nabob asserted that he was unable to yield that which the British government demanded—that the host of natives and Europeans who benefited by the continuance of abuse were too strong for him. This, it will be obvious, was an idle excuse. Although he could have effected nothing without the aid of the British government, he might with their support have relieved his dominions from their oppressors; but he disliked the mode by which relief was to be obtained, and would not purchase protection for his subjects at the cost of gratifying the British government, which he hated. It was natural, indeed, that he should be reluctant to dispossess himself of power; but sovereignty in his hands was but a name—power he had none. The usurers of Madras were masters alike of him and his subjects, and heavily did the yoke press both on prince and people.

The same year which produced this abortive attempt to rescue some of the most valuable districts of the Carnatic from the ruthless grasp of those by whom they were desolated was signalized by the reduction of the Dutch settlements in India and the Indian seas—Ceylon, Malacca, Banda, Amboyna, Cochin. All except the last yielded after very slight resistance.

It has been seen that the policy of Sir John Shore was essentially quiescent. But besides the attack of the Dutch settlements, the necessity for which was imposed upon the Indian government by the alliance of Holland with the revolutionary rulers of France, two events occurred in the northern parts of India which compelled the governor-general to depart from

his ordinary plan of suffering affairs to take their own course. The first of them was the death of Fyzoolla Khan, the persevering Rohilla chief, whose resistance had wearied the vizier into the confirmation of his jaghire, but whom Hastings engaged, in concert with that prince, to dispossess of his territories, although it subsequently appeared that he had no intention of carrying his engagement into effect. Mahomed Ali, the eldest son of Fyzoolla Khan, claimed to succeed his father, and his claim was enforced by the vizier, as well as recognized by the principal persons in the province. His younger brother, Gholam Mahomed, however, an ambitious and unprincipled man, raised a rebellion, made Mahomed Ali prisoner, and after a time murdered him. On these events becoming known to the governor-general, he felt, as might have been expected, that the honour of the British government required the intervention of their arms to suppress the rebellion raised by Gholam Mahomed, and avenge the treacherous murder of his brother. But the just indignation of Sir John Shore took a turn which, with reference to his mild and amiable character, was truly wonderful. He determined to punish, not only the usurper, but the entire family which the culprit had disgraced and injured—the innocent with the guilty—by confiscating the jaghire granted to Fyzoolla Khan, and transferring the districts of which it consisted to the direct government of the vizier. The justice of such a proceeding it would be difficult to vindicate, and it would be not less vain to attempt its defence on the ground of humanity. The dominions administered by Fyzoolla Khan were in a state of prosperity, broadly and strongly contrasting with the condition of the ill-governed and miserable territories of the vizier, to whose wretched sway the governor-general proposed to commit them. The promptitude of Sir Robert Abercromby, the officer commanding the British force in Oude, prevented the full execution of this notable plan. Before the arrival of instructions from Calcutta, he had marched with part of the army of the vizier against the rebel chief. A battle was fought, in which the usurper was defeated. The vizier benefited by the acquisition of considerable treasure; but a jaghire was granted to the infant son of the chief who had been so basely murdered. The rebel fratricide escaped with impunity.

The other event which roused the governor-general to action was connected also with the affairs of Oude. In 1797 the Vizier Azoff-al-Dowlah died. He was succeeded by his reputed son, Vizier Ali, whose title, though impugned by the voice of rumour, was recognized by the British government. The grounds on which this recognition was afforded were the acknowledgment of Vizier Ali as his son by Azoff-al-Dowlah, an acknowledgment corroborated by various acts and declarations, and believed to be valid according to the Mahometan law; the acquiescence of

the begum; and the apparent general consent of the inhabitants of Lucknow. A report hostile to the claims of Vizier Ali had indeed reached the governor-general, and in the same minute from which the above reasons are quoted—in the same paragraph in which they appeared, and in the very next sentence to that in which they are enunciated, Sir John Shore speaks of its being the “popular belief” that the birth of Vizier Ali was spurious. It is not easy to reconcile the facts of the popular belief being against his claim, and the governor-general being aware that such was the case, with the apparent general consent of the inhabitants of Lucknow in his favour alleged in the preceding sentence in justification of his recognition.

Notwithstanding the force ascribed by the governor-general to the reasons in favour of the claim of Vizier Ali, he was not at ease; and he left Calcutta to proceed to Oude, not, as he says, with any view to an alteration of the succession, but under the impression of a possibility “that the repugnance of the inhabitants of Oude to the title of Vizier Ali might be such as to force upon” him “the further consideration of it.” At Cawnpore he was met by the minister of Oude, Hussein Reza Khan; and here that which had been anticipated occurred. The consideration of the new vizier's title was “forced” upon the attention of Sir John Shore, the minister declaring, without reserve, that there was but one opinion on the subject, that opinion being that the reigning prince and all his reputed brothers were spurious; and that Saadut Ali, the brother of the deceased vizier, was the lawful successor to the musnud.

The minister, who had been instrumental in elevating Vizier Ali to a place which he now affirmed belonged to another, endeavoured to excuse his conduct by reference to the same circumstances which the governor-general pleaded in justification of his own. Saadut Ali, according to the report of this functionary, had but few hearty supporters, his extreme parsimony having rendered him unpopular, while the profuseness of Vizier Ali had conciliated the soldiery, who were far more readily influenced by the liberal dispensation of pay and gratuities than by any regard to the lawful claims of inheritance. Other information corroborated the report of the minister as to the Vizier Ali's want of title, and the governor-general resolved to prosecute inquiry, as far as was practicable without exciting suspicion, as to the birth of the reigning vizier, and his brothers or reputed brothers, as well as into the popular belief on the subject. The result of his investigation as to the former point went to establish the following facts:—that the deceased prince was the father of two sons only, both of whom had died in infancy;—that he had been in the habit of purchasing children and their mothers, and that the children thus acquired were, in various instances, acknowledged by him, and brought

up as his own; that the mother of the reigning prince was a menial servant of the lowest description, employed in the house of one of the vizier's officers, at the monthly wages of four rupees;—that she was the parent of three sons, of whom the eldest was purchased by the vizier for five hundred rupees, and received the name of Mahomed Ameer; the second, less fortunate, became a menial servant; while the third shared, and even surpassed, the good fortune of his elder brother, being in like manner purchased by Azoff-al-Dowlah for five hundred rupees, endowed with the name of Vizier Ali, acknowledged by the prince as his son, and heir to his dignity, and finally raised to the throne. It appeared that the younger begum, the wife of Azoff-al-Dowlah, had invariably refused to see Vizier Ali;—that having been requested by the vizier to honour the nuptials of his heir, by allowing him to be introduced to her on the occasion, she had declined with civility; but at the same time declared to the officer who delivered the message, that she would not disgrace the dignity of her family by admitting such a person as Vizier Ali into her presence. All circumstances seem to have combined to discredit the claim of Vizier Ali except one—the elder begum, the mother of the deceased prince, supported the person thus denounced as an unjust pretender to the throne. This, however, cannot be regarded as conclusive, or even strong evidence in his favour. In the impure atmosphere of an eastern court, regard to family honour is often sacrificed to personal motives.

The effect produced on the mind of the governor-general by the evidence which he was able to collect, is thus stated by himself:—“The result of the whole, in my opinion, is this,—that Vizier Ali, and all the reputed sons of the deceased nabob, are undoubtedly spurious. The impressions which I received on this subject since my inquiries commenced are very different from those which I entertained in Calcutta. The parentage of Vizier Ali, as many of the persons to whom I have appealed observe, is not considered as any matter of delicacy in Lucknow. A supposition that he is the son of Azoff-al-Dowlah would have been treated with ridicule, excepting by the partisans of the nabob (Vizier Ali), or those who benefit by his follies and extravagance; and I could add many anecdotes to prove that Vizier Ali has often, previous to the death of Azoff-al-Dowlah, been reproached as the son of a Fraugh, and that the nabob frequently alluded to his base origin. His elevation to the musnud was a matter of surprise to persons of all ranks, and was even spoken of with contempt by the native troops at Cawnpore.” After adverting to certain motives for declining to enter into the investigation at an earlier period, Sir John Shore continues:—“Feeling in all its force the impression of the popular belief of the spurious birth of Vizier Ali, and aware of all the consequences to our political reputation

and justice which might result from the acknowledgment of him as the successor of Asoff-al-Dowlah, I still was not authorized to make them the grounds of rejecting him in opposition to the acknowledgment and declaration of his presumed father; whilst I felt equal repugnance to fix obloquy on the reputation of the deceased nabob by an inquiry dictated by general rumours only. It is now no longer dubious that the repugnance to the admission of Vizier Ali's succession, after an interval of reflection, was general; that the acknowledgment of it by the Company excited surprise and disappointment; that it was esteemed both disgraceful and unjust, and that nothing but the support of the begum and of the Company would have suppressed the expression of that repugnance. That may now exist in a less degree, but the disgrace attached to our decision still remains. I conclude with repeating, that the prevailing opinion of the spurious birth of Vizier Ali was not a partial rumour originating in enmity or interest at his accession; that it has ever invariably and universally prevailed, in opposition to the acknowledgment of him as his son by the nabob, Asoff-al-Dowlah, which never obtained credit with a single human being; and that the truth of it is now established by the clear, positive, and circumstantial evidence of Zehseen Ali Khan, which carries with it the fullest conviction of its truth, as well from his character as from his situation, which enabled him, and him only, to have a personal knowledge of the circumstances which he has detailed. In his house Vizier Ali was born, and he paid the purchase-money for him to his mother. That evidence so clear was to be obtained was not indeed within the probability of expectation."

Few unbiassed persons, after an examination of the evidence, will arrive at a conclusion different from that of the governor-general; yet it cannot but excite surprise that, with a resident at the court of Lucknow whose duty it was to watch and to report to the government which he represented everything of the slightest public importance, the general disbelief of the claim of the recognized son of the sovereign to the inheritance for which he was destined should have been either unknown or disregarded by the British government. The latter, however, appears to have been the fact. Before the death of Asoff-al-Dowlah, the witness, on whose evidence Sir John Shore relied and acted, had communicated to the resident part, at least, of the facts which he afterwards opened more fully to the governor-general. Strange does it appear that they excited no greater degree of attention—that no particular investigation of them then took place—that all inquiry into the conflicting claims of candidates for the succession was postponed till it was necessary to decide at once between them; when, as was certainly far from improbable, the question was improperly determined. It argues little for the activity of the resident, or of the governor-general, that such should have been

the fact. One or both must have deserved great blame. The most probable solution of the difficulty is, that Sir John Shore's almost invincible habit of leaving affairs to settle themselves led him to acquiesce in the recognition of a title which he could not but feel to be questionable, and this view is not inconsistent with his own language. The consideration of the question was at length, as he says, forced upon him; he took it up upon compulsion, but he investigated it with an earnest desire to discover the truth, and his decision was a sound and an honest one.

The elder begum, though she had supported Vizier Ali, had given offence by dissuading him from certain acts of indecorum and extravagance: and in return for the good advice expended on him, the vizier recommended her withdrawal to Fyzabad. The English government, however, had found it expedient to intimate to the begum that her interference in public affairs might be dispensed with; and this communication tended to allay her resentment towards the vizier and turn it on the English. Her chief adviser was a rich and powerful frequenter of the court of Lucknow, named Almas, who had long been regarded as a determined enemy to the influence of the British government. Almas, however, suddenly sought an interview with the native minister, whose communications had led to the inquiries instituted by Sir John Shore, and fell in with what he was satisfied was the course of the prevailing current, by making heavy complaints of Vizier Ali, whom he designated in terms the most opprobrious. He spoke of the baseness of the vizier's birth, and the profligacy of his character; declared that the begum entirely disapproved of his conduct, and that it was the earnest wish, both of her and himself, that the reigning prince should be deposed, and his place supplied by one of two brothers of the late sovereign, whom he named, to the exclusion not only of all the reputed sons of Asoff-al-Dowlah, but also of Saadut Ali, the undoubted heir to the throne, if the children of the late vizier were spurious. The minister recommended him to open his views to the governor-general, and to him he held language similar to that which he had previously employed. He subsequently repeated it in the presence of the officer in command of the British force in Oude; and these communications were important in preparing the way for that which was to follow, as they enabled the English authorities to obtain a distinct admission of Vizier Ali's defective title from the party most likely to defend it in opposition to that of the rightful claimant. True it was that the begum and Almas supported other candidates, and not Saadut Ali, but the claim of Vizier Ali was abandoned by all capable of rendering efficient aid in upholding it. The strange succession of intrigues which had followed the death of Asoff-al-Dowlah are thus recounted by Sir John Shore:—"The preceding detail fur-

nishes a history which has been rarely paralleled. Vizier Ali, without any title in the public estimation, was elevated to the musnud by the selection of the begum, and act of the resident and minister. He was confirmed upon it by the acknowledgment of his title by the Company, and their declaration to support it. Without that acknowledgment and support he would have been opposed by Almas, whose influence over the begum would have gained her consent to his deposition. The declarations of Almas on his departure from Lucknow were equivalent to a renunciation of allegiance to the Vizier Ali, and his measures were so suspicious as to excite general alarm. Vizier Ali immediately began to act in opposition to the influence and interests of the Company, and the interference of the begum in the administration of affairs produced disorder. The begum and Vizier Ali were not then united. She censured and condemned his conduct; he felt sore under her control, and urged her departure to Fyzabad. An intimation to the begum to withdraw her interference united them, and under their union the most violent and insulting measures to the Company were adopted. The begum, from whatever motives, now disclaims Vizier Ali, as illegitimate and unqualified; and proposes to depose the person of her choice, and transfer the succession to the sons of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah. The proposition is brought forward by Almas, who joins in it. This extraordinary succession of incidents gives occasion to a very characteristic remark on the part of the governor-general:—"If," says he, "the interests of the Company and humanity, the reputation of the Company for honour and justice, did not oppose the measure, my own feelings would have induced me to withdraw from a scene of so much embarrassment." He could not withdraw, but his mind appears to have been greatly divided as to the course which he should take. He seriously entertained the thought of continuing Vizier Ali on the throne and endeavouring to control him through the begum. As a temptation to adopt this course, the begum had offered to make an addition to the annual subsidy. Such a plan would have given to her and her ally, Almas, all that they wished; but no one can believe that it would have been beneficial to the interests of the British government. Another mode which occurred to the mind of the governor-general was, to place the administration of the affairs of Oude directly under the control of the Company's government. But this, he observed, could only continue during the minority of Vizier Ali (who was seventeen years of age), and he deemed such a plan open to weighty objections. With much hesitation, he chose the right course; and as his conduct was the result of deep and anxious consideration, the reasoning by which he was finally determined is deserving of notice. "The preceding statement of facts and information," said he, "suggested questions of very serious embarrassment. The course of my investiga-

tion into the birth of Vizier Ali had weakened or subverted all the grounds upon which our acknowledgment of his title had been made: the acknowledgment of him as his son by the late nabob—his birth in the harem—the force of the Mahometan law in favour of that acknowledgment—the apparent satisfaction of the inhabitants at Lucknow at his elevation, and the decision of the elder begum in his favour. It proved, that if the succession to the musnud of Oude had been suspended during the first interval of surprise and confusion attending the sudden death of the nabob Azoff-al-Dowlah, and if an appeal had been made to the unbiased voice of the people as a jury, their verdict would have pronounced Vizier Ali, and all the sons of the late nabob, spurious—destitute of any title to the musnud; and that the sons of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah had an undeniable right to it. The evidence of Zehseen established to my entire conviction the justice and truth of the public sentiment; and I had the mortification to learn that the reputation of the Company had suffered by an act which, in the opinion of all reputable people, had been no less disgraceful than unjust. It was impossible to silence these impressions by arguing that the government had not directly interfered in deciding upon the succession, since, in the opinion of all, Vizier Ali's elevation was considered an act of the English government; and it is certain that, without their acknowledgment and support, he could not have maintained his situation. On the other hand, it might be argued, that the state of the case was now altered; that the nabob having been acknowledged, and that acknowledgment confirmed, the question was no longer open to decision; that the discredit of the act had been incurred, and that the reputation of the Company would not now be restored by an act which, in the first instance, would have promoted it; that the public were in some degree reconciled to the succession of Vizier Ali, who had gained many partisans."

The objection above noticed is combated by the governor-general, after reference to precedent, by arguing, "that our acknowledgment of Vizier Ali in the first instance had been extorted by the urgency of the case, and that the more deliberate confirmation of it was made upon presumption which could not be set aside upon the evidence or information before us;—that the public sense of Vizier Ali's want of all title to the musnud had undergone no revolution, nor ever could;—that there is not a man living who ever believed him to be the son of Azoff-al-Dowlah, or to have a shadow of right to the musnud; on the contrary, that in Lucknow he is generally known to be the son of a Fraush; and if his future character should prove as abandoned as it promises to be, the disgrace attending his elevation to the musnud would be perpetuated;—that although many were now reconciled to his title from various motives—the support of the Company, his liberality, influ-

ence, interest, or indifference—men of the most respectability, who were not biased by such motives, had not changed their sentiments upon it.” The governor-general thus continues:—“The investiture of Vizier Ali, in the words of Abdul Lateef, was doubtless considered by all men of respectability as an act of injustice to the immediate descendants of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah, as the rightful heirs; and no one gave the Company credit for acting from motives of supposed justice, but all ascribed their acknowledgment of Vizier Ali to the political expectation of establishing a more easy and effective influence in Oude than they otherwise could. If so, with a certainty that the sentiments of Abdul Lateef were general, with evidence that they are well founded, the political reputation of the Company can only be restored by the establishment of a family on the musnud which in the universal opinion has an exclusive right to it. Wherever that opinion extends, the justice and reputation of the Company must be affected by confirming the succession of an empire to the son of a Fraush. If Saadut Ali has a right to the musnud, upon what grounds can we defend the denial of it? Whilst the presumption was in favour of Vizier Ali, we determined to maintain his title, not only against Saadut Ali, but against all opposition. That presumption is done away, and the right of Saadut Ali, as the representative of the family of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah, stands undeniable by justice and universal opinion. It may be argued that we are not bound to run the risk of hostilities in support of it; and the argument would be unanswerable if we could withdraw from all interference in the question, or if our interference did not amount to a denial of his right. The begum and Almas, by their admission that Vizier Ali has no title to the musnud, and by their proposition to invest Mirza Jungly (a younger brother of Saadut Ali), on whatever principle it may be founded, have precluded themselves from all right of opposition to the claims of Saadut Ali. I do not mean to assert that they will not oppose his claim against the support of the English; but having admitted the superior right of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah’s sons, their opposition to the representative of that family would prove a total dereliction of all regard to right and principle on their parts, and a determination to maintain their own interests against all opposition. On the other hand, as every act of injustice is the parent of more, we must not overlook the future possible consequences of denying that right to Saadut Ali, to which, in the opinion of all, his title stands good. We are so implicated in our connection with Oude, that we cannot withdraw from it, and we are so situated in it, that without a decisive influence in its administration we cannot have any security. The consequences of such a situation might be fatal if the government of the country were secretly hostile to us, and such, in my judgment, would be the situation of the Company

under the administration of Vizier Ali, admitting that we could extort from him Allahabad, a pecuniary compensation, and an annual addition to the subsidy; he must be put under restrictions, the begum must be compelled to relinquish all interference in the administration, and the power of the Almas must be reduced; without this, which would be equivalent to taking the administration of government into our own hands, all attempts to improve the administration of the country and render the situation of the Company secure would be fruitless.” After adverting to the difficulty of finding proper instruments for effecting this, the governor-general adds:—“The restrictions which must be imposed upon Vizier Ali would never be borne by him, but under a secret determination to embrace the first opportunity of shaking them off.”

The above remarks contain much that admits of far wider application than the events which called them forth, and it is principally for this reason that they have been quoted at length. They contain an unanswerable justification of the course which the governor-general ultimately determined to pursue—granting the facts on which it was based, which indeed scarcely admitted of doubt. It is only to be lamented that these facts were not ascertained at an earlier period. After the series of arguments which have been quoted, Sir John Shore briefly adverted to some personal objections to his acting against Vizier Ali, grounded on their being on apparently amicable terms, and on the governor-general’s dislike to all deception. It is impossible not to be struck with the delicacy of sentiment which these objections display, and equally impossible not to admire the determination with which they were vanquished by a sense of public duty. All the feelings and inclinations of Sir John Shore, but this one, disposed him to acquiesce in the existing state of things, but he did not yield to their influence. Saadut Ali was restored to his right through the agency of the British government, and the usurper compelled to withdraw to a private station, with an allowance for his support, proportioned, not to his natural place among men, but to that which he had for a time so strangely occupied. By the treaty which determined the relations of the new vizier and the English, the annual subsidy was fixed at seventy-six lacs, and the fort of Allahabad surrendered to the latter power. The English force in Oude was to be ordinarily kept up to ten thousand, and if it at any time exceeded thirteen thousand, the vizier was to pay for the number in excess; while, if it were allowed to fall below eight thousand, a proportionate deduction was to be made. Twelve lacs were to be paid to the English as compensation for the expense of placing Saadut Ali on the throne, and he was restrained from holding communication with any foreign state, employing any Europeans, or permitting any to settle in his dominions without the consent of his British ally.

Sir John Shore's administration presents nothing further for report. He was elevated to an Irish peerage by the title of Lord Teignmouth, and quitted India in March, 1798.

CHAPTER XV.

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL—POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN INDIA—HOSTILE DESIGNS OF TIPPOO SULTAN—DISSOLUTION OF THE FRENCH CORPS IN THE NIZAM'S SERVICE—BRITISH ARMY TAKES THE FIELD—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF SERINGAPATAM—DEATH OF TIPPOO—SETTLEMENT OF MYSORE—PARTITION TREATY WITH THE NIZAM—DISTURBANCES CREATED BY DEOONDIA.

SOME hesitation occurred in providing for the vacancy occasioned by the retirement of Lord Teignmouth. The Governor of Madras, Lord Hobart, had expected to succeed to the chief place in the government of Bengal; but the expectation was disappointed by the selection of Lord Cornwallis to re-assume the duties which a few years before he had relinquished. This appointment was notified to India, but never carried into effect, his lordship being subsequently named lord-lieutenant of Ireland. The choice of the home authorities ultimately fell upon the Earl of Mornington, who previously stood appointed to the government of Madras, and he quitted England late in the year 1797. The new governor-general had established for himself the reputation of a distinguished scholar, a brilliant parliamentary speaker, and an able man of business. His attention had for a series of years been sedulously devoted to the acquisition of such information as was calculated to fit him for the office which he had now attained. His pursuit of this branch of knowledge was, in all probability, the result of inclination rather than of any other motive; as the probability of success to any aspirant to an office so honourable and so highly remunerated as that of governor-general must be regarded as small. But whatever the motives, the result was most happy. The Earl of Mornington proceeded to his destination prepared for his duties by as perfect an acquaintance with the history and circumstances of British India as the most assiduous inquiries could secure. In addition to the fruits of his private studies, he had derived some advantage from having served as a junior member of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. At the Cape of Good Hope he met with Major Kirkpatrick, an officer who had filled the office of British resident at more than one of the native courts; and the information derived from him, added to that which had already been accumulated by reading and official observation, enabled the governor-general to enter upon his office with a confidence which in his case was well warranted, but which, with inferior opportunities, no one would be justified in entertaining.

The position of the British government in India at this time was not inaccurately described by Lord Teignmouth as "respectable." The Company possessed a considerable, but not a compact territory. Beyond their

own dominions they exercised a certain influence, which might have been much greater had its extension been encouraged instead of being checked. But still the political prospects of the British in India were far from being bright. In various quarters the elements of danger were gathering into heavy masses, which the most supine observer of the times could scarcely overlook; and the policy which for some years had been pursued threatened to leave the British government to brave the storm without assistance. The probability, indeed, seemed to be, that, in the event of its being attacked by any native power, it would find in almost every other an enemy. Statesmen, whose views, entirely moulded upon European experience, were incapable of adapting themselves to a state of society so widely different as that existing in India, had determined that if ever the British government should emerge from the passive acquiescence to which it was usually doomed, it should be for the purpose of maintaining a principle which had long been regarded as the conservator of the peace of Europe—the balance of power. The attempt to preserve the peace of India upon any such principle must now appear, to every one acquainted with the subject, not only idle, but ludicrous. But at the period under review, the hope, wild as it was, found harbour in the breasts of statesmen of high reputation; and the new governor-general was earnestly enjoined to maintain the balance of power as established by the treaty of Seringapatam. That balance, however, such as it was, had been destroyed; and the apathy or bad faith of the British government had contributed to accelerate its destruction. The dominions and resources of the nizam had been left to be partitioned by the Mahrattas at their pleasure; and though the dissensions of the conquerors had relieved the conquered party from a portion of the humiliation and loss incurred by his defeat, he had, notwithstanding, suffered greatly both in honour and power. The means for preserving any portion of either, which had been forced upon him by the policy of the British government, afforded, as has been seen, additional cause for alarm to that government. The main strength of his army was under French control; and as, in states constituted like that of the nizam, the influence of the army was far greater than in those wherein the due subordination of

military to civil authority is understood and maintained, the councils of that prince were in a great degree swayed by those who held the power of the sword. The danger of the British government from the continued maintenance of such a force in the service of the nizam was sufficiently obvious. No hope of effective assistance from that prince, against Tippoo or any other enemy, could be looked for; and even his neutrality could not safely be relied upon. This was not the only evil, perhaps not the greatest evil, resulting from the unfortunate course of policy which had been pursued. The hostile feelings with which the English and French regarded each other were known throughout India; and the knowledge that the star of French fortune was in the ascendant, while the interest of the English was declining, was eminently calculated to give confidence to the enemies of the latter nation, and even to add to the number of their enemies by deciding the wavering against them.

On turning from the nizam to the Mahrattas, there was little to relieve the gloom created by a contemplation of the unprosperous state of the British interests at the court of Hyderabad. The course of events had greatly diminished the power and influence of the peishwa, and there was little probability that the inferior chiefs would hold themselves bound by engagements entered into by their nominal leader to co-operate vigorously in any common object. The predominant influence at Poona was that of Scindia, who was not believed to have any good-will towards the British government. Such were the altered circumstances of the two states who had co-operated with the English in reducing the power of Mysore. Arcot and Tanjore remained, as they had long been, sources of weakness rather than of strength. The new nabob of Arcot, following the example of his predecessor, gave up his country an unprotected prey to the rapacity of usurers. The state of Tanjore was in this respect little better; and there an intricate question of disputed succession furnished additional cause of embarrassment.

In the north, the extraordinary scenes which had recently taken place in Oude were yet fresh in the memory of all, and the new government which Lord Teignmouth had been compelled by duty to establish, though in strict accordance with public feeling, had not yet acquired any portion of the confidence which is the growth of time. It was apprehended that Almas would resist it by arms, and fears were entertained of an insurrection of the Rohilla chiefs, a hardy and warlike race, never slow to draw the sword when an opportunity presented itself for asserting their independence. Zemaun Shah, the ruler of Caubul, who had on several occasions disturbed the peace of India, might, it was thought, deem the existing combination of circumstances favourable to a renewal of his attempts. This

belief did not rest on mere conjecture. It was known that Zemaun Shah had been in communication with the bitter and irreconcilable enemy of the British power, Tippoo Sultan, and the mention of this prince leads to the consideration of the chief danger which the Company's government had to apprehend. The untamable hostility of Tippoo, a feeling as active as it was intense, had led him, ever since the conclusion of the peace negotiated by Lord Cornwallis, to seek in every quarter the means of regaining his lost power and influence, and of humbling the strangers who had inflicted such deep and painful wounds on his ambitious mind. His intercourse with Zemaun Shah was directed to these objects. An invasion of the north of India from Caubul would have facilitated any hostile measures taken by Tippoo in the south by distracting the attention of the British government and dividing its force. At Poona, Tippoo had laboured assiduously to counteract British influence, and to engage the Mahratta chiefs in his views. At Hyderabad he had ventured to pursue the same course, and here he found his purposes answered by the co-operation of the French officers in the service of the nizam. It was not in this quarter only that Tippoo sought aid from the national feeling of hostility so long existing between the French and the English people. During a period of many years he had employed all the means which suggested themselves for inducing the French to lend him efficient assistance in driving their rivals from India. An embassy sent by him to Constantinople had been intended to proceed from thence to Paris; but circumstances changed the determination, and another embassy, consisting of three persons, was subsequently dispatched direct to France, proceeding by sea from Pondicherry. It arrived while the unfortunate Louis XVI. still sat on the throne of his ancestors, and was received most graciously; but its object was unattained. The French government, then tottering to its foundation, was in no condition to render assistance to a despot separated from France by thousands of miles, and whose only claim to support was founded on his hatred of the English nation. The mission failed, and the meanness of the presents which Tippoo had thought worthy to be offered to the monarch of one of the most powerful nations in the world afforded abundant room for those sportive effusions of wit and ridicule which even the obvious approach of the moral earthquake which was to shake all the thrones of Europe could not banish from the French court. The ambassadors, too, quarrelled among themselves as to the apportionment of certain presents which the liberality of the French king bestowed on them; and on their return, without effecting anything for the purposes of the mission, one, who had been slighted by his colleagues on account of his having previously been in the position of a menial servant, revenged himself by accusing them of partic-

pating in indulgences forbidden by the Prophet. Tippoo, not unprepared to feel displeasure at the unsatisfactory termination of an attempt which had been the cause of considerable expense, soothed his feelings by disgracing the ambassadors. But he did not thus easily relinquish an object so near his heart. The fearful changes which swept over France shortly after the departure of Tippoo's ministers from that country made no alteration in his views or conduct. Through the agency of the government of the Mauritius various communications were made by Tippoo, in all of which he professed the strongest attachment to the French people, and attributed to this cause the hostility of the English, and the misfortunes to which he had in consequence been subjected. Well disposed as were those who administered the government of France to enter into any project for giving annoyance to Great Britain—anxious as they were to vindicate the national glory in India, where the flag of France had so often been lowered in submission to the rival nation, the state of affairs in Europe long rendered it impracticable for the French to bestow much of attention and any portion of assistance upon a supplicant from a distant part of the world. Tippoo, however, was too ardently bent upon his object to abandon it in despair; though the apparent indifference of the great nation must have annoyed, it did not discourage him, and some time in the year 1797 a circumstance occurred which reanimated his hopes. A privateer from the Mauritius arrived at Mangalore dismasted, and the commander solicited the means of repair. The officer exercising the chief naval authority at Mangalore, possessing a slight acquaintance with the French language, entered into conversation with the master of the disabled vessel, and reported, as the result, that this person represented himself as the second in command at the Mauritius, and stated that he had been specially instructed to touch at Mangalore for the purpose of ascertaining the sultan's views regarding the co-operation of a French force which was ready to be employed in the expulsion from India of the common enemy, the English. Nothing could be more gratifying to the sultan than such an overture; the master of the privateer was promptly admitted to the royal presence, and honoured with long and frequent conferences. The result was an arrangement, by which the master of the vessel, though recognized in his high character of an envoy, was, for the sake of concealment, to be ostensibly received into the service of Tippoo; the vessel was to be purchased on the part of that prince, and to be laden with merchandise for the Mauritius; and confidential agents of the Sultan were to proceed in her for the purpose of concerting all that related to the proposed armament.

The servants of Tippoo were less credulous than their master. They had conversed with some of the crew of the privateer, and dis-

covered that the rank and mission of the commander were fictitious. The result of their inquiries was communicated to the sultan, together with a representation of the danger which he would incur by disclosing his views to the English without any prospect of timely or adequate succour from the French. But Tippoo was too anxious that the Frenchman's assertions should be true to allow him to entertain a doubt of them. He met the warnings of his ministers by a reference to the doctrine of predestination, by which a sincere Mussulman consoles himself under all calamities, and excuses his want of exertion to avert them. The purchase of the vessel was arranged, but as the master was to remain in Mysore, the money was intrusted to one of his countrymen to make the required payment on its arrival at the Mauritius. This person absconded with the amount thus obtained, and his subsequent fate is unknown.

His unexpected flight disconcerted in some degree the sultan's plans, and even shook his confidence in the representations of the pretended French envoy, who was placed under personal restraint, on suspicion of being in collusion with the defaulter. Considerable delay took place before Tippoo could determine what course to pursue; but ultimately it was resolved to restore the vessel to the master, on his giving bond for the amount intrusted to his countryman, and to allow him to proceed to the Mauritius, conveying with him two servants of Tippoo, as ambassadors to the government of that island, with letters from their sovereign. The suspicion with which the commander of the vessel had been regarded probably generated a similar feeling in his mind; and, before he had been long at sea, he demanded to examine the letters in charge of Tippoo's ambassadors, threatening that, if refused, he would proceed on a privateering expedition, instead of making for the Mauritius. Some altercation took place, which was ended by the Frenchman adopting the short and effective course of forcibly seizing and opening the objects of his curiosity. The perusal of the letters seems to have removed his distrust, and he steered without hesitation to the Mauritius, where he arrived in January, 1798.

To ambassadors were received by the French governor with distinguished honour; but the publicity thus given to their arrival, however flattering, was altogether inconsistent with the secrecy which it was intended should be preserved with regard to their mission. Their despatches being opened, were found to express the great anxiety of Tippoo for the co-operation of the French in a plan which was laid down for the conquest of the English and Portuguese possessions in India, and of the territories of their natives allies. The answer was most courteous, but little satisfactory. The French authorities declared that they had not at their disposal any adequate means of aiding the sultan's views, but

that his proposals should be transmitted to the government of France, who, it was not doubted, would joyfully comply with his wishes. The letters of the sultan were accordingly transferred to France in duplicate; but as a long period would necessarily elapse before the determination of the government there could be known, the governor of the island, General Malartic, resolved to manifest his sympathy with the cause of Tippoo by issuing a proclamation, inviting citizens, both white and black, to enrol themselves under the Sultan's flag, assuring those who might be disposed to volunteer, of good pay, the amount of which was to be fixed with the ambassadors, and of being permitted to return to their own country whenever they might desire. The success of the experiment was commensurate with its wisdom. Tippoo's servants re-embarked with a mere handful of followers, and they for the most part the refuse of the island rabble. With this precious addition to the strength of the sultan, they landed at Mangalore in April.

One of the earliest measures of Tippoo's new friends, was to organize a Jacobin club on those principles of national equality and universal fraternization which formed the creed of their countrymen at home. This association was not merely tolerated by the sultan—it was honoured by his special approbation, and he even condescended to become a member of it. Whether or not he submitted to the fraternal embrace is uncertain; but it is beyond a doubt that he was enrolled among these assertors of liberty and equality, and added to the titles which he previously bore another, which, in the East, had at least the charm of novelty: the Sultan of Mysore became Citizen Tippoo. The tree of liberty was planted, and the cap of equality elevated. The citizen adventurers met in primary assembly; "instructed each other," says Colonel Wilks, "in the enforcement of their new rights, and the abandonment of their old duties;" the emblems of royalty were publicly burnt, and an oath of hatred to that antiquated institution publicly administered and taken; and these ceremonies took place in a country where one man held at his disposal the lives, liberty, and property of all others—that man, moreover, though not only a despot, but a tyrant, witnessing these republican rites with approving eyes, and giving to them importance by his countenance and support.

The Earl of Mornington arrived at Madras in April, and at the seat of his government in Bengal, in May, 1798. Shortly afterwards, a copy of the proclamation issued at the Mauritius, announcing the designs of Tippoo, and inviting French citizens to join his standard, appeared in Calcutta. It necessarily attracted the attention of the governor-general, whose first impression was to doubt its authenticity. "It seemed incredible," said the governor-general, in recording his views on the subject,

"that if the French really entertained a design of furnishing aid to Tippoo, they would publicly declare that design, when no other apparent end could be answered by such a declaration, excepting that of exposing the project in its infancy to the observation of our governments both at home and in India, and of preparing both for a timely and effectual resistance. It did not appear more probable that Tippoo (whatever might be his secret design) would have risked so public and unguarded an avowal of his hostility." The governor-general, however, deemed it proper to guard against the dangers of rash and obstinate disbelief, no less than against the inconveniences that might result from over-hasty credence. He forthwith instituted such inquiries as might lead to the determination of the question whether or not such a proclamation had been issued; and to be prepared for whatever measures might become necessary, he directed the Governor of Madras, General Harris, to turn his attention to the collection of a force on the coast, to meet any emergency.

The authenticity of the proclamation was soon ascertained; but another doubt occurred—whether the step might not have been taken by M. Malartic without the concurrence of Tippoo, and for the promotion of some object of the French government unconnected with his interests and unauthorized by his consent. The investigation which followed developed all the facts that have been related as to the embassy despatched by Tippoo to the Mauritius, its flattering reception, the previous absence of any view on the part of the French authorities of aiding Tippoo in any manner, and the subsequent proceedings, down to the embarkation of the motley band of volunteers, their landing at Mangalore, and their admission into the Sultan's service.

It was now for the governor-general to determine whether he would afford Tippoo further time to mature his plans, and to gain strength for carrying them into effect, or whether he would strike while the enemy was comparatively unprepared. He preferred the latter course, and resolved to obtain effectual security against the animosity of such an implacable foe by reducing his power so far as to establish a permanent restraint on his means of offence.

With this object in view the Earl of Mornington meditated a series of bold and extended operations against Mysore. It was in the south that the blow was to be struck, and it therefore became of importance to ascertain what probability existed of the speedy assemblage of a powerful army on the coast of Coromandel. The communications from Madras were discouraging. The resources of that presidency were represented as exhausted; the equipment of an army, it was alleged, could not take place within such a period as would admit of its acting with effect; and some of the more influential of the servants of the government even suggested the danger of

making any preparation for war, lest Tippoo should take alarm, and invade the Carnatic before the English were in a condition to resist him. Before the receipt of these representations, the governor-general had been led to conclude that it would be necessary to postpone the execution of his plan for an immediate attack upon Tippoo. The advices from Madras confirmed this view; but as the attack was only to be deferred, not relinquished, and as moreover, under any circumstances, it would be necessary to place the British territory under the government of Fort St. George in a state of defence, directions were given to extricate the army of that presidency from the wretched condition of inefficiency to which it had been reduced by the enforcement of a blind and indiscriminating frugality; and, in the mean time, the negotiations in progress at the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah were continued with reference to the great objects in view—the annihilation of French influence in India, and the increased security of the British dominions in that country, by humbling the chief enemy which the English had to dread, Tippoo Sultan.

The nizam had long been anxious for a closer connection with the British government than that which subsisted between them; but so far from any approach having been made to gratify his wishes in this respect, opportunities for attaching him more intimately to English interests had been positively neglected, much to the detriment of those interests, and to the advancement of those of the French. To the Earl of Mornington fell the task of correcting the errors of those who had preceded him. A new subsidiary treaty, consisting of ten articles, was concluded with the nizam. The first five regulated the pay and duties of the subsidiary force, the number of which was fixed at six thousand. The sixth was a most important article. It pronounced that, immediately upon the arrival of the force at Hyderabad, the whole of the officers and sergeants of the French party were to be dismissed, and the troops under them “so dispersed and disorganized, that no trace of the former establishment shall remain.” It was further stipulated, that thenceforward no Frenchman should be entertained in the service of the nizam, or of any of his chiefs or dependants; that no Frenchman should be suffered to remain in any part of that prince’s dominions, nor any European whatever be admitted into the service of the nizam, or permitted to reside within his territories, without the knowledge and consent of the Company’s government. By other articles, the British government pledged their endeavours to obtain the insertion, in a new treaty contemplated between the Company, the nizam, and the peishwa, of such a clause as should place each of the two latter at ease with regard to the other. Should the peishwa refuse, the British government undertook to mediate in any differences that might arise. The Nizam bound himself to refrain from

aggression on the government of Poonah, and to acquiesce in the decisions of his British ally. No correspondence on affairs of importance was to be carried on with the Marhatta states, either by the nizam or the English, without the mutual consent and privity of both.

The French sepoy corps in the service of the nizam had been raised before the commencement of the war in which that prince was engaged, in conjunction with the English and the peishwa, against Tippoo Sultan, but its original strength did not exceed fifteen hundred. In a few years it had increased to eleven thousand, and, at the period of the arrival of the Earl of Mornington in India, it consisted of thirteen regiments of two battalions each, amounting in the whole to upwards of fourteen thousand men. Its discipline, which had been regarded as very defective, had been greatly improved; and although deemed by military judges inferior in this respect to the English army, it was far superior to the ordinary infantry of the native powers. Besides field-pieces to each regiment, there was attached to the corps a park of forty pieces of ordnance, chiefly brass, from twelve to thirty-six pounders, with a well-trained body of artillerymen, many of whom were Europeans. A design existed of raising a body of cavalry to act with the corps, and a commencement had been made. The national spirit manifested by its officers, and the zeal and activity which they displayed in advancing the interests of their own country and undermining those of the English have been already noticed. The death of its commander, M. Raymond, which had occurred a short time before the period under consideration, did not appear materially to have diminished French influence. Raymond was an accomplished master of intrigue, and a successful practitioner of all the arts of crooked policy, but he enjoyed little reputation for military skill. His successor, M. Peron, was a more active and enterprising man than Raymond, his political feelings were more violent, and he was far better acquainted with the principles of the military art. The second in command, an officer named Baptiste, though inferior to Peron in military endowments, compensated for the deficiency by a burning hatred of the English, and a degree of cunning which rendered him a most useful instrument for carrying on the designs in which the French party had for years been engaged.

But this corps, so long in a constant state of increase, and so long the source of annoyance and apprehension to the British government, was now sentenced to dispersion, and the talents of its officers, whether for war or intrigue, were unable to arrest its fate. The governor-general had directed the government of Madras to make a detachment for the purpose of co-operating with the British troops already at Hyderabad against the French force at that place. The dependency which on former occasions had operated so injuriously at Madras, had on this nearly paralyzed the arm

of the British government, when raised to strike at a most formidable and most insidious source of danger. Objections were raised, and, but for the firmness and public spirit of General Harris, the governor, they would have been fatal. He met them by declaring that he was prepared to take the responsibility of the measure upon himself; and that, if no public money could be had, he would furnish from his private funds the sum necessary to put the troops in motion. The required detachment was accordingly made, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts. Some little delay occurred in its quitting the Company's territories; but it arrived at Hyderabad on the 10th of October, and joined the British force previously at that place.

On the arrival of the detachment, Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, the acting British resident, demanded the full execution of that article of the treaty which related to the French corps. But intrigue was at work to procure its postponement, and the nizam hesitated. His minister, though well inclined to the English, recoiled from a measure so vigorous as that called for by the British resident, and was desirous that resort to extremities should be delayed, and, if possible, altogether avoided. The resident endeavoured to put an end to the vacillation of the court of Hyderabad by a powerful remonstrance, concluding with an avowal of his intention to act without the authority of the nizam, if that authority continued to be withheld. The effect of this was assisted by a movement of the British force to the ground which commanded the French lines. There was now no longer any room for evasion—the nizam and his minister were compelled to make choice between the English and the French; and, as was to be expected, they determined in favour of the former. A body of two thousand horse was sent to the support of the British force, and a mutiny which broke out in the French camp aided the views of those who sought its dispersion. The object was speedily effected, and without the loss of a single life. The French officers surrendered themselves as prisoners, not reluctant thus to escape the fury of their men; and the sepoy, after some parleying, laid down their arms. The whole affair occupied but a few hours. The total number of men disarmed was about eleven thousand, part of the corps being absent on detachment. Means were taken for the arrest of the officers commanding the detached force; and the whole were ordered to be sent to Calcutta, from thence to be transported to England; the governor-general engaging that, on their arrival there, they should not be treated as prisoners of war, but be immediately restored to their own country, without suffering any detention for exchange. The property of the captured officers was carefully preserved for their use, and their pecuniary claims on the nizam duly settled, through the influence of the British resident.

It had been the desire of the governor-

general to conclude with the peishwa a treaty similar to that which had been entered into with the nizam; but the object was not attained. Though the relations between the peishwa and the English government were professedly friendly, there was perhaps not a Mahratta chief who would have viewed the humiliation, or even the destruction, of the British power without delight; and amid the complicated intrigues of which a Mahratta durbar is ever the scene, the attempts of the Earl of Mornington to restore the triple alliance to a state of efficiency were defeated.

In the mean time the preparations against Tippoo proceeded. The objects of the governor-general, as explained by himself, were, by obtaining the whole maritime territory remaining in the possession of Tippoo Sultan below the Ghats on the coast of Malabar, to preclude him from all future communication by sea with his French allies—to compel him to defray the entire expenses of the war, thus securing reimbursement of the outlay rendered necessary by his hostility, and, by crippling his resources, increasing the probability of future security—to prevail on him to admit permanent residents at his court from the English and their allies, and to procure the expulsion of all the natives of France in his service, together with an engagement for the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen both from his army and dominions. Before hostilities commenced, however, the sultan was allowed time to avert them by timely concession. Some doubt had arisen whether or not the district of Wynad were included in the cessions made to the English at the peace, and their claim to it was abandoned. Disputes had arisen between Tippoo and the Rajah of Coorg, whom he cordially hated, and these it was proposed to refer to the decision of commissioners. In November, news arrived in India of the invasion of Egypt by the French, and of the victory obtained over the fleet of that nation by Lord Nelson. This intelligence was communicated to Tippoo, with such remarks as the subject and the known views of the Sultan naturally suggested. During the same month, another letter was addressed by the governor-general to Tippoo, adverting to the transactions between that prince and the French government of the Mauritius, and proposing to send an English officer to Tippoo for the purpose of communicating the views of the Company and their allies. Another letter was subsequently despatched, calling attention to the former; and to be prepared either to lend vigour to the operations of war, or to facilitate the progress of negotiation, the governor-general determined to proceed to Madras, where he arrived on the 31st of December. Here he received an answer from Tippoo to the two letters which he had last addressed to that prince. A ridiculous attempt was made to explain away the embassy to the Mauritius, and its consequences. In all other respects the communication was vague, almost beyond the ordinary measure of Orien-

tal deficiency of meaning. The proposal to despatch a British officer to the court of the sultan might be regarded as declined, Tippoo saying, that he would inform the governor-general at what time and place it would be convenient to receive him, but neither time nor place being named. The answer of the Earl of Mornington contained an able and indignant exposure of the conduct of the sultan; but the door for negotiation was still kept open, and acceptance of the proposal previously made strenuously pressed upon Tippoo's consideration.

A few days later another communication was made, repeating the proposal, and enclosing a letter from the Grand Seigneur to Tippoo, denouncing the conduct of the French in Egypt, and calling upon the Sultan to co-operate against them. Throughout January, and a considerable part of the succeeding month, the letters remained unanswered. Of the state of affairs in Egypt nothing satisfactory was known: the arrival of a French fleet in the Arabian Gulf was apprehended, and it was ascertained that while Tippoo either neglected to answer the communications of the British government, or answered them with studied evasion, an embassy from him to the executive Directory of France was about to take its departure from the Danish settlement of Tranquebar. Overtures for peaceful arrangements of differences were obviously wasted on such a man, and the governor-general properly determined "to suspend all negotiation with the sultan until the united force of the arms of the Company and of their allies" should "have made such an impression on his territories" as might "give full effect to the just representations of the allied powers." Before the despatch, however, containing the report of this intention was closed, a letter was received from Tippoo, singularly brief and frivolous, but which conveyed the sultan's assent, so often requested, to the mission of a British officer to his court. The decision of the Earl of Mornington on this occasion was marked by his usual judgment:—The "design," said he, "is evidently to gain time until a change of circumstances and of season shall enable him to avail himself of the assistance of France. I shall endeavour to frustrate this design; and although I shall not decline even this tardy and insidious acceptance of my repeated propositions for opening a negotiation, I shall accompany the negotiation by the movement of the army, for the purpose of enforcing such terms of peace as shall give effectual security to the Company's possessions against any hostile consequences of the sultan's alliance with the French."

The command of the army of the Carnatic had been intended for Sir Alured Clarke, the commander-in-chief of the forces of Bengal; but the apprehension of an invasion of the north of India by Zemaun Shah suggested the necessity of retaining that officer at Calcutta, where he was appointed to exercise the chief

functions of government during the absence of the Earl of Mornington. The command thus vacated was bestowed on General Harris, who with singular disinterestedness, when the alarm on account of Zemaun Shah had been dispelled by the retrograde march of that sovereign, suggested the re-appointment of Sir Alured Clarke in supersession of himself. The command, however, was retained by General Harris at the express desire of the governor-general, and he accordingly joined the army, which consisted of two thousand six hundred cavalry (nearly a thousand of whom were Europeans), between five and six hundred European artillerymen, four thousand six hundred European infantry, eleven thousand native infantry, and two thousand seven hundred gun-lascars and pioneers; forming altogether a force of about twenty-one thousand. The army was accompanied by sixty field-pieces, and was well supplied with stores. A corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Read, was to collect, arrange, and eventually escort supplies of provisions to this army during its advance. A similar corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, was appointed to the discharge of similar service in Coimbatore.

Another army, consisting of six thousand men, assembled on the coast of Malabar, under the command of General Stuart, ascended into Coorg. It was against this army that the first effort of Tippoo was directed. On the 2nd of March, a brigade of three native battalions, under Lieutenant-colonel Montresor, took post at Sedasseer, distant a few miles from Periapattam. On the morning of the 5th, an encampment was unexpectedly observed to be in progress of formation near the latter place. Before the evening, it had assumed a formidable appearance; several hundred tents were counted, and one of them being green seemed to mark the presence of the sultan. The most recent information, however, was opposed to the belief that the tent was designed to shelter Tippoo, it being represented that he had marched to meet the Madras army, and that a detachment, under Mahomed Reza, was the only force left in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. In this state of uncertainty, General Stuart resolved to strengthen the brigade of Colonel Montresor by an additional battalion of sepoye, and wait for further intelligence to determine his future course. At break of day on the 6th, General Hartley, the second in command, advanced to reconnoitre. He could discern that the whole of the enemy's army was in motion, but the thick jungle which covered the country, and the haziness of the atmosphere, rendered it impossible to ascertain the object of the movement. Uncertainty was removed soon after nine o'clock by an attack on the British line. The front and rear were assailed almost at the same moment, and the advance of the enemy had been conducted with such secrecy and expedition, that the junction of the battalion destined to reinforce

Colonel Montresor was prevented. His brigade was completely surrounded, and for several hours had to sustain the attack of the enemy under the disadvantage of great disparity of numbers. General Stuart, on receiving intelligence of the attack, marched with a strong body of Europeans, and encountering the division of the enemy which was acting on the rear of the English brigade, put them to flight after a smart engagement of about half an hour's duration. The attack in the front still continued, and on reaching it General Stuart found the men nearly exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of ammunition; but the fortune of the day was decided, and the enemy retreated in all directions.

Notwithstanding the reports of the sultan having advanced to oppose General Harris, this attack was made under his personal command, and he was probably encouraged to it by the recollection of the success which some years before had followed an attempt not very dissimilar, in the destruction of the force under Colonel Baillie. The sultan, however, in this instance gained neither honour nor advantage. His loss has been estimated as high as two thousand, while that of the English fell short of a hundred and fifty. The discovery thus made of the unexpected proximity of Tippoo induced General Stuart to change the disposition of his force, and to abandon the post occupied at Sedasseer. This circumstance enabled the sultan, with his usual veracity, to claim a victory. It was apprehended that he might hazard another attack, but, after remaining several days on the spot which he had first occupied, he retired without attempting again to disturb the English force under General Stuart. His efforts were now directed to resist the advance of General Harris, who, having been joined by the contingent of Hyderabad and the troops of Nizam Ali, had crossed the Mysorean frontier, with an army about thirty-seven thousand strong, on the day on which Tippoo had encamped near Seringapatam. His march was attended with many difficulties, but they were surmounted by care and perseverance, and on the 27th of March the army of the Carnatic had advanced to Mallavelly, within forty miles of Seringapatam. Here the enemy occupied some heights, from which they opened a cannonade upon the English force. A general action followed, in which Tippoo was defeated, with severe loss. He retired, and his subsequent movement was designed to place his army in the rear of that of General Harris, who he expected would advance towards Seringapatam by the route taken by Lord Cornwallis. On that route Tippoo had taken his usual precaution of destroying all the forage. But the sultan was disappointed of the success which he had anticipated. At an early period of the march, General Harris had formed the design of crossing the Cauvery at a ford some distance below Seringapatam. The motives to this deviation from the usual route were various:

one object was to mislead the enemy, another, to facilitate communication with the army of Malabar and with the corps under Colonel Brown and Colonel Read. Besides these inducements, the ford was said to be easy, the country was believed to have escaped the operation of the devastating policy of Tippoo, and the southern part of Seringapatam was regarded as the least defensible. The detour was effected so secretly, that the army, with its park and ordnance, had crossed the river and encamped near the fort of Soorilly before Tippoo was aware of the movement. When, too late, he became apprized of it, he is said to have exclaimed, "We have arrived at the last stage," and to have solemnly demanded of his principal officers what was their determination. They answered by professing their readiness to die with him, and henceforward every act of resistance or defence was performed under the chilling influence of despondency.

The advance of the British army, after crossing the Cauvery, to the position intended to be taken up before Seringapatam, was slow. The distance was only twenty-eight miles; but though undisturbed by the enemy, such was the exhausted state of the draught cattle, that five days were consumed in performing it. The deficiency of these animals had seriously impeded the progress of the army from its commencement. It had been a source of complaint from the time of Sir Eyre Coote, if not from an earlier period; but no measures had been taken to guard against the inconvenience. The neglect perhaps was encouraged, if it were not originated, by the sanguine belief which was so widely entertained, that every war in which the English happened to be engaged in India, was to be the last. At length the capital of Tippoo was within view, and the English general issued an order at once brief and inspiring. It ran thus:—"The commander-in-chief takes this opportunity of expressing his deep sense of the general exertions of the troops throughout a long and tedious march in the enemy's country with the largest equipment ever known to move with any army in India. He congratulates officers and men on the sight of Seringapatam. A continuance of the same exertions will shortly put an end to their labours, and place the British colours in triumph on its walls."

The operations of the British army were promptly commenced. On the night of its arrival at its position, an attempt was made upon the enemy's advanced posts. It partially failed; but the attack being renewed on the following morning, was completely successful. On that day, General Floyd was dispatched with a considerable body of infantry and cavalry, and twenty field-pieces, to join General Stuart. Tippoo made a large detachment to intercept them; but all attempts failed, and the united bodies joined General Harris in safety at Seringapatam. Before their arrival, Tippoo had addressed a letter to General Harris, the first that he had forwarded to any

English authority for a considerable period. Its purport was to declare that the writer had adhered firmly to treaties, and to demand the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occasion of hostilities. The English commander answered by directing the sultan's attention to the letters of the governor-general for explanation.

The preparations of the siege continued to be carried on, and much was effected of great importance, the relation of which would be tedious. On the 17th of April an attempt made by the enemy to establish a redoubt on the northern bank of the river, was defeated by a force under Colonel Vaughan Hart, though exposed to a heavy cannonade from the fort. The post thus gained by the English was connected with others previously established, with a view to the future operations of the siege.

The 20th of April was marked by a tardy overture from Tippoo to negotiate. The governor-general had prepared General Harris to enter on this task by transmitting with his final instructions, on the opening of the campaign, drafts of two treaties, either of which he was authorized to adopt under certain specified circumstances. After consulting the commissioners appointed to assist the general in political arrangements, he determined, in reply to the sultan's advance, to transmit a draft of preliminaries embodying the conditions of the less favourable of the two proposed treaties between which he had to choose. This, as it appeared from a despatch addressed by the governor-general to General Harris three days after the date of the overture, and when, consequently, the former was not aware of its having been made, was in perfect accordance with his views of the course proper to be taken under the state of circumstances which then existed. The articles thus proposed to Tippoo provided for the reception at his court of an ambassador from each of the allies; for the immediate dismissal of all foreigners being natives of countries at war with Great Britain; for the renunciation by the sultan of his connection with the French, and for the perpetual exclusion of that people from his service and dominions; for the cession to the allies of one-half the dominions of which he stood possessed at the commencement of war; for the relinquishment of the claims of Tippoo to any districts in dispute with the allies or the Rajah of Coorg; for the payment to the allies of two crores of sicca rupees, one-half immediately, and the remainder within six months; for the release of prisoners; and for the delivery of hostages as security for the due fulfilment of the previous stipulations. These conditions were severe, but not more severe than justice and necessity warranted. While Tippoo retained the power of being mischievous, it was certain he would never cease to afford cause for alarm. So intense was his hatred of the English, and so perfidious his

character, that, instead of allowing him the choice of retaining a diminished share of dominion and influence, or of losing all, the British authorities would have been justified in declaring, like the great powers of Europe at a later date, with regard to another enemy, that they "would no more treat with him, nor with any member of his family."

General Harris required an answer to be sent within forty-eight hours, together with the required hostages and the first crore of rupees, under pain of extending his demand to the surrender of Seringapatam. No answer arrived, and the labours of the besiegers went briskly on. They were only suspended when an attack from the enemy required to be repelled; and in these conflicts success invariably rested with the English. On the 26th of April it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from their last exterior entrenchment, distant something less than four hundred yards from the fort, covered on the right by a redoubt, and on the left by a small circular work open in the rear. The duty was entrusted to Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the trenches. It was a service of difficulty; but, in the course of the night and of the following morning, was successfully performed, though not without considerable loss. This achievement seems to have been deeply felt by Tippoo; and, shaking off the lethargy or the disdain which had hitherto withheld him from replying to General Harris's proposals, he despatched another letter, acknowledging their transmission, but alleging that, as the points in question were weighty, and without the intervention of ambassadors could not be brought to a conclusion, he was about to send two persons for the purpose of conference and explanation. General Harris, in his answer, offered Tippoo once more the advantage of the proposals formerly transmitted, without an addition to the demands therein made; but declined to receive vakeels, unless they were accompanied by the required hostages and specie, in recognition of the terms being accepted. The sultan's determination was demanded by three o'clock on the following day. No reply was forwarded by him; and from the moment in which he received this communication from General Harris, he is represented as passing rapidly through an agony of grief into a silent stupor, from which he seldom awoke except for the purpose of professing a confidence which he could not feel, that his capital would be successfully defended.

On the 30th of April the fire of the English batteries was opened for the important operation of breaching; and on the evening of the 3rd of May the breach was considered practicable. Before daybreak on the 4th the troops destined for the assault were stationed in the trenches. They consisted of nearly two thousand four hundred European, and about eighteen hundred native infantry. The command was intrusted to Major-General Baird.

The instructions of the commander-in-chief to this officer were, to make the capture of the rampart his first object. For this purpose General Baird divided the force under his command into two columns; one commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, the other by Colonel Sherbrook. The assault was to take place at one o'clock; and at a few minutes past that hour, General Baird, having completed all his arrangements, stepped out of the trench, and drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Now, my brave fellows, follow me, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers!" In an instant both columns rushed from the trenches, and entered the bed of the river under cover of the fire from the batteries. They were instantly discovered by the enemy, and assailed by a heavy fire of rockets and musketry. On the previous night the river had been examined by two officers named Farquar and Lalor, and sticks had been set up to indicate the most convenient place for fording. Both the attacking parties ascended the glacis and the breaches in the fausse-braye together. On the slope of the breach the forlorn hope was encountered by a body of the enemy, and the greater portion of those engaged fell in the struggle; but the assailants pressed on, and within seven minutes after they had issued from their trenches, the British flag was waving from the summit of the breach.

As soon as sufficient force was collected, the two parties filed off right and left, according to the plan proposed by General Baird. The party detached for the right marched rapidly forward on the southern rampart, under Colonel Sherbrook. The gallantry of Captain Molle, commanding the grenadiers of the Scotch brigade, was eminently conspicuous and serviceable. Running forward almost singly, he pursued the enemy till he reached a mud cavalier, where he planted a flag and displayed his hat on the point of his sword. His men soon collected around him, and being joined by the rest of the troops engaged in this attack, they advanced rapidly, the enemy retreating before their bayonets. The remaining cavaliers were carried in succession, and in less than an hour after ascending the breach, the party, after occupying the whole of the southern ramparts, arrived at that portion of them surmounting the eastern gateway.

The progress of the column which had proceeded to the left was not quite so rapid. Colonel Dunlop, by whom it was commanded, had been wounded in the conflict at the summit of the breach; and just as the party began to advance from that point, the resistance in front was powerfully aided by the flanking musketry of the inner ramparts. All the leading officers being either killed or disabled, Lieutenant Farquar placed himself at the head of the party, but instantly fell dead. Captain Lambton, brigade-major to General Baird, now assumed the command; and the column, though not without some-

times being brought to a stand, pushed forward, killing many of the enemy and driving the rest before them, till they reached a point where the approach of the right column was perceptible. Here the enemy were thrown into the utmost confusion, and the slaughter became dreadful. The operations of this column were ably supported by a detachment under Captain Goodall, which, having effected a passage over the ditch between the exterior and interior ramparts, took the enemy in flank and rear. The result of these combined attacks was, that when both divisions of the British force met on the eastern rampart, the whole of the works were in their possession. The only remaining objects of anxiety were the palace and person of the sultan.

With regard to the sultan the greatest uncertainty prevailed. Whether or not he had perished in the conflict, and, if he still survived, whether he had effected his escape, or remained to fall with his capital into the hands of the victors, were questions to which no satisfactory answer could be obtained. Three officers of the general staff, Majors Dallas, Allan, and Beaton, passing along the ramparts, discovered three men desperately wounded and apparently dead. Two of these, from their dress and other circumstances, appeared persons of distinction; and one, upon examination, manifesting signs of remaining life, was raised by the British officers. It was not the sultan, as had been conjectured, but one of his most distinguished officers, named Syed Saib. He was recognized by Major Dallas, who addressed him by his name. He had previously appeared excited and alarmed, but the kind bearing of the British officers, and the recognition of his person by one of them, seemed to divest him of fear, and he became instantly composed and tranquil. He raised Major Dallas's hand to his forehead and embraced his knees, but was unable to speak. On partaking of some water, his power of speech returned, and he inquired how Major Dallas came to know him. Being informed that he was the officer commanding the escort of the commissioners at Mangalore many years before, Syed Saib at once recollected him. A surgeon, passing, was called by the officers to the assistance of the wounded man, but having with him neither instruments nor dressings, he was unable to afford any. The palanquin of Syed Saib was then sent for to convey him to camp, and the opportunity was taken to inquire if the sultan was in the fort. Syed answered that he was in the palace. The attention of the British officers was now called off by a firing of musketry occasioned by a sally of the enemy, and they left Syed Saib in the charge of two sepoys. But their kindness was unavailing. Soon after the departure of those who had endeavoured to rescue him from death, the unfortunate man attempted to rise, but staggering from the weakness occasioned by his wound, he fell into the inner ditch.

The firing which interrupted the attentions

shown by the three officers to Syed Saib having ceased, they proceeded to a spot where they could obtain a distinct view of part of the interior of the palace. There they could perceive a number of persons assembled as in durbar, one or two being seated, and others approaching them with great respect. They then sought General Baird, to communicate to that officer what they had heard, and what they had observed. The general had previously received information of similar import, and had halted his troops for refreshment, before he proceeded to summon the palace. The men being somewhat recovered, and the necessary preparations made for attack, should the summons be disregarded, Major Allan was despatched to offer protection to the sultan and every person within the palace, on immediate and unconditional surrender. Having fastened a white cloth on a sergeant's pike, he proceeded with some European and native troops to execute his mission. He found part of the 33rd regiment drawn up before the palace, and several of Tippoo's servants in the balcony, apparently in great consternation. Major Allan made the communication with which he was charged, and desired that immediate intimation of it might be given to the sultan. In a short time the killadar and another officer came over the terrace of the front building and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They evidently laboured under great embarrassment, but not to such an extent as to prevent the exercise of their ingenuity in endeavouring to procure delay, with a view, as Major Allan thought, with great appearance of probability, of effecting their escape under cover of the night. To these functionaries Major Allan repeated the substance of his message; pointed out the danger of neglecting it; urged the necessity of immediate determination; pledged himself for the due performance of the promise which he bore; and, finally, required to be admitted into the palace, that he might repeat his assurances of safety to the sultan himself. To this proposal Tippoo's servants manifested great dislike, but Major Allan insisted, and called upon two English officers, one of whom spoke the native language with extraordinary fluency, to accompany him. The party ascended by the broken wall, and from thence lowered themselves down on a terrace where a large body of armed men were assembled. It was forthwith explained to these persons, that the flag borne by Major Allan was a pledge of security to them, provided no resistance was offered; and a singular step was taken in order to induce them to give credit to the assertion. With a degree of confidence which can only be characterized as imprudent and rash, Major Allan took off his sword, and placed it in charge of Tippoo's officers. The situation of the sultan was still unascertained. The killadar and other persons affirmed that he was not in the palace, though his family were. The Oriental fondness for delay was still indulged,

and the killadar seemed not to know in what manner to act. After a further repetition of the assurances and the warnings which had been already given, the latter being enforced by reference to the feelings of the troops before the palace, which the killadar was apprized could not be restrained without difficulty, that personage and his companions left the British officers, who now began to feel their position critical. A number of persons continued to move hurriedly backwards and forwards within the palace, and of the object of these movements Major Allan and his colleagues were necessarily ignorant. He hesitated whether he should not resume his sword; but, with more prudence than he had displayed in divesting himself of the means of defence, he resolved to abide by the choice which he had made, lest by an appearance of distrust he should precipitate some dreadful act. The people on the terrace, however, appeared to be anxious for the success of the British mission, and to feel great alarm at the possibility of its failure. They entreated that the flag might be held in a conspicuous position, in order at once to give confidence to the inmates of the palace, and prevent the English troops from forcing the gates. At length the forbearance of Major Allan became exhausted, and he sent a message to the sons of Tippoo, who were admitted to be in the palace, urging upon them once more the necessity of decision, and informing them that his time was limited. They answered that they would receive him as soon as a carpet could be spread for the purpose, and shortly afterwards the killadar reappeared to conduct him to their presence.

He was introduced to two of the princes, one of whom he recollected from having witnessed his delivery, with another brother, into the charge of Lord Cornwallis, as a hostage for the due performance of the treaty concluded by that nobleman with their father. Painful and humiliating as was that scene to the house of Tippoo, it was exceeded in bitterness of calamity by the spectacle which Major Allan now witnessed. The sons of Tippoo were then to be temporary residents with the English till the territorial cessions could be effected, and the pecuniary payments made, by which their father had agreed to purchase the privilege of retaining his place among sovereign princes. They had now before them nothing but unconditional submission to a foreign power which held possession of the capital of their country, which could dispose at pleasure of every vestige of territory which yet owned Tippoo as its lord, and to whose humanity himself and his family would owe their lives should they be spared. The feelings of despondency and fear resulting from these disastrous circumstances, were strongly depicted on the features and indicated by the manner of the princes, notwithstanding their efforts to suppress their exhibition. Major Allan having endeavoured to give them confidence by referring to the objects of his mission, represented

the impossibility of their father's escape, and entreated them, as the only way of preserving his life, to discover the place of his concealment. They answered, that he was not in the palace. Major Allan then proposed that the gates should be opened to the English. This renewed the alarm which the courteous bearing and pacific assurances of the British officer had, in some degree, calmed, and they expressed a disinclination to take so important a step without the authority of the sultan. The necessity of yielding being, however, again strongly pressed, and Major Allan having promised to post a guard of their own sepoys within the palace, and a party of Europeans without, to suffer no person to enter without his own special authority, and to return and remain with the princes till General Baird arrived, they consented, and the palace gates opened to admit as conquerors that people whose utter expulsion from India had been meditated by its master.

Before the gates was General Baird, and Major Allan was ordered to bring the princes to the general's presence. Alarmed and reluctant, they raised various objections to quitting the palace, but at length they allowed themselves to be led to the gate. The moment was not the most favourable for their introduction, for General Baird had not long before received information of Tippoo, in strict accordance with his character, having murdered a number of English prisoners who had fallen into his hands. His indignation was highly excited, and to a feeling natural and even laudable in itself may perhaps be ascribed the harshness which, in one respect, he seems to have manifested towards the captive sons of Tippoo. He in the first instance hesitated to confirm the conditions made with them by Major Allan, unless they would inform him where their father was. The attempt to procure the desired information failed, and the general finally assured the princes of protection and safety. It is not to be supposed that General Baird had any serious intention of violating a promise solemnly made by one of his officers under instructions from himself, and by virtue of which possession of the palace had been obtained; but it is to be lamented that the glory earned by the capture of Seringapatam should have been shaded by even the appearance of want of generosity or good faith. Apart, indeed, from all reference to the special obligation which the British authorities had incurred, the attempt to extort from the terror of the sons an exposure of the retreat of the father must be condemned, as at variance with some of the holier feelings of the human heart. There was no proof that the young men who were now the prisoners of the British general, had participated in the guilt arising from the murder of his soldiers; and they ought not to have been subjected to moral torture for the purpose of discovering the retreat of the criminal, he being their father. The cruelty of Tippoo merited the severest retri-

bution which could be inflicted, but if even he had been found within the palace, he must have shared the safety promised to all beneath its roof, or the honour of the British nation would have been irreparably tarnished.

A minute search throughout the palace was ordered, with a view to securing the person of the sultan, who, notwithstanding the denial of his followers, was yet believed to be within its walls. The zenana was exempted from scrutiny, but a guard was placed round it sufficient to prevent the escape of Tippoo if he were concealed there. The search was unavailing, and information was next sought by acting on the fears of the killadar. This officer, upon being threatened, placed his hands on the hilt of Major Allan's sword, and solemnly repeated his former protestation, that the sultan was not in the palace; adding, however, and as it seems for the first time, that he lay wounded at a distant part of the fort. To the spot which he named he offered to conduct the British officers, and professed himself ready to submit to any punishment which the general might be pleased to inflict, if he were found to have deceived him. The place to which the killadar led was a gateway on the north side of the fort. Here hundreds of dead bodies were piled one upon another, and the darkness rendered it almost impossible to distinguish either form or features. Lights were procured, and an examination of the fallen victims of ambition was commenced. The discovery of the sultan's palanquin, and of a wounded person lying under it, seemed to indicate that the object of the search was attained; but the man whose position in this scene of death and carnage appeared to mark him out as the sultan, was only one of his confidential servants who had attended him throughout the day. But the necessity for further search was at an end. The wounded servant pointed to the spot where his master had fallen; and a body dragged from the accumulated mass above and around it was recognized by the killadar as that of the sultan. Being placed in a palanquin, it was conveyed to the palace, where multiplied testimonies to its identity removed all ground for doubt.

Tippoo had fallen, but his fall was scarcely known, and it certainly contributed nothing towards the result of the day. During the last fourteen days of the siege he had fixed his abode at a place formerly occupied by a water-gate, which Tippoo had some years before closed. Here he erected a small stone choultry, enclosed by curtains, and four small tents were fixed for his servants and luggage. Overwhelmed with despondency, he sought consolation in those miserable dogmas, half commonplace, half paradox, which have so often passed current as sound philosophy, and struggled to renovate hope by the delusions of judicial astrology. A rigid Mahometan, he did not in the hour of his distress disdain the knowledge which the brahmins were reputed to possess, and their art was invoked for the

sultan's information. Either from the effect of chance, or from observation of the circumstances of the siege, both Mahometan and Hindoo astrologers declared the 4th of May a day of danger. To avert the threatened calamity, the brahmins recommended an oblation, and the fears of the sultan induced him to bestow the means of making it. On the morning of the day on which peril was apprehended, he proceeded to the palace, bathed, and, Mussulman as he was, presented, through a brahmin of high reputation for sanctity, the required oblation with all the customary formalities. A jar of oil formed part of the offering; and, in compliance with a Hindoo custom, the sultan endeavoured to ascertain the aspect of fate from the form of his face as reflected from the surface of the oil. Whether the exhibition indicated good or evil is not known; but, as Colonel Wilks observes, the result depends on mechanical causes, and "the reflection of any face may be formed to any fortune." About noon the sultan had completed the ceremonies which despair had led him to practise at the expense of his consistency as a believer in Mahomet, and he repaired to the choultry to partake of his mid-day repast. On his way he was informed by two spies that the besiegers were preparing to storm. He remarked, that an assault by day was not probable. An officer who commanded near the breach also apprized him that there appeared to be an unusual number of men in the trenches, and recommended that orders should be issued for the troops to be on the alert. Tippoo again expressed his belief that the attempt to assault would not be made by day; and coolly added, that if it should, the attack must be repelled. The next intelligence that reached him was calamitous. It announced the death, by a cannon-ball, of the man from whom he had received the last communication, and who was one of his chief officers. The sultan was agitated, but gave the orders necessary for the occasion, and sat down to his repast. It was yet unfinished when he received a report that the storm had commenced, and he hastened to the northern rampart.

He found that the English had surmounted the breach, and placing himself behind one of the traverses of the rampart, he fired seven or eight times on the assailants, and, as was believed by those who attended him, killed several Europeans. The flight of his troops before the victorious besiegers compelled him to retire; though whenever an opportunity offered for making a stand, he is stated to have embraced it. But no efforts which he was able to make could turn the current of success. He had received a slight wound, and the exertions which he was unavailingly making rendered painful the lameness under which he laboured. Finding a horse, he mounted and rode towards the gate of the interior work, with what object does not appear. Here he received a wound in the right side from a musket-ball. He rode for-

ward a few paces, when he received another ball in his left breast, and his horse was at the same moment brought down. The faithful servant who had accompanied him through the day, and who survived to point to his conquerors the place where the tyrant had fallen, urged him to discover himself to the English soldiers who were pressing forward, as the most probable means of preserving his life. But the instinct of guilt forbade this course. Tippoo remembered that he had recently murdered some of their comrades with circumstances of great barbarity, and he apprehended that by discovering who he was he should but accelerate the fate which his zealous adherent thus proposed to avert. He accordingly checked the imprudent suggestion, as to him it appeared, by passionately exclaiming, "Are you mad!—be silent!" But silence, though it concealed his rank, availed not to preserve his life. Tippoo was placed by his follower in his palanquin under an arch on one side of the gateway. A grenadier, entering, attempted to seize the sultan's sword-belt, which was very rich. Had he submitted to the loss without resistance, the man would probably have pushed on; but, though fainting with the loss of blood, Tippoo seized, with a feeble grasp, a sword which was near him, and made a stroke at the soldier who had thus commenced the work of plunder, by whom he was immediately shot through the temple. The circumstances attending the discovery and recognition of his body have been already detailed.

On the morning after the capture of Seringapatam, an English officer, having gone towards the river with a party of sepoys, perceived on the opposite side a few horsemen, one of whom waved a white flag. The officer, advancing to the bank, was met by one of the horsemen, who informed him that Abdul Khalik was desirous of throwing himself on the protection of the English, provided his personal safety were secured, and his honour preserved. This candidate for British clemency was the second son of Tippoo, and the elder of the two princes who had formerly been received by the English governor-general as hostages for their father's good faith. The required promise of security and honourable treatment was immediately given, and the prince surrendered himself to the British party. In the evening the remains of the deceased sultan were deposited in the mausoleum erected by Hyder Ali, with all the pomp which could be bestowed. The arrangements were under the superintendence of the principal Mahometan authorities; the chiefs of the nizam's army joined with the followers of the sultan in the solemn procession which followed his remains, and the military honours with which it is the custom of Europe to grace the soldier's obsequies aided the solemnity of the scene. The evening closed with a dreadful storm, by which several persons were killed and many more severely hurt. Seringapatam is subject to such visitations, and there was nothing remarkable in the

storm which succeeded the funeral rites of Tippoo, except its extraordinary violence. Yet the imagination cannot fail to be impressed by the fact, that the consignment of the body of Tippoo to its resting-place was followed by a desolating convulsion not incongruous with his perturbed and mischievous life.

The conquest of Seringapatam was not achieved without a considerable sacrifice, but the loss of the British army was less severe than might have been expected. The total amount of killed, wounded, and missing, in the whole of the operations throughout the siege, fell short of fifteen hundred. The loss of the enemy cannot be ascertained with precision; but it has been estimated that, in the assault alone, eight thousand fell. Dreadful as it is to reflect on such slaughter, it is gratifying to know that scarcely any of the unarmed inhabitants were injured. A few unavoidably suffered from random shot; but the assault being made by daylight, insured the power of discrimination, and it was exercised to the utmost practicable extent.

The capture of Seringapatam placed in possession of the victors guns, stores, and treasure to a large amount. Nine hundred and twenty-nine pieces of ordnance of various descriptions were found within the fort, two hundred and eighty-seven of them being mounted on the fortifications. Nearly a hundred thousand muskets and carbines were also found, a great number of swords and accoutrements, a considerable weight of shot and powder, and specie and jewels exceeding eleven hundred thousand pounds in value. The library of the sultan was not the least remarkable portion of the property transferred by the result of the siege. The books were of small value; but the private collection of state papers was of incalculable interest and importance, as they contributed to render the evidence of Tippoo's hatred of the English, and the extent of his intrigues against them, too strong to be denied or doubted by the most determined advocates of a policy undeviatingly pacific. The history of his negotiation with the government of Mauritius, and of its consequences, was illustrated by copies of all the correspondence which arose out of those proceedings. Other documents were found, relating to his missions to Turkey and France. Others, again, developed his intrigues at the court of the nizâm; and among these were copies of correspondence passing between Tippoo and certain chiefs of the nizâm's army during the first campaign of Lord Cornwallis. The evidence of his endeavours to engage the Mahrattas against the English was in like manner confirmed; and it was further shown, that it was not merely the greater powers of India that Tippoo sought to unite against the object of his hatred—he had descended to solicit many who might have been thought too unimportant for their friendship to be desired or their indifference deprecated, and had addressed others who might have been supposed too distant to

attract the sultan's attention. "This correspondence," says Colonel Kirkpatrick, by whom it was examined, "proves Tippoo to have been extremely active in his endeavours to open and establish an interest even with princes whose names might be supposed to have hardly reached him." The intensity of his hatred enlarged the boundaries of his observation, which in Asia were not determined even by the limits of India. His correspondence was enlarged to Persia, and to the petty sovereigns of Arabia; and its single and invariable object was the destruction of the British power in the East. England has had enemies more able and more formidable than Tippoo, but never one more bitter or more implacable. Yet even he, but for the discoveries made at Seringapatam, might have found apologists among those who can discern nothing of good in the policy of their own country, and nothing of evil in the character of its enemies. The recesses of the sultan's cabinet furnished proof which set at defiance all the arts of sophistry and misrepresentation; and which as amply vindicated the sagacity which had penetrated the views of Tippoo, as the result of the war attested the wisdom and energy by which those views had been counteracted.

The permanent command of Seringapatam was intrusted to Colonel Wellesley, who exerted himself vigorously, as General Baird had previously done, to restrain excess, and restore order, tranquillity, and confidence. The inhabitants who had quitted the city soon began to return, the exercise of the arts of industry revived, and the daily commerce incidental to a populous town recovered its wonted activity. "In a few days," says Major Beatson, "the bazars were stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandise, for which there was a ready and advantageous sale. The main street of Seringapatam, three days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair than that of a town taken by assault." The same period of time was sufficient to convince the military chiefs that their best course was to bow to the authority which had succeeded that of their master. On the 7th of May, Ali Reza, one of the vakeels who had accompanied Tippoo's son to the camp of Lord Cornwallis, arrived at Seringapatam with a message from Kummer-deen, the purport of which was, to acquaint General Harris that, as fate had disposed of Tippoo Sultan and transferred his power to the hands of the English, he begged to be admitted to a conference, and in the mean time he had sent Ali Reza to announce that four thousand men under his command were at the disposal of the British general, and ready to obey his orders. Within five days more, all the chiefs who continued to hold military command, including Futteh Hyder, the eldest son of the deceased sultan, had personally tendered their submission to General Harris, and the example of the chiefs was promptly

followed by the whole of the troops. On the 13th of May, General Stuart, with the army of Bombay, marched from Seringapatam on its return to Malabar by way of Coorg. A detachment from that army was made for the occupation of Canara. The powerful fortresses in that province, and in other parts of Mysore, surrendered to the conquerors; the cultivators of the soil pursued their occupation as though no change had taken place, and a general disposition was manifested to submit to the good fortune of those whom Tippoo, in the insanity of unreasoning passion, had destined to disgraceful flight from the shores of India. The fall of his capital and his own death had put an end to all exercise of authority in the name of the sultan of Mysore.

The occupation of the conquered country being provided for, the next point calling for decision was its ultimate disposal. The governor-general had furnished General Harris with instructions for concluding a preliminary treaty with Tippoo, under certain circumstances; but the infatuated obstinacy of the sultan and the extraordinary success which had thence resulted to the British army, had given rise to a state of things different from any which had been contemplated in framing those instructions. The governor-general, in consequence, reserved the final arrangements for the settlement of the country to himself. His first measure was to call for information on all points respecting the country of Mysore, and the possible candidates for its government, and for the views of the commissioners upon the subject. In conveying to them his orders on these points, the governor-general took occasion to state certain principles as fundamental, and requiring attention in any mode of settlement that might be adopted. These were, that the mode of settlement to be preferred was that which would unite the most speedy restoration of peace and order with the greatest practicable degree of security for the continuance of both; that with this view not only the interests of the Company, but those of the nizam, of the Mahrattas, and of the leading chieftains in Mysore, were to be regarded; that the military power of Mysore must be broken, or absolutely identified with that of the Company; that Seringapatam must be in effect a British garrison, under whatever nominal authority it might be placed, and that the Company must retain the whole of the sultan's territory in Malabar, as well as in Coimbatore and Daraporam, with the heads of all the passes on the table-land. Some of these points, it will be remembered, were propounded by the governor-general as indispensable conditions of peace at an earlier period.

The views of the governor-general were distinguished not less by moderation than by wisdom. The justice of the war against Tippoo could be denied by none but those who were deficient either in intellect or candour; its success was as little open to dispute; and the Company and the nizam consequently enjoyed

the fullest right, in accordance with the received principles which regulate the conduct of nations towards each other, to divide between themselves the territory which their swords, drawn in a lawful cause, had won. Clemency or state policy might urge the abandonment of some portion of their claim, but their right to reap the full advantage of their successes was evident. To the free and unchecked exercise of their right the state of the country offered no impediment. The people appeared to render willing obedience to the new authority. There was nothing to indicate the probability of any outbreak of popular feeling in favour of the former government, nor of any attempt by the military chiefs in favour of the house of Tippoo. It had been the policy of the deceased sultan to discourage and reduce all power founded on hereditary right, established office, or territorial possession, and to concentrate all authority, and as much as was practicable of administrative function, in himself. Many of the military chiefs had fallen in the war, and those who survived had yielded to the victors. There was no reason, therefore, to apprehend that any disposition of the country which might be made by those who had conquered it would give rise to formidable opposition either from the people or the servants of the late sultan.

But there were reasons against the apportionment of the whole between the Company and the nizam, arising from the relative position of those powers towards each other and towards other states. Such a distribution would have excited the jealousy of the Mahrattas, and given them ground for discontent, however unreasonable. It would, at the same time, have increased the power of the nizam to a dangerous extent. It would have transferred to his hands many of the fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysore, while it would have left the British frontier in that quarter exposed. The increase of the strength of the British government would thus have borne no proportion to the extension of its dominions. The Mahrattas would have found fresh cause of enmity both towards the Company and the nizam. The nizam, from a useful ally of the Company, might have been converted into a dangerous enemy. The partition of Mysore between the two powers who united their arms against Tippoo thus promised little for the permanent peace of India.

Still, as it was expedient to preserve as near an approach to a good understanding with the Mahrattas as the character of the people admitted, the governor-general, after much consideration, determined on adopting a plan of distribution, which, assigning to the peishwa a small portion of the territories of Tippoo, gave a larger to the Company and to the nizam, the shares of the two latter powers being of equal value; while, to guard against some of the inconveniences which he perceived to be attached to the complete dismemberment of Mysore, he re-

solved on forming a part of the country into a separate state. It is to be observed that the boon proposed for the peishwa was not to be given unconditionally, but was intended to form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta empire.

This mode of distributing the conquered dominions having been resolved upon, the next question that presented itself for consideration was, who should be the ruler of the renovated state of Mysore. Sound policy seeming to forbid the restoration of the house of Tippoo, the governor-general naturally turned to the representative of the ancient royal family of Mysore, whose rights had been usurped by Hyder Ali. The heir was an infant only five years of age. The intentions of the governor-general were signified through Purneah, a brahmin, whose talents as an accountant had led to his retention in high office by Tippoo, but who was quite ready to transfer his services to the new prince. The communication was followed by a visit of ceremony to the infant rajah from the commissioners who had been appointed to conduct the arrangements for the settlement of the country. They found the family of Hyder Ali's master in a state of great poverty and humiliation. The ancient palace of Mysore, though suffered by the usurpers gradually to fall to decay, had for some years afforded a miserable shelter to those whom they had supplanted. The privilege of occupying even the ruins of the building which had once been the seat of their power was at length thought too great. The palace was converted into a store-house, and the Mysorean family provided with another residence of very humble pretensions. In a mean apartment of this house the commissioners were received. A portion of the room was secluded by a curtain, behind which were the rana and the female relations of the family. The males surrounded the person of the rajah. A formal communication of the design of the British government was made; and the rana, through one of her attendants, acknowledged in strong terms of gratitude the generosity of the British nation in rescuing her family from the degradation and misery in which they had been so long enthralled, and raising the heir of the house to the rank and distinction of a sovereign. A few days afterwards, the infant prince was solemnly placed on the throne. The ceremony took place in the old town of Mysore. The palace was now incapable of affording accommodation to its master; and so complete had been the progress of ruin within the city, that it contained no building in which the ceremony of enthronement could be performed. To supply the deficiency, a temporary shed was erected; and though architectural grandeur was necessarily wanting, there were several circumstances calculated to gratify the Mysorean family and their adherents. It was on the very spot which had been the seat of the power exercised by the ancestors of the young rajah that his title was solemnly recog-

nized; and the musnud on which he sat was the same which former princes had occupied on similar occasions of state. The British commissioners, with the commander-in-chief at their head, awaited the arrival of the rajah. Meer Allum, the chief officer of the nizam, and his son, Meer Dowra, accompanied them; and the presence of a large escort of horse and foot gave to the depopulated town an appearance of gaiety and splendour to which for many years it had been unaccustomed. The prince was attended by all the male part of his family, and followed by a vast concourse of people. At the entrance of the building erected for the occasion he was met by General Harris and Meer Allum, each of whom took his hand. He was thus conducted to the musnud and placed upon it, under a royal salute from the fort, and three volleys of musketry from the troops present on the occasion.

While the family of the late sultan were thus excluded from political power, their welfare was consulted to the full extent that political prudence would permit. The governor-general resolved to assign to them a more ample maintenance than they had enjoyed under the rule of Tippoo, and if there were any error in his arrangements, it was in the disproportionate magnificence with which the relations of the fallen prince were provided for. The failing, however, had its origin in generous and noble feelings. Under the influence of similar feelings the necessary proceedings for the restoration of the ancient dynasty had been deferred until after the departure of Tippoo's sons from Mysore. It was thought a point of policy, not less than of generosity, to conciliate the principal chiefs and officers of the late government by a liberal provision, and to exercise similar consideration with regard to the families of those who had fallen in the war. This principle was extensively acted upon, and in some instances its application drew from the persons in whose favour it was exercised expressions not only of gratitude but of wonder, at the beneficence manifested by the Company's government. Kummer-oo-Deen received a jaghire from the nizam, and another from the Company.

The changes which have been noticed were effected under two treaties, the earlier of which, called the partition treaty of Mysore, was concluded between the Company and the nizam. The first article assigned to the Company a certain portion of the territories of Tippoo, out of which provision was to be made for his family and for that of his father. The principal of these acquisitions were Canara, Coimbatore, and Wynad. The second article determined the districts to be added to the territories of the nizam, which were selected from those adjacent to his former dominions, and recognized the claim of Kummer-oo-Deen to a personal jaghire from the revenues of those districts. The third, after reciting that, for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, and for the general security on the foundations

then established by the contracting parties, it was expedient that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subject to the Company, transferred that fortress, and the island on which it was situated, together with a smaller island lying to the westward, to the Company, "in full right and sovereignty for ever." The fourth provided for the establishment of the new government of Mysore; and the fifth prescribed the cessions to be made for its establishment. The sixth reserved to the Company the right to reduce the amount of its payments to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo on the death of any member of the families; and in the event of any hostile attempt against the Company, the nizam, or the rajah of Mysore, to suspend the issue of the whole or of any part of such stipulated payments. The seventh article related to the reserve of territory made for the peishwa in accordance with the governor-general's views as they have been already explained. This addition to the dominions of the peishwa was made dependent on his accession to the treaty within one month after it should be formally notified to him, and also upon his giving satisfaction to the Company and the nizam on such points of difference as existed between himself and either of those parties. By the eighth article, if the peishwa should refuse to accede to the treaty, and give satisfaction to the original parties to it, the territory intended for him was to revert to the joint disposal of the Company and the nizam. The ninth article provided for the reception of an English subsidiary force by the rajah of Mysore, under a separate treaty to be subsequently concluded between the Company and that prince. By the tenth article the negotiators undertook for the ratification of the treaty by their respective governments. There were two additional articles, by the first of which the two parties were exempted from accountability to each other in consequence of any diminution of the stipends payable to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan by the Company, or of the personal jaghire of Kummer-oo-Deen from the nizam. Its operation was thus reciprocal; but the object of introducing it was a prudent desire on the part of the British government to exclude the nizam from interfering in the arrangements connected with the maintenance of the exiled families. The second additional article was an explanation of the eighth in the treaty, and was framed in contemplation of the possible refusal of the peishwa to avail himself of the advantages to be proffered for his acceptance. In that case, it was provided that two-thirds of the reserved territories should fall to the nizam, and the remaining one-third to the Company. The reason of this unequal distribution was, that if the peishwa should accede to the conditions annexed to his claim to the additional territory, one of these conditions being the satisfactory settlement of certain points of difference between him and the nizam, the latter power would thereby derive considerable bene-

fit; and the design of the article was to afford him ample indemnification in the event of the disappointment of his expectations at Poonah.

Under the fourth and fifth articles of the partition treaty, the new state of Mysore was established in the manner which has been seen. In conformity with the provision of the ninth, a subsidiary treaty was concluded with the government thus called into existence. For many reasons the governor-general deemed it more advisable to erect a new state on the ruins of the old government of Mysore than to divide the entire country between the conquerors; but he had never contemplated this state except as a barrier to the Company's interests; in fact, it was to be British in all things but the name. This intention was never concealed from those who were interested in being acquainted with it. A stipulation for the defence of Mysore by an English subsidiary force, which virtually gave to the English the entire command of the country, was inserted in the treaty with the nizam, and the terms on which the infant rajah was to ascend the throne were at an early period indicated to his advisers. The subsidiary treaty concluded on his behalf consisted of sixteen articles. The first declared that the friends and enemies of either of the two contracting parties should be considered as the friends and enemies of both. By the second, the Company undertook to maintain, and the rajah agreed to receive, a military force for the defence and security of his dominions, in consideration of which he was to pay seven lacs of star pagodas, the disposal of which sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops, were to be left entirely to the Company. The third article was important. Towards the increased expense incurred by the prosecution of war for the defence of the territories of the two parties, or of either of them, or by necessary preparation for the commencement of hostilities, the rajah was to contribute in a just and reasonable proportion to his actual net revenues, the amount to be determined after attentive consideration by the governor-general in council. The fourth article was directed to making provision against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses incurred during war or in preparation for war. For this purpose the British government, whenever they might have reason to apprehend failure, were empowered to introduce such regulations as might be deemed expedient for the management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other department of the government; or they might assume and bring under the management of the servants of the Company any part of the territory of Mysore. The fifth provided for the due execution of the fourth article. Whenever the governor-general in council should signify to the rajah that it had become necessary to bring that article into operation, the rajah was

to issue orders either for giving effect to the prescribed regulations or for placing the required territories under English management. If such orders were delayed for ten days after formal application for them, the governor-general in council might, of his own authority, take the necessary measures. But in all cases where possession was taken of any part of the rajah's territories, an account was to be rendered, and the income of the rajah was in no case to fall short of one lac of star pagodas, increased by one-fifth of the net revenues of the whole of the territory ceded to him by the partition treaty, the payment of which sum the Company guaranteed. These comprehensive articles secured to the British government all the advantages that could be derived from the establishment of the new state. They carried out the avowed objects of the governor-general in a manner not less creditable to his character for manly and straightforward dealing than for political ability.

The articles of the treaty which succeeded the important ones already explained must now be briefly noticed. The rajah was bound to abstain from any interference in the affairs of the allies of the Company, or of any other state; and precluded from holding any communication or correspondence with any foreign state whatever, without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Company. Like other allies of the British government, he was restricted from employing Europeans without the concurrence of the Company, or suffering them to reside in his dominions. This article was framed with unusual strength. The rajah engaged to apprehend and deliver to the Company's government all Europeans of whatever description who should be found within his territories without regular passports from the English government; "it being his highness's determined resolution not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigner to remain within the territories now subject to his authority, unless by consent of the Company." Another point, which the governor-general had justly regarded as important, was provided for by an article giving to the Company the power of determining what fortresses and strong places should be placed in their charge, and thereupon of garrisoning such places in whatever manner they might think proper. The Company's government were to be the sole judges of the propriety of dismantling and destroying any forts, or of strengthening and repairing them; and the charges incurred by any such operations were to be borne in equal proportions by the two parties to the treaty. If the employment of the regular troops of the Company should become necessary to the maintenance of the rajah's authority, their aid, upon formal application being made, was to be afforded in such manner as the Company's government might see fit; but they were not to be employed in ordinary revenue transactions. The rajah was to provide the funds for pensioning the Mahometan officers whom it

had been thought politic to conciliate; but he incurred no charge on account of the late sultan's family, who were to be supported by the British government, nor of Kummerodeen, who was provided for by assignments of jaghire. It was stipulated, that provisions and other necessities for the use of the garrison of Seringapatam should be allowed to enter that place from any part of the rajah's dominions, free from duty, tax, or impediment; that a commercial treaty should be concluded between the two governments; that the rajah should at all times pay the utmost attention to such advice as the English government should judge it necessary to offer, "with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states." With a view to the proper connection of the respective lines of frontier, provision was made for an exchange of territory between the Company and the rajah, or for an adjustment by such other means as should be suited to the occasion, in case it should be found that any districts assigned to either party by the partition treaty of Mysore were inconveniently situated. Such was the substance of the articles from the sixth to the fifteenth; the sixteenth and last providing for the ratification of the treaty by the governor-general.

Thus did the uncontrollable enmity of Tippoo Sultan to the English nation result in a vast acquisition of territory, power, and influence by the people whom he hated, and whom it had been the labour of his life to circumvent. The means taken by him to effect their destruction ended in his own; and, as if to render the retribution more striking, the officer who dealt the final blow, to which Tippoo owed his dethronement and death, had been one of the victims of his tyranny. General Baird had fallen into his hands after the fatal defeat of Colonel Baillie's detachment, and for several years had been subjected to the sufferings and horrors by which imprisonment under Tippoo Sultan was accompanied.

In the new settlement of Mysore, some difficulty was apprehended from the attempts of the poligars, who had been dispossessed by Hyder Ali and Tippoo, to re-establish their claims. It had been endeavoured to guard against this by the mode in which the change was effected. The investment of the rajah with the character of a sovereign was treated not as the restoration of the old government, but the creation of a new one, and the anticipated difficulty was scarcely felt. Some of the commandants of fortresses were anxious to sell their fidelity at a good price; and others, who had collected plunder, delayed surrender to gain time for securing it; but the hostile

demonstrations thus rendered necessary were not of sufficient interest to merit recital. The only impediment of importance occurred in the province of Bednore, where an adventurer named Dhoondia gave some disturbance, requiring the dispatch of a force for its suppression. Dhoondia was a patan, who had incurred the resentment of Tippoo by committing depredations on the sultan's territories. He was at length secured, and the pious zeal of the prince being gratified by the compulsory conversion of his prisoner to the Mahometan faith, Dhoondia made such progress in Tippoo's favour as to be trusted by him with military employment. But his good fortune was of short duration, and for some time before the commencement of the war, the convert had been confined in irons. On the fall of Seringapatam the humanity of the conquerors set him at liberty, and Dhoondia availed himself of his newly-gained freedom by an early flight from the place of his imprisonment, a movement to which his liberators would be likely to attach little importance. Resuming his old habits, Dhoondia, on the disbanding of Tippoo's army, collected a few cavalry, with whom he took the direction of Bednore. The state of the country was not unfavourable for gathering recruits, and he soon found his band of followers considerably increased by men anxious for service of some kind, and not troubled with any acute sensibility of conscience in relation to its character. By the influence of motives which it is not easy to explain, certain killadars were prevailed upon to betray their trusts to him, and in this manner some of the principal places in the province fell into his hands before it was in the power of General Harris to detach from the army a sufficient force to act against him with effect. In the mean while Dhoondia made the best use of the time thus afforded him; he levied heavy contributions on the rich country which lay at his mercy, enforced these exactions by the most unrelenting cruelty, and filled the province with acts of rapine and murder. To stop his career, a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under the command of Colonel James Dalrymple, moved from Chittledroog as soon as their services could be spared. They soon fell in with a party of the banditti, consisting of about two hundred and fifty horse and four hundred infantry, which they completely destroyed. The capture by the English force of a fort on the east bank of the river Tungbudda followed, and not long afterwards another on the west bank was taken. While Colonel Dalrymple was thus engaged, Colonel Stevenson was advancing into Bednore, by another direction, at the head of a light force, composed also of cavalry and native infantry. Simoga was attacked by this force, and carried

by assault. On the 17th of August Dhoondia was attacked near Shikarpoor, and his cavalry, after sustaining considerable loss, were driven into a river which was situated in their rear. The fort of Shikarpoor at the same time fell into the hands of the English. Dhoondia escaped by crossing the river in a boat which had been procured for the occasion. He was closely pursued, and compelled to take refuge in the Mahratta territory, where he encamped with the remnant of his followers. There would have been no difficulty in taking or destroying him, had the British force been at liberty to pass beyond the Mahratta boundary; but this the governor-general had forbidden, and Colonel Stevenson accordingly halted his detachment.

But Dhoondia was not in a position where he could calculate on either safety or repose. A robber and a murderer by profession, he had limited the exercise of his occupations to no particular districts. Wherever his foot had pressed he left records of his presence in acts of violence and blood. The Mahrattas, it appeared, had some accounts of this character against him, and they proceeded very summarily to administer a degree of punishment which, if inadequate to the crimes of Dhoondia, was quite in accordance with the temper and habits of the people among whom he sojourned. A chief, commanding a division of the peishwa's army, paid the wanderer a visit within a few hours after he had pitched his camp within the Mahratta borders, and relieved him of everything which was necessary either to the future exercise of his trade of plunder, or to the supply of the wants of the passing day. It would be too much to ascribe this visitation to the operation of the moral sense in those who made it. Had the character of Dhoondia been as pure as it was depraved, his fate, under the circumstances of his situation, would have been the same. It was his helplessness, not his crimes, which invited the infliction to which he was subjected; and it would be an injustice to Mahratta ingenuity to suppose that if the peishwa's servants had been without experience of Dhoondia's acts they would have wanted a pretence for plundering him. But, whatever their motives, they rendered a useful service to the English which the latter power could not itself perform.

The great work which had brought the governor-general to Madras having been completed, the necessity for his presence there had ceased, and he returned to Bengal in September. At both presidencies enthusiastic congratulations flowed in upon him, which, as soon as the news of his success could be disseminated, were echoed from every part of the world where an Englishman or a friend of England was to be found.

CHAPTER XVI.

PROCEEDINGS IN TANJORE—ASSUMPTION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF SURAT—DHOONDA DEFEATED AND SLAIN—GENERAL BAIRD'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT—MARQUIS WELLESLEY ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CARNATIC—TITLE OF NABOB CONFERRED ON AZIM-UL-DOWLAH—NEW TREATY WITH THE NIZAM.

THE remarkable promptitude and energy which the governor-general had displayed in counteracting the designs of Tippoo Sultan, might lead to the belief that the accomplishment of this object had occupied his undivided attention. But such was far from being the fact. Other affairs of weighty importance pressed on his consideration, and among these were the succession to the throne of Tanjore, and the necessary measures for settling the government of that country in a manner which should relieve the people from the oppression to which they had long been subjected.

Some years before the arrival of the earl of Mornington in India, the rajah of Tanjore, having been deprived by death of all his legitimate children, provided for the succession in a manner not unfrequent in the East, by adopting a son. The guardianship of the child and the care of the government during his minority were assigned by the rajah to his brother, Ameer Singh; but the views of that personage extended beyond the exercise of a delegated and temporary authority. The death of the rajah, which occurred soon after the act of adoption, gave opportunity for the ambition of Ameer Singh to display itself: the title of the youthful successor was forthwith disputed, and the validity of the act under which he claimed denied. Various objections were raised, and the support of the British government being invoked on both sides, the questions at issue were referred by that authority to the decision of a council of pundits learned in Hindoo lore, specially summoned for the occasion. In taking this course, the Company's government had no object in view but to do justice. Nothing had occurred which could lead them to entertain any feeling of partiality or prejudice with regard to either of the candidates for the musnud, and the answer to the questions upon which the decision of the conflicting claims depended was awaited, both at Madras and Bengal, with perfect indifference. Unhappily the desire of the British authorities to do justice was not aided by the knowledge necessary for its guidance; and, in resorting to the advice of native expounders of the law, they had done little to guard themselves from error. The contest between a child and a man of mature age was an unequal one; and the decision of the learned pundits was in favour of the party who had the better means of maintaining his claim, and the readier opportunity of rewarding their services. The British government presumed not to under-

stand the Hindoo law better than its recognised expositors, and the brother of the deceased rajah was declared the lawful successor to the musnud, to the exclusion of the adopted child. The former was accordingly placed on the throne, but not without a distinct intimation of the expectation entertained by the British government, that the excluded infant would be protected and maintained in a manner suitable to the hopes which he had been led to cherish. Nothing could be more easy, nothing more natural, than to promise compliance with the wishes of those who had the power of bestowing or withholding a kingdom; and, as far as professions were concerned, Ameer Singh gave to his patrons full satisfaction. But he went no further. Complaints of the treatment received by his infant rival soon became loud and frequent. He was subjected to rigorous confinement in a dark and unhealthy place, and his mind was left unimproved even by the narrow measure of instruction usually accorded to Oriental youth. The governor of Madras at length felt called upon to address to Ameer Singh a letter suggesting the necessity of taking proper care of the health and education of the boy. By this time Ameer Singh had become impressed with a full sense of his own dignity, and the receipt of the letter filled him with indignation. He had promised, indeed, to comply with the wishes of the English government on the subject, but he now treated its mediation as an improper interference with his domestic arrangements. He alleged that, during the reign of his brother, his own situation had been worse than that of the person in whose behalf he was addressed, and that the British government had never interfered in his favour. Such, indeed, was the spirit in which the communication was received, that it was found necessary immediately to follow it up by another of more decisive tone. Ameer Singh was called upon, in terms somewhat peremptory, but sufficiently warranted by the circumstances of the case, to extend to the adopted son of his brother certain specified indulgences; and, with a view to some better security than Oriental promises for the fulfilment of the desire of the British government, it was intimated that a small guard of Company's sepoys had been directed to attend on his person. After various attempts on the part of the British resident to induce Ameer Singh to yield compliance to the wishes of the British government, they were ultimately carried into effect almost by force. It could

not be expected that the hatred borne by Ameer Singh to his rival would thereby be abated; and he continued to manifest it by all the means in his power. Further measures for the protection of the persecuted youth became obviously necessary; and a wish which he had expressed, to be removed to Madras, was gratified. The widows of the deceased rajah, who had been grievously oppressed by his successor, likewise found a refuge in the Company's territories. One object of their removal was to assist, by their influence, in forcing upon the British government a reconsideration of its decision in regard to the title of the reigning prince of Tanjore. It was represented, and with great appearance of probability, that the pundits to whose opinion he owed his elevation had been bribed; and the judgment which they had delivered was challenged. The British government thereupon deemed it necessary to enter upon a formal examination of the title in dispute. The objections taken to the claim of the adopted son of the former rajah were three:—First, that at the time the act of adoption was performed, the rajah was in such a state of mental and bodily infirmity as rendered him incapable of duly executing so important a function. The second and third related to points of Hindoo law. It was represented that the boy being an only son, his adoption was on that ground invalid; and that his age exceeded that to which the law restricted the exercise of the privilege. The alleged incapacity of the rajah was amply disproved. On the remaining questions a number of brahminical opinions were obtained, all of them favourable to the claim of the youth whom the deceased prince had destined to succeed him. The adoption of an only son, though admitted to be reprehensible, was declared not to be invalid; it was an act which ought not to be done, but which when done could not lawfully be set aside. The question of age was determined unequivocally and without reserve in favour of the rival of Ameer Singh. And these opinions were not confined to the expounders of Hindoo law in the south of India; they were confirmed by the judgment of their brethren in Bengal, and at the great depository of brahminical learning, Benares. The ignorance or the corruption of the pundits upon whose sentence the adopted son had been passed by, thus became evident, and it was but just to retract the false step which had formerly been made. These events and inquiries extended through several years, during which Lord Cornwallis and Lord Teignmouth exercised the powers of governor-general, and a series of governors, commencing with Sir Archibald Campbell, and ending with Lord Hobart, presided at Madras. There appears throughout to have been a strong leaning on the part of the British authorities in favour of Ameer Singh, and against his youthful competitor. The succession of a brother is undoubtedly more consonant to

European feelings than that of a distant relative capriciously invested with a stronger title; but Hindoo feeling is different: and in this case, moreover, the claim of Ameer Singh was vitiated by the fact of his being illegitimate.

The right to the throne of Tanjore had ceased to be matter of doubt when the earl of Mornington arrived in India. The Court of Directors had resolved to uphold the claims of the lawful candidate, and it only remained to determine the time and mode of carrying their decision into effect. The earl of Mornington determined that no delay should take place. There was, indeed, no pretence for delay; but had there been any, the reasons in favour of the course resolved upon by the governor-general were amply sufficient to justify its adoption. The causes of the miserable condition of Tanjore required a searching investigation, and it was in contemplation to issue a commission to examine and report. The governor-general at once perceived that to take such a step while Ameer Singh remained on the musnud, would be but a mockery of inquiry. It could not be expected that he would promote researches which, if successful, would have the effect of exposing his own misgovernment; and his continuance on the throne would enable him to throw impediments in the way of the commissioners. He would have had the power not only of protracting their labours, but of rendering them vain. The adopted heir of the deceased rajah was accordingly placed on the throne. This was comparatively easy; but, in effecting a satisfactory settlement of the country, the governor-general experienced difficulties incalculable and almost insurmountable. These did not in any degree arise from the character of the new rajah, which was amiable and generous, but from the accumulation of abuses under former governments, which had gathered strength proportioned to the time during which they had existed and the numerous interests which were connected with their preservation. The energy of the governor-general ultimately triumphed over all the obstacles that stood in the way of a settlement; and the result was, that, with the free consent of all parties interested, the British government assumed the entire civil and military administration of Tanjore, a splendid provision being reserved for the rajah. This arrangement was undoubtedly beneficial to the interests of Great Britain; but it is no exaggeration to say that it was far more beneficial to the people of Tanjore. It delivered them from the effects of native oppression and European cupidity. It gave them what they had never before possessed—the security derived from the administration of justice. The rajah, who owed to the British government his previous emancipation from thralldom, insult, and personal danger, was now indebted to the same power for his elevation to a degree of state and splendour which must have fulfilled all his

expectations. It was necessary for the purposes of good government, that he should retain little of actual power; but in the enjoyment of a splendid revenue and of a limited degree of military authority, his situation was brightly contrasted with that in which his earlier years were passed. The treaty was concluded on the 25th of October, 1799, and ratified by the governor-general in council on the 29th of November following.

A change, similar to that made at Tanjore, was effected with regard to the principality of Surat. The city of Surat was one of the first in India in point of commercial importance. There also flocked in vast numbers the pious votaries of the Arabian prophet, in search of the means of transport to the city which every good Mussulman is anxious to behold; and Surat thus came to be spoken of as one of the gates of Mecca. The English at an early period had established a factory at Surat, and about the middle of the seventeenth century had bravely defended not only the Company's factory, but a large part of the town, against an attack of the Mahrattas under Sevajee. For this service they received the thanks of the Mogul commander. Nearly a century afterwards, the English were invited by the inhabitants to take possession of the castle and the fleet. They hesitated, from an apprehension of incurring the resentment of the Mahrattas, who some years before had subjugated a large portion of the province of Surat, and, more recently, by taking advantage of disputes carried on for the government of the remainder, had established, with respect to the city and the districts attached to it, a claim for chout. Some outrages committed upon the English by those against whom they had been invited to act finally induced the government of Bombay to interfere. The government of the town had long been separated from the command of the castle and of the fleet, and the person who exercised the first agreed to assist the English in obtaining possession of the two latter, on condition of being protected in his authority. The government of Bombay had previously been in correspondence with a rival candidate for the civil government, the reigning nabob being connected with the party whom the English desired to dispossess. But the view of the person to whom the musnud was to have been transferred not being favoured by the influential part of the inhabitants, a compromise was effected, under which the nabob was to retain his office, and his rival was to be invested with the character of naib or chief manager. Little difficulty was found in carrying this arrangement into effect. The English took possession of the castle and the fleet, and their assumption of the command was afterwards solemnly confirmed by the imperial court of Delhi. All who had ever exercised any description of authority at Surat, excepting the Mahrattas, had professed to act in the name and under the appointment of the Mogul

Emperor. The firman of the emperor transferred the charge of the castle and the fleet to the English; the Mogul flag consequently continued to float from the castle, and was hoisted at the mast-head of the Company's chief cruiser on the Surat station. The acquisition which the Company had made appears, indeed, to have wanted scarcely any conceivable ground of justification. The movement which they had headed was strictly a popular one; the people of Surat had sought the interference of the government of Bombay, and rejoiced in the change which had taken place. The Emperor of Delhi, who claimed the sovereignty, acquiesced, and appointed the Company his vicergerent. The nabob professed to be the servant of the emperor, and could not consistently object to yield obedience to his commands; and he had, moreover, become voluntarily a party to the transfer of the military and naval power to the English. It seems, therefore, that little exception can be taken to the step by which the English first obtained the public and recognized exercise of authority in Surat.

When the British government undertook the charge of the defence of Surat, revenue was assigned for defraying the expenses of the duty. It proved insufficient, and it could not be expected that the Company's government should burden other portions of territory with the charge of preserving Surat from danger. This gave rise to various disputes and negotiations. Other grounds of difference were furnished by the gross mismanagement of that portion of power which had been committed to the nabob. With the abuses existing under an independent government that of the Company would have possessed no right to interfere; but the intimate connection which subsisted between the English and the nabob—the nature of that connection, which could be concealed from no one, and the circumstances under which the power of the Company in Surat had been acquired, rendered it an incumbent duty to exercise that power, not only for the advantage of those who held it, but for the promotion, also, to the widest possible extent, of the prosperity and happiness of the people.

With regard both to its own claims and those of the people of Surat, the British government long entertained feelings of dissatisfaction towards the nabob. The insufficiency of the means placed at their disposal for the defence of the place, and the abuses of the civil administration, had alike furnished grounds of protracted discontent before the arrival of the earl of Mornington in India. With much reluctance, the reigning nabob agreed to make some addition to the payment secured to the Company for the defence of the place; but before the arrangement was concluded he died, leaving an infant son, who survived but a short time, and whose death afforded an opening for the claim of an uncle to succeed to the office. The opportunity was a favourable one for effecting those changes which were indispens-

ably necessary to the good government of the place. The British authorities had long exercised the power of disposing of the office of nabob at their discretion, as the Mogul Emperor had formerly done; and though the claims of relationship had been respected, they had never been regarded as conferring a right to the succession. They were still respected, but not to the extent of subjecting the inhabitants of Surat to the evils which they had long endured under native rule. The candidate for the nabobship was unwilling to comply with the requisitions made of him, and the British government determined to assume the entire civil and military administration—a change in which the people of Surat had far greater reason to rejoice than even those by whom it was effected. The person whose claim to the exercise of power was thus set aside was indulged by being elevated to the rank to which he aspired. An ample provision was made for him and the family to which he belonged; and the only obstacle to improvement being thus removed, the reformation of the wretched institutions of Surat was commenced with promptitude and vigour. Never had there existed greater necessity for such a labour. It was truly stated that “the frauds, exactions, and mismanagement in the collection of the revenue, the avowed corruption in the administration of justice, and the entire inefficiency of the police, as manifested in the different tumults which” had “occurred in the city, particularly that excited in 1795,” afforded “abundant evidence that the nabobs were as incompetent to conduct the internal government of the city as to provide for its external defence.” The riot above adverted to was caused by the rival fanaticism of the Mahomedan and Hindoo inhabitants of the city, and was attended with the perpetration of many acts of atrocious barbarity. The Bombay government had given the nabob some good advice on this occasion, but had not felt at liberty to do more, although the British resident at Surat had strongly urged them to take some decisive measures for the preservation of good order in the city. The Hindoo inhabitants complained loudly of their want of security, alleging that the trade and population of the city entirely depended on the protection of the English. This protection, however, they remarked, had been only nominal since the abolition of the office of naib. While this office was maintained, the person holding it was especially intrusted with the charge of the police of the city, and he was accountable to the British government for the exercise of this as well as of all other powers with which he was invested. The abolition of the office had deprived the Company’s government of all power of efficient control, and committed the peace of the city to those who were either unable or unwilling to maintain it. The moral bearings of the question are exhibited forcibly and tersely in two short passages of a despatch on this subject addressed by the government of

Bengal to that of Bombay: The “right,” say they, “of disposing of the office of nabob is accompanied by an indispensable duty of providing a just, wise, and efficient administration for the affairs of Surat; the lapse of the powers of government having left no other party, excepting the Company, in a state to protect the persons and property of the inhabitants of that city.” And, after adverting to the objects to which the power of the nabobs ought to have been directed, but which they had signally failed to accomplish, the despatch continues: “It is obvious that these important objects can only be attained by the Company taking the entire civil and military government of the city into their own hands; and, consequently, it is their duty as well as their right to have recourse to that measure.”

The Company accordingly now undertook the duties previously assigned to the nabob; and, as far as the people were concerned, the only ground for regret was, that this step had not been sooner taken. One good effect, indeed, attended the delay: the moderation and forbearance of the Company’s government were amply attested. The new arrangements at Surat were embodied in a treaty which was signed by the parties interested on the 13th of May, 1800.

About the time of the settlement of the government of Surat, it became necessary to take measures for the preservation of the Mysore frontier from predatory attacks. The danger arose from Dhoondia Waugh, who had found means to repair the damage which he had sustained from the Mahrattas, and to place himself in a condition to resume the exercise of his occupation. The necessity of putting down this adventurer was urgent, with a view not only to the actual inconvenience occasioned by his ravages, but also to the possible consequences of allowing them to be perpetrated with impunity. Dhoondia was endeavouring to raise himself from the position of a vulgar robber to that of the head of a political confederacy. The discontented within the Company’s territories and those of their allies were invited, by letters written in his name, to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by his invasion of Mysore, and rise simultaneously against the objects of their hate. Dhoondia, though in himself, as he was justly termed by Colonel Wellesley, “a despicable enemy,” thus became a formidable one; and both his character and his attempt may be regarded as having gained something of dignity from the fact of the greatest general of modern times having taken the field against him.

Dhoondia having established himself in the territories of the peishwa, where he had seized and garrisoned several forts, it became necessary to obtain the consent of the Mahratta chief to the passage of the British troops over the boundaries, in search of the freebooter. This was at first refused, under pretence that orders had been given for his expulsion. Sub-

sequently an attempt was made to limit the number of troops to be employed against Dhoondia, by a promise that a Mahratta force should co-operate with them. Finally, and with reluctance, the required permission for the entrance of any number of British troops that might be necessary for the proposed object was accorded.

Colonel Wellesley entered upon the duty which devolved on him with characteristic energy; and after driving the enemy before him for some weeks, and capturing several places which had been occupied by Dhoondia, succeeded, on the 30th July, in surprising a division of his army while encamped on the right bank of the Malpoorba. The attack was crowned by the most complete success. Not a man within the camp escaped; and a quantity of baggage, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks, became the prey of the assailants.

After the destruction of this portion of his army, Dhoondia retired with the remainder to the opposite side of the Malpoorba. This operation was not effected without much difficulty. Being without boats, he had made his way through jungles to the sources of the river, round which he had passed. The transport of the guns and stores of the English army by such a route would have been extremely inconvenient: it was deemed preferable to wait the construction of boats; but in the mean time a detachment, lightly equipped, was despatched to harass Dhoondia's rear, and endeavour to cut off part of his baggage. A brigade was also despatched to occupy the passes of the river most likely to be fordable, and thus to guard against Dhoondia recrossing with any considerable number of followers. This force in its progress gained possession of several forts which were held by parties in the interest of the adventurer. At one of these places, named Sirbitty, an extraordinary instance of cool and determined bravery occurred. The outer gate of the fort was attacked and carried. The inner gate was next to be gained, but the passage was found too narrow to admit a gun-carriage. This difficulty, however, was not suffered to check the progress of the assailants: the gun was instantly taken off the carriage, and, under a very heavy fire from the fort, transported by a body of artillerymen, led by Sir John Sinclair, to the gate, which was very shortly burst open.

The precautions which had been taken to prevent Dhoondia crossing the river were rendered unavailing by its sudden fall, which enabled the adventurer to enter the territories of the Nizam. Thither he was followed by Colonel Wellesley, with as much speed as was consistent with the difficulties attending the movement and the arrangements necessary for effecting the junction of the various portions of the army. The campaign was now approaching to a close. On the 10th of September Colonel Wellesley encountered Dhoondia's army at a place called Conahgull. He was strongly posted, his rear and flank being

covered by a village and a rock; but one impetuous charge put his troops to the rout, the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country. Many were killed, and among the number was the author of the mischief, Dhoondia himself. Part of the enemy's baggage was taken in his camp, and another portion, with two guns, all that remained to him, in the pursuit. Thus terminated the career of Dhoondia Waugh, a man whose views were directed to higher fortunes than he was fated to attain. He assumed the title of king of the two worlds, and elevated some of his officers to the rank of azoffs and nabobs. From beginnings not more respectable, states and dynasties had previously sprung up in India; and Dhoondia Waugh might have been a second Hyder Ali, had his progress not received a timely check. Sir Thomas Munro, writing to Colonel Wellesley, on his fall, said:—"A campaign of two months finished his empire, and one of the same duration has put an end to the earthly grandeur, at least, of the sovereignty of the two worlds. Had you and your regicide army been out of the way, Dhoondia would undoubtedly have become an independent and powerful prince, and the founder of a new dynasty of cruel and treacherous sultans."

The news from Europe at this time was highly unfavourable. The triumphs of the French there would, it was expected, leave them at liberty to direct their arms to more distant quarters; and India or Egypt, it was apprehended, would be among the points selected. To be prepared for danger, wherever it might occur, the governor-general (now, by the well-merited favour of the Crown, the Marquis Wellesley) proposed to concentrate the strength of his majesty's squadron in the Indian seas, together with such an amount of military force as India could spare, at some point whence they might be able to proceed with promptitude and facility to any place where their services might be wanted. The point chosen was Trincomalee; and three European regiments, a thousand Bengal volunteers, with details of European and native infantry, were despatched thither; while Admiral Rainier, who commanded the squadron, was earnestly requested to co-operate in the arrangement, by proceeding to Trincomalee without delay. The employment of the force thus assembled was to be determined by circumstances. It was to proceed either up the Red Sea, to co-operate with any British force that might be employed in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean; to advance to any point in India menaced by the French, should they despatch a force thither; or to be directed to the reduction of the Mauritius. This latter object was one which the information of the governor-general led him to believe might be undertaken with the best prospects of success, and it was one of which the importance would fully justify the attempt. In every war between Great

Britain and France, from the time when the two countries became rivals in the East, the possessions of the latter in the Indian seas had furnished abundant means for annoying the trade of the former. Numerous privateers, fitted out at the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, swept the ocean and enriched their owners, at the expense alike of the East-India Company and of those engaged in the local trade. While Lord Hobart administered the government of Madras, the despatch of an expedition from that presidency for an attack on the Mauritius was contemplated; but the delicate state of the British interest in India rendered it a point of prudence to relinquish the design at that time. The object, however, was steadily kept in view by the Marquis Wellesley; and the Mauritius would most probably have been attacked but for the refusal of Admiral Rainier to co-operate. This refusal appeared at first to be grounded on an opinion that it would be injudicious to employ any considerable portion of the land and sea forces on distant objects of enterprise; but ultimately another reason was permitted to transpire. The admiral held, or professed to hold, the extraordinary principle that the expedition could not be undertaken without the express command of the king, signified in the usual official form to the British government in India and to the commanders of his majesty's forces. Admiral Rainier, it seems, expected that the governor-general would dissent from his view; and the expectation was most just and reasonable. That so monstrous a principle should have been gravely maintained, is sufficiently startling; that it should have been regarded as sound and true by any human being whose education and habits qualified him to form an opinion on such a subject, is utterly incredible. Admiral Rainier, however, professed so to regard it; and the governor-general therefore condescended to honour the objection with an elaborate answer. "If," said he, "the ground of your excellency's dissent from the proposed expedition to the Isle of France be admitted as a general rule to govern the conduct of the military and naval service in these distant possessions during the existence of war, I apprehend that the greatest advantage must result from thence to the cause of the enemy. It is an established maxim of state, as well as an unqualified principle of public duty, that in time of war all public officers should employ their utmost endeavours to reduce the power and resources of the common enemy of the state, and should avail themselves of every advantage which circumstances may present for the advancement of the interests of their country by the vigorous prosecution of hostilities. In remote possessions the exigency of this duty increases in proportion to the distance from the parent state, and to the consequent difficulty of obtaining from home express and precise orders applicable to the various emergencies that must arise in the course of war. If no advan-

tage can ever be taken of the temporary or accidental weakness of the enemy's possessions in India without express orders from England, signified through the usual official channels, not only to the government of India but to the commanders of his majesty's land and sea forces, it is evident that opportunities of reducing the enemy's power and resources must frequently be lost, without the hope of recovery, by reference for formal commands to the source of sovereign authority at home. In the present instance, an extraordinary and fortunate accident had disclosed to me the weak and almost defenceless state of the most important possessions remaining to France in this quarter of the globe. In my judgment, I should have failed in my duty towards my king and country if I had waited for his majesty's express commands, or for his orders signified through the official channels established by Parliament for the government of India, before I had proceeded to take the necessary steps for availing myself of the critical posture of the French interests within the reach of the force intrusted to my control." After some observations on the powers and responsibility of the governor-general in India, the marquis appeals to his own conduct under similar circumstances, and its results. "Of the rule," says he, "which I assert, I have furnished an example in my own practice; and if the principle which your excellency has adopted had governed my conduct, the conquest of Mysore would not have been achieved."

Some time before this dispute, the attention of the governor-general had been turned towards Batavia. He had direct instructions from the king for bringing this settlement under the protection of the British crown, on terms similar to those which had been granted to the Dutch colonies of Demerara, Berbice, and Surinam. It was proposed to effect this by negotiation, and Admiral Rainier was to undertake the task, aided by such an amount of sea and land force as would be sufficient to give weight to his representations. The probability that the required force could be employed more advantageously elsewhere led to the postponement of the attempt; but when the project for attacking the Mauritius was defeated by the perverseness of Admiral Rainier, the views of the governor-general were again turned to Batavia. But the Dutch colony was to enjoy a further period of repose. Soon after the fall of Seringapatam, the Marquis Wellesley had suggested to the ministers at home the practicability of employing a force from India, to co-operate with any that might be despatched from Great Britain, against the French in Egypt; and it has been seen that the assemblage of troops at Trincomalee was made with reference to this among other objects. The suggestion was adopted; and the governor-general was instructed to despatch to Egypt, by way of the Red Sea, a force of about a thousand Europeans and two thousand native infantry, under the command of an

active and intelligent officer. These instructions were immediately acted upon. The force at Ceylon, strengthened by sixteen hundred native infantry which had been assembled at Bombay for foreign service, was intrusted to the command of General Baird, and the whole embarked with all practicable expedition. A squadron of Company's cruisers, under Admiral Blankett, with a small body of troops, had sailed for Egypt some time before. General Baird and his army, after performing a march of extraordinary peril and difficulty across the desert, proceeded down the Nile to Rhonda, from whence they advanced to Rosetta. But the fate of the French attempt upon Egypt had been previously decided; and the Indian reinforcement enjoyed no opportunity of gaining distinction, except by its patient and cheerful submission to hardships and toils, and the ready surrender by the native-portion of the troops of their prejudices to their sense of military duty.

The expedition to Egypt was despatched early in the year 1801. In the month of July, in the same year, a change took place in the affairs of the Carnatic, which will require reference to a series of events of prior occurrence connected with that division of the south of India. The death of Mahomet Ali during the administration of Sir John Shore, and the dispute between the British authorities to which it gave rise, have been noticed. Mahomet Ali was succeeded by his son, Omdut-ul-Omrah, who, from the commencement of his reign, manifested a disposition to pursue the same ruinous policy which had marked that of his father. The Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival from England, occupied a considerable portion of the time which he spent at Madras in vain attempts to obtain the prince's consent to the arrangements necessary for extricating himself and his subjects from the wretchedness in which both were involved. The nabob was obstinately bent on resisting all change, and the governor-general left Madras with a conviction that negotiation was useless. It was, however, obvious that, without the adoption of some new arrangements, it would be impossible to secure the Company from loss, to save the nabob from ruin, or to rescue the oppressed inhabitants of the country from the intensity of misery in which they were involved.

The war with Tippoo commenced, and with it the necessity for all the aid which the nabob could afford to his British ally. At this period the conduct of the nabob's officers, with regard to the collecting of supplies for the use of the British army, indicated a total absence of friendly feeling on the part of the prince, if the acts of the servants were to be viewed as furnishing any evidence of the wishes of their master. They were for the most part inactive. Those who made any exertions directed them to obstruct, not to facilitate, the supply of the wants of the British government. The nabob was not sparing in professions of friendship,

and he even agreed to advance a considerable sum of money for the use of the army, on specified conditions. The conditions were assented to, but the money was not forthcoming, and but for the opportune arrival of treasure from Bengal, the consequences of the disappointment might have been seriously inconvenient.

After Lord Macartney's plan for exercising the administration of the Carnatic territory had been abandoned, an attempt was made to adjust the claims of the Company and the nabob by a treaty concluded by Sir Archibald Campbell; but the execution of its provisions was soon found to be impracticable, and its securities worthless. A new treaty, more indulgent to the nabob, was concluded by Lord Cornwallis: one article of which treaty gave to the Company, in the event of war breaking out in the Carnatic or the contiguous countries, a right to the exercise of full authority within the nabob's dominions, except with respect to certain jaghires. This treaty was in force at the period under notice; and on commencing the war with Tippoo, the governor-general, by virtue of that article, might at once have assumed the entire control of the affairs of the Carnatic. With great moderation he abstained from the immediate exercise of this undoubted right, and only took advantage of the occasion to endeavour to gain the nabob's assent to arrangements at least as beneficial to himself as to the Company. The governor-general addressed to him a despatch of considerable length, adverting to the dislike entertained by the nabob and his father to the assumption of the administration of the Carnatic by the Company, and to the desire of the British government to show respect for their feelings to the utmost extent consistent with security; pointing out mildly, but distinctly and forcibly, the vices of the nabob's administration, and the general ruin that could not fail to follow; and complaining of the violation of the treaty of Lord Cornwallis, more especially by a practice which had notoriously prevailed, of granting assignments of revenue on the districts which formed the security for the nabob's payments to the Company—a practice not only inconsistent with the purpose for which they had been pledged, but in contravention of an express provision of the treaty, that no such assignments should be granted. The governor-general referred to the moderation shown in relaxing the provisions of the treaty concluded by Sir Archibald Campbell, and placing the nabob in the more favourable position secured to him by the later treaty, urging that, as the Company's government then waived an undeniable right under a subsisting treaty, and consented to a new arrangement at the solicitation of the nabob, and for his benefit, that government had a just claim to expect that, in representing the necessity of further modification, its views and intentions should be judged with the same

liberality which Lord Cornwallis exercised towards those of Mahomet Ali. These points being sufficiently pressed, the governor-general proceeded to enumerate the principles of the proposed arrangement. It was designed to extend to every branch of the nabob's affairs connected with his relation to the Company, and by this comprehensiveness to guard, as far as precaution could effect such an object, against future misunderstanding; to provide to the utmost practicable extent against the necessity for any further change, and to relieve the Carnatic from the inconveniences of a divided government or of a fluctuating or precarious authority.

An enumeration of details followed, and the points believed to be most interesting to the nabob were first noticed—the adjustment of his debt with the Company and of certain claims on his part of a pecuniary nature, arising from various sources. Modes of arranging these having been suggested, the governor-general declared himself ready to relinquish the right of the Company to assume the entire government of the Carnatic during the existing war, or any that might thereafter occur, on condition of a territory equal to securing the amount of the monthly payments to the Company for which the nabob was liable, being placed in perpetuity under the exclusive management and authority of the Company. If the required territory should produce more than the amount of revenue anticipated from it, the surplus was to be paid over to the nabob, while, on the other hand, if, from an unfavourable season or any other casualty, a deficiency were to arise, the Company were to bear the loss, and the nabob to be entirely exonerated from charge on this account. The proposal included other points of detail relating to the defence of the country and the satisfaction of the private debts of the nabob, some of which were reserved for consideration at a more advanced period of discussion.

The answer of the nabob was long, but little satisfactory. Its tone was somewhat lofty. The nabob positively refused to consent to any modification of the treaty of 1792. This might have been contemplated from his previous conduct; but his refusal was associated with an application which certainly could not have been looked for. His letter was written after the fall of Seringapatam, and the consequent transfer of the dominions of Tippoo. The nabob availed himself of these events to set up a claim to share in the distribution of the conquered countries. But the reasonableness and decency of the request of the nabob at the time when it was preferred were eminently illustrated by the fact, that within the recesses of Seringapatam, opened to the view of the conquerors by the success which attended their efforts, was found evidence most satisfactorily convicting the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrh and his father, Mahomet Ali, of having perfidiously violated their engagements with the British Government by intriguing with

Tippoo Sultan against that power. This evidence was contained in a voluminous correspondence between Tippoo and two of his vakeels, named Gholaum Ali Khan and Reza Ali Khan, who accompanied the hostages to Madras at the close of the war undertaken by Lord Cornwallis.

The subject was taken up soon after the arrival of the vakeels at Madras. In an early letter they gave their master an account of an interview which had taken place between the nabob, Mahomet Ali, the two princes, and themselves. On that occasion the nabob was represented not only to have professed the warmest attachment to Tippoo, which might have been the effect of hollow courtesy, but to have reprobated the war then just concluded, and to have declared that it had been undertaken by the allied powers for the subversion of the Mahometan religion. This charge was not very probable, seeing that the nizam was a party to the war; but while it could not fail to be agreeable to Tippoo, by leading him to regard himself as a martyr in the cause of the prophet, it also gratified the malignant feelings which Mahomet Ali had long entertained towards his British protectors. The praise of Tippoo was enhanced by contrasting with his conduct that of the nizam, whose future retribution for aiding in the destruction of religion was darkly shadowed forth. According to the vakeels, Mahomet Ali did not confine himself to general expressions of sympathy with the sultan and his cause. At the first and the last meetings he expressed the most earnest wishes for the establishment of relations of friendship and harmony between himself and Tippoo, on the ground of community of religious belief, and with a view to the maintenance of the faith of Mahomet. Tippoo, as may be supposed, was pleased with these manifestations, and directed his vakeels to give them all encouragement; and in two letters, which, some months later, he addressed respectively to Mahomet Ali and Omdut-ul-Omrh, he professed the most entire confidence in their exertions in the common cause.

These discourses and communications would be sufficient to establish the state of feeling with which the nabob and his son regarded the various parties concerned in the war with Tippoo; but they might have been considered nothing more than the purposeless overflowings of uncontrollable hate, had not the acts of the two princes corresponded with their professions. Mahomet Ali maintained secret emissaries in Bengal, to collect information for his use. From these persons he learned that the British resident at Poonah had apprized his government that Tippoo was intriguing with the Mahrattas. This article of intelligence was duly communicated to one of the vakeels of Tippoo, accompanied by a friendly intimation of the impolicy of the course which his master was pursuing, and an urgent admonition to discontinue it until a more favourable time, which was judged not to be far distant. Lord

Cornwallis, it was represented, would soon go to Europe, the hostage princes would return to their father, and the payments of Tippoo would be completed. "After his lordship's departure, the liquidation of the kists and other points, whatever" might be "his highness's pleasure," would, it was declared, "be right and proper."

Nor was this the only instance in which the nabob gave the sultan intelligence and advice. He communicated to him the intended march of British troops against Pondicherry, on the commencement of war between the English and the French, and warned the sultan to be cautious as to the manner in which he carried on his intercourse with the latter people—not to discontinue it, but to avoid written communications—there being no objection, as the nabob is reported to have stated, to verbal communications in case of necessity.

The discovery of the documents relating to these transactions suggested the propriety of endeavouring to elucidate them by an examination of some of the servants of Tippoo. Among these were the two vakeels, whose temporary residence at Madras had afforded opportunity for opening a correspondence between Tippoo and Mahomet Ali. The duty of conducting the examination was intrusted to two experienced servants of the Company, Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close. Gholaum Ali Khan endeavoured to evade the objects of the inquiry, by affecting to have fallen into a state of dotage and imbecility. Ali Reza Khan was more candid and communicative, but little of importance was elicited. It was represented, however, that a marriage between the two houses had been one of the subjects of negotiation; and the vakeels endeavoured to show that all the secret communications which had taken place related to this subject. But they did not agree as to the party from whom the overture came; and if such an engagement really formed a subject of discussion, it was certainly not the only one, nor was it of such a nature as to require the protection of a secret cipher, which cipher, too, was obviously framed for application to political purposes. Further, if the overture, as one of the vakeels affirmed, came from Arcot, the desire there manifested to form an alliance with the bitter and implacable enemy of the English could only be regarded as an additional evidence of hostility to that people.

The investigation of the evidence of the nabob's treachery required time: and, when completed, it was obviously desirable, in a matter so delicate and so liable to misrepresentation, to avoid acting without due deliberation and a full consideration of consequences. There were also motives connected with a pending negotiation with the nizam for some delay. At length, on the 28th May, 1801, the Marquis Wellesley addressed to the governor of Fort St. George, Lord Clive, a despatch, communicating his determination as to the final adjustment of the affairs of the Carnatic. It

was clear, that if the perfidy of Mahomet Ali had been discovered during his life, the British Government would have been justified in inflicting punishment upon its treacherous dependent, and providing for itself security. Omdut-ul-Omrah had, on the part of his father, negotiated the treaty with Lord Cornwallis: he had also been confederate with his father, in the machinations carried on against his British ally. Omdut-ul-Omrah was, indeed, substantially a party to the treaty; for it secured to him the right of succession under the same conditions and obligations which attached to the right of his father. The treaty had been violated by Mahomet Ali—it had been violated by Omdut-ul-Omrah both before the death of his father and subsequently to that event. The governor-general therefore decided that the Company should assume the government of the Carnatic, and that the nabob should become a stipendiary upon its revenues. He could not decide otherwise, without betraying the interests which he was sworn to protect.

The despatch addressed by the Marquis Wellesley to Lord Clive was accompanied by a letter to Omdut-ul-Omrah, which, after alluding to the long suspension of all communication on the part of the governor-general beyond the transmission of ordinary compliments, explained the cause to be the discoveries made at Seringapatam, and referred the nabob to Lord Clive for information as to the steps about to be taken in consequence of those discoveries. Motives of humanity prevented this letter from reaching the nabob. On its arrival at Madras the prince was labouring under mortal disease; and from an apprehension that the communication might aggravate his complaint and accelerate its fatal termination, all knowledge of the intentions of the British government was withheld. But it being understood that some members of his family had introduced armed men into the palace, with the view of advancing their own objects on the occurrence of the death of the prince, if not before, Lord Clive deemed it expedient to despatch a party of the Company's troops to take possession of the principal gateway. This was effected without resistance; and it being explained to Omdut-ul-Omrah that the object of the movement was the preservation of order, he was perfectly satisfied. On the 15th July he died. Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close immediately proceeded to the palace, where they were met by some of the deceased nabob's officers. It was stated that the nabob had left a will, but some difficulty was raised in the way of producing it. The British deputies, however, insisting on its being brought forward, it was at length exhibited. On being read, it appeared that Omdut-ul-Omrah had appointed a reputed son, known as Ali Hussein, to succeed him in the possession of all his rights, possessions, and property, including the government of the Carnatic. The British deputies then requested a private con-

ference with two confidential khans, who stood high in the confidence of the late nabob, and who were nominated in his will as advisers of his heir in the administration of affairs. To these functionaries the deputies stated the nature of the discoveries made at Seringapatam. The khans received the communication with the appearance of great surprise, and endeavoured to explain away the evidence on which the charges against the late nabob and his father rested. The strong professions of friendship for Tippoo were declared not to pass the bounds of ordinary civility. The cipher offered greater difficulty; and the khans had no better excuse to bring forward than the very probable suggestion that the paper containing the key had been placed in the archives of Tippoo by some enemy of Omdut-ul-Omrah, with the view of prejudicing that prince in the estimation of the British authorities.

The object of the khans was obviously to obtain a protracted discussion of the question, in the hope that some favourable chance might suspend the resentment of the British government. This was seen and frustrated by the deputies, who, after referring to the intention entertained of demanding from Omdut-ul-Omrah satisfaction and security, and explaining why it had not previously been acted upon, demanded to know whether the khans, on the part of the reputed son of the deceased nabob, were disposed to an adjustment of the claims of the British government by an amicable negotiation. They answered by making abundant professions of respect for the British government, declaring the family of Omdut-ul-Omrah dependent on its protection, and dwelling on the impossibility of their resorting to any other than amicable means of settlement; but avoided any direct answer to the question proposed to them. The day was now considerably advanced, and the khans heartily tired of the conference. To cut it short, they urged the necessity of their attending to the funeral of the departed nabob, and to the preparatory requisite for transferring his remains to Trichinopoly. This being pressed, on the grounds of public decorum and regard for the feelings of the nabob's family, the deputies did not feel at liberty to resist the desire of the khans, and the conference terminated without any positive answer being given to the proposal made on behalf of the British government. It was renewed on the following day, when the deputies distinctly explained, that the only basis on which the British government could recognize the reputed son of the nabob, was the entire transfer of the civil and military administration of the Carnatic to the Company. The khans made the obvious answer, that such a transfer would be a virtual annihilation of the office of nabob. The deputies replied, that the power of assuming the government in certain cases had been secured to the Company by the existing treaty, and that which preceded it; that the power had actually been exercised, and yet that the rank and dignity

of the nabob had never been impugned. This interview was long, and much of it was occupied by desultory conversation, the khans evincing great anxiety to divert attention from the main points at issue, and great tact in effecting their object. Ultimately they requested a postponement of the question for a day, to allow of their consulting the various branches of the nabob's family; and the British deputies yielded their assent, with an intimation that, at the time specified, they should expect a determinate answer.

The answer given at the ensuing meeting was not such as the deputies had required—a simple acceptance or rejection of the proposal made by the British government. The khans stated that the entire family of the late nabob, as well as his ministers, having been assembled to consider the proposal, the result of their deliberations was, a conviction that, notwithstanding the decided language in which it was submitted, the British government would be disposed to consent to a modification of the terms required for its security in the Carnatic; and they accordingly produced a counter proposal, which they desired might be transmitted to Lord Clive. The deputies reiterated the assurance which they had already given, that they had full power of rejecting any proposal inconsistent with the principle previously laid down by them as the basis of adjustment, and that no other could be admitted. They warned the khans of the consequences which must follow the rejection of their plan; and finally intimated that, in a question which related exclusively to the interests of the late nabob's reputed son, they were desirous of receiving from himself the answer which was to determine his future situation. The khans manifested great dislike to this proposal. They urged as objections the youth of the heir—though he was nearly eighteen years of age—his inexperience, the fear of his mother, and the recent occurrence of his father's death. But the deputies were persevering, and a conference with Ali Hussein was at length fixed for the following day. During this discussion, the khans stated that the subject of the evidence discovered at Seringapatam had been agitated in the durbar for more than twelve months, and that measures had been taken for justifying the conduct of Omdut-ul-Omrah. An instructive commentary was thus afforded on the surprise expressed by the khans when the discoveries were first mentioned to them by the British deputies; and a most satisfactory test of the degree of credit to be attached to anything they might state, or leave to be inferred from their deportment.

At the appointed time the British deputies repaired to the palace, and being first introduced to the khans, they demanded of those officers whether further consideration had wrought any change in their sentiments. They were answered that it was not the intention of Ali Hussein to recede from the terms of the counter project presented at the

previous interview. The heir then entered, in conformity with the arrangement made on his behalf, and, in reply to a question from the deputies, declared that he considered the khans to have been appointed by his father for the purpose of assisting him, and that the object of his own councils was not separated from theirs. The deputies thereupon made a communication, which they had been instructed to deliver, of the intention of Lord Clive to hold a personal conference with Ali Hussein previously to carrying into effect the measures in contemplation. This took the khans by surprise, and appeared greatly to alarm them. Various modes of evading the proposed conference were resorted to; but the deputies insisting that the governor's orders admitted no excuse or delay, the khans retired to make preparations, and Ali Hussein took advantage of their absence to declare, in a low tone of voice, that he had been deceived by them. On their return, the whole party assembled proceeded to the tent of the officer commanding the Company's troops at the palace, where they were met by Lord Clive. The ceremonies of introduction being over, the attendants of Ali Hussein were required to withdraw, and the conference was conducted by him and the British governor. Before the latter had fully explained his views, he was interrupted by Ali Hussein, who, after expressing his sense of the governor's consideration, voluntarily proceeded to state that the conferences had been conducted by the khans without his participation, and that he disapproved of the result which had followed. In consequence of this avowal, the entire substance of the conferences was recapitulated to Ali Hussein, the proofs of the violation of the engagements of the late nabob with the British Government were distinctly enumerated, and the extent of the security required by the latter concisely explained. Ali Hussein then declared himself willing to agree to the terms proposed: and after some conversation on matters of secondary importance, he suggested that a treaty should be prepared, vesting the entire civil and military authority in the Company, which he observed he would be ready to execute, with or without the consent of the khans, at another separate conference which was appointed to be held on the following day within the British lines. On that day the deputies proceeded to the palace, to conduct the heir of Omdut-ul-Omrah to the place of meeting; but a change had passed over his mind, and he announced, that as the two khans had been appointed by his father's will to assist his councils, he could not adopt a line of conduct inconsistent with their advice, and that consequently no further interview with the governor was necessary. He was urged, notwithstanding his new determination, to keep the appointment which had been made, and he consented. The conference with Lord Clive, like the former, took place without the presence of the khans; but Ali

Hussein maintained the same tone which had marked his previous communication to the deputies. Being requested to give some explanation, he said that he was aware that the sentiments which he now expressed differed entirely from those which he had avowed on the preceding day, but that the change was the result of reflection: that the whole family had been assembled to deliberate on his affairs—that he had, in consequence, given the subject better consideration, and that he now considered it to be totally incompatible with his interest and his honour to accede to the proposal to which he had previously given his consent. He was reminded of his admission that the khans had practised deception on him—the consequences of persisting in his new course were pointed out, and assurances were given of protection from any insult or danger that he might apprehend from an adherence to his former decision; but all these topics were urged in vain. A suspicion was then intimated to Ali Hussein that he had been encouraged by interested persons to adopt the fatal course on which he had entered—that their representations had induced him to disbelieve the existence of orders from the governor-general warranting the proposal which had been made to him, and the terms on which its acceptance had been urged. He admitted that he had been spoken to on the subject, but denied that he was influenced by any distrust of the nature of the governor-general's orders.

Against the mischievous deceptions believed to be employed to mislead him, Ali Hussein was warned repeatedly though unavailingly. He was apprized that, if he entertained any hope that what might be done by the government of Fort St. George would be undone by a superior authority, he deceived himself. He was assured, not only that the orders of the governor-general were peremptory to carry into effect the plan which had been submitted for his concurrence, but that the same views were entertained by the government at home, and that consequently, all expectation of revision in that quarter must be vain. The conference concluded on the part of Lord Clive by representing to Ali Hussein that no pains had been spared to guard him against the consequences which he was about to incur; that the duties of humanity towards him, and of attention to the honour of the British name, had been satisfied; that his position in society had been determined by himself, and that his future situation would be that of a private person, regarded as hostile to the British interests, and dependent for support on the voluntary bounty of the Company. Ali Hussein listened to the governor's parting address with composure, and retired from the place of audience without offering any observation on it.

Omdut-ul-Omrah appears to have left no legitimate offspring; and it had been determined, should his testamentary heir reject the throne on the modified terms on which it was

in future to be held, to tender it to the acceptance of Azim-ul-Dowlah. This prince was the only legitimate son of Ameer-ul-Omrah, the second son of Mahomet Ali. The ordinary principles of succession would thus be little violated; and except with reference to the testamentary disposition of the throne by Omdut-ul-Omrah, they would not be violated at all. It was, however, in this case far more easy to determine than to carry the determination into effect. Azim-ul-Dowlah was in the power of those who supported the pretensions of his cousin. Opportunity was sought for making a private communication to him; but so strictly was he watched, that it was found impracticable. A negotiation might have been commenced openly; but this, there was reason to apprehend, might involve the prince in the fate which in the East so often overtakes those who enjoy the dangerous distinction of royal birth without the means of self-defence. Before the question of how to communicate with Azim was solved, it was ascertained that the rival party were displaying much activity, and no inconsiderable share of audacity. The khans had privately, but formally, placed Ali Hussein on the musnud of Arcot, and a public ceremony of the like nature was to take place without delay. As such an investiture would be the signal for civil war, Lord Clive felt it necessary to resort to vigorous measures to prevent it. The officer commanding the British detachment in charge of the palace gateway was ordered to take possession of the entire building, and to remove the guards of the late nabob, who had hitherto been suffered to continue at their posts. This being effected, the difficulty of communicating with Azim-ul-Dowlah was removed; a party of the Company's troops being substituted at the place which he inhabited for the guards of the late nabob who were previously stationed there. The prince was surprised by the change, and his surprise appears to have been not unmixed with alarm. It was explained to him that the movement was intended for his more effectual protection, and he was satisfied. Although he could not be aware of the precise views of the British government, he could at least place confidence in its honour, and must have felt certain that no change of guard could involve him in greater danger than that which previously surrounded him.

On the morning after the change the prince was visited by Colonel MacNeil, the officer in command, who intimated that, if he felt any desire of representing the state of his affairs to the British government, the means of doing so were now open to him without danger. The offer was embraced, and Azim was soon admitted to an interview with Lord Clive. He appeared to entertain no ambitious designs, and he probably did not anticipate the possibility of his elevation to the dignity which Ali Hussein had renounced. He complained of injuries and hardships, of poverty and its

inconveniences, and requested with great earnestness that, in any settlement that might be made of the affairs of the Carnatic, his claims might be considered; but he appeared to limit his expectation to the provision of more suitable accommodation for his family. He was assured that his wishes would be regarded, and the conference closed without any intimation that his expectations were likely to be exceeded. Another interview took place on the following day, when the views of the British government were gradually unfolded. These being understood, there remained little to impede the progress of negotiation. Azim acknowledged the right acquired by the Company by the perfidy of Mahomet Ali and Omdut-ul-Omrah, and expressed himself willing to accept the office tendered him, with all the conditions attached to it by the British government. Within a few days a treaty was drawn up and signed, by which the respective rights of Azim and the Company were defined and settled on the basis previously determined on; a proclamation was issued by the governor of Fort St. George, setting forth the grounds upon which the British government had acted, and thus the long-vexed territories of Arcot passed easily and tranquilly into the possession of the East-India Company. The statesman under whose auspices this great and happy change was effected was amply justified in declaring the settlement of the Carnatic to be "perhaps the most salutary and useful measure which has been adopted since the acquisition of the dewanny of Bengal."

It has been mentioned that the necessary measures for the settlement of the Carnatic were deferred partly with a view to the previous completion of some negotiations pending with the nizam. These ended in the conclusion of a new treaty with that prince, under which provision was made for an increase of the subsidiary force maintained by the Company for the defence of his dominions, and the payments accruing on account of the whole were commuted for assignments of territory. For this purpose the whole of the territory acquired by the nizam under the treaties of Seringapatam and Mysore was, by an article of the new treaty, transferred in perpetuity to the English; but as some of the districts lay inconveniently for their occupation, arrangements were made by a subsequent article for the exchange of those districts for others, which, though of somewhat less value, were more favourably situated with regard to British possession.

The Marquis Wellesley thus secured for his country the full benefit of the conquest of Mysore, and this without invading the just rights of the only ally who had taken part in the conquest. A portion of the acquisitions of that ally was, it is true, now surrendered to the English, and a further cession of territory was made in exchange for the remainder; but for these advantages an ample equivalent was offered, in relieving the nizam from the

subsidiary payments to which he must otherwise have been liable. The nizâm was thus exempted not merely from the necessity of payment, but from the harassing vexations which Eastern princes never fail to experience when money is to be disbursed. His people had reason to rejoice that one excuse for extortion was removed, while the inhabitants of the ceded territory had still greater cause for congratulation in the change of rulers. To the British government the new treaty gave

security for the expense incurred on account of the nizâm, an improved frontier, and all the power and respect resulting from a considerable extension of territory. All parties were thus benefited, and the governor-general had the satisfaction of feeling that, while he was raising the position of his own government among the states of India, he was indirectly contributing to the peace and happiness of others.

CHAPTER XVII.

AFFAIRS OF OUDE—MURDER OF MR. CHERRY—COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND THE NABOB VIZIER—THE VIZIER'S CONTEMPLATED RESIGNATION—MALADMINISTRATION OF OUDE—MR. HENRY WELLESLEY NEGOTIATES THE CESSION OF TERRITORY IN DISCHARGE OF BRITISH CLAIMS—GOVERNOR-GENERAL VISITS THE NORTHERN PROVINCES—INTERVIEW WITH THE VIZIER—ARRANGEMENT WITH THE NABOB OF FUERUCKABAD.

ATTENTION must now be carried back to the commencement of the Marquis Wellesley's administration, and diverted from the southern to the northern parts of India. In Oude the rightful sovereign had been placed on the musnud; but in other respects, all was embarrassment and disorder. The British subsidy was always in arrear, while the most frightful extortion was practised in the realization of the revenue. Justice was unknown; the army was a disorderly mass, formidable only to the power whom it professed to serve. These evils of native growth were aggravated by the presence of an extraordinary number of European adventurers, most of whom were as destitute of character and principle as they were of property. It is worthy of remark, that an ill-governed Indian state is precisely the place which a disreputable class of Europeans find the most suitable to the exercise of their talents. To all these points, as well as to the extraordinary degree of power, far too great for a subject, possessed by Almas, the attention of the governor-general was turned soon after his arrival, and his views were thus explained in a letter dated a few months after that event, and addressed to the resident at Lucknow. "The necessity of providing for the defence of the Carnatic, and for the early revival of our alliances in the peninsula, as well as for the seasonable reduction of the growing influence of France in India, has not admitted either of my visiting Oude, or of my turning my undivided attention to the reform of the vizier's affairs. There are, however, two or three leading considerations in the state of Oude to which I wish to direct your particular notice, intending at an early period to enter fully into the arrangements in which they must terminate. Whenever the death of Almas shall happen, an opportunity will offer of securing the benefits of Lord Teignmouth's treaty, by provisions which seem necessary for

the purpose of realizing the subsidy under all contingencies. The Company ought to succeed to the power of Almas, and the management, if not the sovereignty, of that part of the Doab which he now rents, ought to be placed in our hands, a proportionate reduction being made from the subsidy. The effect of such an arrangement would not be confined to the improvement of our security for the subsidy; the strength of our north-western frontier would also be greatly increased. On the other hand, in the event of Almas's death, we shall have to apprehend either the dangerous power of a successor equal to him in talents and activity, or the weakness of one inferior in both, or the division of the country among a variety of renters. In the first case we should risk internal commotion; in the two latter, the frontier of Oude would be considerably weakened against the attacks either of the Abdalli or any other invader. The only remedy for these evils will be the possession of the Doab, fixed in the hands of our government. The state of the vizier's own troops is another most pressing evil. To you I need not enlarge on their inefficiency and insubordination. My intention is to persuade his excellency at a proper season to disband the whole of his army, with the exception of such part of it as may be necessary for the purposes of state, or of the collection of the revenue. Some expedient must be devised for providing a maintenance for such leaders and officers as from their birth or habits cannot easily be divested of their military pretensions (I do not say military character, for I do not believe that any such description of men exist at Lucknow). In the place of the armed rabble which now alarms the vizier and invites his enemies, I propose to substitute an increased number of the Company's regiments of infantry and cavalry, to be relieved from time to time, and to be paid by his excellency." In addition

to the measures noticed in the above extract, the governor-general meditated the relief of the country from the host of Europeans who had fixed upon it as their prey. These he proposed to disperse by as summary a process of ejection as should be consistent with humanity.

Before these designs could be put in course of execution, a tragical occurrence, arising out of the disputed claim to the musnud of Oude, displayed without disguise the character of the pretender, who had been dispossessed by Lord Teignmouth. Vizier Ali had been allowed to reside at Benares, a place singularly ill-chosen with reference to his pretensions and character, and from which the new governor-general, with sufficient reason, determined to remove him. His numerous retinue had more than once disturbed the peace of the city; and the ordinary military force stationed there was not deemed sufficient to guard against the danger either of commotion or escape. It was also understood that Vizier Ali had despatched a vakeel with presents to the Affghan prince, Zemaun Shah; and it was justly inferred that he would not fail to turn to his advantage any opportunity that might be afforded by the approach of the shah, and the consequent employment of the British troops at a distance. Saadut Ali had applied for his removal; and, independently of this, such a step was obviously called for by sound policy. Mr. Cherry, the British agent, was accordingly instructed to signify to Vizier Ali the governor-general's intention that he should transfer his residence to the vicinity of Calcutta; at the same time assuring him that no diminution of his allowances or appointments would be attempted, and that at his new abode he would neither be subjected to any additional restraint, nor denied any indulgence which he had been accustomed to enjoy at Benares. When this communication was made, Vizier Ali expressed great reluctance to the required change. This had been expected; but in a short time his feelings appeared to have undergone great alteration. He ceased to manifest any dislike to removal, and seemed perfectly satisfied with the assurances which he had received of continued attention and indulgence. The conduct of Mr. Cherry towards Vizier Ali is represented to have been kind, delicate, and conciliatory; and the latter, so far from affording any ground for suspicion, had uniformly professed to entertain towards the British agent feelings of affectionate gratitude. But the part which Mr. Cherry's official duty had imposed on him, in relation to the deposition of Vizier Ali, had fixed in the mind of that person the deepest hatred. Mr. Cherry was warned of this, but unhappily the warning was disregarded. Prudence and the orders of government alike counselled precaution, but none was taken. A visit which Vizier Ali made, accompanied by his suite, to the British agent, afforded the means of accomplishing the meditated revenge. He had engaged himself to breakfast with

Mr. Cherry, and the parties met in apparent amity. The usual compliments were exchanged. Vizier Ali then began to expatiate on his wrongs; and having pursued this subject for some time, he suddenly rose with his attendants, and put to death Mr. Cherry and Captain Conway, an English officer who happened to be present. The assassins then rushed out, and meeting another Englishman named Graham, they added him to the list of their victims. They thence proceeded to the house of Mr. Davis, judge and magistrate, who had just time to remove his family to an upper terrace, which could only be reached by a very narrow staircase. At the top of this staircase Mr. Davis, armed with a spear, took his post, and so successfully did he defend it, that the assailants, after several attempts to dislodge him, were compelled to retire without effecting their object. The benefit derived from the resistance of this intrepid man extended beyond his own family: the delay thereby occasioned afforded to the rest of the English inhabitants opportunity of escaping to the place where the troops stationed for the protection of the city were encamped. General Erskine, on learning what had occurred, despatched a party to the relief of Mr. Davis, and Vizier Ali thereupon retired to his own residence. This, after some resistance, was forced, but not until its master had made his escape, with most of his principal adherents. No further measures seem to have been taken till the following morning, when a party of cavalry was despatched after him; but the rapidity of his movements, and the advantage which he had gained by the delay of pursuit, rendered the attempt to overtake him ineffectual.

The miscreant found refuge in the territories of the rajah of Bhotwul, a chief tributary both to the vizier and the rajah of Nepal, at which latter place the rajah of Bhotwul was at the time in durance. By his representatives, however, Vizier Ali was hospitably received, and allowed to take means for considerably increasing the number of his followers. The British government remonstrated with the rajah of Nepal against this conduct of the rajah of Bhotwul's dependents, and the remonstrance produced such demonstrations on the part of the person to whom it was addressed, as led Vizier Ali to conclude that Bhotwul was no longer an eligible place of residence. The strength which he had acquired enabled him to display a bold front, and he advanced into Goruckpore, whither a detachment of the Company's troops had marched. With these a skirmish took place, to the disadvantage of Vizier Ali. His followers then began to drop off, and he would probably have been taken, but for the treachery of a body of the vizier's troops who had been stationed to intercept him. Passing along the foot of the northern hills, he succeeded in reaching Jynehur, where he was received, but placed under restraint. It being suggested by Captain Collins, the British resident with

Scindia, that the rajah of Jyneghur might be induced, by the offer of a considerable reward, to surrender his visitor, that officer was instructed to open a negotiation for the purpose. The task was not unattended with difficulty. The law of honour, as understood at Jyneghur, stood in the way of giving up to his pursuers even a murderer. On the other hand, the rajah's appetite for wealth was violently stimulated by the large sum offered by Colonel Collins as the price of the transfer of the person of Vizier Ali into his keeping. A compromise was at length effected. Vizier Ali was given up, on condition that his life should be spared, and that his limbs should not be disgraced by chains. Some of his accomplices had previously suffered the punishment due to their crimes. The great criminal escaped through the scruples of the rajah of Jyneghur. Those scruples, however, did not prevent his relieving his guest of the charge of a quantity of jewels. This acquisition, with the sum obtained from the English, probably consoled the rajah for the slight taint which his honour had incurred.

The views which the governor-general had previously propounded to the resident at Lucknow were subsequently directed to be pressed upon the attention of the vizier. It was justly urged that the alarm created by the recent approach of Zemaun Shah ought to operate as an inducement to employ the season of repose afforded by his retirement in providing such effectual means of resistance as might be sufficient to avert the apprehension of future danger. The military establishment of the vizier was admitted, by himself, to be useless for the purpose of defence. It was worse than useless; for at the moment when the presence of the British force had been required to make a formidable demonstration on the frontier, it had been found necessary to retain a part of it in the capital to protect the person and authority of the prince from the excesses of his own disaffected and disorderly troops. The conclusion which this state of things suggested to the governor-general was unanswerable. "The inference to be drawn from these events," said he, "is obviously that the defence of his excellency's dominions against foreign attack, as well as their internal tranquillity, can only be secured by a reduction of his own useless, if not dangerous, troops, and by a proportionate augmentation of the British force in his pay."

A change which not long afterwards took place in the office of resident at Lucknow caused some delay in the communication of the governor-general's views to the vizier. Mr. Lumsden was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, who bore a letter from Sir Alured Clarke, then holding the office of vice-president in Bengal, calling attention to the necessity of military reform. A favourable opportunity for presenting the letter was offered by the vizier's complaints of the turbulent and disorderly state of some of his battalions. Of this Colonel Scott took advantage; and the prince, on read-

ing the letter, declared his thorough concurrence in the sentiments which it contained. The resident thereupon pressed an early consideration of the subject, and requested that the result might be communicated to him as soon as possible. He, at the same time, suggested the propriety of preparing certain statements of the number and expense of the troops of every description employed by the vizier.

More than twenty days passed without any satisfactory notice of this communication. The resident then pressed for the appointment of a day for the discussion of the subject, and a day was fixed. On its arrival, however, nothing could be drawn from the vizier but the most vague and dark intimations of his views and feelings. He observed, that the measure proposed was not impracticable, but such as he hoped might be accomplished; but he added, that he had a proposal to make, connected with his own ease, the prosperity of his government, and the happiness of his subjects, and which, in its operation, could be prejudicial to no one; but all intimation of its nature or character he deferred till an expected visit of the governor-general to Lucknow, or till the execution of the projected measure was committed to the resident. No representations could induce him to explain; but he promised to visit the resident on a future day, and dictate a memorandum. He came, but the matter dictated for report to the governor-general proved to be nothing more than a repetition of what he had stated on the former day. The resident entered into arguments to show the propriety of separating the two projects, as the reform of the military department must be greatly protracted if it were made dependent on the acceptance of the vizier's unexplained proposal. On that proposal it was urged no determination could be formed for a considerable time, inasmuch as the governor-general's presence at Lucknow could not be immediate, and it was not to be expected that he would delegate powers for the conclusion of an arrangement with the nature and object of which he was totally unacquainted. But the vizier was unmoved, and the conference terminated without any progress having been made in the negotiation.

From the mysterious deportment of the vizier nothing could be distinctly known of his wishes or intentions. All was left to conjecture. The resident believed that he was anxious to annihilate the functions of the ministers, who were the ordinary organs of communication with the resident, and to become the sole executor of his own purposes. What those purposes were, and in what manner they were carried on, was manifest from the whole course of the government since its assumption by Saadut Ali. The appropriation of the profits of oppression had been in a great degree changed, but no change had taken place for the benefit of the people. The same abuse and mismanagement, the same frightful extortions which disgraced the revenue collections

under the former government, continued to prevail undiminished in extent or atrocity, under that of Saadut Ali. The only difference was, that the entire fruits went into the private treasury of the sovereign, and, as parsimony was a striking feature in his character, were carefully hoarded by him. Formerly, a large portion was appropriated by those who stood between the prince and the people, and the part which reached the royal coffers was quickly dissipated in wild and thoughtless profusion. "I cannot but feel," said Colonel Scott, "that the ruin of the country, commenced in a reign of profusion and indolence, will progressively proceed in a reign of parsimony and diligence."

The governor-general's answer to the representations of the resident was to the effect, that the present condition of the government appeared to preclude the acquisition of the information necessary to the first step in the proposed reforms; that it was to be hoped an application addressed to the vizier by the governor-general, simultaneously with his communication to Colonel Scott, would remove all difficulty, and establish the resident in the degree of influence and consideration which it was necessary he should enjoy; but if this expectation should be disappointed, the resident was to insist, in the name of his superior, on the vizier placing his government in such a state as should afford the requisite means of information, as well as of carrying the necessary military reforms completely and speedily into effect. The nominal minister, Hussein Reza Khan, was supposed to offer a bar to these results. His master withheld from him confidence, consideration, and power. His talents were not such as to make it desirable to retain him in opposition to the wishes of the vizier, and the governor-general was ready to assent to his removal, due provision being made for his support and safety, provided that his successor should be a person unequivocally well disposed to cultivate and improve the existing connection between the state of Oude and the Company. The proposed military reform, however, was declared to be the great and immediate object of the governor-general's solicitude. This point was to be pressed with unremitting earnestness, and the vizier's acquiescence in the necessary measures was expected to be totally unqualified by any conditions not necessarily connected with it.

In answer to this letter from the governor-general the vizier declared that the advantages, both immediate and future, of a reform in his military establishment were more strongly impressed on his own mind than on that of his illustrious correspondent, and that he would, without a moment's delay, consult with Colonel Scott upon what was practicable, and communicate the result of their joint deliberations. This promise was fulfilled in the manner usual with the vizier—it is unnecessary to explain that, in point of fact, it was not fulfilled at all. The promised communication of the vizier's sentiments not arriving, the governor-general

again addressed a letter to him, representing the obligation of the Company to defend the prince's dominions; the insufficiency for the purpose of the number of British troops ordinarily stationed within them; the danger impending from the intentions of Zemaun Shah, and possibly from other sources; the necessity of an augmentation of the British force, and the ready means of providing for the cost by disbanding the disorderly battalions, which were a source not of strength but of weakness. The letter concluded by intimating that the British troops in Oude would be immediately reinforced by a portion of the proposed augmentation; the remainder were to follow at a future period.

The justice of this measure must be determined by the conditions of the treaty under which the relative claims of the vizier and the British government arose—its expediency, by the circumstances under which it was resorted to.

The treaty was that concluded by Lord Teignmouth and Saadut Ali on placing that prince upon the throne. This instrument formally recognized the obligation incurred by the East-India Company under former treaties, of defending the dominions of the vizier against all enemies; it bound the vizier to pay a specified amount of subsidy for an English force to be continually stationed in his territories, which force was never to be less than ten thousand strong; "and if at any time it should become necessary to augment the troops of the Company in Oude beyond the number of thirteen thousand men, including Europeans, and natives, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the Nawsab Saadut Ali Khan," agreed "to pay the actual difference occasioned by the excess above that number." The possible augmentation of the force beyond thirteen thousand is here clearly contemplated and provided for. A question arises, who was to judge of the necessity? and to this the treaty gives no answer. If the vizier, it might happen that a prince who, like Saadut Ali, was at once under the influence of an extreme love of money, and a headstrong will, might, with a view to the gratification of his passions, deny the necessity, when its existence was clear to every one else; and if his denial were to determine the question, the country might be overrun by enemies, whose subsequent expulsion might occasion to the Company an amount of trouble and of loss which better provision would have averted. The Company, it is to be remembered, were bound not merely to assist the vizier with a specified amount of force for the defence of his dominions—they were bound efficiently to defend them; and to require them to do this with a force inadequate to the exigencies of the case, would be altogether unreasonable and absurd. The obligation to defend the territory of Oude involved the obligation of allotting a sufficient force for the duty; if thirteen thousand men were insufficient, they were bound to employ

more, for the country was to be defended absolutely and unreservedly. The obligation which the Company had undertaken was therefore accompanied by the right of determining upon the necessity for an increase of force. If the right rested with any other party, the result would be, that the Company might be lawfully called upon to perform an impossibility.

Some misapprehension may have arisen from the manner in which the operation of the seventh article of Lord Teignmouth's treaty is adverted to in the letter to the vizier. It is said: "The seventh article of the treaty concluded with your excellency by Sir John Shore, provides for the occasional augmentation of the Company's troops in your excellency's dominions." This is not strictly accurate; the words of the treaty are, "if at any time it should become necessary to augment the troops of the Company in Oude;" the provision is general—it refers not to the augmentation being either occasional or permanent. Indeed, the paragraph of the letter preceding that in which occurs the reference to the power of augmentation as only occasional must have satisfied the vizier that that which was proposed was designed to be permanent. "It might not be in the power of the British government," it is said, "on a sudden emergency to reinforce the troops in your excellency's country with sufficient expedition; my firm opinion therefore is, that the Company can in no other manner fulfil effectually their engagement to 'defend the dominions of your excellency against all enemies,' than by maintaining constantly in those dominions such a force as shall at all times be adequate to your effectual protection, independently of any reinforcement which the exigency might otherwise require, but which might not be disposable in proper season." The views of the governor-general were thus most clearly and distinctly explained.

Should it be said, that if the above construction of the treaty be correct, the vizier, as to the expense of supporting the British force was altogether at the mercy of the British government—this is quite true. He placed himself at their mercy by delegating to them the defence of his dominions. His weakness required support—he consented to receive it from a powerful neighbour. He had placed himself in a condition of dependence, and having agreed to purchase certain advantages upon certain terms, he had no right to object to those terms being enforced. The right of the English government was not indeed to be pressed to its full extent without reason; but if reason existed, he could not justly question its exercise.

This leads to the second point of inquiry—whether at the time it was expedient to call upon the vizier to entertain an increased number of British troops? and this admits of a very ready answer. Oude was menaced by Zemaun Shah, who had not only threatened invasion, but advanced to Lahore to carry

his design into effect. True it was, that, alarmed for the safety of his power at home, he had suddenly retreated; but his return at a convenient season was fairly to be expected. Scindia, too, was believed to cherish designs unfavourable to the peace of Oude. The Rohillas, always turbulent and discontented, were ready to embark in the occupation they loved, and every part of the vizier's dominions was overrun with disorder, crime, misery, and disaffection.

A new scene was now about to open at Lucknow. The vizier had for some time been in the habit of dwelling, in his conversations with the British resident, on the impossibility of his conducting the affairs of the country. So frequently had this occurred, that the resident stated he had been led to conjecture that the prince had it in contemplation to retire from the cares and fatigues of government. This surmise he had never communicated to the governor-general, and he imputes his silence to various causes—the apparent absurdity of the expectation, and the countenance afforded to a contrary belief by the conduct of the vizier, in meditating state regulations, projecting buildings, and making household arrangements, implying the intention permanently of residing at Lucknow.

The time, however, arrived when Colonel Scott had something more than his own conjectures to communicate. The vizier made a formal avowal of his desire and resolution to relinquish a government which he declared himself unable to manage either with satisfaction to himself or—and in this respect the admission was certainly as literally true as it was apparently candid—with advantage to his subjects. Colonel Scott made some remarks tending to show that, by following his advice, the affairs of the country might be administered for the benefit of the people, and at the same time with ease and reputation to the prince. The vizier replied that this might be so, but it was impossible for one person to judge of the feelings of another; that his mind was not disposed to the cares and fatigues of government; that he was firmly disposed to retire from them; and that, as one of his sons would be raised to the musnud, his name would remain. At a subsequent period of the conference, he added, that in relinquishing the government he renounced every thought of interfering in its concerns, or of residing within its limits; that the money he possessed was sufficient for his own support, and for the attainment of every gratification in a private station—which was certainly the fact; but he desired to stipulate for a due provision being made for his sons, and for the other branches of his family, whom he meant to leave at Lucknow.

In reporting to the governor-general the intention of the vizier, together with the substance of several conversations held with him on the subject, Colonel Scott suggested certain points for consideration. One of these was, whether it would not be more advisable, if the

vizier's consent could be obtained, that the abdication, instead of being confined to his own person, should also extend to his posterity. In connection with this suggestion, it is right to state, that though the vizier had sons, none of them were legitimate. Another question raised by the resident related to the disposal of the treasure left by the former vizier. This had been removed by Saadut Ali from the public treasury to the female apartments of his palace, and it was conjectured that this step might have been taken in contemplation of the design of relinquishing the government. The debts of the vizier's brother, to whose place and treasure Saadut Ali had succeeded, were considerable, and no part of them had been paid. Salaries were due to public servants, and a considerable amount of allowances to pensioners. All these claims it was probable Saadut Ali meant to evade. Colonel Scott had recommended that the vizier should himself write to the governor-general. This he declined, on the ground that there was no one about him to whom he could confide so delicate an affair; and he desired the resident to draw up a paper in Persian, embodying the views of the prince as previously explained, for transmission to the governor-general, which was accordingly done. It is unnecessary to trace minutely the proceedings which followed. It will be sufficient to state that, in reference to the various communications which he had received, the governor-general transmitted a series of instructions to the resident, a draft of a proposed treaty, and a paper explanatory of the views of the British government, specially intended for the perusal of the vizier. The tendency of these documents was rather to discourage the meditated step of abdication than otherwise. The governor-general saw that many advantages would result from it, if the entire administration of the government, civil and military, were transferred to the Company; but he saw also that the realization of those advantages would be greatly impeded if the abdication of Saadut Ali was to be followed by the establishment of a successor. The certainty that the evils by which the country was afflicted would be continued under such an arrangement, and the possible inconveniences to Saadut Ali himself, were pointed out, and the representation was fatal to the vizier's resolution. He rejected the condition proposed to be attached to his retirement, and declared that, as the appointment of a successor was objected to, he was ready to abandon his design, and retain the charge of the government. Whether he had ever entertained any sincere intention of relinquishing it, is a question on which it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.

The delivery of the letter to the vizier, announcing the march of a body of the Company's troops to augment the British force in Oude, had been deferred pending the proceedings arising out of the vizier's professed desire to abdicate. When that project was aban-

doned, the letter was presented. The proposed reinforcement also marched without further delay, and after multiplied subterfuges and evasions on the part of the vizier, the process of disbanding his disorderly battalions commenced. The accomplishment of this necessary measure required much care to avert dangerous consequences; but the requisite care was not wanting, and the British authorities taking an interest in the inspection of the accounts, and the due discharge of arrears, the business proceeded with less difficulty than could have been anticipated, and without any disturbance of serious character.

While some progress was thus making in reforming the military affairs of Oude, its civil government remained in the same wretched circumstances by which it had ever been characterized. The vizier took advantage of this to intimate the probability of an approaching failure of his engagements with the British government. This step accelerated a measure really necessary and important, but which the vizier was most especially anxious to postpone—an inquiry into the cause of that misery and disorder which was universally spread over the fertile country subject to his administration. That cause, as pointed out by the governor-general, was the government. Adverting to the communication from the vizier, the governor-general, in addressing Colonel Scott, says: "Had the territories of Oude been subject to the frequent or occasional devastations of an enemy—had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, or by other calamities which impair the public prosperity, the rapid decline of the vizier's revenues might be imputed to other causes than a defective administration. But no such calamitous visitations have afflicted the province of Oude, while, in consequence of the protection which it derives from the presence of the British forces, it has been maintained, together with all the Company's possessions on this side of India, in the uninterrupted enjoyment of peace. A defective administration of the government is therefore the only cause which can have produced so marked a difference between the state of his excellency's dominions and that of the contiguous territories of the Company. While the territories of the Company have been advancing progressively during the last ten years in prosperity, population, and opulence, the dominions of the vizier, though enjoying equal advantages of tranquillity and security, have rapidly and progressively declined." A detail of particulars would amply bear out the general remarks above quoted. "I have repeatedly represented to your excellency," said the governor-general, addressing the vizier, "the effects of the ruinous expedient of anticipating the collections—the destructive practice of realizing them by force of arms—the annual diminution of the jumna of the country—the precarious tenure by which the aumils and farmers hold their possessions—the misery of the lower classes of the people, absolutely

excluded from the protection of the government—and the utter insecurity of life and property throughout the province of Oude." These positions are illustrated by reference to facts then of recent occurrence; and the representation being addressed to the vizier, the truth of the alleged facts would have been impugned had it been possible. The vizier, indeed, had admitted the miserable condition of his revenue administration; and all authorities concur in exhibiting the state of his dominions as little removed from complete anarchy. Under these circumstances the continued payment of the British subsidy could not reasonably be relied upon; and the vizier himself had, by his own suggestions, lent encouragement to those apprehensions which, on other grounds, there was abundant reason to entertain.

It has been seen that, at an early period of his administration, the Marquis Wellesley had been impressed with the necessity of obtaining territorial security for a part, at least, of the vizier's pecuniary engagements with the British government. The desire of abdication, which at one time the vizier entertained or affected to entertain, suggested another mode of arrangement, which the governor-general now instructed the resident at Lucknow to press upon the consideration of the prince. This was the entire transfer of the government of the country, civil as well as military, to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of the vizier and his family. Colonel Scott was directed to prepare the draft of a treaty for this purpose, on the model of the treaty concluded with the rajah of Tanjore and that proposed to the vizier at the period of his meditated abdication. In framing such a treaty, the resident was instructed to keep in view its primary objects—the abolition of abuses, and the substitution of "a wise and benevolent plan of government, calculated to inspire the people with confidence in the security of property and of life; to encourage industry; to protect the fruits of honest labour, and to establish order and submission to the just authority of the state, on the solid foundations of gratitude for benefits received and expectation of continued security:" but he was, at the same time, to defer to the inclinations and prejudices of the vizier, as far as might be compatible with the attainment of the main objects of the treaty. The draft, when prepared, was to be submitted to the vizier. If on receiving it he might manifest any disposition to accede to its general principles, but should desire some particular modifications, his suggestions were to be reserved for the decision of the governor-general. But as it was obviously more probable that he would reject the proposal altogether, this result was provided for. In that case the resident was to fall back on the plan which the governor-general had entertained from the moment of his entering on the duties of his office, and probably from an earlier period.

The vizier was to be informed that the funds for the regular payment of the subsidy must be placed without delay beyond the hazard of failure, and for this purpose the cession of territory of adequate extent was to be required. The doab, including the tribute from Furruckabad, was to form part of the territory to be thus demanded, and Rohilcund was pointed out as an eligible addition. The possession of these provinces by the English would tend to remove the vizier from foreign connections and foreign sources of danger; and it was suggested that their transfer would be less mortifying to him than that of any other portions of his dominions, inasmuch as they were not part of the more ancient possessions of his house, but had been acquired for it by the British arms.

The absence of the vizier on a hunting excursion, and the subsequent celebration of a Mahometan festival, delayed for some time the execution of the orders of the governor-general. When the draft of the proposed treaty was at length submitted to the vizier, his department was such as afforded no clue to his probable decision. He received the draft, with a letter addressed to him by the governor-general, without any manifestation of emotion, and engaged to communicate with Colonel Scott on the subject as soon as he should have fully considered it. Two days afterwards a second conference took place, when the vizier, though he did not positively reject the first proposal—that of the total relinquishment of the government of Oude to the Company—displayed a strong repugnance to it. Colonel Scott endeavoured to reconcile him to the arrangement by an appeal to his patriotic feelings, but the attempt was a failure. The resident having suggested that the sacrifice of feeling on the part of the vizier would be compensated by the satisfaction which he would derive from witnessing the increasing prosperity of the country and the happiness of the people under the management of the British government, the prince answered with great candour, that, under the circumstances in which he should be placed, the contemplation of these things would not afford him the smallest gratification. He referred to a letter of advice addressed to his predecessor by Lord Cornwallis, which though it contained strong recommendations for the introduction of various reforms in the different branches of government, left the execution of the proposed measures to the hands of the vizier and his ministers. To this there was an obvious answer. Lord Cornwallis quitted India in August, 1793: the conversation in which his advice was thus referred to took place on the 26th February, 1801. The interval was little less than eight years, and not one step had been taken, either by the reigning vizier or his predecessor, towards carrying into effect any portion of the salutary suggestions offered to them. This, as the resident argued, showed either that the advice

was disregarded, or that the power of acting upon it was wanting, the latter supposition being countenanced by the desire which the vizier had some time before professed to abdicate. The vizier further represented that his own payments of subsidy had been punctual, while those of his predecessor had been irregular; and he urged that it would be time enough to demand security when failure actually took place. To this it was answered, that if that period were waited for, it would then not be within the reach of human wisdom or power to retrieve the affairs of an exhausted and depopulated country. The vizier might have been reminded of his own expressed apprehension of its approach.

After making some remarks on the proposed establishment of courts of justice, to which the prince seemed to entertain great dislike, he requested to be furnished, on a future day, with some account of the second proposal—that which was confined to the demand of territory as a security for the claims of the British government, which was afforded. Being now in possession of the entire views of the governor-general, the vizier formally and distinctly rejected both branches of the alternative submitted to him. He could not, he said, with his own hands, excludé himself from his patrimonial dominions, “for,” he naively asked, “what advantage should I derive from so doing?”—nor could he consent to any positive territorial cession by way of security for the British subsidy; and the reason assigned for this refusal is truly wonderful, when considered in relation to the character and conduct of the vizier. “I expect,” said he, “to derive the most substantial profits from bringing into a flourishing condition this country, which has so long been in a state of waste and ruin; by a separation of territory my hopes of these substantial profits would be entirely cut off.” The governor-general in reply addressed a letter to the vizier, tendering again the two proposals for acceptance, and answering at great length the objections of the prince, showing that there was no hope for the abolition of the mass of abuses by which the country was overrun but in its transfer to the British government; and whether this desirable event should take place or not, exhibiting the right of that government to demand adequate security that its interests should not be involved in the general ruin. “It would be vain and fruitless,” said the governor-general, “to attempt this arduous task”—that of thorough and effectual reformation—“by partial interference, or by imperfect modifications of a system of which every principle is founded in error and impolicy, and every instrument tainted with injustice and corruption. After long and mature deliberation,” he continued, “I offer to your excellency a renewal of my former declaration, that the province of Oude cannot otherwise be preserved than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration founded

on principles of substantial justice and of comprehensive policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the English government.” After illustrating some of the advantages of this plan, he added, “but whatever may be your excellency’s sentiments with regard to the first proposition, the right of the Company to demand a cession of territory adequate to the security of the funds necessary for defraying the expense of our defensive engagements with your excellency is indisputable.” That right was rested principally upon the notorious fact, that the evils and abuses of the existing system of administration had greatly impaired the resources of the state, and the well-grounded inference that the causes of decay would continue to operate with increased and accelerated effect, until ultimately the prince should become unable to fulfil his engagements with the Company. The pretended expectations of the vizier were justly met by an inquiry, whether he could reasonably hope to induce the governor-general, by this unsupported assertion, to rest the interests of the Company in the province of Oude on a foundation so precarious and insecure as the expectation of an improvement obstructed by the whole system of the vizier’s government, and by every relative circumstance in the state of his affairs.

The vizier continued to withhold his assent to either proposal, and to endeavour, by a resort to all possible arts of evasion and delay, to defer the final settlement of the questions at issue between the British government and himself. At last he determined on a list of conditions or stipulations, to which he desired the assent of the governor-general before agreeing to the required cession of territory. They were in number eighteen, and related to a great variety of subjects. The first was a very characteristic one. It referred to the payment of the debts of Azoff-al-Dowlah, for which the vizier congratulated himself he was not accountable, and, moreover, avowed that he was unable to provide; and, referring to the non-responsibility of the Company, seemed to infer that their government would confirm the exemption which he claimed for himself. Other of the vizier’s demands pointed in the same direction. The fourth would appear, on a cursory reading, to be little more than idle verbiage; but it had a deep and important meaning. It ran thus:—“Whatever hereditary rights of this state descended to the late Nawaub Azoff-al-Dowlah now devolve upon me his successor; let me enjoy such rights exclusively, and let all the inheritances of my ancestors and the whole of the rights attached to my family centre in me, and let no person interfere in or assume them.” Colonel Scott was sufficiently acquainted with native diplomacy, and with the character of the vizier, to be induced to suspect that more was meant than met the eye. He imagined that it might be intended to recognize the right of the vizier to appropriate the property of the Bho Begum,

and, with some hesitation, this construction was acknowledged by a moulay retained by the vizier to be the correct one.

This was, therefore, an indication of a design on the part of the prince to resort to the same means of enriching his treasury which had been practised by his predecessor under the patronage of Warren Hastings. It was believed that, in addition to the strong appetite for accumulation which the vizier manifested at all times and under all circumstances, there was a peculiar reason for the attention which he thus bestowed on the reputed wealth of the begum. With the view, probably, of securing, during her own life, the enjoyment of that wealth, she had proposed to the British government to make the Company her heir. The imprudence of the begum, or of some of her dependants, had, it was supposed, suffered the secret to reach the ears of the vizier, and the mysterious article by which he sought to fortify his claims to succeed to all that was enjoyed or inherited by his predecessor was apprehended to have been the result. The resident very fairly took occasion to contrast this article with the first, in which he disclaimed the debts of the prince whom he succeeded. He claimed all the property which his predecessor possessed, or to which he was entitled, but he would have nothing to do with that prince's liabilities. Colonel Scott inquired by what rule of equity the debtor and creditor sides of the account were to be thus separated, but it does not appear that he received any answer. The fifth article was not dissimilar in its object from that by which it was preceded. It was wide and sweeping in its range:—"Should any person," it ran, "have obtained, or hereafter obtain, by breach of trust or other means, possession of specie or property belonging to this circar, let no one obstruct my taking back such property or specie." Ostensibly this was not open to objection. No one could properly desire to protect the possession of property fraudulently obtained; but the effect of the provision would have been to secure to the vizier the power of subjecting whom he pleased to those means of pressure by which Oriental potentates are accustomed to relieve wealthy subjects of a portion of their treasure. During the confusion that succeeded the death of Azoff-al-Dowlah, and continued through the short reign of Vizier Ali, it was suspected that much valuable property had been carried away from the private treasury, jewel-office, and wardrobe; and the suspicion was probably well founded. The British authorities did not wish to give impunity to these thefts, nor to screen from punishment those by whom it was merited; but neither did they wish to let loose on every person whom the vizier might think a fit subject for experiment, the processes by which are tested the possession of property, and the degree in which the possessor is endued with the power of tenacity. Colonel Scott desired that the suspected persons might be

pointed out, but he condemned the design of involving every person about the court in vexatious accusations. The thirteenth of the required stipulations was not less mysterious than some of those which had preceded it. It commenced with this recital:—"Some arrangement among the servants of the circar (state) calculated to diminish my expenses will become indispensable; and to obviate disturbances, it will become necessary to return such numbers only as can be paid monthly and regularly." These premises were followed by a very peremptory conclusion and a very sweeping demand:—"This arrangement can only be effected by dismission, and I desire that no intercession be made for any person whatever." Who were the persons destined for dismission, and thus excluded from the benefit of intercession? Whomsoever the vizier pleased—his brothers—the begum—the family of the deceased vizier—the public servants of the state, and all persons holding jaghires or enjoying pensions. These provisions were intended to afford the vizier a field for plunder. There were others, designed to secure to him the privilege of misgoverning his dominions without let or molestation. It was required that all correspondence should in future be carried on directly between the governor-general or the resident on the one part, and the vizier on the other, to the exclusion of the ministers of the latter—"since the present practice," said the prince, "is apt to render such people contumacious." The resident was to shut his ears to everything but what the vizier chose should enter them: "Let the resident," he said, "cordially and with sincerity uniting with me, pay no sort of attention to the representations of event-searching, self-interested persons." Further it was demanded, that the British troops to be paid by the vizier should remain permanently in the ceded countries, and that no interference, except in the way of advice, should take place in "any one" of the affairs—such were the vizier's words—of his government. Some of the proposed conditions would seem almost to have been framed with the intention of offering personal offence to the governor-general. The imputations conveyed in the following passages could not be misunderstood:—"When the matters now under discussion shall have been finally adjusted, according to what his lordship has written, let no fresh claims, of whatever sort, be advanced—let no increase be demanded." And again—"Let the engagements entered into between his lordship and this circar be firm and permanent, and let such a treaty be now drawn up, that no governor-general, who shall hereafter be appointed to the charge of the Company's affairs, may have it in his power to alter, change, or infringe the said treaty." Of the affronts thus offered to himself the governor-general took no notice; but he rejected the whole of the proposed conditions, partly on the ground that the demand made on behalf of the Company being a matter of right, compliance

ought to be unshackled with any conditions, even though they should be unobjectionable, and partly because the conditions proposed, so far from being of this character, were calculated to bring disgrace on the British name, and ruin to the honour of the vizier, the dignity and security of his relations, and the happiness of his subjects. Adverting to the articles which manifested more especially the vizier's dislike of British interference, the governor-general said: "From these articles it appears that the nawab vizier has already forgotten that the safety of his person and the existence of his government have been maintained exclusively by the British power, and by the presence of British troops. His excellency now seems disposed to gratify his unwarrantable suspicions at the hazard of the continuance of his authority over his subjects, and even of his personal safety, by removing the British forces from his territories, and by confiding his government and his life to those whose treason had repeatedly endangered both." Passing on to the articles which were designed to gratify the vizier's avarice, the governor-general thus expressed his opinion with regard to them: "The object of those articles appears to be, under the shelter of the British name to cancel all the public debts of the state of Oude; to defraud and plunder the ancient and venerable remains of the family and household of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah, together with whatever is respectable among the surviving relations and friends of the late Nawab Azoff-al-Dowlah; to involve the whole nobility and gentry of Oude in vexatious accusations and extensive proscriptions; to deprive the established dependants and pensioners of the state of the means of subsistence; to frustrate every institution founded in the piety, munificence, or charity of preceding governments, and to spread over the whole country a general system of rapacious confiscation, arbitrary imprisonment, and cruel banishment."

The negotiation continued to drag on for several months without apparently making any progress. The vizier, on being apprized of the determination of the governor-general in respect to the proposed stipulations, declared that without their concession on the part of the British government he would not yield his assent to either of the plans which had been submitted to him; but while thus refusing to be a party to the separation of his dominions, he affected a spirit of meek and patient resignation, declared that he had neither inclination nor strength to resist, and expressed a desire to proceed on a pilgrimage. During his absence he proposed that one of his sons should be invested with the office of deputy, and be empowered to carry into effect the territorial cession, as well as to complete the yet imperfect measure of reducing the vizier's military force.

Before this scheme was brought to the knowledge of the governor-general, he had

determined to despatch his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, a gentleman endowed with singular talents for diplomacy, to co-operate with Colonel Scott in endeavouring to bring the British relations with the vizier into a more satisfactory state. One motive to this step was the belief that the presence of one so nearly allied to the governor-general would have the effect of accelerating the vizier's determination, and it was further intended to put an end to a hope which the vizier was believed to entertain of procrastinating his decision till the arrival of the Marquis Wellesley on a visit, which he had long meditated, to the northern parts of India. To put an end to this hope, it was distinctly intimated that the governor-general was resolved not to hold any personal intercourse with the vizier while the points in dispute remained undecided. Before Mr. Wellesley arrived, a premature intimation given by the resident to certain aumils as to the payment in the coming year of the revenues for which they were responsible, gave the vizier a pretence for withholding payment of the kists actually due. There appears in this case something to blame on both sides. The vizier ought not to have withheld payments actually secured by treaty, unless he proposed to put an end to the treaty and was able to maintain his intention by force. At the same time, as there was no immediate necessity for the intimation given by Colonel Scott, it was an outrage upon the feelings of the vizier which might well have been spared. The vizier required that, as some reparation, the resident should call upon the aumils to pay their respects at the prince's durbar as usual. This, it appeared, they had never ceased to do, and the resident, feeling that any such intimation from him would seem to indicate that the British government faltered in its determination, refused to give it. Eventually the vizier made the necessary payments, to prevent, as he said, the Company's affairs from being embarrassed by his withholding them.

Mr. Wellesley arrived at Lucknow on the 3rd of September. On the 5th he presented to the vizier a memorial, recounting the motives which had led to his mission, and referring to the determination of the governor-general to avoid a personal interview with the vizier under the existing state of circumstances; warning him that no change in the British councils at home would affect the general tenor of the policy of the British government in India, and that no relaxation would take place in pursuing the measures previously deemed necessary for the peace and prosperity of Oude and the security of the Company's dominions. The memorial concluded by calling the vizier's attention to the first of the two proposals which had been submitted to him, and inviting a discussion of its terms. The vizier engaged to consider the subject, and after several days delivered his answer, declining, as on previous occasions, to agree

to any arrangement which might involve the sacrifice of his sovereignty. The British negotiators sought to shake this determination, but in vain. The vizier was peremptory in avowing his rejection of the plan, and declared it to be unequalled. The discussion of the second proposal made to the vizier by the governor-general was then resumed; and after several days had been consumed in profitless disputation, the prince signified his readiness to assent to it on certain conditions. These conditions were, that he should be permitted to depart on a pilgrimage; that his authority during his absence should be exercised by one of his sons, the right of resuming the government on his return being reserved to the vizier, in the event of his being disposed to avail himself of it. The British negotiators felt some doubt as to the course which it would be expedient for them to pursue, but finally they determined to accept the vizier's consent thus qualified. But a new difficulty was immediately interposed, by a demand from the prince for the introduction of an article, providing that as the territories to be ceded were to be entirely under the management and control of the Company, so those to be retained by him should be exclusively under his own, or that of his heirs and successors. This was so directly at variance with the views avowed on the part of the British authorities throughout the negotiations, and with one main object of the proposed new arrangement, that the vizier must have known it could not be entertained. The presumption is, that the attempt to revive discussion upon a question long before set at rest was only made for the purpose of delay. Other expedients for procrastination were found with the facility usual with Oriental diplomatists on such occasions; but at length a treaty was concluded, which on the 14th of November received the ratification of the governor-general. By this engagement the vizier bound himself to cede territory yielding a revenue of one crore thirty-five thousand lacs, including expenses of collection, in commutation of all claims on the part of the British government, and he in return was released from all future demands on account of the protection of Oude or its dependencies. The engagement on the part of the Company to defend the vizier from foreign and domestic enemies was repeated and confirmed, and the prince was restricted to the retention of a limited number of troops for purposes of state and revenue. A detachment of British troops, accompanied by a proportion of artillery, was to be at all times attached to the vizier's person; the remainder were to be stationed in such parts of his dominions as might seem fit to the British government. The territories not ceded to the English were formally guaranteed to the vizier, the guarantee being accompanied by one of those provisions which the prince had been most anxious to avert—that in the exercise of his authority he was in all cases to be guided

by the advice of the officers of the Company.

When the treaty with the vizier was ratified, the governor-general was on a progress through the northern provinces, undertaken with the view of informing himself of their state more particularly than could be effected at Calcutta, of stimulating by his presence the zeal of the Company's civil and military servants, and ultimately of proceeding to Lucknow to complete the arrangements which had been begun and carried forward to a certain point by others. On the 10th of January, 1802, he was met at Cawnpore by the vizier, who proceeded from his capital for the express purpose of conducting the governor-general to Lucknow. Concluding that the mind of the prince could not fail to be sore, from the effects of the long course of attrition which preceded the conclusion of the treaty, the governor-general judiciously resolved to defer all reference to the object of his visit till by the interchange of personal civilities opportunity might be afforded of softening any feelings of asperity that might find place in the vizier's heart, and disposing him to some measure of cordiality and confidence. The attention of the governor-general was assiduously directed to this purpose, and as he was endowed in an eminent degree with those qualities which are calculated to win for their possessor the esteem and affection of those towards whom they are exercised, his hope of succeeding was reasonable. Soon after arriving at Lucknow, the governor-general had a private conference with the vizier, in which the attention of the prince was directed to various points of considerable importance both to the English government and that of the vizier. One of these was the necessity of immediately taking measures for introducing an improved system of administration into the vizier's reserved dominions, in conformity with the treaty. This was further pressed at a subsequent interview, when the vizier returned to that system of evasion which was habitual to him, and which was never relinquished but under the pressure of necessity, and then only for a very brief period. He admitted the existence of the abuses and evils pointed out, and acknowledged the propriety of the remedial measures proposed, but accompanied these admissions by mysterious complaints of his want of sufficient authority to check the evils or enforce the remedies. All attempts to draw from him any explanation of the nature of the impediments thus darkly alluded to were vain; but a paper which he soon afterwards delivered showed the point towards which his objections were directed. The master grievance was the check interposed by the presence and counsel of the British resident. It would be idle to expect that the existence of such a check could ever be rendered agreeable or even tolerable to a prince who loves the exercise of power. Saadut Ali loved power; but still more did he love that which power enabled him to obtain. He had

contracted an unconquerable aversion to Colonel Scott, but he stated his views in general terms, and without any apparent reference to that officer. It has been seen that the vizier was much disposed to be his own minister; and he demanded that whatever advice the resident might have to give should be communicated to him, in the first instance, without the presence of any other person; and further, that the resident should not hold any communication with the vizier's subjects, except through his intervention. This second demand was most properly rejected. In answering it, the governor-general laid down a principle which ought ever to be borne in mind under similar circumstances. "It appears," said he, "to be indispensably necessary for the resident's correct information, as well as for the maintenance of his authority, that he should maintain the most free and unrestrained intercourse and correspondence with all ranks and descriptions of people." The first point was conceded, on the understanding that the vizier would not act in any important matter without the consent of the resident, whose judgment was to be final. The rejection of part of his demands gave great dissatisfaction to the prince. He resumed his proposal of proceeding on a pilgrimage, which had for some time slept; but finally he appears to have become reconciled to the circumstances in which he was placed, which he had no power of modifying, and which could not have been modified in any mode satisfactory to himself without inflicting gross injustice on his people. One object of the governor-general's visit to Lucknow was to arrange an exchange of territory, for the convenience of both parties interested, and this was effected without difficulty.

Among the cessions made by the vizier to the British government was that of the tribute paid to the former by the Nabob of Furruckabad. The arrangement between these two princes was not unlike those between the British government and its subsidiary dependents. The Nabob of Furruckabad was restricted from maintaining more troops than were requisite for purposes of state, and the vizier was charged with the defence of the province both from internal and external enemies. The nabob with whom the engagement was concluded, Muzuffer Jung, was murdered by his eldest son. The parricide escaped the severity of punishment which he well merited. His life was spared; but he was carried to Lucknow and there confined by order of the vizier. Consequent upon the conviction of the elder son, the inheritance was transferred to the second son of the murdered prince; but he being a minor, it was necessary to appoint a manager. A person named Khirudmund Khan was selected for the office; but having powerful enemies, who hoped to obtain an ascendancy in the new government for themselves, he refused to undertake it without the fullest assurance of support and pro-

tection from the British government. This was given, and the manager entered upon his office under the joint protection of that government and the vizier.

The promise of support which Khirudmund Khan had required, the British government was, on various occasions, called on to fulfil. The enemies of the manager succeeded in establishing an unbounded influence over the mind of the young nabob, and about the time of the changes at Oude, the nabob, whose minority was nearly at an end, laid claim to the privilege of taking into his own hands the administration of affairs. Khirudmund Khan was equally anxious, or affected to be equally anxious, to be relieved from his charge, and to retire upon a provision which had been secured to him on the occurrence of such an event. The making some arrangement for conducting the affairs of Furruckabad was thus imperatively pressed upon the British government.

There was some difficulty in determining what that arrangement should be. According to Khirudmund Khan, the disposition of the young nabob was bad, and his natural propensities to evil had been aggravated by the advice and example of his associates. This representation, indeed, was to be received with caution, for the nabob bore no good-will to the man by whom it was made, and the associates whom he charged with encouraging and multiplying the nabob's vices were his own enemies, and had been competitors for the power which he exercised. He, too, was accused by the nabob of abusing his office. On neither side do the accusations seem to have been substantiated; but on neither side were they destitute of probability. It is not incredible that an Oriental guardian should endeavour to profit unduly by his office—it is not incredible that an Oriental prince should find evil advisers and listen to them. In both cases the presumption lies against the parties accused.

The solution of the question in what manner the government of Furruckabad should in future be administered was intrusted by the governor-general to his brother, Mr. Henry Welleseley, who had been placed at the head of a commission for the settlement of the ceded provinces with the title of lieutenant-governor. Mr. Welleseley commenced his task by calling upon Khirudmund Khan to communicate his views with regard to the future government of the province. The manager displayed a truly Eastern reluctance to any direct avowal of opinion; but with some difficulty he was brought to state that three different modes suggested themselves to his mind:—that the administration of affairs should be continued in the same hands by which it had been carried on during the nabob's minority; that the nabob, on the attainment of the proper age, should be allowed to assume the government; or that the entire civil and military administration should be transferred to the British government. The first would probably have been the most agreeable to the manager: the

last, he might expect, would be the most acceptable to his auditor; but the wary officer contented himself with suggestion, and presumed not to say which of the suggested plans was the best. Mr. Wellesley did not conceal his own leaning in favour of the transfer of all power to the government which he represented, and Khirudmund Khan professed himself ready to promote his views; but it is worthy of remark, that he never took a single step in furtherance of them. A proposal for the entire transfer of the nabob's dominions to the Company was, however, made by Mr. Wellesley to the nabob. The latter was very unwilling to relinquish the power to the enjoyment of which his hopes had so long been directed; but he reluctantly yielded. The province of Furruckabad was added to the dominions of the Company, and the nabob was

endowed with a splendid provision, the security of which was some satisfaction for the loss of the dependent sovereignty of which it was the price.

The duty of settling the provinces acquired from the vizier was performed by Mr. Henry Wellesley in a manner which secured for him the approbation of all to whom he was responsible. Some overgrown zemindars, who were disaffected to the new government because it tended to restrain the power which they had been long accustomed to abuse, offered resistance, which in a few instances was formidable; but they were ultimately subdued, and the entire country submitted peaceably to the British authority. Mr. Wellesley, on the close of his duties in the ceded provinces, departed for Europe, having established the reputation of an able public servant.

CHAPTER XVIII.

MARQUIS WELLESLEY MISUNDERSTOOD AT HOME.—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PEISHWA.—SCINDIA AND THE PEISHWA DEFEATED BY HOLKAR.—RESTORATION OF THE PEISHWA.—GENERAL WELLESLEY TAKES THE FIELD.—FALL OF AHMEDNUGGER AND BROACH.—NOTICES OF PERRON AND DE BOIGNE.—PERRON DEFEATED BY LORD LAKE.—CAPTURE OF COEL AND ALLYHUR.—RESTORATION OF THE EMPEROR.—BATTLE OF ASSYE.—FALL OF AGRA.—BATTLE OF LASWARREE.—NEGOTIATIONS WITH SCINDIA.—BATTLE OF ARGAUM.—CAPTURE OF GAWILGHUR.—PEACE WITH THE RAJAH OF BERRA AND SCINDIA.—OCCUPATION OF BUNDLECOND.—A FRENCH SQUADRON REPULSED BY A FLEET OF INDIAMEN.—VARIOUS TREATIES.

On the 1st of January, 1802, at a time when his policy was everywhere throughout India crowned with the most brilliant success, the Marquis Wellesley addressed to the Court of Directors a despatch, intimating his desire to resign his office at the close of that year or the commencement of the succeeding one. The desire of the governor-general to be thus early relieved from an office in which he had rendered to his country such splendid service, and acquired for himself so much honour, would be inexplicable without reference to the feelings with which he was regarded at home. In his official despatch he did not enter into the reasons which led to the tender of his resignation, but other documents supply the deficiency. He had not the confidence of the Court of Directors, and he felt it. They had, on various occasions, issued orders which the governor-general felt as offensive to himself, and others which he viewed as dangerous to the public service.

Among these was a peremptory order to reduce the army, especially in the peninsula. This arrived at a time when it could not be obeyed without putting in hazard not only recent conquests, but the entire fabric of the British empire in India. The governor-general suspended its execution, and, as will hereafter be seen, subsequent events amply justified the exercise of this discretion. As the increase of the army had been the act of the governor-general, he considered the order for its reduction to have been framed in a

spirit of personal hostility; but it was probably only the offspring of a blind economy. Some other instances of frugality would seem to be more open to the suspicion of personal aim. Colonel Wellesley, who held the chief command in Mysore, was, by the nature of his duties, subjected to heavy expenses; his allowances were consequently fixed by the government of Madras on a liberal scale. The home authorities thought them too great. On this subject his lordship expressed himself in the language of indignant remonstrance. After stating that, though the duty of fixing the allowances of Colonel Wellesley was part of the ordinary detail of the government of Madras, with which the governor-general did not interfere except in cases of exigency, it must yet be reasonably supposed that he was cognizant of the subject, and had exercised his judgment with regard to it, although no record of such judgment might exist, the marquis demands, "Can the Court of Directors suppose that I am capable of permitting the government of Fort St. George to grant an extravagant allowance to my brother, and that my brother is capable of accepting such an allowance? If such be the opinion of the Court, it ought to remove Colonel Wellesley from his command and me from my government." He continues: "The fact is, that the allowance is scarcely equal to the unavoidable expenses of Colonel Wellesley's situation, which is known to be of a very peculiar nature, involving the necessity of a great

establishment and of other charges requisite for the maintenance of our interest in that recently-conquered kingdom." After dwelling upon the affront offered to his brother, and its possible effect, the governor-general adds: "It cannot be denied that the Court, by reducing the established allowances of Colonel Wellesley, has offered me the most direct, marked, and disgusting personal indignity which could be devised. The effect of this order must be, to inculcate an opinion that I have suffered my brother to derive emoluments beyond the limits of justice and propriety; and that I have exhibited an example of profusion and extravagance in an allowance granted to my nearest connection. I have already stated that the ground of the order is as unjust and unwarranted in point of fact, as its operation is calculated to be injurious and humiliating to my reputation and honour. If the Court of Directors really was of opinion that Colonel Wellesley's allowances were too high, the respectful and decorous course would have been to have referred the question to my consideration; nor can it be imagined that the Court would have omitted so indispensable a precaution of delicacy and justice, unless the Court acted under a strong sense of displeasure and discontent at the general tenor of my administration, and under the influence of an unconquerable jealousy of my intentions."

But darkness of political vision and undue parsimony were not the only sources of the hostility directed against the Marquis Wellesley. A body of men, who at that time exercised a very powerful interest in the councils of the Company, conceived that their interests were injuriously affected by some measures adopted by the governor-general with regard to trade. The Company's monopoly had a few years before been relaxed by an enactment requiring them to provide a certain amount of tonnage annually for the use of private merchants. As far as the export trade from Great Britain was concerned, the extent of the provision was probably sufficient, as at that time there was little demand in India for British manufactures; but it was not sufficient for the return trade. There was throughout Europe a considerable demand for various articles which India could furnish; and the supply of this opened a convenient mode of remittance to persons who had acquired fortunes in that country, which they proposed to invest and enjoy at home. From this state of things a large portion of the exports of India found their way to Europe in foreign shipping, though the trade was supported and carried on by British capital—the accumulations of the servants of the East-India Company. For this state of things there was no remedy but the employment of India-built shipping to an extent which might supply the deficiency in the Company's tonnage; thus diverting a valuable and increasing department of trade from foreign to British ships. Though in England extraordinary delicacy of

feeling had been manifested with regard to Indian princes, though the exercise of the right of self-defence has been almost proscribed in their favour, little sympathy has ever been displayed towards the people at large. Subjected to British rule, they had been treated as aliens, and denied rights enjoyed by every other class of British subjects. The London shipbuilders chose to consider the extension of justice to India as an act of injustice to them. Some time before the departure of the Marquis Wellesley they remonstrated against it, and though it was obvious that the employment of India-built ships would displace not British but foreign tonnage, they demanded its prohibition. The degree of justice attending this demand is accurately and forcibly depicted in a communication from Mr. Dundas, then president of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, to the chairman of the committee of shipbuilders. "The injustice of the proposition," says he, "consists in depriving a great description of the subjects of Great Britain of a right undoubtedly belonging to them. The British territories in India are under the sovereignty of Great Britain, and the ships built there are equally entitled to all the privileges of British-built shipping as those built in the West Indies, or Canada, or any other foreign dependency of the empire; and I have never heard that the ship builders in Great Britain have set up a claim to prohibit any of the shipping in those quarters from bringing home the produce of those territories in ships of their own building, if they found it convenient to do so; and yet it is obvious that the same plea of interest and supposed injury would equally apply." Having vindicated the rights of the people of India to be regarded as British subjects, the writer proceeded to show that the view taken by those whom he was addressing, of their own interests and those of the British nation, were erroneous, observing:—"They (the shipbuilders) conceive that the prohibition of India-built ships coming to Great Britain would make a proportionate degree of room for the shipping of the East-India Company. It would have no such effect. It would have no other effect than that which it has always had, of driving those ships, with their cargoes, into foreign ports, and thereby establishing in foreign countries an Asiatic commerce, founded on British capital, which, by a contrary policy, ought, in the first place, to centre in the river Thames, and be from thence re-exported for the supply of other European nations." Sound as were these views, they failed to satisfy the shipping interest, which continued to employ its vast influence in the courts of the East-India Company to withhold from the shipping of India all participation in the trade carried on between that country and Great Britain.

The necessity, however, of providing some extent of extra tonnage was so apparent, that

it was impossible to resist it. Accordingly, authority was given to the government of Bengal to take up a limited amount of tonnage on account of the Company, and relet it to the merchants of Calcutta. The Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival at that place, had been assailed by representations from the mercantile community in favour of the employment of India-built ships; and in carrying into effect the orders from home, he made some changes calculated to divest the authorized measure of some incumbrances which tended to impede its beneficial operation. He took the same course at a subsequent period, and thus at once earned the gratitude of the mercantile interest of India, and the relentless enmity of the shipbuilders of the port of London. Between the two periods of granting indulgence to India-built ships a year had intervened, during which it had not been resorted to; and the experience of that year was stated by the governor-general to have attested the expediency of restoring it. "Goods to a large amount," he said, "originally intended for the port of London, were sold to foreigners in the port of Calcutta, and thus diverted to the channel of the foreign trade." This result appeared to the governor-general to justify a return to the position of the preceding year. "The rapid growth," said he, "of the foreign trade during the last season urgently demanded the immediate interference of your government on the spot. The number of foreign ships actually in the port of Calcutta, the alacrity, enterprise, and skill of the foreign agents now assiduously employed in providing cargoes, and the necessary inaction and languor of the British private trade, embarrassed by the restraints of the existing law, created a serious apprehension in my mind, that any further delay in the decision of this momentous question might occasion evils of which the remedy might hereafter become considerably difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The unrestrained progress of the foreign trade in the present season, added to its great increase during the last, might have established its predominance over the private trade of British subjects, to an extent which no future regulation might have proved sufficient to limit or restrain. The difficulty of diverting this lucrative commerce from the channel into which it had been forced would naturally be aggravated, in proportion to the length of time during which the trade should continue to flow in that course." Such were the views, or rather such was the necessity, under which the governor-general acted. It is a case in which it is impossible to assign to his conduct any motive but a sense of public duty. Yet, while thus suspending for a season the operation of measures which he felt to be just, wise, and necessary,—while seeking to be relieved from the painful duty of upholding them on his own responsibility,—he incurred the resentment of those who supposed themselves injured by those measures, and thus added

another active ingredient to the elements of opposition which were fermenting at home.

The orders to reduce the army have been mentioned, as well as those relating to the allowances of Colonel Wellesley. The Court had, in other instances, animadverted on measures of policy in a manner which the governor-general regarded as offensive. On some of these points he appears to have felt a degree of indignation which, at this distance of time, seems scarcely warranted by the occasion. But high genius is ever associated with strong sensibility. The Marquis Wellesley knew his own purity; he knew also the feelings with which he was regarded at home; and it need excite no surprise, if, irritated by annoyances which he thought an ungracious return for his eminent services, he should have alluded to some of them with more impatience than they now seem calculated to excite.

Amidst the great events which mark the administration of the Marquis Wellesley, it would be wrong to pause for the purpose of discussing the merits of the servants of the government, except so far as they were connected with those important facts which it is more especially the province of history to record. A very brief notice of the acts of the Court, in displacing certain servants from office, and appointing others, must therefore suffice. The governor-general had appointed Colonel Kirkpatrick secretary in the political department. The Court ordered the appointment to be rescinded, on the ground that his military commission disqualified him for civil office. This was a new construction of the law, and certainly had the appearance of having been specially devised for the occasion. The Marquis Wellesley was not the first governor-general who had nominated military men to political or civil duties. He found the practice to a certain extent existing; and it is not inapplicable to remark, that it has never been entirely discontinued. The general rule, undoubtedly, should be to distribute civil appointments among the members of the civil service; but, with reference to the peculiar delicacy and difficulty of the political offices under the governor-general, it may sometimes become necessary to dispense with the rule. Where a military officer possesses a pre-eminent degree of fitness for such an appointment, it is obviously not for the benefit of the public service to pass him by. On the same principle which was applied to Colonel Kirkpatrick, orders were given to revise the appointment of Colonel Scott at Lucknow, with a view to rescind it. This was certainly an ungracious step towards both the governor-general and Colonel Scott. A most important negotiation had been brought to a successful conclusion—that which had been done was formally approved from home—yet discouragement, and, indirectly, blame, were cast both on him who had devised the plan and on him by whom it had been carried into effect. The Marquis Wellesley believed that the extraor-

dinary interference from home was intended to give personal annoyance to himself and Lord Clive. The latter nobleman entertained the same impression. He had entered cordially and zealously into the policy of the Marquis Wellesley, and the hostility displayed towards the governor-general was believed for this reason to be extended to the governor of Fort St. George.

There was one further ground of difference between the Court of Directors and their governor-general, which, although it had not been fully developed, it will be convenient to notice here, to avoid interrupting the progress of the narrative hereafter. The altered situation of the Company had not at this time produced any alteration in the mode of selecting their servants, or of preparing them for their duties. The Marquis Wellesley saw the evil, and determined on providing a remedy. In a minute of great length and ability, he adverted to the vast changes which had taken place since Great Britain first obtained a settlement in India, to the extent of the Company's dominions, the important duties devolving on their servants, and to the qualifications which they ought to possess. After dwelling upon these points in detail, he thus summed up his views:—"The civil servants of the English East-India Company, therefore, can no longer be considered as the agents of a commercial concern. They are, in fact, the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign; they must now be viewed in that capacity, with reference not to their nominal but to their real occupations. They are required to discharge the functions of magistrates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces, in all the complicated and extensive relations of those sacred trusts and exalted stations, and under peculiar circumstances, which greatly enhance the solemnity of every public obligation, and aggravate the difficulty of every public charge. Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world, with no other characteristic differences than the obstacles opposed by an unfavourable climate, by a foreign language, by the peculiar usages and laws of India, and by the manners of its inhabitants. Their studies, the discipline of their education, their habits of life, their manners and morals, should therefore be so ordered and regulated as to establish a just conformity between their personal consideration and the dignity and importance of their public stations, and to maintain a sufficient correspondence between their qualifications and their duties. Their education should be founded in a general knowledge of those branches of literature and science which form the basis of the education of persons destined to similar occupations in Europe. To this foundation should be added an intimate acquaintance with the history, languages, customs, and manners of the people of India, with the Mahometan and Hindoo codes of law and religion, and with the political and commercial

interests of Great Britain in Asia. They should be regularly instructed in the principles and system which constitute the foundation of that wise code of regulations and laws enacted by the governor-general in council, for the purpose of securing to the people of this empire the benefit of the ancient and accustomed laws of the country, administered in the spirit of the British constitution. They should be well informed of the true and sound principles of the British constitution, and sufficiently grounded in the general principles of ethics, civil jurisprudence, the law of nations, and general history, in order that they may be enabled to discriminate the characteristic differences of the several codes of law administered within the British empire in India, and practically to combine the spirit of each in the dispensation of justice and in the maintenance of order and good government. Finally, their early habits should be so formed as to establish in their minds such solid foundations of industry, prudence, integrity, and religion, as should effectually guard them against those temptations and corruptions with which the nature of this climate and the peculiar depravity of the people of India will surround and assail them in every station, especially on their first arrival in India. The early discipline of the service should be calculated to counteract the defects of the climate and the vices of the people, and to form a natural barrier against habitual indolence, dissipation, and licentious indulgence; the spirit of emulation in honourable and useful pursuits should be kindled and kept alive, by the continual prospect of distinction and reward, of profit and honour; nor should any precaution be relaxed in India which is deemed necessary in England, to furnish a sufficient supply of men qualified to fill the high offices of the state with credit to themselves and with advantage to the public. Without such a constant succession of men in the several branches and departments of this government, the wisdom and benevolence of the law must prove vain and inefficient. Whatever course and system of study may be deemed requisite in England to secure an abundant and pure source for the efficient supply of the public service, the peculiar nature of our establishments in the East, so far from admitting any relaxation of those wise and salutary rules and restraints, demands that they should be enforced with a degree of additional vigilance and care, proportioned to the aggravated difficulties of civil service, and to the numerous hazards surrounding the entrance to public life in India."

Such were the views entertained by the Marquis Wellesley as to the importance of due preparation for the discharge of the important duties of the civil service of India. He proceeded to show that the minds of the young men annually arriving at the presidencies in the capacity of writers had rarely undergone any adequate preparation—that from some,

all instruction in liberal learning had been withheld, while in others, the course of study had been interrupted precisely at the period when it might have been pursued with increased advantage—that in India they had no opportunities of acquiring even the technical knowledge requisite to fit them for civil office—knowledge of the languages and customs of the natives; of the regulations and laws; or of the details of the established system of revenue—that the well-disposed and industrious were bewildered for want of a guide, while others, devoting themselves wholly to luxury and sensual enjoyment, remained sunk in indolence, until their standing in the service rendered them eligible to some office of trust, for which, however, they were incapable, from want of preparation, and from the difficulty of suddenly breaking long-indulged habits of idleness and dissipation. There were not wanting, indeed, instances of application to study and habitual propriety of conduct; but all the merits of the civil servants, it was urged, were to be ascribed to themselves, while their defects were to be attributed to the constitution and practice of the service, which had not been accommodated to the progressive changes of our situation in India—had not kept pace with the growth of the empire, or with the increasing extent and importance of the functions and duties of the Company's servants. To remedy the existing evils, the governor-general proposed to establish a college in Calcutta, for the reception of writers for the three presidencies, who were there, for a limited period, to be subjected to the restraints of academic discipline, and trained in such studies as might fit them for their future duties. These were to be pursued under the superintendence of two clergymen, chaplains in the Company's service; for the native languages moonshes were to be provided. The expense of the institution was to be provided for in a manner which should not in the first instance subject the Company to any additional charge; but the governor-general expressed a hope that the liberality of the Court of Directors would in due time be extended to it. It was established without previous reference home, and the following grounds were assigned for the omission: a conviction of the great immediate benefit to be derived from the early commencement even of the partial operation of the plan—the experience of the advantages which had already in some instances been derived from the systematic study of the native languages—the anxiety felt by the governor-general to impart to the young men arrived from Europe within the three preceding years a share of the anticipated benefits of the institution, and a solicitude, perfectly natural in its projector, to superintend the foundation of the college, and to accelerate and witness its first effects.

It will be judged, from the rapidity with which the design was carried into execution, that the establishment of the College of Fort

William was a favourite object with the Marquis Wellesley. It was not so fortunate as to meet equal favour in Great Britain. The Court of Directors, prepared to look with suspicion on any proposal originating with the governor-general, feeling perhaps some displeasure, not altogether unwarranted, that the plan had been actually carried into effect without their concurrence, and anticipating a charge upon their finances, of heavy and undefinable extent, withheld their approval of the magnificent establishment which had been devised, but voluntarily sanctioned the formation of an institution of more humble pretensions, at each of the presidencies, for instruction in the vernacular languages. The abolition of the college followed.

The suppression of the college added one further mortification to those which the governor-general had already experienced; but his design to return home at the expiration of a year from the time when he announced it was not carried into effect. The Court of Directors requested him to prolong his stay for another year, acknowledging that, though they had differed from him in some material points, it was impossible not to be impressed by the zeal and ability which he had displayed in the general management of their affairs, and intimating a conviction that the interests of the Company would be essentially promoted by his yielding to their request. Whether or not he would have complied, had India remained at peace, cannot be known; but a state of affairs had arisen which deprived him of the opportunity of returning with honour. He consequently remained to enter upon a new course of arduous and important service, which must now be followed.

The governor-general had been desirous of drawing more closely the connection between the British government and the peishwa. He had invited that prince to co-operate in the war against Tippoo Sultan, and though the appeal was disregarded, he had proposed to bestow on the peishwa a portion of the territory which the British arms had conquered. He had been anxious to conclude a subsidiary treaty with the head of the Mahratta confederacy, but the measure, though unremittingly pursued for a long period, had failed. Throughout these negotiations the peishwa did not discredit the established character of his countrymen for proficiency in all the arts of evasive and dishonest policy. While seeking to amuse the British agents by a series of illusory representations, he was employed in endeavouring to detach the nizam from his British ally, and to engage him in a confederacy against that power to which he was indebted for protection. At length, late in the year 1801, the peishwa, being surrounded with difficulties from which he knew not how to extricate himself, signified his willingness to subsidize six battalions of British troops, on the condition that they should not be stationed within his own dominions, but be prepared at

all times to act on his requisition; and for the payment he proposed to assign territory in Hindostan. The proposal required and received mature consideration. The peishwa was obviously and not unnaturally anxious to surrender as small a portion of power as possible. He was aware that the permanent establishment of a British force at Poona would be fatal to his independence; he therefore sought to keep it at a distance, except in cases of emergency. In the opinion of the governor-general, he probably calculated that the knowledge of his ability to command so powerful a body of troops as that which he proposed to subsidize would be sufficient to support his authority and overawe those who might be disposed to subvert it. As to the portion of the territory to be assigned for the payment of the required force, it was simply stated to be in Hindostan. From this intimation it was inferred that it was to be north of the Nerbudda. There, however, the peishwa possessed only a nominal authority, and the assignment of territory, under such circumstances, was very different to transferring its possession. It was suspected, also, that the territory might be selected with a view to the reduction of the power of Scindia or of Holkar, or of relieving the peishwa from the control exercised over him by the former chief, which he had long felt a sore burden, and that the mode by which this object was to be effected was by involving Scindia in a contest with the British government. There were some other proposed conditions of inferior importance, to which it is not necessary to advert. The governor-general, on a review of the relative positions of the peishwa, his nominal dependents, and the British government, deemed the proposal inadmissible without considerable modification; but there were indications in the political horizon which disposed him to acquiesce in the required limitation as to the portion of the subsidiary force, provided a less objectionable arrangement for the discharge of the subsidy could be effected. In July, 1802, the British resident at Poona was instructed to intimate that he was prepared to make a communication on the subject of the peishwa's proposal. The peishwa received the intimation with great indifference, and manifested a remarkable absence of curiosity as to the governor-general's determination. At last the affair was opened and the proposed arrangement discussed, but with little apparent probability of an early conclusion. The approach of Holkar, who was in arms against Scindia and his nominal head, the peishwa, brought the negotiation to a crisis. On the 23rd of October, Holkar encamped within a short distance of Poona. On the 25th an action took place between his army and the combined force of the peishwa and Scindia. The peishwa, to be prepared for the event, whatever it might be, moved out of the city attended by the standard of the empire, and at the same time despatched his minister to the British resident with an instrument

under the prince's seal, declaring his consent to subsidize the proposed number of troops, and engaging, for their subsistence, to cede to the Company territory in Guzerat or in the southern quarters of his dominions, yielding an annual revenue of twenty-six lacs. The minister, at the time of presenting this instrument, gave the British resident the fullest assurance that it was the peishwa's intention and meaning, that a general defensive alliance should be concluded between himself and the Company, on the basis of the treaty of Hyderabad. The resident deemed it expedient, under the circumstances, immediately to suggest to the governments of Madras and Bombay the necessity of preparing a body of troops at each presidency, for the eventual support of the peishwa's government. He made a similar application to the resident at Hyderabad, with a view to the service of a considerable detachment from the subsidiary force stationed there. These preparations were not needless. The battle, which had commenced at half-past nine in the morning, ended about mid-day, when victory rested with Holkar, a result to be attributed in a great degree to his own desperate efforts. The peishwa fled with a body of cavalry to the fort of Singurh. The Company's resident, Colonel Close, remained at Poona, and the British flag, which waved conspicuously at his quarters, commanded the respect of all parties.

The engagement of the peishwa had been transmitted without delay to the governor-general, who ratified it on the day of its arrival. Orders were at the same time issued to the governments of Madras and Bombay, and to the resident at Hyderabad, confirming the requisitions of Colonel Close for the assemblage of troops. The peishwa, quitting Raigurh, proceeded to Mhar, whence he despatched letters to the Bombay government, requesting that ships might be sent to convey him and his followers to that presidency. Alarmed by the advance of some of Holkar's troops, he soon after fled to Severndroog, where he resided for some time under protection of the fort. A British ship finally conveyed him to Bassein, where he arrived on the 16th of December, attended by a small escort of about a hundred and thirty followers.

The British resident remained at Poona for some time after the departure of the peishwa, and had several conferences of an apparently friendly character with Holkar. The object of that chief was to obtain possession of the person of the peishwa, and use the name and authority of the prince, as Scindia had previously done, for his own purposes. To this end he was desirous of having the support of the British government, and he invited the resident to undertake the task of effecting an accommodation for him with the peishwa. Colonel Close referred him to the governor-general; and with some difficulty obtained permission to depart. He arrived at Bombay on the 3rd of December. On the 6th he received a communication from the gover-

non-general, approving of the arrangements into which he had entered. On the arrival of the peishwa at Bassein, Colonel Close waited on the prince, and the necessary steps were commenced for the conclusion of a definitive treaty. Some difference existed as to the territories to be assigned for the pay of the subsidiary force, but it was terminated by the peishwa suddenly and unexpectedly signifying his assent to the surrender of those on which the British resident had insisted. On the last day of the year 1802 the treaty was signed and sealed; and the counterpart, duly ratified by the governor-general, was shortly afterwards transmitted to the peishwa.

This document was of great length, comprising no fewer than nineteen articles. It declared the friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties, friends and enemies of both, and confirmed all former treaties and agreements between the two states not contrary to the tenor of the new one. It provided for the joint exertions of both to defend the rights or redress the wrongs of either, or of their respective dependents or allies; and this provision was followed by an explanatory addition, declaring that the British government would never permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of the peishwa, but would at all times maintain and defend them, in the same manner as the rights and territories of the Company. The subsidiary force was to consist of six thousand regular native infantry, with the usual proportion of field-pieces and European artillerymen attached, and the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition, and it was to be permanently stationed within the peishwa's dominions. This last point was an important departure from the plan proposed by the peishwa, and to which the governor-general was prepared, if necessary, to consent: but the concession was not extorted by the force of circumstances, it had been yielded by the peishwa at Poona, and before his fortune had taken the unfavourable turn which led to his flight. A succeeding article provided for the cession of territory described in a schedule attached to the treaty, for the payment of the subsidiary force, and another provided for exchange of territory should it at a future period appear desirable. The total annual expense of the force was estimated at twenty-five lacs—the estimated value of the lands ceded was twenty-six lacs, the additional lac being intended to meet possible deficiencies—an arrangement the expediency of which will be denied by none who have had opportunity of observing the wide difference which, in matters of Indian revenue, ordinarily exists between estimates and realizations. By the next article, designed to avert a collision of authorities and claims, it was stipulated that orders should be given for admitting the Company's officers to the charge of the ceded districts as soon as it should

be signified that they were prepared to take it; that all collections made by the peishwa's officers between the date of the treaty and the period of the Company's taking possession should be carried to the credit of the latter; and all claims to balance on account of antecedent periods be considered void. All forts within the ceded districts were to be given up without injury or damage, and with their equipment of ordnance, stores, and provisions. Grain, and all articles of consumption, and provisions, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary numbers of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the subsidiary force, were to be entirely exempted from duties; the commanding officer and the officers of the force were to be treated "in all respects in a manner suited to the dignity and greatness of both states." The force was to be at all times ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the peishwa's person, the overawing and chastisement of rebels, or suppression of disturbances in his dominions, and due correction of his subjects and dependents who might withhold payment of the just claims of the state; but it was not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor in a variety of ways which were enumerated. The negotiation of this treaty afforded opportunity for relieving Surat from certain Mahratta claims which had been a source of much vexation and dispute, and it was not neglected. These claims were to be abandoned on consideration of the surrender, on the part of the Company, of land, the revenue of which should be equal to the annual estimated value of the Mahratta tribute. Some similar claims in other places were to be extinguished in the same manner. The article with regard to the employment of Europeans by the peishwa was far less stringent than that inserted in other engagements of like character between the British government and its allies. In place of stipulating for the entire exclusion of Europeans and Americans from the service of the peishwa, the treaty, after reciting that it had been usual for that prince to enlist and retain in his service Europeans of different countries, provided that, in the event of war breaking out between the English and any European nation, and of discovery being made that any Europeans in the peishwa's service belonging to such nation at war with the English should have meditated injury towards their government, or have entered into intrigues hostile to their interests, such persons were to be discharged, and not suffered to reside within the peishwa's dominions. The following article restrained the peishwa from committing any act of aggression against the Company's allies or dependents, or against any of the principal branches of the Mahratta empire, or against any power whatever; and bound him to abide by the Company's award, should differences arise. Two other articles, which referred to existing disputes with various parties (the Mahrattas were never

without a standing array of disputes with every Indian power), gave to the Company the right of arbitration, and pledged the peishwa to obedience. In the event of war, the peishwa engaged, in addition to four battalions of the subsidiary force, to aid the Company immediately with six thousand infantry and ten thousand horse from his own troops, and, with as little delay as possible, to bring into the field the whole force which he might be able to supply from his dominions. The Company, on the other hand, engaged to employ against the common enemy the largest force which they might be able to furnish, over and above the number of the subsidiary troops. When war might appear probable, the peishwa was to provide stores and other aids in his frontier garrisons. He was neither to commence nor pursue negotiation with any power whatever without giving notice and entering into consultation with the Company's government. While his external relations were thus restrained, the rights preserved to him in his own dominions were most ample. The Company disclaimed all concern with the peishwa's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom his highness was declared to be absolute. The subsidiary force were to be employed, if necessary, in suppressing disturbances in the ceded districts; and if disturbances should arise in the peishwa's territories, the British government, on his requisition, were to direct such of the Company's troops as should be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling them. The concluding article, in oriental fashion, declared that the treaty should last as long as the sun and the moon should endure.

In conformity with the suggestions of Colonel Close, confirmed by the governor-general, the whole of the subsidiary force stationed in the territories of the nizâm, amounting to something more than eight thousand three hundred men, marched from Hyderabad at the close of the month of February, and on the 25th of March reached the town of Paraindah, situate on the western frontier of the nizâm's dominions, about a hundred and sixteen miles from Poona. The subsidiary force was accompanied by six thousand of the nizâm's disciplined infantry, and about nine thousand cavalry. At Madras Lord Clive prepared for carrying out the views of the governor-general. On the 27th of February he instructed General Stuart, then present with the army on the frontier of Mysore, to adopt the necessary measures for the march of the British troops into the Mahratta territory, leaving it to the judgment of the general to determine the amount of force necessary to be detached for the purpose. The choice of a commander Lord Clive did not delegate to another. He selected for the command Major-General Wellesley, who, in addition to his military claims, had acquired in Mysore much local knowledge that could not fail to be eminently useful, and by his cam-

paign against Dhoondia Waugh, had established among the Mahratta chieftains a high degree of reputation and influence. The detachment made by General Stuart consisted of one regiment of European and three regiments of native cavalry, two regiments of European and six battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery. It amounted to nearly ten thousand men, and to this force were added two thousand five hundred of the rajah of Mysore's horse. It is impossible to advert to this without referring to one advantage of the conquest of Seringapatam, and the subsequent treaty which the movement of the troops under General Wellesley brings to notice. For the first time in the wars of Great Britain with the native states, were the power and resources of Mysore brought to the assistance of the Company's government. Hitherto that state had been a source of unceasing danger and alarm. The policy of the Marquis Wellesley had converted it into a valuable accession of strength.

General Wellesley commenced his march from Hurryhur, on the frontier of Mysore, on the 9th of March, and crossed the Toombudra river on the 12th. The march of the British troops through the southern division of the peishwa's territories had the effect of restoring a degree of peace which the country rarely experienced. The chieftains and jaghiredars, whose petty differences had previously kept the districts oppressed by them in a state of constant warfare and outrage, suspended their contests for a time, awed by the presence of a commander whose name imposed terror on all disturbers of the peace. Most of them joined the British army in support of the cause of the peishwa. Among the number were several who had incurred that prince's displeasure, and who hoped that the influence of the British government, exercised in acknowledgment of their services, might be sufficient to restore them to favour. On the 15th of April General Wellesley effected a junction with the force from Hyderabad. As he proceeded, the advanced detachments of Holkar retreated before him, and on his approach to Poona, the chieftain himself retired from that place to Chandoor, a town about a hundred and thirty miles distant, leaving at Poona a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Under these circumstances, it was not deemed necessary to advance to Poona all the troops at his disposal, and as the country was much exhausted and a great deficiency of forage prevailed, it was not advisable. General Wellesley therefore determined so to distribute his troops that the whole might procure forage and subsistence, but at the same time to reserve the power of readily forming a junction, should such a step be desirable. Colonel Stevenson, with the Hyderabad force, was ordered to march to Gardoor, to leave near that place, and within the nizâm's dominions, all that prince's troops, and to place himself with the British subsidiary force, in

a position on the Beemah river, towards Poona, near its junction with the Mota Mola river.

General Wellesley continued his own march towards Poona by the road of Baramooty. He had received repeated intimations that it was intended to plunder and burn the city on the approach of the British troops. As this would have been an exploit perfectly in accordance with the Mahratta character, the prevalent belief was by no means improbable. The peishwa, alarmed for the safety of his capital and his family, urgently solicited that some of his own troops might be despatched for their protection; but the British commander knew too well the character of those troops to act upon the suggestion. On the 18th of April, it was ascertained that the peishwa's family had been removed to the fortress of Saoghur, a measure supposed to be preparatory to the destruction of the city. When this intelligence was received, General Wellesley was advancing to the relief of Poona with the British cavalry. At night, on the 19th of April, he commenced a march of forty miles over a very rugged country and through a difficult pass. The next day saw him at the head of his cavalry before Poona, the whole distance travelled in the preceding thirty-two hours being sixty miles. The commander of Holkar's force in Poona, on hearing of General Wellesley's approach, precipitately quitted the place with his garrison, leaving to the English the easy duty of taking possession. A great part of the inhabitants had quitted their homes and fled to the hills during the occupation of Holkar. The few that remained manifested great pleasure at the arrival of the English troops, and those who had fled bore evidence to the confidence to which the change gave birth by returning to their homes and resuming the exercise of their usual occupations. While General Wellesley was on his march, preparations had been making at Bombay for the return of the peishwa to his capital. From the time when he took up his residence at Bassein, he had, at his own request, been attended by a British guard. This force was now considerably augmented, and, being placed under the command of Colonel Murray, formed the prince's escort on his march back to the capital whence he had so recently made an ignominious flight. On the 27th of April he left Bassein, attended by the British resident, Colonel Close; on the 18th of May he took his seat on the musnud in his palace at Poona, amidst the roar of cannon from the British camp, echoed from all the posts and forts in the vicinity.

The accession of the principal Mahratta states to the great confederation of which the British government in India was the head, had been an object which the governor-general had long and strenuously laboured to effect. His efforts, so long and so often frustrated, had at length succeeded with regard to the chief authority in the Mahratta confederacy, and the peishwa was now the subsidiary ally

of the English. To conciliate Scindia, the resources of diplomacy had been tried, almost as perseveringly as they had been used to win the peishwa, but with no better success than had attended their exercise with the latter chief, before the impending loss of every vestige of power led him to seek, in a British alliance, the means of deliverance from the ambitious dependents who were anxious to take charge of his person and authority. Scindia had met the overtures of the British resident civilly, but evasively. The turn which affairs had taken seemed to warrant the hope of a different issue—a hope corroborated by a letter which Scindia addressed to the governor-general, after the flight of the peishwa from his capital. In this communication Scindia announced his march from Oujein towards the Deccan, for the declared purpose of restoring order and tranquillity in that quarter, and expressed a desire that, in consideration of the friendship subsisting between the British government and the peishwa, and of the relation in which Scindia stood to both, as guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, the former would, in “concert and concurrence with him, render the corroboration of the foundations of attachment and union, and the maintenance of the obligations of friendship and regard, with respect to his highness the peishwa, as heretofore, and conformably to existing engagements, the objects of its attention.” This was sufficiently vague; but it was not more vague than the generality of Mahratta communications. If it could be regarded as bearing any meaning, it was to be understood as a call upon the British government to aid in the restoration of the peishwa to the musnud at Poona.

A few days after the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, Colonel Close addressed a letter to Scindia, announcing that engagements of a defensive nature had been formed between the British government and the peishwa; and that, agreeably to the tenor of those engagements, a British force would be stationed within the peishwa's dominions. In making this communication, Colonel Close expressed his hope that Scindia would co-operate with the British government in endeavouring to arrange the affairs of the peishwa, and restore the prince to the exercise of his authority at Poona. The answer of Scindia was satisfactory, as far as any Mahratta answer could be satisfactory. It was in the following terms:—“I have been favoured with your acceptable letter, intimating that, as the relations of friendship had long subsisted between the Peishwa Saib Bahaudur and the English Company Bahaudur, engagements of a defensive kind were concluded between the two states; and that accordingly, with a view to the occurrences that had taken place at Poona, the Nabob Governor-General Bahaudur had determined to forward a British force to that quarter, to the end that, with my concurrence and co-operation, the refractory may be brought to punishment. My friend, in truth,

the ancient relations of friendship and union which hold between the different circars required such a design and such a co-operation. My army, which has also marched from Oujein towards the Deccan, with a view to lay the dust of commotion and chastise the disrespectful, crossed the Nerbudda, under happy auspices, on the 8th of February, and will shortly reach Boorhampore. My friend Colonel Collins, who, agreeably to the orders of his excellency the most noble the governor-general, has left Furruckabad for this quarter, may be expected to join me in a few days. Inasmuch as the concerns of the different circars are one, and admit of no distinction, on the arrival of my forces at Boorhampore, I shall without reserve make you acquainted with the measures which shall be resolved on for the arrangement and adjustment of affairs." The letter concluded with some expressions of piety, very edifying from a Mahratta, but not necessary to be quoted.

The mission of Colonel Collins, referred to in the above letter, had its origin in instructions forwarded by the governor-general to that officer soon after the peishwa had consented to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the Company. Colonel Collins accordingly proceeded to the camp of Scindia at Boorhampore. On his way he received a letter from Colonel Close, apprising him of the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and of the fact that Scindia had been informed of it. The first communication made by Colonel Collins after his arrival in Scindia's camp, therefore, announced the British officer's knowledge of these events, and his authority to enter into engagements with Scindia similar to those which had been concluded with the peishwa. Scindia, in reply, referred the discussion of the important points of this communication to personal conference; but the opportunity for thus discussing them was long in arriving. At length a meeting took place, when the British resident stated the objects of his mission to be threefold: to concert with Scindia the most effectual means of restoring and securing tranquillity in the Deccan; to offer to that chief the mediation of the British government for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between him and Holkar; and to make to him a tender of admission to the general defensive alliance on terms similar to those which had been accepted by the peishwa. It was answered, on the part of Scindia, that the important nature of these proposals called for mature deliberation, and that time was necessary for the purpose. The conference here terminated. Five days afterwards, one of Scindia's ministers attended the resident to convey to him the results of the consideration which had been bestowed on his proposals. To the first it was answered, with true Mahratta ambiguity, that for the British government to concert with Scindia the most effectual means of restoring and securing tranquillity in the Deccan was conformable to the

relations of friendship subsisting between the two states. To the second: "That the affairs of the families of Scindia and Holkar had been one and the same from father to son; that heretofore differences had arisen between them, but that these differences had always been adjusted by themselves." To the third of Colonel Collins's proposals the answer was, that Scindia, being guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, had been surprised at the conclusion of the defensive alliance between the peishwa and the British government without his knowledge; that, after a personal conference with the peishwa, he should be apprised of the real state of circumstances, and should then act in such a manner as might be suitable and proper. It will be unnecessary to waste time on the answers to the first and second of Colonel Collins's suggestions; they are mere ordinary specimens of the Eastern art of putting together words for the ear alone, not for the understanding. The third may justify some examination. Although Scindia now declared that he had been surprised at the conclusion of the defensive alliance between the British government and the peishwa without his knowledge, it is to be remembered that he had expressed no surprise when, some time before, the same fact had been communicated to him by Colonel Close. Adverting, in his answer to this arrangement, to the consequent movement of a British force, and to the request for his co-operation, he had said that "the ancient relations of friendship and union which hold between the different circars required such a design and such a co-operation." This language does not necessarily imply his approval of the treaty. It is, according to Mahratta custom, adapted to receive almost any interpretation which it might be convenient to put upon it; but if it expresses no approbation, it certainly indicates no surprise; and if Scindia were sincere in his subsequent avowal of this feeling, it must be concluded that while, in all other persons, surprise is the instantaneous result of some unexpected discovery, in the Mahratta chief it required a considerable space of time to mature and bring it forth. His complaint that a treaty to which he was guarantee had been set aside without his knowledge, was as frivolous as his affectation of surprise was unwarranted. Scindia had no interest in the treaty; at least he had ostensibly no interest in it. His office of guarantee, so long as it continued, bound him to enforce its observance upon both the parties for whose benefit the engagement was contracted; but it certainly gave him no authority to prevent their making any additional engagements, or even abrogating the original treaty by mutual consent. The only effect of such measures with regard to him would be to release him from the obligation of enforcing, in his capacity of guarantee, the stipulations of the treaty which had been modified or annulled. To discuss the nature of the relation subsisting between the peishwa

and those chiefs who acknowledged him as their head would be idle, because no satisfactory conclusion could be attained; but if any point connected with it be clear, it is the right of the peishwa to bind himself by treaty without consulting the inferior chiefs. Scindia was not a party to the treaty of Salbye, and he had no claim to be a party to any new treaty. If, however, he were anxious to form an alliance with the British government, the opportunity was afforded him. He, indeed, thought that the new treaty was injurious to his interest, and so it was, by taking the peishwa out of his power. But the power which he had exercised was a usurpation un-sanctioned by the avowed principles of the Mahratta confederacy. All, indeed, within that confederacy was usurpation; but the whole question may be reduced to very simple elements: if the theory of the Mahratta association were to be upheld, Scindia was a dependant of the peishwa, and his attempts to establish his own authority on the ruin of that of his superior were little, if at all, short of treason; if the theory were to be discarded, and Scindia to be viewed as an independent prince, seeking to advance his own ends by subjugating another to his will, the right of the latter to seek the means of escape, and the right of a neighbouring state to afford those means, are indisputably clear. The course of events was unfavourable to the views of Scindia, but he had not the slightest ground for reasonable complaint. His intimation of the necessity of a personal conference with the peishwa implied either a doubt of the truth of the representations made by the agents of the British government, or an intention to obstruct the progress of the new arrangements. To indicate such a doubt was offensive to the British government—to entertain such an intention was the preliminary to a state of hostility. Some of these points were pressed on the notice of Scindia and his ministers by Colonel Collins, and he succeeded, after a time, in drawing from the chief a declaration unexampled perhaps in the annals of Mahratta diplomacy for explicitness. Scindia now stated that he could not give a decided answer to the proposals of the British government till after a conference which he proposed to hold, not with the peishwa himself, but with an agent of that prince, whose arrival he expected; but he added, that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the arrangements lately concluded between the peishwa and the British government; that, on the contrary, it was his wish to improve the friendship at present subsisting between the peishwa, the British government, and his own state. Notwithstanding these favourable feelings, Scindia manifested a strong dislike to the march of the British troops to Poona, and he requested that orders might be issued to stop them. He preferred that the city should remain in possession of Holkar rather than be delivered by the inter-

position of a British force. At the period when this reasonable request was made, no orders could have been issued in time to prevent the march of General Wellesley to Poona—it is needless to add that, even had time permitted, no such orders would have been issued.

In addition to the inferences to be drawn from the conduct of Scindia and his ministers, other grounds for suspecting their intentions existed. On the day on which Colonel Collins joined the chieftain's camp, he received intelligence that a confederacy between Scindia and other Mahratta chiefs, for purposes hostile to the British interests, was in course of arrangement. Scindia's prime minister had been deputed on a mission to the rajah of Berar. Another confidential servant was despatched to the peishwa, to remonstrate, as it was believed, against the treaty of Bassein, and vakeels from Holkar arrived in Scindia's camp for the purpose of effecting an adjustment of their differences. The deportment of Scindia's ministers towards the British resident became intemperate and offensive, and early in May that chief marched from the vicinity of Boorhampore to meet the rajah of Berar, who had taken the field with a large army. He, however, expressed a wish that the British resident should follow him, with which Colonel Collins complied.

The governor-general had doubted the existence of the alleged confederacy against the British government, and the grounds of doubt were not unreasonable. That Scindia and the rajah of Berar should be disposed to reduce the peishwa to a state of subserviency to their views, might readily be believed; but that they should venture, in carrying out such a plan, to provoke the hostility of the British government, was scarcely credible. Happily, the governor-general did not suffer his doubts to overcome his caution. He was struck by comparing the apathy of Scindia, while Holkar was in undisturbed possession of the peishwa's capital, with his renewed activity when that capital was about to be rescued by a British force. He wisely, therefore, deemed it necessary to instruct Colonel Collins to remonstrate with Scindia, and to require from him unequivocal evidence of friendly intentions; it being pointed out that the only satisfactory evidence would be his retirement to his dominions north of the Nerbudda. Scindia was further required to disavow the imputation of being engaged in a confederacy with Holkar and the rajah of Berar against the English. A remonstrance was also addressed to the rajah of Berar, which was followed by a second communication of like character, on the governor-general receiving intelligence that the rajah had put his army in motion for the purpose of meeting Scindia.

Colonel Collins, on receiving his instructions, proceeded without delay to act upon them. Having explained at length the treaty of Bassein, he demanded whether it contained

anything at variance with Scindia's rights. One of the ministers answered that it did not, and Scindia himself confirmed the acknowledgment. Colonel Collins then claimed to be informed of the nature and objects of the recent negotiations among the Mahratta chiefs. He was answered that Scindia had no intention to invade the dominions of either the nizam or the peishwa; but, on the resident urging the necessity of a disavowal on the part of Scindia of any intention to disturb the treaty of Bassein, it was answered that Scindia could afford no satisfaction on that point until he had conferred with the rajah of Berar. The resident continued to press the points suggested by his instructions, representing that the refusal of Scindia to afford satisfactory explanation, combined with the unremitted prosecution of his military arrangements, would compel the British government to adopt precautionary measures upon every part of Scindia's frontier, and that the confirmation of the report of his accession to a confederacy against the British power would lead to the immediate commencement of active hostilities. The chief, to whom the representation was addressed, remained unmoved by it. He adhered to the silence which he had resolved to maintain as to his future intentions, and terminated the conference with this remarkable declaration:—"After my interview with the rajah of Berar, you shall know whether it will be peace or war." Suspense was thus converted into certainty. Scindia was prepared to embark in a war with the British government if the rajah of Berar would join him. On the decision of that prince it rested whether it should be "peace or war." Scindia had acknowledged that he had no just grounds of exception to the treaty of Bassein, but that treaty was, notwithstanding, to be the cause of involving the Mahratta countries in all the calamities of war, if the rajah of Berar should stand firm. The insult offered to the British state by Scindia's declaration, that state might perhaps have afforded to despise when coming from a chief of freebooters; but the positive danger indicated could not be disregarded, and the governor-general proceeded with promptitude and vigour to prepare for the crisis which was obviously approaching. Before, however, adverting to the measures resorted to for the purpose, it will be convenient to follow the proceedings at the camps of Scindia and the rajah of Berar so long as negotiation was maintained with them by the English authorities. On the 4th of June the meditated meeting between those two chiefs took place at Mulkapore, on the frontier of the nizam's dominions; but on that occasion nothing passed beyond the exchange of the usual ceremonies. On the 8th a long conference took place, and on the following day Colonel Collins reminded Scindia of his promise to give an explicit answer after his interview with the rajah of Berar. The reply of Scindia was as usual evasive; and on the

subject being more formally pressed upon him three days afterwards, the necessity of another conference was assigned as a reason for the delay of a decided answer. The rajah of Berar, in answer to representations made to him by the British resident, referred in like manner to an intended conference, in which not only Scindia and himself were to engage, but also Holkar, whose name was now, for the first time, introduced as a party necessary to be consulted in deciding the question of war or peace with the English. This suggestion seemed to postpone the decision indefinitely, as Holkar was at a great distance from Mulkapore. Scindia subsequently intimated a wish that the resident should pay a visit to the rajah of Berar, and Colonel Collins, in consequence, requested the rajah to appoint a day for receiving him. The rajah declined to appoint any day, and appeared anxious to dispense with the proposed visit. As it could not be doubted that Scindia was acquainted with the rajah's feelings, and that when he made the suggestion he well knew what reception awaited the proposal, Colonel Collins justly concluded that he had been wantonly exposed to insult, and intimated his intention to retire from Scindia's camp. He was entreated to postpone his departure for six days, and he consented. He was further admitted to an audience of the rajah of Berar, but the rajah simply acknowledged that he had received a letter from the governor-general, declining to enter into any discussion upon it. Little interest would attach to a detail of further conferences and correspondence, which would exhibit nothing but a repetition of a desire, on one side, to procure an explicit answer, and an exhaustion of all the arts of evasion and delay, on the other, to avoid it. In conformity with instructions from the governor-general, General Wellesley, about the middle of July, addressed a letter to Scindia, requesting him to separate his army from that of the rajah of Berar, and retire across the Nerbudda; which being effected, the British troops under General Wellesley, who had made some advance, were to retire to their usual stations. The transmission of this letter, and discussion of its contents, gave rise to further communications between the resident and Scindia's ministers, of the same character with those which had preceded it. Proposals which must have been known to be untenable were made to Colonel Collins; and when, at length, he had consented to forward one somewhat less objectionable than others which had preceded, it was transmitted to him for despatch to General Wellesley, with alterations which were in direct violation of its spirit. The resident now justly conceived that further attempts to preserve the relations of peace were at once hopeless and imprudent. On the 3rd of August he commenced his march from Scindia's camp, and from that period the British government was to be regarded as at war with the confederate chieftains.

The governor-general had made extensive preparations for carrying on hostilities with vigour and effect. A vast plan of military and political operations, embracing within its compass the entire territory of India, had been framed, and all its details, with a due regard to contingencies, had been arranged with minute care. It consisted of two grand divisions, the management of which was assigned respectively to the commander-in-chief, General Lake, and to General Wellesley. To the former officer were committed the affairs of Hindostan; to the latter those of the Deccan.

In this plan, the views of the Marquis Wellesley were directed not merely to the temporary adjustment of the disputes which had rendered it necessary to put large armies in motion, but to such a settlement as should afford a reasonable prospect of continued peace and security to the British government and its allies.

General Wellesley had marched from Poona, with the main body of the forces under his command, on the 4th of June. The peishwa was to have provided a contingent to accompany him, but a very small portion of the stipulated force was furnished. Under the authority conferred on him by the governor-general, General Wellesley exercised a general superintendence over the diplomatic intercourse of Colonel Collins with Scindia and the rajah of Berar. On this coming to an end, he gave immediate orders for the attack of Scindia's fort of Baroach, and issued a proclamation explaining the grounds upon which it had become necessary for him to commence hostilities against the combined Mahratta chiefs. The force under his immediate command at this time consisted of three hundred and eighty-four European, and one thousand three hundred and forty-seven regular native cavalry; one thousand three hundred and sixty-eight European and five thousand six hundred and thirty-one native infantry. In addition to these numbers were a few artillerymen, between six and seven hundred pioneers, two thousand four hundred horse, belonging to the rajah of Mysore, and three thousand Mahratta horse. Nearly eighteen hundred men, European and native, with some Bombay lascars, and a small park of artillery, had been left at Poona for the protection of the capital and person of the peishwa. The weather prevented General Wellesley from marching as early as he wished. On the 8th of August it cleared, and early in the morning of that day he despatched a message to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, to require him to surrender the fort. He refused, and the pettah was immediately attacked at three points. The contest was severe, but it terminated in favour of the British. On the following day preparations were made for attacking the fort. On the 10th a battery of four guns was opened; the fire of which soon had the effect of inducing the killadar to make an overture of surrender upon terms. On the 12th, he with

his garrison of fourteen hundred men marched out, and the British commander took possession. The effect of this capture was to place at the command of the English all Scindia's territories south of the Godavery.

A few days after the fall of Ahmednuggur, General Wellesley had the satisfaction to hear that his orders for the attack of Baroach had been successfully carried into effect. This duty was performed by Colonel Woodington. He had expected assistance from a schooner with two eighteen-pounders, which was to have been brought to anchor within a short distance of the fort. It was found impracticable to bring her up, and in consequence Colonel Woodington was compelled to make an arrangement for bringing up the eighteen-pounders and stores in boats. The pettah, though defended by the enemy in great force, fell into the hands of the English without much either of difficulty or loss. The fort was subsequently stormed, and though a vigorous resistance was offered, the attack was eventually successful. The loss of the British was small; that of the enemy dreadfully heavy.

The capture of Baroach was effected on the 29th of August. On the same day on which victory thus graced the British arms at the western extremity of the peninsula of India, the army of Bengal, under General Lake, struck the first important blow against the enemy on the frontier of Oude. Its object was a French corps in the service of Scindia, under the command of an officer named Perron. This corps, which was originally raised by an officer named De Boigne, had acquired great celebrity in India. De Boigne is said to have been a native of Savoy, who, after serving successively in the armies of France and Russia, and having, whilst in the service of the latter power, been made prisoner by the Turks, found his way to Madras, where he became an ensign in the army of the East-India Company. According to some authorities, the distant prospect of promotion in that service discouraged him; according to others, he took offence at some act of the governor; but, whatever the cause, he quitted Madras and proceeded to Calcutta, being provided with letters of introduction to Mr. Hastings. From Calcutta he proposed to proceed overland to Russia, and the design, it has been alleged, was not then first formed. It is said that at St. Petersburg De Boigne had laid before the Empress Catherine a project for exploring the countries between India and Russia; that, in the exercise of its usual policy, the Russian court had offered encouragement to the plan; and that at Calcutta De Boigne submitted it to Hastings, concealing from him the fact that the government of Russia was interested in the project. Hastings, who was always zealous for the extension of the boundaries of geographical knowledge with regard to India and the surrounding countries, gave him a commendatory letter to the vizier, who bestowed on him a dress of honour, in addition to other

gifts better suited to the necessities of a traveller. Circumstances, which are differently related, led him to relinquish the dangers and difficulties of his projected journey to Russia for a continued residence in India, and Hastings soon learned that De Boigne had entered the service of the rajah of Jeypoor. The governor-general thereupon recalled him to Calcutta, and, though he had no power of enforcing the call, De Boigne thought fit to obey it. He succeeded in making his peace with Hastings, and obtained his permission to return. In the interval the rajah of Jeypoor had resolved to dispense with his services, but he made him a liberal present; and, according to some, De Boigne further improved his fortune by successful speculations in trade. But De Boigne was not at ease—he longed to resume his military habits and occupations, and opportunity was not wanting. Scindia was actively engaged in promoting his own aggrandizement at the expense of his neighbours, and De Boigne deemed that his own interests would be best advanced by uniting them with those of Scindia. In his eyes all services were alike, if they offered hope of promotion or of gain. Whether he sought Scindia, or Scindia him, seems doubtful; but he entered the service of that chief, and soon secured such a measure of his confidence as led to the rapid increase of his own power and influence. De Boigne at first commanded two battalions. In process of time the number was augmented to eight, and subsequently to sixteen, with a train of eighty pieces of cannon. At later periods still further additions were made, and the whole were formed into three brigades; the first and third commanded by Frenchmen named Perron and Pedrons, the second by an Englishman of the name of Sutherland. De Boigne retired some years before the period immediately under notice, partly, it is believed, from a fear that jealousy of his overgrown power might lead to some attempt to reduce it, partly because his constitution was broken and debilitated, and partly because one object to which his exertions had been assiduously directed was attained, in the accumulation of a fortune supposed to amount to four hundred thousand pounds. The retirement of De Boigne led to a struggle for the honour of succeeding him in the chief command. Sutherland aspired to it, but Perron, having the advantage of seniority, and the still greater advantage of being present with Scindia at the time the vacancy occurred, secured to himself the desired post.

The origin of Perron was very humble: he had arrived in India as a common sailor. Having entered the service of De Boigne, he manifested an aptitude for rising not inferior to that of his commander. On succeeding to the chief command, he sedulously improved all opportunities for increasing his own power. De Boigne had received certain lands for the maintenance of his troops. Perron, succeeding to this as well as to the authority of his

predecessor, sought both to extend his possessions and to render himself independent of the chief from whom they had been obtained. Scindia's local authority in Hindostan had declined, and that of Perron had increased. The districts subject to the latter yielded a revenue of vast amount. The inhabitants regarded him as their immediate chief, while the allegiance of the troops at his command was naturally and necessarily yielded rather to the man from whom they received orders, subsistence, and pay, than to an authority of which they knew little, and which was never visibly exercised. The designs of Perron had been aided by a variety of circumstances. Though a Mahratta, Scindia was greatly inferior to him in cunning and activity. The almost exclusive direction of that chief's attention to the Deccan—the anxiety with which he had sought to promote his interests at Poona, had greatly weakened his influence in the northern parts of India. In states constituted like those of the Mahratta confederacy, the authority of the prince is always endangered by absence or inactivity; and in the case of Scindia, the causes of decline previously at work had been powerfully aided by the success of Holkar. The result was, in the words of the governor-general, "to found an independent French state on the most vulnerable part of the Company's frontier." Nor was it to be overlooked that Perron's influence extended considerably beyond the dominions of which he possessed the actual administration. He sought to dictate with the authority of a superior to the petty states around him, and even to some at a distance; and having at his disposal a military force, which neither with reference to numbers or discipline could be despised, his attempts were not unattended with success. The governor-general saw the necessity of crushing without delay this new and formidable enemy. General Lake was instructed to regard "the effectual demolition of the French state erected by M. Perron on the banks of the Jumna, as the primary object of the campaign," and the general was to distribute his forces and regulate his operations in such a manner as to effect it without delay.

On the 7th of August Lord Lake had marched from Cawnpore with the infantry on that station under the command of Major-General St. John. The cavalry, under Colonel St. Leger, followed on the 8th. On the 13th the whole army encamped near Kanonghe. It was subsequently joined by Major-General Ware with a detachment from Futtyghur. On the 28th it encamped on the frontier, and at four o'clock on the morning of the 29th, entered the Mahratta territory. No time was lost in moving to the attack of Perron's force, which was strongly posted at a short distance from the fortress of Allyghur. At seven o'clock the British cavalry advanced upon them in two lines, supported by the infantry and guns; but the rapid retreat of the enemy put an end to the action almost as soon

as it had commenced. Attempts were made to charge some considerable bodies of cavalry who made pretence of standing, but in vain. All fled, and with such hearty vigour as left to their pursuers little chance of overtaking or doing them any considerable mischief. The English took possession of the town of Coel, and made preparations for attacking Allyghur, which place Perron had left in charge of Colonel Pedrons; but the attack was delayed for a few days to try the effect of negotiation. It has too often been the practice of Europeans in Indian warfare to have recourse to means of attaining their objects, which, however common in native contests, are highly discreditable to nations professing to be governed by higher standards of morality and honour. It was thought that corruption might prove an efficient substitute for arms; and it was not till the hope of success from this source had failed, that it was resolved to try more honourable means of obtaining possession of Allyghur.

After weighing the comparative advantages of seeking the reduction of the place by a regular siege or by an immediate assault, the latter course was resolved upon. The 4th of September was fixed for the attack. The force destined for it was composed of four companies of the king's 76th regiment and detachments from two regiments of native infantry. It was led by Colonel Monson, an officer of distinguished bravery. During the preceding night two batteries of four eighteen-pounders each had been erected to cover the approach of the storming party, which left the camp at three o'clock in the morning, and advanced in a curved direction towards the gateway. On arriving within four hundred yards of it, they halted till break of day. While thus waiting, an officer, who had been reconnoitring, reported that sixty or seventy of the enemy were seated round a fire smoking in front of the gateway. A British party was immediately detached in the hope of taking them by surprise, and to endeavour, amidst the confusion which it was expected would ensue, to enter the fort with them and secure the gate till the main body should arrive. The latter object was not attained. The surprise was so complete, and the ardour of the British party so great, that all opportunity of retreat for the enemy was cut off. Not one of them escaped to relate the particulars of the surprise; and though the sentinels on the ramparts gave fire on hearing the disturbance, no extraordinary alarm was excited, the affair being taken to be the result only of a near approach of the videttes of the British force.

The morning gun was the signal for the movement of the storming party, which, covered by a heavy fire from the two batteries, advanced till they came within a hundred yards of the gate. Here a traverse had been recently thrown up, and mounted with three six-pounders; but the enemy were dislodged before they had time to discharge them. Colonel Monson pushed forward with the two

flank companies of the 76th regiment to enter the fort with the retreating guard, but the gate was shut, and the approach exposed to a destructive fire of grape. Two ladders were then brought to the walls, and Major M'Leod with the grenadiers, attempted to mount; they were opposed by a formidable row of pikemen, and desisted. It was then proposed to blow open the gate, and a six-pounder was placed for the purpose, but failed. A twelve-pounder was brought up, but a difficulty arose in placing it; and in these attempts full twenty minutes were consumed, during which the assailants were exposed to a destructive fire. The enemy behaved with great bravery, descending the scaling-ladders which had been left against the walls, to contend with the party seeking to force an entrance. The first gate at length yielded, and the attacking party advanced along a narrow way defended by a tower pierced with loopholes, from which a constant and deadly fire was kept up by matchlock-men, while showers of grape poured from the batteries. The British party, however, kept on its way to the second gate, which was forced without much difficulty. At the third the assailants passed in with the retreating enemy, but a fourth still remained to be carried. Here the progress of the assailants was again stopped. The attempt to blow open the gate failed, but Major M'Leod succeeded in forcing his way through the wicket and ascending the ramparts. Resistance now became feeble, and the fortress of Allyghur passed into the hands of the British, the reward of about an hour's vigorous efforts. The loss of the English was severe, and among the wounded were Colonel Monson and Major M'Leod. The loss of the enemy was, however, much greater; and as the fort had been made by the French their principal depot for the Doab, a vast quantity of military stores was transferred with it to the British, besides two hundred and eighty-one pieces of cannon.

The terror inspired by the fall of Allyghur caused the immediate evacuation of some minor forts, the governors being unwilling to await the arrival of the victors. The event was also followed by another, scarcely less important and desirable. This was the surrender of Perron to the British general. The step was not occasioned, perhaps it was scarcely accelerated, by the success of the British arms at Allyghur. Some time before the actual commencement of hostilities, Perron had announced to the governor-general his wish to quit the service of Scindia, and obtain permission to pass through the British territories on his way to Europe. A favourable answer had been returned, but Perron did not follow out his proposed plan. He subsequently made overtures to General Lake, and some negotiation took place which ended in nothing; and the British army, as has been seen, attacked the French adventurer immediately on entering the Mahratta territory. His rapid flight on that occasion seemed to indicate little de-

termination to resist, and soon after the capture of Allyghur he renewed his application for permission to enter the British territories. It was promptly complied with, and one great object of the war was thus achieved almost without an effort.

The retirement of Perron, after raising himself to the rank of a petty sovereign, cannot but appear extraordinary. It was not the effect of moderation nor of satiety, but of necessity. Perron continued to love power, and all that power can command, as well as he had ever loved them; but a combination of circumstances had rendered his tenure of power insecure, and he thought it better to preserve his movable property, which was considerable, than risk it in a contest for dominion which might probably be unsuccessful. The English government had determined on the destruction of his power if practicable. But, besides this cause for alarm, he had others arising out of the circumstances of the Mahratta state, of which he was a dependent. Perron's conduct had given rise, in Scindia's mind, to suspicion. A chief, named Ambagee Inglia, took advantage of it to advance his own interests and undermine those of Perron. His views are said to have been aided by a supply of money to meet the wants of Scindia, and the authority of the French chief was transferred to his native rival. To render the transfer effective, Ambagee Inglia intrigued with Perron's officers. Had they been faithful, their commander might not have been compelled to seek safety in flight; but where personal interest is the sole motive of action, fidelity is never to be relied upon; and some officers, who had received signal marks of Perron's favour, went over to his enemy. He had consequently no choice but to withdraw: to remain was to devote himself to plunder and perhaps to death.

The retreat of Perron was the virtual dissolution of the French state which he had formed on the Jumna. This did not necessarily involve the reduction of the force which he had commanded; but the loss of its chief, preceded as it had been by a course of conduct on his part, which was at the least undecided, if not pusillanimous, shook greatly the strength of native confidence in French officers, and impressed those officers with a strong feeling of the necessity of providing for their own safety. An officer named Fleury had attacked a body of troops under Colonel Cunningham, who, after vigorously resisting and temporarily beating off a force greatly superior to his own, had been compelled to accept for himself and his men permission to retire with their arms, on condition of not again serving against Scindia during the war. A detachment was sent against Fleury, which he contrived to evade, but he finally accompanied his chief to the British camp. Another officer named Louis Bourquin, who commanded a division of Perron's force, resolved to make a stand against the main body of the English under General Lake. The hostile armies met on the 11th Septem-

ber, about six miles from the imperial city of Delhi. The British had performed a march of eighteen miles, and had just taken up their ground for encampment, when the enemy appeared in such force as to oblige the grand guard and advanced pickets to turn out. The numbers continued to increase, and General Lake on reconnoitring, found them drawn up on rising ground in great force and in complete order of battle. Their position was well defended, each flank being covered by a swamp, beyond which cavalry were stationed, while artillery guarded the front, which derived further protection from a line of intrenchments. The English commander resolved, however, to give them battle. The whole of his cavalry had accompanied him on his reconnoissance, and that being completed, he sent orders for the infantry and artillery to join. This could not be effected in less than an hour, during which the British cavalry, which were two miles in advance, were exposed to a heavy fire from the enemy, which brought down many men. During this interval the horse of General Lake was shot under him.

Although the British commander had determined on hazarding an action, he felt that to attack the enemy in the position which had been taken up would be attended with but a feeble chance of success. He therefore ordered his cavalry to fall back, partly to cover the advance of the infantry, but principally with a view to allure the enemy from their advantageous post by the appearance of a retreat. The feint had the desired effect. No sooner were the British cavalry in motion than the enemy rushed forward with wild manifestations of triumph and delight, the vivacity of the French leaders having communicated itself to those whom they commanded. But their exultation was soon checked. The cavalry continued their retrograde movement till the infantry came up; the former then opened from its centre, and allowed the latter to pass to the front. Preparations having been made for guarding the flanks of the British force, one of which was threatened by some native cavalry, the whole line moved forward. A tremendous fire from nearly a hundred pieces of cannon, some of them of large calibre, fell around them; but the British troops, unmoved by it, advanced steadily and without removing their muskets from their shoulders till within a hundred paces of the enemy. Orders were then given to charge—the whole line fired a volley, and, headed by the commander-in-chief, pushed on their bayonets with resistless force. The fate of the day was decided, and when the troops halted after the charge, the enemy were flying in all directions. The victorious infantry immediately broke into columns of companies, by which movement the whole of the cavalry, both European and native, were enabled to charge through the intervals with their galloper guns, pursuing the enemy to the Jumna, where great numbers perished. All the artillery and stores of

the enemy fell into the hands of the English, and three days after the battle, Louis Bourquin, with four other French officers, surrendered themselves.

In the city of Delhi, which was forthwith evacuated by the French, the battle had been an object of much interest. There, at the ancient seat of the power which Baber had reared—where Akbar had placed on record the length and breadth of the provinces which owned its sway—where Aurungzebe had assembled mighty armies to chastise his enemies and reduce to subjection tributary kings—there dwelt the living representative of the house of Timour in the person of a miserable man, old, blind, and decrepit—without power, without pomp, or state, or retinue—almost without the means of commanding the common necessities of life. This was Shah Allum, once the gallant shazada, whose military energy had alarmed and annoyed the British government, but for many years the suffering captive of those who secured his person for the sake of abusing his name to purposes of selfish aggrandisement. He had allied himself with the Mahrattas, and through their assistance had obtained possession of Delhi. This is not the place to pursue the troubled history of his life. It must suffice to say that thenceforward it was an almost unbroken series of calamity. The territories nominally subject to the emperor were the constant scene of disorder and rebellion. Surrounded by troubles of every description, he conceived the most violent suspicions of the loyalty of his eldest son. Such suspicions are of common occurrence in oriental monarchies, and are frequently not unwarranted. In this instance there seems to have been no ground for them. Alienated from the affections of his father by those who had an interest in fomenting dissensions, the shazada passed a great part of his life at a distance from the city which was the witness of the former glory and present degradation of his house. He made repeated efforts to obtain the aid of the British government for the deliverance of his father from thralldom, but in vain. Hastings was not indisposed to afford it, but was restrained by orders from home dictated in the spirit of the non-intervention policy which then prevailed. The shazada died in the British dominions, of fever, and not long afterwards the calamities of his wretched parent were consummated. A ruffian chief, of Rohilla origin, named Gholaum Kaudir Khan, having obtained possession of the city of Delhi, and with it of the person of the emperor, committed the most dreadful excesses—excesses which an historian has felt justified in declaring to be “almost without parallel in the annals of the world.” The apartments of the women, which in the East usually command some respect even from the most abandoned, were rendered by Gholaum Kaudir the scene of crimes of which violent and indiscriminate plunder was the lightest; and the emperor, after being exposed to every insult

which malice and insolence could devise, was deprived of sight by the dagger of the wretch who had previously heaped on him every other misery. The arms of Scindia rescued the unhappy monarch from the power of Gholaum Kaudir, and the crimes of that miscreant met a fearful retribution. The authority of Shah Allum was once more recognized, but the recognition was only formal. All substantial power was exercised by the Mahratta authorities. The office of vakeel ool-moolk, or executive prime minister of the Mogul empire, was bestowed on the peishwa, but Scindia had no intention to burden his highness with the duties of the office. The discharge of these he personally undertook as the peishwa's deputy, and the function, with all its power and influence, passed to his successors. Perron, in the course of his restless intrigues, obtained the appointment of commandant of the fortress of Delhi, and thus the person and power of Shah Allum was transferred from the Mahrattas to the French. From neither did the emperor meet with either kindness or generosity. He was not merely deprived of power—of this he could scarcely complain, having by his own act transferred his right to others—but his rank and misfortunes commanded no sympathy, and even the means of subsistence were tardily and scantily dealt out to him. A considerable sum had been professedly allotted to the support of the royal household, but so badly was it paid, that the emperor and his family were often in want.

The triumph of the British arms under General Lake opened a new scene. Immediately after the battle the emperor had despatched a message to the victorious commander, offering the monarch's congratulations and soliciting protection. An appropriate answer was returned; and on the 16th of September the heir of Timour, so long the victim of adverse fortune, seated in the capital of his ancestors, gave audience to the English general. In that place his predecessors, clothed in the most gorgeous productions of the loom, had sat upon thrones formed of gold, and made radiant by a dazzling profusion of the most costly jewels. Around them had stood hundreds of obsequious guards and dependants, waiting in mute and watchful attention the expression of the sovereign's will, and ready to give it effect as soon as uttered; while vassals from distant countries, or their representatives, tendered respectful homage to the lord of the faithful throughout India, and wooed his favour by presents worthy of his rank. Far different was the scene which met the eye of the British general and his attendants. Beneath a small and ragged canopy, the appearance of which seemed a mockery of regal state, sat one whose age exceeded that usually attained by man, but in whose appearance the operation of time was less apparent than that of long and hopeless misery. Eighty-three years had passed over his head, and they had been filled with trouble

and sorrow. While his name was held in reverence throughout India, his life had been passed amid poverty, danger, and suffering, and all around him at this moment indicated the most wretched destitution. But there was one element of misery greater than all. The light of heaven, the common source of enjoyment to the prosperous and the wretched, shone not for him—the face of nature was to him a blank. The miserable satisfaction of contrasting the appearance of all things around him then with former scenes was denied him. Strangers from a far distant country stood before him—in their hands was his fate—they addressed to him words of sympathy, and kindness, and comfort, but he could not read in their countenances a confirmation of the friendly language which fell on his ear. Poor, dependent, aged, infirm, and sightless, the head of the empire illustrated in his person the wide-spread ruin which had overwhelmed the empire itself.

Shah Allum regarded the English as his deliverers, and he bestowed on General Lake a host of titles, in testimonial of his bravery and military skill—the sword of the state, the hero of the land, the lord of the age, and the victorious in war. Such were the terms in which, in the spirit of Oriental exaggeration, the services of the British commander were acknowledged.

Colonel Ochterlony was left at Delhi, in a capacity similar to that of resident, and Lord Lake resumed his march. But before advert- ing to the subsequent events of his career, attention must be directed to the progress of the British arms under General Wellesley in a different part of India.

Scindia and the rajah of Berar had entered the territories of the nizam, and it was supposed would cross the Godavary, which was fordable, and attack Hyderabad. General Wellesley moved to counteract them, and the confederates retired towards the point by which they had entered. They were soon after joined by a considerable detachment of regular infantry under two French officers. On the 21st of September, General Wellesley was so near the corps of Colonel Stevenson, who commanded the Hyderabad subsidiary force and the nizam's horse, as to be able to hold a conference with that officer, when a plan was concerted for attacking the enemy on the 24th, it being understood that their army was collected at a place named Bokerdun. General Wellesley was to attack their left, and Colonel Stevenson their right. The former directed his march with the view of arriving on the 23rd within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy; but it turned out that the information upon which the plan had been arranged had deceived the commander. The enemy's camp, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right at that place, and extended several miles to Assye. There was a district, as well as a village, called Bokerdun: the camp was entirely within the district, and hence arose the mistake. Its result was, that

General Wellesley on the 23rd found himself within six miles of the enemy, instead of the distance which he had expected. To add to the surprise which the discovery of the enemy's position was calculated to produce, and to increase the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the unexpected state of circumstances, General Wellesley received intelligence that the confederates were about to retire. If, therefore, he postponed the attack till the arrival of Colonel Stevenson on the following day, the opportunity might be lost, by the departure of the enemy in the night. It was probable that they might have heard of his approach, and the intelligence would be likely to accelerate their removal. Should this not be the case, there was another danger of a different character: General Wellesley could not hope to withdraw unobserved, and retreat would have exposed him to harassing attacks from the enemy's cavalry, attended, in all probability, with the loss of part of his baggage. These were reasons against retreat. On the other hand was the alarming fact, that in his front was a hostile army comprising a body of infantry three or four times as many as his own, a numerous cavalry, and a vast quantity of cannon; the whole occupying a formidable position. In emergencies like this, the bolder course is not unfrequently the safest. General Wellesley preferred it, and resolved to attack.

The enemy's right consisted entirely of cavalry, and it was in front of this that the British commander found himself. He determined, however, to direct his attack to their left, as the defeat of the infantry was the more likely to be effectual. Between the hostile armies flowed the river Kaitna. This was crossed by the British force at a ford which happily the enemy had neglected to occupy. The infantry were immediately formed into two lines, and the British cavalry, as a reserve, into a third. The native horse were employed in keeping in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry, which had followed the march of the British force.

The attack was made with promptitude and vigour; it was attended by corresponding success. Some mistakes occurred, which, though they affected not the fortune of the day, added greatly to the loss of the English. The enemy had made a change in their position, which threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and which was surrounded by cannon. General Wellesley, observing this, directed the officer commanding the pickets on the right to keep out of shot from that village. The officer, misapprehending the order, led directly upon it. The 74th regiment, which had been ordered to support the pickets, followed, and suffered severely. The mistake rendered necessary the introduction of the cavalry at an earlier period than was desirable. Various evils attended this step. The cavalry suffered much from the cannonade; they were incapacitated

for pursuit when the period for thus employing their services arrived, and when they were brought forward there was no reserve. One consequence of this deficiency was, that stragglers left in the rear of the British force, who had pretended to be dead, were suddenly restored to animation, and turned their guns upon the backs of the conquerors. But the victory, though bought by the sacrifice of many valuable lives, was complete. The resistless bayonets of the British troops drove the enemy before them in repeated charges, and when their last-formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, leaving the English masters of the field, and of nearly a hundred pieces of cannon abandoned by the fugitives. General Wellesley shared largely in the labours and the dangers of the conflict. Two horses were killed under him, and every officer of his staff experienced similar casualties. The loss on the part of the English amounted to nearly four hundred killed. The number of wounded was fearfully large—between fifteen and sixteen hundred. The enemy left twelve hundred killed, and a vast number were wounded; but many of the latter being scattered over the country, not even an estimate could be formed of the amount. Among the mortally wounded was Scindia's principal minister, who survived but a short time.

The battle of Assye places in a conspicuous light the cool determination of the general, and the admirable qualities of the troops at his disposal. Entangled in difficulties from which there was no escape but through danger, he chose the mode which to the superficial or the timid would have appeared the most dangerous. He was justified by the character of his troops, and the result was alike honourable to his own judgment and to the intrepid spirit of those on whom he relied. Misinformation brought the battle prematurely on—mistake added to its dangers and difficulties; but all untoward circumstances were successfully overcome by the admirable judgment of the leader and the devoted earnestness of his followers.

So rapid and so numerous were the successes of the British arms, and so much were all these operations parts of one consistent whole, that it is impossible to restrict the attention of the reader for any length of time to one series, without neglecting and throwing out of place other transactions of great interest and importance. The proceedings of General Lake must now for a brief interval supersede the record of those of his coadjutor in the south. On quitting Delhi, General Lake had marched towards Agra, at which place he arrived on the 4th of October. The fort was summoned; but no answer being returned, preparations were made for dislodging seven battalions who held possession of the town, of an encampment with a large number of guns on the glacis, and of the ravines on the south and southwest face of the fort. This being effected with success, though not without considerable loss, the operations of the siege commenced,

the approaches being made under cover of the ravines which had been won from the enemy. On the 14th a communication was received from the fort, demanding a cessation of hostilities, on the ground that terms were about to be proposed. General Lake, in consequence, directed the firing to cease for a few hours, and requested that a confidential person might be sent without delay with the proposed terms. Terms were sent, and General Lake despatched one of his own officers with letters, giving his assent to them. The fort had been for some time the scene of mutiny; but in the communication to General Lake it was stated that all ill-feeling was at an end, and that officers and men were alike ready to abide by whatever agreement might be made between their commandant, Colonel Hessian, and the English general. But this unanimity, if it ever existed, was of short duration. The British officer despatched to make the final arrangements found great diversity of opinion among the native chiefs, and a great desire to raise objections. While he was endeavouring to remove these, the firing from the fort was recommenced without any apparent cause. On this the English officer returned. The belief of General Lake was, that the overtone was but an expedient to gain time, and this opinion seems highly probable. Throughout his career, the humanity of the commander-in-chief was eminently conspicuous, and it is to this feeling that his consent to a cessation of firing is to be ascribed. It may, however, be doubted whether, under the circumstances, he was justified in consenting to discontinue his fire, with a view to obtaining a surrender on terms. He had expressed his belief that the place would not stand ten hours' breaching, and any appearance of hesitation was calculated to give confidence to the enemy, and diminish that feeling among his own troops.

On the 17th of October, the grand battery of the besiegers being completed, they were enabled to open a destructive fire on the point of the fort which appeared least capable of resistance. A practicable breach would soon have been made, but in the evening the garrison sent an offer to capitulate, and on the following day, at noon, marched out, when the place was immediately occupied by a portion of the British force. The fort contained one hundred and seventy-six guns, which, with twenty-six captured beyond the walls, made a total of two hundred and two.

In addition to the great plans which General Lake and General Wellesley were successfully working out, there were various detached operations at this time in progress, all bearing some relation to each other, and all conducted with vigour and success. The notice of some of these must be deferred to a later period, but the occupation of Cuttack, which was completed during the month of October, may properly be adverted to in this place. This service was effected by Colonel Harcourt, who, having occupied that great seat of Hindoo superstition,

Juggernaut, proceeded to reduce the fort of Barabutte, situate about a mile from the town of Cuttack. The fort was built of stone, and was surrounded by a ditch twenty feet deep, and varying in breadth, according to the situation of the bastions, from thirty-five to a hundred and thirty-five feet. A battery was completed on the night of the 18th of October, and on the morning of the 14th opened its fire. By eleven o'clock most of the defences in that part of the fort against which the fire was directed were taken off, the enemy's guns were silenced, and Colonel Harcourt judged that the time for attempting to gain possession had arrived. Over the ditch was a narrow bridge leading to the gate, and by this communication the assailants were to endeavour to effect an entrance. The party, which consisted of both Europeans and sepoys, was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Clayton. They advanced under a fire of musketry from the fort, ill-directed but heavy, to which they were exposed for forty minutes. The gate was to be blown open, but no impression could be made except on the wicket, the remainder being fortified by large masses of stone. The wicket having yielded, the assailants entered, but could only pass singly. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, and a very determined resistance offered at the outer and two succeeding gates, the British party gained possession of all, and the victory was the more gratifying from its having been attained with comparatively little loss. The capture of Barabutte was followed by the entire submission of the province of Cuttack, and the greater part of the troops by whom the conquest had been effected were at liberty to enter Berar, to co-operate with the army under General Wellesley.

The month of November opened with a brilliant addition to the splendid success which in every quarter had crowned the arms of England. General Lake marched from Agra on the 27th of October, in pursuit of a Mahratta force composed of some brigades despatched from the Deccan in the early part of the campaign, and of a few battalions which had effected their escape from Delhi. Great anxiety was felt to destroy or disperse this corps, on account of its being provided with a numerous artillery. The march of the English army having been seriously impeded by unfavourable weather, it was resolved to leave the heavy artillery at Futtypore, and pursue the enemy by forced marches. On the 31st, the British force encamped at a short distance from the ground which the enemy had quitted on the same morning, and General Lake determined to push forward with his cavalry, in the hope of overtaking and delaying them by a light engagement till the infantry should be able to come up. At midnight the cavalry was accordingly put in motion, and, after a march of twenty-five miles, came up with the enemy soon after daybreak. On desecring them, the English commander supposed that they were in retreat, and, to prevent their

effecting this object, he resolved to attack them at once, instead of acting upon the plan which he had proposed, of keeping them in check till the infantry arrived. The official details of the early proceedings of this day are singularly obscure; but this much is certain, that the attempt to make any permanent impression on the Mahratta line by cavalry alone was unsuccessful. The enemy's artillery mowed down men and horses in masses, and the sacrifice was vain. The valour displayed by the British cavalry in this fruitless struggle, commands indeed the most unbounded admiration, mixed with a deep feeling of regret that it should have been so utterly wasted. Nothing could excuse the premature conflict provoked by General Lake, but the mistake under which he laboured in believing the enemy to be in retreat, and the laudable desire which he felt to prevent the escape of a force which was regarded with considerable apprehension. The infantry, which had marched at three, arrived at eleven, having occupied in their march only two hours more than the cavalry. At this time a message was received from the enemy, offering to surrender their guns upon terms. This was remarkable, because up to this period the Mahrattas had no cause to be dissatisfied with the fortune of the day. The probability is, that it was an expedient to gain time for some desired object, and the result seems to countenance such a belief. General Lake accepted the offer, "anxious," as he says, "to prevent the further effusion of blood." He might have adduced another reason also: his infantry, after a long march, performed very rapidly, under a burning sun, needed rest and refreshment. Whatever might be the motive of the Mahrattas for seeking delay, this circumstance made delay not the less desirable for the English. General Lake allowed the Mahrattas an hour to determine whether they would agree to his acceptance of their own proposals,—a mode of proceeding more easily reconcilable with the ordinary course of Indian negotiations than with common sense. The English general seems to have expected little from this overture, and, whatever the measure of his expectation, he acted wisely in employing the interval of suspense in making preparations for renewing the attack under more advantageous circumstances. The infantry was formed into two columns on the left. The first, composed of the right wing, was destined to turn the right flank of the enemy, and to attack the village of Laswaree; the second column was to support the first. There were three brigades of cavalry. One of these, the third, was instructed to support the infantry; the second was detached to the right to watch the motions of the enemy, take advantage of any confusion that might occur, and fall upon them in the event of a retreat: the remaining brigade—the first, which was formed between the third and second, composed the reserve. As many field-pieces as could be brought up with the gallopers attached to the cavalry

formed four distinct batteries for the support of the operations of the infantry.

The hour of expectation passed, and nothing further being heard from the enemy, the infantry were ordered to advance. Their march lay along the bank of a rivulet, and for a time they pursued it under cover of high grass and amidst broken ground concealed from the enemy. As soon, however, as they were discovered and their object ascertained, the enemy threw back their right wing under cover of heavy discharges of artillery. Showers of grape, poured forth from large mortars as well as from guns of heavy calibre, had fearful execution on the British infantry, whose batteries returned the fire with promptitude and vigour indeed, but, from their inferiority in numbers and weight of metal, with very inferior effect. The King's 76th was at the head of the advancing column, and so dreadful were the ravages made in its ranks by the storm of fire to which it was exposed, that, on its arriving at the point from which the charge was to be made, General Lake resolved rather to proceed to the attack with that regiment and some native infantry who had closed to the front, than to wait for the remainder of the column, whose advance had been from some cause delayed. The conduct of the men nobly justified the confidence reposed in them by their commander. They advanced with as much regularity as was practicable, under a tremendous shower of canister-shot, which further thinned their previously weakened ranks. This was immediately succeeded by a charge from the enemy's cavalry; but they were received in a manner which sent them back in confusion. They rallied at a short distance, and there being reason to apprehend further mischief, the King's 29th dragoons were ordered to attack them. They formed on the outward flank of the 76th, by whom they were received with cheers, which were echoed back by the cavalry with no diminution of vigour. From this time the details of the battle became too involved to be narrated with perspicuity. A general charge of horse and foot was made, in which the desperate valour of the assailants set at naught every obstacle and defied every danger. At the moment when the commander-in-chief was about to place himself at the head of the infantry, his horse was shot under him. While in the act of mounting that of his son, Major Lake, that officer was wounded by his side; but this was no time for the indulgence of even the deepest sympathies of nature. The notes of the cavalry trumpets sounding to the charge—which caught the ear when the thunder of the guns from the enemy's lines for a moment subsided—told that those lines were to be won, and those guns made prize; and such was the result. The enemy fought with a determination far exceeding all that had been expected of them, and it was not till they had been dispossessed of all their guns that they relinquished the contest. Even then some of the best qualities of the

character of a soldier were displayed, in an attempt made by their left wing to effect an orderly retreat. In this, however, as in every other point, they were defeated; a regiment of British dragoons and another of native cavalry breaking in upon them, cutting many to pieces, and making prisoners of the rest, with the whole of their baggage.

The loss of the English, in killed and wounded, amounted to more than eight hundred; but this, though heavy, was not to be compared with that of the enemy. About two thousand of the latter were taken prisoners, and with the exception of these, and of a few whom the possession of good horses and local knowledge might enable to escape to a distance, the whole of the seventeen battalions were destroyed. It has been conjectured that the number of slain could hardly be less than seven thousand. The destruction of this force was scarcely less important with regard to that strength which is based on opinion, than on account of its actual and immediate effect in crippling the resources of the enemy. The battalions which fell at Laswaree constituted the flower of Scindia's army, and had been distinguished by the imposing name of the Deccan Invincibles. The charm was now broken; not only had the invincible battalions been vanquished, but so entire had been their defeat that they had ceased to exist. The completeness of their destruction was indeed in one sense honourable to them, for it attested the vigour of their resistance; but how proud was the distinction earned by those who had dispelled the illusion which had raised this corps above the reach of the chances of war and claimed for it a charter of perpetual success!

The victory was gained entirely by hard fighting. The course taken by General Lake in various instances was bold even to the verge of rashness. So nearly did it approach the line which separates courage from temerity, that had the result been unfavourable, it would probably have been impugned by that numerous class whose judgment, if not altogether governed by the event, is greatly modified by it. His venturing to attack the enemy with his cavalry alone, cannot be defended without reference to the belief under which his resolution was taken. He found the enemy were about to elude him altogether. The subsequent advance to charge with only part of his infantry, is more easily defensible. Exposed as they were to a fire which was rapidly consuming them, it was scarcely possible that they could be placed in more unfavourable circumstances, while an indication of fearless determination was calculated at once to keep up their spirit and to abate that of the enemy. But whatever opinion may be formed of the conduct of the battle of Laswaree, it is impossible to trace its progress and results without a deep impression of reverence for that indomitable courage and perseverance by which victory was secured to the English. The sanguine and imaginative will, from a perusal of its history, catch some portion of the spirit

which burned in the breasts of those by whom it was won; and if a casual recollection of it should ever flit over the mind of one engaged amid equal dangers in maintaining the cause of England in distant lands, the lapse of years will detract nothing from the force of the example: the dauntless heroism of those who fought and conquered at Laswaree will aid to nerve the arms and brace the sinews of the soldier, so long as their deeds are remembered.

Again does it become necessary to direct attention to the army in the south for the purpose of noticing in their proper place its contributions towards the safety and honour of the British government. General Wellesley had apprized Colonel Stevenson of the necessity imposed on him of attacking the enemy at Assye without waiting for his junction. The latter immediately marched with part of his troops; and the enemy, on hearing of his advance, departed suddenly from the spot where they had passed the night after the battle, and proceeded towards the Adjunttee Ghaut. Colonel Stevenson, having met with considerable difficulties on his march, was unable to pursue them; and he was further detained, that the wounded in the battle of Assye might have the assistance of his surgeons, great inconvenience and suffering having been occasioned by the want of a sufficient number of medical officers. When Colonel Stevenson advanced, the enemy's infantry, or rather the wreck of it, retired towards the Nerbudda. This division of the British force met with no interruption in the field, and Colonel Stevenson obtained possession of several important fortresses with little difficulty. General Wellesley in the mean time made some rapid and harassing marches, all of them intended to promote important objects. His situation cannot be better painted than in his own words. "Since the battle of Assye," says he, "I have been like a man who fights with one hand and defends himself with the other. With Colonel Stevenson's corps I have acted offensively, and have taken Asseerghur; and with my own I have covered his operations, and defended the territories of the nizam and the peishwa. In doing this, I have made some terrible marches; but I have been remarkably fortunate—first, in stopping the enemy when they intended to pass to the southward through the Casserbarry Ghaut; and, afterwards, by a rapid march to the northward, in stopping Scindia when he was moving to interrupt Colonel Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur, in which he would otherwise have undoubtedly succeeded. I moved up the Ghaut as soon as Colonel Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur; and I think that in a day or two I shall turn Ragojee Bhoonslah, who has passed through to the southward. At all events, I am in time to prevent him doing any mischief. I think that we are in great style to be able to act on the offensive at all in this quarter; but it is only done by the celerity of our movements, and by acting on the offensive or defensive with either

corps, according to our situation and that of the enemy."

In pursuit of the rajah of Berar, General Wellesley arrived at Aurangabad on the 29th of October. The rajah was so little anxious for a meeting, that in the two days succeeding the arrival of the British force at that place he moved his camp five times. He, however, gathered sufficient confidence by the 31st to venture, with a body of four or five thousand horse, to attack a small force engaged in protecting a convoy of fourteen thousand bullocks; but was compelled to retire without any advantage beyond the capture of a few of the beasts.

Several weeks before this transaction, vague and apparently unauthorized overtures for negotiation had been made on the part of Scindia to General Wellesley. Early in November there arrived in the English camp, on a mission from Scindia, a Mahratta chief of considerable rank, named Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray, and a Brahmin named Naroo Punt; but these persons, when called upon to produce their credentials, had none to show. They were permitted to remain in the English camp till measures could be taken for remedying this defect; but before any answer could be received to their application for the purpose, a letter was received by General Wellesley from Scindia, disavowing Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray and his colleague, and intimating an intention of sending another person to negotiate with the British general. The latter was persuaded, notwithstanding, that Scindia had really despatched the mission which he now disavowed, and, notwithstanding the letter of Scindia, it was not dismissed. General Wellesley was not unacquainted with the characteristics of Mahratta diplomacy. "In proportion," said he, "as I gain experience of the Mahrattas, I have more reason to be astonished at the low and unaccountable tricks which even the highest classes of them practise, with a view, however remote, to forward their own interest." An addition to his experience was now about to be made, perfectly in accordance with that which he had previously gained. Shortly after the receipt of Scindia's letter, disavowing Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray and his Brahmin associate, those parties produced a letter from their master, conveying to them certain powers sufficient to corroborate their claims to be received as the representatives of Scindia, but insufficient to justify the British commander in even opening a negotiation. Unable to treat for a peace, the vakeels proposed a temporary suspension of arms, and this was acceded to on condition that Scindia with his army should enter Berar twenty coos (about forty miles) to the eastward of Ellichpore, and keep at all times at that distance from the British troops. On the part of Scindia, it was demanded that the cessation of arms should extend to Hindostan, but to this General Wellesley refused to consent. "The rule," said General Wellesley, "not to cease

hostilities till peace be concluded, is a good one in general." His chief reason for concluding that a deviation from it would, in this case, be beneficial, was, that if hostilities continued uninterruptedly, Scindia would probably embarrass the contemplated operations of Colonel Stevenson, while the English would be unable to do anything effectually against Scindia, the army with him in the field being composed entirely of horse, to follow which would draw the English force too far from its sources of supply, and prevent its being directed against the rajah of Berar. Colonel Stevenson was preparing to attack Gawilghur, within the territories of the last-named chief, and the fall of that place was regarded as of great importance. An irruption of the enemy into Guzerat, which was but weakly provided with the means of defence, was also apprehended, and to avert this was one of the objects of the British general in concluding the truce; another was, to effect a division between Scindia and the rajah of Berar, who was not included in it. The agents had proposed that it should extend to the forces of that chief; but the proposal, independently of its interfering with one main object of the British commander, that of separating the interests of the confederates, could not have failed to be rejected. The agents of Scindia had no powers to treat for the rajah of Berar, and consequently he could not be bound by any stipulations which they might make on his behalf. He might have repudiated them on the ordinary principles of reason and justice, and without any necessity for resorting to the convenient resources of Mahratta morality.

Colonel Stevenson having equipped his force at Asseerghur for the siege of Gawilghur, marched to Ballappoor, where he was joined by the convoy which the rajah of Berar had in vain attempted to cut off. To support and cover his operations, General Wellesley descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th of November. At Parterly was a force belonging to the rajah of Berar, and commanded by his brother, Manoo Bappoo: it comprised, together with a body of cavalry, a great part, if not the whole, of the rajah's infantry, and a large proportion of artillery. Scindia's vakeels became alarmed by General Wellesley's approach to this force, and intreated that it might not be attacked. His answer was, that there was no suspension of arms with the rajah of Berar; and to this communication he appended another, probably more unexpected, that there was none with Scindia till he should comply with the terms of the agreement. The provision that Scindia should occupy a position twenty coos to the east of Ellichpore had not been complied with, that chief being encamped at Serroody, about four miles from the force under Manoo Bappoo. That Scindia should conform to any obligation except so far as it appeared to answer a present purpose, was, indeed, not to be expected. His conduct had reduced the armistice to that which Mah-

ratta engagements may, for the most part, be considered—an idle and useless piece of writing, without force and without value. General Wellesley accompanied his notice of Scindia's breach of engagement by a declaration that he should attack the enemies of the Company wherever he should find them, and Scindia was undoubtedly to be accounted not merely as an enemy, but as one engaged in active hostilities.

At Parterly General Wellesley was joined by the division under Colonel Stevenson. Shortly after their arrival parties of the enemy's horse appeared, with which the Mysorean cavalry skirmished during part of the day. On General Wellesley going out to push forward the pickets of the infantry to support the Mysorean horse, he perceived a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Arghaum, about six miles from the place where he had intended to encamp. It was late, the day had been intensely hot, and the British had marched a long distance; but, notwithstanding these circumstances, General Wellesley resolved not to lose the opportunity which presented itself, and he accordingly marched forward to attack. The advance was made in a single column, in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy's line, the British cavalry leading. The rear and left were covered by native cavalry.

The enemy's infantry and guns were on the left of their centre, and on the left of these was a body of cavalry. Scindia's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, and to its right was a body of Pindaries and other light troops. The enemy's line extended about five miles, having in its rear the village of Arghaum, with extensive gardens and inclosures. In its front was a plain, but considerably intersected by water-courses.

As the British army approached the enemy it was formed into two lines, the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, supporting the right, which was rather advanced, to press on the enemy's left. The left of the British was supported by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry. Some delay took place from part of the native infantry getting into confusion. By one of those inexplicable panics which sometimes seize even the best troops, some battalions, which had eminently distinguished themselves at the battle of Assey, were so terrified by the cannonading, far inferior as it was to what they had previously encountered, that they broke and fell into confusion. Happily, the general was at no great distance, and the presence of him who had so lately led them to victory brought them back to their duty. The whole then advanced in the best order.

The conflict was not marked by any of those vicissitudes which lend interest to the narrative of such events, when victory seems to hover between the combatants. The battle was sanguinary, but from the moment when the

temporary confusion in part of the British line was dispelled, the result was not for an instant doubtful. The King's 76th and 78th regiments were fiercely attacked by a large body of Persian troops, and the latter were entirely destroyed. Scindia's cavalry made a charge on the first battalion of the 6th regiment; but being repulsed with great slaughter, the whole line of the enemy gave way, and fled in the utmost disorder, abandoning to the victors thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition. They were pursued, and great numbers of the fugitives destroyed. The close of the day gave some advantage to the flying, but the light of the moon was sufficient to enable the pursuers to add to their previous captures many elephants and camels, and a considerable quantity of baggage. The loss of the English in killed and wounded amounted to three hundred and forty-six. The enemy suffered dreadfully, and General Wellesley declared his belief that, with one hour more of daylight, not a man would have escaped.

After this signal victory, General Wellesley determined to proceed to the siege of Gawilghur. Both divisions of the army accordingly marched on the 5th of December, and arrived at Ellichpore on the same day: here they halted on the 6th, to provide an hospital for the wounded.

Gawilghur is thus described by General Wellesley:—"The fort of Gawilghur is situated on a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poona and Taptee. It stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one complete inner fort, which fronts to the south, where the rock is most steep; and an outer fort, which covers the inner to the north-west and north. The outer fort has a third wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers. The communications with the fort are through three gates: one to the south with the inner fort; one to the north-west with the outer fort; and one to the north with the third wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is practicable only for men: that to the second is by a road used for the common communications of the garrison with the countries to the southward; but the road passes round the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance to its fire; it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to approach regularly by it, and the rock is scarped on each side. This road also leads no further than the gate. The communication with the northern gate is direct from the village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of the fort; but the road to Labada leads through the mountains for about thirty miles from Ellichpore, and it was obvious that the difficulty and labour of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great."

Notwithstanding the objections existing against the last-mentioned route, it was re-

solved to adopt it, on the ground that it was the least objectionable of the three, and the requisite measures were immediately taken. Two detachments were made—one to drive the enemy from the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort; the other to seize the fortified village of Damergaum, covering the entrance to the mountains which were to be passed in the way to Labada. These detachments succeeded in performing the services on which they were respectively despatched.

On the 7th of December both divisions of the army marched from Ellichpore; Colonel Stevenson into the mountains by Damergaum, and General Wellesley towards the southern face of the fort of Gawilghur. From that day till the 12th, when Colonel Stevenson broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division went through a series of exhausting labours not unprecedented in Indian warfare, but rarely paralleled elsewhere. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over mountains and through ravines for nearly the whole distance which had to be passed, and this by roads which it was previously necessary for the troops to construct for themselves. At night, on the 12th, Colonel Stevenson erected two batteries in front of the north face of the fort: one, consisting of two iron eighteen pounders and three iron twelve-pounders, to breach the outer fort and third wall; the other, composed of two brass twelve-pounders and two five-inch howitzers, to clear and destroy the defences on the point of attack. On the same night the troops of General Wellesley's division constructed a battery on a mountain towards the southern gate. Two brass twelve-pounders were here mounted; two iron ones were to have been added, but no exertions of the troops could get them into their places.

All the batteries opened their fire on the morning of the 13th, and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. The party destined for the main attack from the north was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Kenny; and, to divert the enemy's attention, two attacks were made from the southward by troops from General Wellesley's division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace and Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers. About ten in the morning the three parties advanced, and nearly simultaneously. The detachment under Colonel Chalmers arrived at the north-west gate at the moment when the enemy were endeavouring to escape through it from the bayonets of the assailants under Colonel Kenny. Thus far, therefore, the attack had entirely succeeded; but the wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been made, was yet to be carried. After some attempts upon the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, a place was found at which it was deemed practicable to escalade. Ladders were brought, by which Captain Campbell and the light in-

fantry of the King's 94th ascended: by them the gates were opened to the storming party, and the fort was in the British possession. This acquisition was made with comparatively small loss. During the siege and storm, the total amount was one hundred and twenty-six killed and wounded. The garrison was numerous and well armed: vast numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different gates. Much ordnance and many stands of English arms were found within the fort. The killadar was a Rajpoot of eminent bravery, but whose judgment seems to have been so greatly inferior to his courage that he had been unable to frame any regular plan for defending the inner wall. He was aided by another Rajpoot, Beni Singh, bold and intrepid as himself; but the bravery of the leaders does not seem to have been shared by those whom they commanded. Little of their spirit was displayed by the garrison. The two Rajpoot commanders appear to have considered the fall of the place as inevitable, and to have resolved not to survive the event. Their bodies were found among a heap of slain; a more fearful evidence of the determined spirit in which they had acted was afforded by the discovery, that, in conformity with the feeling of their country, they had doomed their wives and daughters to become sharers in the fate which they scorned to evade for themselves. But the task had been imperfectly performed. A few of the women only were dead: the rest, some of whom had received several wounds, survived to afford exercise to the humane feelings of the conquerors. It is scarcely necessary to add, that General Wellesley directed all attention and respect to be shown them.

The battle of Argam and the capture of Gawilghur impressed the confederate chieftains with a sense of the necessity of quickening their endeavours to secure to themselves some portion of territory and some degree of power. Before the occurrence of the latter event, the rajah of Berar had despatched vakeels to the camp of General Wellesley, and on the 17th of December a separate treaty of peace with that chief was concluded. By this treaty the rajah ceded the perpetual sovereignty of the province of Cuttack, including the fort and district of Balasore, to the Company and their allies. The latter were not named, and General Wellesley, in transmitting the treaty to the governor-general, observed: "The reasons for omitting to name the allies in the treaty, and to engage that they shall ratify it, will become sufficiently obvious when the character and conduct of the government of these allies are recollected. It will remain with your excellency," he continued, "to give such orders as you may think proper to the residents at the different durbars, to obtain the assent of the allies to the treaty, but I should imagine that the rajah of Berar will be satisfied with your excellency's ratification." In truth, there was not, and never has been, a prince in India who would not feel more

confidence in the simple promise of the head of the English government than in the most solemn securities of any native sovereign within the country. The general terms in which the cessions were made were thus accounted for by General Wellesley: "The cessions under the treaty are made to the British government and its allies, and I have drawn it in this manner in order that your excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter, in such manner as you may think proper." Besides the cessions above mentioned, the rajah of Berar relinquished all claims on certain old possessions of the nizam, the revenues of which had for some time been collected by the two princes in various proportions. At first the rajah received only a fifth: the encroaching spirit of Mahratta policy soon increased his share to a fourth. It then became half, by treaty, and latterly four-fifths, by exaction and violence. By the treaty this partition, with all its tendency to throw the whole into the hands of the Mahratta prince, came to an end, and the frontier of the nizam was carried forward to the Wurda river. The ministers of the rajah were desirous of the insertion of an article confirming all grants and treaties made heretofore by the nizam and the peishwa; but General Wellesley objected that he could not consent to confirm that of which he had no knowledge. In place of confirmation, he proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British, and a claim upon its justice, as the best security that the rajah could have for his demands upon the other powers; and the proposal being accepted, an article was framed, binding the Company's government to the discharge of the requisite duties. The comment of General Wellesley upon this part of the negotiation is full of instruction. "It appears to me," says he, "an important point gained, and highly honourable to the character of the British government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice against the demands of its allies." To an article binding the rajah never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or subject of any European or American government at war with the English, or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British government, no objection was offered by his ministers; but a clause was added, at the rajah's request, by which the Company engaged not to aid or countenance any of his discontented relations, rajahs, zemindars, or subjects, who might fly from, or rebel against, his authority. A succeeding article, providing that accredited ministers from each government should reside at the court of the other, was admitted by the rajah's ministers with equal facility, but another was the occasion of some difficulty. The British government had concluded treaties with some minor chieftains, feudatories of the rajah. The article in question required that these treaties should be confirmed, and it was provided that lists of

the parties with whom treaties had been made should be given to the rajah, when that with himself should be ratified by the governor-general. The rajah's minister objected that, after the cessions which his master had made by former articles of the treaty, he had no territory left which he might not be bound to give up by virtue of the article under consideration. The answer of General Wellesley was decisive. The rajah's minister was told that the article was indispensable, and could not be given up; but it was added, that the British government would not have consented to conclude a treaty of peace with the rajah had it desired the destruction of his state. The article, it was explained, was not intended to apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government, and it was stated that it should be applied to no other. The vakeel professed himself satisfied, and the article was admitted. By an article immediately following that which had occasioned the discussion above noticed, the rajah agreed to separate himself from the confederacy formed by Scindia and other Mahratta chiefs against the Company. This, like the preceding article, was a source of some difficulty—not that it was objected to by the rajah, but the British commander demanded a hostage for its due performance. The answer of the rajah's vakeel was, that his master would send whomsoever the English general pleased, with certain exceptions—those exceptions extending to the only persons whose presence in the English camp would be of the least value as a security, the brother, son, or nephew of the rajah. Fearing that this point would not be conceded, and that the treaty, which it was certainly very desirable to the British government to obtain, might go off on the question, General Wellesley resolved not to persist in demanding a hostage. The last obstacle to the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiation was thus removed, and the confederacy against the British government was deprived of an important limb. The treaty was duly ratified by the rajah of Berar, and also by the governor-general.

The secession of the rajah of Berar probably determined Scindia to seek peace with more earnestness and sincerity than he had heretofore displayed. Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray and Naroo Punt had remained in the British camp, and on the 23rd of December they were joined there by two of Scindia's ministers, named Eitil Punt and Havel Nyn, with the declared object of concluding a peace. The ordinary course of Mahratta diplomacy might, however, have been pursued, but for the extraordinary decision of General Wellesley; and the result of his firmness was, that on the 30th a treaty was signed, which, like that with the rajah of Berar, was declared to be with the Company and its allies, the latter not being named, and the cessions to be made to the allied powers generally. Those cessions

comprised all the territories north of the countries of the rajahs of Jeypore and Joudpore, and the rana of Gohud, with the exception of certain pergunnahs considered the private property of Scindia's house. The jaghire lands of the ladies of his family, and those of some of his powerful ministers and sirdars, were to remain in their possession, under the protection of the British government; and other sirdars in Scindia's service were to be provided for by pensions or jaghires, subject to a provision fixing a limit to the total amount to be thus applied. General Wellesley, in communicating this arrangement to the governor-general, thus assigns his reasons for consenting to it:—"It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in the disturbed state of Scindia's government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation in comparison with that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's hands, and to add to his arms, all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries, who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindia's service, and must have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent with your excellency's policy; and it appears that, besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindia's durbar, which must guide its measures in a great degree, even if Scindia should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British government in his durbar, if he should agree to the terms of the general defensive alliance."

Besides the districts already described, Scindia agreed to give up, in perpetual sovereignty, the forts of Baroach and Ahmednugur, and the territories depending upon them, except so much of the territory dependent on the latter as formed part of his family property; but into the land thus reserved to him, he was never to introduce any troops to collect revenue, or under any pretence whatever. Further, Scindia renounced for ever all claims of every description upon the British government and their allies, the nizam, the peishwa, and the guicowar; he agreed to confirm the treaties concluded by the British government with the rajahs and others previously his feudatories; to admit the rights of the peishwa to certain lands in Malwa as formerly existing, and, in case of difference, to submit to the arbitration of the Company; to relinquish all claims upon the emperor, and abstain from all interference in his majesty's affairs. The provision, excluding from Scindia's service Frenchmen and other foreigners, was the same

as that in the treaty with the rajah of Berar. Accredited ministers from the two states were to be reciprocally received. Scindia was to be admitted, if he chose, to the general defensive alliance subsisting between the Company and its allies; and in the event of his consenting within two months to become a party to it, the Company engaged to furnish a force, for the defence of his territories, of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments; but no pecuniary payment or further territorial cession was to be made on this account; the expense of the force was to be defrayed out of the revenue of the lands ceded by other articles of the treaty. If Scindia should decline to become a party to the general defensive alliance and receive a British force, the refusal was not to affect any other stipulations of the treaty. The exemption of Scindia from any additional charge on account of the British, should he consent to receive such a protection, was one of the most extraordinary, but, at the same time, one of the most judicious points of arrangement exhibited in the treaty. The reasons operating on the mind of the British negotiator, and tending to its adoption, are thus stated by himself in addressing the governor-general:—"In the course of this war, Scindia's power, reputation, and military resources have been greatly diminished, while his rival, Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family by his treaty of peace with Scindia, remains with undiminished power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of Scindia, his power and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the war; and I have but little doubt that the contest between those chiefs will be revived. This would be a matter of but little consequence to the British government, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindia in every point of view, and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar; or if he should endeavour to avoid the contest, which I do not think probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent upon that of his rival. Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your excellency's determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established by the exercise of the force of the British government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindia an option of becoming a party of the general defensive alliance; and, as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his revenue. I was induced to make this last engagement by the conviction that Scindia would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although

his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he were to be obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive, and that if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is secured as far as it can be by human means. I have every reason to believe also, that when Scindia shall wind up his affairs at the end of the war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue such as the British government would require to pay the expenses of the force which might be given to him."

It thus appears that there was reason to suspect that Scindia could not have paid for a subsidiary force had he been disposed, and that, if he had possessed the power of paying, he would have been unwilling to pay. It was important to uphold him against Holkar, and to attach him, if possible, to the British confederacy—so important, that with reference to the fact that the English acquired by the treaty large territorial cessions, and in consideration of this advantage, it was worth while to afford to Scindia the assistance of the British force without demanding more. Such were the views of General Wellesley, and they were justified by the circumstances under which they were formed.

The day on which the negotiations with Scindia were brought to a termination was distinguished by an event of a different character, but one calculated to promote the interests of peace and order. General Campbell, with a force previously employed in defence of the nizam's territories, had been despatched into the south Mahratta country to check some suspicious indications on the part of the jaghiredars there. On the 27th of December he received at Woodasoor information that a party of Mahratta plunderers, amounting to about ten thousand horse, with some pindaries on foot, had passed the Kistna at the Dharoor Ghaut, and were proceeding towards Moodanoor. General Campbell marched on the following morning with his cavalry and flank companies lightly equipped, and on the 29th reached Jallyhall, when a party of marauding horse sent to watch his motions were surprised, and their chief, a notorious plunderer, with several of his officers—if officers they may be called—brought in prisoners. The leader of the ruffian force, of which General Campbell was in search, was a man named Mahomed Bey Khan; but this name he repudiated as unsuitable to his purpose. That by which he chose to be known was Dhoondia Waugh, a name which it will be recollected was borne by a preceding adventurer, whose career towards sovereignty, as well as his life, were prematurely abridged by General Wellesley. Although the death of Dhoondia Waugh was a matter of sufficient notoriety, the new adventurer found from eastern credulity a ready admission of his pretensions. He was, moreover, a devotee, and exhibited that combination of undisguised robbery and avowed sanctity, which, however extraordinary elsewhere, is

not regarded as remarkable in countries where religion, though extending its control to almost every outward act which men can perform, aspires not to the office of purifying the heart. At Jallyhall General Campbell heard that this saintly robber had pitched his camp between Doodyhall and Moodianoor, with the intention of intercepting the British convoys and carrying his depredations beyond the Toombuddra. The British commander thereupon marched on the enemy on the evening of the 29th of December, and at four o'clock on the morning of the 30th learned that he was within six miles of those whom he sought, and that they were entirely ignorant of his approach. At dawn of day he came upon them, and pushed his cavalry into the centre of their camp with little opposition. An hour sufficed to destroy part of the band which the sham Dhoondia Waugh had collected around him, and to disperse the rest. Two thousand of the enemy were killed, and upwards of one thousand wounded or made prisoners; the remainder threw down their arms and fled. Among the prisoners was the venerable faquir, who, under borrowed plumes, had led to the work of plunder and devastation. His banner, on the day of his defeat, was followed by four Frenchmen, who, it seems, in the search for military employment, were oppressed with few scruples as to its character when tested by the principles of morality, or the degree of estimation in which it must be regarded by men trained in European modes of thought. One of these, whose dress and appointments seemed to indicate him to be a person above the common rank, was killed; the remaining three escaped by the help of good horses and their own discretion, which prompted them to depart at an early period of the engagement. The whole of the freebooters' baggage and bazaars, and upwards of twenty thousand bullocks, were taken. Only two men in the English force were killed and fifteen wounded. The flank companies of the King's 83rd, after marching thirty miles, came up with the cavalry, and had their full share in the attack upon this horde of plunderers.

Among the objects embraced by the governor-general's comprehensive plan of warfare was the occupation of Bundelcund. This design was prosecuted during the progress of the important operations which have been narrated, but was not entirely completed until after the conclusion of peace with the rajah of Berar and Scindia. The peishwa had certain claims on Bundelcund, and it was as his ally that the English, in the first instance, appeared there. More than seventy years before the occurrence of the transactions under review, a Hindoo prince of Bundelcund, named Chitoor Sal, being hard pressed by a Rajpoot enemy, solicited the aid of the peishwa. It was promptly granted, and so highly was the service appreciated by Chitoor Sal, that he adopted the peishwa as a son, and on his death left him an equal share of his dominions with two sons, whose claims to the title were founded in

nature. This was the origin of the peishwa's right. It is unnecessary to pursue the history of Bundelcund minutely—it will be enough to say that it differed little from that of other parts of India under native government or native anarchy. Late in the eighteenth century we find the province overrun by two chiefs, named Ali Bahaudur and Himmut Bahaudur, the former an illegitimate scion of the house of the peishwa, the latter a soldier of fortune, little scrupulous as to modes of obtaining its favour, though distinguished for his religious attainments, and holding high rank in one of those associations which open to fanaticism means for gratifying spiritual pride, and to imposture opportunity for profitable deception. He was a gossain. Ali Bahaudur acknowledged the paramount authority of the peishwa, and owned his own liability to render tribute, but which, according to Oriental fashion, he never paid. His death left the authority of Himmut Bahaudur predominant; but that pious person not feeling quite secure in his authority, and thinking that a jaghire under a power able to protect its dependants was preferable to the possession of nominal sovereignty without the means of maintaining it, made a tender of the province of Bundelcund to the British government. The offer was made to Mr. Henry Wellesley while holding the office of lieutenant-governor of the ceded provinces. It was declined on the obvious and honourable ground that it could not be accepted without violating the rights of the peishwa.

The capture of Poona, the flight of the peishwa, and the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, by changing the position of the British government, effected a change in its determination. The occupation of Bundelcund, in the name and on the behalf of the peishwa, was consistent with justice, while, at the same time, it was undoubtedly expedient, with a view to prevent its falling into the hands of the confederated chiefs. Mr. Mercer, a medical officer, who had been secretary to Mr. Henry Wellesley, was accordingly despatched to Illalabad, to confer with an agent of Himmut Bahaudur, and terms for the co-operation of that personage were arranged. The gossain, it appeared, had a relative who had been engaged in the conspiracy of Vizier Ali, and on that account was kept prisoner at Lucknow. His liberation was demanded by Himmut Bahaudur, and the British government undertook to solicit the vizier to grant it, on condition of the party thus favoured giving security for his future good conduct. Thus much did the holy man stipulate for his relation; but, albeit his vows should have weaned him from any aspirations after the ordinary objects of human desire, he had yet something to ask for himself. It was not a cell, where he might pass his days in solitary meditation, nor a sum of money to be disbursed in charitable gifts—it was a jaghire in the Doab, suitable, not to his profession, but to "his rank and station,"

and an assignment of revenue in Bundelcund of twenty lacs of rupees for the support of a body of troops which this despiser of earthly good proposed to keep at his command. In consideration of this arrangement, the troops were to be always prepared to obey the orders of the British government. These terms were granted, the progress of the negotiation being facilitated by another carried on with the peishwa for the cession to the British government of territory in Bundelcund in place of other cessions made by the treaty of Bassein.

A British detachment which had been formed near Ilalabad, under Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, shortly afterwards entered the country, and was joined at Terora by Himmüt Bahadur, at the head of eight thousand irregular infantry, about four thousand horse, three regular battalions commanded by a European officer, and twenty-five pieces of ordnance. On arriving at the river Cane, which flows through Bundelcund and falls into the Jumna a little below the town of Corah, they found posted on the opposite side the army of Shumsheer Bahadur, son of Ali Bahadur, who, like those by whom he was confronted, professed to act in the name of the peishwa. Having reduced several forts in the vicinity, and established the British authority between the Jumna and the Cane, Colonel Powell crossed the latter river. A series of desultory warfare and indecisive negotiation followed. The British authority continued, in the mean time, to be extended. Shumsheer Bahadur found great difficulty in prevailing on himself to submit, although submission was obviously inevitable; but an offer to settle on him and his family an annual sum of four lacs of rupees brought him to the English camp. His submission was speedily followed by the surrender of all the forts in Bundelcund held by his adherents.

Mention has been made of a negotiation with the peishwa, having for its object an exchange of a portion of the cessions made under the treaty of Bassein. It ended in the formation of eight supplemental articles to that treaty, by the first of which certain territories in the Carnatic, yielding a revenue of sixteen lacs, were restored to the peishwa. By the second, the Company's government renounced a portion of territory in Guzerat, yielding three lacs sixteen thousand rupees. The third provided for the addition to the Poona subsidiary force of a regiment of native cavalry, of the same strength and complement as the cavalry regiment belonging to the Hyderabad subsidiary force. The fourth annulled the fifteenth article of the treaty, which regulated the amount of force to be brought into the field by the peishwa in case of war, and fixed it at four thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores; this was a considerable reduction from the former amount, which was ten thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry. The fifth article pro-

vided that a corps of Mahratta cavalry, amounting to five thousand, should, during the war, be maintained by the British government for the service of the state of Poona, two thousand of whom were to serve with the peishwa, and three thousand with the British army in the field. The sixth related to the cessions to be made in consideration of the countries relinquished by the Company under the first and second articles, and of the additional expense incurred by them under others. Territory in Bundelcund producing a revenue equal to that ceded in the Carnatic and Guzerat, namely, nineteen lacs sixteen thousand rupees, was to be transferred to the Company; a further tract of country, yielding fifty thousand rupees, was to be bestowed, in consideration of the high value of the country restored in Guzerat, and cessions to the amount of separate sums of seven lacs and a half, five lacs, and four lacs, to meet the expense of the cavalry regiment added to the subsidiary force, that of maintaining the Mahratta corps of horse, and the extraordinary expenses of putting down resistance in Bundelcund and establishing the British authority there. The total value of the cessions in Bundelcund was thus thirty-six lacs sixteen thousand rupees. By the seventh article, the whole of these cessions were to be taken from those parts of Bundelcund most contiguous to the British possessions, and most convenient for the Company's occupation. The eighth article related to the territory restored in Guzerat, and, after reciting that such territory was particularly valuable to the Company, by reason of its proximity to the city of Surat, in the prosperity of which the British government entertained an anxious concern, it provided that the territories referred to should be so managed and governed at all times by the Mahratta authorities, as to conduce to the convenience of Surat, by attention to the rules of good neighbourhood, and the promotion of amicable and commercial intercourse between the inhabitants on both sides. It was further provided, that as the sovereignty of the river Taptee belonged to the British government, the Mahratta authority in the restored territory should have no right or concern whatever in the wreck of any vessel that might be cast upon any part of the country bordering on the river, but should be bound, in the event of any wreck taking place, to render the vessel all practicable aid, for which the parties assisting were to be entitled to receive, from the owners of the wreck, just and reasonable compensation. This last article was not unnecessary. Even in countries where higher principles of action than prevail among the Mahrattas are professed, the fragments of property that have survived the destruction occasioned by tempest or accident are but too frequently regarded as lawful objects of appropriation. The Mahrattas, in adopting this view, would only be extending to the waters the principles by which their conduct is invariably governed on the land.

On the remainder of the supplemental articles little observation is necessary. The exchanges of territory were convenient to both parties interested in them. The British government obtained territory in a quarter where it was very desirable to possess it. The peishwa received back a country from which he would realize a revenue, in exchange for one from which he had never derived any; while Bundelcund, by being placed under the authority of the Company, was relieved from the anarchical state which had long prevailed, and placed in circumstances to partake of the good order and prosperity which characterize the British dominions in India, as compared with those under native governments.

A brief digression from the progress of events in India must now be permitted, for the purpose of noticing a naval action of extraordinary brilliancy, in which the Company's ships, unaided by any vessels of war, signally sustained the honour of Great Britain in the Indian seas. A fleet from Canton had been despatched from that place on the 31st January, 1804, under the care of Captain Dance, who commanded one of the ships named the *Earl Camden*, and who was selected for the charge assigned to him as being the senior commander. On the morning of the 14th of February four strange sail were discerned. It was subsequently ascertained that they consisted of a ship of eighty-four guns, two heavy frigates, and a corvette of twenty-eight guns. At daybreak on the 15th, the ships which were discerned on the preceding day were observed lying to, about three miles to windward of the English fleet. The merchantmen hoisted their colours and offered battle if the strangers chose to come down. The four ships immediately hoisted French colours, and the larger was observed to carry a rear-admiral's flag. In addition to the ships already mentioned was a brig, which hoisted Batavian colours. They formed a squadron which had been despatched under Admiral Lincois to the Indian seas on the recommencement of hostilities between the English and French after the brief peace of Amiens. The enemy evincing no alacrity in accepting the invitation of the British commander, the latter formed in order of sailing and steered his course. The enemy then filled their sails and edged down towards the English, with the obvious intention of cutting off their rear. As soon as this was perceived, Commodore Dance made the signal to tack and bear down. The manœuvre was performed with great precision, and the gallant merchantmen stood towards the enemy under a press of sail, and forthwith opened their fire on the headmost ships. The *Royal George*, commanded by Captain Timins, was the leading ship of the English line, and was carried into action in admirable style. The *Ganges*, Captain Moffatt, was the next, and this was followed by the commodore's ship. The fire of these three had such an effect on the enemy,

that before the remaining ships could be brought up they stood away to the eastward under all the sail they could set. The English commander made signal for a general chase, and the enemy was pursued for two hours, when Commodore Dance fearing that he might be carried too far out of his course, and with reference to the great value of the ships and cargoes (estimated at eight millions), deemed it prudent to discontinue further attempts to overtake the frightened foe. Had circumstances permitted, there can be no doubt that those who had so bravely commenced would have brought the affair to a worthy conclusion.

An event so honourable to the maritime service of the East-India Company could not be passed in silence without injustice to that service, and to the country to which it was an ornament and a safeguard. The narrative must now return to the course of negotiation consequent on the splendid success of the British army by land. The opening afforded for Scindia's accession to the general defensive alliance was improved by the despatch of Captain Malcolm to the camp of that chieftain, to endeavour, by negotiation, to attain the object. After encountering the usual amount of difficulty interposed by Mahratta habits of delay and dissimulation, he succeeded, and on the 27th of February a treaty of alliance was signed. It consisted of sixteen articles. The first contained an ordinary declaration of friendship and union. By the second the parties bound themselves to concert and prosecute measures of defence in case of either being attacked, the expression of this mutual obligation being accompanied by a long explanation declaring that the British government would never permit any power or state to commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against Scindia, but, on his requisition, would maintain and defend his rights and territories in like manner with those of the Company. By the third, Scindia was to receive a subsidiary force of not less than six thousand infantry, duly provided with artillery and properly equipped; and by the fourth, that prince was exonerated from all additional expense on this account. The fifth article provided for the mutual exemption from duties, of supplies for the forces of the Company or of Scindia when in the territories of each other, and for securing to the officers of the two states due respect and consideration. The sixth declared the purposes for which the subsidiary force was to be employed, which were stated generally to be "services of importance"—a description illustrated by enumerating a few instances of similar character to those referred to in other subsidiary treaties. The seventh article extended and rendered more stringent the provision of the former treaty against the employment of foreigners. The change was made on the suggestion of the governor-general. By the former treaty, Scindia was restrained from taking into his

service or retaining therein any Frenchman, or the subject of any European or American power the government of which might be at war with Great Britain. The amended article introduced into the new treaty contained no reference to the contingency of war; Scindia was never to employ in his service or permit to remain in his dominions any European or American whatever, without the consent of the British government. In return, the British government undertook never to employ or sanction the residence within its dominions of any person guilty of crimes or hostility against Scindia. The eighth article restrained Scindia from negotiating with any principal states or powers without giving notice to the Company's government and entering into consultation with them. On the other hand, the Company's government declared on their part that they would "have no manner of concern with any of the Maharajah's relations, dependants, military chiefs, or servants, with respect to whom the Maharajah" was admitted to be "absolute." The British government was never to afford "encouragement, support, or protection to" any of the parties above enumerated "who might eventually act in opposition to the Maharajah's authority, but, on the contrary," on being required, were "to aid and assist to punish and reduce all such offenders to obedience," and no officer of the Company was to interfere in the internal affairs of Scindia's government.

The ninth article bound Scindia to refrain from entering into hostilities with any state in alliance with the Company, and to submit all disputes with any such states to its arbitration. The tenth and eleventh regulated the amount of force to be furnished by each party in the event of their being engaged in war with any other power, and provided for the accumulation of stores. The twelfth provided for the equal partition of conquests made in any such war, on condition that each party should have fulfilled the stipulations of the treaty. The thirteenth related to points of detail connected with the employment of the subsidiary force, and of other forces of the Company, in the event of disturbances. The fourteenth restricted both parties from interfering with the tributaries of the other. By the fifteenth the Company agreed to exert their influence to maintain the observance of such ceremonies and customs as should appear to be fixed in communicating between the peishwa and Scindia, and to recognize the right of the latter to all the possessions which he held either by written or unwritten authority, provided the written authority, if any, should not contravene the provisions of the treaty, and that all disputes relating to possessions held by unwritten authority should be referred to the arbitration of the British government. In this case, therefore, the Company only agreed to recognize that which themselves should determine to be right. The article concluded with an engagement on the part of the British govern-

ment to use its endeavours to prevent any acts done by Scindia or his ancestors, under the authority of the peishwa, from being subverted; provided, however, the maintenance of such acts should be consistent with the honour and dignity of the peishwa and the stipulations of the treaty of peace. The value of such an engagement, so qualified, is very easily appreciated. The sixteenth article related to the negotiation and ratification of the treaty, and to the delivery of the ratified copy.

From causes which will hereafter appear, the provisions of this treaty became practically of no importance; but a just estimate of the policy then pursued in India could not have been formed without a full exposition of the views entertained and the measures adopted with regard to Scindia. For this reason, the principal parts of the treaty have been exhibited with a degree of care which, for other purposes, would be unnecessary.

Allusion has been made to treaties concluded with certain minor chiefs. These were the rajahs of Bhurtpore, Jodepore, Jeypoor, Machery, and Bhoondee, the rana of Gohud, and Ambajee Inglia. The territories of the whole lay in the region of the Jumna; all the treaties were concluded by General Lake; and, in most instances, the friendly desires of the native princes received an impulse from the result of the battle of Laswaree. The first to tender his adherence was the rajah of Bhurtpore, with whom a treaty was, in consequence, concluded, stipulating perpetual friendship and alliance, binding the British government not to interfere in the concerns of the rajah, nor to exact tribute of him, and engaging each party to co-operate in defending the territories of the other. By the treaty with the rajah of Machery, that chief agreed to refer his disputes for settlement to the Company's government, and to defray the charge of aid afforded him for the defence of his dominions at the same rate as other chiefs of Hindostan. The rajah of Jeypoor made similar engagements, and further agreed to act, in time of war, "though in reality master of his own army," agreeably to the advice of the British commander employed with his troops. He also engaged not to entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to any European without the consent of the Company's government. The treaty with the rajah of Jodepore corresponded with that formed with the chief last mentioned. Ambajee Inglia was a powerful servant of Scindia, who had been appointed to supersede the authority of Perron, and whose appointment led to the precipitate departure of that person from the spot where he had contemplated the formation of an independent state. Part of the territories which Ambajee had been authorized to administer formed the ancient possessions of the house of Gohud, which had been conquered by Scindia some years before. Ambajee made overtures to the British govern-

ment, offering to detach himself from the service of Scindia and become a tributary to them. It was desirable to afford him encouragement, and the difficulty of reconciling his claims with those of the rana of Gohud was got over by dividing the country, and assigning the independent possession of part to Ambajee, in consideration of his surrendering the right of administering the whole. A negotiation with this view was opened, and, after much evasion, a treaty concluded by which Ambajee agreed to surrender all the territory north of Gwalior, together with the fortress of that name, the British government guaranteeing to Ambajee the remainder of the territory which had been under his management. A force was despatched to take possession of the fortress, and Ambajee readily gave an order for its delivery. The commandant, however, refused to obey the instructions of his master, and measures were taken for the reduction of the place by force. When a breach had been effected the garrison offered to surrender in consideration of the sum of fifty thousand rupees. This being refused, they demanded the value of certain stores as the price of submission, which being granted, possession of the fort was obtained by the English.

By the treaty with the rana of Gohud, Gwalior was ceded to the Company, by whom the territories restored to her under the arrangement with Ambajee were guaranteed. The rana was to subsidize a British force of three battalions of infantry, and the payment was fixed at seventy-five thousand rupees per month.

For the emperor, whose person the success of the campaign had transferred into English keeping, a munificent provision was made, and an adequate degree of state provided. He

was not invested with any actual power, and indeed no human agency could have restored the Mahometan empire to respectability. It belonged to an age which had passed, and it was better for the peace and happiness of India that no attempt should be made to revive it.

The conclusion of peace with Scindia and the rajah of Berar suggests the inquiry how far the objects proposed by the governor-general at the commencement of hostilities had been effected? A more convenient opportunity will be found for inquiring whether the pursuit of these objects was consistent with wisdom and justice—all that will be attempted here will be a very brief notice of what was proposed as compared with what was performed. We are not left to conjecture what were the objects proposed by the governor-general, nor whether he had accurately defined them to himself. He placed them on record in a letter of instruction addressed to the commander-in-chief several weeks before a blow was struck. They were, first, the destruction of the French state on the banks of the Jumna, with all its military resources; secondly, the extension of the Company's frontier to the Jumna, with the possession of Agra, Delhi, and a sufficient chain of forts on its banks; thirdly, the possession of the nominal authority of the Mogul; fourthly, the establishment of alliances with petty chiefs southward and westward of the Jumna, from Jyenaghur to Bundelcund; fifthly, the annexation of Bundelcund to the Company's dominions. Such were the objects, the attainment of which, in the estimation of the governor-general, would constitute "the most prosperous issue of a war with Scindia and the rajah of Berar on the north-western frontier of Hindostan"—and they were attained.

CHAPTER XIX.

CEYLON PLACED UNDER THE DIRECT GOVERNMENT OF THE CROWN.—WAR WITH THE CANDIANS.—SURRENDER OF AN ENGLISH DETACHMENT, AND MASSACRE OF THE PRISONERS.—SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.—REMARKS BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

THE Dutch settlements on the island of Ceylon had fallen into the hands of the English during the time that Lord Hobart exercised the government of Madras. For a short period they formed an appendage to that presidency; but as soon as the ministry at home found leisure to reflect on the subject, it was deemed inexpedient that Ceylon should continue under the administration of the East-India Company. It was accordingly placed under the direct administration of the Crown, and a governor appointed, who was to be altogether independent of the authority which was paramount over all the British possessions on the Indian continent. It would be idle to waste time in conjecturing the causes of this change. The motives are too obvious to be

mistaken. All parties when in opposition declaim against the increase of ministerial patronage—all parties when in office labour to add to its extent, till checked by some strong intimation that they have reached the verge of parliamentary forbearance. It is rare indeed that such check is interposed, as those from whom it should come are often too much interested, either for themselves or their friends, to impose any limit on a privilege from which they hope to benefit.

It is worthy of remark, that the chief mover in the proceedings which secured to the ministry the entire patronage of Ceylon was Mr. Henry Dundas, one of the most vehement opposers of the India Bill proposed by the famous coalition ministry, the main object

of which was to transfer the patronage of India to that ministry. Mr. Dundas was then in opposition—when the Ceylon question was to be disposed of he was a cabinet minister.

In the interior of the island was the kingdom of Candy—a state of some extent and power. Previously to the acquisition of the Dutch settlements in Ceylon, more than one attempt had been made by the English to establish amicable relations with the sovereign of this state, but without success. An overture from the government of Madras, after the conquest, was not more fortunate in its results; and on the arrival of Mr. North, the first governor appointed by the crown, not only were the relations of Candy to the British government entirely unsettled, but the country itself was in a state of confusion, originating in the death of the king, and the elevation of a usurper in his place, to the exclusion of the rightful claimant of the throne. This had been effected through the intrigues of a man named Pelime Talauve, who held the office of chief adigur, or first minister. The person whom he had placed on the throne was of low extraction, and destitute of talents. These circumstances probably constituted his chief qualifications in the eyes of the ambitious adigur, who intended, in eastern fashion, to exercise the power without assuming the title of sovereign. He succeeded in attaining his object. The second adigur retained his allegiance to Mootto Sawmy, the lawful inheritor of the throne, and paid the price of his fidelity in the forfeiture of his head. The queen and all the relations of the deceased king were thrown into prison; but, after a time, several, and among them Mootto Sawmy, found means to escape. They claimed protection from the British government, which was granted, but under restrictions which deprived them of all power to disturb the existing government of Candy.

Pelime Talauve was apparently not less disposed to seek the aid of the British government, and he is stated to have made some very atrocious proposals for his own aggrandizement, accompanied by conditions which he believed would be acceptable to the English. These were rejected with becoming expressions of indignation; but soon afterwards, from motives which do not very clearly appear, Major-general M'Dowall was dispatched on a mission to the court of Candy. The instructions given to General M'Dowall seem to indicate a desire, on the part of the governor, to establish the British authority in Candy, and to connect it with his government by the tie of a subsidiary alliance. But the first interview of business put an end to all hope of effecting any of the objects of the mission, whatever they were. General M'Dowall's first request was moderate; that which he asked was calculated not less for the benefit of the subjects of the king of Candy than for the convenience of the people under the British government—it was for permission to construct a road through the king's territories, to connect

Colombo with Trincomalee. The answer was an unqualified denial, the king expressing his decided aversion to any intercourse between his subjects and Europeans. Such was the fruit of this mission, which had been despatched at vast expense, General M'Dowall being attended to the frontier by a large force, and bearing magnificent presents.

Various attempts at negotiation followed, which, as they were marked by no circumstances of interest and led to no results, may be passed over. The hostile designs of the court of Candy were, however, placed beyond doubt by the warlike preparations reported to be in progress in the country, and by repeated acts of aggression upon British subjects. One of these called forth a remonstrance from the English governor. A number of bullocks, laden with areka-nuts, belonging to persons who were peaceably pursuing an ordinary branch of traffic, were seized and confiscated. The answer to the representations of the British government promised restitution; but the fulfilment of the promise was constantly evaded under some frivolous pretence, and no redress was obtained. The governor now determined on war, and on the 31st of January, 1803, General M'Dowall marched from Colombo with a force about two thousand strong. A few days later Colonel Barbutt marched with a large force from Trincomalee, and on the 20th of February the two divisions met before the city of Candy, the capital of the country. General M'Dowall's division had performed a march of a hundred and three miles; that of Colonel Barbutt had traversed a hundred and forty-two; and though the progress of the invaders was not altogether unopposed, the resistance which they experienced was too inconsiderable to call for notice. On the 21st of February a strong detachment marched into Candy, which they found completely evacuated, and in several places on fire. The great arsenal had been blown up, but a considerable quantity of ammunition, brass cannon, and small arms, was found in various places.

Mootto Sawmy, the lawful claimant of the throne of Candy had been placed under the care of Colonel Barbutt. In consequence of representations from that officer of the disposition of the inhabitants of those parts of Candy with which he was acquainted to receive Mootto Sawmy as their sovereign, it was determined to recognize his title and proclaim him king. On the 4th of March he arrived in the city of Candy, and a convention was concluded, by which the British government agreed to deliver over to him that place, and all the possessions belonging to it which were at that time in their occupation, with certain exceptions, among which was included a strip of ground across the Candian territories, of sufficient breadth to form a road from Colombo to Trincomalee. The prince engaged to cede this and the other excepted portions of territory, and to permit all Malays resident in his kingdom to proceed

with their families to the British settlements, from which he was to receive an auxiliary force in case he should require it to maintain his authority. The deposed king was to have safe conduct to Colombo, and a sufficient provision for his maintenance; a general amnesty was to be granted, and the English were to be secured certain privileges with regard to the trade in cinnamon, the cutting of wood in the Candian forests, and the surveying of rivers and water-courses with a view to rendering them navigable for the purposes of trade and the mutual advantage of both countries, which object the king was to promote by his assistance. "In this matter," says a narrator of these proceedings, "arrangements were made with the most sincere cordiality between the British government and Mootto Sawmy." But neither the sincerity nor the cordiality withheld the British government from concluding, within a few days afterwards, other arrangements utterly at variance with the former, and depriving Mootto Sawmy of nearly all that had been professedly secured to him. It is said that this prince, although well received by the inhabitants of the frontier, met with no adherents as he approached the capital, and that he remained in his palace at Candy surrounded only by his own domestics, and supported by no other power but that of the British army. If this be true, it shows the extreme imprudence with which the engagement had been formed: but as it does not appear that Mootto Sawmy himself had misled the British government, as to the extent of his own popularity, it is difficult to see upon what grounds of justice or good faith he could be sacrificed, to repair an error arising out of the credulity and precipitancy of others. Pelime Talauve had never ceased to pursue his trade of intrigue: he "had the effrontery," says Mr. Cordiner, "to carry on a deceitful correspondence, under the mask of friendship, with the commander of the British forces," and that commander, he might have added, had the weakness to be deceived by him. "No art," says the historian, "was left untried which might either dupe or cajole our government"—and Pelime Talauve had no reason to complain of want of success. He promised to betray his puppet master to the English, and requested the despatch of two strong detachments by different routes to the place where the prince was to be seized. The required detachments marched, and had proceeded only a few miles before both were subjected to a heavy fire from every direction: they continued, however, to move on. Their route lay over roads of the worst possible description, and was pursued under the annoyances of which they had received so early a specimen. They at length arrived at the place where the king was to have been found, but he had not thought fit to await their approach. The indefatigable Pelime Talauve wished to draw them forward into fresh snares, but the officer in command, Colonel Baillie, declined to be fur-

ther trepanned, and returned without delay to head-quarters. In the meantime jungle fever had made its appearance in the British force, and committed frightful ravages.

Pelime Talauve continued to correspond with the government, expressing his surprise that the governor should incur so much trouble and expense, and proposing an arrangement in which himself, as might be expected, was to be the party chiefly benefited. These overtures received a favourable answer, and they were followed by the appearance at Candy of the person holding the office of second adigur, or minister, carrying a firelock and match wrapped in white mualin—"as an emblem of peace," says the historian—perhaps also as an emblem of purity. This personage was forthwith admitted to a conference with General M'Dowall, and the rights, which a few days before had been solemnly secured to Mootto Sawmy, were summarily cut down, in conformity with more recent views of convenience. The servants of Mootto Sawmy's rival were not less ready to sacrifice the claims of their master than were the English to surrender those of their ally. By General M'Dowall and the Candian negotiator it was agreed that Pelime Talauve's pageant king should be given up to the English, and the adigur himself invested with supreme authority in Candy; that he should pay annually a sum of thirty thousand rupees to Mootto Sawmy, who was to hold the semblance of a court at Jaffnapatam; that certain cessions should be made to the English, differing little from those stipulated in the agreement with Mootto Sawmy, and that a cessation of arms should immediately take place. Soon after this arrangement General M'Dowall departed for Colombo, leaving in the city of Candy a garrison of seven hundred Malays and three hundred Europeans, besides a great number of sick, whose removal was impracticable.

Pelime Talauve now expressed a desire to be admitted to an audience of the British governor, for the purpose of arranging a definitive treaty of peace. It was about the same time suggested to the governor that his presence in the province of the seven coorles, which was to be one of the cessions, might be desirable; he proceeded thither, and there, on the 3rd of May, received Pelime Talauve. The terms which had been agreed upon by General M'Dowall were confirmed by the governor, and apparently little remained to be done but for the English to extricate themselves from the difficulties of their previous engagement with Mootto Sawmy. Colonel Barbutt undertook to negotiate with that prince, but was prevented by an attack of fever, which in a few days terminated his life. Pelime Talauve expressed great uneasiness at this, lest it might protract the execution of the articles of the treaty; to avert which inconvenience he earnestly requested that General M'Dowall might be sent to Candy to perform the task which had been designed for Colonel Barbutt. In accordance with the adigur's wishes, General

McDowall marched from Colombo on the 11th of May, and arrived at Candy on the 23rd; but being soon seized with fever, he was compelled, on the 1st of June, to quit it for a situation more favourable to the restoration of health.

The garrison at Candy was left under the command of Major Davie. At this time the intentions of Pelime Talauve became evident even to the British authorities, who had so long given him credit for sincerity. He made another attempt to entrap the British commander into the despatch of a force to take the person of the fugitive king, but he was not so weak as to fall into the snare. All around was war, notwithstanding the engagements which had been made for its suspension; and the Candians succeeded in dispossessing the English of several strong posts. On the 24th of June they attacked the capital before daybreak. They were repulsed, but soon resumed the attack, and a fire was kept up from both sides till two o'clock, when the British displayed a white flag, and the firing ceased. Articles of capitulation were with little difficulty agreed upon. By them Candy was to be delivered up, with all the stores and ammunition within it; the British troops were to march out with their arms, on the road leading to Trincomalee; Mootto Sawmy was to be permitted to accompany them, and the adigur engaged to protect such sick and wounded as should be unavoidably left, and provide them with provisions and medicines till they could be removed to Colombo or Trincomalee.

At five in the afternoon the British troops, consisting of fourteen European officers, twenty European non-commissioned officers and privates, two hundred and fifty Malays, and a hundred and forty gun-lascars, marched out of Candy, on the road leading to Trincomalee, accompanied by Mootto Sawmy. After advancing a mile and a half, they were compelled to halt for the night: a river was to be crossed which was not fordable, and the party had neither boats nor rafts. In the morning, while endeavouring to provide the means of transit, armed bodies of Candians were observed to gather around them. A party of chiefs, after a time, approached, and informed Major Davie that the king was greatly incensed against the adigur for allowing the garrison to leave Candy; but that if they would deliver up Mootto Sawmy, they should be supplied with boats to cross the river, and receive every assistance on their march. Major Davie, in the proper spirit of a British officer, refused. The offer was repeated some hours afterwards by another party, accompanied by assurances of safety and protection for Mootto Sawmy. Major Davie, on this occasion, is represented to have consulted his officers—as if the question of surrendering the unhappy prince to his enemies were one of doubt. It is to be presumed that the advice which he received was such as became those to whom the British commander applied for counsel, for his answer to the Can-

dian chiefs was, that he could not part with Mootto Sawmy without orders from Colombo. The Candians departed, but soon returned, declaring that if Mootto Sawmy were not given up, the king would send his whole force to seize him and to prevent the British troops from crossing the river. Major Davie then had recourse to another consultation. How he was advised cannot be known—how he acted is but too certain. He informed Mootto Sawmy that he had no longer power to protect him; and the unfortunate prince, with his relatives and servants, was delivered up to the agents of the king of Candy, or rather of the man who ruled the king. It is said that Mootto Sawmy, on learning his fate, indignantly exclaimed—"Is it possible that the triumphant arms of England can be so humbled as to be awed by the menaces of such cowards as the Candians!"—but this appeal to national feeling was vain. Mootto Sawmy was marched to Candy, and there put to death. Two of his relatives shared his fate. Six weeks after his being surrendered, eight of his servants appeared at Trincomalee, who, after being deprived of their noses and ears, had been suffered to depart.

The day of dishonour, on which Mootto Sawmy was abandoned to destruction, passed without the English having been able to effect the passage of the river and without their receiving any assistance for the purpose. On that which followed, a body of Candians having taken post within a hundred yards of the British party, their leader advanced to Major Davie, and intimated that it was the pleasure of the king that the garrison should return to Candy unarmed, and that instant death was the penalty of refusal. The requisition was complied with; and after proceeding a short distance towards Candy, the whole of the British officers and soldiers were murdered, excepting Major Davie and two other officers, who were spared, and a corporal named George Barnsley, who, after being left for dead, recovered and made his escape. Native officers and men, who refused to enter the service of the king of Candy, were despatched in various modes, some of them of extreme barbarity. The sick left in Candy, consisting of a hundred and twenty men belonging to the King's 19th regiment of foot, were all murdered in cold blood as they lay incapable of resistance in the hospital.

The details of the earlier part of this melancholy and discreditable series of transactions are too imperfect to admit of confident remark. Sickness had greatly diminished the strength of the garrison commanded by Major Davie; some desertions from the native part of it seem to have taken place, and more to have been apprehended; but still he was not reduced to extremity. Reinforcements were on their way to his relief. This, indeed, he did not know; but he was certainly bound to protract the defence as long as possible, in the hope that either some assistance might reach, or some accident befriended him. But if the

propriety of his abandonment of Candy be open to doubt, that of his subsequent abandonment of the unhappy prince, Mootto Sawmy, is liable to none. Mootto Sawmy had been invited from Trincomalee, where he was in safety, to Candy, where the English either wanted the power to place him on the throne, or were induced by the arts of Pelime Talauve to abstain from using it. They then, with an extraordinary degree of levity, degraded Mootto Sawmy from the rank of a king to that of a stipendiary upon the bounty of the man who hated him, and had already violently deprived him of his rights. This was a great stain upon the honour of the British nation, but one far darker followed in the surrender of Mootto Sawmy to certain death. For the safety of that prince the faith of the British government was pledged, and it was the duty of every man in its service to shed his last drop of blood in defending him from harm. Honour was sacrificed to fear, and the reward was worthy of the act. Those who devoted Mootto Sawmy to destruction thought by the dishonourable deed to insure safety to themselves. But they were disappointed—their weakness and perfidy were rewarded by a miserable death or a more miserable captivity. Painful as are the feelings excited by the narrative of the surrender of Candy and the subsequent events, the story presents a lesson not to be forgotten.

The corporal, Barnaley, who had happily escaped the death which had overtaken his comrades under Major Davie, succeeded in making his way to a British post called Fort M'Dowall, which was defended by a small garrison under Captain Madge. That officer, on hearing the corporal's intelligence, determined to evacuate the fort and retreat towards Trincomalee. He departed in the night, and during a march of four days was exposed to a constant fire from large bodies of Candians. He then fell in with a detachment proceeding to the relief of Candy, and the enemy thereupon dispersed.

The defence of another English post, named Dumbadenia, demands notice, not from its importance nor the magnitude of the operations carried on before or within it, but from the gallant spirit displayed by a small body of men, not one of whom was in a condition for active service. Dumbadenia was a small redoubt, slightly constructed of fascines and earth; its garrison consisted of only fourteen convalescents of the 19th regiment, who were on their way to Colombo for the restoration of their health, and twenty-two invalid Malays. It was commanded by an ensign named Grant. The Candians, headed by the second adigur, mustered before it in several thousands, and kept up an incessant fire for several days, the garrison lying sheltered behind a breastwork, and only discharging an occasional shot when the enemy ventured to approach sufficiently near to render it effective. Invitations to surrender were sent daily, accompanied by

solemn promises of honourable treatment, which would doubtless have been observed as strictly as at Candy. Ensign Grant was so enfeebled by sickness as to be scarcely capable of ordinary motion; but his spirit was subdued neither by disease nor the apparently desperate nature of his situation. He strengthened his shelter by bags of rice and such other materials as could be obtained, and resolved to persevere. A seasonable reinforcement, after a time, reduced the fearful disproportion of force against which he had to contend; and another enabled him to bring away in safety the whole of the brave men by whom he had been supported, after destroying all the stores and provisions in the place.

A long series of hostilities on a minute scale followed. The King of Candy, emboldened by the success which had attended him, surrounded the British possessions, and threatened even their capital, Colombo. But his army being totally defeated at Hangwell, about eighteen miles from that city, by Captain Pollock, of the King's 51st regiment, the Candian prince made a precipitate retreat, and revenged his disappointment by cutting off the heads of two of his chiefs, who had the indiscretion to follow his majesty's example with so much zeal as to overtake him before his indignation had found opportunity for vent.

It would be uninteresting to pursue the history of this war further in detail. The imperfect means of defence possessed by the Ceylon government were increased by assistance from Bengal and Madras. The Candians, driven from the British possessions, continued for some time to harass the frontiers. In the spring of 1804 they meditated a general invasion of the British dominions, but were anticipated by an attack on their own. In the following year the enemy resumed their attempts, but were repulsed. From that time there was a suspension of active hostilities, but the relations of the two states were not determined by any treaty or engagement. This state of things has been characterized as "a tacit suspension of hostilities." The war, indiscreetly begun and imprudently conducted, was thus unsatisfactorily terminated. The victims of the massacre of Candy remained unavenged, and the honour of the British name unvindicated.

The first information which the governor-general received of the war was from the *Ceylon Gazette*, containing the proclamation of the governor of the island announcing its commencement. A heavy pecuniary demand for the necessary outlay was immediately afterwards made upon Bengal, but it was intimated to the governor of Madras that no troops would be wanted unless a second campaign should be necessary, which was not thought probable. Subsequently troops were requested; but the request being rested principally on the apprehension of a renewal of the war with France, and being accompanied by favourable

representations of the progress of the war in Ceylon, and the means at the governor's disposal for carrying it on, there was no reason to believe that the want was urgent; and the application was moreover made at a season impracticable for the voyage.

The announcement of the fatal events in Candy opened the real state of affairs in the island. At this time, all the resources of India were required for the efficient prosecution of the Mahratta war. But Ceylon could not be left to ruin; and between the 29th of July, when the danger first became known, and the succeeding November, the island was reinforced from India by two detachments of the king's troops, amounting respectively to two hundred and eight-two and one hundred and eighty-seven, by five hundred Bengal volunteers, and three hundred Madras sepoy.

The effects of the separation of Ceylon from the government of India were thus not left for any long period to be conjectured. Almost as soon as the separation was effected the fruits began to appear. The consequences had been foreseen and foretold by the governor-general, but his warnings experienced the fate that usually awaits advice which runs counter to men's prejudices and interests. Prediction had now become fact. "Under the new constitution," said the Marquis Wellesley, "treaties have been concluded and a war has been undertaken by the government of Ceylon without the previous knowledge of the governor-general; the expenses of that war have, however, been supplied in the first instance by the government-general, and the calamities which have attended the progress of the war have occasioned demands for troops from the government-general. Whether the war in Cey-

lon could have been altogether avoided; whether its commencement could have been postponed to a more convenient season; or whether its conduct could have been improved, and an early and honourable peace established upon permanent foundations, are questions which it is neither my present duty nor intention to examine; but it is evident that every arrangement connected with these questions might have been formed with greater advantage under the direct authority of the power which must ultimately furnish the supplies for war and provide the securities of peace. Had the government of Ceylon remained subordinate to this government, the war in that island, if deemed necessary, would have been undertaken after a deliberate preparation of sufficient resources, and after a full consideration of the most effectual means of supplying them. This government could not have been taken by surprise with respect to the actual commencement of the war, or to its result; and an opportunity would have been afforded of apportioning, at an early period of time, to the service in Ceylon such aid as might have appeared, on a just comparison of objects and means, to be compatible with due attention to other branches of the service in India, or to be indispensably necessary for the safety of Ceylon. The independence of Ceylon has placed all these considerations beyond the reach of the governor-general in council, who was unapprized of the approach of war in Ceylon until it had actually commenced, and of the probable demand for considerable reinforcements in Ceylon, until a war on the continent of India had limited the means of furnishing them."

CHAPTER XX.

PROCEEDINGS OF HOLKAR—COLONEL MONSON'S DISASTROUS RETREAT—COLONEL BURN'S DEFENCE OF DELHI—BATTLE OF DERG—SUCCESSES IN THE DECCAN—SIEGE OF BHURTPORE—TREATY WITH THE RAJAH—CONDUCT OF SCINDIA—ATTACK ON THE BRITISH RESIDENCY—HOLKAR'S LETTER TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL—SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY RETURNS TO ENGLAND—AMBAJEE INGLIA—WARLIKE PREPARATIONS SUSPENDED—ARRIVAL OF THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—CHARACTER OF THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

THE conclusion of peace with Scindia and the rajah of Berar did not relieve the British government from all apprehensions of danger from Mahratta enemies, nor allow of the immediate recall of its armies from the field. Holkar was to have aided those two chiefs against the English, and actually despatched for the purpose a body of troops under a military adventurer known as Ameer Khan; but the commander, hearing of the glorious battle of Assye, became too much alarmed to proceed, and returned to his employer. Holkar participated in the fright of his servant to an extent sufficient to restrain him from taking any decisive steps against the

English; but he endeavoured by correspondence to rouse the spirit of the native princes against them. He also plundered the territories of some of the allies and dependents of the British government; and though this was by no means an unequivocal demonstration of enmity, seeing that it is the Mahratta custom to plunder friends and foes with the greatest impartiality, it was justly deemed proper to warn him against a repetition of such acts, and to take measures for defending the territories of the Company and their allies from attacks which there was some reason to apprehend. General Lake accordingly took up a position which enabled him to restrain Holkar's pre-

datory operations in the quarter where they were most to be apprehended; and also, under instructions from the governor-general, addressed a letter to that chief, expressing the disposition of the British government to leave him in the unmolested exercise of his authority, provided he would abstain from acts of aggression against that government and its allies. In proof of his amicable intentions, he was required to withdraw his army from the menacing position which it had taken up, to retire within his own territories, and to abstain from exacting tribute from the allies of the Company. Holkar was also invited to send vakeels to the British camp, to make known his wishes and form arrangements for the establishment of relations of friendship. After a considerable time, during which Holkar occupied himself in addressing friendly letters to General Lake, and letters to the surrounding princes filled with denunciations of the nation and government which General Lake represented, vakeels were despatched by him to the British camp. They were, as usual with Mahratta negotiators, unfurnished with powers to conclude any engagement; their function was simply to communicate the demands of their master. These demands were, that he should be permitted to collect *chout* according to the custom of his ancestors—a custom which Holkar regarded as too laudable (to say nothing of its profitableness) to be relinquished; that certain possessions formerly held by his family, including twelve *pergunnahs* in the Doab, and a *pergunnah* in Bundelcund, should be given to him; that the country of Hurriana should be transferred to him; the country then in his possession guaranteed, and a treaty concluded with him on the same terms as with Scindia. As these terms were not proposed with the expectation of their being accepted, it is unnecessary to discuss their reasonableness or the propriety of putting them forward. They were of course rejected, with a natural expression of astonishment on the part of General Lake that they should have been submitted. With reference to a promise formerly given by Holkar, the vakeels were asked whether their chief would withdraw his troops from their offensive position. The answer was explicit far beyond the ordinary measure of Mahratta candour; it was, that Holkar would not consider the promise binding unless the demands which they had made on his behalf should be complied with. After the conclusion of this conference, the vakeels intimated that some relaxation of the terms might be made. The British commander replied by referring to former connections with Holkar; and requiring, as an indispensable preliminary to negotiation, the immediate return of the chief to his own possessions. It would be useless to follow in detail the progress of a negotiation distinguished in nothing from others in which Mahrattas are parties: the negotiation came to an end, as it was evident that it must, without any arrangement being effected; and orders were issued to

General Lake and General Wellesley to commence hostile operations against Holkar both in Hindostan and the Deccan. These orders were dated the 16th of April, 1804. General Wellesley had some time before received a menacing letter from Holkar, demanding the cession of certain provinces in the Deccan as the condition of peace; and adding that, in the event of war, though Holkar might be unable to oppose the British artillery in the field, "countries of many coos should be overrun, and plundered and burnt;" that General Lake "should not have leisure to breathe for a moment; and that calamities would fall on laos of human beings in continued war, by the attacks of" Holkar's "army, which overwhelm like the waves of the sea." One of those admirable military qualities which pre-eminently distinguished the great commander to whom this letter was addressed, and which has greatly contributed to his brilliant success, was, the habit of leaving nothing to chance, or to a hasty and unpremeditated arrangement, when the opportunity existed of making previous provision to meet coming events. In the exercise of this comprehensive prudence, General Wellesley forthwith proceeded to place the troops under his immediate command in a state of equipment for active service, and to reinforce the corps in Guzerat. On receiving orders for the commencement of hostile operations, General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray, commanding the force in that province, to march with the greater part of it for the purpose of co-operating with the commander-in-chief in such manner as circumstances might require. He likewise addressed the resident at Scindia's court, calling for the aid of that chieftain's army in support of the common cause of the allies. Scindia promised to comply, and to adopt the measures suggested by General Wellesley.

Holkar had been at Ajmeer, within the territories of Scindia—ostensibly for purposes of devotion, for Hindoo robbers are remarkably devout. His devotions being completed, he returned through the territories of the rajah of Jyenaghur, where he remained for some time with a considerable body of horse, engaged in a series of predatory occupations, which it may be presumed his recent visit to Ajmeer had sanctified. To protect the city of Jyenaghur, General Lake made a detachment of three battalions of native infantry, which were placed under the command of Colonel Monson, of the King's 76th regiment. Their approach disturbed Holkar in the exercise of his vocation, and caused him to retire with some precipitancy to the southward. He was followed by General Lake, the detachment under Colonel Monson continuing in advance. On the 10th of May, a detachment was made from the main body for the purpose of attacking Tonk Rampoor, a Rajpoot town about sixty miles from the capital of Jyenaghur, in the occupation of Holkar. The detachment, consisting of three battalions of

native infantry, a regiment of native cavalry, and a proportion of artillery, was commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Don. The attack was made at two o'clock on the morning of the 15th of May. Colonel Don advanced with his party undiscovered to within two hundred and fifty yards of the gateway; they were then fired upon by a picquet on their right, but the party moved on without noticing the interruption. On coming within a hundred yards of the passage they encountered a smart fire from the rampart. This was returned by a fire of musketry, which did considerable execution among the men on the ramparts. The first gate was then successfully blown open; the fire of musketry being kept up for the purpose of dislodging the people who occupied the works. The second gate, being out of repair, was not shut; the third and fourth were blown open, and the British force entered the town. While some of the assailants ascended the ramparts, Colonel Don pushed on with the remainder to a small gateway on the south side of the fort, through which the enemy were making their escape. The success of this attempt deprived Holkar of the only footing that he had in Hindostan north of the Chumbul. The country commanded by the fort of Tonk Rampoora necessarily passed under the control of the possessors of the fort.

Holkar, however, had fled so rapidly, and to such a distance, that it was deemed inexpedient for the main body of the British army to attempt following him; and General Lake determined to march his troops back into quarters, leaving to Colonel Monson, with the detachment under his command, the duty of guarding against the return of Holkar, while Colonel Murray, it was expected, was moving against him from Guzerat. This determination of the commander-in-chief seems to be little in accordance with his general character; nor is it easy to understand why the main body of the army could not keep the field as well as Colonel Monson's detachment. It appears, indeed, that General Lake's army was suffering much in health from the operation of the hot winds, and that the cattle were perishing from want of forage. Colonel Monson's detachment, being composed entirely of infantry, would have fewer wants than a force of which a large proportion was cavalry; but, on the other hand, from the want of cavalry it would possess fewer facilities for supplying its necessities. The retrograde movement of General Lake seems also to have been subject to difficulties and hardships not inferior to those which might have been expected to attend his advance, and the loss of men almost incredible, with reference to the fact that they never met an enemy, excepting a few robbers of lower grade than the freebooters whom the army had advanced to punish. The march was at length completed and the troops dispersed to their allotted stations.

Although the celerity of Holkar's retreat had rendered it impracticable for the English

army to keep near him, his movements had been accompanied by a body of Hindostanee cavalry despatched for the purpose. It consisted of two parties; one commanded by Captain Gardiner, an officer in the service of the rajah of Jyenaagur, the other by Lieutenant Lucan, of the king's service. On the 29th of May, Colonel Gardiner learned that a native chieftain named Tantia, in the interest of Holkar, was encamped with a considerable force at no great distance from him. With the assistance of Lieutenant Lucan this place was attacked, and the whole of the infantry, amounting to about two thousand, surrendered, on condition of being escorted to the camp of Bappoojee Scindia, who commanded the troops which Dowlut Row Scindia, in ostensible conformity with his engagements, had put in motion against Holkar. There the prisoners were to be released, under promise of never serving against the British government.

In another quarter the British arms met with reverses. Ameer Khan, with a large body of predatory horse, fell suddenly on two companies of British sepoys and about fifty artillerymen, employed in the trenches against a small fort in Bundelcund, destroyed the whole party, and carried off their guns and tumbrils. According to this marauder's report he gained other advantages, but the English accounts vary from his own; and as he entirely forgets to record his subsequent defeat and the dispersion of his force, though sufficiently notorious, it is evident that his statement cannot be admitted without a minute inquiry into its truth, which the importance of the facts is not sufficient to warrant.

The trifling disasters sustained in Bundelcund were succeeded by others far more serious. Subsequently to the capture of Tonk Rampoora, Colonel Don, with so many of his detachment as were not required for the garrison of that place, joined Colonel Monson, who, thus reinforced, moved in the direction of Kotah, and arrived in its vicinity early in June. Here he was joined by a body of troops in the service of the rajah of Kotah. Pursuing a southerly course, he advanced to the strong pass of Mokundra, where he halted a few days to collect supplies; after which, resuming his march, he arrived on the 1st of July in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Hinglaishgur, an old possession of Holkar's family, and held in his name by a garrison of eight hundred foot and three hundred horse. It was assailed on the 2nd, and carried with great rapidity and inconsiderable loss. Colonel Monson subsequently advanced his position about fifty miles beyond the Mokundra pass, to a place where he was informed supplies could be obtained, and from which also he expected to be able to communicate with Colonel Murray, at that time on his march from Guzerat towards Oujain with a considerable detachment. Colonel Monson's corps had been originally unaccompanied by cavalry, but before this period

it had been joined by two bodies of irregular horse, one (already mentioned) under the command of Lieutenant Lucan, the other commanded by Bappoojee Scindia.

Colonel Murray, after advancing a certain distance towards Oujain, became suddenly alarmed; resolved to retire behind the Mahie river, and actually fell back for the purpose. This retrograde movement gave confidence to Holkar, who, after his retreat, had taken post in Malwa, with the Chumbul river between him and Colonel Monson. This post he now quitted, and recrossed the river with his whole army. It had been the intention of Colonel Monson to attack Holkar, but under the influence, as it is represented, of motives arising from various causes—a deficiency of grain in his camp, the absence of a detachment employed to bring up a supply, and of another part of his force that was on its march to join him from Hinglaighur, but above all, the retreat of Colonel Murray—he determined to retire to the Mokundra pass—a determination induced, it is said, by the treacherous advice of Bappoojee Scindia. Accordingly, at four in the morning, on the 8th of July, he sent off the whole of his baggage and stores to Soonarah, the troops remaining on the ground of encampment, in order of battle, till half-past nine. The infantry then moved off, the cavalry being left on the ground with orders to follow in half an hour, and to send Colonel Monson the earliest intelligence of Holkar's motions. The infantry met with no interruption; but after marching about twelve miles, a report reached them, that at a considerable distance in their rear Lieutenant Lucan's cavalry had been attacked by the whole of that of Holkar. Colonel Monson immediately formed his troops in order of battle, and was proceeding to the support of the party attacked, when Bappoojee Scindia arrived with the fearful intelligence that they were no longer in a situation to receive support. They had been nearly cut to pieces, and their gallant commander, dreadfully wounded, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. It is said that this catastrophe was occasioned by the cavalry having remained longer on the field than Colonel Monson intended.

On receiving the news of the destruction of so large a portion of his force, Colonel Monson resumed his march towards the Mokundra pass, which he reached on the following day without molestation.

On the morning of the 10th of July a large body of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, and their numbers continued gradually to increase till noon on the 11th, when Holkar, with a degree of modesty becoming his character, sent a letter to Colonel Monson, demanding the surrender of the guns and small arms of the British force. On receiving a refusal—for it need scarcely be stated that the insolent demand was refused—Holkar divided his force into three bodies, which at the same point of time attacked the

front and flanks of Colonel Monson's corps. The assailants were bravely repulsed; but, not dismayed by their first failure, they repeatedly returned to the attack, and were as often driven back with severe loss. Finding that he could make no impression on the men whose arms he had coolly demanded, Holkar drew off his troops to the distance of about four miles, where he was joined by his infantry and guns.

The brave resistance offered by the British force on this occasion, is but a brilliant speck in the train of disaster and suffering. Colonel Monson had intended to make a stand at Mokundra, but fearful that the enemy might get to his rear and cut off his communication with the pass and with the town of Kotah, which was the only place from whence he could obtain supplies—adverting, moreover, to the circumscribed nature of his position, to the reputed strength of Holkar's force, and the supposed weight and number of that chieftain's guns, he resolved to continue his retreat to Kotah; and so great was his anxiety to avoid an engagement, that he left his camp standing to deceive the enemy. His march to Kotah was performed under inclement skies and through an inundated country, and when he arrived, fresh difficulties awaited him. The rajah declined to admit the British troops into the town, and declared that he could furnish no provisions, of which they began to be greatly in want. Colonel Monson was, therefore, compelled to pursue his march amidst nearly all the privation and suffering which can attend the movement of an army. On the 15th July the guns became so firmly embedded in the mud which formed the basis of the road by which they had to be transported, as to defy all the efforts made to extricate them. They were consequently spiked and abandoned. The march was then continued through a country completely under water. The Chumbulee rivulet was crossed, and on the 29th the whole of the corps was at Tonk Rampoor. On its progress several trifling conflicts took place, in all of which the character of the British troops was maintained.

As soon as the situation of Colonel Monson at Mokundra had become known to the commander-in-chief, a reinforcement of two battalions of sepoys, with four six-pounders and two howitzers, and a body of Hindostanee cavalry, had been despatched from Agra to his relief, as well as a supply of grain. This reinforcement joined Colonel Monson at Tonk Rampoor, where he remained for several days, as if with the intention of making a stand. He, however, finally resumed his retreat, but not until the enemy were close upon him. On the 22nd of August he arrived at the Banas river, which was so swollen as to render it impossible to cross. A halt was thus unavoidable, and opportunity was afforded for the assemblage of the whole force of the enemy in the neighbourhood of the

detachment. On the 24th the river, being fordable, was crossed in the face of the enemy. A sharp action took place, in which a single battalion of native infantry not only resisted an attack of the enemy, but charged and drove them from several of their guns, which, however, they were unable to retain. So far from carrying off the enemy's guns, the British commander was unable to secure his own baggage, the whole of which was abandoned to facilitate the retreat of the corps to Kooshaighur, which he reached on the night of the 28th.

At Kooshaighur Colonel Monson found a party consisting of six companies of sepoy, which he had sent forward under Captain Nicholl, with the treasure of the detachment, the day preceding the action at the Banas river. This party, on the night of its arrival, had been attacked by a body of troops belonging to Scindia, but succeeded in maintaining their post till the morning, when the whole of the detachment, with a company of native infantry previously stationed at Kooshaighur, entered the fort, having learned that it was the intention of Scindia's commander to levy a contribution on the town, though it belonged to the rajah of Jeypore, an ally of the British government. Here a formal demand was made by the Mahratta leader, of the surrender of all the elephants, treasures, and arms of the detachment; on compliance with which, Captain Nicholl was graciously assured he should be permitted to depart without molestation, while refusal was to be visited by a cannonade. This was not an empty threat, for a battery of ten guns was opened on the fort; and a few hours afterwards a body of Scindia's infantry entered the town, from which position they were immediately driven by a party of sepoy, not exceeding, if it amounted to, one-sixth of the number of the enemy, led by Lieutenant Harriott. Captain Nicholl intended to follow up this success by storming the battery, but the Scindians prudently disappointed him by moving off the guns to their camp.

At Kooshaighur Colonel Monson's difficulties thickened. He had expected to find there five battalions, and twenty pieces of cannon belonging to the rajah of Jeypore, but they had been withdrawn before his arrival. The whole of Holkar's cavalry were gathering and encamping around him; and at this moment, when the fidelity and bravery of every single man were of the utmost importance, he discovered a correspondence between some native commissioned officers and Holkar, having for its object the transfer of certain battalions to the enemy. The danger being known, measures of precaution were taken; but the greater part of two companies of infantry deserted, with about four hundred of the irregular horse. Colonel Monson left Kooshaighur on the day after his arrival; and having formed his detachment into an oblong square, resumed his march. The enemy fol-

lowed; harassing them by repeated attempts to charge, which were met with exemplary coolness and spirit. At sunset, on the 28th of August, the detachment was at the Biana pass, where it was intended to halt for the night, the march having been continued from one o'clock in the morning, and the troops having been called upon not long before to repel a desperate charge from the enemy's cavalry. The reception given to the enemy deterred them from immediately renewing the attempt, but their guns arrived at the Biana pass simultaneously with the British force, and the halt of the latter was the signal for the commencement of a powerful cannonade. This compelled Colonel Monson to proceed; and from this period the order and regularity which had previously been maintained appears to have been lost. Separate portions of the detachment made their way, in their own manner, to Agra, and by the 31st all who escaped the enemy had arrived there.

The retreat of Colonel Monson must be placed among the most lamentable transactions which the history of British India presents to notice. The sufferings of so many brave men as were involved in the calamity, the loss of so many valuable lives as were unavoidably sacrificed to purchase the safety of the remainder, appeals strongly to those feelings of sympathy which are awakened when, ceasing to regard an army as a whole—ceasing to view it as a vast machine framed to effect great objects—we contemplate its members as individual men, influenced by good and evil circumstances, like those for whom their swords are drawn, and on whom the history of an eventful campaign acts but as an exciting romance. The fate of those who fell, and of those who survived to undergo renewed trials and privations, was the more bitter, because, with regard to them, the conqueror's triumph secured not the conqueror's reward. In all their conflicts with the enemy the English were successful; but the ear of the dying soldier was not solaced by the shout of victory, which told him that the field had been won and would be held by his countrymen and comrades; nor could he who had escaped the dangers by which he had been surrounded exult in the reflection that the only remaining duty was to pursue those whom he had aided in discomfiting. When the enemy were repelled, the only hope afforded by success was that time might be gained for pursuing the movement which was to carry the victors farther from the enemy—the only prospect before the soldier was a repetition of similar conflicts, under circumstances of equal or greater discouragement.

An inquiry into the sources of the disaster will tend to show that it was not a misfortune resulting from causes which could not have been guarded against; it will also evince that the blame attached to it extends to more than one person. When General Lake detached Colonel Monson, his orders were that the

latter should remain at such a distance from the main army as might enable him to receive support from it. Yet General Lake, not long afterwards, retired with his army to cantonments, leaving Colonel Monson without the power of obtaining that support which he had previously thought it necessary to preserve.

Colonel Monson, however, increased the danger by advancing beyond the position which he had been instructed to take. This was in the vicinity of the passes of Bhoondes and Lakery, in the chain of mountains to the southward of Tonk Rampoor. He thought that advantage would arise from advancing to Mokundra, which he represented as a place equally defensible. Subsequently he extended his advance even far beyond Mokundra, thus greatly adding to the distance between his detachment and the army which had receded from it. He did not, however, calculate on being attacked—the return of Holkar was a step for which the English commander was quite unprepared. He believed the freebooting chief to be destitute of the means of offering any serious annoyance, and this belief was shared by General Lake. The last-named officer, addressing the governor-general, says:—"At this period"—the period when, having resolved to leave Colonel Monson's detachment in the field, he withdrew his own army into cantonments—"At this period I was informed from all quarters that Holkar's pecuniary resources were reduced to the lowest ebb; that his army was filled with terror and dismay; and that his troops, who before had been mutinous and discontented, were now deserting from him in great numbers. These representations were rendered more probable from the consideration that a successful war is necessary to retain together an army, and to support the confidence of troops whose chief bond of union is plunder. I therefore gave them considerable credit, although I found it impossible to obtain accurate information, and was aware of the exaggeration which the natives of this country give to all their relations. The reduced state of the enemy's power and resources, and the great distance to which he had prosecuted his flight, appearing to me in a great measure to have released those states with which we were in alliance from all hazard of future depredations, and to have deprived Jeewunt Rao Holkar of all hopes of success in any future attempt to invade the British territories in Hindostan, I determined without further delay to withdraw the main army to their respective cantonments within the Company's provinces." Such was the source of the errors of both General Lake and Colonel Monson, and instances of similar delusions are not unfrequent. A large portion of the reverses which have been sustained by the British nation in the East are to be traced to an absurd confidence either in the good faith of an enemy, or in his weakness, or in his want of disposition to attack.

But while Colonel Monson did not entertain

that degree of apprehension with regard to Holkar which the resources of that chief warranted, it is but just to remember that he did not anticipate that complete destitution of support which it was his fate to experience. He confided in the advance of Colonel Murray from Guzerat; and to the extraordinary conduct of that officer in falling back, the ruin which overtook Colonel Monson's corps may be attributed. Sent forward by the commander-in-chief to a distance at which no aid could be furnished within a reasonable period—led on to a still greater distance by his own ardent temperament and his reliance on the advance of Colonel Murray—Colonel Monson seems to have felt no alarm till Holkar's sudden change from retreat to advance roused him to even more than a just sense of his danger. From this moment he appears to have lost all confidence in himself, and to have possessed no settled plan of proceeding. His first impression was to engage the enemy; and whatever might have been the event, its effects could scarcely have been worse than those of the tamer course which he preferred, and in which he persevered till he reached Agra. He generally avoided the enemy when practicable, although when forced into action he was successful. Adverting to Holkar having been permitted to cross the Chumbul unmolested, General Lake says:—"Perhaps the omission should have been repaired by an attack under the most favourable circumstances that could afterwards be obtained. His numbers were certainly inferior to those of the enemy; but he had on his side discipline, approved valour, and the choice of position. A bold effort was likewise evidently necessary to extricate him from his situation, and to avoid the disgrace and misfortunes inseparable from a rapid retreat." A bolder man than Colonel Monson never drew a sword; and yet his retreat before Holkar was characterized by a degree of timidity and vacillation of which the military history of Great Britain presents few examples. He meditated a stand at Mokundra, but sudden alarm induced him to abandon his camp and quit that place with singular precipitation. At Tonk Rampoor he lingered till the enemy was close on his rear, distracted, as it appears, between the orders of the commander-in-chief forbidding his further retreat, and his own conviction that retreat was inevitable. The fatal detention at this place led to all the calamities that followed in rapid succession, till discipline gave way before them, and retreat became flight.

To erase the scandal brought on the British name by the unfortunate result of Colonel Monson's movement, every resource of the government was immediately employed. Measures were taken for the speedy equipment of several distinct armies, destined to act in different quarters, and to act offensively. The governor-general avowed his decided preference for such a plan, as compared with any plans merely defensive; and his judgment on this

point entirely coincided with that of his distinguished brother.

Among the first and most important measures of preparation was the establishment of an army in Hindostan, equipped for light movements, and of sufficient strength to encounter, with a prospect of success, the main body of Holkar's force. This army, it was proposed, should be commanded by General Lake, and joined by a body of irregular horse to be furnished by the allies. All reliance on merely defensive operations was to be abandoned. Holkar was to be pressed, if possible, to an action, and if the attempt should fail, to be pursued to the last extremity. The commander-in-chief accordingly marched on the 3rd of September from Cawnpore, with the whole of the European cavalry and infantry at that place, and arrived on the 22nd at Agra. There another portion of the intended army of Hindostan had been assembled, and was at this time encamped at Secundra, about six miles distant from Agra. The assembled force consisted of three regiments of European light dragoons, five regiments of native cavalry and the horse artillery, the king's 76th regiment of foot, the flank companies of the king's 22nd foot, ten battalions of native infantry, and the usual proportion of artillery.

Holkar had taken possession of Muttra, the British force there having abandoned it on the 3rd September, leaving behind them a large quantity of grain and baggage, which, together with the town, fell into the hands of the enemy. On the approach of the British army, which marched from Secundra on the 1st of October, Holkar drew off to the north-west, along the bank of the Jumna. Muttra was reoccupied by a force under Colonel Don, and three successive attempts were made by the commander-in-chief, on the 2nd, 7th, and 10th of October, to bring the enemy's cavalry to action, but in vain. In the mean time his infantry and guns had been moving in the direction of Delhi, and on the 8th of October they arrived before that city.

The British resident, Colonel Ochterlony, had anticipated the visit, and provided, as far as lay in his power, for the consequences, by calling in various portions of troops, regular and irregular, and making other preparations for the defence of the city. To place it in a defensible state was, however, no easy task. The city is of great extent; it was unprotected, except by a wall badly constructed, in many places without a parapet, and so far from being capable of resisting the guns of the enemy, unable to bear the shock of those that might be discharged in its defence. Redoubts were constructed at two of the gates, and some partial repairs of the old defences performed. But, after all had been effected, the means of resistance were contemptible; while a great part of the troops within the city were of such a description that no reliance could be placed either upon their fidelity or their courage, and

the general population was of the worst character.

Holkar's army amounted to about seventy thousand men. The force which was to defend Delhi against this overwhelming host consisted of two battalions of native infantry and four companies of another; but a large proportion of these were obliged to be devoted to the protection of the palace and person of the emperor. Besides the regular troops, there were about two corps of irregular horse, and the same number of irregular infantry, and a corps of matchlock-men. But all the irregular horse deserted on the approach of Holkar—some of them to join him—and the matchlock-men broke into mutiny. The mutiny was subdued by severe punishment, but most of the corps subsequently deserted.

The British force was at this time encamped under the walls; they were soon afterwards attacked and driven into the town. The enemy then brought up a hundred and thirty guns and commenced a tremendous cannonade.

The officer in command of the garrison was Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, who, with his corps, had been called in from Saharunpore; and a soldier better calculated to contend with the difficulties of his situation could not have been found. Amidst all the disheartening circumstances of that situation was one which yet remains to be noticed. The commander-in-chief, under the belief that it was impossible for so small a force to defend both the city and the person of the emperor, had ordered that the former should be abandoned, and that the exertions of the garrison should be devoted solely to the defence of the citadel. The political resident forwarded this order to Colonel Burn, with instructions to act upon it. He subsequently went in person to require compliance; but in the mean time Colonel Burn, in addition to the suggestions of his own excellent judgment and noble spirit, had fortified himself with the opinion of some of his officers in whom he placed confidence, and had determined not to abandon the city. He was reminded of the peril which he incurred; but he was prepared to encounter it.

The cannonade commenced by Holkar was continued, without intermission, day and night. It was evident that a practicable breach would soon be effected, and Colonel Burn resolved to interrupt the progress of the besiegers by a sortie. This was made on the evening of the 10th of October, when a party, consisting of two hundred men of the battalion under Colonel Burn, and one hundred and fifty irregulars commanded by Lieutenant Ross, proceeded to storm the enemy's battery. They succeeded with little difficulty in gaining possession of it, spiked the guns, and retreated with small loss.

On the 13th there appeared indications of an approaching attack of a formidable character; unusual vigilance was therefore exercised by the garrison, and supporting parties were directed to be in readiness. The expectation

of a serious attack was not vain. At daybreak on the 14th the enemy's guns opened in every direction, and, under cover of the cannonade, a large body of infantry, with ladders, made an assault on the Lahore gate. This was the real object of attack, but to divert the attention of the besieged, guns were pointed against the Ajmeer gate, and a British officer was there mortally wounded. The attack on the Lahore gate, which the enemy confidently expected to carry, signally failed. The assailants were driven back in confusion, and with considerable loss, leaving behind them the ladders by which they were to have gained entrance. This defeat seems to have completely dispirited the enemy. In the evening a show was made of drawing some guns towards the Cashmere gate, which subjected the garrison to the labour of making some preparations for defence there; but none were needed. The disappointed foe retired in the night; and at daybreak all that was visible of the besiegers of Delhi was the rear-guard of their cavalry, at a considerable distance. The successful defence of a place of no strength, with a force numerically insufficient to afford the requisite relief, was admirably calculated to revive impressions of respect for the British arms, and to dissipate the unfavourable feelings engendered by the unfortunate retreat of Colonel Monson. The noble determination evinced at this critical period by Colonel Burn was invaluable to his country; and justly did the political resident estimate the effects of the gallant exertions made by that officer and his troops. "The fatigue," said he, "suffered by both officers and men could be exceeded by nothing but the cheerfulness and patience with which it was endured; and it cannot but reflect the greatest honour on the discipline, courage, and fortitude of British troops, in the eyes of all Hindostan, to observe, that with a small force they sustained a siege of nine days, repelled an assault, and defended a city ten miles in circumference, and which had ever before been given up at the first appearance of an enemy at its gates." This eulogy from one who had recommended a different course requires neither addition nor comment. What might have followed had Colonel Burn acquiesced in the views of the commander-in-chief and the resident, and had the loss of Delhi been added to previous disasters, it is fearful to imagine.

Foiled in his attempt upon Delhi, Holkar crossed the Jumna at the ford of Panniput, threatening to desolate the British territories in the Doab with fire and sword. General Lake arrived at Delhi on the 18th of October. He did not, however, enter on the pursuit of the enemy till the 31st, although his presence at Delhi could answer no purpose. The delay appears to have been partly occasioned by a deficiency of provisions and beasts of draught. The news of Holkar's irruption into the British provinces in the Doab roused him to exertion; and detaching a force under General Fraser, the

second in command, in search of Holkar's infantry and guns, General Lake resolved to proceed in person with the whole of the European dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry, the horse artillery, and the reserve of the army, consisting of two companies of European and three battalions of native infantry, in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry in the Doab. The first service which this force was called upon to perform was to relieve the gallant commander of the garrison of Delhi and his battalion. After the departure of the besiegers, Colonel Burn had quitted Delhi to proceed to his station at Saharunpore, from which he had been called by Colonel Ochterlony, to defend the imperial capital. The enemy's horse fell in with his party near Candlah, and completely surrounded them; but Colonel Burn, clearing a road with grape-shot, made good his way to Shamlee, where, getting into a small mud fort, he prepared for a desperate defence. The fort was about a hundred yards square. The party, ill supplied with provisions, were unable to obtain any from the adjacent town of Shamlee, the inhabitants of which place manifested a strong feeling of hostility, and joined Holkar's dismounted horsemen in firing from the town wall with matchlocks on those who had taken refuge in the fort. About a hundred British sepoys thus lost their lives. In this extremity the Mahometan part of Colonel Burn's force were subsisted by sacrificing the draught bullocks to the necessity of providing food. The Hindoos, precluded by their prejudices from this mode of sustaining life, had been without food for some time, when the approach of General Lake relieved them from the presence of the enemy. Holkar's troops did not think fit to await the arrival of the British commander-in-chief, nor even to take any steps towards ascertaining the extent and nature of his force. No sooner were the clouds of dust which announced the movement of the English column perceptible than the enemy disappeared.

A few days after General Lake had left Delhi, the division under General Fraser marched in pursuit of Holkar's infantry and guns. On the 12th of November he arrived at Goburdun, where from the heights the enemy were visible, encamped between a deep tank and an extensive morass—their right covered by a fortified village, and their left extending to the fort of Deeg. No time was lost in preparing for attacking them. At three o'clock in the morning of the 13th four battalions of sepoys and two European regiments marched for the purpose. A detour of considerable extent was necessary to avoid the morass, but at daybreak the British column arrived at the fortified village, situate on a hill which covered the enemy's right; the troops immediately wheeled, the king's 76th regiment and two of the battalions forming a first line, and the remainder a second. The 76th led the way, with its wonted alacrity and

determination, by taking possession of the village; which was no sooner accomplished than, running down the hill, they charged and carried the first range of the enemy's guns, under a tremendous shower of round, grape, and chain shot. The second line had now reached the village, and, on discovering the 76th far in advance surrounded by the enemy, rapidly pushed forward to their support—the Company's first European regiment being foremost, and the two sepoy battalions following. The two remaining battalions were employed, under Major Hammond, in watching the enemy's brigades and guns near the morass, and keeping them in check. When the first range of guns had been carried, the victors were opposed by a most destructive fire from the second range; and General Fraser losing a leg by a cannon-shot, the command devolved upon Colonel Monson. Nothing daunted by the unhappy accident which had befallen their commander, the British troops advanced, captured the second range of guns, and then continued to charge battery after battery for a space of two miles, when, being close under the walls of Deeg, they were fired upon from the fort. While thus pursuing their successes, the first range of guns had been retaken by a body of the enemy's horse, and turned against the English. But the advantage was enjoyed for a very short time. Captain Norford, with only twenty-eight men, retrieved the guns, the life of the gallant officer being unhappily sacrificed in the exploit.

The troops who had been engaged in carrying the batteries, having pursued their success as far as was practicable towards Deeg, returned to attack the body which, during their advance, had been kept in check by the battalions under Major Hammond. That officer, with the aid of three six-pounders, had steadily maintained his position in the face of a heavy fire from artillery far superior to his own. Colonel Monson, having ordered up several more six-pounders, moved round under cover of their fire upon the left flank of the enemy, who forthwith made a precipitate retreat into the morass, where great numbers perished. Two battalions of sepoys had been left with the baggage, and some native cavalry had been employed in watching the enemy's horse. These now came up to assist in securing the guns and removing the wounded; and the British encamped on the field which they had so gallantly won.

The loss of the enemy, on the field and in the morass, has been estimated at nearly two thousand, and eighty-seven pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the English, including some which Colonel Monson had lost on his retreat. The victory was brilliant and complete, but it was not purchased without heavy loss. The English return of killed and wounded amounted to upwards of six hundred and forty, and among them was the brave officer who had planned and commanded the

attack: the wound of General Fraser proved mortal, and he survived the victory only a few days.

Holkar was destined soon to sustain another reverse. Himself and his cavalry had been for several days flying with great rapidity before General Lake, pursued with even greater rapidity by that commander. The distance between them kept gradually diminishing until, on the 17th of November, after a night march, the head of the British column reached the skirts of the freebooter's camp. The horses were at picket, and beside them lay their riders, wrapt in their blankets, sleeping. For many days the English had been subjected to most harassing marches; and within the twenty-four hours immediately preceding their arrival at Holkar's camp they had marched fifty-eight miles. Their fatigues were, however, forgotten, for the enemy whom they had so perseveringly pursued was now before them; and on the preceding evening fresh vigour had been given to their hopes by the receipt of the news of the glorious battle of Deeg. The first intimation which the slumbering camp of Holkar received of the presence of the English was a discharge of grape from their horse-artillery. "It awakened some," says Major Thorn; "but sealed many in an everlasting sleep." Before the surprise caused by this fearful warning could be shaken off, the British cavalry dashed into the camp at full gallop, and charging in all directions, the place which had so lately been the seat of repose and silence resounded with the clash of swords, the shouts of an excited soldiery, and the groans of the dying.

Holkar was slow to believe that the disturbance in his camp could be occasioned by General Lake, whom he supposed to be at a considerable distance. When convinced of it, instead of taking any measures for the safety of his army, he mounted his horse, and, with the troops immediately about him, rode off at full speed. The fate of an army thus abandoned need scarcely be related. Dispersing in every direction, some mounted, others on foot, their horses being too much jaded to carry them, they were followed and cut down in vast numbers so long as the British were able to continue the pursuit, which extended for about ten miles. The loss of the enemy in killed was computed at three thousand, but this formed but a small portion of the amount by which Holkar's army was weakened. By the number of desertions which followed—the dropping off of masses of fugitives, who never rejoined the ranks of their master, it was believed that his cavalry force had been diminished to the extent of one-half. On the part of the English, only two men were killed and about twenty wounded.

Holkar fled across the Jumna, followed by General Lake, who, on the 28th November, arrived at Muttra. Here he found the division under Colonel Monson, which had retired to this place to deposit the wounded at the battle

of Deeg, and to disencumber itself of the vast quantity of ordnance which formed part of the spoil in that memorable action. The guns had been forwarded to Agra, and Colonel Monson, it is stated, intended to fall back beyond Muttra but for the arrival of the commander-in-chief. There, however, after a separation of a month, the two branches of the army met under circumstances which gave just ground for mutual congratulations. The one had routed Holkar's infantry and divested him of most of his ordnance: the other had marched about five hundred miles, not a step of which had been taken in vain—had struck a fatal blow at the force on which Holkar mainly depended, and was now ready to co-operate in any service that might tend to conduct the war to a satisfactory conclusion.

The first duty to which they were called was to punish the perfidy of the rajah of Bhurtpore. That prince, it will be recollected, had been among the earliest of the Mahratta tributaries to seek the friendship of the British government after the first brilliant successes of General Lake, and great reliance seems to have been placed upon his fidelity. He had furnished a body of horse to act with the British army, and which was thus employed till the conclusion of the campaign. About the period of Colonel Monson's retreat some circumstances occurred to excite suspicion of the rajah's sincerity; and in consequence of information which reached the commander-in-chief, a person named Nerungin Lall was seized in the town of Muttra, who, on examination, confessed that he had been employed for a considerable time in carrying on communications between Holkar on the one hand, and, on the other, several chiefs and semindars, including the rajah of Bhurtpore. Colonel Monson also forwarded from Tonk Rampoorra some intercepted letters, addressed to Holkar by the rajah of Bhurtpore, his eldest son, his confidential servants, and Nerungin Lall, which fully corroborated the testimony of the last-named person.

These discoveries, however, were not deemed sufficient to warrant an immediate dissolution of the relations of amity which apparently subsisted between the British government and the rajah of Bhurtpore, and which the former was desirous of preserving. General Lake was instructed to remonstrate, and to call upon the rajah to adhere to his engagements. But of this result being produced by the representations of the commander-in-chief there appeared little hope. It was generally believed that Holkar had been encouraged to advance to the Jumna principally by the promises of the rajah of Bhurtpore: it was supposed that the rajah had assisted him with money—it was certain that he had supplied Holkar's army with provisions, had protected his baggage and bazaars, and through the means of an agent despatched to the British camp for the ostensible purpose of conferring with the commander-in-chief respecting the junction of

the allied forces, had endeavoured to excite disaffection within the British possessions, and to prevail on the semindars in the Doab to intercept the supplies forwarding to the English army. At the battle of Deeg all reserve was thrown aside; the rajah's cavalry openly joined that of Holkar, and the English were fired upon from the walls of Deeg, which belonged to the rajah, and was garrisoned by his troops. It could be no longer a question whether the rajah was to be treated as a friend or an enemy, and it was resolved to lay siege to Deeg as soon as a battering-train could be procured from Agra.

Deeg was defended by a strong mud wall, with bastions, and a deep ditch passing entirely round, excepting at an angle, where stood a high rocky mount, almost a fortress in itself, having an area of about fifty yards square, and presenting four commanding bastions at the four cardinal points. About a mile from this place, and nearly in the centre of the town, was the citadel, strongly built, in good preservation, and well stored with guns. The ramparts were high and thick, furnished with bastions, and surrounded by a deep ditch faced with masonry. Massive gateways and towers of considerable height defended the near and distant approaches.

On the 18th of December, the battering train having arrived, General Lake took up the position before Deeg which he meant to occupy during the siege. It being previously occupied by the enemy, it was necessary to dislodge them: but this service was performed without difficulty, and without the occurrence of any event calling for notice. At night the pioneers broke ground, and on the evening of the 16th of December a breaching-battery was completed within seven hundred and fifty yards of a high outwork at the angle of the town intended to be attacked. On the next morning its fire opened from six eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and four mortars; but the effect being very small, a battery of three eighteen-pounders was erected during the night of the 20th to the left of the besieging army, and nearer to the enemy's works than that previously erected. By these means a practicable breach was effected by the 23rd, and the commander-in-chief determined to storm on that night. The force to whom this service was assigned was divided into three columns. The centre column, led by Colonel Macrae, who had the command of the whole, composed the storming party. The other columns, commanded respectively by Captain Kelly and Major Ratcliffe, were to make two separate attacks to the right and left of the principal point. The different parties moved so as to reach the places selected for attack soon after twelve, and all succeeded. The storming party passed through a galling fire of cannon and musketry to the breach, and soon gained possession of the works. The two remaining columns, diverging outwards, attacked the

enemy under the walls, where they had erected some batteries which those of the English had been unable to touch: these were carried at the point of the bayonet. The British were now in possession of the town and of the batteries without it. Preparations were made for assailing the inner fort, but on the night of the 24th it was evacuated. A hundred guns were captured at Deeg, with a considerable quantity of ammunition and military stores. The year 1804 thus closed in Hindostan with a signal triumph to the British cause.

Before pursuing further its history in that quarter, it will be proper to advert to the operations carried on against Holkar in the south. In June, General Wellesley, being about to proceed to Bengal on public service, resigned the political and military powers which he exercised in the Deccan; but before withdrawing from the scene where he had won so much renown, he suggested to the residents at Poona and Hyderabad a plan of operations to be carried on against Chandore, and the other provinces of Holkar and his partisans in the Deccan, at the proper season. The troops for this service were to consist of detachments from the subsidiary forces serving with the peishwa and the nizâm, with the contingents to be furnished respectively by those two powers. A battering-train had been prepared at Poona, which, as soon as the weather should permit, was to be sent to Aurungabad, whither Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton, who commanded the portion of the Hyderabad subsidiary force destined for this service, was to proceed with his troops as soon as he was advised of the movement of the train. On its becoming known at Poona that Colonel Haliburton had commenced his march, Colonel Wallace was to move with the detachment from the peishwa's subsidiary force, and the whole were to join in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad. In conformity with his usual prudent habits, General Wellesley made admirable arrangements for securing supplies of money and provisions for the use of the detachments. The exhausted state of the country through which Colonel Haliburton had to march, rendered it necessary that large convoys of grain should be advanced to him from Hyderabad; and it being understood that on their receipt that officer would immediately commence his march, Colonel Wallace moved from Poona, crossed the Godavery about the middle of September, and at the end of that month was joined by Colonel Haliburton; the advance of both having been greatly impeded by the weather. Early in October the peishwa's contingent arrived. On the 8th of that month, Colonel Wallace detached a party to take possession of a small fort belonging to Holkar, called Lasselgong, situated about twelve miles from Chandore. They succeeded in occupying the pettah, but the attempt to storm the fort failed. The strength of the detachment was increased, and, on a second attempt, the fort was carried,

though not without a loss which, with reference to the object, must be considered severe.

The town of Chandore was occupied by Colonel Wallace without opposition. Preparations were made for attacking the fort, and a battery was nearly ready to open, when an offer was made to surrender on terms which Colonel Wallace accepted. The conditions were, the safety of private property and permission to the garrison to depart wherever they pleased. A number of small forts yielded within a few days after the surrender of Chandore, and Colonel Wallace, marching from that place on the 17th of October, arrived before Galna on the 21st, and immediately took possession of the pettah. Batteries were formed for the reduction of the fort, and after their fire had effected two practicable breaches, the garrison surrendered on the same conditions which had been granted at Chandore. The command of these forts deprived Holkar of all his possessions to the southward of the Taptee; and, after making the necessary arrangements for their defence and administration, Colonel Wallace proceeded to take up a position at Borenaire, from which he might be able to move in any direction where the assistance of his detachment might be required.

The advance of Colonel Murray, with the force under his command, towards Oujein—his subsequent retreat and resumed advance—have already been noticed in narrating the retreat of Colonel Monson. Colonel Murray arrived at Oujein without encountering any opposition, and took possession of the whole of Holkar's territories in that quarter, including the chieftain's capital, Indore. On the 18th of October he advanced from Oujein, and on the 11th of November arrived at Mundasera, having occupied the pergunnahs of Burrowda and Jowra, through which he had directed his march; afterwards advancing from Mundasera, he took possession of various forts of greater or less importance, and by these operations completed the conquest of the whole of Holkar's possessions west of the Chumbul. Continuing to advance, he arrived at the Mokundra pass on the 30th of November, and at Shahabad, about forty miles west of Narwar, on the 25th of December, where he resigned his command to Major-General Jones, who had arrived from Bombay to assume it.

In Cuttaok some annoyances, created by the rajah of Khoordah and the zemindar of Kunka, were suppressed by a force under Colonel Harcourt. After some minor successes, the pettah and fort of Khoordah were carried with great gallantry, by a detachment under Major Fletcher, of the Madras European regiment. The Kunka chief, alarmed by the rapid annihilation of the power of the rajah of Khoordah, read in his fate the necessity of prompt submission to the British authority.

The proceedings of General Lake subsequently to the fall of Deeg now call for notice. A few days after that event he broke up his camp, with the highest anticipations of future

success, and marched to Muttra, where he was joined by Major-General Dowdswell, with the 75th regiment and a supply of stores. On the 1st of January, 1805, the army thus reinforced moved towards the capital of the rajah of Bhurtpore, which was to be the next object of attack; on the 2nd it took up its position before the place, and on the 3rd preparations for the siege were commenced. A grove, or garden, considerably in advance of the camp was occupied. On the 5th a breaching-battery for six eighteen-pounders was commenced; on the 7th it opened its fire. Another battery, of four eight-inch and four five-and-a-half-inch mortars, being completed by noon on that day, commenced throwing shells into the town. Cannonading on both sides continued with little interruption till the afternoon of the 9th, when the breach in the wall being reported practicable, it was resolved on that evening to attempt to storm.

About seven o'clock the party destined for the duty moved in three columns. Lieutenant-Colonel Ryan, with one hundred and fifty of the Company's Europeans and a battalion of sepoys, was ordered to attempt a gateway to the left of the principal battery. Major Hawkes, with two companies of the 75th regiment and another battalion of sepoys, was to carry the advanced guns of the enemy on the right of the battery. Both columns were to endeavour to make their way into the town with the fugitives; but if that were impracticable, they were to turn and support the centre column in endeavouring to get in at the breach. That column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, consisted of the flank companies of the king's 22nd, 75th, and 76th regiments, and those of the Company's European regiment, amounting in the whole to about five hundred men, with a battalion of sepoys. Colonel Maitland's orders were to take the enemy by surprise; but in this he altogether failed. The ground being broken by swamps and pools, the orderly advance of the party was greatly checked; many lost their way, and men belonging to one column followed another. It is represented that, to avoid the fire from the ramparts, Colonel Maitland led his men so much to the left as to enroach upon Colonel Ryan's line of march, and that some altercation took place between these two officers as to the relative situation of the breach and trenches; that Colonel Maitland, then marching to the right, found himself at the entrance of the trenches, when he resolved to direct the head of his column once more to the left, and in that manner to proceed across the plain towards the breach. Long before this period all was confusion. The enemy received the storming-party with a heavy fire of musketry and of grape from three guns in the flank of a circular bastion next to the breach: nevertheless, some of the men, headed by their officers, succeeded in getting across the ditch, the water in which was breast-high, and a few ascended the breach to within a short distance

of the top; but their number was too small to admit of their attempting to storm the enemy's guns. In the mean time Major Hawkes, with the right column, had succeeded in driving the enemy from their advanced guns, and, after spiking them, was on his return to support the centre; while Colonel Ryan, with the left, had compelled the enemy to quit their post in that direction, but was prevented by the intervention of a deep drain from pursuing his success. Colonel Maitland, whatever might have been his errors or misfortunes, nobly supported the character of the British soldier, and never relaxed in his exertions to bring his men forward till he fell mortally wounded. The greater part of the troops either stopped or went back to the battery as soon as they got to the water. The few devoted men who had ascended the breach, being unsupported, were compelled to retire; and this ill-judged and unfortunate attempt against Bhurtpore ended in exposing the British arms to the contempt of the enemy. The loss of the English was heavy, and among the killed and wounded was an unusual proportion of officers.

On the day succeeding this disastrous failure the enemy began to repair the breach through which the English had hoped to pass to conquest. The next effort against the place it was resolved should be directed towards a part of the wall a little to the right of the former point of attack. Batteries were accordingly erected, and two twenty-four-pounders, ten eighteen-pounders, seven twelve-pounders, and eight mortars, opened a destructive fire on the 16th of January. Part of the rampart of the curtain was beaten down, but the next morning the breach was found stockaded; the firing being continued, the piles gave way, and a hole was made completely through the work; but on the 18th the breach was again stockaded. On that day the British army was reinforced by the arrival of Major-General Smith with three battalions of sepoys and some convalescent Europeans, with a few field-pieces. The batteries continued their fire until the 21st, when a breach, reported practicable, had been made; and the enemy, fearful that their guns should be dismounted, withdrew them behind the parapets, thus keeping them in reserve to be employed against those who might be engaged in a future attempt to storm. On the preceding night the English had been compelled to remove from the batteries the two twenty-four-pounders, in consequence of the whole of the shot being expended, and to supply the deficiency by two four-and-a-half-inch howitzers. To add to the difficulties of the besiegers, Ameer Khan had been invited by the rajah of Bhurtpore to march to his assistance, and the invitation, being accompanied by several lacs of rupees, had been accepted.

Before making a second attempt to cross the ditch, it was deemed advisable to gain some knowledge of its breadth and depth at the place where a passage was to be sought. The duty of making the requisite observation was

committed to a havildar and two privates of the native cavalry, who reported that the ditch was not very broad, nor did it appear very deep, and that the breach was easy of ascent. Upon this vague statement, the result of an inspection made under circumstances which almost precluded the possibility of any approach to accuracy, it was resolved once more to risk an attempt to storm. Noon, on the 21st of January, was the time fixed on for the assault. The troops by whom it was to be made were brought into the trenches before daylight, and the interval was to be employed in destroying the impediments with which the enemy, in the course of the night, might have encumbered the breach. This, however, occupied a period somewhat longer than had been anticipated. At break of day the breach was perceived to be again stockaded, and it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that it was cleared. The troops then moved out of the trenches, and advanced towards the ditch. Here it was for the first time discovered that, by damming up the water at certain points, a sheet of great depth and breadth had been accumulated in front of the breach. A portable bridge had been constructed for the purpose of crossing the ditch, but it was too short to be of any use; a scaling-ladder was brought to lengthen it, but this got entangled with the bridge, and, instead of connecting it with the escarp, fell over on one side, carrying with it the bridge, from which it could not be disengaged. No systematic attempt was therefore made to pass the storming party over the ditch; but Lieutenant Morris, of the Company's European regiment, and several men, gallantly swam across and ascended the breach. Lieutenant Morris got on the rampart, and there received a severe wound in the leg; in swimming back, when the attempt to storm had been abandoned, he was again wounded in the neck. The retreat commenced in great confusion; but another column of the British force making its appearance from a jungle, round which it had been moving with a view to an attack upon a different point, the retiring party thereupon rallied. The meditated attack of the advancing column, however, being found impracticable, the whole fell back, leaving to the enemy the bridge and scaling-ladders, and, which was far worse, a large number of wounded. Throughout the advance of the British force, during the delay at the bridge (which occupied at least half an hour), and on the retreat, the enemy kept up a destructive fire of grape, round-shot, and musketry. The effect was attested by a melancholy return of eighteen officers and five hundred men killed and wounded. During the attack the British cavalry were engaged in keeping off Holkar and Ameer Khan, a task readily effected by the galloper guns. About fifty of the enemy were killed.

On the day after these unfortunate attempts a detachment under Captain Welsh was despatched to bring in a convoy of provisions on

its way from Muttra. On returning with its charge, it was attacked by Ameer Khan with a vast body of his predatory horse. Captain Welsh took possession of a village on a lofty site, and succeeded in keeping off the assailants till the arrival of a party of cavalry under Colonel Need, who had been despatched on the sound of the firing being heard at the British camp. The British sepoys, on perceiving the advance of the reinforcement, raised a loud shout of exultation, and, rushing on the enemy's guns, carried them at the point of the bayonet just at the moment when the cavalry arrived: the latter dashing in, completed the victory. The commander-in-chief, with the remainder of his mounted force, followed Captain Need, but found that nothing was left for them to perform. Four guns, and nearly forty stand of colours, with Ameer Khan's palanquin, fell into the hands of the victors; but, on the other hand, they lost a great portion of the convoy which they were escorting, and of which the army was greatly in want. Their necessity was supplied by despatching Colonel Don with a detachment to bring an immense convoy from Agra, an object which was successfully effected, the attempts of the enemy to intercept this supply being rendered vain by the judicious arrangements made for its safety. Soon after this, Ameer Khan, becoming dissatisfied with his associates, Holkar and the rajah of Bhurtpore, departed into Rohilcund, followed by a British detachment under General Smith, which, after pursuing him for several hundred miles, and compelling him to repossess the Ganges, returned to the British camp before Bhurtpore. During their absence the position of the camp had been shifted, a measure absolutely necessary to the health of its occupants, and which moreover was called for by a change of purpose as to the future point of attack. The army had also been strengthened by the arrival of the division under General Jones, originally commanded by Colonel Murray, and further attempts had been made for the reduction of Bhurtpore. Batteries had been erected and brought into operation on a new point, and the state of the breach was deemed to warrant a third attempt to storm. The 20th February was appointed for the purpose, and the storming party was ordered to the trenches at an early hour, to be in readiness for attack as soon as the batteries should have beaten down the defences and stockades which might have been raised in the night. At break of day the enemy made a sally on the British trenches, and for a time appear to have retained a decided advantage. They were at length driven back; but the conflict seems to have lasted for several hours, and the English troops, fatigued by their exertions, and dispirited by the long resistance opposed to them, cannot be believed to have been in the best condition for the duty of assaulting a strong fortress from which they had been twice repulsed.

A column under Colonel Don, composed partly of Europeans and partly of sepoys, was to advance to storm; a second column, similarly composed, under Captain Grant, was to carry the enemy's trenches and guns outside the town; and a third, composed in like manner of European and native troops, under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, was to attack a gate called Beem Nurram gate, which was reported to be easily accessible. Captain Grant, with the second column, carried the intrenchments and batteries against which his efforts were directed, and pursuing the fugitives to the walls of the town, nearly succeeded in obtaining entrance, the enemy not being able to close the gate till the head of the column was close upon it. Eleven guns were taken, all of which were safely brought into camp. The third column was less fortunate. Having lost its scaling-ladders, and one of its guns being dismounted by a shot from the town, the attempt on the gate was deemed impracticable, and the column retired.

The movement of Captain Grant's column was to be the signal for the advance of that of Colonel Don to storm. The Europeans forming the head of the column were accordingly ordered to advance, and the native infantry to follow. Fifty men carrying fascines were to precede the former, who, after throwing the fascines into the ditch, were to wheel outwards and keep up a fire of musketry on the breach while the rest of the party advanced to the assault. But a hesitation occurred: the assailants were exposed to an enfilading fire—an apprehension prevailed that the enemy during their occupation of the extremity of the trench had established a mine—the effect of these discouraging circumstances was aided by the sight of the wounded in the conflict of the morning lying around, and the groans drawn forth by their sufferings; and Colonel Don strove in vain to counteract the impressions thus created. The Europeans in front would not move. A better spirit was manifested by the remains of the flankers of the king's 22nd regiment and by the 12th native infantry. These followed their gallant commander, and two six-pounders were run out upon the plain to keep up a fire on the walls and batteries while the troops attempted an assault. The ditch was impassable at the breach from the depth of the water. The storming party, therefore, proceeded to another part, where the water was shallow, and where a ragged bastion seemed to offer the means of climbing. Having passed the ditch, several succeeded in scrambling up, and the colours of the 12th regiment of native infantry were planted on the top of the bastion; but the ascent was so difficult, that sufficient numbers could not be got up to support each other and render effectual the advantage that had been gained. Those who reached the summit, small as was their number, were ready to persist in the endeavour to maintain it at any hazard; but Colonel Don, aware of the hopelessness of their exertions, recalled the

whole party. Soon after the assault the enemy sprang several mines in the breach and counterscarp, but there being no assailants near these points, the explosions were harmless, except to those by whom they were caused, in adding to the damage which the English batteries had inflicted on the works. The loss of the British army on this disastrous day amounted to eight hundred and ninety-four killed and wounded.

On the morrow the commander-in-chief appeared on parade, and addressed in appropriate terms the troops whose unhappy defection on the preceding day had brought dishonour on the service to which they belonged. The effect was, that on those who chose to volunteer for another assault being required to step out, the whole answered to the call. The assault, it was determined, should take place on that day, and about four o'clock the troops moved to the attack. The party was commanded by Colonel Monson. It advanced with perfect regularity to the bastion on which the colours of the 12th native infantry had on the previous day been planted. A vast gap had been made in the lower part of it, which afforded shelter to those who could avail themselves of its protection, but, as before, there were no means of getting the men from this point to the summit in sufficient numbers. All that could be done, however, was resorted to, and enough was achieved to redeem the honour of those who, on the previous day, had shrunk from the dangers which are but the ordinary incidents of a soldier's life. Several of the soldiers drove their bayonets into the wall, so as to form a series of steps, by which they hoped to reach the top; but in the attempt to ascend they were knocked down by logs of wood, shot, and various missiles from above. Others attempted to effect their object by means of the shot-holes caused by the English fire, but they generally failed, and the fall of one man brought down those beneath him. All this time, the enemy from the next bastion kept up a sweeping and destructive fire; but amongst all these dangers and difficulties, Lieutenant Templeton, a gallant young officer who had volunteered to lead the forlorn hope, succeeded in again planting the British colours near the summit of the bastion. As soon as he had performed this act he fell dead. Major Menzies, a volunteer, and aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, whose animating language and heroic bearing are represented to have inspired with renewed energy all who were enabled to hear the one and observe the other, met the same fate, after having actually gained the summit. At every point where an opening seemed to present itself, an attempt to render it available was made. On the part of the enemy, an incessant fire of grape was kept up, and from the walls were poured showers of destructive missiles—ponderous pieces of timber, flaming packs of cotton steeped in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder and other com-

bustibles, which exploded with fearful effect. Thus raged the conflict for a space of two hours, when Colonel Monson, finding it hopeless, ordered a return to the trenches. Such was the result of the fourth attempt to carry Bhurtpore by assault. It was attended with a loss of nearly a thousand in killed and wounded.

In the various attempts against Bhurtpore the English had lost about three thousand men; and they were not now in a condition to renew hostile operations. On the night of the 22nd of February the ordnance was withdrawn from the batteries and the troops from the trenches. The battering train with the army was declared unfit for service; not one eighteen-pounder shot remained for use; very little powder was left, and few other stores. Provisions also were scarce. On the 23rd the enemy burned the British batteries, and on the 24th the British army changed ground—an operation in which they were considerably harassed by Holkar's cavalry. Its new position was about six miles north-east of Bhurtpore, and covered the road leading to the depôts at Agra, Muttra, and Deeg.

Much argument has been expended on the causes of the failure of the British arms before Bhurtpore; but the inquiry does not appear very difficult or perplexing. Many errors might be committed in the conduct of the siege, but the failure was undoubtedly attributable to the want of sufficient strength. General Lake, confident in the bravery of his troops, appears to have considered that it was sufficient to effect anything. The strength of his artillery, considered with reference to the duty which it had to perform, was contemptible, and the insufficient number of men may be inferred from the incessant and harassing labours which they were called on to sustain, as recorded in the following extract from a journal of the siege:—"The cavalry brigades and horse artillery troop, detached every third day on foraging parties, were often out of camp from daybreak till dark, and always called for on occasions of convoy and escort duty. They endured great fatigue in the long pursuit of Ameer Khan and in the several attacks upon Holkar, besides doing much duty in protecting the camp. The infantry had to carry on the principal duties of the camp and trenches. With scarcely a relief from some daily duty, they had a share in all foraging parties and convoy escorts, and exclusively bore the brunt of the several assaults. The artillery and pioneers remained, day after day and night after night, constantly on duty. While the other branches of the army had some occasional relief, and the infantry in the trenches were relieved daily, the artillery and pioneers, from the extreme lowness of their number both in officers and men, were harassed far beyond their strength, and had a prodigious share of exposure and fatigue. The details of the Bhurtpore siege," the writer adds, "will, it is hoped, evince that deficiency

of siege materials is as contrary to economy as it is fatal to humanity, and serve to inculcate Colonel Jones's maxim, that 'no policy at a siege can be worse than beginning operations with a small quantity of materials, and making the attack keep pace with the supply.' In India, where success is the criterion of superiority, and where the tranquillity of our empire depends solely upon the high opinion of our military prowess entertained by the natives, our safety may be considered intimately connected with the result of every siege. No means, therefore, should be neglected, no efforts spared, to insure success in such operations."

Both parties had now become weary of the war. The ill-success of the British commander against Bhurtpore had diminished the confidence with which he had undertaken the siege, while it had for a time annihilated his means of pursuing it; and though the rajah had reason to rejoice in the good fortune which had attended his efforts for the defence of his capital, he was not without some apprehension for the future; more particularly as it became evident that Holkar could not hope to maintain war successfully against the English, and, single-handed, the rajah of Bhurtpore could not but feel his own cause to be desperate. The rajah had been led to join Holkar by the reverses which befell the English; the dark prospects of Holkar now separated the rajah from that chief. Pursuing the policy of adhering to the side which success seemed most disposed to favour, the rajah condescended to make the first overture to the English for peace. On the 10th of March vakeels from him were received into the English camp, and negotiations immediately commenced. While these were in progress, the British cavalry marched out to beat up the quarters of Holkar. But Holkar had received information of their approach, and, not liking the visitation, was prepared for flight—an operation which he performed with his usual celerity and success. He retired to a considerable distance south-west of Bhurtpore, where he thought himself secure, but where, notwithstanding, he was surprised by the British cavalry at daybreak on the 3rd of April. About a thousand of his followers fell on this occasion; but the victory failed of completeness from the same cause which had so often produced similar results. The chief and his troops contended for priority in flight, and all that was left to the English was to pursue as fast and as far as the speed and strength of their horses would allow.

Bappoojee Scindia, whose name will be recollected in connection with the unhappy retreat of Colonel Monson, had now openly joined the enemy, and his cavalry were stationed near Dolepore to support the remains of Holkar's infantry, commanded by Hernaut Singh. To dislodge this force, a detachment, composed of sixteen companies of newly-raised sepoys, a battalion of regular infantry, and a

party of irregular horse, was despatched from Agra under the command of Captain Royle. He marched from Agra on the 28th of March; on the 31st he fell in with the cavalry of Bappoojee Scindia, and totally routed it. On the 8th of April he attacked the powerful force under Hernaut Singh, consisting of between three and four thousand men, infantry and cavalry, and occupying a strong position under the fortified town of Adowlutnaghur, having the town in its rear, and its front and flanks covered by deep ravines filled with troops. Captain Royle made his dispositions for attack with equal spirit and judgment. The enemy's infantry kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, aided by three guns; but Captain Royle's party, rushing in with charged bayonets, took possession of the guns and put the whole body to flight. Captain Pohlman, with the irregular horse, pursued and killed great numbers of the fugitives. Besides the three guns, all the enemy's baggage was taken, more than twenty stand of colours, and, in addition to a quantity of matchlocks and pikes, a great number of muskets of European manufacture.

On the day distinguished by this brilliant stroke the army before Bhurtpore again changed its ground, taking up nearly the same position which it had previously occupied. This movement appears to have given some uneasiness to the rajah, and probably accelerated the conclusion of the treaty. On the 10th of April preliminaries were agreed upon: on the following day the third son of the rajah arrived in the British camp as a hostage; and on the 17th a definitive treaty was signed, under which the fortress of Deeg was to be restored by the British government, when assured of the fidelity of the rajah, who pledged himself to aid that government against its enemies, and never to hold any correspondence or have any connection with them, nor to entertain, without the sanction of the English, any European in his service. He further agreed to pay twenty lacs of rupees in compensation of the expenses of the war, three of which were to be advanced immediately; but the payment of the last instalment of five lacs to be remitted on proof of the rajah's continued attachment; and as a security for the due execution of this part of the treaty, one of the rajah's sons was to reside constantly with the commanding officer of the British forces in the soubah of Delhi or Agra.

These terms were not dishonourable to the British; yet the precedent of submitting in patience to repulse, and suffering negotiation to wait upon defeat, was a bad one. The British commander-in-chief, however, was not sorry to be relieved on any terms from the necessity of making further attempts against Bhurtpore. Not only was he discouraged by his reiterated failures, but he was apprehensive, and justly so, of the effect which they might have upon the hollow allies of the British government; and more especially upon Scindia,

whose conduct since the conclusion of peace with him had never ceased to be suspicious. During the negotiations for the treaty under which Scindia had agreed to receive a British force for his protection, a vakeel from Holkar had arrived in the camp of his brother chief; and he continued to reside there, not only after the conclusion of the treaty, but after Holkar had placed himself in a position of unequivocal hostility with regard to the English government. On being apprised of the intention of that government to reduce the power of Holkar, Scindia expressed himself ready to assist, and he actually despatched a force under Bappoojee Scindia (already mentioned), professedly to co-operate with the British commander-in-chief; but he did not dismiss Holkar's vakeel. His dismissal was at length formally demanded by the British resident; who, at the same time, submitted a plan formed by General Wellesley, which contained various suggestions for the effective co-operation of Scindia in the hostile proceedings which were about to take place. By this plan it was proposed that Scindia should send an officer to join the army under Colonel Murray, for the purpose of securing the application of the resources of that chief's territories to the exigencies of the British force, and of taking charge of such portions of Holkar's possessions in Malwa as Colonel Murray might subdue and think proper to intrust to that officer's care; that Scindia should provide at Oujein battering guns for the use of Colonel Murray, and that he should employ his horse without delay in reducing the principal possessions of Holkar. Scindia, in reply, promised to send an officer to the camp of Colonel Murray as desired; but he took various objections to other parts of the proposed plan. He alleged that, from acting upon it, danger would arise to his own possessions, and that he had no ordnance of the description required to be provided at Oujein; but it was added, that if the guns taken from him in the late war by the British army were restored, they should be applied in aid of the operations of Colonel Murray's force. Holkar's vakeel, it was represented, was on bad terms with his master, and transacted no business for him; his continued residence in Scindia's camp was therefore justified, on the ground that his knowledge of Holkar's affairs might be made useful. These representations were followed by the expression of an expectation that, as the governor-general had declared an intention of assigning to Scindia a portion of the territory which might be taken from Holkar, he would restore to Scindia the forts of Gohud and Gwalior, and further make compensation to him for the loss sustained by the temporary alienation of that portion of his possessions.

The renewal of Scindia's claim to the restitution of Gohud and Gwalior, together with the objections made to the course pointed out by the British authorities for the conduct of the war, gave rise to considerable discussion

between Scindia's ministers and the British resident. At length, however, all points of dispute appeared to be amicably adjusted. Scindia engaged to lend all the aid in his power towards prosecuting with vigour the war against Holkar, to dismiss that chieftan's vakeel, to renounce all pretensions to Gohud and Gwalior, and to confirm the treaties referred to in the ninth article of that between the British government and himself. But he made heavy complaints of pecuniary distress, and represented an advance from his British ally as necessary to enable him to carry his good intentions into effect. While Dowlut Rao Scindia was thus professing friendship for the English, and soliciting pecuniary assistance from them, Bappoojee Scindia had employed himself in desolating the territories of Bhoonadi, from which Colonel Monson drew part of his supplies, had seized eighty camels belonging to that officer's army, and had stopped the transit of the British post.

Notwithstanding these suspicious indications, and others of a similar character in Malwa, of which Colonel Murray complained, the resident at Scindia's camp was authorized to afford him pecuniary assistance, provided some reasonable security could be obtained that the object for which the advance was made would be effected. With this view, it was suggested that the chief should himself assume the command of the army under Bappoojee Scindia, and that he should proceed from Borhanpore, where his camp then was, to his capital, Oujein. These suggestions drew from Scindia's ministers a declaration, that to their adoption two conditions were indispensable: the first might readily have been expected—it was, that the resident should supply funds to defray the expense of Scindia's march to his capital. The second could scarcely have been anticipated, even by those best acquainted with Mahratta modesty, and best qualified to judge of its extent—it was, that in the event of a junction of Scindia's army with a British force, the Mahratta leader should exercise command over both. The resident replied, that whenever Scindia might be desirous of having the disposal of a British force he might apply for the subsidiary force, in conformity with the provisions of the treaty of defensive alliance; but that the proposal to subject a British army to his command, or to that of his officers, was utterly inadmissible. The application for funds to undertake the march to the capital was answered by intimating that the British government had previously manifested a disposition to relieve Scindia's immediate exigencies, though it could not undertake to provide for the permanent disbursements of the state. The amount of the pecuniary assistance to be afforded, the conditions on which it was to be given, and the period to be appointed for repayment, continued for a lengthened period to furnish grounds for discussion, which was conducted by Scindia's servants in a manner which did not discredit the established character of

Mahratta diplomacy. In addition to these topics, the mode in which Scindia was to co-operate with the English was debated; and among other plans submitted for the consideration of the British resident was one, by which Scindia was to take the field in person, with a large body of horse and a proportion of infantry and artillery, at a monthly expense of about a quarter of a million sterling. Together with this plan, three others less costly were suggested; but on the resident inquiring by what means the expense of any of them was to be provided for, he was given to understand that Scindia relied in this respect on the British government. This renewed the interminable discussion which had already consumed so much time, and which continued to occupy the resident and the Mahratta ministers till the arrival in camp of a personage whose presence augured ill for the British cause. This was Scindia's father-in-law, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay by name, a man profligate, intriguing, rapacious, and cruel, beyond even the ordinary measure of Mahratta profligacy, intrigue, rapacity, and cruelty, and not more distinguished by his pre-eminence in all the evil propensities which deform the Mahratta character than by his inveterate hatred of the English. He had been appointed, under extraordinary circumstances, Scindia's dewan. The appointment originated in the following manner. Before the marriage of Scindia with the daughter of Shirzee Rao, a compact had been made between the latter personage and the peishwa, by virtue of which, in consideration of equivalent services, the peishwa authorized Shirzee Rao to make a promise on his part to Scindia of two crores of rupees; he also engaged to procure Shirzee Rao to be appointed Scindia's dewan. The expenses of Scindia's marriage exhausted his treasury, and he was left without the means of providing for the charges of his military establishment. In this emergency he pressed the peishwa for payment of the two crores of rupees which had been promised. The prince declared himself unable to raise them; but suggested that Shirzee Rao should be nominated Scindia's dewan, and in this character levy for the amount upon the rich inhabitants of Poona. The plan was adopted, and Scindia's treasury replenished by the perpetration of a series of atrocities rarely equalled even in countries where such modes of obtaining money are in ordinary practice. All who possessed wealth, or were supposed to possess it, were subjected to the most frightful tortures, under the infliction of which some died. Captain Duff, after detailing the circumstances of the appointment, says, "Such were the secret means by which Shirzee Rao Ghatgay became minister to his son-in-law, and by which Bajee Rao Rugonath let loose upon his subjects the violence and extortion of a monster whose name will be remembered, while Poona exists, with horror and execration." The course of the dewan was worthy of its commencement; but at length he fell under the displeasure of

Scindia, and was not only dismissed from his employment, but arrested, and for a time subjected to imprisonment. When set at liberty, he commenced a new career of intrigue and crime. In releasing Shirzee Rao, Scindia had been influenced by the advice of a minister named Balloba Tattyha; and the first use which Shirzee Rao made of his freedom was to compass the destruction of his benefactor, together with his adherents. Balloba was at his instigation thrown into prison, where a natural death released him from further persecution; but his relatives and associates felt the full force of Shirzee's vengeance. For one of them Shirzee invented a new mode of execution: a number of rockets were fastened on him, which being fired, carried the wretched man onward, mangling his body in a horrible manner, to the amusement of the brutal contriver of this new mode of frightful punishment. When Scindia departed to the northward, Shirzee Rao remained in the Deccan to manage the chieftain's affairs in that quarter. Left there ostensibly to suppress the troubles and disorders which prevailed, his presence tended but to increase them. After pursuing his vocation of plunder to the southward, he repaired with a small party to Poona, where he became importunate in his demands for money, and sat in *dhurma* at the door of the peishwa's favourite minister. This experiment had nearly cost him his liberty, if not his life. The minister, under pretence of giving him bills on certain bankers, invited him into the house, received him there with extraordinary courtesy, and, after a due interchange of civilities, rose apparently to fetch the promised bills. But the favour which he intended to bestow was of a different kind. His departure was to be the signal for seizing and perhaps murdering his unwelcome visitor. Shirzee Rao, either apprised of the intention or, which is more probable, suspecting it from some indication on the part of his host, drew his sword, sprang at the throat of the minister, and in this manner dragged him into the street, where, vaulting upon his horse, he with his party made the best of their way to the army which he commanded; the whole of which he forthwith brought to Poona, resolving to plunder and burn the city. The interference of the British resident became necessary to prevent mischief; and it was only Scindia's want of the services of this turbulent and audacious man in another place which relieved the peishwa from the fear and danger resulting from his proximity. This was the man who now appeared at Scindia's durbar to inflame the ill-feeling already prevailing therein against the English. His influence over Scindia appeared to be as great as it had ever been, and he was admitted to frequent secret conferences. His character and feelings were too well known to leave any doubt of the use made of these opportunities. Had his views required illustration, it would have been found in the fact that he was visited by Holkar's vakeel, whom he re-

ceived with marks of distinction. The arrival of Shirzee Rao, the attention which he secured, and the continued presence of Holkar's vakeel, called forth fresh remonstrances from the British resident, which were met by fresh assurances of good faith and good disposition towards the English. In the mean time Bappoojee Scindia, with his army, had fallen off to the enemy. This defection being brought to the notice of Scindia's minister, he, with that impudent reliance upon European credulity which Mahratta negotiators so often manifest, and for the indulgence of which, it must be admitted, European diplomatists have not unfrequently afforded ample encouragement, stated the substance of some letters, or pretended letters, from Bappoojee Scindia, representing his submission to Holkar as a measure of necessity, but expressing his resolution to return immediately to his duty. This was somewhat more than the resident was prepared to credit; and after expressing some surprise at his want of faith, Scindia's ministers promised inquiry and explanation. Not long afterwards, Bappoo Wittul, the minister who was believed the best affected to a British alliance, was attacked by disease, which terminated in his death. His illness transferred Scindia entirely into the hands of Shirzee Rao, whose intriguing spirit found fit occupation in moulding the mind of his weak, vacillating son-in-law to his will. Scindia now marched from Borhampore. He was attended, not only by his ministers and servants, but also by Holkar's vakeel. This was one indication of his feeling towards his British ally. He did not march direct to Oujein, as suggested by the British resident, and as the state of affairs imperiously required—and this was another. It was officially intimated to the resident that Scindia would proceed in the first instance to Jellode, a place within his own dominions, and there settle the future direction of his march. On the morning of the day, however, fixed on for the commencement of the march, and after both Scindia and the resident were actually in motion, the former, without any announcement of his intention, suddenly changed his course, and proceeded in the direction of Bhopal. Bhopal was at this time an object of some interest. The fort and territory of Hosheingabad, belonging to the nabob of Bhopal, had long been coveted by the rajah of Berar, who ultimately attained his object by corrupting the persons in charge of the fort. When the rajah of Berar was engaged in hostilities with the British government, the nabob of Bhopal took advantage of the circumstance to endeavour to regain Hosheingabad, and succeeded. It had been rumoured that Scindia, in consideration of a sum of money to be paid by the rajah of Berar, was to assist that chief with a military force, to be employed in reducing Hosheingabad once more under his authority; and in consequence, the nabob of Bhopal had made application to the British resident with Scindia to be placed under the

protection of the British government. He had some claim, on the ground of former services, to the protection which he sought, his predecessor in the government having some years before rendered valuable service to a British force under General Goddard, when that commander was surrounded by hostility and perfidy. The overture, however, was met by general expressions of courtesy, accompanied by a statement that the policy of the British government precluded its interposition to influence the results of any contest between states with which it was at amity.

Serious illness had prevented the British resident from keeping up with the march of Scindia, and he did not overtake him until he had arrived within the territories of Bhopal, where his troops were employed under Shirzee Rao in attacking a small fortified village named Cheonee. Immediately on reaching the camp, the British representative despatched Mr. Jenkins, the secretary to the residency, to remonstrate. That gentleman accordingly repaired to the durbar, and after adverting to the existing state of facts, proceeded to point out the inconsistency of Scindia's conduct with the obligations of the defensive alliance. He represented that, although Scindia, in reply to the British resident's repeated applications, had declared that he was unable to march unless pecuniary aid were afforded by the British government, he had marched, notwithstanding he had received no such aid, and to a distance which, in the direction recommended by the resident, would have enabled him to form a junction with the British force under Colonel Murray; that the late movement of Scindia's army was unconnected with any single object of the contest with Holkar; that it was directed to the injury of a state which maintained relations of peace both with Scindia and the British Government, and was thus a violation of the principles of the defensive alliance, which were opposed to aggressive war and the spirit of conquest; and that the attack upon Bhopal was at variance with the provisions of the subsidiary treaty, which treaty, on the other hand, was again violated by the withdrawal of Scindia's forces from the war with Holkar, and the employment of them on objects in which the allied powers had no just interest, and in a manner calculated to increase the number of their enemies.

After many attempts to evade discussion altogether, Scindia made an effort to justify his conduct. He still maintained that he was destitute of the means of co-operating efficiently with the British force; arguing, that as Holkar's force consisted principally of cavalry, thirty thousand horse would be necessary to oppose him, and that Colonel Murray had no horse. His march to Bhopal, Scindia justified by alleging that the nabob was his tributary; that the step which he had taken encouraged officers to join him who would otherwise have been deterred by the want of pecuniary resources; and that so far from his

march being, as the British functionary alleged, unconnected with the objects of the war, it was undertaken with especial reference to them; Scindia's design being, as he stated, to levy contributions on the nabob of Bhopal, for the purpose of placing his army in a condition to act against the enemy. On part of this explanation the British resident, Mr. Webbe, in a communication to his government, remarked—"The nabob of Bhopal is not a tributary to Scindia, so considered, although it is true that he has been subjected to such exactions as the superior force of Scindia has occasionally rendered it convenient for him to enforce; but the true object of Scindia's march to this place was founded on a plan concerted between him and the rajah of Nagpore, for the purpose of assisting Ruggojee Bhonsla in wresting the fort and territory of Hosheingabad from the nabob of Bhopal." The designs of the rajah of Berar with respect to Hosheingabad have been already mentioned. It was believed that his views extended further than the recovery of the fort and territory known by that name. There was some reason to apprehend that he meditated the resumption, by force of arms, of the territory which had been surrendered by the treaty so lately concluded by him with the British government. The existence of such views was attested by a series of correspondence which fell into the hands of the British resident at Nagpore; and was further corroborated by the efforts made by the rajah to raise funds, and by the extraordinary activity which appeared to pervade the various departments of his government. For some time previously to these discoveries, it had been observed that no cordial feelings of friendship existed on the part of the rajah towards the British government. That government felt bound to adhere to certain engagements made with parties previously dependents upon the rajah of Berar, and to continue to extend to them its protection, although in some instances the date of the treaties was subsequent to that of the peace with their former chief. Reparation was offered to the rajah; but though he sullenly accepted the list tendered to him of his alienated dependents, he refused to accept of the reparation, or to enter into any additional engagements, though attended with advantage to himself. The rajah, indeed, eventually expressed himself satisfied that the British government had acted correctly; but it was evident that he had experienced a degree of disappointment which must long preclude any implicit reliance on his friendship. At length a military force was put in motion, which marched nearly five miles from Nagpore, in the direction of Hosheingabad; while military preparations were in progress in Ruttenpore, for the alleged purpose of reducing some refractory zemindars, but the extent of which seem disproportioned to the object. In other quarters similar preparations were made under similar pretences. In the

mean time a very suspicious correspondence was carried on between the rajah of Berar and Ameer Khan. According to the rajah's ministers, the objects of the latter were to deter the rajah from proceeding against the nabob of Bhopal, and to obtain a sum of money. The British resident was of opinion that his purpose was to prevail on the rajah to join in a combination against the English. The intercourse of native princes is surrounded with so much mystery, that it is almost always difficult to ascertain its precise object. There was undoubtedly sufficient cause for the distrust felt by the British authorities in this case, but the course of circumstances seemed to countenance the statement of the rajah, as Ameer Khan actually invaded his territories and committed various excesses.

While the intentions of the rajah of Berar were thus doubtful, the state of affairs at Scindia's camp continued to indicate the hostile feelings of that chieftain. The British resident, Mr. Webbe, died soon after the advance from Borhampore. Colonel Close was instructed to proceed from Poona, to assume the charge vacated by the death of Mr. Webbe, the duties of which were in the interval performed by Mr. Jenkins. Scindia, leaving Hosheingabad in his rear, had now advanced into the territories of the rajah of Berar, and Mr. Jenkins felt bound to demand an explanation of this movement, as well as of the intercourse known to have taken place between Scindia and the rajah. After various expedients for procrastination, Scindia appointed a day to receive the acting resident, when, in answer to the latter point of inquiry, he declared that the rajah of Berar had applied to him to assist him in recovering Hosheingabad and another fortress from the nabob of Bhopal, but that he had not answered the application, and did not intend to interfere in the prosecution of an object in which he had no interest. To the former inquiry, and to others, as to the fact of his having ordered his troops in Malwa to quit that possession and join the army under his personal command, as to his having required his Pindarries also to join him, and as to the destination of his march, he answered that he had chosen the route which he was pursuing because of the scarcity of grain in the direct route to Oujein; that he was marching through the territories of the rajah of Berar for the purpose of crossing the Nerbudda at a ford which would enable him to proceed to Saugur, and that he had withdrawn his troops from Malwa for the purpose of assembling his army in a plentiful country. Having given this explanation of his conduct, Scindia concluded, as usual with Mahratta princes under such circumstances, by assurances of his faithful adherence to the obligation of his engagements with the British government.

About the time when these explanations and these assurances were afforded, the British

agent in Bundelcund intercepted a letter addressed by Ambajee Inglia, to a petty rajah dependent on the peishwa, stating that Scindia and the rajah of Berar had combined against the British power; that the former with his army was on his march to join Ameer Khan; that when the junction should be effected, Scindia was to direct his course towards Calpee, on the Jumna, while the rajah of Berar should invade Bengal; and that Ambajee had despatched a force into the territory of the rana of Gohud for the purpose of recovering possession of it. The immediate object of the letter was to induce the person to whom it was addressed to unite his force with the troops sent by Ambajee into Gohud. It was soon ascertained that one portion at least of the intelligence transmitted by Ambajee was true. A considerable body of troops belonging to that personage had actually invaded Gohud, and laid siege to a fort at a short distance from Gwalior. This was followed by the attack and defeat of a body of the rana of Gohud's troops. Thus was furnished new ground of remonstrance with Scindia, and the acting resident at his camp received instructions adapted to the occasion.

Before their arrival, Scindia, who had been pursuing his march along the north bank of the Nerbudda, intimated that he held from the peishwa an unliquidated assignment upon Saugur, and expressed an intention of realizing the amount. Mr. Jenkins strenuously opposed the execution of this project, which he declared would be regarded as an act of hostility against the peishwa. He demanded that the design should be abandoned, and that Scindia's profligate minister, Shirzee Rao, should be dismissed; and, on failure of compliance with these demands, intimated that his departure from Scindia's camp would become necessary. Scindia affected to comply in both instances; but Shirzee Rao was not dismissed, and his master continued to march towards the town of Saugur. The depredations committed by Scindia's troops in the country bearing that name again called forth remonstrance from Mr. Jenkins, and a renewal of his demand for permission to depart. In consequence he received a visit from a servant of Scindia, who alleged, in extenuation of the offensive conduct of his chief, that disappointment at not receiving the pecuniary aid expected from the English had led him to Saugur. Mr. Jenkins, in reply, insisted on the point previously urged, that the plunder of the country by Scindia's Pindarries constituted an act of direct hostility against an ally of the British government; and recapitulated the grounds of his repeated remonstrances, showing that, instead of going to Oujein, as was necessary for the benefit of the cause of the allies, Scindia had sacrificed the interests of that cause by proceeding in an opposite direction; and that, although the want of funds for the pay of his troops was the constant subject of complaint, the numbers of his troops

continued to be augmented. The acting resident concluded his representation by promising that, if Scindia would immediately proceed in the direction of Oujein, and would in other respects regulate his conduct according to his professions, he would continue to attend his court. The meeting at which the above communication was made, took place on the 1st of January, 1805. On the 6th Scindia advanced to Saugur, where he was joined by nine battalions of his infantry and sixty-five guns. From the 7th to the 9th the army of Scindia was employed in investing the fort of Saugur, for the purpose of realizing the amount of his pretended claim; and in consequence he was informed that the British representative would march on the following morning, and required passports. To this intimation and demand it was answered that an agent from Scindia should wait upon the resident, and that all points should be satisfactorily arranged. But the resident having repeated his application, the conciliatory tone was exchanged for that of arrogance and defiance. It was signified that Ambajee Inglia was expected to arrive in the space of eight days, and that on his arrival it would be determined whether Scindia should go to Oujein or the British representative receive his dismissal. This message resembled a former communication from Scindia to a British agent, that the result of an approaching interview would decide whether it should be peace or war; and evinced that the lesson which Scindia had received had not sufficed to eradicate the arrogance which had then led him to defy the power of the English government. On receiving it, Mr. Jenkins immediately struck his tents and prepared for departure. Scindia then thought that he had gone too far, and representations were made to the resident which induced him to postpone his march. He was solemnly assured that on the 16th Scindia would march for Oujein, and would thenceforward act in every respect in accordance with the advice of the British functionaries. The delay of six days was required in consequence of the death of a member of the chieftain's family; and the consent of the acting resident was secured by information conveyed to him, to the effect that the arrival of Ambajee would probably lead to the expulsion of Shirzee Rao. Mr. Jenkins was not then aware of the invasion of Gohud by Ambajee; and according to general opinion, that personage was adverse to the renewal of hostilities with the British government.

On the evening preceding the day on which the march, in conformity with the last arrangement, was to commence, Scindia applied for a further delay of two days, accompanying the application with a solemn promise of then prosecuting the march to Oujein without a halt. With some reluctance the resident assented; and on the 18th of January the chief actually commenced his march. It was observable, however, that only a small part of his army accompanied him; the larger portion,

with the guns, continued to occupy their position in the vicinity of Saugur. Not less observable was the care which his highness manifested for those of his troops who were put in motion. Their spirits were not broken nor their efficiency impaired by a march of harassing length. They received orders to pitch their tents at the end of three miles; and the resident was informed that it was the intention of the single-minded Mahratta chief to halt on the spot for four days. The British officer had recourse to a duty which repetition must have rendered familiar. He remonstrated; and was answered that, in conformity with the pledge that had been given, Scindia had marched at the time specified; but that, within thirteen days after the death of a member of his family, it was inconsistent with established custom to quit the spot where the calamity had taken place. He declared, however, that at the end of the four days which remained to complete the required period of mourning he would positively proceed to Oujein. What degree of credit the British resident gave to this promise may readily be conceived; but not being desirous to precipitate war, he acquiesced in the proposed arrangement.

Before the expiration of the period of halting, Mr. Jenkins became officially acquainted with the incursion of Ambajee Inglia into Gohud. He thereupon, in conformity with instructions from the governor-general, addressed a memorial to Scindia, setting forth the fact of the hostile incursion, with a copy of Ambajee's letter to the peishwa's tributary; calling for proof that Ambajee's assertion that Scindia, the rajah of Berar, Ameer Khan, and himself were combined against the British government was unfounded, and that Scindia had no concern in the proceedings of Ambajee; and demanding the immediate issue of an order directing that person to withdraw his troops from Gohud, together with a formal declaration of Scindia's entire concurrence in the measures that might be necessary for his punishment. The memorial, which was accompanied by a verbal message suggesting the immediate transmission of proper communications to the governor-general and to Ambajee, not producing any satisfactory result, strong remonstrance followed, accompanied by an intimation that, in the event of Scindia marching on the following morning in the direction of Oujein, the resident might be induced to remain in the camp, according to the orders of the governor-general; but the intimation of this act of forbearance was accompanied by very significant warnings as to the consequences to be apprehended from the hostile and treacherous courses pursued by the chief and his dependents. Fresh attempts to lull the suspicions of the resident, and to induce him to consent to further delay, followed; but no satisfactory steps being taken, the resident again demanded passports. His demand received an insolent answer; and on the

23rd January he departed without them, and marched fourteen miles. This was a proceeding for which Scindia was not prepared, and it excited some dismay. Two persons were immediately despatched to overtake the British officer, and, if possible, prevail upon him to forego his intention. Mr. Jenkins refused to listen to their entreaties until assured by them that they were authorized to pledge Scindia's name for the performance of any conditions which might be necessary to procure the resident's return. He then proposed the following: that on the day after his return to the camp, Scindia should seriously enter upon his long-promised and long-deferred march to Oujein, and proceed thither without any further halts, except at the necessary and usual intervals; that he should without delay act in conformity with the resident's advice in regard to Ambajee, and also disavow in a letter to the governor-general the acts of that person, and of another who had appeared in the character of Scindia's agent at Hyderabad, where, by exaggerating the successes of Holkar, and announcing an extended alliance against the British government, to which Scindia and the rajah of Berar were to be parties, he had endeavoured to promote the objects which such an alliance would be intended to advance. The recall of this person was required to be effected through a letter from Scindia to be delivered to Mr. Jenkins, and by him forwarded to the British resident at Hyderabad. The messengers agreed in the most formal manner to the prescribed conditions, and Mr. Jenkins returned to Scindia's camp on the morning of the day after he had quitted it.

The experience of a few hours sufficed to test Scindia's sincerity. On the evening of Mr. Jenkins's return, he learned that Scindia intended to halt on the following day. This being a direct violation of one of the conditions of the resident's return, he had only to choose between again quitting the camp or remaining a monument of the degradation of the government which he represented. He did not hesitate in taking the former course, but had proceeded only a short distance, when he was again called back by a message from Scindia, expressing a desire to receive a visit from him. He accordingly directed his baggage to remain at a grove in the vicinity of Scindia's regular brigade, and proceeded with Lieutenant Stuart, the officer commanding his escort, to the tent of the vacillating and treacherous chief. Some idle attempts were made by Scindia to excuse his conduct, and these being disposed of, he expressed himself ready to comply immediately with the resident's request as to Ambajee, and to recommence his march on the following morning. Mr. Jenkins was requested to retire to another tent with some Mahratta officers, to prepare the letters; and some progress had been made, when it was announced that Scindia's devotions had been interrupted by the arrival of the British resident—that he was now anxious

to resume them—that the letters, when completed, should be sent for the resident's inspection, and that if their terms should not entirely accord with his wishes, he could return to the chieftain's tent in the evening and suggest the required alterations. On the faith of this arrangement Mr. Jenkins despatched orders recalling his baggage. The baggage, however, before the arrival of the orders, had passed out of the hands of those left in charge of it. The British camp had been attacked by the entire body of Pindarries retained by Scindia, and plundered of every article of value. The escort, in defending it, had suffered severely, and among the wounded were the lieutenant in command and the surgeon attached to the residency. An attempt to plunder the British camp had been made some weeks before, with partial success. In this second instance the success was complete. The loss of property, though productive of the most serious inconvenience to the resident and his attendants, was not the worst result of the outrage which had been perpetrated. The circumstances of the residency deprived it of all outward claims to respect, and the spirit prevailing in Scindia's camp was not such as to supply the want of them. Mr. Jenkins was naturally and justly anxious to withdraw from a situation where his office could no longer command even decent regard, and he requested permission to retire to some place of safety, where he might avail himself of the first opportunity that should offer of proceeding to a British camp. Scindia in reply expressed great concern at what had happened, but declined to comply with the wish of the resident to quit the camp. He accordingly remained, and the consequent position of the British residency is thus described by himself:—"Under the operation of the late events, the British residency is become a degraded spectacle to a camp by which it was formerly held in the utmost veneration and respect. Our equipage is reduced to a single tent, which occupies a small corner of Scindia's encampment; and in this situation we are exposed to the derision of the plunderers, who triumph in the protection of a nefarious government, under the countenance of which they presume to insult us with the proffer for sale of our plundered effects. Exposed to these insults and to the entire neglect of the government, which does not think it necessary even to profess regret for what has passed, the escort of the residency, deprived of its arms and accoutrements, and disabled by the loss of about fifty men killed and wounded, while so far from being protected we have been openly attacked by Scindia's army, you will in some measure conceive the irksomeness of our situation."

In this miserable condition did the British residency accompany the march of Scindia, who left the vicinity of Sangur on the 24th of February, leaving there, however, some battalions under an officer named Baptiste, of French origin but native birth, to realize the

contribution which it had been the pleasure of the Mahratta chief to exact. Mr. Jenkins, feeling that under its present circumstances the British residency could command no respect, and desirous of receiving the instructions of the governor-general for the guidance of his future conduct, wished to decline any political intercourse with Scindia or his servants; but the earnest request of the chief induced the resident to consent to receive a visit from him. On that occasion Scindia displayed a combination of hypocrisy and audacity worthy of the race to which he belonged. He endeavoured to justify the general conduct of his government in regard to his engagements with the English, and to remove from the resident's mind the impression, which he most justly concluded must find place there, that the outrage perpetrated on the British camp had not been committed without his approbation or cognisance. It was, he alleged, to be attributed entirely to the Pindarries, over whom he had no control. He expressed, too, a hope that the misfortune would not interrupt the friendship subsisting between the two states. The resident made little answer, conceiving this course the most accordant with the due maintenance of the dignity of his office and government. Of the motives which actuate a Mahratta it is at all times difficult to judge; but as Scindia had before this period held language widely different in its character, and had addressed to the governor-general a letter framed in a tone far from conciliatory, the expression of a desire for the preservation of amity with a state whose representative had so recently been exposed to insult and violence, must be regarded as the effect of some temporary cause, probably of a belief in the eventual success of the British arms. The weakness of Scindia's character, combined with his intense hatred of the English and his participation in the duplicity which is always an element in the moral constitution of a Mahratta, produced great fluctuations in his feelings and deportment. The history of the letter to the governor-general above noticed is remarkable. The letter bore the date of the 18th of October. It was forwarded by two messengers on foot to a person residing at Benares, who for many years had held the nominal appointment of vakeel, first to the predecessor of Dowlut Rao Scindia, and subsequently to himself. The vakeel was to proceed with the letter to Calcutta, in order to deliver it in person; but he did not report his arrival in that city till the 18th of February, exactly four months after the date of the letter. It has been questioned whether Scindia knew anything of this letter, and whether its preparation and transmission were not altogether the acts of his ministers. But this is a point of little importance—by whomsoever it might be framed, by whomsoever forwarded, it is extraordinary that it should have been four months on its journey to Calcutta. The only possible solution of the

difficulty is to be found in the supposition that the letter was written under the influence of the feelings excited by the successes of Holkar and the disasters of Colonel Monson; that subsequent events gave rise to different feelings and expectations, which suggested the prudence of keeping it back; and that the ultimate determination to revert to the original intention of the writer, by causing it to be delivered at its destination, was prompted by the reverses of the English before Bhurtpore. Another extraordinary fact connected with this proceeding is, that it was transmitted without the knowledge of the British resident with Scindia, whose duty it was to forward to his government any representation which he might receive from that to which he was deputed, and who, it could not be doubted, was ready faithfully to discharge his trust.

The letter, after an ordinary compliment, adverted to the relations subsisting between Scindia and the Company's government, and thence proceeded to complain of the neglect of the latter to afford to the chief pecuniary assistance. The next subject was one which would perhaps have been avoided by negotiators of any other race than that of the Mahrattas. It arose out of the former, and presented a curious version of the circumstances under which Bappoojee Scindia passed over to the enemy; a result which was attributed to the want of funds. It was alleged that on an application being made by Bappoojee to Colonel Monson for money to pay his troops, the British commander answered that he could advance none, and referred the applicant to General Lake. This was something more than mere misrepresentation—it was a positive falsehood; for Colonel Monson had advanced to Bappoojee a considerable sum. Bappoojee, however, it was represented, being, for want of the required assistance, unable to sustain his troops, was obliged to despatch an officer named Suddasheo Rao, with a body of horse and foot, in search of provisions; himself, with three thousand men, remaining with Colonel Monson; in which situation, according to Scindia's statement, they exerted themselves most meritoriously. The succeeding part of the narrative was a tissue of untruths and misrepresentations, ending with a statement of the reasons which led Bappoojee to join Holkar, differing but little from that which was given to the British resident. After the enumeration of his pecuniary grievances, Scindia proceeded to the statement of other grounds of complaint. The first related to a question which had been settled professedly to the satisfaction, and certainly with the acquiescence, of Scindia's ministers—the transfer of Gohud and Gwalior. There were seven more. The name of the rajah of Jodepore, it was said, had been improperly inserted in the list of chieftains to whom the provisions of the ninth article of the treaty applied; the payment of certain pensions as stipulated was represented

to be irregular; delay in delivering to Scindia some districts to which he was entitled was complained of; a similar complaint was preferred as to collections from other districts; the maharajah had been prevented, as he alleged, from placing in specified countries a sufficient number of troops for their protection, in consequence of which they had become a scene of devastation; the jaghires in Hindostan, covenanted to be returned to Scindia, were, he urged, still retained; and, lastly, the obligation incurred by the Company under the second treaty, to protect Scindia's territories in the same manner as their own, was stated to be disregarded. These complaints were interspersed with abundant abuse of the British resident, Mr. Webbe. The conclusion was peculiarly edifying, from the high moral tone which characterizes it, and the beautiful exposition of the obligations of friendship which it affords. On such a subject a Maharatta may well be expected to be eloquent, and Scindia did not discredit either his theme or his country. "Where," said he, "friendship has been established by treaties and engagements between princes and chiefs of high rank and power, it is incumbent on both parties to observe it on all occasions, and they consider the injuries and losses of friends and allies to be their own; and, in the same manner, the strength and power of friends and allies to be their own strength and power. My continuance during so long a period of time in the vicinity of Borhampore has been owing entirely to my expectation, founded on the union of the two states, of aid in all my affairs on the part of your excellency. As Mr. Webbe, who resides with me on the part of your excellency, practises delay and evasion in every point, and avoids the advance of money in the form of pecuniary aid, of a loan, or on account of that which is clearly and justly due by the conditions of treaty, I have deemed it necessary to communicate all circumstances to your excellency. My army having reached the banks of the Nerbudda by successive marches, is beginning to cross. I shall now remain in expectation of an answer. Your excellency is endowed with great wisdom and foresight, and is unequalled in the virtues of fulfilling the obligations of engagements and of friendship. I therefore request your excellency to take into your deliberate consideration all that I have written, and adopt such measures as may most speedily both terminate the contest with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and fulfil the obligations of the treaties subsisting between us, and strengthen in the most perfect degree and perpetuate the foundations of union and alliance between the two states. Let your excellency further be pleased to consider where is the advantage of suffering that which has been taken from friends to fall into the hands of enemies: undoubtedly your excellency's provident wisdom and correct understanding will never approve such a thing, since the power and strength of one friend

must be considered to be the power and strength of another, and the weakness and defective resources of the one also those of the other. If I acquire strength by territory and money, that strength (as the consequence of our union) becomes in truth the strength of the Company also. Having maturely weighed and considered all these points, let your excellency be pleased to favour me with a speedy and favourable answer. If by the time of my arrival at Malwa a full and detailed answer to all that I have written arrives, it will be extremely proper and advisable."

Complaints similar to those contained in Scindia's letter had been addressed by some agents of that chief to Colonel Close at Nagpore, to which place he had proceeded on his way to undertake the duties of resident at Scindia's camp, but on learning the events which had occurred, had thought it expedient to wait for further instructions from his government. These, when received, directed him to proceed to assume the duties to the discharge of which he stood appointed, and to demand reparation for the outrage which had been committed on the British residency. A copy of these instructions being furnished to Mr. Jenkins, that gentleman immediately, in accordance with their spirit, reassumed the functions which had since the attack on his camp been permitted to remain dormant.

The complaints embodied in the letter of Scindia, together with the communications to Colonel Close, received from the governor-general an elaborate reply. After adverting to the date of Scindia's letter, to the extraordinary delay which had taken place in delivering it, and to the aspersions cast by Scindia on the character of Mr. Webbe, the governor-general proceeded to expose the trickery and injustice of reviving the claim to Gohud and Gwalior, after repeated recognitions of the acts of the British government with respect to those possessions. Scindia was reminded of the various acts by which he was pledged not to disturb the arrangement which had been made, and was called upon once more, by a formal declaration in writing, to renounce his claim. This would have added something to the evidence previously existing on the subject, but it cannot be supposed that it would have operated in the slightest degree to prevent the revival of the claim whenever it might suit the purposes or the caprice of this unstable chief to assert it. The case of the rajah of Jodepore was divested of all difficulty. He had refused to abide by the engagement which had been made; his name in consequence was directed to be erased from the list presented to Scindia; but by some error or accident this had been omitted. The payment of the pensions, it was shown, had not only been strictly regular, but that the prescribed period had been anticipated. In answer to Scindia's complaints of the non-surrender of the pergunnas to which he had a claim, it was stated, that no person duly authorized had ever been sent to

take charge of them. It was very properly added that, with reference to the operations of the war with Holkar, it had become inexpedient at that period to give them up; but that they would be surrendered at the termination of hostilities with the last-named chief, or rented by the English, as Scindia might choose. Payment of the collections from those pergunnas, Scindia was informed, would be regularly made to his officers until the delivery of the districts. With regard to other collections which Scindia claimed, the governor-general professed never before to have heard of the claim; but intimated that an investigation should take place, and that when the accounts were adjusted, payment should be made of whatever might be found due. To the charge of the British having abandoned to devastation part of Scindia's territories, the governor-general replied, that the British were not bound to suppress internal disturbances, or to protect the country against robbers; but that, notwithstanding, directions should be given for the preservation of order. The relinquishment of the jaghires in Hindostan, it was stated, would take place forthwith, on a proper application to the commander-in-chief; and the jaghiredars would receive from the British government whatever that government had received on account of the jaghire lands since the treaty of peace. In reply to the last head of charge, that the British had not protected Scindia's territory from invasion, but had permitted Holkar and Ameer Khan to ravage and plunder within it, it was observed, that the obligation of a defensive alliance was mutual, and that the British might with equal justice complain of Scindia for not preventing the incursions of the enemy into the Company's territories. "An appeal to the evidence of facts, however," continued the governor-general, "will manifest the degree in which either state has fulfilled the obligations of the defensive alliance. By the valour, activity, and skill of the British armies, Jeswunt Rao Holkar has been deprived of nearly all his territorial possessions; a part of which, including the capital city of Indore, was delivered over to your highness's officers. The whole of his force has been repeatedly defeated and nearly destroyed, with the loss of all his artillery; and he has been deprived of every resource but that which he derives from the feeble and precarious aid of the rajah of Bhurtpore. Has your highness," it was then properly asked, "according to the provisions of the treaty, contributed in any degree to these victories? On the contrary, has not the conduct of your highness and of your officers aided the cause of the enemy against the power by which those victories have been achieved, and with which your highness was pledged to co-operate?" After some remarks on various parts of the conduct of Scindia during the war, his more recent proceedings were thus noticed. "On every occasion when the resident urged your highness to proceed to Onjein for the

purpose of restoring the vigour of your government, of reviving the efficiency of your declining resources, and of co-operating with the British troops in the prosecution of the war, your highness uniformly asserted your inability to proceed, for want of funds to pay your troops; and in your highness's letter you have ascribed your detention at Borhampore to the same cause. Your highness, however, stated in the same letter, that you had been enabled by loans to provide necessaries for your march, and for collecting your troops; that you had accordingly marched from Borhampore; that you had written to all the officers of your troops to join you from every quarter; and that it was your intention to raise new troops." On the foundation of the facts referred to in this passage, the governor-general raises the following conclusion, and addresses the exhortation which succeeds:—"It is evident, therefore, that your highness never intended to comply with the suggestion of the resident on the subject of your return to Onjein; for your highness assigned the deficiency of your funds as the only cause which prevented your return to Onjein in conformity with the resident's advice; and when your highness, according to your own declaration, had obtained funds, you marched in a different direction, and afforded to the resident no explanation of the nature of your designs. Under these circumstances, it is evident that your highness never entertained the design of proceeding to Onjein, or of co-operating with the British troops in the prosecution of the war. With what degree of justice, therefore, can your highness complain of the conduct of the British government in withholding the pecuniary aid which you solicited, until adequate security had been obtained for the due application of those funds to the common cause of the allies, instead of perverting the aid furnished by the allies to the cause of the enemy? Your highness," the governor-general continues, "has stated in your letter, that it was your determined resolution, after having collected a numerous army, consisting both of old troops and new levies, to proceed to chastise the enemy; and your highness adds, 'How can I be content to see a territory which for a long time has been in my possession, and in the conquest of which crores of rupees have been expended, and great battles have been fought, in the possession of another?'—and that 'it is no difficult matter to wrest the territory from the hands of the enemy.' I am unable to comprehend your highness's meaning in the passage above quoted. The enemy has not at any stage of the war been able to effect the conquest of a single district, and wherever the British troops have approached, the enemy has sought his safety in a precipitate flight; and although, subsequently to the date of your highness's letter, you have received constant reports of the repeated defeats of the enemy by the British troops, your highness has continued to augment your forces and to advance

to the effect that it could not be supposed that Scindia would act in opposition to justice and good faith, an attendant upon Scindia's alleged agent asked if it were not supposed that Scindia moved to the northward in consequence of being offended, to what motive was that step ascribed? These avowals that Scindia's movements were influenced by designs which he concealed from the British resident, contrast strikingly with his often-repeated expressions of a desire to comply with the advice of that functionary, his declarations of continued attachment to the British cause, and his professions of anxiety to fulfil his engagements and maintain unimpaired his alliance with the British government.

The governor-general was no sooner apprised of the communications made to Mr. Jenkins and Colonel Close, than, with his characteristic energy, he took measures for frustrating the meditated designs of Scindia. Instructions were forwarded to the commander-in-chief, directing him to reject peremptorily all demands on the part of Scindia which might be at variance with the treaty of peace; to repel any act of hostility from Scindia with promptitude and effect; and to provide, in the event of war, for the safety of Mr. Jenkins and the British residency. Other parts of the instructions referred to the contingency of war being followed by negotiation; and it was distinctly laid down, that Scindia was not to be permitted to treat for Holkar, nor Holkar for Scindia. These orders were explained and enforced by others forwarded a few days afterwards. While provision was thus made for frustrating the hostile designs of Scindia in the north, the south was not neglected. Impressed with a sense of the advantages resulting from the system adopted in the previous war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, of intrusting very general and extensive powers, both political and military, to the hands of a single local authority, the governor-general resolved to invest Colonel Close with the same powers which had formerly been exercised by General Wellesley in the Deccan, with the exception of the control of the military commander in Guzerat. On the return of General Wellesley from Calcutta to Madras, it appears to have been for some time doubtful whether he would resume his station in the Deccan or not. It was ultimately determined in the negative; General, now, by the well-merited grace of his sovereign, Sir Arthur Wellesley, being of opinion that his services were no longer necessary; being anxious, with regard to the state of his health, as well as to his professional prospects, to proceed to Europe; thinking also that his presence there might enable him to dispel some misapprehensions with regard to the policy lately pursued in India, and being moreover dissatisfied with the authorities at home. It is satisfactory to relate that the greatest commander of modern times was not permitted to quit the scene of his early glories without testimonies, warm and

abundant, to his eminent services. Soldiers and civilians, Europeans and natives, vied in rendering him honour.

Colonel Close, under the powers assigned to him, was to take the command of the main army in the Deccan. In furtherance of the views of the governor-general, Colonel Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force at Poona, and Colonel Haliburton, commanding that at Hyderabad, were ordered to occupy with their troops the positions most favourable for the seizure, if necessary, of Scindia's possessions south of the Nerbudda; but these officers were not to commence operations against Scindia without express orders, except in the event of intelligence reaching them of the actual commencement of hostilities in Hindostan. In Guzerat it was necessary to provide considerable reinforcements, the number of troops in that province having been greatly reduced by the detachment of the force which originally marched under Colonel Murray to Oujein, and subsequently, under General Jones, joined the army of Hindostan. To supply the deficiency thus occasioned, the government of Bombay were instructed to despatch to Guzerat as soon as practicable, and by the safest and most expeditious route, a corps consisting of at least four companies of European infantry, a company of European artillery, and one battalion of sepoys, with a due proportion of camp equipage, artillery, pioneers, lascars, and every necessary equipment to enable the corps to be employed on field service the moment it should reach Guzerat. Colonel Woodington, the officer commanding in the province, was to be instructed to place the corps under him in an efficient state of equipment, and to lay up, at convenient places on the frontier, supplies of grain and stores. Thus reinforced, it was expected that Colonel Woodington would be able, not only to defend Guzerat from invasion, but to attack with success the forts and possessions of Scindia in that province, should war ensue.

Soon after the issue of these several instructions, a letter was received from the acting resident at Scindia's camp, which seemed to indicate more pacific feelings on the part of Scindia than had been contemplated. The resident had held communications with the chief and his ministers, which had produced a satisfactory letter to the governor-general in reply to the demand for reparation on account of the outrage upon the residency, a multiplicity of assurances of friendly intentions, and a promise that Scindia should halt upon the Chumbul until the arrival of Colonel Close. The promise was kept with Mahratta strictness. Scindia retired to Subdulgur; but on the 7th of April Ameer Khan left Bhurtপুর with the avowed intention of joining Scindia; and on the same day Shirzee Rao, with a large body of Pindarries and a considerable part of Scindia's cavalry, marched towards Bhurtপুর. Previously to his departure one of Scindia's ministers waited on Mr. Jenkins to announce

the intended movement, and to explain that it had reference to the proposed mediation. The resident demanded an audience of Scindia himself, which was granted, and the chief gave the same explanation which had been offered by his minister. The statement was accompanied by strong professions of fidelity and friendship, and by a repetition of a request formerly made, that Mr. Jenkins would write to the commander-in-chief to desire that hostilities with Holkar might be suspended. The object of despatching Shirzee Rao to Bhurtpore was undoubtedly to prevent the rajah from entering into a pacific arrangement with the British government; but the design was defeated. On the 11th the conditions of a treaty were finally determined upon; and on the 17th, as has been already related, the treaty was signed.

On arriving at Weir, a place about fifteen miles from Bhurtpore, Shirzee Rao addressed a letter to the commander-in-chief, intimating that, at the request of the British resident, Scindia had consented to wait at Subdulghur in expectation of Colonel Close's arrival. This was true; but it would be inconsistent with Mahratta custom to offer truth unmix'd with some alloy of falsehood; and the announcement of Scindia's position, and the cause of his occupying it, was associated with a representation that the British resident had expressed a desire that Scindia should interpose his mediation for obtaining peace; in consequence of which desire his highness had despatched Shirzee Rao to Bhurtpore to negotiate. The commander-in-chief, in reply, stated that peace having been established between the British government and the rajah of Bhurtpore, the presence of Shirzee Rao at Bhurtpore was unnecessary; that he must not think of advancing, as such a proceeding might subvert the union subsisting between the Company and Scindia. On the following day, however, Shirzee Rao did, with a small party of horse, advance within a short distance of Bhurtpore, and transmitted to the rajah a message soliciting a personal conference. The rajah declined granting the application, and Shirzee Rao returned to Weir without gaining any thing by his movement. At Weir he was joined by Holkar, with three or four thousand horse, and both proceeded towards the camp of Scindia at Subdulghur. Scindia had for some time maintained, through an agent of his own, a correspondence with the court of Holkar. Some of the letters of this agent to his employer, which fell into the hands of the English, fully confirmed all that was suspected of the views of Scindia, and of the degree of credit to be given to his expressions of fidelity and attachment. It is wearisome to find occasion for recurring so frequently to the task of exhibiting Mahratta chicanery and dissimulation, but it is necessary to the just understanding of the relative circumstances and position of the British government and the Mahratta chiefs. While Scindia was intriguing with Holkar, who was in a state of avowed war with the Company's govern-

ment, while the former chief was advancing towards Bhurtpore in the hopes of striking a blow at the interests of his English ally, he was profuse in declarations of sincerity and good faith. Never were his professions more strong than at this period; and it may be added that never were they either more or less honest.

In consequence of the movement of Scindia to the northward, Colonel Martindell, who had been stationed in a position to enable him to secure the tranquillity of Bundelcund and to protect Gohud from invasion, advanced in the same direction, under orders from the commander-in-chief, carefully avoiding any violation of the possessions of either Scindia or his dependents; and on the 8th of April he reached Hingorah, a position on the southern bank of the Chumbul, at a short distance from Dholepore. His proximity was distasteful to Scindia; and on the 11th that chief requested that the British resident would prevent the approach of Colonel Martindell within twenty coss of his camp. Mr. Jenkins answered by expressing surprise that Scindia should feel any uneasiness in the presence of the British troops, under the continued assurances given that he considered himself standing in the closest relations of alliance with the British government. He remarked, that under the terms of the treaty the British troops were to act in concert with those of the maharajah; and he reminded the chieftain that when Colonel Murray was stationed at Oujein no apprehension was expressed, but, on the contrary, Scindia was continually urgent for the assistance of the British troops for the protection of his country. If Scindia had no other view than that of maintaining his relation with the British government, what, the resident asked, was there to apprehend from the neighbourhood of the troops of his ally? He added, that Colonel Martindell was within the Company's territories, and that his advance had been rendered necessary by circumstances, more especially by the movement of the notorious Bappoojee Scindia in the direction of Scindia's camp, and the vicinity of considerable bodies of the troops of Holkar and Ameer Khan, in charge of the baggage of those chiefs. The pointed question put by the resident it was not easy for Mahratta ingenuity to answer; but Scindia urged, that if the Pindarries of his camp should happen to commit any excesses, or should enter into disputes with any of the inferior people of the British camp, the blame of such conduct might attach to the government. Mr. Jenkins answered that the known and exemplary discipline of the British troops should preclude any uneasiness respecting their conduct, and that Scindia's distrust of the inferior part of his own army only afforded a further proof of the necessity of Colonel Martindell's advance to the frontier; though nothing short of actual aggression would produce any hostile proceedings on the part of that officer. Scindia renewing his request that an application should be made to Colonel Martindell to keep at a distance of twenty coss

from the Mahratta's camp, the resident shrewdly suggested, that if the maharajah desired to maintain this distance between the two camps, it would be better that his highness should himself make a movement for the purpose. To this Scindia expressed himself averse, and (according to his own declaration) his aversion had a most creditable origin, being founded on his promise to Mr. Jenkins to wait in the position which he now occupied for the arrival of Colonel Close—so sacred did Scindia deem a promise, even though the person to whom it was made was willing to relieve him from the obligation to an extent which would enable him to effect a purpose which he professed to think important. Scindia at length expressed himself satisfied, and adverting to the presence of Bappoojee Scindia in the neighbourhood, intimated an intention of visiting him. The resident was silent till his opinion of the meditated visit was asked. He then referred to the maharajah's sense of propriety, to determine whether or not it was advisable to visit a man whose traitorous conduct had placed him in the position of an enemy to the British government. Scindia manifested his respect for that government, and his regard for the opinion of its representative, by paying his promised visit to Bappoojee Scindia on the same evening.

On the 14th of April the arrival of Ameer Khan was announced to the British representative, as a preparative to the public reception of the respectable freebooter and temporary associate of Holkar; and as it was necessary to devise a plausible pretext for receiving him, it was stated that Scindia supposed that Ameer Khan had been dispatched by Holkar with views corresponding with those which had led to the mission of Shirree Rao from the camp of Scindia to Bhurtpore. Two days afterwards Scindia sent to congratulate the resident on the conclusion of peace between the British government and Bhurtpore. The person who was on this occasion the organ of Scindia's politeness took occasion to intimate that Holkar had resolved to renew his attack on the Company's territories, but had abandoned his intention at the persuasion of Shirree Rao; that Holkar had consented to accept the mediation of Scindia, and, in company with Shirree Rao, was on his way to Scindia's camp. On the following day he arrived with all his remaining force, and was immediately visited by Scindia and his principal officers. This ceremony was preceded by a very characteristic specimen of Mahratta duplicity and insolence. Scindia dispatched a message to Mr. Jenkins, intimating that he was surprised by the sudden arrival of Holkar; that he had desired that chief not to cross the Chumbul, but that the request having been disregarded, Scindia was compelled to visit him; and that it was his particular wish that the British representative should be present at the meeting. The resident answered by pointing out the extreme impropriety of the request, and observing that

Scindia's intended visit was utterly inconsistent with the relations subsisting between him and the British government.

The resident, in regard to the duty which he owed to the government represented by him, did not, therefore, attend the auspicious interview between the two Mahratta chiefs, whose hereditary and personal quarrels were now suspended to enable them to combine against a common object of hatred. But he was soon summoned to an interview, at which various attempts were made to prevail on him to believe that all that had occurred was occasioned by a sincere regard to promote the peace of India. The servants of Scindia descanted on this theme with their habitual fluency, till disconcerted by a remark thrown out by Mr. Jenkins, that since the approach of the troops of an ally within twenty coos had lately created so much uneasiness in the mind of Scindia, it could not fail to excite surprise to find the army of his highness encamped in union with that of the common enemy.

Holkar had not long occupied his proximate position to Scindia before he manifested his power by seizing the person of Ambajee Inglia. This act was intended to extort a contribution, and it appears to have succeeded to the extent of obtaining a promise from Ambajee of the payment of fifty lacs. Ambajee was at this time in the service of Scindia, and apparently in his confidence; yet the chief did not interfere to protect his servant from plunder. His conduct in this respect seems to have decided, in the mind of the commander-in-chief, the question in what relation Scindia stood towards the British government; and he suggested that the British resident should take the earliest practicable opportunity of quitting Scindia's camp. On the 21st of April, the commander-in-chief, being now relieved from anxiety with regard to Bhurtpore, quitted that place with the whole of the army under his personal command, and marched in the direction where it was evident his services were about to be required. His previous success had been rewarded by a peerage, and he now bore the title of Lord Lake.

On his march Lord Lake received a letter from Scindia, referring to the treaty of peace concluded with him, and stating that ever since its conclusion the friendship between the two states had been progressively increasing. "The object of the treaty," said Scindia, "was to give peace to the country and quiet to its inhabitants; and with a view to this object, friendship was established between all the different chiefs and the British government. Jeswunt Rao Holkar alone remains to be settled with; and for the purpose of settling disputes between Holkar and the British government, and concluding a peace between them, I have marched from the city of Borhampore, and have arrived at Subdulghur;" he having formerly professed to be actuated by very different views. The letter then adverted to the war between the Company's government and

the rajah of Bhurtpore, and to the steps taken by him in regard to it—omitting, however, all notice of Scindia's endeavours to induce the rajah to re-engage in war. But the alleged services of Scindia in restraining Holkar from ravaging the Company's territories were not forgotten; and the remainder of the letter was employed in commending its bearer to the British commander, as "a man of sense," and one enjoying Scindia's "confidence;" with recommendations to negotiate with Holkar, and to abstain from molesting him. The answer of Lord Lake was such as became a British officer. It exposed the flimsy pretences under which Scindia sought to veil his enmity; apprized him that Mr. Jenkins had been instructed to withdraw from his camp; and intimated that the British government would consider Scindia responsible in his own person, in his family, his ministers, and his servants, for the safe and unmolested journey of its representative, with his attendants and property, to the nearest British camp.

Between the dispatch of Scindia's letter and the receipt of Lord Lake's answer Mr. Jenkins had, in compliance with previous instructions from the commander-in-chief, requested an audience of Scindia, for the purpose of formally demanding the retirement of the chieftain from the position which he occupied, and his separation from Holkar. Scindia appointed a time for receiving the British resident; and the latter, with a view to placing Scindia in a situation to afford a satisfactory answer, transmitted a memorial, embodying the principal facts which he intended to urge at the approaching audience. At the time appointed, however, Scindia neither afforded the promised interview, nor answered the memorial. Great confusion and no inconsiderable portion of alarm was now felt in Scindia's camp, from a report which prevailed that the British troops were in the vicinity; and on the morning of the 28th April the armies both of Scindia and Holkar retreated with the utmost precipitation in the direction of Sheopore, a town situate a short distance south of the Chumbul, on the road to Kotah, and about fifty miles north-east of that place. They marched on that day twenty miles, on the following day fourteen, and on the third day arrived at Sheopore. Their route lay along the banks of the Chumbul, over deep ravines; the difficulties and fatigue of the march were aggravated by excessive heat and the want of water, and considerable numbers of the troops of both chiefs perished.

It will be recollected that, on the approach of Scindia towards Bhurtpore, vigorous measures had been adopted for placing the British forces throughout India in a condition for carrying on the operations of war with effect. Under the orders issued for this purpose, Colonel Close had directed Colonel Haliburton, commanding the Hyderabad subsidiary force, to advance to Moolapore, there to be joined by the Poona subsidiary force under Colonel Wallace. At Fort St. George it was deemed

advisable to assemble a considerable force in the ceded districts. A call was made upon the dewan of Mysore to take the field with a body of the rajah's troops, to which call he promptly responded; and a body of Silladar horses in the service of the rajah was to join the British troops to be assembled at Bellary, in the ceded districts. At Bombay equal activity was displayed in complying with the orders of the governor-general for reinforcing Colonel Woodington in Guzerat. But the retreat of Scindia and his Mahratta colleague from Subdulghur was assigned as a reason for modifying the instructions under which these arrangements had been made. The government of Fort St. George was directed to suspend its preparations, to distribute the army of the presidency in its usual stations, and to proceed immediately to withdraw from the Deccan all corps and establishments which might be extra to the field establishment of the subsidiary forces serving with the peishwa and the nizam. The extra battalions on the establishment of the presidency were also to be reduced, and every practicable diminution of expense effected. Colonel Close had commenced his return to Moolapore, to take the command of the army to be assembled there. On his way he received a copy of the instructions forwarded to Fort St. George, with orders to carry into effect such parts of them as might depend upon the exercise of his authority. The extraordinary military and political powers vested in him were at the same time withdrawn; and he was directed to return to Poona, to resume his duties as resident at the court of the peishwa. Instructions similar in character were forwarded to Bombay, and on the authorities of this presidency the necessity of economy was urgently enforced. The troops in Guzerat were to be cantoned, in order to avoid the expense of field allowances; and no field expenses were to be incurred without the special sanction of the government of Bengal, except under circumstances of urgent and uncontrollable necessity.

The pacific and economical policy now adopted was extended to the army of Lord Lake. Scindia and Holkar were to fly without disturbance and without alarm. The commander-in-chief was instructed not to pursue the retreating forces of the chiefs confederated against the British government, and who held in durance a considerable number of its subjects, but to direct his attention to the necessary arrangements for cantoning his troops. The Bombay army, under General Jones, was to proceed to Rampoorah, on its return to Guzerat; and all the irregular corps in the British service were to be reduced. At the time, however, when these orders were issued permanent tranquillity was not expected; for the probability of a renewal of hostilities at no distant period was distinctly noticed, and, as far as the prescribed reductions would admit, provided for.

Scindia had fled with his companion Holkar.

The British territories were not menaced; and though chastisement was deferred, it did not necessarily follow that it was altogether abandoned. But the flying confederates had carried with them the British residency deputed to one of them; and the safety of the resident and his attendants was an object of interest. On transmitting to Scindia Lord Lake's reply to the chieftain's letter, Mr. Jenkins adverted to the instructions which he had received to withdraw, and requested to be informed of the arrangements which the maharajah might be pleased to make for the purpose of facilitating his departure. Scindia replied that, as his minister, Shirzee Rao, was absent, he could not return a decided answer, but that in the course of two or three days a reply to Lord Lake's letter would be prepared. The resident shortly afterwards renewed the application, expressing his dissatisfaction at being prevented from complying with the orders of the commander-in-chief, and intimating that the cause assigned for delay was inapplicable to the case, inasmuch as Lord Lake did not expect any answer to his letter, but would be justly surprised if the British representative at Scindia's court were not permitted to obey the orders of his own government. Mr. Jenkins further pointed out the propriety of his departure taking place with the sanction and under the protection of Scindia; that established usage, as well as the principles of justice and public faith, required that a person in his situation should be entirely free from restraint; and that a communication of Scindia's intentions was necessary to enable the resident to exculpate himself from the charge of a voluntary deviation from orders which he was bound to obey. Nothing satisfactory followed this representation, but Mr. Jenkins was informed that a copy of the commander-in-chief's letter, together with the substance of Mr. Jenkins's messages on the subject of his departure, had been communicated to the minister, Shirzee Rao. To abate the resident's solicitude to withdraw, the Mahratta officers expatiated with much power on the dangers to which he would be exposed from the state of the country between Scindia's camp and the head-quarters of the British army. To these representations Mr. Jenkins had a ready answer—that whenever a day should be fixed for his departure, the commander-in-chief would dispatch a force to meet him, and that he should require a convoy of Scindia's cavalry merely to show that he had the maharajah's protection, and not to repel any danger. This produced a representation that the advance of a British force was unnecessary, for that whenever the departure should take place, exclusively of about a thousand horse to be furnished in equal proportions by Scindia and Holkar, the British resident should receive the protection of any force of infantry and guns that he might desire, and that for his safe conduct to the head-quarters of the British army the maharajah would be fully responsible.

On the 10th of May the confederates recommenced their march in the direction of Kotah, without dismissing the British residency. Mr. Jenkins had previously suggested, with reference to the systematic evasion and delay which characterize the proceedings of a Mahratta court, that the commander-in-chief should address a separate letter to Scindia, the object of which should be limited to the demand of safe conduct for the resident and the gentlemen of the residency to the British camp. Lord Lake acted on the suggestion—the letter was transmitted, and the application met with the same success which had attended former demands of the same description.

The confederated chiefs continued to move in a westerly direction towards Ajmeer. Their progress was marked by some extraordinary events: the first to be noticed demonstrates the power of Holkar in a manner not less decided than the seizure by that chief of Ambajee Inglia. Baptiste, already mentioned as in the service of Scindia, had made himself obnoxious to the wrath of Holkar, and, it was said, meditated the seizure of that chieftain's person. The spirit of vengeance thus roused in Holkar's breast found gratification in the apprehension of his enemy, who was immediately subjected to one of those barbarous inflictions of which native annals afford so many instances. The unhappy prisoner was deprived of sight. He did not long endure the misery of the privation, the outrage leading to his death. Thus did Holkar, the enemy of the British state, act towards a servant of Scindia, its pretended ally; and Scindia submitted.

A still more remarkable event followed, if any thing can be regarded as remarkable in a Mahratta court. Ambajee Inglia having been subjected to the process of plunder, and the plunder having been secured, was released from the restraint imposed upon him for the purpose of drawing forth a contribution. This was not very remarkable. The object being attained, the means by which it was to be procured were discontinued as no longer necessary. But the liberation of Ambajee Inglia was followed by extraordinary honour. He was received by Scindia with the highest degree of respect and attention, and the ceremony of his reception was regarded as an indication of his intended appointment to the charge of the executive authority in place of Shirzee Rao. Such instances of capricious change are, indeed, but ordinary events among the Mahrattas.

In the mean time the British residency remained virtually, though not apparently, in a state of imprisonment. The commander-in-chief again demanded their release; and ultimately the governor-general addressed a letter to Scindia, requiring their dismissal within fourteen days from the receipt of the letter. It was dated the 25th July. On the 30th the Marquis Wellesley signed his last despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors; and at six o'clock on the evening of that day a salute from the battery announced that he was

superseded in his high functions by the arrival of the Marquis Cornwallis.

The unrivalled brilliancy of the Marquis Wellesley's administration has perhaps tended to obscure the rare qualities which led to its success. The first of those qualities was his extraordinary sagacity. He saw the true position of the British government in India—a vision withheld not only from his predecessors, but from his contemporaries. It is common to say of the great minds whose genius stands out in bold relief amid universal tameness, that they are beyond their age; and if ever this were true of living man, it is of the Marquis Wellesley. His mind was not led captive by words—it was not to be trammelled by conventional opinions. He neither gave credence to the prevailing cant of his time on the subject of India, nor affected to give credence to it; and this leads to the notice of another striking point of his character—the manly boldness with which he avowed and maintained opinions not lightly formed, and which he therefore felt were not lightly to be abandoned.

The vigour with which he carried into action the great plans which his genius suggested is scarcely less remarkable than his sagacity. When resolved to strike a blow at Mysore, he was met by difficulties which ordinary minds would have deemed insuperable. He determined that they should be overcome, and they were overcome. The same determination of purpose—the same unshrinking energy, are manifested in his transactions with Arcot, with Oude, with the peishwa, and indeed in all the principal acts of his government. Like all truly great men, he was not the slave of circumstances—he made circumstances promote his purposes.

Eminent talents are a blessing or a curse alike to their possessor and to the world, according to the use made of them. Those of the Marquis Wellesley were invariably directed to the highest and best ends—the promotion of peace, of the interests of the two countries with which he was connected, with one by birth, and with both by office—and to the happiness of mankind. He laid in India the foundations of peace and increasing prosperity, and if the superstructure was not completed in accordance with the original design, the crime rests on the heads of others.

It is not less remarkable than laudable that a mind so vigorous and determined should, in the exercise of almost boundless power, have been kept in constant subjection to the dictates of justice. That he thus withstood the temptations of his position is a proof of the

possession of moral strength proportioned to his intellectual ability.

To his disinterestedness it is perhaps less necessary to advert, as the sordid vices are rarely associated with genius; but the unhappy example of some of his predecessors justifies some notice of his purity in this respect. They grasped at wealth, with little regard to the means by which it was to be acquired, or to the imputations which they might incur. He on one extraordinary occasion recoiled from the acceptance of a large sum tendered to him under circumstances which would, to most minds, have appeared to justify its receipt, but which were not such as could satisfy the sensitive honour which ever governed him. The king, in the exercise of his prerogative of disposing of prize, had determined to allot to the governor-general a hundred thousand pounds from the fruits of the capture of Seringapatam; but the royal favour was declined, because he for whose benefit it was intended would not enrich himself at the expense of the brave men whose swords had won for his and their country so noble a conquest.

The same delicacy which led him to decline his sovereign's bounty was manifested, after his return to England, in his steady refusal to accept office, though repeatedly pressed upon him, so long as the malignant charges made against him were suspended over his head. He held that a man against whom such imputations were afloat ought not to have place in his majesty's councils. When they fell to the ground, he readily returned to the service of his country.

In describing the characters of great men, the speck of human infirmity, which is to be found in all, should not be passed over. The Marquis Wellesley was ambitious; but his ambition sought gratification not in mere personal aggrandizement, but in connecting his own fame with that of the land to which he belonged, and of the government which he administered—in the diffusion of sound and liberal knowledge, and the extension of the means of happiness among millions of men who knew not his person, and some of them scarcely his name. That name is, however, stamped for ever on their history. The British government in India may pass away: its duration, as far as human means are concerned, will depend on the degree in which the policy of the Marquis Wellesley is maintained or abandoned—but whatever its fate, or the length of its existence, the name and memory of the greatest statesman by whom it was ever administered are imperishable.

CHAPTER XXI.

POLICY OF THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS—PROPOSED RESTORATION OF CONQUERED TERRITORIES—DEATH AND CHARACTER OF THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS—SIR GEORGE BARLOW PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR-GENERAL—HIS NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY—LORD LAKE'S REMONSTRANCES—TREATIES WITH SCINDIA AND HOLKAR—MUTINY AT VELLORE: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES—REMOVAL OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK AND SIR JOHN CRADOCK.

THE Marquis Cornwallis arrived in India, prepared to abandon, as far as might be practicable, all the advantages gained for the British government by the wisdom, energy, and perseverance of his predecessor; to relax the bands by which the Marquis Wellesley had connected the greater portion of the states of India with the British government; and to reduce that government from the position of arbiter of the destinies of India, to the rank of one among many equals. His great age seems to have had little effect in diminishing his zeal, and he entered upon the task before him with an alacrity and energy worthy of a better object. On the 1st of August, 1805, he announced to the Court of Directors his arrival and assumption of the functions of governor-general. On the same day (two days only after his landing) he addressed the Secret Committee, expressing great concern at finding that the government of which he was the head was "still at war with Holkar," and could "hardly be said to be at peace with Scindia." With reference to this state of things, the governor-general intimated that he had determined to proceed immediately to the upper provinces, in order to avail himself of the cessation of military operations caused by the rainy season, "to endeavour to terminate by negotiation a contest in which," the Marquis Cornwallis was pleased to observe, "the most brilliant success can afford us no solid benefit." It is not necessary to pause in order to inquire what was the precise meaning attached by the writer to the words last quoted, or whether in any sense they were true with regard to the existing position of the British interests. The passage marks sufficiently the spirit in which the letter from which it is extracted was written; and not less strongly indicates the nature of the policy which, under instructions from home, the governor-general proposed to pursue. It is true that the expression of his desire to terminate the contest by negotiation was qualified by the conditional words, "if it can be done without a sacrifice of our honour;" but little importance could be attached to this saving clause, when placed in juxtaposition with the concluding words of the governor-general's letter, in which he declares that the continuance of "the contest" must involve the state "in pecuniary difficulties which" it would "hardly be able to surmount." The war had undoubtedly, as in all similar cases, been at-

tended with considerable temporary addition to the current expenses, and some financial difficulties had been the result; but to regard the necessary vindication of the national honour and the defence of the national interests as likely to lead to such a degree of embarrassment as should be nearly, if not altogether, insurmountable, was a view of the subject which the judgment and experience of the governor-general ought to have led him to repudiate with contempt.

A month after the date of the Marquis Cornwallis's first letter to the Secret Committee, he addressed to them a second, dated on the river near Raj Mahal, in which he avowed his dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs at the courts of the peishwa and the nizâm. His views were stated more at large in communications addressed by his order to the residents at those courts. Colonel Close, the resident at Poona, had been compelled to animadvert on some of the gross abuses suffered to prevail under the peishwa's government, as in those of all other Oriental potentates; and he had reported to his own government the representations which he had made, and the results. It is unnecessary to advert to the precise points of discussion, or to offer an opinion on them. The affair is referred to only for the purpose of showing the deliberately expressed judgment of the Marquis Cornwallis on an important part of the policy of his predecessor. That opinion was condemnatory. The Marquis Cornwallis had arrived at an age which entitled him to respect. A large part of his long life had been passed in the discharge of important military and political functions, and a portion of his experience had been gained in India. Yet he could refer to the alliance with the peishwa in the following terms:—"It must be in your recollection that during Marquis Cornwallis's former administration, his lordship, foreseeing the evils of mixing in the labyrinth of Mahratta politics and Mahratta contentions, sedulously avoided that sort of connection with the peishwa's government which was calculated to involve the Company in the difficulties and embarrassments of our actual situation; and that his lordship decidedly rejected distinct proposals conveyed through the channel of Hurry Punt Phurkiah for a more intimate alliance than that which was concluded by the convention of 1792. The evils, however, which his lord-

ship then anticipated from such an alliance appear to his lordship to have been exceeded by those which have actually occurred under the operation of the treaty of Bassein, combined with the distracted condition of the peishwa's dominions, and with the weakness and inefficiency of his highness's administration." These remarks vividly illustrate the spirit in which the Marquis Cornwallis's second Indian administration was to be conducted.

The manner in which the Marquis Cornwallis proposed to bring the war to an end, "without sacrifice of honour," was expounded by himself in a letter to Lord Lake. The principal obstacles, he observed, with regard to Scindia, were the detention of the British resident by that chief, and the refusal of the British government to deliver up Gwalior and Gohud. The governor-general had a ready mode of getting rid of these difficulties. It was to surrender both points to Scindia—to give him everything in dispute, to restore to him territory which the British government had solemnly guaranteed to another, and to allow his right to exercise the discretion of choosing his own time for the release of the British residency—to dismiss his prisoners when he pleased, and not a moment sooner. "I am aware," said the governor-general, "of the disadvantages of immediately relinquishing or even of compromising the demand which has been so repeatedly and so urgently made for the release of the British residency"—strange would it have been had he not been aware of them, and strange it was that an English nobleman, and an English soldier, should have perceived only the "disadvantages" of such a course, and have been blind to the disgrace which it involved. The governor-general continues, "but I deem it proper to apprise your lordship that, as a mere point of honour"—although the "sacrifice" of "honour" was to be avoided—"I am disposed to compromise, or even to abandon, that demand, if it should ultimately prove to be the only obstacle to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs with Dowlut Rao Scindia; and that I have hitherto been induced to support it (the demand), by the apprehension that the motives of such a concession might be misinterpreted, and that it might lead to demands on the part of Scindia with which we could not comply without a sacrifice of dignity and interest incompatible with our security, and thereby render still more difficult of attainment the desirable object of a general pacification." In this extraordinary passage "a mere point of honour" is disposed of as summarily as though it were a claim to a fraction of a rupee, and the promise that no sacrifice in this respect should take place might be supposed to be forgotten.

For the surrender of Gwalior and Gohud the governor-general had a better apology. "With regard," says he, "to the cession of Gwalior and Gohud, in my decided opinion, it is desirable to abandon our possession of the

former and our connection with the latter, independently of any reference to a settlement of differences with Dowlut Rao Scindia." In declaring such a course "desirable," the governor-general must have meant desirable for the government which he administered. Upon this assumption he thus proceeds: "I have therefore no hesitation in resolving to transfer to Dowlut Rao Scindia the possession of that fortress and territory; securing, however, suitable provision for the rana—an arrangement which, under actual circumstances, I am satisfied is entirely consistent with our public faith." The word "therefore" is important—it displays fully and nakedly the morality of the proposed transaction. The governor-general first asserts that it is desirable—desirable to himself and his government—to dissolve the connection subsisting between that government and a native prince—"therefore" he "has no hesitation"—such are his words—in resolving to give away to an enemy the territory of that prince, territory which he enjoys under the protection of the British government, and which is secured to him (as far as a written instrument can be a security) by a solemn treaty. "Under actual circumstances"—that is, with reference to the supposed convenience of the arrangement, the governor-general is satisfied that such a transfer is entirely consistent with public faith!

Equally impolitic and dishonourable was the course which the Marquis Cornwallis proposed to adopt towards the native princes beyond the Jumna with whom the British government had recently formed engagements. Those engagements he intended summarily to annul. There was a portion of territory lying to the southward and westward of Delhi, which the governor-general calculated would afford him the means of carrying his views into effect with some semblance of regard to the claims of those who were to be deprived of the protection of the British government. A portion was to be assigned in jaghires to the inferior chiefs who had joined the British cause; the remainder to be divided in unequal proportions between the rajahs of Machery and Bhurtpore, on those chieftains relinquishing their alliance with the British government—a connection which, it is clear, they could not maintain, if the party contracting with them chose to withdraw from it.

It is to be lamented that nearly the last official act of the Marquis Cornwallis's life should have been the affixing his signature to a letter so injurious to his character as a statesman, and so imbued with false principles of political morality. He was at an advanced age; his health, which was not good when he left England, had gradually become worse under the influence of an enervating climate and of the bodily and mental fatigue imposed by the duties of his office, and on the 5th of October he drew his last breath at Ghazepore, near Benares.

Little remark will be necessary on the

character of the departed governor-general. He had many excellent qualities, but his mind was destitute of the originality and power essential to the character of a great statesman. Great minds impress their own character upon their age—inferior ones derive theirs from it. Of this latter class was the Marquis Cornwallis. He was emphatically the man of his age—the representative of its spirit, its opinions, and its prejudices. To these he clung with all the pertinacity of sincere conviction; and, indeed, so far as conviction can be entertained without examination, it may be said that he felt it. He never doubted but that what he had so often heard asserted must be true; and experience itself could not undeceive him. He left India at the conclusion of his first administration with views unaltered by the startling shock which his prejudices had encountered; he returned to it with those prejudices aggravated rather than softened. His mind was of a character not uncommon. It was entirely passive; the impressions it received from without remained undisturbed by any process from within. At the same time, it possessed great tenacity with regard to that which had once been admitted. The truth or the error that happened to be in fashion was embraced, and neither reasoning, change of circumstances, nor, after a certain time, even change in the popular current of opinion, could dislodge it. The mental constitution of the Marquis Cornwallis might be described in few words as being of the highest order of the commonplace. His lot was that which often falls to men of like character. He enjoyed an extraordinary degree of reputation during his life, and for a few years after his death; but the artificial brilliancy has passed away. In this respect his fate is strikingly contrasted with that of his illustrious predecessor. Thwarted and reviled, his policy denounced by authority and by the popular voice, and impeachment threatened as the reward of his services, the Marquis Wellesley lived to see his enemies silenced, his policy vindicated, his person honoured by marks of public respect and gratitude, and his fame, like a mighty river, continually increasing in volume and strength as the distance from its source was extended.

On the death of the Marquis Cornwallis, the office of governor-general devolved provisionally on the first member of council, Sir George Barlow. The rapidly sinking state of the Marquis Cornwallis had for several days previously to his death indicated that the fatal event could not be far distant, and a communication to that effect reaching Calcutta, Sir George Barlow had determined to proceed to Benares, either to assist the Marquis Cornwallis in the conduct of the negotiations, if he should still survive, or undertake their entire charge in the event of his death. He was consequently on the spot where his services were required within a few days after power and life had departed from the late governor-general.

Before the letter of the Marquis Cornwallis transmitting that to be forwarded to Scindia was received by the commander-in-chief, the aspect of affairs in the camp of Scindia had undergone some change. The ascendancy of Shirree Rao was apparently at an end; and Ambejee Inglia, after being plundered by Holkar with the connivance of Scindia, had attained that degree of elevation in the service of the latter chief which had been anticipated from the honourable reception which awaited him after the purpose of his imprisonment had been answered. Scindia, from various causes, had become less indisposed to peace, and a negotiation had been opened, which was conducted on the one part by Colonel Malcolm, then present in the camp of the commander-in-chief as the governor-general's agent, and on the other by an old servant of Scindia's, bearing the name and title of Moonshee Kavel Nyne. This person had fled to Delhi when the authority of Shirree Rao became paramount. Colonel Malcolm, under the authority of Lord Lake, having sent for him to the British camp, induced him to despatch a relative to Scindia, on whose suggestion that chief sent proposals to be laid before the commander-in-chief by Moonshee Kavel Nyne. Lord Lake's answer to the overture was, that he could not notice any proposal till the British residency was released. It was thereupon allowed to depart. Under these circumstances, Lord Lake thought it not incumbent upon him to forward to Scindia the letter of the governor-general, and for this exercise of discretion his country ought ever to feel grateful. This was not the only instance in which he sought to maintain its honour against the desperate determination prevailing at the seat of government to surrender it. He remonstrated vigorously against the fatal design of severing the British connection with the princes in the vicinity of the Jumna, and gave good reasons against such a measure, which none could have resisted but those determined to be unmoved by any arguments which were opposed to their preconceived opinions. After adverting to former representations on the benefits likely to result from expelling the Mahrattas from Hindostan, Lord Lake said, "I can only add to what I have before said on this subject my firm conviction that the maintenance of the strong boundary we now possess will soon cause the Mahratta nation to abandon every idea of attacking our provinces in this quarter, which I am fully persuaded they never will do if they are permitted either to possess territory in Hindostan, or to employ their armies against the petty chiefs and jaghiredars, who are declared independent (but have not the advantage of the British protection), on the west side of the Jumna." The danger of the intended course Lord Lake illustrated by referring to the feuds subsisting between the different chiefs—feuds which had been fostered and encouraged by the Mahrattas for their own purposes. Lord Lake proceeded to show the

importance of maintaining the British authority with a view to the suppression of the evils which the Mahrattas had aggravated, and the probability that in the course of time both princes and subjects would become sensible of the advantages of the peaceful habits imposed upon them. "The very contests," said he, "that would immediately take place among the rajahs and chiefs when they were declared free of all control of the British government, and at liberty to pursue the dictates of their own interests or ambition, would, I conceive, be attended with the worst consequences to the British government. These petty states would first quarrel with each other, and then call in the different native powers in their vicinity to their respective aid; and large armies of irregulars would be contending upon the frontier of our most fertile provinces, against whose eventual excesses there would be no well-grounded security but a military force in a state of constant preparation." In the minds of the inferior rajahs, Lord Lake declared that the mere proposal of withdrawing the British protection would produce the utmost alarm. They would regard it, he said, as a prelude to their being sacrificed to the object of obtaining peace with the Mahrattas. On one point Lord Lake appears to have concurred with the governor-general: he thought that the weakness of the rana of Gohud warranted the abrogation of the treaty with him. It is remarkable that one who thought and felt so justly on other points of a similar description, should on this have failed to reach a conclusion consistent with that at which he arrived in other cases. He was satisfied, he affirmed, that nothing less than "the direct operation of British authority" would ever place Gohud in a situation "to meet those expectations which were formed at the conclusion of the treaty with its present ruler." This language is so vague, that it is impossible to determine whether the commander-in-chief was prepared in this instance to defend a violation of faith or not. The treaty itself was the standard of the rana's obligations, not any expectations that might have been formed at the time of its conclusion. If the direct operation of British authority were necessary to compel the rana to fulfil his obligations, only one reason can be suggested for its refusal—that irreconcilable prejudice which dictated that nothing within India should be done by British authority which it were possible to avoid. Independently of this single error relating to the rana of Gohud, the letter of Lord Lake is alike sound in its political views and admirable for the high and honourable feeling by which it is pervaded. Putting out of view the brilliant military services of Lord Lake, and calling to mind only his endeavours to save the British character in India from the shame which was about to fall upon it, his name should ever be held by his countrymen in grateful and honourable remembrance.

The letter of the commander-in-chief bore date the 6th of October, the day following that on which the Marquis Cornwallis died. The task of deciding on its arguments and suggestions consequently devolved on Sir George Barlow, whose answer to the representations of Lord Lake is dated the 20th of the same month. It avowed his resolution "to maintain the general principles of policy by which the late governor-general deemed it proper to accomplish a general plan of arrangement with respect to the chieftains and the territories on the west of the Jumna." It might have been doubted whether the course of the new governor-general were not the result of regard for the views of his predecessor, or for the judgment of some higher authority; but he was careful to divest his motives of all ambiguity, and to vindicate his claim to a portion of the glory which was to result from a persevering disregard to the obligations of treaties. "This resolution," said he—the resolution just quoted—"is founded, not only upon my knowledge of the entire conformity of those general principles to the provisions of the legislature and to the orders of the honourable Court of Directors, but also upon my conviction of their expediency with a view to the permanent establishment of the British interests in India." From the enunciation of his own views, Sir George Barlow proceeded, through some intermediate discussion, to impugn those of Lord Lake, which appeared to him "to involve the necessity of maintaining the principal part of our territorial possessions on the west of the Jumna, and of establishing our control over the several states of Hindostan, with a view to preclude the occurrence of those disorders and contentions which" the commander-in-chief "considered to be calculated to endanger the tranquillity and security of" the British territory "in the Doab. Such a system of control," argued Sir George Barlow, "must in its nature be progressive, and must ultimately tend to a system of universal dominion. I am of opinion," he continued, "that we must derive our security either from the establishment of a controlling power and influence over all the states of India, or from the certain operation of contending and irreconcilable interests among the states whose independence will admit of the prosecution of their individual views of rapine, encroachment, and ambition, combined with a systematic plan of internal defence, such as has been uniformly contemplated by this government." This systematic plan for securing the British frontier, Sir George afterwards explains to be the establishment of a connected chain of forts along the Jumna. He then returns to the favourite feature of his system, and expresses a hope that Lord Lake will probably concur with him in thinking that, with such a barrier, "the British possessions in the Doab will derive additional security from the contests of the neighbouring states."

Having thus laid down the general principles of his policy, Sir George Barlow enters upon a discussion of the claims of the parties to the west of the Jumna, whom it was intended to abandon. "With regard to the engagements which your lordship has stated as subsisting between the British government and the several descriptions of persons enumerated in your lordship's despatch of the 6th of October, it appears to me that the obligation of a considerable proportion of those engagements necessarily depends upon the supposition that it was the intention of the British government to maintain its authority and control over the bulk of the territories on the west of the Jumna, ceded by Dowlut Rao Scindia. If the British government is at liberty to surrender its possessions to the west of the Jumna, the obligation to protect the zemindars and jaghiredars established within those possessions, or immediately dependent upon them, can be considered to exist no longer than while the British government deems it expedient to maintain its authority over those territories. As far, therefore, as regards that description of persons, the true question appears to be, whether we are compelled by the nature of our engagements to maintain possession of the territories in question." Such is the casuistry by which Sir George Barlow arrived at the conclusion which it was his object to reach. He admitted, however, that he did not intend it to apply to chiefs to whom the British government was pledged to make pecuniary or territorial assignments; and these persons he proposed to provide for by jaghires in a portion of the territory on the west of the Jumna which was to be retained. But the true question was not, as Sir George Barlow represented, whether the British government was compelled to maintain possession of the territories in question; but whether, by abandoning possession, it could at the same time formally abandon to ruin those who, under a reliance on its power and character, had committed themselves to its protection.

It is no agreeable task to pursue the sophistry of expediency through its entangled course—it is not more grateful to record the acts which presumed convenience dictated at the expense of justice and honour. The British government being prepared to indulge Scindia to the utmost extent of his demands, no impediment could exist to the establishment of what was to be called peace. Colonel Malcolm was intrusted with the duty of negotiating a treaty with Scindia, and on the 23rd of November his labours were successfully brought to a close. The defensive alliance was not renewed—the Marquis Cornwallis, in conformity with the general tenor of his policy, had expressed his determination to be rid of it—but every part of the former treaty of peace, with the exception of such parts as might be altered by the new treaty, was to remain in force. Gwalior and Gohud were transferred to Scindia out of "considerations of friendship." Scindia,

on his part, relinquished all claims to the pensions previously granted to different officers of his court, from the 31st of December, up to which period the Company undertook to pay them, subject to deduction on various grounds, and among them the plunder of the British residency. The Company also agreed to pay to Scindia a personal allowance of four lacs annually, and to assign, within their territories in Hindostan, a jaghire of two lacs per annum to the chieftain's wife, and another of one lac to his daughter. The Chumbul was to be the general boundary between the territories of the contracting parties; and the Company engaged to form no treaties with the rajahs of Oudepore and Joudpore, and other chiefs tributary to Scindia in Malwa, Mewar, or Merwar, and in no instance to interfere with the settlement which Scindia might make with those chiefs. The Company were not to return to Holkar any of his family possessions in the province of Malwa which might have been taken by Scindia. The two chiefs were to arrange as they pleased the claims of Holkar to tribute or territory north of the Taptee and south of the Chumbul, and the British government was not to interfere. The most extraordinary article of the treaty was one by which Scindia agreed never to admit Shirzee Rao to his councils, or to any public employment under his government. The British constitution regards the sovereign as irresponsible, and visits all delinquency in the conduct of public affairs upon the minister; but the application of such a principle between states was probably made for the first time in this instance. By a formal article in a treaty, to prescribe the employment of any particular individual might be thought unworthy of any government—it was especially unworthy such a government as that of Great Britain in India. At this time, however, all the acts of that government were characterized by pettiness. With all its concessions, the treaty did not go quite far enough to please Sir George Barlow, and, in transmitting its ratification, he annexed certain declaratory articles, intended to carry out his favourite object of releasing the British government from the obligation of keeping faith with its weak allies, some of whom might have been saved by the operation of the boundary article without explanation. Lord Lake deferred the transmission of the declaratory articles to Scindia, and remonstrated, but in vain. The governor-general replied, that great attention was due to the long experience of Lord Lake, and evinced his respect for it by immediately forwarding to Scindia the articles against which Lord Lake had appealed.

While the negotiation with Scindia was in progress, Lord Lake had been engaged in following the flight of Holkar into the Punjab; where, disappointed in the hope of obtaining assistance from the Sikhs, and reduced to the last extremity, the eager desire of the British government for peace worked most opportunely

to his rescue from entire destruction. A treaty was concluded, by which Holkar renounced all right to the districts of Tonk Rampoor, Bhoondee, and places north of the Chumbul. The Company agreed not to interfere south of that river, and to restore at the end of a specified term certain forts and districts belonging to Holkar in the Deccan. Holkar was not to entertain any Europeans in his service, and he was further restricted from employing Shirzee Rao, whose name seems to have been a constant source of terror to the British government of that period. Here, again, the policy of Sir George Barlow received additional illustration. He had been desirous of transferring the districts of Tonk Rampoor to Scindia, in place of the pension of four lacs secured to that chieftain by the late treaty. One motive to the intended cession originated in the circumstance of the district having belonged to Holkar, and the consequent expectation of the governor-general that an additional cause of dispute between the two chieftains would thus be furnished, tending to promote his favourite object of keeping native states at war for the benefit of the English government. But the hope of obtaining Scindia's consent failed, and the governor-general was in a state of pitiable anxiety as to the disposal of the troublesome acquisitions. No state or chief, he apprehended, would take them as a free gift without a guarantee from the British government, and there appeared no choice but to give such a guarantee or to keep them. Neither of these courses suited the policy of Sir George Barlow; and not knowing what to do with the surrendered districts, he determined to give them back to Holkar without any kind of consideration in return. This was effected by a declaratory article, reciting—not that Sir George Barlow had in vain sought to transfer the districts to Scindia, and that no one else would take them without a guarantee, but that it was understood that the maharajah attached great value to them, and that the relations of amity being happily restored, the British government was desirous of gratifying the wishes of the maharajah to the greatest practicable extent consistent with equity—a word most infelicitously chosen with reference to the policy then pursued. Lord Lake again remonstrated, and with the same success that had attended his former representations.

Among the persons sacrificed by the "equity" of Sir George Barlow were the rajahs of Bhoondee and Jeypore. The conduct of the former, from the commencement of his connection with the British government, had been undeviatingly friendly and faithful. His fidelity had been tested during the retreat of Colonel Monson, and he had on that unfortunate occasion rendered aid that was both timely and valuable. By this conduct he had incurred the implacable hatred of Holkar. Lord Lake justly considered that the services and the dangers of this faithful ally merited more consideration than Sir George Barlow

was disposed to give them, and he repeatedly and pressingly urged the claims of the rajah to protection. But the governor-general, who, it is clear, thought that political affairs are excepted from the obligations of ordinary morality, was not to be moved by so visionary a feeling as regard to past services, and the rajah of Bhoondee received sentence accordingly. The case of the rajah of Jeypore was not precisely similar. Under the influence of terror, produced by the approach of Holkar, he had swerved from fidelity; but he had returned to his duty, had rendered good service to the army of General Jones, and had received the most solemn assurances that his failure would be forgotten, and the protection of the British government continued. In favour of this prince Lord Lake laboured with the zeal which he invariably displayed in endeavouring to save the British government from the disgrace which a timid and unprincipled policy was bringing upon it. But Sir George Barlow resolved, not only that the alliance with the rajah of Jeypore should be dissolved, but that the dissolution should be immediate; and for this characteristic reason—the territories of the rajah of Jeypore lay on Holkar's returning route; the governor-general thought, with much reason, that the freebooter might be tempted to commit some excess in passing them. If the alliance continued, the British government would be obliged to take notice of any outrage; if it were previously dissolved, the obligation was at an end. Well might an agent of the rajah, in a conference with Lord Lake, indignantly exclaim, that the English government, in this instance, made its faith subservient to its convenience.

Sir George Barlow had now effected nearly all that had been contemplated by his predecessor and himself, in the way of diminishing the power and influence of the British government in India. The defensive alliances with Bhurtpore and Machery remained to be dealt with, and Lord Lake was instructed to open a negotiation for the purpose of detaching them from their British ally. In conformity with the plan of the Marquis Cornwallis, these princes were to be tempted to renounce their British connection by the offer of a considerable accession of territory. Lord Lake, not dispirited by former repulses, once more resorted to expostulations, and for the first time his remonstrances produced some effect. The governor-general, in his conversion from the creed of the Marquis Wellesley to that of the Marquis Cornwallis, had displayed great aptitude for transition; but in adhering to the views which he professed at any particular moment, he invariably manifested a degree of doggedness not less remarkable. In this spirit he did not admit that the representations of the commander-in-chief had changed his opinion, but he consented to postpone acting upon it till a future period. The motives to this step are not easily discover-

able; nor, indeed, can any valid reason be assigned for the great delicacy shown to the claims of the rajahs of Bhurtpore and Machery in comparison with those of the rajahs of Bhoondee and Jeypore. Why were the engagements of the British with the latter two princes dissolved without ceremony, while the abrogation of similar engagements with the former two were to be the subject of negotiation? Only one solution presents itself: the rajahs of Bhoondee and Jeypore were weak; those of Bhurtpore and Machery comparatively strong.

Thus did Sir George Barlow tranquillize India. Lord Lake spent the year 1805 in completing the negotiations with which he had been intrusted, and in making various necessary military arrangements. Early in the following year he quitted India, leaving behind him a reputation for adventurous valour and high feeling which will not be forgotten. It would not be proper to anticipate results by any observations in this place on the effects of the policy which that gallant officer so strenuously, though, for the most part, so unsuccessfully opposed: this will be displayed hereafter. The aspect of the period under review is sufficiently dark to need no aggravation from a premature view of the future. Under the Madras presidency events occurred soon after Sir George Barlow's pacification, which, though unimportant if regarded with reference merely to their extent, derived consequence from the alarm which they were calculated to create in relation to the instrument by which Great Britain had subjected a great part of India to its sway, and by which its conquests were to be maintained.

The extraordinary fact, that England maintains her empire in the East principally by means of a native army, renders the connection between the ruling powers and the military one of extreme delicacy. One great point of reliance, which is afforded by almost every other army, is wanting in that of India. The pride of country offers one of the best securities for the fidelity of the soldier, and all judicious commanders are well aware of the importance of preserving it unimpaired. In India the case is different. The national feeling of the troops can afford no ground of confidence; whatever portion of this quality they may happen to possess, must operate to the prejudices of their rulers. The men who govern India are not natives of India, strangers to the soil command the obedience of its sons; and if national pride entered largely into the character of the natives, that obedience, if yielded at all, would be yielded reluctantly. Generally, in India, this feeling is anything but strong; and its place is supplied by a sense of the benefits derived by the individual from the maintenance of the European supremacy, and by a powerful instinct of obedience, combined with a somewhat indefinite, and perhaps almost superstitious

feeling of respect for the people who, within the compass of a very brief period, have, as if by enchantment, become masters of an empire splendid beyond comparison with any other ever held in a condition of dependency by a foreign state. Yet, with all the allowances that must be made on the grounds of selfishness, habit, admiration, and fear, it must not be supposed that natives always look on the existing state of things with entire satisfaction. It is not easy for the Mahometan to forget that, very recently, men of his own race and creed wielded the sceptre which is now transferred to Christian hands; and though the passive character of the Hindoo, and the estrangement from political power consequent upon the previous subjugation of his country, may generally be sufficient to preclude him from meditating schemes of conquest and reprisal, he is under the influence of other feelings little calculated to promote military subordination or to secure military fidelity. The pride of caste, and the bigoted attachment with which the Hindoo clings to an unsocial superstition which interferes with almost every action of daily life, have a direct tendency to foster habits which in Europe must be regarded as altogether inconsistent with the character of a soldier. Between an army composed of Hindoos and Mahometans, and the Europeans who command them, there can be but little community of feeling. Differing as they do in country, in religious belief, in habits of life, in form and complexion, they have not even the bond of a common tongue; the European officers generally possessing but a slender knowledge of the languages of the men under their command, and the men no knowledge at all of the language of their officers. The elements of discontent are, therefore, sufficiently powerful, while the means of allaying it are small; and it is obvious that, in an army so constituted, vigilance must never for a moment be permitted to slumber. This important truth can never be lost sight of without endangering the safety of the British dominion in India, and, by consequence, the well-being of the people committed to its care.

These reflections are suggested by the facts which it is now necessary to relate, facts which at the time excited no inconsiderable alarm both in India and at home, and which are recorded in characters of blood.

In the spring of 1806, symptoms of insubordination were manifested by a part of the troops under the presidency. They seem scarcely to have excited the degree of attention which they called for; and at the very moment when the authorities were congratulating themselves upon their entire suppression, the fortress of Vellore became a scene of open mutiny and ferocious massacre.

The ostensible cause of the disturbance was a partial change in the dress of the troops. The old turban had been thought inconvenient, and it was proposed to replace it by one

lighter, and better adapted to the military character. The alteration was recommended by two officers of long experience in the Company's service, was sanctioned by the commander-in-chief, Sir John Cradock, and finally was submitted to the governor, Lord William Bentinck—that nobleman having succeeded Lord Clive, who had retired under feelings of disgust. The governor not only approved, but ordered the new turban to be adopted by a corps of fencibles under his own especial command. The use of this turban, however, either actually violated the prejudices of the men, or was seized upon by designing agitators as affording the means of exciting disaffection to the European authorities. Acts of insubordination occurred, connected with an alleged reluctance to the adoption of the new turban. Neglected for a time, it at length became impossible to avoid noticing them. They were confined principally to two battalions of different regiments—one of them stationed at Vellore, the other at Wallajahbad. The irregularities were more general, as well as more marked, in the battalion stationed in the former place; and when they attracted attention, it was deemed inexpedient to suffer the battalion to remain there. It was accordingly ordered to proceed to the presidency, where a court-martial was assembled for the trial of two men, whose conduct had been especially reprehensible. They were convicted, and sentenced to corporal punishment. At Wallajahbad, a native soubahdar, who had been guilty of apparent connivance at the disorderly proceedings which had taken place, was summarily dismissed from the service, and, on the recommendation of the commander at that station, three companies of European troops were marched thither from Poona-mallee. The intimations of disorder now appeared to subside at both places. The commanding officer of the battalion stationed at Vellore reported it to be in as perfect a state of discipline as any other native corps on the establishment. At Wallajahbad subordination appeared to be entirely restored. A general order had been prepared, for the purpose of removing any apprehensions which the native troops might entertain as to future interference with their religious prejudices; but the apparent calm lulled the authorities into a persuasion of security, and it was deemed judicious to suspend the publication of the order.

The seeming tranquillity was deceitful. The assurance of the re-establishment of discipline at Vellore, conveyed from that station to the commander-in-chief, and by him forwarded to the government, reached the presidency on the 10th of July, and, on the same day, the smouldering embers of sedition and mutiny burst into a flame. Early in the morning of that day, the native troops rose against the European part of the garrison, consisting of two companies of his Majesty's 69th regiment, whom, with every other European within their reach, they doomed to indiscriminate

slaughter. The attack was totally unexpected, and consequently no preparations had been made for resisting it. The hour chosen by the conspirators, two o'clock in the morning, was well adapted to their murderous intentions, the execution of them being aided by darkness, and by the fact of a considerable portion of their destined victims being asleep. But, notwithstanding all these unfavourable circumstances, the British troops did not dishonour their country. For a considerable time they maintained possession of the barracks, exposed to a heavy fire from their assailants. When this position became no longer tenable, a part of the garrison effected their escape to the ramparts of the fortress, where they established themselves, and of which they retained possession for several hours after all the officers of the corps had been killed or disabled, and after their ammunition had been entirely exhausted.

About four hours after the commencement of the attack, intelligence of it was received by Colonel Gillespie, at the cantonment of Arcot, a distance of about sixteen miles, and that officer immediately put in motion the greater part of the troops at his disposal, consisting of the 19th regiment of dragoons and some native cavalry, of the strength of about four hundred and fifty men. Putting himself at the head of one squadron of dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, he proceeded with the greatest celerity to Vellore, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow with the guns under Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy. On his arrival, Colonel Gillespie effected a junction with the gallant residue of the 69th; but it was found impracticable to obtain any decisive advantage over the insurgents until the arrival of the remainder of the detachment, which reached Vellore about ten o'clock. The main object then was to reduce the fort. The mutineers directed their powerful force to the defence of the interior gate, and, on the arrival of the guns, it was resolved that they should be directed to blowing it open, preparatory to a charge of the cavalry, to be aided by a charge of the remnant of the 69th, under the personal command of Colonel Gillespie. These measures were executed with great precision and bravery. The gate was forced open by the fire of the guns; a combined attack by the European troops and the native cavalry followed, which, though made in the face of a severe fire, ended in the complete dispersion of the insurgents, and the restoration of the fort to the legitimate authorities. About three hundred and fifty of the mutineers fell in the attack, and about five hundred were made prisoners in Vellore and in various other places to which they had fled.

The number of Europeans massacred by the insurgents amounted to one hundred and thirteen. Among them were Colonel Fancourt and thirteen other officers. Vellore was the only station disgraced by open revolt and massacre; the symptoms of disaffection manifested at Wallajahbad, Hyderabad, and other places,

were by seasonable and salutary precautions suppressed. In some instances the murderous proceedings at Vellore impressed the commanding officers at other stations with such an undue degree of apprehension, as to lead them to disarm their native troops without sufficient cause—an unreasonable suspicion thus succeeding to an unreasonable confidence. Indeed, the European officers seem generally to have taken but small pains to inform themselves of the feelings and dispositions of the native troops. Looking at the events which preceded the unhappy affair at Vellore, it seems impossible to avoid feeling surprise at the unconsciousness and security displayed by the European authorities up to the moment of the frightful explosion. No apprehension appears to have been entertained, although the massacre was preceded by circumstances abundantly sufficient to justify the feeling, and though the approaching danger was not left to be inferred from circumstances. Positive testimony as to the treacherous intentions of the native troops was tendered, but, unfortunately, treated with disregard and contempt.

Amidst the disgusting exhibition of almost universal treachery, a solitary instance of fidelity to the ruling powers occurred, and the name of Mustapha Beg deserves on this account to be recorded. This man, who had become acquainted with a part, if not the whole, of the designs of the conspirators, proceeded on the night of the 16th of June to the house of one of the officers of the garrison, and there stated that the Mussulmans of the battalion had united to attack the barracks, and kill all the Europeans, on account of the turban. The course taken upon this occasion by the officer to whom the communication was made, was certainly, under the circumstances, an extraordinary one: he referred the matter to the native officers, and they reported that no objection existed to the use of the turban. One of the parties implicated admitted having used certain expressions attributed to him, but gave them an interpretation which rendered them harmless; and the evidence of the informant was alleged to be unworthy of credit—first, on the ground of general bad character; and secondly, because he laboured under the infirmity of madness. The charge of habitual drunkenness, which was brought against Mustapha Beg, was certainly not sufficient to warrant the rejection of his evidence without further inquiry; and the imputation of madness appears never to have been thought of before, but to have been fabricated at the moment for the especial purpose of destroying the force of his testimony. That it should have obtained the implicit belief and acquiescence of the European officer in command is inexplicable upon any reasonable grounds. The men who made the charge had a direct interest in establishing it—something more, therefore, than mere assertion was requisite before it could reasonably be credited; yet no evidence that Mustapha Beg had ever previ-

ously displayed symptoms of insanity seems to have been afforded, or even required. His story was at once rejected as the effusion of a distempered mind, and thus success was insured to the atrocious design, which a reasonable caution might have frustrated. The degree of information possessed by Mustapha Beg has been the subject of question. It has been said that he knew much more than he avowed; that he was, in fact, acquainted with the entire plans and objects of the conspirators, and studiously concealed a part of them. This may be true, inasmuch as, in most cases, it is nearly impossible for any degree of labour or ingenuity to draw from a native witness "the whole truth;" but it must be remembered that this charge rests upon testimony in no way preferable to that of Mustapha Beg himself; and, if well founded, the fact of the informer concealing a part of what he knew, cannot justify the unaccountable inattention displayed towards that which he revealed.

The communication made by Mustapha Beg was disregarded, and the massacre of Vellore followed. This event, in connection with the insubordination displayed at other stations, demanded careful and minute inquiry as to the cause. The greatest confidence had been reposed in the native troops; that confidence had been continued even after much had occurred which ought to have shaken it; but the disaffection of a part of the troops was no longer matter of mere report or mere suspicion—it had been manifested too plainly and too terribly to admit of denial or of doubt. The government, therefore, now commenced the business of inquiry in earnest.

From the national characteristics of the native troops, it must be always a work of some difficulty to trace their actions and impressions to their genuine origin. The obnoxious turban was put forward as the main ground of dissatisfaction, combined with some orders which had been recently issued, by which the men, when on duty, were forbidden to wear on their faces certain marks of caste, and were required to trim their beards in a uniform manner. It appears that the latter regulations were not altogether new: they had been enforced in certain regiments and neglected in others, and the orders only required a general conformity to practices which had for some time been partially adopted. The objection to the new turban (as far as any sincere objection was felt at all) lay principally with the Mahometans, who thought themselves degraded by being required to wear anything approaching in appearance to a European hat. The restrictions in regard to marks of caste were applicable to the Hindoos; but the regulations relating to the beard seem to have been obnoxious to both classes. As the two officers by whose recommendation the regulations were adopted had been long in the Company's service, it may seem that they ought to have been better acquainted with the feelings and prejudices of the native troops

than to have risked the affections of the army, and the consequent safety of the British dominion, upon a point so perfectly trifling as a change of dress. As far, however, as the turban is concerned, it is but justice to those officers to state, that they appear to have had little reason to apprehend any opposition to its introduction, and still less to anticipate the criminal excesses for which it afforded a pretext. The proposed change was long a matter of publicity. In the first instance, three turbans were made, and three men—one of them a Mahometan—wore them at the presidency for inspection. These men declared that they preferred them to the old ones. The pattern turbans were afterwards publicly exhibited at the adjutant-general's office, where they were seen by officers and men of all ranks and classes. The new turban bore a near resemblance to that which had been long worn by one of the battalions of native infantry; in another regiment, one of the battalions wore a turban little differing from a Scottish bonnet, and turbans not very dissimilar were in use in various regiments. With such precedents, it might have been presumed that no resistance would have been offered to an innovation calculated materially to promote the comfort of the men. On the other points, it is not perhaps easy to acquit the framers of the regulation of having somewhat rashly impaired the real efficiency of the army, from an over-anxious desire to improve its appearance. The Hindoos are, of all people upon the earth, the most alive to any interference with their superstitious observances. This fact must have been familiar to officers of so much experience as those who proposed the offensive orders; and to outrage the feelings of the troops for no better purpose than to render their appearance more agreeable to the eye of military taste, was ill-advised and imprudent. Yet, though this gave considerable offence—and, if the prejudices of the Hindoos are to be respected, the feeling of offence was not unwarranted—it was not the main cause of the mutiny; for it appears that few of the Hindoos joined in it except by the instigation of the Mahometans. The latter class were everywhere the promoters of the disturbances, and it remains to be seen by what motives they were actuated.

The Mahometans objected to the new turban, and this led the Hindoos to dwell upon their own grievances; but the turban itself was but a pretext, artfully used by the emissaries of those hostile to the British way, to excite discontent and rebellion. The native officers, both before and after the occurrences at Vellore, declared that there was nothing in the new turban inconsistent with the laws and usages of their religion, or in any way degrading to those who were required to wear it; and the chief conspirator at Vellore, a few days previously to the insurrection, being questioned by his commanding officer as to the existence of dissatisfaction, offered, in the presence of the

other native officers, to place the Koran on his head and swear that there was none, and that the whole corps were prepared to wear the turban. The feeling against it was certainly far from universal; for, in many instances, much alacrity was shown in adopting it; and, after the mutiny, some corps requested permission to wear it as a testimony of their unshaken fidelity. Something, indeed, must be allowed for the habitual dissimulation which is one of the national characteristics; but all the evidence tends to show that, had no political causes intervened, the change would have been effected as quietly as others had been which in themselves were more likely to give offence. But Vellore was, at that time, the seat of deep and dark intrigues, directed to the destruction of the British government and the elevation of a Mahometan sovereignty upon its ruins. The fortress of Vellore was the residence of the sons of Tippoo Sultan, and the whole neighbourhood swarmed with the creatures of the deposed family. The choice of this place for their abode was an injudicious one, and the circumstances under which they were permitted to reside there enhanced the dangers arising from their situation. An extravagant revenue had been placed at their disposal, which enabled them to purchase the services of a host of retainers—an advantage which they did not neglect. Many were to be found who, from old associations, possessed a feeling of attachment to the family of Tippoo; many more who, from religious bigotry, were willing to engage in any scheme having for its object the destruction of a European and Christian power; and a still greater number ready to sell themselves to the best bidder, and to lend their assistance to any cause in the prosperity of which they hoped to participate. The Mahometan power had declined with extraordinary rapidity, and the number of those whose fortunes had declined with it was considerable. Many of these persons had entered the army of the conquerors; and our own ranks thus comprehended a body of men whose feelings and whose interests were arrayed against us. Over every class of those who cherished sentiments of discontent, or hopes of advantage from change, the sons of Tippoo were imprudently allowed the means of establishing and retaining unbounded influence. The place chosen for their residence was in the immediate neighbourhood of their former grandeur—the restraint under which they were placed of the mildest character—the accommodation provided for them of the most splendid description—their allowances on a scale of oriental magnificence. The imprudent bounty of the British government thus furnished them with an almost unlimited command of the means of corruption, and enabled them to add to the stimulus of hope the more powerful temptation of immediate benefit. These opportunities and advantages they abundantly improved, and the consequence was, that, in the town and garrison of Vellore, their numerical strength was

greater than that of the government which held them in captivity.

It appears that no fewer than three thousand Mysoreans settled in Vellore and its vicinity subsequently to its becoming the abode of the princes; that the number of their servants and adherents in the pettah amounted to about one thousand eight hundred; that the general population of the place had astonishingly increased, and that some hundreds of persons were destitute of any visible means of subsistence. These were circumstances which ought to have excited suspicion—which ought to have called forth vigour: unfortunately they were regarded with apathy. Instead of the strict and vigilant superintendence which ought to have been exercised over such a population, in such a place, there is the strongest ground for concluding that the utmost laxity prevailed. It is clear that, for the purposes of security, the military power ought to have been paramount; but authority was at Vellore so much divided as to destroy all unity of purpose, all energy, and nearly all responsibility. The commanding officer, of course, controlled the troops; the collector was charged with the care of the police; and the paymaster of stipends with the custody of the princes. This was a departure from the original plan, by which the whole of those duties had been intrusted to the military commander; and the change was far from judicious.

With so many chances in their favour, the sons of Tippoo were not likely to be very scrupulous in availing themselves of the opportunities which fortune had thrown in their way; and that, at least, two of them were implicated in the atrocities of Vellore, is beyond question. The connection of those events with simultaneous disturbances at Hyderabad and other places was not distinctly traced; but there can be little doubt of their having originated in the same cause, and little danger of error in treating them all as ramifications of the same conspiracy. The means resorted to of exciting disaffection were invariably the same. The changes of dress, which, but for the sinister arts employed to pervert them, would have attracted no more attention than matters so trivial demanded, were declared to be part of an organized plan for forcing Christianity on the troops and the people. The turban was held up to their hatred as a Christian hat, as the turn-screw attached to the fore part of the turban was converted into a cross, the symbol of the Christian faith. Even the practice of vaccination, which had been for some time introduced, was represented as intended to advance the cause of Christianity. The reports circulated for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the people, differed only in the greater or less extent of their demands upon popular credulity. At Hyderabad the most outrageous rumours were propagated and believed. Among other extravagances, it was currently reported that the Europeans were about to make a human sacrifice, in the person

of a native; that a hundred bodies without heads were lying along the banks of the Moose river; that the Europeans had built a church, which it required a sacrifice of human heads to sanctify; and that they designed to massacre all the natives except those who should erect the sign of the cross on the doors of their dwellings. Superstitious feeling was assailed in every practicable way. Fanatical mendicants prowled about, scattering the seeds of sedition and revolt, and astrology was called in to predict the downfall of the Christian and the ascendancy of Mussulman power.

Such means could not fail to operate powerfully upon the minds of an ignorant and bigoted people, accessible to the belief of any reports, however improbable or absurd, if addressed to their religious prejudices: and the effects of the poison attested the skill with which it had been prepared. To a European, the very imputation of an intention on the part of the government to interfere with the religion of the people of India, excluding all consideration of the means by which it was to be effected, can appear only ridiculous. No government has ever exercised such perfect toleration, or displayed so much tenderness towards religions differing from those of the governors, as that of the British in India. Indulgence has been pushed even to excess—the most horrible atrocities were long allowed to be perpetrated with impunity, from a fear of giving offence to the votaries of the gloomy creed in which they originated. Impartial observers have sometimes complained of the indifference of the ruling powers to the cause of Christianity; but never has there been a shadow of reason for ascribing to them an indiscreet zeal to accelerate its progress. Towards the native troops, especially, the greatest forbearance has been uniformly manifested, and the strictness of military discipline has been in various points relaxed, in order to avoid offence to the prevailing superstitions. The European servants of the Company have rigidly pursued the course prescribed by the supreme authority. Their own religious observances, when attended to, have been unmarked by ostentation, and unmixed with any spirit of proselytism. At the time of the unfortunate disturbances, no missionary of the English nation had exercised his office in that part of India where they occurred. In the interior there was no provision whatever for Christian worship; and the commander-in-chief stated it to be a melancholy truth, that so unfrequent were the religious observances of the officers doing duty with battalions, that the sepoys had but recently discovered the nature of the religion professed by the English. These circumstances did not, however, secure the government from a suspicion of intending to force the profession of Christianity upon the natives; for, though the originators and leaders of the conspiracy well knew the falsehood of the imputation, it was, no doubt, believed by many who were induced to unite with them. The undeviating policy

of the government ought to have exempted it from such suspicion—the absurdity of the means by which it was alleged to be intended to effect the object was sufficient to discredit the charge, had it been sanctioned by probability; but fanaticism does not reason: any report that falls in with its prejudices is eagerly received and implicitly credited.

The mutineers were quickly overcome, and order was re-established in the fortress. But the difficulties of government did not end with the suppression of the external indications of dissatisfaction. The regulations which had furnished a pretext for the perpetration of so much crime and mischief were still in force, and it was a matter of some delicacy to determine how to deal with them. Every course that could be suggested was open to serious objections, and great calmness and great sagacity were required in making a selection. To discuss at length the wisdom of the chosen line of policy would occupy too much space. It may suffice to say, that conciliation being thought expedient, the regulations were abandoned: and though it may be urged that this was almost a matter of necessity, under the circumstances which existed, still it was not unattended with danger, from the evil precedent which it afforded of a concession extorted by mutiny and massacre. Mutiny is a crime which, by the severity of military law, is deemed deserving of death; but the insurrection of Vellore was not an ordinary case of mutiny, grave as is that offence in itself. The baseness, treachery, and murderous cruelty with which it was marked, gives it a frightful pre-eminence over the generality of military revolts, and it is painful to think that so detestable a project should have been so far attended with success as to procure the abolition of the orders which had been made the pretext for it. The fatal regulations being disposed of, another question arose as to the manner of disposing of the culprits—and conciliation again triumphed.

On this subject great difference of opinion existed, and much discussion took place. The governor, Lord William Bentinck, advised a very mild course; Sir John Cradock, the commander-in-chief, recommended one somewhat more severe. The other members of council coincided in opinion with the governor; while the governor-general in council, who interfered on the occasion, adopted the views of Sir John Cradock. Ultimately, the greater part of the disaffected troops escaped with very slight punishment, and some may almost be said to have been rewarded for their crimes. A few only of the most culpable suffered the punishment of death; the remainder were merely dismissed the service, and declared incapable of being readmitted to it; and some of the officers, whose guilt was thought to be attended by circumstances of extenuation, received small pensions. The propriety of this last favour is something more than questionable. To the army, the example was

anything but salutary. By the people at large, whom this act of liberality was doubtless meant to conciliate, it was in danger of being misunderstood, and was quite as likely to be attributed to the operation of fear as to the spirit of magnanimous forgiveness. It was a proceeding which can on no ground be justified, and which, it is to be hoped, will never furnish a rule for the guidance of any future government.

On another point a collision of opinion took place. Sir John Cradock advised that the regiments which were implicated in the mutiny should be expunged from the list of the army; Lord William Bentinck took a different view: but on this question the other members in council agreed with the commander-in-chief. The former, however, attached so much importance to his own view of the question, as to determine to act on his own judgment and responsibility, in opposition to the opinion of the majority in council. It would appear incredible that a question regarding no higher or more momentous matter than the retention of the names of two regiments upon the army list, or their expulsion from it, could have been regarded as justifying the exercise of that extraordinary power vested in the governor for extraordinary occasions, and for extraordinary occasions only, were not the fact authenticated beyond the possibility of doubt. On his own responsibility Lord William Bentinck set aside the decision of the majority of the council, and determined that the regiments in which the mutiny had occurred should remain on the list. In turn, the act by which the governor of Fort St. George had set aside the opinion of his council was as unceremoniously annulled by the supreme government, who directed that the names of the guilty regiments should be struck out. The conduct of the governor, in thus indiscreetly exercising the extraordinary power vested in him, was also disapproved at home. On some former occasion his policy had not commanded the entire approbation of the Court of Directors, and this act was followed by his lordship's recall. It was at the same time deemed no longer advisable that Sir John Cradock should retain the command of the army, and he was accordingly removed from it. A calm inquiry into the course pursued by Sir John Cradock will perhaps lead to the conclusion that he did not merit very severe reprehension. He seems, in the commencement of the disturbances, to have been guided by the opinions of others whom he thought better informed than himself. On finding that the line of conduct which he had been advised to pursue was fomenting discontent among the troops, he stated the fact to the governor, by whose encouragement he was led to persevere. The disastrous results, however, which followed, showed but too plainly the impolicy of doing so; and the commander-in-chief must, undoubtedly, be held responsible for the conduct

of the army ; but the errors into which Sir John Cradock was led admit of the extenuation arising from the fact of his being nearly a stranger at the presidency. It was thought, however, and perhaps justly, that, after what had occurred, there was little hope of his being able to exercise his authority beneficially to the army or the British government. Still, the case of Sir John Cradock appears to have been attended with some hardship ; and it is to be lamented that a course could not have been devised which might have spared the feelings of the gallant officer, without compromising the interests of his country, or the spirit and efficiency of the army of Madras. The adjutant-general and deputy adjutant-general were ordered to return to Europe, but the former officer was subsequently restored. These two officers were better acquainted with India than the commander-in-chief, but there was much to extenuate their error ; and few men, perhaps, in their circumstances would have acted with more discretion.

One change, consequent upon the mutiny of Vellore, was a very proper and necessary one: the family of Tippoo Sultan was removed to Bengal, and thus separated from the spot where they could most effectually intrigue against British power and influence. The extravagant allowances, also, which they had previously enjoyed, were subjected to judicious retrenchment.

One of the most remarkable and lamentable circumstances brought to light by the transactions which have been narrated was, the want of cordiality and confidence between the British and native officers. A spirit of estrangement seems to have existed between them, altogether inconsistent with the interests of the service to which both belonged. Whether anything in the conduct or deportment of one class was calculated to give reasonable cause of offence to the other, it might not be easy now to determine ; but certain it is, that the interests of the government imperatively require that courtesy and urbanity should invariably mark the habits and demeanour of the British towards the native officers and troops. These virtues must not, indeed, be carried to such an excess as to lead to the sacrifice of any moral principle, or to the surrender of one tittle of the great duty of military obedience ; but, short of these, it is impossible they can be carried too far, and a systematic neglect of them by any British officer is in fact a breach of his duty to his country.

The clamour raised against the new turban was instigated in a great degree by political emissaries, assuming the guise of religious devotees, and who thus were enabled to exercise a powerful influence over a bigoted and superstitious people. But the mischievous labours of these persons were by no means distasteful to the native officers, though a majority of them were convinced that there

was nothing in the turban inconsistent with the dictates of their religious belief, and that the reports of the designs of the British to make a forcible change in the religion of the people were ridiculous and unfounded. The conduct of the native officers at Vellore needs neither illustration nor remark. At other places they were found not exempt from the taint of sedition which had affected the privates. At Nunddroog an inquiry was instituted, and it was proved that very offensive expressions had been uttered, and various attempts had been made to excite insubordination. Seventeen persons were dismissed the service, and among them several officers. No doubt was entertained as to the existence of a similar spirit at Bangalore, but the fact could not be established by legal evidence. At Palnacotta, where a body of Mussulman troops had been disarmed somewhat abruptly by the commanding officer, it was deemed expedient, on re-arming them, to except some of the native commissioned officers, and after an inquiry, several were dismissed. There, as at Nunddroog, language had been used sufficiently significant and highly reprehensible. Criminality of a similar character was established against several persons at Wallajahabad, and some dismissals took place there. At Bellary, a soubahdar was convicted on the clearest evidence of having, in company with two sepoys, aided two religious mendicants in propagating doctrines of the most atrocious description, and he was in consequence dismissed. So striking and conspicuous was this unworthy conduct in the native officers, and so alarming their abuse of the influence which they naturally possessed over the minds of the men, that it was deemed necessary to publish a general order especially addressed to them, calling to their recollection the principles upon which they had been employed in the Company's service, and warning them of the consequences which would attend a departure from their duty.

The storm happily passed over, but it affords abundant materials for speculation as to futurity. The safety of the empire demands that the bond of connection between the native army and their British officers should be confirmed and strengthened. For this purpose, the more the means of intercourse between the several classes are facilitated the better. A common language is a great instrument for avoiding misunderstanding and promoting good-will ; and it is to be feared that the native tongues have not always received that degree of attention from British officers to which they are entitled. Some additional encouragements to their study seem requisite, as the mastering of them so materially tends to promote that harmony and mutual good understanding which it is so important to establish. A mere smattering of a language may be sufficient for conveying and understanding the dry details of regimental duty, but is not sufficient for establish-

ing and maintaining that degree of influence over the natives which every well-wisher to the permanence of the British dominion must be desirous should exist.

Another point of vital importance will be to raise the character of the native troops, and especially of the native officers, as far as may be, to a British standard; to imbue them with a portion of those noble principles which the European world derives from the age of chivalry, and to give them the habits and the feeling of gentlemen. The principle of honour, which feels "a stain like a wound," should be sedulously inculcated and encouraged. By advancing the character of the native soldiery in the scale of moral dignity, we are adding to

the security of our own dominion in the East; by degrading it, or suffering it to sink—nay, by permitting it to remain stationary, we are co-operating with the designs of our enemies, and undermining the safety of our government. Where the soldier is actuated exclusively by the lower and more selfish motives, his services will always be at the command of him who can hold out the strongest temptations to his ambition or cupidity. The many affecting instances of fidelity which the native troops have shown, prove that they are open to the influence of higher and better feelings, and no pains should be spared to cherish and encourage them.

CHAPTER XXII.

DISPUTES BETWEEN MINISTERS AND THE COURT OF DIRECTORS—LORD MINTO APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL—AFFAIRS OF TRAVANCORE—MILITARY PROCEEDINGS—EXPEDITION AGAINST MACAO—TREATY WITH BUNJEET SINGH—MUTINIOUS PROCEEDINGS OF THE MADRAS OFFICERS—OCCUPATION OF BOURBON—CAPTURE OF BRITISH SHIPPING—CAPITULATION OF THE ISLAND OF MAURITIUS—SURRENDER OF AMBOYNA—EXPEDITION AGAINST BATAVIA—CONQUEST OF JAVA—TREATIES WITH SCINDE, CAUBUL, AND PERSIA—LORD MINTO RESIGNS.

IN the course of more than half a century, during which India has been governed through the instrumentality of two independent bodies, collision has very rarely taken place; it has been generally averted by discretion and mutual forbearance. Still, it has sometimes arisen, and the vacancy caused by the death of the Marquis Cornwallis gave occasion for an instance. The ministry who had signified the approbation of the Crown to the appointment of that nobleman was no longer in being. It had been dispersed by the death of its chief, Mr. Pitt. The Whigs, having formed a coalition with the party of which Lord Grenville was the head, had returned to office after a long exclusion from it—an exclusion originating in the plan which they had proposed and endeavoured to carry through parliament, for the administration of the affairs of India, in 1784. Intelligence of the death of the Marquis Cornwallis arrived in England almost simultaneously with the accession of the new ministers to office. It was deemed expedient to make immediate provision for the exercise of the full powers of the governor-general, and Sir George Barlow, at that time possessing the entire confidence of the Court of Directors, was appointed, with the approbation of the new President of the Board of Commissioners Lord Minto. That functionary, indeed, stated that the appointment must be regarded as temporary; but he added, that no immediate change was in contemplation.

After such an announcement, it must have been concluded that the new governor-general would be permitted to enjoy his appointment for a period of some moderate duration; and few speculators upon political probabilities

would have assigned to Sir George Barlow's tenure of office a shorter existence than that of a few months. No one, at least, could have expected that the acquiescence of his Majesty's ministers was to expire in ten days, and that, at the end of that period, a communication would be made of their desire that the appointment which they had so recently sanctioned should be superseded, and another governor-general named—yet such was the fact.

The person selected for this high office by the servants of the Crown was the Earl of Lauderdale; but it being found that the claims of this nobleman were very unfavourably regarded by the Court, the proposal was withdrawn; not, however, without an intimation that it would be revived at a future period. The first correspondence on the subject took place in March. In May the subject was again brought forward by ministers, but without success. The Court of Directors refused to revoke the appointment of Sir George Barlow, and, of course, unless their resolution could be changed or their authority overcome, the case of the nominee of ministers was hopeless. But the cabinet was not prepared to yield. The death of Mr. Pitt had shattered the administration of which he was the head into fragments which no one appeared to have either the capacity or the confidence to reunite. The coadjutors of the deceased statesman had, in the language of Mr. Tierney, "stultified themselves" by the tender of their resignations on the death of their leader. The new ministers, in consequence, felt strong in the weakness of their opponents.

It was at that period almost universally held to be impossible to form any other ad-

ministration than that which, under Lord Grenville, swayed the councils of the state; and though a very few months dissipated this illusion, the ministry of 1806 claimed possession of "all the talents" of the country, and on this ground placed opposition at defiance. Flushed with confidence in their own strength, the ministers were not inclined to be very delicate as to the means by which they accomplished their object; and, finding their recommendation without weight, they resolved to call into exercise an extraordinary power vested in the Crown by the act of 1784, but which had never been exerted. That act enabled the sovereign, by an instrument under his sign manual, to vacate any appointment in British India without the consent of the Court of Directors. The right was unquestionable; so is the right to withhold the assent of the Crown from bills which have passed both Houses of Parliament—and the exercise of the latter prerogative was almost as much to be expected as that of the former, after it had been allowed for so many years to sleep. But, unprecedented as was its exercise, ministers did not shrink from advising it; and the commission by which Sir George Barlow had been appointed governor-general was vacated by the royal authority.

So remarkable an exercise of prerogative did not, of course, pass without notice. On the 8th of July, the subject was brought before the upper house of Parliament by Lord Melville, formerly Mr. Henry Dundas, and during many years President of the Board of Commissioners. After advertg to the principal facts connected with the transaction, his lordship called the attention of the House to the act of 1784, by which the power of recall was given to the Crown; and contended that the clause in question, if construed so as to warrant the proceedings of his Majesty's ministers with regard to Sir George Barlow, would be altogether at variance with the spirit and intent of the act of which it formed part. Referring to the period when the act was passed, he said that the whole country was then convulsed with conflicting opinions on the best mode of governing India, and that the two principal plans were embodied in two bills, which were known by the names of the leaders of the two parties by whom they were respectively introduced; one being called Mr. Fox's bill—the other, Mr. Pitt's. He reminded the house that these two bills were universally understood to be framed in accordance with the different views of the two parties in the great struggle upon the question, whether the patronage of India should be vested in the hands of the Crown or of the Company. The bill of Mr. Pitt, which passed into a law, disclaimed the patronage on the part of the Crown, and was based on the assumption that it might be more beneficially exercised by the Company; it could not be supposed, therefore, that the legislature intended that the bill should convey a power

inconsistent with the spirit in which it was framed and passed: it could not be supposed that it intended to enable his Majesty's ministers, at any future time, by exercising at pleasure the power of recall, to appropriate to themselves the patronage of India. The design of the clause was obvious. It was intended as a check upon the Court of Directors, in the event of their being led by partiality to make an improper appointment: it also enabled government to interfere in differences between the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors—a case, not merely hypothetical, a remarkable instance having occurred not long before the passing of the act, where the Court of Proprietors refused to acquiesce in the recall of Mr. Hastings, when proposed by the Court of Directors. He urged that the power thus intrusted to the Crown would be grossly abused if applied to any other purposes than those contemplated by the law—if exercised merely with a view to enforce the appointment of a particular individual whom his Majesty's ministers wished to see governor-general. This was the first instance in which the power had been exercised, and those who advised its exercise were bound to show good cause for it. Lord Melville pronounced a high panegyric upon the character and public services of Sir George Barlow, and animadverted with great severity upon the conduct of the ministers, which, he said, if the result of mere caprice, was highly blamable, but if originating in an intention to seize the patronage of India, was a direct violation of the spirit and the meaning of an act of parliament. After dwelling upon the inconveniences likely to arise to the public service from the extraordinary course pursued by ministers, Lord Melville concluded by moving for certain papers connected with the removal of Sir George Barlow, and for others relating to the financial affairs of the Company.

The exercise of the royal prerogative was defended by the premier, Lord Grenville, who contended that the law must be taken in its plain meaning, not according to any fanciful interpretation, and that the act of 1784 clearly gave a power of recall. That power had been objected to, at the time of passing the act, on one of the grounds now taken by Lord Melville, namely, that it might virtually give to ministers the patronage of India; but it was answered then, as it might be answered now, that because the Crown had the power of negating an act of parliament, it could not be said that it had the power of directing the legislature; and, by parity of argument, it could not reasonably be contended that, because a particular appointment in India was reversed, the whole of the appointments must fall under the control of his Majesty's ministers. He admitted, however, that if it could be shown that the power had been exercised merely for the purpose of procuring the appointment of a particular person, it would be a violation of the law; but he called upon

Lord Melville to recollect, that, from the passing of the act in 1784 to 1801, there had not been a single governor appointed who had not been recommended by that nobleman himself; and as the same system had prevailed from 1801 downward, there did not appear much to justify the surprise expressed on this occasion. His lordship then reminded the house, that Sir George Barlow had been appointed to succeed the Marquis Wellesley, and had almost immediately been superseded in favour of the Marquis Cornwallis. In connection with the latter appointment, Lord Grenville passed a censure upon the late administration for a neglect which had placed their successors in some difficulty. Possessed, he admitted, of every other qualification for the high office to which he was called, the Marquis Cornwallis wanted youth and health. It was generally supposed in London that he would be unable to bear the voyage, and that if he arrived in India he would survive only a short time; yet his Majesty's late advisers made no provision for an event which must have been expected, and from their criminal neglect, his Majesty's present ministers were called upon, within twenty-four hours of their acceptance of office, to provide for the government of India, in consequence of the communication of the death of the Marquis Cornwallis. In this emergency, they approved of the appointment of Sir George Barlow; but they never regarded this appointment as being anything more than temporary. For these reasons, and on the grounds of the inconvenience that would result from acceding to the motion, he opposed the production of the correspondence.

Several other peers took part in the discussion: among them Lord Hawkesbury, who, as a member of the late government, denied that it was necessary to take more than ordinary precaution against the decease of the Marquis Cornwallis. Considering the advanced age of the marquis, he had never known a man more likely to live; and such was the opinion of his friends who had last seen him at Portsmouth. The arguments used by the other speakers were little more than repetitions of those brought forward by Lords Melville and Grenville, and, on the question being put, both motions were lost without a division.

Two days afterwards, the subject underwent some discussion in the House of Commons. In a committee of the whole house on the India budget, Mr. Johnstone, after taking a review of the conduct of Sir George Barlow, and passing on it a high eulogy, condemned the conduct of ministers in nullifying their original appointment. He said he had heard that Sir George Barlow was recalled because he did not possess the confidence of ministers; but he believed that two noble lords, under whose administrations the British interests in India had flourished in an extraordinary degree—he meant Lord Macartney and Lord Cornwallis (the latter as governor-general and

the former as the head of one of the other presidencies)—he believed that those noble persons possessed little of the confidence of those who, during the period of their respective administrations, held the reins of government in England. Lord Castlereagh joined in reprehending the conduct of ministers; the chancellor of the exchequer, Lord Henry Petty, defended it: and Mr. Francis, who disclaimed offering an opinion of his own, alleged that, on former occasions, Sir George Barlow had incurred the displeasure of the Court of Directors, who now supported him. On the 16th of July, when the committee sat again, Mr. Grant, an influential director of the East-India Company, and the chairman of the preceding year, defended the conduct of Sir George Barlow throughout the negotiations for peace. Mr. Paul justified the removal of Sir George Barlow; he maintained that, to secure the respect of the native courts, the governor-general should be a man of high rank; and that, though Sir George Barlow was an excellent revenue officer, he had none of the qualities necessary for a governor-general.

The ministerial speakers in the House of Commons seem rather to have evaded discussion, either because no specific motion was made on the subject, or from a conviction that the course which they had advised was an unpopular one. The ministry had, however, one advantage, which, probably, most cabinets value more than any powers of reason or eloquence,—they had majorities in parliament, and these enabled them to submit with philosophic calmness to charges which it might have been troublesome to answer. The knowledge that the ministry had the means of triumphing in the division, though they might be vanquished in the argument, probably withheld most of the members of the House of Commons who especially represented East-Indian interests, from the steps which might have been expected from them. The novelty of their situation might also have some effect in diminishing the vigour of their efforts. The Company had enjoyed the countenance and protection of the late ministers (to whom they regarded themselves as mainly indebted for the preservation of their chartered rights) during a period of twenty-two years, with the exception of the short administration of Lord Sidmouth; and the policy of his administration differed, indeed, little from that of Mr. Pitt, whom he had succeeded, and by whom he was supplanted. Accustomed for so long a time to act in concert with the ministers of the Crown, those directors who had seats in parliament seem to have felt as though there would be something indecorous in any very decided public opposition, even when the former enemies of the privileges of the Company had obtained the reins of power. This feeling, combined with a conviction of the hopelessness of struggling in a contest where the victory was already adjudged, may account for the feebleness of

the efforts made within the walls of parliament to justify the conduct of the Court of Directors in opposition to that of the ministers of the Crown. But, though apparently declining any public appeal against the dictation to which it was sought to subject them, they steadily persevered in resisting it; and it being ultimately found impossible to overcome the objections of the Court of Directors to the Earl of Lauderdale, that nobleman withdrew his claim to the office of governor-general; the court consented to nominate the President of the Board of Control, Lord Minto, and thus the differences between the Court of Directors and his Majesty's government were terminated.

Lord Minto arrived at Calcutta and took his seat in Council on the 31st of July, 1807. He found the country in that state of torpor which Sir George Barlow and his friends regarded as tranquillity, and during several months of the earlier period of the new governor-general's administration little occurred of sufficient importance to demand an historical record. The close of the year 1808 opened a scene in Travancore which fearfully disturbed the preceding calm, and the circumstances of this extraordinary outbreak will now require detail.

The connection between Travancore and the East-India Company has been of considerable duration, and the government of the latter had, on various occasions, rendered good service to the former. It will be recollected that, in 1790, Tippoo Saib attacked Travancore, and penetrated to Virapelly; and that Lord Cornwallis promptly interposed to rescue the country from an invader who threatened in a very brief period to overrun it. In 1795, a subsidiary treaty was concluded between the British Government and the rajah of Travancore; and ten years after, in 1805, a second treaty. By the former treaty, the rajah engaged to assist the East-India Company in time of war with troops to the extent of his ability. By a clause in the latter, this aid was commuted for an annual tribute.

Travancore was among the most scandalously misgoverned of Indian states. Retrenchment and reform were indispensably necessary, and the treaty provided for their being commenced and conducted under the auspices of the British government. To afford time for effecting the necessary changes, the payment of half the additional subsidy stipulated for by the second treaty was remitted for two years, but the end of that period found the rajah no better disposed to pay the entire amount of subsidy than the beginning. One heavy source of his expense was a military body, called the Carnatic Brigade, which, though unnecessary as well as burthensome, the rajah insisted upon retaining, in spite of the remonstrances of the British representative at his court. This gave rise to much angry feeling. The resident, Colonel Macaulay, pressed for the required payment of subsidy, and after a while a part

of the amount was liquidated, but a very large portion still remained undischarged.

The resident having to perform a most ungracious duty in urging the demands of his government, became an object of aversion to the dewan, into whose hands the rajah had suffered the whole power of the state to fall. That officer, while ruling his master, was himself under influence unfavourable to the interests of the British government. His conduct had long been evasive and unsatisfactory, and towards the close of the year 1808, it became suspected that he entertained views of direct hostility. It had been ascertained that communications had taken place between the dewan and some Americans, who had recently arrived from Persia. The nature of these communications was kept secret, but they were followed by overtures from an agent of the dewan to the rajah of Cochin, for entering into joint measures in opposition to the British power. It was reported that a French force would land on the coast of Malabar in the course of January, and in anticipation of this event, the dewan urged the rajah of Cochin to prepare to unite himself with the Travancorians and French, for the purpose of expelling the English from the country.

The dewan was not one of those who content themselves with merely giving advice—he enforced his recommendation by example. Extensive military preparations were entered into; the people were trained to warlike exercises, and large supplies of arms were obtained. The object of these proceedings was all but avowed, and it was currently reported that emissaries had been sent to the Isle of France to solicit a reinforcement of artillery. These circumstances attracted the attention of the government of Fort St. George, then administered under the presidency of Sir George Barlow, he having been thus consoled for his disappointment in regard to the office of governor-general. By that government immediate and active measures were deemed necessary. Troops were ordered to march from Trichinopoly, and others were embarked from Malabar for Quilon; but these movements were suddenly countermanded, and a determination taken to try further the effects of a conciliatory policy.

The experiment met with that species of success which usually attends attempts at conciliation under such circumstances. The dewan professed great alarm at the military preparations which had been made by the British government, and intreated permission to throw himself upon the generosity of the power which he had provoked. A succession of messages followed, and this portion of the drama ended in the dewan, on the ground that his person was not safe in Travancore, expressing a desire to resign his office and retire within the territories of the Company. The resident agreed to indulge him, and on the 28th of December, everything was prepared for his journey from Aleppi to Calicut;

a sum of money was advanced for his expenses, and as the alleged fears of the dewan led him to demand a large escort of troops, the force attached to the residency was weakened for the purpose of affording it.

A little after midnight the sleep of the resident was broken by a loud noise in the vicinity of his house. He arose and proceeded to the window, whence he perceived that the building was apparently surrounded by armed men. Hearing his own name mentioned, he opened the lattice and demanded who was there; upon which several voices exclaimed at once that it was the colonel, and several pieces were simultaneously discharged at the window, but happily without producing the intended effect. The object of the assailants being now manifest, the resident seized his sword, and was rushing down stairs to oppose the entrance of the assassins, when he was interrupted by a clerk in his service, who, pointing out the hopelessness of contending with a numerous body of armed men, suggested that his master and himself should conceal themselves in a recess in a lower apartment, the door of which was scarcely discernible from the wainscot in which it was inserted. This retreat Colonel Macaulay was reluctantly induced to enter just at the moment when the assailants, having disarmed the guard, were forcing their way into the house. Having succeeded, every part of it, except the concealed recess, was carefully searched for the intended victim. Disappointed of finding him, they spent the night in plundering the house. At daybreak a vessel, with British troops traversing the deck, appeared in sight, and the ruffians becoming alarmed, made a precipitate retreat. This afforded the resident the opportunity of escape; a boat was procured, and he was shortly on board a British ship.

The vessel that had appeared in sight so opportunely for the resident was one of several which were conveying reinforcements to the British strength in Travancore. All of these arrived in safety except one, having on board a surgeon and thirty-three privates of his Majesty's 12th regiment. This vessel, being detained by some accidents, put into Allepi for a supply of water and for other necessaries. Two or three of the soldiers, landing immediately on the vessel arriving at her anchorage, were told by some servants of the rajah, that a large body of British troops were in the neighbourhood, and that if they were disposed to join them every requisite aid would be afforded for the purpose. The whole party were thus induced to disembark, when they were surrounded and overpowered, tied in couples back to back, and in that state, with a heavy stone fastened to their necks, thrown into the back-water of the port. The ferocity of this deed would almost seem to justify the opinion avowed by some Europeans who have enjoyed the best means of judging of the state of Travancore, that in turpitude and moral

degradation its people transcend every nation upon the face of the earth.

Two days after the outrage on the resident's house, the officer commanding the subsidiary force at Quilon received intelligence, that a large body of armed men had assembled in the inclosure round the dewan's abode. This being an unusual occurrence, Colonel Chalmers ordered his men to rest that night on their arms. Immediately afterwards he was informed that a body of armed nairs had been collected at Paroor, a few miles to the southward of the cantonment, for the purpose of advancing upon his force. To avert an attack of two bodies of troops at the same time, a party, under Captain Clapham, was despatched with a gun, to take post on a height commanding the dewan's house, so as to keep the troops collected there in check. The detachment had scarcely arrived at the point assigned for it, when it was discovered that a small hill, immediately on the flank of the post, was occupied by the Travancore troops, whose numbers appeared to be rapidly augmenting. The eminence on which Captain Clapham's party was posted was evidently a military object to the enemy, and it became necessary to prepare to defend it. A column of nairs was soon seen advancing, which was challenged and requested to halt. The challenge and request were disregarded, and the column continued to advance, obviously for the purpose of charging the British detachment. When within ten paces, Captain Clapham gave orders to fire. The fire was returned, but it was followed up, on the part of the British force, with so much quickness and precision, that after several ineffectual attempts to gain the height, the enemy was obliged to retire.

On the following morning, Major Hamilton proceeded, at the head of a body of British troops, to take possession of the battery at the dewan's house, a service which was effected without loss, and the guns conveyed within the British lines. These guns had been ordinarily used for firing salutes, but on examination, after they came into the hands of Colonel Chalmers, they were all found loaded and double-shotted; and it is also worthy of remark, that they were taken, not in the situation where they were usually placed, but on a spot having the command of the only road leading to the dewan's house.

Before Major Hamilton could return to his position he was required to push on with his party to Anjivicha, to intercept the enemy, who in great numbers were crossing the river in that direction. He arrived just as a numerous body were crossing in boats, while another party was drawn up on shore to cover their landing. The British commander immediately attacked the party on shore, who were dispersed forthwith, pursued to the bar, and driven into the water. A battalion, on the opposite side, witnessed the defeat and destruction of their countrymen, without attempting to assist them further than by a few discharges

of small arms at a distance from which they could do no execution. On the dispersion of the enemy on the nearer side of the river, Major Hamilton directed his artillery to open on the battalion on the opposite shore, and almost the first shot put them to flight. They subsequently returned with reinforcements, and an attempt was made to surround Major Hamilton's force, but prevented by his retiring within the lines of the cantonment.

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the news of these events at Fort St. George, the government of that presidency received from the collector in Malabar the translation of a letter, addressed by the dewan of Travancore to the zamorin rajah in Malabar, and which had been confidentially communicated by the zamorin's minister. It was an extraordinary composition, appealing to the attachment felt by the natives to their ancient superstitions, and expressing violent apprehension of the extension of the Christian faith. To resist this, the zamorin was exhorted to rise against the British, who were to be forthwith expelled, and no amity thenceforward maintained with them. The zamorin was informed that hostilities had begun, and that within eight days the Company's battalions should be compelled to evacuate Quilon.

Some further communication with the zamorin's minister took place, through a confidential agent, whom the dewan deputed to hold a conference with him, and it was not undeserving of notice. On the zamorin's minister suggesting the imprudence of a small state rising in hostility against so vast a power as the British, the dewan's agent, after advertising to the application made to the Isle of France for assistance, said that it was well known that the greater portion of the Company's forces would soon be engaged in a Mahratta war, and in the defence of their northern frontier against an invasion of the French. Thus did the accessibility to invasion of our northern frontier give confidence to those hostile to our power, and thus early were our enemies aware of the existence of that Mahratta combination, which it took several years to mature for action. Yet then, as, under similar circumstances, before and since, there were many who saw nothing but uninterrupted peace and unassailable security.

Further projects of conciliation had been meditated, even after the attempt upon the life of the British resident; and, to gratify the parties by whom that atrocity was contrived and executed, the temporary suspension of Colonel Macaulay was determined on. The news of the attack upon the troops at Quilon, however, put an end to these conciliatory movements, and negotiation was abandoned for arms. It was now thought important to secure the continued services of Colonel Macaulay, and that officer was requested, in language almost apologetic, to resume the duties of resident, until the contemplated proceedings connected with the station should

have been carried into complete effect. A letter was addressed to the rajah of Travancore, explaining the circumstances under which the advance of troops into his country had become necessary; and a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants, assuring them that the peaceable and well-affected had no cause for apprehension, was issued with similar views.

The troops destined for service in Travancore were to advance in various directions. Lieutenant-colonel Arthur St. Leger, of the Madras cavalry, was appointed to conduct the operations on the eastern side; Lieutenant-colonel Cuppage, with another body of troops, was to enter by the northern frontier; while Colonel Wilkinson commanded a detachment, assembled in the south country, for the preservation of tranquillity in that quarter, and for the purpose of reinforcing the army in Travancore, if found necessary. The troops assembled at Quilon remained under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Chalmers.

The last-named officer was soon required to employ the force at his disposal. At six o'clock on the morning of the 15th January, he was informed that the dewan's troops were advancing in different directions. On reconnoitring, in front of the British lines to the left, a large body of infantry drawn up with guns was perceived, on which Colonel Chalmers, without delay, ordered his line to advance in two columns to receive the enemy. The action that ensued lasted five hours, and ended in the flight of the dewan's troops and the capture of several of their guns by the British force. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was great, that of the British very trifling. Ten days afterwards, an attack made by three columns of the enemy on three different points of a detachment in Cochin, commanded by Major Hewitt, was repulsed with the most decisive success, although the British force was greatly inferior, in point of numbers, to its assailants, and was unprotected by either walls or batteries.

The share in the operations intrusted to Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger was conducted with remarkable spirit and brilliancy. The corps forming his detachment reached Palamcottah, after a very rapid march from Trichinopoly, and proceeded from thence to the lines of Arumbooly, which they reached on the 3rd of February. These lines were of great natural and artificial strength, but, after some short time spent in reconnoitring, it was determined to attack them by storm. The storming party, under Major Welsh, left the British encampment on the evening of the 9th, and, after encountering all the difficulties presented by thick jungles, abrupt ascents, rocky fissures, and deep ravines, arrived at the foot of the walls on the top of the hill, which they immediately surprised and carried, driving the enemy down the hill before them. The batteries in their possession were now opened and directed against the main line of the enemy's defences. A reinforcement arriving,

at break of day Major Welsh proceeded to storm the main lines, and these also were carried in spite of a more severe resistance than had previously been offered. The enemy, appalled by the approach of the main body of the troops, to maintain the advantages which had thus been gained, precipitately fled; and, at an early hour of the day, Colonel St. Leger had the happiness of reporting to his government that the British flag was flying on every part of the Arumbooly lines, as well as on the commanding redoubts to the north and south.

Having established a secure post within the lines, Colonel St. Leger pursued his success. A large body of the enemy had taken post in the villages of Colar and Nagrecoil, and the task of dislodging them was intrusted to a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Macleod, of the king's service. The country through which the detachment had to march was unfavourable, and the position which the enemy had chosen strong and advantageous. Protected in front by a battery commanding the only point by which an assailant could approach, this defence was aided by a river, while in the rear were thick, impassable woods. These advantages, however, were unavailing. The lines were attacked and carried after a sharp action, and the enemy forced to retreat in great confusion.

At this place the enemy had intended to make a determined stand. The dewan himself had taken refuge there, and only fled on the approach of the British troops, whose proximity he naturally regarded with dislike, and whose extraordinary success had impressed with terror all opposed to them. The forts of Woodagerry and Papanaveram (the latter one of the strongest places in Travancore) surrendered without the firing of a shot.

The fatal blow thus struck at the power of the dewan was aided by the western division of the British troops. On the 20th of February a detachment from this force assailed and most gallantly carried some batteries erected by the enemy at Killianore, captured seven guns, and defeated a body of troops, consisting of about five thousand men. In the beginning of March Colonel Chalmers advanced with the western division, to effect a junction with Colonel St. Leger, and encamped about twelve miles north of the rajah's capital. About the same period the force on the northern frontier, under Colonel Cuppage, entered without opposition, and took up the strong position of Paroor, while the troops from the southern division of the army, under the command of Colonel Wilkinson, took possession of the defile of Armagawal, and proceeded to occupy the passes of Shincotte and Achincoil. The dewan now fled towards the mountains on the northern frontier, and being abandoned by his master, whom he had misled, parties were despatched in all directions to endeavour to apprehend him. Negotiations commenced for the restoration of relations of amity between Travancore and the Company, and in a

very short period affairs returned to their former state. The dewan wandered in the mountains, till compelled to retire by the difficulty of procuring food among rocks and jungles—a difficulty increased by the seizure of some of his followers, by whom he had been previously supplied. In this situation he came to the resolution of repairing to a pagoda, named Bhagwady, where he put an end to his life, by stabbing himself in various places. His brother was apprehended, and as he had participated in the atrocious murder of the thirty-four unhappy persons belonging to his Majesty's 12th regiment, he was, by the orders of the rajah, most justly executed in sight of that regiment.

The occurrences which have been related illustrate a state of things common in India—a sovereign abandoning himself and his territories to the guidance of a favourite minister, who soon becomes more powerful than the sovereign himself. In former times the mayor of the palace in certain European states reduced the king to a cipher, and while ruling without check or control, suffered the odium of his bad government to attach to the unfortunate person who bore the royal dignity. In India that system is still in active operation; the indolence and the vices of native princes, aided sometimes by their peculiar circumstances, throw them into the custody of the bold or the designing; and from the thralldom which thus involves them they rarely escape, but by the death of their keeper. Their people, in the meantime, are generally exposed to the most dreadful oppression, and king and country have alike cause to rue the lamentable weakness which has invested a subject with the power of sovereignty divested of the name.

The event which next calls for notice is the return of an expedition fitted out against the Portuguese settlement of Macao. The despatch of the expedition was suggested by the state of affairs in Europe, where the French emperor meditated and was endeavouring to effect the subjection of Portugal as well as Spain to his power. The object proposed by the Indian government was attained: Macao was occupied without difficulty, but the Chinese authorities immediately stopped the British trade. The force despatched against Macao thereupon abandoned their acquisition, and returned to India, having twice traversed the distance between Bengal and Macao, with no other result than that of affording, at considerable expense, fresh occasion for the manifestation of the jealousy of the Chinese. The measure which was suggested by the committee of supercargoes at Canton gave great displeasure at home. The Court of Directors passed a resolution condemning in severe terms the conduct of the committee in proceeding, "upon unaccredited rumours, without any permission of the government of China or previous communication with it," to encourage "the Bengal government to send a military force to take possession of Macao," and concluding

with a declaration that a change in the leading members of the committee had thereby become necessary—which change was immediately commenced by the appointment of a new president.

In this year the British government first became connected by treaty with the sovereign of Lahore, Runjeet Singh. This extraordinary person had afforded some ground for apprehension; but a negotiation, conducted by Mr., afterwards Lord Metcalfe, assisted by a military force, ended in the conclusion of a treaty, by which the British government engaged not to interfere with the territories or subjects of the Seik chief north of the Sutlej, he on his part binding himself not to maintain within his territories on the left bank of that river more troops than might be necessary for carrying on the ordinary functions of government, and to abstain from encroaching on the rights of the chiefs in the vicinity.

The untoward result of the expedition to Macao was not the only misfortune of the period immediately under notice. Circumstances occurred in the army of Madras calculated to excite far more regret and far greater apprehension for the interests of Great Britain in the East.

From a variety of causes, the army of India was slow in attaining that perfect system of subordination which is alike required by military duty and essential to military efficiency. The fact of its officers living, in so many instances, apart from all society but their own, while it tended to cherish habits of exclusiveness and assumption, afforded opportunity also for the excitement and encouragement of discontent. Where men have no employment for their leisure but the discussion of their grievances, real grievances will not fail to be magnified and imaginary ones to be invented. The anxiety felt by most officers to obtain the means of returning home, tended to make them peculiarly sensitive in regard to pecuniary affairs; and the inequalities existing at the different presidencies with respect to allowances, afforded to portions of the army specious reasons for dissatisfaction. Insubordination had also been cherished by the undue indulgence shown by the authorities at home to persons whose offences called for severe punishment, more especially in the case of Sir Robert Fletcher, who, after having, as commander of a brigade, fomented and abetted mutiny in the army of Bengal, was appointed commander-in-chief of the army at Madras. From these and other causes the Indian army remained long in a state of unhealthy irritability, capable of being thrown into confusion by the occurrence of the slightest circumstance calculated to afford ground for discontent. Such exciting cause could never be long wanting, and the effect of any that might occur could not fail to derive additional strength from the appearance—perhaps in some cases more than the mere appearance—of undue favour towards the king's officers in comparison with those of the Company.

In the Madras army discontent had for some time been gradually increasing in extent and gaining in intensity. Those who should have checked it—officers of high standing and long experience—unfortunately lent their aid to increase the feeling. Among them Colonel Arthur St. Leger, a brave officer, but an intemperate man, stood conspicuous. So early as March, 1807, the government of Madras, in addressing the Court of Directors, felt called upon thus to advert to his conduct, and to the feeling prevailing in the army:—"We have already stated that a very dangerous spirit of cabal has shown itself among several officers in your army. The feeling has been greatly influenced by the impunity with which the Honourable Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger has been hitherto enabled to brave and insult the authority of this government; for it is with concern that we observe, in addition to the explanations which we have already given regarding the conduct of that officer, that every means of the most public nature have been taken at most of the principal military stations to hold up Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger as the champion of the rights of the Company's army, and as one whose example calls for imitation.

Colonel St. Leger was far from being the only officer of high rank who engaged in this unworthy course. On the removal of Sir John Cradock, General McDowall, of his Majesty's service, had been appointed to the office of commander-in-chief. That officer had a grievance of his own which he threw into the common stock, and forthwith applied himself vigorously to aggravate and extend the ill-feeling which he found existing. The Court of Directors had departed from established precedent by not appointing the new commander-in-chief to a seat in council. This was not intended as a personal slight to General McDowall, the Court having adopted on general grounds the principle of excluding provincial commanders-in-chief from council. While, however, it is impossible to excuse the conduct of General McDowall in perverting the influence of his authority to uses most disgraceful to himself and most dangerous to the interests which it was his duty to uphold, it is equally impossible to discern the wisdom or propriety of the course taken by the Court. It is not easy to discover even a plausible reason for excluding the commander-in-chief from council, while the convenience and advantage of admitting him to a place there are obvious. Unhappily the person on whom, in this instance, the penalty of exclusion fell was a man reckless of his own honour and of that of his country in pursuit of revenge. He assumed the command a short time before the arrival of Sir George Barlow, who thus found the army arrayed in opposition to the government by the man whose duty it was to hold it in subordination. Sir George Barlow had other difficulties. Mr. Petrie, a member of council, had held the government provisionally from the super-

session of Lord William Bentinck, and judging from his subsequent conduct, he appears to have been dissatisfied with the brief tenure of his authority. From the time of Sir George Barlow's arrival he was found in unceasing opposition to the governor, even to the extent of the abandonment of his own recorded opinions. The new and the old governor thus became engaged in disputes, in the course of which it must in candour be admitted that there were times when neither of them appeared to much advantage.

While Lord William Bentinck had exercised the functions of government, and Sir John Cradock retained the command of the army, it had been determined to abolish a system of tent contract of no long standing, the continuance of which was believed to be injurious to the public interests. On Sir George Barlow devolved the duty of giving effect to the determination, and as the measure was offensive to the commanding officers of corps, fresh ground for dissatisfaction with the government generally, and with Sir George Barlow especially, was afforded.

The officers of the Madras army were preparing an address to the governor-general on their grievances. The commander-in-chief, in accordance with his duty, issued a circular letter discountenancing the measure; but he destroyed its effect by encouraging, in his personal and private intercourse with his officers, the proceedings which he officially denounced. He did not, indeed, confine his attempts to excite discontent within the limits of private communication. Some of them were made publicly; and one remarkable instance was furnished in an address made by the commander-in-chief on reviewing an European regiment in the northern circles.

Having scattered widely and abundantly the seeds of disaffection, General McDowall determined to leave it to time and circumstance to bring them to maturity. He resolved to quit the country, an intention indeed which he appears to have entertained long before, but which he probably postponed in the hope, too well grounded, of preparing the elements of extensive mischief. His conduct now became more violent and more open. He placed under arrest the quarter-master-general, Colonel Munro, upon a charge of casting imputations on the character of the army in an official report drawn up many months previously. The judge-advocate-general had given his opinion that no legal matter of charge existed against Colonel Munro, and thereupon the government released him. General McDowall now embarked for Europe, leaving behind him an offensive and inflammatory general order, which was published after his departure by the deputy adjutant-general. Upon its appearance the government formally removed General McDowall from the office of commander-in-chief, and gave further evidence of displeasure by suspending both the officer by

whom the offensive order had been published and his principal.

These expressions of the opinion of government seem to have produced little effect upon the officers of the army, a portion of whom manifested their sympathy with the parties thus visited with punishment, by preparing and circulating for signatures a memorial to the governor-general, and an address to the displaced deputy adjutant-general. These proceedings being regarded as inconsistent with military subordination, an order of government appeared on the 1st of May, severely animadverting on the conduct of the officers most active in the circulation of the offensive papers, suspending several officers, including Colonel St. Leger, from the service, and removing others from particular commands.

The more marked indications of ill-feeling towards the government had hitherto been exhibited by that portion of the army serving in Travancore. The publication of the order of the 1st of May led to acts of insubordination, not only more violent than any which had previously taken place, but more general. At Hyderabad, Masulipatam, Seringapatam, and other places, discontent, previously ill suppressed, burst into open mutiny; in one lamentable instance blood was shed, in consequence of the resistance offered to the passage of a revolted battalion from Chittledroog to join the disaffected in Seringapatam.

Widely, however, as the seeds of discontent were spread, and rapidly as they had sprung into life, there was no principle of permanence in the resistance to authority thus suddenly called forth. That which had been done under the influence of excited feeling was not of a nature to bear the calm reflection which time could not fail to suggest. The dissatisfied could not but perceive that, while they were placing the interests of their country in peril, they were in all human probability involving themselves in ruin, while the inconsistency and dishonour of the course into which they had been seduced were not less evident than its folly. The first manifestation of a returning sense of duty was at Hyderabad; the example was speedily followed at other places: and thus ended a movement which in its commencement and progress seemed to threaten the very existence of the British government in the part of India in which it occurred. Lord Minto, on learning the nature and extent of the disaffection, had proceeded without delay to Madras; but the crisis had passed before he arrived.

Few remarks are requisite on such a subject as the conduct of the Madras army. It cannot be necessary to inquire whether mutiny be in any case justifiable or not; but the judgments of popular opinion, not less than those of law, should be framed with due regard to circumstances. Many of those concerned in the unhappy proceedings under notice were young men, led to take part in them by the criminal advice and criminal example of those to whom,

as their senior and superior officers, they looked with respect and deference. This extenuating circumstance was permitted to have its just effect; and though the number of those who had participated, in a greater or less degree, in the outbreak was large, the punishments were few. The great criminal—he for whom no punishment that it becomes a civilized government to inflict could be regarded as too severe—lived not to receive retribution. The ship in which General McDowall took his passage to Europe was lost, and in the waste of waters he found that impunity which he could scarcely have expected had he survived.

The conduct of Sir George Barlow was violently attacked at home, but a majority in the Court of Directors approved it. His coadjutor, Mr. Petrie, who had differed from the governor on almost every point on which difference was possible, was less fortunate. He was removed from council, and the Court repaired their former error by appointing the new commander-in-chief, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, to the vacant seat.

The administration of Lord Minto was marked by brighter incidents than the misconduct of the army of Madras: to some of these it is satisfactory to turn.

During the wars which followed the French Revolution, the injuries sustained by our commerce, from the enemy's settlements in the Indian seas, were severely felt. The principal seats of annoyance were the Mascarene Isles, comprising the Isle of Bourbon, or Mascareneha, properly so called; Mauritius, or the Isle of France; the small Island of Rodriguez; and others of inferior note. Such a group, lying on the very highway of the commerce between India and England, could not be left in the hands of an active and insidious foe with impunity, and the actual results fully realized all that might have been anticipated. From the Mauritius especially, French cruisers issued in vast numbers to prowl over the Indian seas, and the consequent loss was immense. It has been said that, previously to the fall of this island, the insurance offices of Bengal alone were losers to the amount of three millions sterling from captures. The amount may be exaggerated, but there can be no doubt of its having been very great.

That such a course of things should have been allowed to proceed so long unchecked, argues little either for the wisdom or the activity of the British government; but its toleration was in perfect harmony with the indifference usually manifested on such occasions. A persuasion had indeed long prevailed, that the Mauritius could not be successfully assailed by a hostile force, and this persuasion the French naturally used their best endeavours to encourage. A plausible error, once established, is hard to be shaken, and the currency of a belief that the island was impregnable, combined with the imperturbable apathy with which British statesmen have generally regarded the interests of our Indian possessions,

must account for the supineness which so long left a valuable branch of commerce at the mercy of the enemy. The Marquis Wellesley had been well aware of the evil, and meditated measures for the reduction of the settlements which gave the enemy the power of inflicting it; but circumstances prevented his carrying his views into effect.

The enormous extent of loss at length roused the British cabinet to some exertions. Admiral Bertie, who commanded on the Cape of Good Hope station, was ordered to enforce a rigorous blockade. The service was intrusted to Captain Rowley; and, to assist the contemplated operations, Lieutenant-colonel H. S. Keating, of his Majesty's 56th foot, was, in 1809, despatched from India, with a small force, to occupy the Island of Rodriguez, about one hundred miles distant from the Mauritius.

On his arrival he found only two families on the island, and of course took possession of it without difficulty. After some time spent in acquiring a perfect knowledge of the coast, Commodore Rowley resolved to make an attack upon the town of St. Paul's, the chief port of the Isle of Bourbon, and for this purpose requested the co-operation of Colonel Keating. A detachment was forthwith embarked from Rodriguez to join Commodore Rowley off Port Louis, the capital of the Mauritius.

On the evening of the 19th of September, the force destined for the attack stood for the Isle of Bourbon, and, on the following morning, disembarked to the southward of Point de Gallotte, seven miles from St. Paul's. The landing was effected with great dexterity, and the troops immediately commenced a forced march, in order, if possible, to cross the causeways extending over the lake or pond of St. Paul's before the enemy discovered their debarkation. In this they succeeded; and they had the further good fortune of passing the strongest position of the enemy before the French had time to form in sufficient force. By seven o'clock, the assailants were in possession of the first two batteries, Lamboussière and La Centière, and the guns were forthwith turned against the enemy's shipping, whose well-directed fire of grape, from within pistol-shot of the shore, had greatly annoyed the British force.

A detachment, consisting of the second column, under Captain Imlack, of the Bombay infantry, was now despatched to take possession of the third battery, La Neuve, which the enemy had abandoned; but, on its way, it fell in with the main force of the enemy, strongly posted within stone walls, with eight six-pounders on its flanks. They were charged in gallant style, but without driving them from their position. Captain Harvey, with the third column, then moved to support Captain Imlack, and succeeded in taking two of the enemy's guns. The action now became warm and general. The French were reinforced from the hills and from the ships in the harbour—the British by the advance of the reserve,

which had previously covered the batteries. The guns of the first and second batteries were spiked, and the third was occupied by seamen under the command of Captain Willoughby, who soon opened its fire upon the shipping. The enemy now gave way, the fourth and fifth batteries were won without resistance, and at half-past eight the town of St. Paul's was in the possession of the British.

Till this period the naval force had been compelled to remain inactive, as they could not venture to attack the enemy's ships, lest they should annoy the British troops, who were within range. They now stood in, Captain Pym taking the lead, and opened their fire upon the enemy's ships, all of which cut their cables and drifted on shore. The seamen, however, succeeded in heaving them off without any material injury.

The force by which this brilliant exploit was achieved was inconsiderable. The detachment embarked on Rodriguez consisted of only three hundred and sixty-eight officers and men. It was strengthened by one hundred seamen and one hundred and thirty-six marines from the blockading squadron; thus making a total of six hundred and four. The victory was gained with the comparatively trifling loss of fifteen killed, fifty-eight wounded, and three missing.

The success which attended the attempt seems to have paralyzed the enemy. General Des Brulles, the commander of the island, marched from the capital, St. Denis, to repel the invaders, and on the evening of the 22nd of September appeared with considerable force on the hills above St. Paul's; but, either from overrating the numbers of the British, or from some other cause, at which it were vain to guess, he retreated, and terminated his career by shooting himself. He left behind him a paper, which sufficiently illustrates the state of his feelings, though it but imperfectly accounts for his despair of success. It was to this effect:—"I will not be a traitor to my country. I will not, in consequence of what I foresee from the hatred and ambition of some individuals, who are attached to a revolutionary sect, sacrifice the inhabitants in the useless defence of an open colony. Death awaits me on the scaffold. I prefer giving it myself: and I recommend my wife and children to Providence, and to those who can feel for them."

Judging from the temper with which Buonaparte was accustomed to regard unsuccessful commanders, the apprehensions of General Des Brulles cannot be considered unreasonable. It is gratifying to know that his wishes with regard to his family were not disappointed; they found in the British commander those humane and generous feelings which their deceased protector had invoked on their behalf. The widow of the general having expressed a wish to go to her own family at the Mauritius, Commodore Rowley immediately appointed a vessel, with a cartel

flag, to convey her thither, with her children, servants, and effects.

The career of the small British force had been highly brilliant, and, in addition to its actual achievements, it had obviously inspired a degree of terror altogether disproportioned to its extent; but it was quite unequal to undertake the conquest of the island; and this result formed no part of the plan of those who projected the attack. In the destruction of the batteries and the capture of the shipping in the harbour, a part of which were prizes which had been recently taken by the enemy, all that was sought for was attained. As much public property as could be carried away was embarked, the remainder was destroyed, and the island for a while abandoned; the squadron resuming its usual occupation, and Colonel Keating, with his troops, returning to Rodriguez.

In the following year, preparations were made for a serious attempt to annihilate the French power in the Indian seas; an attempt encouraged by the success of a desultory but brilliant exploit achieved by Captain Willoughby, who, at the head of about a hundred of the crew of the *Néréide*, which he commanded, landed at Jacoet in the Mauritius. The landing was effected under the fire of two batteries, and, as the assailants formed on the beach, they became exposed to a heavy discharge of musketry; but in ten minutes the first battery was in their possession, and having spiked the guns, they marched to the guard-house, which was protected by ten field-pieces, some regular troops, and a strong detachment of artillery. They were charged by Captain Willoughby and his little band, and immediately gave way, abandoning their guns and their commanding officer, who was made prisoner in the act of spiking them.

The British then pushed on to the second and stronger battery, to gain which they had to pass the river Le Goulet, swollen and greatly increased in rapidity by heavy rains. The difficulty of crossing the river having been conquered, the battery was immediately carried, and the commander taken. Here, as before, the guns were spiked, and the party were about to return to their first ship, when the troops which had fled from the battery again appeared, strongly reinforced by militia and irregulars. Captain Willoughby advanced towards them, and on his coming within musket-shot they opened their fire. Suspecting that they would again have recourse to flight, the British commander made an oblique movement, with the intention of getting into their rear; but the moment this was discovered by the militia they fled, followed by the regulars, with a celerity that defied pursuit. Finally, Captain Willoughby burnt the signal-house and flag-staff, and, carrying with him some field-pieces and stores, re-embarked with all his men except one, who was killed.

The organized system of operations against the French islands was not acted upon until

later in the year. The first step was to renew the attempt against the Isle of Bourbon, with sufficient strength to take and retain possession of that colony. For this purpose, the force at Rodriguez, under command of Colonel Keating, was augmented from the three presidencies to the number of three thousand six hundred and fifty rank and file, of whom about one-half were Europeans. Colonel Keating had been long occupied in training his troops, at Rodriguez, to the service to which they were destined, accustoming them to a country intersected with ravines and precipices, like that in which they were about to act. The transports, which conveyed the reinforcements, arrived off Rodriguez on the 20th of June; but the unfavourable state of the weather detained the expedition from proceeding until the 3rd of July. Before it sailed, Colonel Keating communicated to the commanders of brigades the information he had acquired as to the enemy's strength and position, and his own determination as to the mode of operations. This, in his own words, was "to strike the first blow at the heart of the enemy," to gain possession of the capital, and let further proceedings be guided by circumstances. Every thing during the night, or before daylight, was to be carried by the bayonet, Colonel Keating judiciously concluding that the French island force, trained in a system of firing from behind walls and houses, and from the opposite side of impassable ravines, would never be brought to stand against English bayonets.

On the 6th of July, the whole of the expedition came to a rendezvous about fifty miles to the windward of the Isle of Bourbon, when part of the troops were removed from the transports on board his Majesty's squadron, consisting of the *Boadicea*, the *Sirius*, the *Iphigenia*, the *Magicienne*, and the *Nereide*, under the command of Commodore Rowley, which immediately stood for the different points of debarkation. On the afternoon of the 7th, most of the ships had arrived at their destined stations off the island, and preparations were made for landing the troops. This was effected to some extent. Captain Pym landed the whole of the troops on board his frigate, the *Sirius*, at Grande Chaloupe, a part of the beach about six miles to the westward of St. Denis, the capital of the island; and Lieutenant Watling, of that frigate, with his men, took possession of a neighbouring height, thereby preventing reinforcements being sent to St. Denis from the neighbouring town of St. Paul's.

The other point of descent was the Rivière de Pluies, about three miles to the eastward of St. Denis. The beach on that side of the island is composed of large shingle, steep and difficult of access, and the wind, which is very uncertain in these latitudes, suddenly and violently increasing, the surf rose to an unexpected height. Captain Willoughby, ever the first at the post of danger, pushed off,

with a party of seamen and a detachment of troops, in the *Estafette*, prize schooner. A few boats followed, and the men were landed with the loss of only four; but the schooner and several of the boats were dashed to pieces in the surf. Another small body of troops effected a landing somewhat more to the right, under Lieutenant-colonel William Macleod, of his Majesty's 69th Foot. A small transport was placed upon the beach to act as a breakwater, in the hope that the men might be enabled to land over her stern or under her lee: this was ably performed by Lieutenant Lloyd, of the *Boadicea*; but the violence of the weather, and the natural difficulties of the situation, frustrated the success of the attempt, and it was found impossible to land any more troops that evening. Those who had succeeded in landing had lost a considerable part of their arms, and all their ammunition was damaged.

It now became an object of importance to communicate with the detachment on shore, but all hope of doing so seemed cut off by the circumstances which suspended the landing of the troops. In this emergency the desired means of communication were furnished by that unconquerable spirit which our countrymen have so often displayed under circumstances which almost justify despair. Lieutenant Foulstone, of the 69th regiment, volunteered to swim to shore: his offer was accepted; he made the attempt, and succeeded, by diving under the surf, from whence he was dragged by a boat-hook. By the gallantry of this high-spirited officer, orders were conveyed to Colonel Macleod, the senior officer of the detachment on shore, to take possession of St. Marie for the night. That officer immediately marched with his slender force, and carried the fort at the point of the bayonet.

The impracticability of disembarking any more troops to the windward, during the existing state of the weather, being apparent, it was resolved to despatch the remainder to Grande Chaloupe, where the landing was successfully effected.

In the meantime, the brigade under Lieutenant-colonel Hastings Fraser, 86th Foot, which had previously landed at Grande Chaloupe, had pushed forward a party, the commanding officer leading the way, to dislodge a body of riflemen who occupied the heights and kept up a harassing fire. This was soon accomplished, and the brigade moved rapidly over the mountains towards St. Denis. They halted there during the night, then began to descend at four o'clock on the following morning, having in the interval been joined by sepoy, pioneers, and artillery. They found the enemy drawn up on the plain in two columns, each with a field-piece at its head, supported by some heavy cannon on the redoubt. A severe fire of ordnance and musketry was opened upon the British force, who, however, advanced in admirable order. On reaching the plain, orders were given to

charge. The French remained steadily at their guns until the British grenadiers came in contact with them, when finding that the thunder of their ordnance was to be met with the silent but deadly thrust of the bayonet, they retired and attempted to form behind the parapet of the redoubt. From this they were speedily driven by the weapon they so much dreaded; the British colours were hoisted on the top of the redoubt, two guns which had been spiked were rendered serviceable and turned against the enemy, and the batteries to the west of the river St. Denis were stormed and demolished. Thus the main force of the island was totally defeated by a body of troops not amounting to six hundred men. The commandant, Colonel St. Susanne, escaped with difficulty, and the officer second in command was wounded and made prisoner.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, a brigade under Lieutenant-colonel Edward Drummond, of the king's 86th, which had been landed that morning at Grande Chaloupe, arrived in sight of St. Denis, after a severe march over the mountains, harassed by the enemy's chasseurs, who hung upon their flanks. As they approached, they were exposed to a heavy fire of cannon, grape, shells, and musketry from the town, without a possibility of either returning or avoiding it. Colonel Fraser, however, kept up a brisk fire upon the town from the redoubt. About four o'clock, he was joined by Colonel Drummond's brigade; and Colonel Keating, who had landed at noon with the rest of the troops, appeared on the heights. Preparations were now made for a simultaneous attack upon the place, when, at the very moment of advance, a flag of truce arrived to treat for the surrender of the island, Colonel Fraser having refused to negotiate on any other terms.

The articles of capitulation stipulated for the immediate evacuation of all the military posts and the surrender of all public stores; the troops of the line and Garde Nationale to march out with the honours of war; the former to surrender as prisoners, the officers being allowed to retain their swords and military decorations, and embarked, as well as the troops, either for England or the Cape, with the exception of the commandant, St. Susanne, who was to be allowed to depart either to France or the Mauritius on his parole of honour. To these a provision was added, that funeral honours should be paid to the French officers who had fallen, according to their respective rank. The laws, customs, and religion of the inhabitants, as well as their private property, were to be respected.

The ordnance found at St. Paul's and St. Denis amounted to one hundred and forty-five pieces of heavy artillery. The loss sustained in making the conquest was slight; eighteen killed, seventy-nine wounded, and four drowned in landing. That of the enemy

was never precisely ascertained, but it was very considerable.

The capture of the Island of Bourbon was principally desired as a preliminary to that of the still more important settlement of the Mauritius; and in anticipation of our attempts upon that island, Mr. Farquhar, the English governor of the Isle of Bourbon, published an address to the inhabitants of the Mauritius, the distribution of which he found means of effecting from the *Ile du Passe*, which had been taken possession of by a party from his Majesty's cruisers. This acquisition was made in a very brilliant manner. Five boats from the *Sirius* and the *Iphigenia* proceeded on the night of the 13th of August to the landing-place on the north-west side of the island, which was defended by a chevaux-de-frise and two howitzers. To gain this spot, it was necessary to pass a battery of several guns, and fortunately the attempt was favoured by a heavy cloud suddenly obscuring the moon, which had previously been shining with great brightness. Before, however, the boats reached the landing-place, the enemy discovered and commenced firing upon them: two men were killed and several wounded, but, nothing daunted, the assailants advanced and landed. Lieutenant Norman, in attempting to scale the works, was shot through the heart by a sentinel above: he was immediately shot by one of the seamen, who, headed by Lieutenant Watling, speedily ascended the walls. A brief but warm encounter followed, in which the British had seven men killed and eighteen wounded; but they succeeded in obtaining possession of the walls. Lieutenant Watling then proceeded to attack the batteries on the south-east side, where he was met by Lieutenant Chads, who had landed at another point and stormed and carried the works there without the loss of a man. The two parties being united, the French commandant offered no further resistance, but surrendered at discretion.

The island was intrusted to the charge of Captain Willoughby, who availed himself of its proximity to the Mauritius to pay visits to the coasts of the latter. His first attack was upon Point du Diable, which was stormed and carried; the French commander and three of his men killed, and three gunners made prisoners. The guns were spiked, the carriages burnt, and the magazine blown up; after which Captain Willoughby moved on to Grand Port, a distance of twelve miles. He remained on the island until sunset, and a strong party of the enemy, which attacked him, were put to the rout with the loss of six men. On another occasion he destroyed the signal-house and staff at Grand Rivière, blew up the remaining works at Point du Diable, and retired without molestation.

The British arms had hitherto been eminently successful, but the flattering hopes which their success had called forth now sustained a severe check by a series of dis-

asters, which for a time gave the enemy the dominion of the Indian seas. Among other prizes they succeeded in capturing the *Windham* and *Ceylon*, East-Indiamen. These ships, with another Company's ship, the *Astell*, were sailing for Madras, when they were attacked by a French squadron under Commodore Duperre. The Indiamen maintained a very gallant and hard-fought contest with a very superior force for several hours; when the *Windham* and the *Ceylon*, having sustained serious loss in killed and wounded, and much injury in their hulls, masts, and rigging, were compelled to strike. The *Astell*, after taking its share in the unequal struggle, effected its escape under cover of the darkness of the night. The French account of this transaction was marked with that bad faith which has too often characterized the official statements of our neighbours, and which was almost universal during the reign of Buonaparte: it asserted that the *Astell* had struck her colours previously to her escape—an accusation which the captain and his officers publicly refuted.

The success of the enemy was not restricted to encounters with merchant ships. The French squadron, with the two Indiamen, their prizes, ran for Port Sud-Est, in the Mauritius, at the entrance of which lay the Ile du Passe, which the English had occupied and garrisoned. Four British frigates were also cruising off the station, and in the attempt to make the port, the *Windham* East-Indiaman was turned and recaptured by the *Sirius*, Captain Pym. Having despatched his prize to Bourbon, that officer formed the design of attacking the French squadron in the harbour; but, not being sufficiently aware of the difficulties of the navigation, the attempt terminated in defeat and serious loss. Three of the ships took the ground, and the fourth was prevented from closing with the enemy. These unfortunate occurrences enabled the foe to open all their guns upon a single vessel, the *Nereide*, commanded by Captain Willoughby. The fortitude and courage displayed by this officer and his crew were beyond all praise, and probably have never been surpassed. Deprived of all efficient assistance from the other frigates, the *Nereide* singly maintained the contest for the almost incredible space of ten hours. Captain Willoughby lost an eye, and was otherwise dreadfully injured in the head. A boat was sent from the *Sirius* to bring him off, but he declared he would neither abandon his men, nor strike the British flag while there was a man on board able to support it. He kept his word—he fought the ship till every man of her whole crew, consisting of two hundred and eighty, was either killed or wounded; and when the enemy took possession of their dearly-purchased prize, they found only a miserable wreck, peopled with the maimed, the dying, and the dead.

Of the remaining vessels, two, the *Sirius*

and *Magicienne*, were so situated that their abandonment became necessary, and after setting fire to them, their respective crews were landed on the Ile du Passe; the fourth, the *Iphigenia*, was, with some difficulty, warped up to that anchorage, the enemy making no attempt to prevent her. In this situation she lay, without the power of removing from it, while the state of the little garrison at the isle became every day more forlorn; their stock, both of provisions and water, was low, and they had no prospect of receiving succour. To complete their distress, they were blockaded by a French force; and as their means of subsistence were almost at an end, and escape was impossible, they were compelled to surrender.

No one object of this unfortunate attempt was achieved; its disastrous issue was complete: all the vessels engaged in it were either destroyed, or fell into the hands of the enemy. But though, as it subsequently appeared, the undertaking was ill-judged, the conduct of those engaged in it was such as to enable their countrymen to call up the recollection, even of discomfiture, without a blush. Heroism like that displayed by Captain Willoughby and his intrepid comrades sheds over defeat the lustre of victory. Amid scenes of blood and suffering far surpassing the ordinary horrors of warfare, these gallant spirits were insensible to everything but their own duty and their country's honour. Never was duty more devotedly performed, never was honour more completely sustained.

The record of disaster, though drawing to a close, is not yet entirely complete. The *Africaine* frigate was taken by the enemy, after a severe action, in which her commander fell; and another frigate, the *Ceylon*, shared the same fate. This vessel, having on board General Abercrombie, appointed by the governor-general to take the command of the troops destined for the reduction of the Mauritius, fell in with some French cruisers off the Island of Bourbon. An action ensued, which was gallantly maintained for five hours, when the *Ceylon*, being dismasted and rendered ungovernable by this and other causes, was compelled to yield to adverse fortune and overwhelming force. It is said that the French commander observed, that he should have the honour of introducing General Abercrombie to the governor of the Isle of France sooner than he had expected. But this honour he was not destined to enjoy. In a few hours the *Ceylon* was retaken by the English, when the general, thanking M. Hamelen for his kind intention, said he felt extremely happy in being able to return the compliment, by introducing him to Commodore Rowley.

The necessity of wresting the Mauritius from the enemy now became more than ever apparent, and preparations for the attempt were carried on with renewed vigour. On the 14th of October, Commodore Rowley sailed with a gallant squadron from the harbour of St.

Paul's, to resume the blockade of the Mauritius, taking with him Major-general Abercrombie, to reconnoitre the situation of the French colony, and concert the necessary measures for its reduction. He arrived off Port Louis on the 19th, where he found the whole of the enemy's naval force at anchor in the port, two only of the ships being in a state of apparent readiness for sea.

Having left a sufficient force to watch the enemy's movements and blockade the port, he proceeded to Rodriguez, where the different divisions destined for the attack on the Mauritius were appointed to assemble. He found that the troops from Bombay had already reached their destination. They were soon followed by those from Madras; but the non-arrival of the divisions from Bengal and the Cape at the expected time, was a source of great disappointment and anxiety, as the stormy season was approaching, and in the event of unfavourable weather the danger to the fleet would be extreme. He therefore suggested to the general the propriety of standing out to sea with the troops already assembled, and cruising to the windward of the French island, to await the junction of one or both of the divisions so anxiously looked for. To this suggestion the general assented, and the 22nd November was fixed for the departure of the fleet from Rodriguez. Everything was in readiness on the previous evening, when the welcome intelligence was received that the Bengal division was seen in the offing.

That not a moment might be lost, it was resolved that the convoys just arrived should be supplied with the requisite provisions from the beach and shipping, and, without dropping anchor, be ordered to accompany the fleet then getting under weigh; and soon after, the fleet, consisting of nearly seventy sail, stood from the anchorage of Rodriguez to the selected point of debarkation.

The coasts of the Mauritius are beset by dangerous reefs, and the island has only two good harbours. That called Port Sud-est, which was principally used by the Dutch, is the more capacious, and being on the windward side of the island, it is the easier of entrance, as well as the more healthy; but the wind almost perpetually blowing in, the difficulty of getting ships out counterbalances the advantage offered by the facility with which they can enter. For this reason, Port Nord-ouest was preferred by the French when the Mauritius came into their possession, and there, during the administration of Mahé de la Bourdonnais, who was governor from 1784 to 1786, the only town in the island was erected, in a narrow valley at the head of the harbour. This henceforward was the seat of government, and the port and town were denominated Port Louis.

The Portuguese, by whom the island was discovered, do not appear ever to have taken possession of it. It was first occupied by the Dutch, in the seventeenth century, who gave

it the name of Mauritius, in honour of Prince Maurice of Nassau. These indefatigable traders are said to have been driven out of the island by the swarms of rats with which it was infested, and it is certain that they abandoned it about the year 1710. Whether the French had less dread of the disagreeable quadrupeds which had conquered their predecessors, or possessed better means of contending with them, is not recorded; but they took possession of the island after it was forsaken by the Dutch, and always attached great importance to it. Raynal dwells enthusiastically upon its political and commercial advantages, and especially on its value as the means of upholding French dominion in the East. The statesmen of France had participated in this feeling, and much labour had been employed to place Port Louis in a posture of defence. They seem, however, to have relied too implicitly upon the reef which surrounds the island, and to have concluded too hastily, that the town would only be attacked by sea. To guard against such an attack, works of considerable strength were constructed. As the approach of the English was not unexpected, additional means of defence were resorted to, and the fortifications on the sea side placed in such a state as to render an attack an act of extreme temerity; but the means of defence on the land side seem to have been, in a great degree, neglected.

The advantages of superior knowledge of the coast were now manifest. The French had supposed that the reefs which surround the island rendered it impregnable, and that the depth of water without the reef rendered it impossible for a fleet of transports to find anchorage. These impressions were not unknown to the British commanders; but, instead of supinely acquiescing in the popular belief, they took measures for ascertaining its accuracy. Every part of the leeward side was examined, and sounded with the most minute and scrupulous attention. This service was performed by Captain Paterson, of his Majesty's ship *Hesper*, and Lieutenant Street, commanding the government armed ship *Emma*. The soundings were taken in the night, to avoid observation, and it was by these means discovered that a fleet might safely anchor in a narrow strait between an islet called the Gunner's Coin and the main land, and that there were also openings in the reef there, through which several boats might enter abreast. The only objection to this place of debarkation was its distance from Port Louis; but this was not to be placed in competition with its manifold advantages.

On the morning of the 29th, the English fleet came to anchor in the strait. Two brigs, which drew but little water, anchored on the reef, within a hundred yards of the beach, to cover the landing; the conduct of which was intrusted to Captain Philip Beaver, of the *Neus* frigate. Soon after one o'clock the debarkation commenced, and in three hours, ten

thousand men, with their guns, stores, ammunition, and three days' provisions, were landed, without the slightest loss, or even a single accident. The enemy appear to have been astonished by the boldness and novelty of the attempt. On the first appearance of the British fleet they abandoned a fort called Malastrie, the only fortified place in the vicinity. The landing having been thus happily effected, no time was lost in following up the success which had attended it. The troops were instantly put in motion, to prevent the enemy from gaining possession of a thick wood which lay on the road, and using the means which it afforded of harassing the flanks of the invading army. On reaching it, the advanced guard fell in with a picquet of the retreating corps, which, after a feeble attempt to dispute the passage, was driven from its position. This was the only opposition encountered till the columns reached the more open country. About midnight they halted, and before daybreak resumed their march. It was the intention of General Abercrombie not to halt again till he was before Port Louis, but the march of the preceding day, though short, had been so extremely harassing, that his intention could not be persevered in. The men were greatly exhausted by their previous exertions, their way having lain for four miles among thick brushwood, through which the artillery and stores had to be dragged, with a degree of labour almost intolerable.

The inconvenience arising from the heat of the weather was increased by a deficiency of water. Several men and two officers had sunk under their exertions, and were left dead on the march. It was fortunate that these harassing circumstances were not aggravated by any operations of the enemy; but the condition of the troops rendered it obviously imprudent to attempt to reach Port Louis without rest. About noon, therefore, a position was taken up at Moulin-à-Poudre, on a gentle elevation, a wood stretching along its front and extending with some intervals to Port Louis, five miles distant. In the afternoon, the French general, de Caen, with a party of cavalry and riflemen, approached the British lines to reconnoitre, and surprised a small picquet. They were driven back and pursued by some light companies. A few men were killed, and the general himself received a contusion from a ball.

Before daylight on the following day, a brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel William Macleod, was detached to attack some batteries, the possession of which was necessary to enable the troops to draw their supplies from the fleet. Some of the batteries had already yielded to our seamen; the remainder were evacuated as the troops approached. At five o'clock, the main body of the troops was put in motion. It shortly afterwards encountered a corps of the enemy, who, with several field-pieces, had taken up a

strong position, very favourable for making an attack on the head of the column. The march of the British troops lay along a narrow road with a thick wood on each flank. On meeting the enemy, the European flank battalion, which composed the advance guard, formed with as much regularity as the bad and broken ground would admit, and charged the enemy with such spirit as compelled them to retire with the loss of their guns, and many killed and wounded; but this advantage was obtained by the fall of Colonel John Campbell, of the king's 83rd, and Major O'Keefe, of the royals, two officers of distinguished ability. There was a signal-post on a hill, called the Vivebot, from whence every movement of the enemy could be discerned. The French being driven from their position, a corps ascended this eminence, removed the enemy's flag, and hoisted the British ensign in its place; which was then, for the first time, planted in the Mauritius.

The weather still continued oppressive, and the troops were greatly exhausted. These circumstances, combined with the lateness of the day, rendered desirable a suspension of active operations until the morning, when a general attack was determined upon. During the night a mistake occurred which was productive of unfortunate results. A party of marines arrived to join the British force; they were dressed, as customary in India, in white and blue, and in the darkness were unhappily mistaken for French soldiers. An alarm was given, several corps stood to their arms, some gave fire, and the consequence was, that many were wounded, and a few killed. But misapprehension was not confined to the British: the enemy were likewise disturbed by a false alarm, during which, it has been said, the National Guards betrayed such a degree of irresolution as had considerable effect in determining the events of the following day.

On the approach of morning, preparations were made for the intended attack; but they were interrupted by the arrival of a flag of truce from General de Caen, offering to capitulate upon conditions. Three of the conditions were, that the troops and seamen should be sent to France; that the four frigates and two corvettes in the harbour should be retained by the French; and that inventories should be taken of all the articles belonging to the French emperor, and such articles restored to him at the conclusion of peace.

The articles which stipulated for the restoration of the shipping and the property of the French emperor were rejected; that which claimed for the enemy's troops and seamen immunity from the ordinary fate of the vanquished, was assented to — a fact which could not fail to create surprise in all acquainted with the relative situations of the invading and defending forces; while it was equally calculated to excite regret, not unmixed with indignation, in all who valued the honour of the British arms.

The prize was gained at a comparatively small cost. Our loss amounted to only twenty-nine killed, ninety-nine wounded, and forty-five missing. The conquest placed in our possession a large quantity of ordnance and shipping—some of the latter of great value, the island having long been the dépôt for the prizes made by the French privateers in the Indian seas. At home, the island was justly regarded as a most valuable acquisition, but the terms upon which it was obtained excited general disgust, and became the subject both of private and public reprobation.

The Mauritius is still ours, but the island of Bourbon was, at the peace of 1814, restored to the French. This has been the usual course of events—what we have gained by our arms, we have lost by our diplomacy; our soldiers and seamen having poured out their blood in the purchase of conquests to be calmly yielded up by the liberality or the incompetence of our statesmen. The island of Bourbon is, from its position, of less importance than the Mauritius, but the possession of both is necessary to the security of our eastern possessions and commerce; and, by surrendering one, we have compromised our power of retaining the other. In the event of a war, it will be a question whether the French shall recover the Mauritius, or the English the isle of Bourbon. The dominion of the Indian seas we ought never to have surrendered; it is an essential appendage to our commercial greatness and to the safety of our Asiatic empire. Never was a more mistaken policy, than to settle a probable enemy upon the road to our most valuable possessions, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the colony which is the key, as it were, to them.

It is creditable to Lord Minto that, while he held the office of governor-general, his attention was directed, with laudable perseverance, to the reduction of the power of the enemy in the east. He understood the value of our Indian possessions, and he felt the necessity of securing them. But before recording other instances of his wise and vigorous policy with regard to the territorial possessions of the European enemies of Great Britain, it will be necessary to make brief reference to some minor incidents of his administration.

The pirates in the Persian Gulf had, from time immemorial, pursued their avocations greatly to the injury of the country trade. An outrage committed on the crew and passengers of an English ship, named the *Miserva*, at length roused the attention of the British government to the evil, and called forth measures for its suppression. In the case of the *Miserva*, the piratical captors, not content with plundering the ship and crew, had compelled their male prisoners to submit to be initiated into the Mahometan religion, while some females who were on board were subjected to the last extremity of brutal outrage. To chastise the ruffianly perpetrators of these

enormities a small expedition was despatched from Bombay. The first object of attack was the fort of Mallia, situate within the tributary dependencies of the Guicowar, an ally of the British government, but who was unable to restrain the predatory propensities of those who found refuge and protection within its walls. Mallia, in common with a multiplicity of forts in India, enjoyed the reputation of being impregnable. Here, as in numerous other instances, the charm was broken by the success of a small English force, who, after carrying the outer fort by storm, were admitted to possession of the inner fort by the flight of the enemy. Subsequently, Rns-ul-kima, the port and arsenal of the pirates, was attacked, the enemy driven from the town, and kept out of possession for a sufficient period to allow the assailants to spike the guns, blow up the magazines, and set fire to the vessels in the harbour, great and small, amounting to about seventy in number. After visiting some of the inferior stations of the pirates, the British, in conjunction with a force despatched by the Imam of Muscat, attacked the fort of Soheenaas, and, after overcoming a desperate resistance, carried it by storm. The labours of the expedition were now at an end, for at the remaining stations the pirates saved their chasteiers all trouble by burning their craft and taking flight.

In the interior of India some alarm was excited by the movements of Ameer Khan. After the conclusion of peace, Holkar had no further occasion for the services of this adventurer; but the desire for separation was not reciprocal. Ameer Khan, whether employed or not, required the means of subsisting his troops, and, to relieve himself from the burthen, Holkar permitted the Patan chief to levy contributions in his name upon such states as were too weak to resist the demand. Holkar became insane, and this increased the power and audacity of Ameer Khan, who advanced to the frontier of the rajah of Berar, under pretence of an old claim to jewels, alleged to have been taken by the rajah from Holkar. The British government deemed it necessary to despatch troops, under Colonel Close and Colonel Martindale, to repel probable danger, and Ameer Khan retreated. The movements of the British forces were marked by much military judgment, but no striking incident; and the retreat of the enemy against whom they had marched deprived them of the opportunity of action. Notwithstanding the course which events had taken, it was, however deemed advisable to station a force permanently on the Nerbudda.

We now turn to affairs of greater dignity than the suppression of pirates or the holding freebooters in check. The subjection of the republic of the United Provinces to the dominion of France had placed the colonial possessions of the Dutch in the hands of England's most inveterate foe. Among the more impor-

tant of these were the Molucca Islands and the settlements in Java. The British cabinet suggested the blockading of those places; the more vigorous policy of Lord Minto planned and directed their conquest. They were in succession attacked with the same spirit that was displayed in the movements against the French islands, and with similar results.

The first attack was on the island of Amboyna, a place which has attained an infamous celebrity, from the atrocities of which it was once the scene. The island had been taken by the British during the first war with revolutionary France, but was restored at the peace of Amiens: since that period, it was understood that the means of defence had been greatly augmented, and that several additional works had been raised at considerable labour and cost. The principal fortress had, however, the radical defect of being overlooked and commanded by eminences of superior height. The naval part of the expedition designed for the reduction of Amboyna consisted of the *Dover*, Captain Tucker, the *Cornwallis*, Captain Montague, and a sloop commanded by Captain Spencer: the chief command was entrusted to the first-named officer. The military force, composed of a part of the Company's Madras European regiment and a small body of artillery, was placed under the command of Captain Court.

On the morning of the 16th February, 1810, the plan of attack was arranged by the commanders, and on the afternoon of that day the expedition was in motion. By a series of very skilful and well-executed manœuvres the attack was kept concealed from the enemy till it was too late to offer any successful resistance to the landing of the British force. When the vessels got under weigh, they stood across the bay, as if intending to work out to sea; but, by a dexterous management of the sails, they were kept drifting towards the landing-place: the boats in the mean time were all out, with the men in them, but were kept on that side of the ships which was out of the enemy's sight. On approaching within a short distance of the shore, the ships, according to signal, bore up together; and when within about a cable's length of the landing-place, the boats were all slipped at the same moment: the ships immediately opened their fire upon the batteries, and the party in the boats proceeded to land without opposition. The entire force of the British did not much exceed four hundred men. It was immediately on its landing formed into two divisions; the first, under Captain Phillips, proceeded to attack one of the batteries, which, though defended with obstinate bravery, was finally carried, and three of the guns brought to bear upon the enemy in his retreat.

With the other division of the British force, Captain Court had advanced to dislodge the enemy from the principal fort. It being inexpedient to make the attack in front, it was necessary to take a circuitous and most fatiguing

line of march. Vast steepes had to be ascended and descended successively, for five hours, and it was frequently necessary for the men to use their hands to assist their progress, and to trust for safety to the hold which they were able to gain upon the slight and thinly scattered shrubs. These difficulties being surmounted, the British reached an eminence which commanded the enemy's position. The perseverance which had been displayed seems to have struck the garrison with panic, for they immediately spiked their guns and retreated. On the following day the island was surrendered to the British force, the number of which has already been mentioned. That of the enemy amounted to about thirteen hundred men, and was supported by two hundred and thirty pieces of ordnance. The surrender of Amboyna was followed by that of the subordinate islands, five in number.

Another brilliant exploit was the capture of Banda Neira, the principal of the spice islands: this took place in August of the same year. The service was performed by Captain Cole, who had been despatched from India with the *Caroline*, *Piedmontaise*, and *Baracosta*, to the support of the division off Amboyna. Captain Cole had requested from Admiral Drury permission to attack some of the enemy's settlements which lay in his way, and it was granted; but not without a cautionary intimation of the disproportionate strength of Banda Neira to the means at his disposal. Not dismayed by this warning, Captain Cole departed on his course, and, having obtained from the government of Penang twenty artillery-men, two field-pieces, and some scaling-ladders, he proceeded into the Java sea, against the south-east monsoon. During the passage, which occupied six weeks, the ship's company were daily exercised in the use of the pike, sword, and small arms, and in mounting the scaling-ladders placed against the masts, as a preparatory exercise for any attempt at escalade. On the evening of the 8th of August the Banda Islands became visible, and preparations were made for an attack. It was intended to run the ships into the harbour before daylight in the morning, but, about ten o'clock, they were suddenly fired upon from the island of Roijen; an occurrence perfectly unexpected, as the British commander was not aware that the island was fortified. The attempt to take Banda Neira by surprise was thus for the time frustrated; but, on the following night, it was renewed with signal courage and good fortune.

The party destined for the service was about three hundred and ninety strong, but those actually engaged did not exceed two hundred. While the ships were standing towards the land, the men rested with their arms by their sides. At eleven o'clock they were ordered into their boats, and directed to rendezvous close under the lee of the point of Great Banda. The night, however, was dark and stormy, and at three o'clock only a few boats had reached the place appointed, the rest having been

driven to leeward. As the success of the attack depended upon its taking place under cover of darkness, Captain Cole determined not to wait for the arrival of the remainder of the boats, but to make the attempt without delay. They accordingly pulled for the shore, but within a short distance of it the boats grounded on a coral reef; and, after labouring through a boisterous night, the men had to wade up to their waists in water. The landing was effected close to a battery of ten guns. This was immediately attacked and carried by the pikemen, the officer and his guard being made prisoners, without the firing of a single shot, although the enemy were at their guns with matches lighted.

Though success had crowned their daring, the situation of the British force was now most critical. Daylight was approaching, and the bugles of the enemy were spreading alarm throughout the island. A rapid movement was made towards Fort Belgica, and in twenty minutes the scaling-ladders were placed against the walls. So silent was the march of the British, that the garrison were not aware of their approach till they were within a hundred yards of them. The outworks were speedily carried, and the ladders hauled up, under a sharp fire from the garrison; but they were found too short for the escalade of the inner walls. A rush was then made for the gateway, which, at that instant, was opened to admit the colonel-commandant and three other officers, who lived in houses at the foot of the hill. The enemy fired a few guns and kept up a discharge of musketry for about ten or fifteen minutes; they then fled in all directions. A few were killed, and among them the colonel-commandant, who refused to receive quarter, and fell in the gateway, sword in hand: some threw themselves from the walls, but the greater part escaped.

A flag of truce was forthwith despatched to Fort Nassau, demanding its surrender. It was answered by the verbal submission of the governor; but the Dutch colours continuing hoisted, Captain Cole despatched a second flag, announcing his determination to lay the place in ashes if they were not immediately struck. This threat, aided by a well-placed shot from Fort Belgica, produced the desired effect, and the handful of Englishmen who had been engaged in this gallant enterprise were then undisputed masters of the island, with its two forts and various batteries, mounting nearly one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and which had been defended by seven hundred disciplined troops, besides the militia.

The only possessions now remaining to the enemy, in the east, were the Island of Java and its dependencies. An extraordinary value had been placed upon these settlements by the Dutch, who used to call Java the most precious jewel in the diadem of the Company, and its capital, Batavia, the queen of the east. Unfortunately, like most other eastern potentates, Batavia was regardless of the lives of

her people; for though, soon after its foundation, this settlement had been pronounced as healthy as any part of the Indies, experience has shown that it is, beyond all places in the world, destructive to the lives of Europeans. This circumstance was regarded by the Dutch as an advantage, the terror of the climate affording, as they supposed, a sufficient defence against any hostile attempt. But such a defence was no longer relied on when its sovereignty was transferred from the Dutch to the French. The skill which the latter people so eminently possessed in the art of war was called into operation at Batavia; and a considerable body of French troops, officers, and engineers, was sent out for its defence.

The reduction of the Dutch settlements was first suggested to Lord Minto by Mr. Raffles, and his lordship was induced, by the information brought to his notice, to determine on the attempt upon his own responsibility. This was previous to the capture of the French islands. In the mean time the governor-general received from home a qualified approval of his meditated operations against Batavia. The views of the home authorities, however, extended no further than to the expulsion of the Dutch, the destruction of their fortifications, and the distribution of their arms and stores; after which it was proposed that we should evacuate the island, resigning possession to the natives. Such a termination of the expedition would have been singularly ill-judged and mischievous. There is not, perhaps, a more dissolute place in the world than Batavia, nor one which contains a larger proportion of the elements of crime and disorder. The Malays are sufficiently notorious for perfidy and cruelty. The Chinese, forming another large proportion of the population, less ferocious and blood-thirsty, are generally distinguished by dishonesty and want of principle, and could scarcely be expected to have forgotten the atrocious murder of their countrymen by the Dutch, in 1740. The number of slaves, too, was enormous; many of them having been reduced to captivity by violence and fraud, and almost all treated with great cruelty. These, maddened by their wrongs and sufferings, would eagerly have embraced any opportunity that might have offered for revenge. To withdraw from such a population the European control by which they had been so long coerced, without substituting in its place any other, would have been to abandon the colony to all the horrors of insurrection and massacre; to invite, in another quarter of the world, a repetition of the scenes which had been acted at St. Domingo, or, if possible, something still more frightful and appalling. Lord Minto, therefore, declined acting upon these instructions, and determined, in the event of success, upon establishing such a government as should be sufficient for the preservation of public order.

The preparations for the reduction of this last relic of the colonial dominion of the Hol-

landers were upon a scale commensurate with the object to be attained. The armament sailed from Malacca, and the governor-general himself accompanied it. It had been objected, that so much time had been consumed in preparation, that the favourable season for its departure had been suffered to pass, and that it would have to contend against the adverse monsoon. This danger was obviated by the route chosen for the expedition. On leaving the straits of Singapore it stood across to the western coast of Borneo; then, under the shelter of the land, and with the assistance of the land wind, made good its course to Pulo-amber, and from thence striking across to Java, made the coast of Point Indermago. The merit of ascertaining the practicability of this passage is attributable to Captain Greig. On the 4th of August, 1811, the expedition arrived in the Batavia roads. The army, which was under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, was divided into four brigades, one forming the advance, two the line, and one the reserve. Nominally, the force employed on this expedition amounted to twelve thousand, of which number nearly one half were Europeans; but so many of the troops were disabled by sickness, that the number capable of service was reduced in a very unusual proportion to the apparent strength.

The place of landing was a spot similar, in some respects, to that selected for the purpose at Mauritius; the natural obstacles which it presented having been considered sufficient to deter an invading army. In consequence of this belief it was left unguarded, and the debarkation of the troops took place without resistance. The different corps had ground allotted to them, as they landed, on which to form, and as soon as the principal part of each battalion was on shore it proceeded to the position which it was to occupy. The advanced posts were pushed on, and the troops were formed in two lines, one fronting Batavia, and the other Meester Cornelis. In the course of the night, a patrol of the enemy's cavalry, accompanied by an aide-de-camp of General Janssens, the governor, galloped into the advanced posts on the Batavia road, where they received the fire of two six-pounders, and that of a picket of infantry, and retired with the loss of an officer and two or three men.

On the following day, the 5th August, the horse-artillery and cavalry were landed, and the position of the army was advanced towards Batavia. On the 6th, the roads to the city, and the country all along the coast, were reconnoitred. From some symptoms manifested in Batavia, the general judged it to be the intention of the enemy to evacuate the city. On the 7th the infantry attached to the advance pushed forward, the only serious impediment to their progress arising from the destruction of the bridge over the river Anjol. A bridge of boats was constructed, by which a passage was effected late at night; but, as the troops could only pass over in single file, considerable

delay took place. On the following day the burghers of Batavia surrendered the city without opposition, the garrison having retreated to Weltevreden. Though the enemy had declined an engagement, he had made ample preparations for what may be called passive resistance. The houses were deserted, the bridges broken down, and the conduits which supplied the city with water destroyed. The public storehouses had been burned, and considerable efforts had been made to destroy every species of public property. Happily, some public granaries were preserved, and provisions were abundant.

Only a small part of the British force entered the town in the first instance. Their arrival afforded a timely check to the system of depredation and destruction which the Malays had commenced, and they succeeded in rescuing several large stores of colonial goods from plunder.

Many circumstances combined to excite in the mind of the British authorities a suspicion that the enemy meditated an attack, and this was confirmed by the report of Captain W. Robinson, of the 24th foot, aide-de-camp to Lord Minto, who had been despatched with a summons to General Janssens to surrender the island. He was conducted blindfolded through the lines, but, as he passed along, he heard a considerable movement of men, horses, and artillery-carriages. The answer which he brought back was in the style of gasconade which characterized the military school of revolutionary France. It was to the effect, that the governor was a French general, and would defend his charge to the last extremity. Soon after the receipt of the French governor's answer the troops were silently called out, and ordered to lie on their arms in the great square in front of the town-house. They had scarcely reached it when the head of the enemy's column appeared and opened a fire of musketry. Colonel Gillespie sallied out at the head of a party, from a gateway on the west side of the city, with the intention of charging the assailants in flank. The firing immediately ceased, and no more was seen or heard of the enemy during the night. It appears that they had calculated upon the British force in the city being less numerous than it really was, and they had also relied on the expectation of disabling our men by means not recognised among the ordinary instruments of warfare. A large quantity of deleterious spirit was stored up in the town, and this the Chinese, in compliance, it was understood, with instructions from the enemy, pressed upon our soldiers instead of water, which was extremely scarce—a proclamation having been issued by the French general, forbidding any family to possess more than one jar of water for their own use. By the judicious and decisive measures of Colonel Gillespie their designs were frustrated, and the British force was preserved from surprise and destruction.

Early on the morning of the 10th of August,

the troops, together with the inhabitants, had a narrow escape. A Malay was discovered with a firebrand in his hand, in the act of setting light to some wooden magazines containing a considerable quantity of gunpowder. He was taken, and, on the following day, in a spirit of summary justice, hanged. These were not the only acts of similar character which occurred. The commanding officer's quarters were kept by a Frenchman; and, as an honourable way of serving his country, this man poisoned the coffee prepared for the breakfast of Colonel Gillespie and his staff: the atrocious attempt was unsuccessful, the effects of the poison having manifested themselves before sufficient of the adulterated beverage had been taken to produce the intended effect. In the hurry of the moment, it is to be lamented that the author of this abominable act escaped.

On the 10th, Colonel Gillespie advanced with his corps towards the enemy's cantonment at Weltevreden, supported by two flank battalions of infantry. They found the cantonment abandoned, but the enemy was in force at a short distance beyond. Their position was strongly defended by an *abatis*, occupied by three thousand of their best troops and four guns, horse artillery. It was promptly attacked by Colonel Gillespie, and, after an obstinate resistance, carried at the point of the bayonet, the enemy's force driven to the shelter of their batteries, and their guns taken.

But, though vanquished, the enemy were not entirely subdued. They were greatly superior in numbers to the invading force, and they entrenched themselves in a strong position between a large river and a broad and deep canal, neither of which was fordable. Their position was further defended by a deep trench strongly palisaded, seven redoubts, and many batteries. The fort of Meester Corseelis was in the centre, and the whole of the works were defended by a numerous and well-organized artillery. The season was far advanced and the heat violent; and these reasons, combined with the insufficient number of the British troops, determined the general to decline attempting the reduction of the position by regular approaches, and to endeavour to carry the works by assault. Some batteries were erected, with a view of disabling the principal redoubts: from these a heavy fire was kept up for two days with great effect; and, though answered by a far more numerous artillery, it succeeded in silencing the nearer batteries of the enemy, and considerably disturbing their entire position.

At dawn of day, on the 26th, the assault was made. It was proposed to surprise one of the redoubts constructed by the enemy beyond the canal, to endeavour to cross the bridge over that water with the fugitives, and then to assault the redoubts within the lines. The enemy was under arms, and prepared for the combat, and General Janssens was in the advanced redoubt when the attack commenced.

Colonel Gillespie, after a long *détour* through

a close and intricate country, came on their advance, which he routed almost instantly, and with extraordinary rapidity proceeded, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, to the advanced redoubt, of which he was soon in possession. He then, in accordance with the proposed plan, passed the bridge, and, after an obstinate resistance, carried with the bayonet a second redoubt. The operations of other columns were directed with equal success against different parts of the works; but the explosion, either by accident or design, of the magazine of one of the redoubts, destroyed a number of brave officers and men, who were crowded on its ramparts, which the enemy had just abandoned. The park of artillery was attacked and carried in a masterly manner, and a body of cavalry, which had formed to defend it, speedily put to flight. A strong body of the enemy, which had taken their position in the lines in front of Fort Corseelis, were attacked and driven from them, and the fort taken. The enemy was now completely put to flight; a vigorous pursuit followed, and the whole of the flying army was either killed, taken, or dispersed. So close was the combat, that in the course of the day almost every officer was engaged hand to hand. Colonel Gillespie, in person, took prisoners two generals and a colonel, and another colonel fell by his hand. General Janssens succeeded with some difficulty in reaching Buitenzorg, a distance of thirty miles, with a few cavalry, the sole remains of an army of ten thousand men.

The loss on the part of the British was severe; that of the enemy still more so. About a thousand bodies were buried in the works, many perished in the river, and many in the fight. Nearly five thousand were made prisoners, among whom were three general officers, thirty-four field officers, seventy captains, and one hundred and fifty subalterns. In the British army, about one hundred and fifty men, European and native, were killed or missing, and upwards of seven hundred wounded.

The conquest of the island might now be considered as achieved: but as General Janssens showed no intention of giving up the contest, Sir Samuel Auchmuty prepared to push his success with vigour. Captain Beaver, of the *Ninus* frigate, was despatched with a detachment to Cheribon, and, on arriving there, proceeded in the exercise of his duty with great spirit, by summoning the French commander to surrender, allowing him five minutes for decision. The terms he proposed were, that the garrison should be prisoners of war, all public property surrendered, but all private property respected. Immediately after the flag of truce had been despatched, Captain Beaver stood in with the frigate towards the fort. The result was, that the terms were submitted to, the French colours hauled down, the British marines landed, and placed in possession of the fort.

At this moment the French general, Jumelle, and two other officers, one of them an aide-de-camp of the commander-in-chief, arrived with tidings that detachments to succour Cheribon were on their way, and that three hundred infantry and two hundred and fifty cavalry might be hourly expected. But it was too late—the officers were made prisoners, and Captain Beaver, who had not waited for the ship which had the troops on board, landed one hundred and fifty seamen to garrison the fort, leaving the marines to act offensively in the field if requisite. The prisoners being all natives except one or two officers, were dismissed to their homes, with an intimation that if afterwards found acting against the British, they would be hanged. It was said that this caution did not appear at all to diminish their gratitude for their deliverance.

The marines were then marched to Carong Sambar, thirty-five miles inland, where nine waggon-loads of silver and copper money, with stores to a great amount, were deposited. Seven hundred prisoners, including a very large proportion of officers, were taken, without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded, during these operations.

Sir Samuel Auchmuty having proceeded to Samarang, and being joined there by Admiral Stopford and a few of the troop ships, called upon General Janssens to surrender the island on terms of capitulation. This was refused, and the French general succeeded in making such a show of strength as led Sir Samuel Auchmuty to conclude that it was not advisable to assault the fort until further reinforced. Some fishermen, however, having reported that Janssens was withdrawing his troops into the interior, and had fortified a position a few miles on the road towards Karta Soora, Sir Samuel Auchmuty prepared to attack the town, when it was immediately surrendered.

Janssens had retired to the position which he had chosen at Serondel, three miles from Samarang, where he was completing batteries and entrenchments, and where he had succeeded, with the assistance of the native princes, in drawing together a large force. The British commander, having waited in vain for reinforcements, determined upon hazarding an attack, which he entrusted to Colonel Gibbs. In the course of the night one ship arrived, which enabled the European garrison from the fort to join the field force, which was further strengthened by a company of sepoys. But with these additions it only amounted to about eleven hundred infantry, was totally deficient in cavalry, and almost without artillery.

At two in the morning, on the 16th of September, the troops marched from Samarang; and, after advancing about six miles, discovered the enemy's force. They were attacked without delay, their flank soon turned, and they took to flight in the utmost disorder,

pursued by the British force to Onorang, a distance of seven or eight miles. Here it was found that the enemy had halted, and collected in irregular masses. Some cannon from the fort and village opened on the British line as it advanced; but on the advance of Colonel Gibbs to assault the fort, it was evacuated, and the enemy again fled in confusion. General Janssens retired to Saltiaga, twelve miles south of Onorang, where, abandoned by his native allies, no course was left for him but submission. The negotiation was conducted on the part of Sir Samuel Auchmuty with much firmness, and ended in the surrender of the island, as well as that of the French general, with all that remained of his army, as prisoners of war.

The naval operations were conducted with equal success. Captains George Harris and Fleetwood Pellow, in the *Sir Francis Drakes* and *Phaeton* frigates, succeeded in reducing the French fortress in the island of Madura, and detaching the sultan from the interests of the enemy. This service was performed with extraordinary brilliancy. Leaving their ships at anchor under the isle of Pondok, these officers landed about two miles from Fort Sumanap, and forming their men into columns of sixty bayonets and thirty pikemen each, flanked by two or three pieces of artillery, and with a body of marines for their reserve, they marched with such perfect silence towards the fort, that, though the boats had been seen standing in for shore, the men were not discovered till they were through the outer gate. In ten minutes the fort was carried by storm, and several hundred Madura pikemen were made prisoners. At daybreak the natives began to assemble in great numbers, when Captain Harris called on the governor to surrender in ten minutes. In reply, he was required to evacuate the fort within three hours, on peril of having it stormed.

The governor commanded three thousand musketeers, sixty artillerymen, and about fifteen hundred armed with pike and pistol, and he had four field-pieces planted on a bridge, commanding a straight road of a quarter of a mile in length, along which the British must pass before they could reach the bridge. Captain Harris, however, determined to attack them. Leaving about fifty men in the fort, he led a body of ninety to turn the left flank of the enemy, and to make a diversion in favour of Captain Pellow's party, which was to advance as soon as this column should fire the first gun. This bold attempt was entirely successful. Some sharp firing took place while the British columns were advancing, but as soon as they were near enough to charge, the contest was at an end. The governor was made prisoner, and the colours and guns taken. Friendship always follows success: the Sultan of Madura forthwith joined the conquerors, and offered four thousand men to assist in attacking Sourabaya; but this aid was not needed, in consequence of the surrender of the whole island.

The appointment of lieutenant-governor was conferred by Lord Minto upon Mr. Raffles, who had preceded the expedition for the purpose of collecting information, and to whose judicious advice its success may in a great degree be attributed.

The fall of Batavia was followed by an event so remarkable as to deserve notice.

The sultan of Palimbang, a chief in the south-eastern part of Sumatra, no sooner received intelligence of the success of the British arms, than he formed the atrocious resolution of destroying the Dutch resident, and every male person belonging to the factory at Palimbang, not excepting even children, and of razing the fort to the ground. This horrible scheme he executed, in spite of the remonstrances of some Malay agents of the British government, who represented that the destruction of the fort would be an act of hostility against those to whom the Dutch establishments had been transferred by right of conquest. The number of persons thus wantonly massacred was nearly a hundred, thirty of whom were European-born.

The motives which led to this barbarous policy were probably twofold. The Dutch are regarded throughout the Malay states with inveterate hatred, and the feeling is not altogether without cause. The sultan perhaps rejoiced in an opportunity of taking signal revenge upon a people towards whom the feeling of hostility was universal and long cherished. He might further think that the circumstances which had occurred presented a favourable opportunity for dissolving all connections with European powers. The entire proceeding appears to have been marked by that sinister policy unfortunately so common among the chieftains of the East. The Malay agents alleged that, in the first instance, the sultan compelled them to sign a false report of the transactions, and afterwards, with a view of preventing a disclosure of the real facts, endeavoured to add them to the number of his victims.

Previously to these facts becoming known to the government of Java, a mission had been despatched for the purpose of taking charge of the factory at Palimbang, and of making arrangements for the preservation to the British of a monopoly of tin produced in the island of Banca, but on terms far more advantageous to the sultan than those existing under the Dutch government. The mission was received in the most contemptuous manner; the claims of the English to succeed to the rights and privileges of the Dutch were denied, and the sultan even ventured to assert that he had completed his hostile proceedings against the Dutch before the conquest of Java had been achieved. The real character of those proceedings he did not avow; but represented them to be confined to the destruction of the fort and the expulsion of the garrison. This mission, therefore, returned without accomplishing its object. Its arrival

was soon followed by that of ambassadors from the sultan, who repeated the statements of their master; but by this time the truth was known, and vigorous measures were determined on, to assert the rights of the British government and punish the faithlessness and cruelties of the sultan.

For this purpose, a force, consisting of nearly a thousand men, was put in motion, under the command of Colonel Gillespie: it sailed from Batavia on the 20th March, 1812, but its progress was considerably retarded by contrary winds and currents. On the 3rd of April the fleet reached Hawk's Island, and continued a week at anchor. Tents were pitched on shore, and a number of artificers employed in the completion of the boats intended for the passage of the Palimbang river, in constructing platforms for the field-pieces, and in providing shelter for the troops from the oppressive heat of the day and the noxious air of the night. On the 10th of April the fleet got under weigh, and came to anchor on the 15th, opposite the west channel of the Palimbang river. On the arrival of the British force the sultan attempted to negotiate, transmitting messages to the commander, filled with expressions of the most profound respect and the warmest attachment to the English nation; but his treacherous character was too well known to allow of any one being deceived by such professions. Colonel Gillespie refused to treat except with the sultan in person at Palimbang. The expedition accordingly advanced and took possession of the works at Borang; on learning which the sultan fled, leaving the fort, palace, and city in a state of inconceivable disorder. He had previously removed his treasures and his women into the interior.

After the occupation of the works at Borang, the troops had been re-embarked; but, on learning the state of the capital, Colonel Gillespie determined to push on with the light boats, and endeavour to stop the scenes of confusion and carnage which were taking place there. The city, which stretched along the banks of the river for upwards of seven miles, presented to the view of the British an awful scene of murder and pillage. The most dreadful shrieks and yells were heard in all directions, and conflagrations appeared in various places. An eye-witness declares, that "romance never described anything half so hideous, nor has the invention of the imagination ever given representations equally appalling." Amid these horrors, Colonel Gillespie stepped on shore, accompanied by only seven grenadiers, and proceeded into the city, surrounded by the glittering weapons of ferocious Arabs and treacherous Malays. One of the latter nation pressed through the crowd, approached the colonel, and was walking by his side, when a large double-edged knife was silently put into his hands by one of his countrymen. He received the instrument, and was in the act of concealing it in

his long loose sleeve, when a sudden flash of lightning discovered it. The man was instantly disarmed, and his murderous design thus frustrated; but, amid the confusion that prevailed at the moment, he found means to mix in the crowd and escape.

On approaching the palace, the horrors of the spectacle were aggravated. The apartments had been ransacked; the pavements and floors were flowing with blood; the flames were rapidly consuming all that plunder had spared, and while they were pursuing their devastating career, the crackling of the bamboos is said to have resembled the discharge of musketry. At intervals, the roofs of the various buildings fell with tremendous crash, and notwithstanding the descent of torrents of rain, the fire continued to spread, and threatened even that part of the palace where the British forces were compelled to take up their temporary abode. This force consisted only of a few grenadiers and seamen, and they were surrounded on all sides by hordes of assassins. The best means of defence were adopted by the little band. At midnight they were joined by a small reinforcement, under Major French, of the king's 89th foot, and in the morning by another, under Colonel Alexander M'Leod, of the king's 59th. Resistance was now no longer thought of, and the resolution of Colonel Gillespie had thus, without the loss of a man, placed in the possession of the British the city, fort, and batteries, defended by two hundred and forty-two pieces of cannon.

Notwithstanding the subjugation of the Dutch and French power, parts of Java remained in a disturbed state. The sultan of Djoejocarta, one of the most turbulent and intriguing of the native princes, manifested a hostile disposition to the British government; in consequence of which, Mr. Raffles, the lieutenant-governor, had proceeded in person to his court, soon after the conquest of the island, with the hope of definitively fixing by treaty the relations between the two governments. The sultan received Mr. Raffles surrounded by several thousands of his armed followers, whose deportment was marked by extraordinary violence. Creses were unsheathed, and it was plain that those who brandished them only waited for the command to use them against their English visitors. The command did not issue, and the lieutenant-governor and his retinue retired in safety.

A treaty was concluded, by which the sovereignty of the British over the island of Java was acknowledged by the sultan, and the English East-India Company were confirmed in all the privileges, advantages, and prerogatives which had been possessed by the Dutch and French governments. To the Company also were transferred the sole regulation of the duties and the collection of tribute within the dominions of the sultan, as well as the general administration of justice

in all cases where the British interests were concerned.

This treaty was concluded before the expedition against Palimbang. The occupation of the troops which had been despatched thither seemed to afford the sultan of Djoejocarta a favourable opportunity of evading the engagements into which he had recently entered, and this, in the true spirit of native policy, he eagerly embraced. By his agency, a confederacy was formed of all the native courts, the object of which was to expel all European settlers, of every country, and to sweep from the island every vestige of European power. As soon as the design became apparent, preparations were made for resisting it by such means as were at the disposal of government; and in the emergency Colonel Gillespie opportunely arrived from Palimbang. The lieutenant-governor and the commander of the forces immediately proceeded to Djoejocarta with such military force as could be collected, and hostilities were precipitated by Colonel Gillespie, arriving with a reconnoitring party, unexpectedly falling in with a large body of the sultan's horse.

As offensive measures had not been determined on, Colonel Gillespie refrained from attacking them, and endeavoured, through Mr. Crawford, the resident, to prevail upon them to return to the palace. They for a while refused, and some stones were thrown at the English party. This outrage was not repelled, and at length the sultan's troops consented to retire; but, taking advantage of the growing darkness, they again threw stones at our men, and a sergeant and four dragoons were wounded. This attack was followed by several others, and the British dragoons were ultimately obliged to out their way out sword in hand.

On the following day an attempt was made to negotiate, but without success, and it was clear that nothing was left but an appeal to force. The residence of the sultan was about three miles in circumference, surrounded by a broad ditch with drawbridges, possessing a strong high rampart with bastions, and defended by nearly one hundred pieces of cannon. In the interior were numerous squares and courtyards, inclosed with high walls, and all defensible. The principal entrance or square, in front, had a double row of cannon facing the gate, and was flanked with newly-erected batteries, right and left. Seventeen thousand regular troops manned the works, and an armed population of more than a hundred thousand surrounded the palace for miles, and occupied the walls and fastnesses along the sides of the various roads. The Dutch had erected a fort close to the palace, and this was now occupied by the British. Their force was small, not exceeding a thousand firelocks; but what was wanting in number was made up by intrepidity. They forthwith commenced cannonading the palace; the fire was immediately returned, and in the

evening the sultan sent a message demanding an unconditional surrender.

In the course of the night, Major Dalton, who, with a party of the Bengal light infantry, occupied part of the Dutch town, between the fort and the palace, was attacked four times in succession, but on every occasion repulsed the enemy with great steadiness. Various skirmishing took place between parties of the enemy and others of our dragoons, in which the latter displayed remarkable gallantry. The day after, a detachment under Colonel Alexander M'Leod, whose arrival had been anxiously expected, reached head-quarters, but their long march and exposure to a burning sun rendered some repose necessary. In the evening, Colonel Gillespie ordered all the troops, both cavalry and infantry, into the fort, and this measure fully persuaded the sultan that he had struck the British commander with terror.

He was mistaken. No symptom of concession having been evinced by the enemy, Colonel Gillespie had determined on an assault. Two hours before day the leaders of columns received their orders, and instantly proceeded to execute them. The assault was made by escalade, and was completely successful. The British force quickly occupied the ramparts, and turned the guns of the enemy upon themselves. The sultan was taken in his stronghold. He was subsequently deposed, and the hereditary prince raised to the throne. The other confederated princes readily acceded to the terms proposed to them. The conquest of Java was thus complete, and the British power was paramount throughout the island.

The establishment of the British power in the East without a European rival, was the crowning act of Lord Minto's administration, and it was one of which he had reason to be proud. To the incidents which have been already related little need be added, beyond a very brief notice of some of the various diplomatic affairs in which Lord Minto engaged. His attention, as far as his situation would admit, was zealously directed towards the wise policy of keeping all enemies at a distance. He effected the conclusion of a treaty with the amirs of Scinde, by which those chiefs bound themselves not to "allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in" their country. He opened a communication with Caubul; and Mr. Elphinstone, on the part of the government of India, concluded a treaty with the reigning sovereign, by which the latter undertook to resist any attempt of the French and Persians to pass through his dominions into those of the British government, which government engaged, in return, to provide, to the extent of its ability, for the expense of such resistance. The king of Caubul was also restrained from permitting any Frenchman to enter his territories. With the same object which suggested the mission to Caubul, Lord Minto despatched Sir John Malcolm to Persia, where the French were

endeavouring to establish their influence with great probability of success. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the governor-general's envoy, Sir Harford Jones reached Persia, in the character of a plenipotentiary of the British crown. By him a treaty was concluded binding the sovereign of Persia to resist the passage of any European force through his country towards India, and his Britannic majesty to furnish aid in case Persia should be invaded from Europe. In consequence of this arrangement, the emissaries of the French in Persia were dismissed. With some minor states engagements were concluded by Lord Minto, greatly at variance with the then fashionable doctrine of non-interference, but the expediency of which was forced on the mind of the governor-general by the results of his personal experience.

Having concluded the usual period of residence, Lord Minto resigned his office, and late in the year 1813 proceeded to England. But he was not destined to a long enjoyment of that repose to which men look as the termination and reward of public services, his death having taken place within a few weeks after his arrival in this country. Before his departure from India, his services had been honourably acknowledged by his elevation to an earldom.

The administration of the earl of Minto was distinguished by great moderation, but it was marked also by very considerable ability and energy. The line of policy incessantly pressed upon him from home was that of peace, and he laboured assiduously to preserve it. But he was not insensible to the peculiarities of our situation in India, surrounded by those who regarded us as hostile intruders: he perceived that adherence to neutrality might be carried too far for national interest, no less than for national honour; and his views on subjects which, soon after his retirement, became of vital importance, were apparently not very dissimilar from those of his successor. In England he had been deeply impressed with the views and principles of those who trembled lest their country should be too powerful in the East, and its beneficial influence be too widely extended there. The solid good sense, of which he possessed so large a portion, enabled him subsequently to perceive the impracticability of maintaining these views and at the same time maintaining the integrity of the British empire. He became fully conscious of the inapplicability to our situation in India of that timid and indecisive policy which was prevalent in England; he had the candour to avow his convictions, and the expression of his opinion was not without effect in the most influential quarters. His mistakes and failures may fairly be attributed less to himself than to public opinion in England, which overawed and controlled him. The outrages of the Pindarries, the encroachments of the Ghoorkas, and the insolence of the Burmese, attracted his attention; but he waited for encourage-

ment from home to determine him to grapple with them. This, the most exceptionable part of his policy, must be attributed to constitutional caution. The most brilliant, as well as valuable, acts of his government were the well-planned and successful expeditions against the enemy's possessions in the East. He here showed that he understood his country's interests, and he acted upon his con-

victions with vigour and decision. Upon the whole, though one or two of those who have occupied the same high station with himself have left behind them a reputation more brilliant and dazzling, that of the earl of Minto rests on a basis of substantial service, and he well deserves to be held in remembrance as one of the eminent statesmen of India.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ACTS RELATING TO THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY—MINISTERS DETERMINE TO THROW OPEN THE INDIA TRADE—COMMITTEE OF HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE COMPANY—EVIDENCE CALLED—DISCUSSION IN HOUSE OF LORDS—DEBATES IN THE COMMONS—RESOLUTIONS MOVED BY LORD CASTLEREAGH—BILL EVENTUALLY PASSED.

It has been seen that, from a feeble and obscure association of traders, the East-India Company had, in the eighteenth century, become the lords of a vast territory, and the dominant power in the field of Indian politics. They had attained this high position under the license of the British Crown; but beyond this their obligations to the government of their country were few. It was to the talents and intrepidity of their own servants that they were indebted for the commanding situation which they held; and the extraordinary ability displayed by men educated upon ordinary principles and taken from the ordinary walks of life may be received as evidence, that the native vigour of the English character will manifest itself under any circumstances which afford room for its display.

The struggles of the Company in Parliament and by private negotiation, to preserve a portion of the power and influence which they had achieved, and to counteract the growing appetite of the ministers of the Crown to appropriate them, have been detailed with some degree of minuteness to the year 1784, when that peculiar form of carrying on the government of India, which has ever since prevailed, was first established. In 1793 the approaching expiration of the term fixed for the duration of the Company's government and exclusive trade rendered necessary some legislative provision to meet the event; and an act was accordingly passed, continuing both the government and trade to the Company for a further term of twenty years, commencing from the 1st of March, 1794. The plan of government adopted in 1784 was substantially renewed; but the ministry, which nine years before had ostentatiously professed to renounce patronage in connection with the government of India, now evinced an inclination to abate somewhat of the sternness of their resolve. The members of the Board of Commissioners had previously been unsalaried. A portion of them, on whom it may be presumed the main weight of business was to devolve, were no longer to remain in so unsatisfactory a posi-

tion. Some additional restraint was laid on the power of the Court of Directors to make pecuniary grants, and the Company were required to reserve a specified amount of tonnage, at regulated rates of freight, for the use of private merchants, to whom the right of trading with India was now for the first time conceded; the amount to be increased, if necessary, under the orders of the Board of Commissioners. The trade with China was continued to the Company without invasion. This state of things continued undisturbed till the session of 1813, when the battle for the retention of the government of India and of exclusive privileges of trade had again to be fought.

On every occasion when the East-India Company had sought a renewal of their privileges, their claims had been resisted; but the grounds of resistance were not always the same with those taken in 1813. Men will always be anxious to participate in a trade which they believe to be profitable, and they will never be unable to suggest plausible reasons for acceding to their wishes. But the principles of which Adam Smith, though not the author, was the great disseminator, furnished new weapons for combating all exclusive privileges of trade, and afforded the means of concealing the interested motives of the opponents under the guise of science.

The terms upon which the government and trade of India were to be continued in the Company gave rise to inquiry and discussion for several years before the expiration of the old act. In 1808 some correspondence took place on the subject between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors; and very early in the following year it was intimated that his Majesty's ministers were not prepared to concur in an application to Parliament for a renewal of those restrictions by which the trade with India had been hitherto limited. This intimation was, of course, little agreeable to the Company. A variety of arguments were adduced in opposition to the proposed innovation; and it was alleged, that "the loss

of the Indian monopoly, such as it was left by the act of 1793, would lead, by no slow process, to the entire subversion of the Company both in their commercial and political capacity, and of that system which the legislature had appointed for the government of India: of which system the Company formed an integral and essential part."

During these discussions, a parliamentary committee was engaged in an elaborate investigation of all the great branches of the Company's affairs; and upon the ground that it was desirable that the reports of the committee should be submitted to Parliament before the question of renewal was brought forward, the correspondence on the subject was suspended for a considerable period. At the close of the year 1811 it was resumed. The opening of the trade with India, generally, to British merchants and British ships, was again laid down by ministers, as the only ground upon which the negotiation for continuing to the Company any portion of its powers could be conducted. The clamour from without excited, in the judgment of trading politicians, the pertinacity of ministers; a large proportion of the mercantile and manufacturing world appeared to look upon the East in the light in which it had been represented by the writers of fable, and to regard an introduction to it as a passport to the possession of unmeasured wealth. Though the sober habits of men of business would lead us to a different belief, experience shows that no class of men are more open to the influence of such delusions.

The denunciation of monopoly formed the principal ground of attack upon the commercial privileges of the Company; and on this point no defence was offered. Monopolies generally were given up; but some attempts were made to show that they might be tolerated under certain circumstances, and for definite periods of time; and further, that, as the trade with India was then carried on, the monopoly of the Company was not a very close one. On the part of the assailants, the principle that all monopolies are injurious was fortified by allegations of particular evils, supposed to result from that of the East-India Company. Manufacturers of various articles declared themselves, as well as the country wronged, by being restrained from pouring an unlimited supply of their various commodities into India; and such restraint being pronounced "humiliating to individuals, and degrading to the national character," there could be no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion, that it was "a national grievance."

But one of the most remarkable, not to say one of the most amusing, charges against the monopoly was, that "it cooled the ardour of generous and liberal competition." The generosity and liberality of commercial competition gave rise to those sanguinary scenes in the East in which the Portuguese and Dutch were

such distinguished actors. The generosity and liberality of commercial competition, as manifested in the slave-trade, deluged Africa with blood and covered Europe with guilt. And the generosity and liberality of commercial competition are now strikingly set forth in the factory system of England, under which the happiness of myriads of human beings, through time and eternity, is sacrificed to the Moloch of manufactures; the wages doled out to the wretched victims, during their brief career of life, being, in fact, not the reward of labour, but the price of blood. Such are a few of the triumphs of a generous and liberal commercial competition.

The Company replied by affirming, that the paramount object of any new arrangement for India ought not to be commercial, but political; and that the commercial monopoly was to be regarded as an instrument in the hands of the Company for the government of India; that the Company's territorial rights could only be enjoyed through the medium of commercial privileges; and that no provision made for securing them could be compatible with the entire opening of the Eastern trade. These assertions were clearly erroneous: the territorial claims of the Company were quite distinct from their commercial privileges; and there could be nothing to prevent the retention of the one after the other had been relinquished. Experience, too, has shown, that the commercial privileges of the Company are not indispensable to the maintenance of its authority in India.

The earnestness with which the Company pressed the necessity of retaining their trade as an instrument for exercising their functions of government, was the result of a conviction long cherished, though proved by the test of experiment to be unwarranted. The trade of the Company was regarded by them as indispensable to the support of the financial operations required by the relative circumstances of Great Britain and India. They viewed it not only as the best, but the only practicable channel of remittance, and without it they apprehended that the means of conveying from India the funds required to be provided in this country would fail.

They were more fortunate in referring to their own exertions to effect the introduction and consumption of European commodities—exertions made through a long series of years, with great perseverance and extraordinary zeal; to their labours in upholding the interests of Great Britain in India, against European rivalry and native jealousy; to the magnificent empire which they had added to the British dominions; and to the great wealth which flowed into this country, in consequence of their spirited and judicious policy. After enumerating some of these advantages in one of their official papers, they emphatically and justly added, with reference to the charges of their opponents—"Such are the injuries, the grievances, the evils—such the degrada-

tion, which the East-India Company have brought on the country."

The debts and embarrassments of the Company afforded a ground of accusation peculiarly calculated to render them unpopular, and of course they were not forgotten. The answer of the Company was to the effect, that they had never had occasion to apply to Parliament for aid to support their own establishments; but that their applications had been in consequence of levies made by government, on the score of a right to participate in the territorial revenues; or for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement of immense sums disbursed for the state in military expeditions—sums very tardily acknowledged, and not then fully paid; or to enable the Company to meet the transfer to this country of Indian territorial debt, the increase of which was not to be attributed to the Company, but to his Majesty's government and to Parliament. There was much in these statements that deserved consideration; but there is no novelty in the truth, that when either individuals or societies expend their funds for the public benefit, they rarely meet with much gratitude in return.

Political economy did not furnish the whole of the arguments by which the privileges of the Company were assailed: the higher science of natural law was invoked to the same end. A full and free right to trade with all countries and people in amity with the British crown was asserted to be "the natural birthright and inheritance of the people of this empire, of every subject of it, and of every port in it." What may be "the natural birthright and inheritance" of a "port," it would not be very easy to determine; and if the assertion be taken in the sense in which it was probably meant, it may reasonably be doubted whether a position so wild merited any answer at all. If it did, the Company gave it a very proper one by observing, that men living in society must submit to the laws of society, and to restraints upon what is called their natural liberty, when, in the opinion of the legislature, the public interest demands it; that the Indian monopoly was established because it was thought beneficial; that it had been continued on the same principle, and that its abolition, or further retention, must be a question purely prudential. In urging their plea of natural right, some of the opponents of the Company endeavoured to make a special case. Their principle, it was alleged, became strengthened by its application to countries acquired and maintained by the efforts and valour of the forces of his Majesty. The countries, however, with which they wished to trade, had been, for the most part, acquired and maintained by the efforts of the Company and the valour of their servants, and altogether under the exclusive powers and privileges which it was now desired to abrogate.

A plausible, and not altogether an unreasonable, objection to the continuance of the Company's privileges was founded on the fact,

that the existing system gave advantages to foreigners which were denied to British merchants, and that the Americans especially had availed themselves of these advantages to secure the markets of Europe, South America, and the West Indies. From this latter circumstance, also, an inference was drawn in favour of general freedom of trade. The Company answered, that the connection of the Americans with the Indian seas was formed under peculiar circumstances, and that their success in the market of Europe was to be ascribed to the political state of that part of the world.

The necessity for the claimants finding new channels of enterprise; the misery of the manufacturers, occasioned by their exclusion from the continent of Europe; the certainty of finding a remedy in the unbounded field which the trade to the East would open to manufacturing and mercantile industry—these, and similar topics, furnished another class of arguments, which were pressed with extraordinary pertinacity by those who conceived they had interests hostile to those of the Company. It was answered, with much calmness and moderation, that any great extension of the trade with India must take place very gradually; that, consequently, the benefits to be derived from it must be very distant; and that, though it might be very easy to send out to India large quantities of goods, it might not be equally easy to obtain returns.

Experience has shown that these opinions were, in a great measure, correct. The trade which succeeded the act of 1813 has been little beneficial to England, while to India it has, to a certain extent, been positively injurious. The petitioners for an open trade had, however, made up their minds to its advantages, and, further, that they were destined to enjoy them; for it was urged, as a reason for extending the trade to the outports, that at Bristol and Liverpool the docks had been enlarged in anticipation of the concession. This specimen of commercial confidence is perhaps without parallel.

Such were the principal arguments by which the advocates of free and of regulated trade, respectively, supported their opinions. But the question was virtually decided before the discussion commenced. The principles of free trade had made too great progress for ministers to venture to resist them without exercising a degree of magnanimity seldom acquired or retained amid the haunts of office.

On the 22nd of March, 1813, the House of Commons resolved itself into a committee of the whole house, to consider of the affairs of the East-India Company; and the various petitions which had been presented having been ordered to be referred to the committee, Lord Castlereagh proceeded to expound the plan which he had to propose on the part of the ministers of the Crown. The term for which the charter was to be renewed was twenty years. The Company were to retain

for that term the exclusive trade to China, but the trade with India was to be thrown open on certain conditions. It was to be confined to ships of a certain amount of tonnage; the trade outward was to be open to all the ports of the empire, but the homeward-bound trade to be restricted to certain ports, to be hereafter named. The Company were to be left in full possession of the power of deportation, to enable them to remove from India individuals whose conduct or intentions they might find or suspect to be dangerous; and this power his lordship held to be sufficient to calm any apprehension that might be excited by the facility of commercial intercourse about to be established. It was also proposed to continue to them the command of the native army, as, after mature consideration, ministers were of opinion, that to separate the command of the army from the civil administration of India would be to sap the foundations of the government. The question, it might have been thought, could scarcely require mature consideration, or, indeed, any consideration at all.

At every successive arrangement, the Company had been called upon to sacrifice some portion of their authority to the ministers of the Crown, and of course the present could not be suffered to form an exception. The Crown previously possessed the power of recall; but, under the pretence that this was an invidious exercise of prerogative, it was proposed to render the sign manual of the Crown necessary to the validity of certain appointments. One of the most important and most beneficial of the contemplated changes applied to the defects of the ecclesiastical establishment. The members of the Church of England in India had hitherto been deprived of those rites of the church, the administration of which appertains exclusively to the episcopal function, and the clergy had been left without superintendence or control. To remedy these evils, it was proposed to appoint a bishop for India, and three archdeacons to superintend the chaplains of the different settlements. Lord Castlereagh embodied the principal points of his speech in a series of resolutions, and concluded by moving them.

The ministry, in accordance with the practice of all ministries who feel or think themselves strong, was disposed to carry the question with a high hand. Some members suggested that, in so important a matter, it might be desirable to hear the evidence of persons whose opinions, on the grounds of acknowledged ability and intimate acquaintance with India, were entitled to attention. Lord Castlereagh objected, and Mr. Canning, whose zeal for the success of the ministerial measure was quickened by the fact of his holding a brief for the great commercial town of Liverpool, which he represented, was surprised that any one should think it necessary to hear evidence, when the question was one of free trade. The sense of the House, however, was

strongly in favour of hearing evidence, and the ministers acquiesced, fearing that they were unable successfully to oppose.

On the 30th of March, the committee was resumed and evidence called. The first witness was a man rendered eminent by his career in India, and no less so by the long and harassing judicial proceedings which awaited him at home. It was Warren Hastings, then in the eightieth year of his age. His examination was of some length, and related to various subjects—the settlement of Europeans, the demand for British commodities, and the propagation of the Christian religion. To the first he expressed himself strongly opposed: he apprehended great injury and oppression to the natives, and regarded the indiscriminate admission of Europeans as fraught with danger to the peace of the country and the safety of the Company. This opinion, he averred, he had long maintained, and he expressed himself anxious to vindicate himself from the suspicion of being biased by his obligations to the Company. With this view, he stated that, twenty years before, when the privileges of the East-India Company were under discussion, he spontaneously addressed a letter to the chairman of the Court of Directors, in which he strongly urged the necessity of providing against the irruption of British adventurers into India. A clause having been inserted in the act, permitting strangers to reside by license, he addressed a second letter to the chairs, remonstrating against it, as likely to produce greater mischiefs than even the permission of indiscriminate residence; because the favoured parties would appear to have the sanction of the Company, and would thereby possess an influence which no man would dare to resist; while a body of adventurers without privilege would be under the jealous eye of government, and naturally excite its attention. In a still more recent letter, he had repeated these opinions.

On the question as to the probable demand for British commodities, Mr. Hastings was less decided, but he thought it would be inconsiderable. It was his opinion, that the trade between India and England, as then regulated, was far more beneficial to both countries than if perfectly free. Being reminded that, in a review of the state of Bengal, which he had written some years before, he had said, "that although we had been so long in possession of the sovereignty of Bengal, yet we had not been able so far to change our ideas with our situation as to quit the contracted views of monopolists," and that in the same work he had insisted upon it, as a fixed and incontrovertible principle, that commerce could only flourish when free and equal, he professed not to recollect the words alluded to, but to have no doubt of their being correctly quoted; and added, that he did not come there to defend his own inconsistencies—that if he had ever expressed such opinions he then abjured them—that his present sentiments were widely dif-

ferent—and that he could not say when he changed them.

On the subject of the propagation of Christianity in India, the opinions delivered by Mr. Hastings were singularly vague and undecided. On the proposed episcopal establishment he expressed himself with an equal degree of oracular darkness; and, for the son and grandson of a clergyman, he certainly evinced a most philosophic indifference, both to the general interests of Christianity and the welfare of the Protestant episcopal church. On the whole, he did little for the elucidation of the various questions before the House, and his answers were distinguished by nothing so much as the pompous and inflated language in which they were conveyed. Age had probably clouded his faculties, and the failings of a man of fourscore years claim indulgence. But in the vigour of his mental strength, Warren Hastings was a man of expedients, not of principles. His last public exhibition, though feeble, was not uncharacteristic. To himself, at least, the occasion must have been gratifying, from its having called forth a spontaneous and almost unanimous indication of respect from the House.

Lord Teignmouth, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, and other witnesses of distinguished character, were examined; and their evidence, on the whole, tended rather to support the views of the Company than those of the ministers. After being persevered in for some days, the mode of investigation originally adopted was suddenly abandoned. Ministers either found, as they alleged, that the time of the House was too much occupied, or the affair was taking a tendency opposed to that which they desired. On the 13th of April, Lord Castlereagh, after complaining of delay and inconvenience, and referring to a precedent to authorize the course he was about to recommend, moved for the appointment of a select committee to examine witnesses, and report the minutes to the House. Mr. Robert Thornton opposed the motion, on behalf of the Company, as did also Mr. Grant and Mr. Astell, the last-named gentleman denouncing the proposal as an attempt to smother the remainder of the Company's case. Mr. Canning, the representative of one of the towns most interested in destroying the Company's privileges, supported the motion. It was resisted by Mr. Tierney and Mr. Ponsonby, leading members of the opposition; the former of whom insinuated a charge of unfairness against the ministry. On a division, the motion was carried, and the select committee met on the 15th, and continued to sit, notwithstanding the House adjourned for the Easter holidays.

In the mean time, the question of an arrangement with the Company had been introduced into the Upper House. On the 30th of March, the earl of Buckinghamshire, president of the Board of Commissioners, announced, that though a different course had formerly been

adopted, it had been deemed advisable, in the present instance, that the resolutions which had been laid before the Commons should also be presented to their lordships, and that a committee of the whole House should, with all the documents before it, proceed to the hearing of any evidence which might be offered. Lord Grenville having suggested a select committee as more advisable, Lord Liverpool, the premier, immediately assented, and a motion for the appointment of such committee having been made, it was carried without a division. On the 5th, the select committee of the Lords met, and proceeded to hear evidence. As in the Commons, the first witness called was Warren Hastings. His answers to the questions put to him were of extraordinary length, but added little or nothing in substance to the evidence which he had given before the Lower House. Some further evidence was heard, and on the 9th, an animated debate took place, on a motion made by the Marquis Wellesley for the production of certain papers connected with the inquiry in which the House was engaged. The noble marquis introduced the motion by a very long and elaborate speech, decidedly in favour of re-establishing the power of the Company, not only with regard to the government of India, but to the exclusive privileges of trade which they enjoyed. He supported his opinion by appealing to what the Company had done—to their banishment of foreign influence and intrigue—to the consolidation of institutions and authorities—to the amelioration of the condition of the natives, and especially to the state of tranquillity in which those countries had been placed—the Deccan, for instance, and the provinces north of Mysore—which, in all previous times, had been constantly exposed to war and devastation. This testimony was important, because it could not be but the result of cool and deliberate conviction. Personally, the marquis of Wellesley had at that time little cause for bestowing panegyric on the Company.

After Lord Buckinghamshire had spoken in defence of the conduct of ministers, Lord Grenville delivered his opinions at great length. He considered all former arrangements relating to the government and commerce of India only as experiments, and not always successful ones; at best only calculated for a limited duration, never permanent, nor even meant for permanence. He wished not to perpetuate these anomalous and imperfect arrangements, but he believed the time had not arrived when any final regulation could be safely established. Whatever was now done should be temporary, and he objected to the part of the ministerial plan which proposed that the arrangements now entered into should be for so long a period as twenty years. He regarded the claims of the East-India Company as nothing, and argued that the first duty of the British parliament was to consult the welfare of the country for which it was

called upon to legislate. Next to this object in importance was the interest of our own country, which was deeply implicated in the discussion. Taking his stand upon these principles, he considered both the plan of the Marquis Wellesley for reinvesting the Company with all their privileges, and that of ministers for divesting them of a portion, as highly questionable. He was friendly to a free trade, but he could not hope that a competition, in which the whole influence of the government, territory, and revenue of India would be arrayed against the unprotected enterprise of individual adventurers, could either deserve the name of free trade or insure its advantages.

His lordship reprobated the union of the characters of merchant and sovereign, which he alleged to be opposed to all authority and condemned by all experience. He would not admit that the improved condition of India was to be attributed to the Company, but claimed the praise for the wisdom and justice of the public councils of the state. For twenty years after the Company acquired the dewannee, India, he said, was so constantly ill-governed as to compel the forcible interposition of Parliament; and good government commenced only in the year 1784, when the power of controlling the Company was vested in commissioners appointed by the Crown. It is observable, that this was the precise period at which Lord Grenville and the party with which he then acted commenced a long official career.

His lordship proceeded to say, that he was for transferring the government to the Crown altogether. He thought that arrangements might easily be made with regard to the patronage, by which all danger of unduly increasing the influence of ministers might be avoided; but he did not state that he had not thought so in 1784, when he opposed and, with his colleagues, succeeded in throwing out the far-famed India Bill of the Coalition ministry, because it deprived the Company of its patronage. The plan of which his lordship was the advocate went to put up the civil appointments for competition among certain public schools, and to appropriate the military appointments to the sons of deceased officers. Lord Grenville, adverting to the China trade, condemned the intention of ministers to continue the monopoly to the Company. He apprehended that when the India trade was thrown open it would be, in fact, impracticable to preserve the Chinese monopoly, as the productions of China would be brought down in country vessels to any of the ports of the Eastern Archipelago that our merchants might choose.

Lord Grenville made some observations on minor topics connected with the renewal of the charter, and the debate was closed by Lord Liverpool, who briefly defended the line taken by ministers. The motion for papers not being resisted was, of course, carried without a

division; and it seems, indeed, only to have been made for the purpose of enabling the Peers to deliver their opinions on the principal question.

The speech of Lord Grenville was, undoubtedly, the most remarkable that was made. The sweeping doctrines which he avowed were, perhaps, at that time, little to be expected from any member of the House of Peers; but, of all men, they were least to be expected from the noble baron who gave them the weight of his authority. Lord Grenville had been long on the political stage, and his conduct on this occasion must alike have astonished his friends and his foes. His political course had hitherto been guided by expediency, not by abstract principle. No one had ever suspected him of being a theorist, and the robe of the philosopher was assumed too late in life to be worn with either ease or grace. It was an incongruous covering for a man who had become grey in habits of official intrigue, and whose political life and liberal doctrines were bitter satires on each other.

Independently of his general character, there were some particular incidents in Lord Grenville's career which certainly did not lend any weight to his advocacy of the destruction of the East-India Company. He had, as has already been mentioned, been one of the most active and zealous of that party which, with Mr. Pitt at their head, had succeeded, in 1784, in displacing the Coalition ministry, solely on the ground of their contemplated violation of the chartered rights of the East-India Company. Some years afterwards he had, as a cabinet minister, given his consent to an act which continued to the Company that monopoly and that power which he now professed to regard as so dangerous. It was unfortunate that political philosophy should have deferred her visit to this statesman until a period when both his mind and body were enfeebled by age, and his moral vision clouded by those feelings which must attend a man who, after passing a long life in office, finds himself doomed to linger out his declining years in the cold atmosphere of the opposition benches.

In the House of Commons, the select committee continued the examination of witnesses which had been commenced in the committee of the whole house. This labour lasted much longer than had been expected; but, having been at length concluded, the Commons, on the 31st of May, once more resolved themselves into a committee of the whole house, in which Lord Castlereagh proceeded to submit an amended series of resolutions. The first, declaring that the privileges of the East-India Company should continue for a limited period, with the exception of such as might be subsequently modified or repealed, having been moved, Mr. Bruce, historiographer of the Company, entered into a long and laboured review of its progress from its incorporation by Elizabeth, and condemned any deviation from the existing system as replete with danger

He was followed, on the same side, by a far more brilliant speaker—Mr. Charles Grant, junior, afterwards created Lord Glenelg. That gentleman glanced at the speech of Lord Grenville in the Upper House, and argued that the improvement, which was admitted on all hands to have taken place in India, was attributable to the Company. He denied that the year 1784 constituted the epoch of the commencement of a new order of things. The foundations of improvement were laid earlier; and it was not until much had been done that the legislature interfered. The king's government had, indeed, subsequently co-operated with the Company; but it did not follow, that, because certain results were produced by the operation of a complex system, the same results would follow if one part of the system were removed. Mr. Grant's opinion of Lord Grenville's plan for the distribution of the patronage of India was delivered with much freedom. He viewed it as altogether inefficient; and contended that, if adopted, it would ultimately be the means of effecting that which it professed to guard against, by placing the patronage at the disposal of the minister of the Crown. He maintained, that the efficiency of the existing system for the government of India consisted, in a great degree, in its publicity—every man engaged in it acted on a conspicuous theatre. He could hardly hope that the rules of the service would survive the existence of the Company; and if they did, their vigour and efficiency might be entirely superseded. He objected, further, to the suggested plan of patronage, on the ground of its exclusiveness; and thought it remarkable that a plan professing to proceed upon hostility to all exclusion, should in itself involve a system of exclusion the most cruel and unjust. To confine the civil services of India to the highest classes of the public schools, and the military service to the sons of officers who had fallen in battle, was cutting off the larger portion of the British community from a wide and honourable field of exertion.

Proceeding to the question of the union of the political and commercial functions, Mr. Grant said, the objection to the union rested upon the authority of a great master of political economy, Adam Smith. But it was curious to observe how the charge had shifted its ground since it was first made. Dr. Smith objected to the union, because he thought the interests of the Company, as merchants, would interfere with their duty as sovereigns; his disciples took precisely the opposite ground. The merits of the Company, as rulers, were admitted; but it was alleged that they sacrificed their interests, as merchants, to their duties, as sovereigns. After all, the charge rested upon assumption. It pronounced the junction of the sovereign and mercantile capacities to be ruinous; but the only instance upon record of such a junction was that of the East-India Company, and it seemed like begging the question to begin with laying down a

theory, and then to reason from this theory, and pronounce *a priori* upon the only fact in history to which it could be applied. To argue that such a mixture of functions must upon theory be bad—that the system of the East-India Company is an example of such a mixture, and therefore is a pernicious system—such a mode of arguing was assuming the very point to be ascertained. "Political science," said Mr. Grant, "depends upon an induction of facts. In no case, therefore, can it be allowed to close the series of experiments, and to declare definitively that for the future no practical results whatever shall shake an established doctrine. Least of all is this allowable when the doctrine can by possibility refer only to a single fact, and when that single fact is at war with the doctrine."

The expectation of a great increase of commerce, flowing from an unrestrained intercourse with India, Mr. Grant considered a delusion—a delusion, however, which the evidence that had been heard ought to be sufficient to dissipate. The manufacturers had been duped by misrepresentations which had been industriously circulated among them, in some degree, he believed, from ignorance, but in some degree also, he feared, from motives less excusable. To the happiness of the people of India Mr. Grant apprehended great danger from the influx of Europeans. With the solitary exception of Asia, British adventure had not been favourable to the happiness of the countries visited. He appealed to our intercourse with the native tribes of North America, and especially to the effects of free trade in Africa. In speaking to this part of the subject, Mr. Grant expressed himself with great severity respecting those who, having participated largely in the slave trade as long as it existed, were now the advocates of free trade in India. These remarks were especially directed against Liverpool.

The peroration of Mr. Grant's speech was remarkably bold and striking. Having announced himself the advocate of the natives of India, he thus continued:—"On their behalf, in their name, I venture to intrude myself upon the House. Through me they give utterance to their prayers. It is not my voice which you hear, it is the voice of sixty millions of your fellow-creatures, abandoned to your disposal and imploring your commiseration. They conjure you by every sacred consideration to compassionate their condition; to pay due regard to *their* situation and your own; to remember what contingencies are suspended on the issue of your vote. They conjure you not to make them the objects of perilous speculation, nor to barter away their happiness for the sake of some insignificant local interests. It is a noble position in which this House is now placed. There is something irresistibly imposing in the idea, that, at so vast a distance, and across a waste of ocean, we are assembled to decide upon the fate of so many millions of human beings; that we are to them as another

Providence; that our sentence is to stamp the colour of their future years, and spread over the face of ages to come either misery or happiness. This is, indeed, a glorious destiny for this country; but it is one of overwhelming responsibility. I trust that the question will be decided, not upon party principles, not upon trust, not upon vague theories, but upon sound practical policy, and with a view to the prosperity and preservation of our Indian empire." After some remarks on the danger of a system of speculation and experiment, and the impolicy of breaking down ramparts which could never be reconstructed, Mr. Grant concluded with the following sentence:—"In maintaining the system which has been the parent of so many blessings to India, we shall find our recompense in the gratitude of the people; and if that recompense should be denied us, yet, when we look on the moral cultivation and progressive felicity of those regions, and when we reflect that these are the fruits of our wise and disinterested policy, we shall enjoy a triumph still more glorious and elevated, a delight infinitely surpassing the golden dreams of commercial profit, or the wildest elysium ever struck out by the ravings of distempered avarice." Such were the views of free trade, of experimental legislation, and of the interests of India, then avowed by this eloquent champion of the East-India Company.

On the 2nd of June the matter was again resumed in committee. The third resolution was in favour of free trade to India, subject to certain regulations. This provoked a discussion, in which various members took part; among them Mr. Tierney, some of whose observations evinced a perfect acquaintance with the objects of those seeking the abolition of the Company's privileges. He had not heard, he said, that the persons who talked so much of the happiness of India had ever proposed to allow its manufactures to be freely imported into this country. The general principle was to be, that England was to force all her manufactures upon India, and not to take a single manufacture of India in return. It was true, they would allow cotton to be brought; but then, having found out that they could weave, by means of machinery, cheaper than the people of India, they would say, "Leave off weaving—supply us with the raw material, and we will weave for you." This might be a very natural principle for merchants and manufacturers to go upon; but it was rather too much to talk of the philosophy of it, or to rank the supporters of it as in a peculiar degree the friends of India. If, instead of calling themselves the friends of India, they had professed themselves its enemies, what more could they do than advise the destruction of all Indian manufactures? It appeared that these alterations had been proposed for no other purpose but to appease the clamour of the merchants; and no man could point out anything like the good of India as being the object of any of the resolutions.

On the following day the proceedings in committee were continued, and the speakers were numerous; but the arguments were for the most part the same that had been previously urged. The House then resumed, and the chairman reported the resolutions. On the 11th of June they were taken into consideration. On this occasion Sir John Newport recommended delay, for the purpose of framing a more comprehensive measure of freedom, and he therefore moved that the consideration of the report be postponed to that day three months. The amendment was lost by a majority of above eight to one, and the report was ordered to be again taken into consideration on the 14th. On that day a declaratory resolution, asserting the sovereignty of the Crown, and affirming that the first duty of Parliament in legislating for India was to promote its happiness, was proposed and lost. The next point of discussion was raised with regard to the term for which the arrangement with the Company should be renewed. Lord Castlereagh proposed twenty years; Mr. Ponsonby moved, as an amendment, that the term should be only ten. Two divisions followed—one on the amendment, and a second on the original resolution, which gave a vast majority in favour of the longer term. Another amendment was proposed, limiting the China monopoly to ten years; on this also a division took place, when it was lost. On the 16th, the House having again resumed the committee, Mr. Baring moved an amendment, confining the return of vessels from India to the port of London for a limited period. This motion was warmly opposed by the members for the outports. It was supported by Mr. Grant and Sir William Curtis. Mr. Astell, in taking the same side, remarked with much acuteness, that, however those who opposed the Company might exclaim against monopoly, the question was only as to the extent to which monopoly should be carried. The plan supported by ministers recognized the principle of monopoly, as the trade was to be thrown open only to a few favoured ports. On a division, the amendment shared the fate of previous ones, being lost by a large majority. Another amendment, moved by Sir John Newport, to the effect that the outports to be hereafter admitted to the privileges of the trade should be determined by Parliament, was negatived without a division. Lord Castlereagh then proposed that, with respect to places not immediately within the Company's charter, applications should be made for licenses only to the Board of Control, who might consult the Court of Directors if they thought proper. This motion, after some discussion and a division, was carried. An amendment proposed by Mr. Baring, taking from the Board of Control the power of obliging the Company to grant licenses to persons going to India, was negatived without a division; and, after a desultory conversation, the whole of the resolutions were agreed to, except one, asserting the

duty of this country to extend to India useful knowledge, and moral and religious improvement, and recommending facilities to be given to persons desirous of going to or remaining in India for the purpose of accomplishing such objects. This it was determined to postpone, and transmit the other resolutions to the Lords.

On the 18th of June some conversation took place on the resolutions; and on the 21st their lordships went into committee on them. They were agreed to almost unanimously; the earl of Lauderdale alone saying "not content" to the first, and stating generally that he objected to them all, but declined at that time discussing them. On the motion that the report should be received on the following day, the marquis of Lansdowne moved that it be received that day three months. The amendment gave rise to some debate. Lord Melville supported the views of ministers. The earl of Lauderdale made a violent speech on the other side. He condemned the conduct of the Court of Directors in the severest terms, and declared them unfit for the civil and military control of India. He alleged, that to say that the Court of Directors afforded the best form of government for India was to give the lie to all experience. If the position were just, the British constitution of King, Lords, and Commons ought to give way to a similarly constituted body; for if twenty-four directors residing in England formed the best government for India, twenty-four directors residing in India would be the best government for Great Britain. This position of the noble lord's it is, perhaps, unnecessary to discuss; but it is remarkable that Lord Lauderdale was, a few years earlier, very desirous of becoming the instrument through which the twenty-four directors, whom he now denounced, were to exercise the powers of government. Lord Grenville repeated some of his former arguments as reasons for delay; and two or three of the ministerial peers having spoken on the opposite side, the amendment was lost on a division, by a majority of thirty-five. The bringing up the report, on the following day, gave rise to scarcely any observation.

On the 22nd of June an important discussion took place in the Commons on the resolution which had been postponed. Lord Castlereagh delivered a guarded speech in favour of a regulated toleration of missionary exertions. Sir Henry Montgomery opposed it. He was answered by Mr. Wilberforce, in a speech which was throughout able, eloquent, and convincing. It must be hoped that a large portion of it would, in the present day, be unnecessary. The resolution was carried.

On the 28th of June the House resolved itself into a committee upon the bill. An extended discussion took place, but little additional light was thrown upon the various questions. Finally, the report was received,

and ordered to be taken into further consideration on the 1st of July. On that day various amendments were proposed and lost. Among them was one against the clause respecting the propagation of Christianity in India. Mr. Marsh made a violent speech against the missionaries, and was answered by Mr. Wilberforce. On the following day the committee was resumed, and some discussion took place, but proceeded languidly. A motion for an establishment of the Scottish church in India was lost. On the 12th the report was brought up, when Mr. Howarth opposed its reception in a speech of much power. In the course of it he said:—"The monopoly of the Company was originally granted them for the public benefit, and it is but fair to ask whether it has produced it. Through all the varied vicissitudes of two centuries, they were, undoubtedly, monopolists; nobody was found to claim a participation with them in the drenchings at Amboyna; they were left in undisturbed possession of the Black Hole in Calcutta; they had the exclusive privilege of fighting, single-handed, against all the powers of Europe who had got a footing on the peninsula of India. But now that they have, with a valour almost unexampled, driven every hostile European from the continent of India; now that they have acquired an extent of territory of nearly four thousand square miles; brought under the government and control of this country a population of sixty millions; realized a revenue of sixteen millions; raised an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men; erected fortresses; established factories; swept the Indian seas of every hostile flag, and possessed themselves of a sea-coast of three thousand miles in extent, with all the facilities of commerce; now it is that the liberality of the British merchant claims an unqualified participation of a free trade to India; now the wisdom of the legislature interferes, to render inefficient that instrument by which these acquisitions have been attained; and its equity is now about to refuse to secure even the dividends of that capital stock which has been sunk in the public service. Now it is discovered that twenty-four merchants are very unfit persons—not to manage the government, for that they are admitted to be eminently qualified—but to manage the commerce of their dominions."

There was certainly much truth in this; but it was of little avail to press the former services of the Company against the claims of numbers, urged on by an impetuous desire to participate in the presumed advantages of Oriental commerce, and fortified, as they now were, by the doctrines of modern political economy.

On the 13th of July the bill was read a third time in the House of Commons, and passed. In the House of Lords it passed almost *sub silentio*, it being opposed only by the earl of Lauderdale, because it did not go far enough; and the hostility of that disappointed aspirant

to the office of governor-general evaporated in an angry protest.

Thus was inserted the narrow end of the wedge which was to shatter the fabric of com-

mercial grandeur reared by the East-India Company by the labours of more than two hundred years.

CHAPTER XXIV.

LORD MOIRA APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL—DISPUTES WITH NEPAUL—MILITARY OPERATIONS—REPULSE AT KALUNGA, AND AT JYETUCK—SUCCESSSES OF COLONEL OCHTERLONY—ILL SUCCESS OF THE BRITISH FORCES—REDUCTION OF ALMORAH—ABSURD TREATY—RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES—PEACE—AFFAIRS IN JAVA AND CEYLON—DISTURBANCES AT BAREILLY.

THE person selected as the successor of the earl of Minto was the earl of Moira. This nobleman possessed considerable military reputation, in addition to which he had acquired the character of an accomplished statesman. He was a man of mature age and great experience: he moreover enjoyed the personal friendship of the prince regent, and was universally regarded as under the guidance of the best and most honourable feelings. A wise and high-minded course of policy was, therefore, expected from him, and India was esteemed fortunate in having received from Britain such a ruler. He arrived at Calcutta in October, 1814.

According to his own statement, the prospect of affairs, on Lord Moira's arrival in Calcutta, was far from gratifying. He represented the finances as in a dilapidated condition, and the military force inefficient and discontented, in consequence of the severe and unremitting duty, rendered necessary by the reductions which financial embarrassment had pressed upon the government. He found also the external relations of the country in an unsettled and precarious condition. The new governor-general succeeded to not less than six hostile discussions with different native powers, and to the necessity of devising measures for curbing the Pindarees, who had long committed the most horrible ravages with impunity. Among the more important and urgent of the disputes on hand was that with the state of Nepal, where the Goorkha tribe had, in a comparatively short period, established a very formidable power.

The origin and early history of this tribe does not fall within the province of this history: it will be sufficient to say that, for a series of years, the Goorkhas had pursued an aggressive course of policy, and with no inconsiderable success. The dissensions of the rajahs afforded ample opportunities for its prosecution, and there was no deficiency of promptitude in embracing them. In every quarrel, the Goorkha prince appeared as umpire and mediator, and these functions he invariably rendered subsidiary to the aggrandizement of the house of which he was chief. The Goorkhas thus acquired an extent of dominion and a degree of power which, combined with the disposition they had mani-

festated, rendered them dangerous neighbours to the British government, whose frontier they bordered for about eight hundred miles.

Some attempts had been made to establish relations of amity with Nepal; but the overtures for this purpose were not met, by the ruling party in that state, in the spirit which had led the British authorities to make them. A treaty was indeed concluded, but the conduct of the Nepaulese government, after a very short period, compelled the governor-general in council to declare the treaty dissolved. This occurred during the administration of the Marquis Wellesley; and, from that period, no intercourse took place between the two governments, until the encroachments of the Nepaulese compelled the British to renew it.

These encroachments were extended into almost every district of the Company's dominions which abutted on the frontier, as well as into the territories of native rulers under the protection of the British government. Among their victims was Perthee Saul Sing, the hereditary rajah of Palpa and zemindar of Bootwul. Driven from the hills, he retained possession of the zemindary, for which he engaged to pay to the British the same annual assessment he had formerly paid to the Oude government, to whom they had succeeded. He had thus become entitled to the special protection of the Company: this arrangement, however, conduced nothing to his safety; for the Goorkhas, shortly afterwards, found means to entice him to Katmandoo, where they first imprisoned, and finally put him to death. The family of the murdered rajah, despairing of preserving their remaining possessions from the grasp of the enemy, surrendered the lands to the Company, and retired into Goruokpore, where they subsisted on a provision allowed them by the British government. But this did not deter the Nepaulese sovereign from prosecuting his course of aggression. He subsequently claimed the management of Bootwul, as the representative of the rajah of Palpa: the establishment of his authority was formally proclaimed, and his pretensions were supported by the assemblage of a considerable body of troops on the frontier. The proper mode of noticing these acts would have been

by the despatch of a British force sufficient to compel the retirement of the invaders; but negotiation was preferred to arms, and the result of the preference was, that the Goorkhas succeeded in occupying two-thirds of the district of Bootwul, west of the Terraie, the revenues of which they collected and appropriated.

On the accession of Sir George Barlow to the government, he deemed it necessary to rescue the question from the oblivion into which it had fallen; but the temporizing course which he adopted was little calculated to sustain either the honour or interests of the British, in a dispute with antagonists, bold, acute, and enterprising as the Goorkhas. He required them, indeed, to evacuate Bootwul; but the demand was coupled with an offer of relinquishing, on the part of the British authorities, all claims to the sovereignty of Sheoraj. Sheoraj was included in the territory ceded by Oude to the Company, but it had previously to the cession been subjugated by the Goorkhas. This was assumed as the justification of the concession, but very unreasonably so. The right set up, on the part of Nepal, was founded in usurpation, and, though exercised for a somewhat longer period of time, was in no respect better than that which they asserted to Bootwul. The proposed surrender was, however, without effect. The Goorkha prince rejected the offer, and refused any concession beyond that of farming Bootwul as a seminary. Sir George Barlow shortly afterwards went to Madras, and, after his departure, the matter for a time rested in such perfect tranquillity as might almost warrant a suspicion that it was forgotten.

At length Lord Minto directed the magistrate of Goruckpore to report on the Nepaulese encroachments; and, soon afterwards, he addressed a letter to the rajah, requiring him to withdraw from Bootwul, and acquiesce in the re-establishment of the British authority. So far from complying, the rajah asserted his right to a further extension of territory, and alleged his respect for the British government as the cause of his forbearing to take possession of it. He proposed, however, an investigation by officers appointed by the two governments, with a view to the settlement of the differences between them. Here the negotiation again rested for a considerable period, till the rajah's respect for the British became so weakened, as to prove insufficient to restrain him any longer from the occupation of the districts on which he had previously set his desire. The Nepaulese crossed the Terraie, which had hitherto been their limit, into the districts of Palce, and at the same time extended their inroads from Sheoraj into the adjoining tuppah of Debrooah.

These new aggressions it was impossible to bear with the philosophical indifference which the British authorities had hitherto displayed with regard to the encroachments of the

Nepaulese. They were roused, not indeed to action, but to threats, qualified, as usual, by the display of a spirit of concession. It was intimated that the rajah's proposal of an inquiry by commissioners would be accepted; Colonel Bradshaw was accordingly appointed by the British government, and proceeded to Bootwul, where he was met by the Nepaulese commissioners. The appointment of a commissioner to inquire into rights which were perfectly clear cannot be regarded as either a wise or a dignified proceeding. Lord Minto, indeed, seems to have felt that to such a course of policy it was necessary to fix a limit; and although he had previously been willing to adhere to the proposal of Sir George Barlow, and sacrifice Sheoraj to gain possession of Bootwul, he determined, on the appointment of the commissioner, to insist on the restitution of both, if the right to them should be established by the investigation. It was established; and then, as might have been anticipated, the Nepaulese commissioners turned their minds to the discovery of expedients for procrastination. An offer of compromise was made, and referred by Colonel Bradshaw to the governor-general, by whom it was very properly rejected, and the rajah of Nepal was called upon to surrender that which he had clearly no right to retain. This was the state of things when the earl of Minto resigned the government to the earl of Moira.

The encroachments already related, though they may be regarded as the more important, were by no means the only acts of aggression perpetrated by the Nepaulese against the British and the chiefs under their protection. In Sarun, some serious disturbances had taken place from the same cause. A Nepaulese soubahdar, having passed the frontier, seized, plundered, and burnt some villages. At the very time when an inquiry into the transaction was pending, under the sanction of both governments, the Nepaulese took possession of the remaining villages of the tuppah; the total number seized being twenty-two. These villages had been in the possession of the British for thirty years, and the attack was made without any previous demand or notice. When Colonel Bradshaw had concluded the Bootwul investigation, he was instructed to proceed to the Sarun frontier, for the purpose of adjusting the differences existing there. This appears to have been both unnecessary and injudicious: the Nepaulese had not the shadow of right, and there was consequently nothing to discuss.

The government appears to have subsequently found itself embarrassed by the character in which it had permitted Colonel Bradshaw to proceed to the Sarun frontier. The villages had been restored, subject to the result of the investigation: with this investigation the British government declined to proceed. They would have been perfectly

justified in this had they taken the determination earlier; but, having permitted the Nepaulese diplomatists to lead them thus far, it is not easy to defend their sudden departure from a course to which the other party must have considered them pledged. It is true that the proceedings at Bootwul were not calculated to inspire the British with much confidence in the good faith of their opponents: this, it may be presumed, was the impression of the government; and Colonel Bradshaw was accordingly instructed to invite the Nepaulese commissioners to meet him, for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings already taken, and, nothing appearing to give a different complexion to the transactions, to demand a renunciation of all pretensions to the twenty-two villages, and a surrender of the lands on the Sarun frontier which were still withheld.

In pursuance of these instructions Colonel Bradshaw addressed a note to the commissioners, proposing a meeting. To this the commissioners replied by a very long letter, declaring that they would not meet Colonel Bradshaw, nor hold any communication with him, revoking the conditional transfer of the twenty-two villages, and requiring the British commissioner instantly to quit the frontier. It is to be lamented that any pretext was afforded to the Nepaulese for thus abruptly terminating the negotiations; but it is admitted that the communications of Colonel Bradshaw with the commissioners had countenanced the belief that an investigation similar to that in Bootwul was to be instituted in Sarun. It has been alleged, that Colonel Bradshaw was not authorized to give any positive assurances to that effect. A faithless government may always avail itself of this excuse to disavow the acts of its agents; and it is unfortunate when an upright and honourable one is compelled to have recourse to it. But while the position in which the British government was thus placed was somewhat embarrassing, and its decision, perhaps, rather hasty, two points are perfectly clear—that its claims were founded on substantial justice, and that the objects of the Nepaulese were only evasion and delay.

The earl of Moira now addressed a letter to the rajah of Nepal, threatening immediate resort to hostile measures, unless the rights of the British were conceded; and, not resting on idle threats, Colonel Bradshaw was instructed, in the event of refusal or evasion on the part of the rajah, to resume possession of the usurped lands. The answer of the rajah being unsatisfactory, Colonel Bradshaw proceeded to execute the orders which he had received, and the resumption of the disputed lands was effected without opposition.

A similar course was adopted with regard to Bootwul and Sheoraj. Their restitution was demanded within a given time, and on failure, the magistrate of Goruckpore was

ordered to take possession of them. The period having expired without any intimation, on the part of the Nepaulese, of a disposition to comply with the dictates of justice, the magistrate directed his police officers to advance and establish stations at certain fixed places. Being resisted by the Nepaulese officers, they retired, when a body of troops marched in, and occupied the disputed lands without impediment.

But the course of events was not to continue thus smooth. In consequence of the approach of the sickly season, it was deemed necessary to withdraw the troops from the Terraie, and their departure was the signal for the revival of aggression on the part of the Nepaulese, attended, too, by circumstances of peculiar atrocity. On the morning of the 29th of May, 1814, three of the police stations in Bootwul were attacked by a large force, the officers driven out, and eighteen of them killed. Among the slain was the tannahdar of Chilwan, who, after having surrendered himself prisoner, was murdered, in cold blood, by the Nepaulese commander. The whole of the lands at Bootwul were forthwith reoccupied by the usurping power; and Sheoraj, from the want of regular troops to defend it, was abandoned. The insalubrity of the season, which had dictated the withdrawal of the troops, precluded their return, except at great risk. The government, therefore, confined its measures to the defence of the existing frontier, and the prohibition of all commercial intercourse between the British provinces and Nepal.

The last outrage committed by the Nepaulese government might have been expected to put an end to negotiation; but the earl of Moira made one further attempt to effect a settlement of the existing differences without an appeal to the sword. A letter addressed by him to the rajah of Nepal, complaining especially of the treacherous attack upon Bootwul and the murder of the police officers, was answered by one in which no notice whatever was taken of those subjects, but which was filled with reiterations of refuted claims, groundless accusations of the agents of the British government, and menaces of hostility, if events should render it necessary. With the receipt of this letter the system of fruitless communication came to an end, the governor-general very properly suffering it to pass without reply.

War being inevitable, the earl of Moira took immediate measures for commencing it with activity and vigour; and a plan was laid down for invading the Nepaulese territory at four different points. For this purpose, four separate divisions of troops were assembled: one to act directly against the enemy's capital, by the route of Mucwanpore; a second, intended to resume the usurped lands of Bootwul and Sheoraj, and afterwards menace the province of Palpa; a third, with the design of penetrating the passes of the Deyra Dhoon,

occupying that valley and other positions in Gurhwal, and seizing the passes of the Jumna and the Ganges; and a fourth, to act against the western provinces and the western army of the Goorkhas, which was understood to be composed of the flower of their troops. The last division, which was placed under the command of Colonel Ochterlony, consisted originally of about six thousand men, with sixteen pieces of ordnance. Its strength was subsequently increased to seven thousand men, and the number of pieces of ordnance to twenty-two. Attached to this division was a body of irregular troops, which, in the course of the campaign, amounted to about four thousand five hundred men. Part of these were auxiliaries furnished by the Seikh chiefs and the expelled rajah of Hindore. In the progress of the operations a corps was also formed of deserters from the Goorkha army.

The earl of Moira proposed, in aid of his military operations, a series of political arrangements, the object of which was to engage in the British cause the chieftains of the ancient hill principalities, who had been driven out by the Goorkhas; and through them to draw over their former subjects, who were represented as retaining a strong attachment to the families of their exiled rulers, and holding their conquerors in the greatest detestation. The expediency of this plan seems to have been doubted by Colonel Ochterlony, who urged that embarrassment, inconvenience, and expense were likely to result from the restoration of the hill chieftains under the protection and guarantee of the British government, and especially pointed out the necessity which would constantly arise for its interposition to settle the differences which, it might be foreseen, would occur among them. This obligation, however, Lord Moira did not appear to contemplate as necessarily falling within the province of the protecting power, and his opinion of the military and political advantages of the plan remained unshaken. Colonel Ochterlony was, therefore, furnished with a draft of a proclamation, declaring the intention of the British government to expel the Goorkhas and restore the ancient chiefs; disclaiming all pecuniary indemnification, and requiring only a zealous and cordial co-operation against the Goorkhas, then, or at any future period when it might again be necessary. The time for issuing this proclamation was left to the discretion of Colonel Ochterlony; and that officer, having completed his preparations, proceeded to Roopoor, where he was to commence his march into the hills.

The third division, destined for Gurhwal, was placed under the command of Major-General Gillespie, who had quitted Java in consequence of disputes with the lieutenant-governor of that settlement. Its original strength, of three thousand five hundred men and fourteen pieces of ordnance, was afterwards augmented to about ten thousand five hundred men and twenty pieces of ordnance.

Attached to this division were between six and seven thousand irregulars, of various descriptions, raised by Mr. William Fraser, first assistant to the resident at Delhi, and, when embodied, placed under the command of Lieutenant Frederick Young, to whose peculiar fitness for the charge the governor-general afforded his personal testimony. To Major Stevenson was allotted the duty of obtaining intelligence and guides. The force under the command of Major-General Gillespie was assembled at Seharunpore by the middle of October, and marched towards the Dhoon shortly after. The movements of this division, as well as those of the last, were intended to be assisted by a course of negotiations, which were intrusted to Mr. Fraser, above mentioned, and the Honourable Edward Gardner.

The second division, which was destined to clear the Terraie and re-establish the British authority in the usurped lands, consisted of nearly five thousand troops, with a body of irregulars amounting to nine hundred. Twelve pieces of ordnance were originally allotted to it, but, by after-arrangements, some of them were replaced by others of superior power, and the number was increased to fifteen. This division was placed under the command of Major-General John Sullivan Wood, to whom was also committed the management of the political negotiations that were to be combined with the operations of his division. He arrived at Goruckpore on the 15th of November, the climate of the Terraie, antecedently to that period, being regarded as unfavourable to the health of the troops.

The division which was intended to advance directly against Katmandoo remains to be noticed. Of the operations of this division the highest expectations were formed, and the commander-in-chief was anxious to place it in the very highest state of efficiency. It comprehended eight thousand troops and twenty-six pieces of ordnance, which were placed under the command of Major-General Marley. The political arrangements connected with this division were intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw.

Subsidiary, in some degree, to the duties assigned to this division of the invading army, was a force placed under the command of Captain Barré Latter, designed to act principally, though not exclusively, on the defensive. To that officer was intrusted the defence of the British frontier, from the river Koosi, eastward, to Juggigobath, on the Burhampooter; and his attention was more especially called to that part comprehended between the Koosi and the Seistah, which latter river formed the eastern limit to the Nepaulese territories. The force, regular and irregular, placed at the disposal of Captain Barré Latter, amounted to about two thousand seven hundred men.

While these preparations were in progress, the Nepaulese continued to repeat those mock overtures for an amicable adjustment of the pending differences in which they had so long

persevered. Frequent communications were made to Colonel Ochterlony by Ummer Sing Thappa, who commanded the western force of the Goorkhas; but these appear to have been ascribed to motives less honourable to that officer than those which he avowed. Some information which had reached the British government induced a belief that Ummer Sing Thappa, notwithstanding his apparent attachment to the Goorkha cause, was secretly disaffected to the Nepaulese government, and might be induced to betray the army he commanded and the country he occupied into the hands of the English, in consideration of his personal interests being adequately provided for. Acting upon this information, the British government gave secret instructions to Colonel Ochterlony and to the resident at Delhi to meet with encouragement any advance which Ummer Sing Thappa might make towards effecting such a bargain.

Before the result of these instructions could be known, the governor-general's agent at Benares announced that a brahmin, who declared himself authorized by Runjore Sing Thappa, son of Ummer Sing Thappa, had proposed, on behalf of that functionary and his father, to put the British troops in possession of Nepal, on conditions, the objects of which were to confirm the rajah in the government, and secure to the negotiators certain advantages as the reward of their services. A favourable answer was returned, and Runjore Sing Thappa was recommended to put himself in communication with Colonel Bradshaw, to whom, as well as to Colonel Ochterlony, notice of the proposal, and instructions as to their own course, were forthwith transmitted. The brahmin returned to Katmandoo, avowedly to communicate to his employers the result of his mission, and not long afterwards reappeared at Benares, with another person of the same order with himself. But the new mission professed different objects from the old one. The two brahmins were the bearers of letters from the rajah and his ministers, intimating a desire to open a negotiation for peace; and the prospect of overcoming the Nepaulese by intrigue, instead of force, was in this quarter at an end.

It seems not improbable that the overture was only a piece of that tortuous policy which characterizes all the proceedings of Eastern statesmen. That policy appears, on this occasion, to have attracted the favour and excited the imitation of their rivals, who were determined, if possible, to shake the integrity of Ummer Sing Thappa. But the coyness of the Nepaulese general surprised and disappointed them, and Colonel Ochterlony was instructed to spare him the confusion of an unsolicited confession of attachment, by hinting that his advances would be entirely agreeable. The British commander accordingly took advantage of some partial successes on his own part to address a letter to Ummer Sing Thappa, intimating that he had received

the authority of the governor-general to communicate with him on any proposal that he might have to offer. But though thus assiduously wooed, the Goorkha chief was not won. His answer was a decided and somewhat scornful rejection of the suit. This, however, did not prevent its renewal. Fresh communications with Ummer Sing were subsequently opened, and kept on foot through his son, in the hope that the private interests of the minister and the general might be made the instruments of overcoming their public duty; but they ended like the former. Either the honesty of these officers was impregnable, or their expectations of the ultimate success of the British arms were not high.

The progress of events has been somewhat anticipated, in order to throw together all the incidents connected with this process of Machiavellian policy. It will now be necessary to take up the detail of the military operations. The campaign commenced by the seizure of the Tinley pass, in the Deyra Dhooon, on the 20th of October, by Lieutenant-Colonel George Carpenter, of the 17th native infantry, who had been detached for that purpose by Major-General Gillespie. The latter officer entered the Dhooon on the 24th, by the Kerree pass, and immediately marched upon Kalunga, while detachments occupied the passes and ferries of the Jumna. On the 29th, preparations were made for an attack upon Kalunga; the army under General Gillespie being formed into four columns, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter, Captain J. W. Fast, of the 17th native infantry, Major Bartlet Kelly, of the light infantry battalion, and Captain William Campbell, of the 6th native infantry, with a column of reserve under Major John Ludlow, of the 6th. At half-past three o'clock on the afternoon of the 30th, the columns under Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow marched from their encampment, without any resistance from the enemy, and took possession of the table-land, where they established themselves so as to cover the working party which was to be employed during the night in constructing batteries. The three remaining columns moved at an early hour the next morning, to be in readiness to attack simultaneously with that from the table-land; Major Kelly, on Kurulle, by the Jagherkeena road; Captain Fast, towards the stockade, by the village of Luckhound; and Captain Campbell, by the village of Ustall. Shortly after daylight the batteries opened on the fort with ten pieces of ordnance.

The signal for the columns moving to the assault was to be given from the batteries two hours previously to the moment of attack, and repeated from the camp below; but the arrangements appear to have been ill concerted; at all events they were inefficient. The signal was fired about eight o'clock, but it was not heard by Major Kelly, Captain Fast, or Captain Campbell; and, consequently, only the columns under Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow

moved. These advanced and carried the stockade thrown across the road leading to the fort; they then pushed on close under the walls, which were stockaded all round. Here their progress was stopped. The fire of the batteries had been ineffective; a small opening only was visible, and that was defended by stockades within stockades. The British force was consequently obliged to retire, after sustaining a frightful loss in officers and men.

Soon after the columns moved, three additional companies had been ordered from the camp; but, by the time they arrived on the table-land, the columns in advance had been forced to fall back. An attack by so small a force had obviously little chance of success; but General Gillespie was, no doubt, apprehensive of the unhappy effects likely to follow a repulse at so early a period of the war, and this, in addition to the impulses of his personal bravery, probably induced him to head an assault made by this little band, assisted by two six-pounders. The assault was made and failed; a second met with no better success; a third was still more unfortunate in its results, for, when within thirty yards of the gateway, the gallant general was mortally wounded while in the act of cheering on his men. Thus terminated the proceedings of this ill-fated day, with the loss of an officer who had rendered good service to his country in the East, and whose career had been marked by a courage which deserves the epithet of heroic. The memory of General Gillespie received from the public authorities the honours which it so well deserved.

Kalunga was yet to be the scene of fresh misfortune and discomfiture to the British force. The failure of the former attack had suggested the necessity of procuring a battering-train. It arrived, and was forthwith brought into operation. At one o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th of November, the breach was reported to be completely practicable, and the command having, by the death of General Gillespie, devolved on Colonel Sebright Mawbey, of his Majesty's 53rd foot, that officer ordered a storming party to advance. But this renewed attempt to gain possession of the fort was not more fortunate than the preceding one. The enemy defended the place with desperate valour, and, after a contest of two hours, Colonel Mawbey withdrew his troops with severe loss. The storming party had succeeded in gaining the top of the breach, when a momentary hesitation proved fatal to them, and a large proportion was swept away. The failure was ascribed by Colonel Mawbey partly to the bold resistance of the enemy, who, in spite of repeated discharges from all the guns, mortars, and howitzers of the battery covering the advance, persisted in manning the breach and bidding defiance to the assailants; and partly to the difficulties of the service which the British troops were called upon to perform. The descent from the top of the breach is represented as having been so

deep and rapid that the most daring of the assailants would not venture to leap down; and it is added, that, had they done so, the attempt would have involved the certain destruction of those who made it, from a number of pointed stakes and bamboos which had been placed at the bottom, and which it would have been impossible to avoid. Such was the representation of the officer in command. But the explanation was by no means satisfactory to the earl of Moira, who expressed some discontent and surprise at this second failure to carry a place (to use his own words) "certainly of no great strength or extent, destitute of a ditch, and defended by a garrison whose only means of resistance consisted in their personal gallantry." While some weight must be allowed to the circumstances enumerated by Lord Moira, candour must attribute a portion of his implied censure to the feeling of disappointment at the repeated reverses which thus marked the commencement of a campaign on the plan of which he had bestowed so much thought, and in the success of which his own reputation was essentially committed.

But the repeated assaults upon Kalunga, though unsuccessful when made, were not without effect. Though retaining possession of the fort, the garrison had suffered dreadfully from the fire of the British artillery; and, greatly reduced in numbers, deprived of their officers, in want of provisions and water, and in danger of pestilence from the accumulation of the dead, they, on the morning of the 30th of November, evacuated the place, which was immediately taken possession of by Colonel Mawbey. The scene within the fort was of the most appalling description, and bore ample testimony to the desperate spirit which had animated its defenders. Their fortune without the walls was not happier than it had been within, their flight being intercepted by detachments of the British force, and the greater part of the fugitives either killed, wounded, or made prisoners. In this service Major Ludlow greatly distinguished himself, especially by attacking and dislodging from a very advantageous position a force composed of the few followers who had accompanied the killadar, Bulbudder Sing, in his escape, strengthened by a body of about three hundred Ghoorkas who had been despatched to reinforce the garrison of Kalunga, but had vainly hovered about the hills, waiting an opportunity to enter the place. The fort was ordered to be destroyed.

The fall of Kalunga was followed by some other advantages, which, though trifling in themselves, were necessary to the success of the general plan of operations. A strongly stockaded position which the enemy occupied on the heights above the town of Calaisie was abandoned after a feeble resistance; and the strong fort of Baraut, situated in the mountains forming the north-eastern boundary of the valley of Deyra, was evacuated by the garrison and forthwith occupied by the British.

The precipitate abandonment of this place was occasioned by the defection of the chief zemindars and inhabitants, whose zeal for the British cause appears, however, to have been stimulated by the promise of a native officer, that their services should be requited by a small gratuity. In addition to these acquisitions, the post of Luckergaut, on the Ganges, where it forms the eastern limit of the Dhoon, was in the possession of a British detachment; thus completing the occupation of the valley and of the principal passes leading to it. But Gurhwal, to the east of the Bageruttee, still remained in the possession of the enemy; and this tract included several strong and commanding positions.

A force deemed sufficient for the occupation of the Dhoon having been left under the command of Colonel Carpenter, the rest of the division marched for Nahun; and, during its progress, the command was assumed by Major-General Martindell, who had been appointed to succeed General Gillespie. Nahun fell without an effort, the enemy abandoning it on the approach of the invading force, and withdrawing to Jyetuck, a fort erected on the summit of a mountain of great elevation, bearing the same name. Upon this point a force was concentrated, amounting to about two thousand two hundred men, commanded by Runjore Sing.

The operations for the reduction of Jyetuck were multiform and long-protracted, and their commencement was marked by misfortune and defeat. With the double view of dispossessing the enemy of a strong position and cutting off the supply of water, a combined attack was planned upon a stockade, about a mile west of the fort, and on the morning of the 27th of December was put into execution. One column, a thousand strong, was commanded by Major Ludlow, who was directed to proceed to the left of the fort of Jumpta, while Major William Richards, with another column comprising about seven hundred men, was to make a détour to the right, and take up a position on the other side. It was calculated that both columns would reach the respective points of attack before daybreak; but, unfortunately, Major Ludlow did not arrive till long after. He was of course perceived, and the anticipated advantage was lost. Notwithstanding this unfavourable circumstance, the first encounter was encouraging to the hopes of the assailants, the enemy being driven from his advanced position, and compelled to retire into his stockade. But here the tide of success turned. A gallant, but, under the circumstances, an inconsiderate and imprudent charge, made by a part of the king's 58rd, in opposition to the judgment of the commander, was repulsed, and the assailants were driven back in confusion. The ground, thus rashly lost, might, perhaps, yet have been recovered, had the rest of the detachment performed its duty; but the native infantry appeared panic-struck, and all efforts to form them proved

ineffectual. The column under Major Richards displayed a better spirit and met with better fortune. They carried the position which they had been despatched to occupy, and maintained it against repeated and vigorous assaults of the enemy, who, after Major Ludlow's defeat, were enabled to turn their whole force against them.

Their mode of attack was peculiarly harassing: intrenching themselves behind jutting points of rock and other situations affording shelter, they kept up an irregular fire, charging occasionally and then retiring to their coverts. From the nature of the ground, it was almost impossible to dislodge them from their retreats, and the British troops were, therefore, compelled to sustain their attacks without the advantage of shelter enjoyed by their opponents; they, however, nobly maintained their post through the whole day, and with but small loss, until they were withdrawn from their arduous duty by orders from General Martindell to return to camp. These orders did not arrive until the whole of the ammunition was expended, and the troops had been compelled to employ stones in their defence. The retreat was far more disastrous than the conflict. It was effected under cover of a very gallant charge made by Lieutenant Thackeray, with the light company of the 2nd battalion of the 26th native infantry, in which that officer and nearly his whole company fell. The sacrifice of these brave men probably saved the entire detachment from destruction. Still a retreat by night through a country beset by difficulties, and in the possession of an enemy, active by nature and habit, and elated by success, was not to be effected without confusion and serious loss.

The unfortunate result of this attack seems to have been produced by the operation of various errors on the part of the British, all combining to insure the success of the enemy. The delay, which deprived Major Ludlow's division of the advantage of approaching the enemy under cover of darkness, and the unfortunate impetuosity of a part of the troops, have been already mentioned. In addition, Major Ludlow was embarrassed by the non-arrival of his artillery. He was instructed, on attaining the summit of the hill, to fire shot and shells into the stockade, and, having succeeded in driving the enemy out, to make a lodgment there; but he was unprovided with the means of acting upon these instructions, the guns having been left much in the rear; and it appears that neither they nor the spare ammunition were ready to move at the appointed hour. Of this circumstance General Martindell was not apprized, and he subsequently alleged that the knowledge of it would have led him to countermand the march of the troops. It seems extraordinary that no report of so serious an impediment to the success of his plan should have reached him, and there must undoubtedly have been neglect somewhere.

The continued ill-success of the operations of this division was a source of great disappointment to the governor-general, and he regarded the conduct of the officer in command with much dissatisfaction. Approving the project of seizing two points, each important to the conduct of a siege, he condemned the withdrawal of Major Richards, who had succeeded, for no better reason than because the attack under Major Ludlow had failed. He argued that the unfavourable issue of the enterprise in the one quarter furnished additional cause for improving our success in the other; and that the despatch of a reinforcement, with due supplies of provisions and ammunition, would have been a far more judicious proceeding than that which was adopted, of ordering the detachment to retreat, without knowing the extent of peril to which such an operation might expose it. The opinion of the governor-general appears sound; but General Martindell must not be blamed with too great severity, for his situation was far from being easy or enviable. The necessity of caution had been impressed upon him from the highest quarter, and the commander-in-chief had expressed an especial desire, upon the general assuming the command, that, while the spirit of the troops was depressed by their recent misfortunes, an assault upon Nahun should be avoided, and more patient measures adopted for its reduction. Nahun fell into our hands without an effort; as far, therefore, as that place was concerned, the advice was not needed, and the different circumstances of Jyestuck rendered it there in a great degree inapplicable. This was felt by Major-General Martindell, and he consequently resorted to a more daring course than that which had been prescribed to him at Nahun. The partial failure of his attempt led him, somewhat too hastily, to despair of it altogether, and to abandon the success which was within his grasp. The fatal consequences which before Kalunga had resulted from indiscreet daring probably occurred to his mind, and led him into the opposite extreme of overmuch caution. This effect would be aided by the instructions which he had received, and the consequent apprehension that unsuccessful enterprise would be regarded as a violation of them. It is possible also that, looking at the unhappy and unexpected failure of a part of the native troops in Major Ludlow's division, he might have been apprehensive of similar occurrences in that of Major Richards. It is true that nothing of the kind took place, the whole of that division having manifested the most perfect steadiness and intrepidity; but of this General Martindell could not have been aware when he despatched the orders for retreating, nor perhaps was he very accurately informed of all the circumstances under which the failure had occurred. The orders were certainly injudicious; but sufficient allowance seems scarcely to have been made for the difficulties under which they were dictated.

It will now be proper to advert to the movements of the other divisions of the army destined for the invasion of the Nepalese territories.

That under Colonel Ochterlony penetrated the hills, in the direction of Nalagurh, within a few days after General Gillespie entered the Dhoon; and the commencement of its operations was not inauspicious. Batteries were opened against Nalagurh, and, on the 5th of November, 1814, the fort surrendered. The capture of Taragurh, a small hill-fort in the neighbourhood, followed. The two places were garrisoned by small parties of troops, and a depôt was established at Nalagurh, which thus afforded the means of an undisturbed communication with the plains.

An apprehension appears to have existed, in certain quarters, of a design, on the part of Ummer Sing, to retreat with his army to the eastward, and the necessity of precautionary measures for frustrating such an attempt was impressed upon the commanders within the field of whose operations the movement, if made, would have fallen. Colonel Ochterlony maintained that the expectation was utterly unwarranted by probability, and, further, that if Ummer Sing did retreat, as he would without a contest relinquish the country he had occupied to the protection of the British government, that alone would be an honourable issue of the war in one quarter, while his great distance from the eastern districts, compared with that of our attacking forces, rendered the chance but small of his coming in sufficient time to have much influence there. The result proved that the judgment of Colonel Ochterlony was correct; and it further attested the soundness of the opinions entertained and expressed by that officer, at a very early period after the commencement of hostilities, as to the nature and character of the war in which the British had become involved. He predicted that the Goorkhas would defend to the utmost every place which they thought defensible, and resist as long as possible in those they thought the weakest. This opinion, however, was not that which prevailed at head-quarters, where a very insufficient estimate appears to have been formed of the courage and determination of the troops by whom the British force was to be opposed. Their warlike qualities were greatly underrated, and the victory was anticipated upon terms as easy as those on which it had been attained over tribes of less hardihood and activity. The stockades of the Goorkhas had been universally regarded with contempt. Colonel Ochterlony viewed them with very different feelings. He pronounced them extremely formidable, and the experience of British troops on several occasions afforded but too convincing evidence that he was right. We learned, at length, that we were contending with an enemy who was not to be despised; but the lesson was not acquired without severe suffering and loss.

Instead of retiring on the Eastern Provinces, Ummer Sing, leaving garrisons in Irkee, Subbatoo, and other forts in the interior, concentrated his force on the heights of Ramgurb, to the number of three thousand. The ridge on which he was posted was defended by several forts of considerable strength. In the rear of it, and running in a direction nearly parallel, was another range of lofty and rugged hills, defended, like the former, by forts. Between the two ridges flowed the river Gumber, in its progress to the Sutlej. Here Ummer Sing was enabled to draw supplies from the rajah of Belaspore, a prince devotedly attached to him, who had lands on both sides of the Sutlej; and this advantage was peculiarly valuable at a time when his communication with other quarters was out off.

Colonel Ochterlony, having established his depôts in Nalagurb, advanced on the enemy, and from the heights of Golah gained a full view of his stockade. The position which Ummer Sing had taken up was of extraordinary strength. His right was covered and commanded by the fort of Ramgurb, his left by a high and nearly inaccessible hill, called Kote, on which a strong party was posted. On a first view, however, the left stockade appeared to Colonel Ochterlony to be assailable, and in the hope of being able to turn it, and take the enemy in flank, he made preparations for an attack. Better information induced him to hesitate, and it was deemed necessary to reconnoitre more particularly. This duty was committed to Lieutenant Peter Lawtie, of the Bengal Engineers, by whom it was performed with extraordinary zeal and ability; and the result was a conviction that a successful attack on the enemy's front was almost impossible, and that the attempt would involve a loss of men both certain and severe. The reports of the country people induced a belief that the hills were more accessible in the rear of the enemy, and these were confirmed by the observations of Lieutenant Lawtie; but the road, by which alone the rear could be gained, was declared impassable for the guns. This difficulty was overcome by efforts to which no warfare but that carried on by Europeans in the East can furnish a parallel. The docility of the elephant was relied upon for effecting a passage impracticable by other means, and six of these animals became the bearers of as many pieces of ordnance, while seven hundred coolies or porters were put in requisition to carry the necessary ammunition and equipments. In this manner a road characterised by Colonel Ochterlony as "indescribably bad" was successfully traversed, the wild and rugged hills passed in safety, and a descent effected into the plain in the enemy's rear.

A battery was immediately erected, and began to play at an early hour in the morning of the 26th November; but it was found to be too distant, and that the elevation of the work against which it was directed was

too great to admit of its producing any material effect. The firing was in consequence discontinued, and Lieutenant Lawtie was instructed to reconnoitre the ground, with a view to the choice of a more favourable position. While in the performance of this duty, the officer and his escort were suddenly attacked by a party of the enemy, whom, however, they drove back towards his stockade, and, pushing their advantage, took up a post within three hundred yards of the work. As soon as their situation was perceived at the battery, the whole of the men there were dispatched to their assistance; but the enemy threw out from the different stockades and from Ramgurb such numbers, that the party was compelled to relinquish the ground they had gained before the reinforcement could arrive. The affair was altogether a trifling one, but it was injurious to the British cause, by sustaining the hope of the Gorkhas and dispiriting those who were opposed to them. No blame can be attached to any party in the transaction; but it cast over the commencement of operations by this division of the army a portion of the gloom in which the unfortunate events before Kalunga had involved those intrusted to General Gillespie.

The establishment of a battery at a more advanced point was still the object to which the commander of the division directed his attention. One position only presented itself where the artillery could be used with any prospect of success; and to gain this a considerable space of ground was to be traversed by the column of attack, exposed to the fire of the enemy from the other stockades, as well as from that against which their operations were directed. On the expediency of risking this, Colonel Ochterlony consulted the field-officers with the detachment. The general impression appeared to be unfavourable, and it was observed, that it was an acknowledged principle, that all attacks of such a nature should be sustained by great superiority of numbers; whereas, in the instance under discussion, the force of the enemy far exceeded that of the whole detachment opposed to them. The intelligence of the disastrous result of the second attack upon Kalunga seems to have determined Colonel Ochterlony not to make an attempt attended by so many chances of failure; and he forthwith avowed his conviction that the enemy's rear was unassailable with his present means. In fact, the force at the disposal of Colonel Ochterlony was inadequate to the purpose for which it was destined; he therefore determined to wait for reinforcements, and not to risk the efficiency and safety of the army at his disposal by precipitate and ill-judged movements. This determination could scarcely be acceptable to his superiors, but it incurred no reproach. The experience and character of Colonel Ochterlony probably averted the censure which would have been bestowed upon an officer who had numbered

fewer years, and whose reputation was less firmly established. Conscious that he did all that he ought, Colonel Ochterlony appears at the same time to have been aware that he did not attempt all that was expected from him. In a letter to the adjutant-general, dated the 2nd December, he wrote that he "did not blush to acknowledge that he felt his mind inadequate to a command requiring great powers of genius, and so novel in its nature and in all its circumstances."

It was about this period that the large irregular force in aid of Colonel Ochterlony's division was raised and embodied. The division was also strengthened by the accession of an additional battalion of native infantry and some artillery. These arrived on the 27th December; and on the evening of that day, as soon as it was dark, the reserve, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Thompson, of the 3rd native infantry, moved to attack a chosen point of the enemy, with the view of cutting off his communication with Belaspore, the principal source of his supplies. The march was one of great fatigue and difficulty; but Colonel Thompson succeeded in reaching the point of attack in the morning. The field-pieces were forthwith brought into operation against the enemy's position, and continued firing through the day, but with little effect. A very bold and spirited attack upon the British position, made on the following morning, was repulsed with great gallantry, and the enemy driven to a distance. Perceiving the purpose with which the movements of the reserve had been made, the enemy now suddenly abandoned all his positions on the left of Ramgurh, and took up a new one on the opposite side of the fort, which, by a change of his front, he still kept on his right. The object of the movement was thus defeated, yet the attempt was not unattended by beneficial consequences. The enemy was compelled to contract his limits. By the establishment of the reserve on the ridge, some advantage was secured for further operations; and what was, perhaps, of not less importance, the repulse of the enemy was calculated alike to diminish the confidence of the Goorkha troops, and to remove the despondency which repeated reverses had diffused among our own.

Disappointed in the immediate attainment of his object, Colonel Ochterlony continued to pursue it with exemplary perseverance, and a series of operations followed, distinguished alike for the judgment with which they were planned and the energy and precision with which they were executed. Their object was to compel Ummer Sing either to quit his position or to risk an engagement. A considerable body of irregulars, under Lieutenant Ross, was despatched by a circuitous route to take up a position on the heights above Belaspore; and on the 16th of January, 1816, Colonel Ochterlony passed the river Gumber to a position on the road to Irkee, near the southern extremity of the Malown range of

mountains, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel George Cooper, of the 1st native infantry, with a battalion and the battering guns, at the former position at Nehr, strongly stockaded. It had been anticipated that this movement would cause Ummer Sing to quit his position and move in a direction to cover his supplies, and the result corresponded with the expectation. Ummer Sing marched to Malown, leaving small garrisons in Ramgurh and the other forts in that range. The principal stockades evacuated by the enemy were immediately occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel John Arnold, of the 19th native infantry, who was ordered, after performing this duty, to follow the march of the enemy, and take up a position in the vicinity of Belaspore. This was not effected without some delay and considerable difficulty, occasioned by the inclemency of the weather and the mountainous nature of the country. It was, however, at length successfully accomplished. Colonel Arnold took up a very advantageous position at Ruttengurh, directly between Malown and Belaspore, and commanding the principal line of communication. The irregulars, under Lieutenant Ross, had previously gained possession of the heights above Belaspore, after defeating a considerable body of Kuhlora troops, who attempted to maintain them. These movements being completed, Colonel Ochterlony, with the reserve, took up a position on the right bank of the Gumrora, which at once afforded means for watching the movements of the enemy and facilities for cutting off his communications.

The progress of the British arms in this quarter was now steady and satisfactory. On the 11th of February the heights of Ramgurh were taken possession of without opposition. The surrender of the fort of Ramgurh followed, after a resistance rendered brief by the opening upon the place of some eighteen-pounders, which had been carried up to the ridge with almost incredible labour. The garrison of Jhoo-jooroo surrendered to a detachment of irregulars. Taragurh was evacuated by the enemy on the 11th of March. The fort of Chumbull subsequently surrendered, and the garrison were made prisoners of war. These services were performed by Colonel Cooper and the force left at Nehr. They occupied a period of about six weeks of unremitting exertion. When completed, Ramgurh was converted into a principal dépôt, and Colonel Cooper's detachment became at liberty to aid in investing the enemy's position.

In the mean time a negotiation had been opened with the rajah of Belaspore, whose territory had been left entirely at our mercy by the retirement of Ummer Sing, which ended in the transfer of the rajah's allegiance from the Goorkha to the British government; and on this condition his possessions on the left bank of the Satlej were guaranteed to him without tribute or pecuniary payment of any kind.

The proceedings of the division of the in-

vading army under General Wood now require to be noticed. Its march was, in the first instance, retarded by the want of means for transporting the stores and supplies. This difficulty was removed by obtaining bearers from Lucknow, as well as a number of elephants furnished by the nabob vizier; but, in consequence of the delay thus occasioned, General Wood was not prepared to move till the middle of December. He at length advanced, and occupied the Terraie; but his operations were still impeded by delays in the commissariat department. As the obstacles arising from this cause were removed, the hesitation of the general in the choice of a route interposed fresh ones. His information as to the country, the force of the enemy, and every other point by which his determination was to be influenced, appears to have been miserably defective; and, harassed by a multiplicity of discordant reports, the movements of this division were, from the first, characterized by feebleness and indecision.

The first intention appears to have been to leave Bootwul on the right, and attack Nyacote, a fort situated on the hills to the west of the town. Various plans of operation were in succession adopted and abandoned. At last, the general was led by the advice of a brahmin, named Knuckunuddee Sewaree, into a course singularly imprudent and unfortunate. This man was a native of the hills, but for many years resident in Goruckpore, attached to the rajah. Having obtained the confidence of General Wood, he proceeded to insist upon the difficulties presented by the Mahapore hills, which it had been proposed to pass, and suggested that the detachment should cross the Tenavee, occupy Bussuntpore, about ten miles from Simla, and leaving there the supplies and baggage, push on to Palpa, where an abundance of provisions might be secured, and from whence Nyacote might be attacked on the side where the well that supplied the garrison was situated; but, preparatory to this movement, he recommended that a redoubt at Jeetgurb, which had been thrown up across the foot of the hill of Mujoote, one mile west of Bootwul, should be carried, and the deserted town of Bootwul burnt. The success of this scheme was represented as certain, and the advantages of possessing the fort to be first attacked, as of the highest importance. The brahmin professed to be well acquainted with the country: in recommending the proposed plan of operations, he felt, or counterfeited, the greatest enthusiasm—a feeling which he succeeded in communicating to the general, who, at once captivated by its apparent practicability and advantage, resolved to carry it into effect without delay.

The morning of January the 3rd was fixed for the attack upon Jeetgurb, in front of which, according to the brahmin's report, was an open plain. The morning came, and the movement to attack took place. Between the British camp and the redoubt lay the Sal

forest; but, instead of debouching upon an open plain, as was expected, General Wood, with his staff and the foremost of the advanced guard, on approaching to reconnoitre, found themselves, greatly to their astonishment, within fifty paces of the work. A heavy fire was immediately commenced from the redoubt, which for some time could be returned only by the few men who had accompanied the general and his staff. On the arrival of the troops forming the head of the column, they advanced, under Colonel Hardyman, to attack the work, while a party led by Captain Croker, of his Majesty's 17th foot, driving the enemy before them up a hill on the right of the redoubt, succeeded in gaining its summit. The post seemed now in the power of the British troops; but, deterred by the apparent force of the enemy on the hill behind it, the possession of which was necessary to the retention of Jeetgurb, General Wood refrained from pushing his advantage, and ordered a retreat. Considerable loss was sustained on both sides, but that of the enemy was the more severe. The brahmin who was the cause of the mischief disappeared as soon as the fort was in sight. General Wood closed his despatch, giving an account of this affair, by observing with great *naïveté* of his deceitful guide, "If he is with the enemy, I can have no doubt of his treachery:" a conclusion from which few will be found to dissent.

The proceedings before Jeetgurb seem to have been marked throughout by no considerable degree of levity,—to have been undertaken and abandoned alike inconsiderately. The information upon which the general acted was not merely imperfect, but false, and it is strange that no attempt was made to test the correctness of the brahmin's report before advancing. Undertaken, as circumstances showed, in perfect ignorance of the ground, the attack was yet, to a certain extent, successful, and it was the apprehensions alone of the commander that kept the fort out of his hands. But his astonishment and distrust at finding the height covered with troops was a clear indication that he was not better informed as to the force of the enemy than he had been as to the nature of their position. He advanced upon the foe, ignorant whether he was going—this was a great error; but his good fortune saved him from its probable consequence, and he was on the point of achieving the very object so imprudently sought. He then first began to doubt his power of retaining that for which he had incurred such risk, and, deterred by circumstances which he ought previously to have known and weighed, he retired, consigning the men under his command to the dispiriting consequences of defeat, after paying, in killed and wounded, the price of victory. Measures more ill-judged and dangerous have rarely occurred in any course of warfare.

Little more was attempted by this division, and nothing important effected. After dis-

posing of his wounded, and making some provision for the defence of the eastern part of the district, General Wood proceeded in a westerly direction, with the view of effecting one of the objects assigned to his division, that of creating a diversion of the enemy's force, as well as with the intention of penetrating, if possible, into the hills, by the passes of Toolsepoore. But his progress was arrested by the movements of the enemy, who, encouraged by the failure at Jeetgurb, and being, it was alleged, reinforced from Katmandoo, advanced into the country, burning the villages and committing horrible devastations in their route. On the 24th of January General Wood, in communicating these facts, avowed his utter inability, with the small force at his disposal, to carry on any offensive operations, and solicited instructions for his guidance. The answer, dated the 30th of the same month, attributes the embarrassed situation of General Wood to the delays which occurred in the advance of his detachment, and to his having pursued a system purely defensive. The impracticability of furnishing precise instructions for the guidance of an officer holding a distant command, under circumstances liable to daily change, was pointed out; but some suggestions were offered, and a more active system of operation strongly urged.

Towards the close of the season General Wood again marched upon Bootwul, but without producing any effect. The approach of the rainy season now indicated the necessity of suspending all offensive operations, and General Wood retired towards Goruckpoore, and proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for the defence of the frontier. These measures were in accordance with the views entertained at head-quarters; but the division being attacked by sickness to an alarming extent (twelve hundred men being at one time in the hospital), it became expedient to break up before the final orders for that purpose arrived. The division separated without attaining a single object for which it had been brought together, and the corps not destined to the defence of the frontier returned to their ordinary cantonments.

Previously to this it was deemed necessary to incapacitate the Terraie of Bootwul and Shiraz from furnishing supplies to the enemy in a future campaign, by destroying the crops on the ground, and preventing the cultivation of the country for the following season. Lord Moira declared that he adopted this policy with reluctance; and it is but justice to add, that nothing was neglected that could soften such an infliction. The inhabitants were not abandoned to famine: they were invited to remove to a more southern tract, where lands were assigned to those who accepted the offer.

The operations of the division of the army destined to march through Muckwanpoore, direct upon the Nepaulese capital, yet remain to be noticed. It was that upon which the

governor-general had fixed his strongest hopes, and on the equipment of which the greatest care and expense had been bestowed. The corps had assembled at Dinapore, and had crossed the Ganges before the end of November. Six companies had previously been despatched, under Major Edward Roughsedge, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw. The former officer moved forward with his detachment to occupy the Terraie of Tirhoot, while the latter proceeded, with the troops under his immediate command, to attack a position at Burhurwa, occupied by Pursaram Thappa, the Nepaulese soobahdar of the Terraie, with about four hundred men. This enterprise was successfully executed. The enemy was taken by surprise, and, after a short conflict, put to the rout. Being cut off from a retreat to the north, the fugitives fled southward to Kurrurbauna Gurhee, three miles from the scene of attack. Being pursued to that place, they abandoned it, and were chased across the Baugmutty, where many were drowned, and those who escaped death threw down their arms. Two standards fell into the hands of the victors, and Pursaram Thappa himself was killed in a personal encounter with Lieutenant Boileau, of the native infantry. This brilliant affair, which took place on the 25th of November, secured the immediate possession of the Terraie of Sarun. About the same time Major Roughsedge, commanding the Rangurh local battalion, occupied the Terraie of Tirhoot without opposition, the enemy withdrawing as he advanced.

General Marley, who had been appointed to the command of the division, did not arrive on the frontier until the 11th of December, and by this delay the opportunity of depressing the spirits of the enemy and sustaining those of his own troops, by immediately and vigorously following up the success of Colonel Bradshaw, was lost. This loss was not repaired by any subsequent activity. General Marley deemed it necessary to wait for a battering-train, which could not arrive for a considerable time; and this postponement of all offensive operations on the part of the British seems to have emboldened the Goorkhas, and led to the assumption by them of the course which their adversaries declined. The torpor of this division of the British force was, on the 1st of January, very inauspiciously disturbed by a simultaneous attack on two of their advanced posts situated at Pursah and Summundpoore. These posts were about forty miles asunder, and about twenty-five miles from the position which General Marley had taken up at Lowtun. They had been established by Colonel Bradshaw, together with a third, at Barra Gurry, nearly equidistant from the two, but somewhat more retired. The Goorkhas were so greatly superior in numbers, that the British force was compelled, in each instance, to retire with severe loss, including that of the two commanding officers, Captains Sibley and Blackney, both of the native infantry.

The positions, however, were not yielded without hard fighting. At Pursah, Lieutenant Matheson, of the artillery, remained at his post, and continued to work a gun after every man under his command was either killed or wounded.

But, though relieved by this and other instances of individual bravery, the tendency of these events was to cast a gloom over the prospects of the campaign. They occasioned great anxiety in the highest quarters, and drew from the earl of Moira expressions of marked displeasure. The governor-general condemned the disposition of these posts; but the disposition was that of Colonel Bradshaw, not of General Marley. A charge, bearing more directly against the latter officer, was grounded on the fact that, although reports of the intended attacks had been prevalent, no effectual means had been taken to strengthen the posts against which they were directed. These reports do not, indeed, appear to have called forth all the vigilance that was to be expected; but a party of two hundred men had been despatched to Pursah, and might have arrived in time to change the fortune of the day at that post; unfortunately, they halted at a distance of several miles. It must be acknowledged, however, that they were not aware of the urgent necessity for their advance, and so little was this felt by Captain Sibley, who commanded at Pursah, that, though informed, the day before, of the approach of the party, he took no steps to hasten their movement, and did not even think it requisite to reply to the communication. These circumstances show that the feeling of security was not confined to General Marley, but extended to other officers of his division.

It was, indeed, as urged by the governor-general, an obvious and indispensable precaution, not to continue the posts advanced and exposed during a period of inactivity, which allowed the enemy ample leisure to contrive and mature plans of attack. General Marley was persuaded that he was not in a condition to advance with safety, and in this belief a concentration of his force would undoubtedly have been more judicious than the continuance of the arrangement adopted by his predecessor. But he was placed in circumstances where a man must possess extraordinary firmness to act resolutely upon his own convictions. He knew that he was expected to advance, and he felt that this expectation could not be fulfilled; he knew also, that, by withdrawing the parties in advance, he should occasion great disappointment to the distinguished projector of the campaign, and draw down no ordinary degree of censure upon himself. A lover of reckless enterprise would have executed his orders, or at least would have tried to execute them; a man of high confidence in his own judgment would have shaped his course according to its suggestion. General Marley did neither; hesi-

tating between his instructions and the conclusions of his own mind, he followed neither completely or vigorously, and his proceedings exhibited the usual characteristic of middle courses—uniting the disadvantages and excluding the probable benefits of both extremes.

With regard to the advanced posts, further blame was cast upon General Marley for not protecting them by stockades. Such a proceeding, however, was altogether new in Indian warfare. It was adopted by Colonel Ochterlony, much to the credit of his sagacity and discrimination. That able commander saw that the war with Nepal was altogether different from any in which the British had previously engaged, and that the peculiarities of the country and the character of the enemy called for important changes in our modes of operation. But it would be unfair to pass sentence of reprehension upon any commander upon grounds merely comparative, and to condemn him, not for absolute deficiency, but because he manifested less skill than another officer.

But whether attributable, according to the view of General Marley, to the inadequacy of the force at his disposal, or, according to that of the governor-general, to the incompetence of the commander, it is certain that the course of events was productive of the most lamentable consequences to the interests of the British government. General Marley, on the 6th of January, made a forward movement towards Pursah, and encamped about a mile and a half to the south of that place. But this position he almost immediately abandoned, alarmed by the reports of the designs of the enemy, and by some very unpleasant symptoms manifested by a part of the native troops. The dissatisfaction displayed itself only in words and in a number of desertions; but these were indications that could not with safety be disregarded. General Marley, under the circumstances, deemed it advisable to retrograde, for the purpose of covering the depot at Betteah, and favouring the junction of the long-expected battering-train. This being accomplished, some other movements were made, but without effecting anything for the British cause.

In the meantime the enemy ravaged the Terraie, the whole of which, with the exception of the country immediately protected by our posts, again fell into their hands; their incursions were extended even beyond it. Their confidence attained a most extravagant height, and they threatened to attack Barra Gurry, though a thousand men were there in garrison. They actually threw up a stockade at Sooffre, a short distance from that post. The prudence of the Nepaulese commander, Bhagut Singh, withheld him, however, from attacking it; but his caution did not find greater favour in the eyes of his government than that of some of the British commanders had met from theirs. Being the subject of a semi-barbarous state, his fate was even

worse. He was not only recalled, but disgraced by being publicly exhibited in woman's attire, as one unworthy to wear the habiliments of man.

Some attempts were made, by hasty levies of irregulars, to provide for the protection of the frontier, and restrain the aggressions of the Goorkhas; but they were attended with little success. The despondency of General Marley appeared to increase, as did also the dissatisfaction of the commander-in-chief at his inactivity. The conviction of the general, that his means were inadequate to the fulfilment of his instructions, not only remained undiminished, but seemed to gather strength, and that conviction was sanctioned by the judgment of Lieutenant-colonel George Dick, of the 9th native infantry, and Lieutenant-colonel William Chamberlain, of his Majesty's 24th. The opinions of those officers, together with his own, having been transmitted by General Marley to the commander-in-chief, the representation was answered by his recall, and the appointment of Major-general George Wood to succeed him.

The embarrassments of his situation, acting upon a mind perhaps little adapted to encounter them, led at length to a most extraordinary proceeding on the part of the general. On the 10th of February (his successor not having arrived) he quitted the camp, before daylight in the morning, without any previous intimation of his intention, and without making any provision for the command after his departure. Such a step is of a nature to forbid comment. It indicates the existence of a state of nervous excitement under which the ill-fated officer was not master of his own actions, and which consequently shields them from remark.

The interval that elapsed between the departure of General Marley and the arrival of his successor was distinguished by an affair of some brilliancy, which tended, in no inconsiderable degree, to abate the presumptuous confidence of the Goorkhas and revive the exhausted hopes of the British force. Lieutenant Pickersgill, while reconnoitring, discovered, at no great distance from the camp, a party of the enemy about five hundred strong. The discovery was immediately communicated to Colonel Dick, who, as the officer next in seniority, had, on the departure of General Marley, assumed the command. A party of irregular horse was, in consequence, despatched to strengthen Lieutenant Pickersgill, and Colonel Dick followed with all the pickets. The Goorkhas, encouraged by the small number of Lieutenant Pickersgill's force, resolved to attack him; but, on emerging from a hollow where they were posted, they perceived the force that was advancing to his assistance. This discovery appears to have struck them with panic, and they made an immediate and precipitate retreat, pursued by Lieutenant Pickersgill, who had waited only for the junction of the cavalry. The entire

detachment was cut to pieces, and so great was the terror inspired by this encounter, that the Goorkhas hastily retreated into the hills, abandoning every position which they had established in the forest and Terrais.

Major-general George Wood joined the division to the command of which he had been appointed, on the 20th of February, ten days after the departure of his predecessor. The force at his disposal had been greatly augmented, and he found himself at the head of upwards of thirteen thousand regular troops. He had, in every respect, the advantage of his predecessor in the command: his force was not only considerably larger, but the tone of their spirits was greatly raised by the successful affair which took place only the day before his arrival. Nevertheless, the new commander determined that he could do nothing to redeem the alleged errors of General Marley: he apprehended that the efficiency of his army might be impaired by sickness, if he attempted to penetrate into the forest, and, after a long march eastward to Goruckpore and back again, which was performed without seeing an enemy, and the object of which is not very clear, all operations were suspended for the season. The change of generals thus failed of accomplishing the object which the commander-in-chief most ardently desired. The division did not march to Katmandoo, nor make an attempt to do so.

The occupation of Kumaon was an object highly desirable, but, owing to the unpropitious progress of the campaign, apparently little likely to be attained by any portion of the regular force. A correspondence had, however, been opened with the leading men of the country, and their wishes were ascertained to be decidedly favourable to the British, whose success they promised to promote by all the means in their power, if they would invade the territory and rescue it from the rule of the Goorkhas; but they expressly stipulated, that their ancient rajahs should not be restored, and desired that the country should be placed under the direct government of the Company. The way was thus prepared for a successful irruption into Kumaon, but the means of effecting it were wanting. The army under General Martindell remained before Jyetuck, and no portion of it could be spared for any other service. The season of operation was rapidly passing away, and the British party in Kumaon becoming alarmed lest their correspondence should be discovered, were pressing in their representations of the necessity of immediate action. In this emergency it was determined to try what could be effected by a body of irregulars, accompanied by a few guns and aided by the co-operation of the inhabitants. The duty of raising this force was assigned to Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, to whom also was intrusted its subsequent command. It amounted, in the first instance, to about three thousand men: it was increased by a corps raised and formed

by Captain Hearsey. Four six-pounders were placed at the disposal of Colonel Gardner, and he was ordered to act under the direction of his relative, the Honourable Edward Gardner, who was to proceed to Kumaon in a political character.

The levying of this force was, however, a work of time, and after it was ready, a succession of bad weather prevented its being put in motion. By these causes its advance into the hill country was delayed until the 17th of February. Having occupied the Chilkeeah pass, Colonel Gardner proceeded by a route lying chiefly along the bed of the Cosillas river. This route, not the most direct one to Almorah, was chosen as offering the fewest impediments to an invading force, as being in a great degree unguarded, and likely to afford opportunities for turning the positions of the enemy. The Goorkhas withdrew as the British force approached, and Colonel Gardner's movements were characterized by an energy and rapidity which suffered no advantage to be lost. Having anticipated the Goorkhas in the occupation of an important post, he availed himself of it to collect his force and bring up his guns and baggage, which, by the rapidity of his progress, had been left in the rear. He then pursued his march, and took up a commanding position on a hill called Kompore, in front of which the enemy's force, reinforced by a large proportion of the garrison from Almorah, was strongly stockaded. In the course of the march several skirmishes took place, the results of which were invariably favourable to the British.

The success which had marked the progress of Colonel Gardner was most encouraging, but it did not seduce him into attempts which might not only have thrown away the advantages already gained, but have frustrated the objects of the enterprise altogether. The enemy were too strongly posted to justify an attack in front by a force composed entirely of hastily-levied and irregular troops, and Colonel Gardner, therefore, judiciously determined to turn his position, and by the sudden movement of a part of his corps, combined with a demonstration of attack, either to place himself between the enemy and his capital, or compel him to retire to prevent it. But even for the performance of this manœuvre Colonel Gardner felt that he was not yet sufficiently strong. He, accordingly, waited the junction of an additional body of irregulars, amounting to one thousand, which had been raised in the Doab, and were proceeding to Kumaon. On the arrival of this reinforcement he executed his intention almost without opposition. The enemy withdrew with so much precipitation as to leave part of his arms and baggage behind him, and, being closely followed by the force under Colonel Gardner, he abandoned the position in front of Almorah, to which he had retired and posted himself on the ridge on which the

town stands. On the 28th of March the British force occupied the position which the enemy had deserted.

While Colonel Gardner was thus triumphantly advancing, Captain Hearsey with his followers was endeavouring to create a diversion in another quarter, but with very different success. Having secured the Timley pass and the forts which commanded it, he had advanced and occupied Chumpawut, the capital of Kali Kumaon, and laid siege to a strong fortress near it called Kutoolgurb. While thus engaged, a Goorkha force crossed the Sardah and attacked one of his posts, but it was forced to recross the river with some loss. The attack was speedily succeeded by another. On this occasion the enemy appeared with increased strength, and crossed the river at a point somewhat above Captain Hearsey's division. On learning this movement the British commander advanced to attack the enemy, with all the force that could be collected, leaving his adjutant to prosecute the siege of Kutoolgurb. The issue was disastrous. The troops under Captain Hearsey shrunk from their duty, and he was wounded and taken prisoner. The Goorkha commander then attacked the party left before Kutoolgurb, which he quickly dispersed. The remainder of Captain Hearsey's battalion unceremoniously abandoned their posts and fled into the plains.

Though Colonel Gardner's success was very flattering, it was a matter of great doubt whether, with a force altogether irregular, he would be able to reduce Almorah. Some attempts had been made to tamper with the Nepaulese commander who held possession of it, by suggesting to him that an arrangement might be made for his benefit if he would retire with his troops across the Kali. This mode of crippling an enemy, by corrupting his officers, appears, from its frequent recurrence, to have been a favourite engine in the policy of Lord Moira. On this occasion, as on others, however, it failed; the Nepaulese commander giving no encouragement to a proposal which implied a belief that he was a miscreant of the lowest description. As, therefore, his fidelity was not to be shaken, and it was deemed imprudent to rely entirely upon an irregular force, a detachment of regular troops, two thousand strong, was devoted to the operations in Kumaon, and the entire force was placed under the command of Colonel Nicolls. That officer arrived at Kattar Mull on the 8th of April, and as soon as his regular force was assembled, sent a detachment, under Major Robert Patton, of the 5th native infantry, to a position to the north-west of Almorah, in which direction a body of the enemy had proceeded. They were attacked by Major Patton and completely routed. The Goorkha commander was killed, as were also the second in command, and several other officers. This success was gained on the 23rd of April. On the 25th,

Colonel Nicolls proceeded to attack the heights and town of Almorah with a success more rapid, if not more decisive, than he had anticipated. Two of the enemy's breastworks on the Sittolee ridge were carried by a part of the regular infantry, led by Captain W. C. Faithful, of the 4th native infantry, while the irregular troops, ever the devout worshippers of fortune, were worked upon, by the auspicious appearance of events and the energy of Colonel Gardner, to attack and carry the remaining three. The enemy retreated by five roads, on each of which they were pursued; some important positions were taken, and the British gained possession of about one-third of the town.

During the night an attempt was made to dispossess the victors of their advantage; but it was met with judgment and gallantry, and defeated. In the morning measures were taken for attacking the fort, and at nine o'clock in the evening a flag of truce arrived, bearing a letter from the Goorkha commander requesting a suspension of arms, preparatory to a termination of hostilities in the province. Another letter to the same effect was written by Captain Hearsey, then a prisoner in the fort. On the following day a convention was framed, by virtue of which all the forts were to be surrendered to the British, and the whole province of Kumaon evacuated in their favour, the Goorkhas being permitted to retire unmolested across the Kali with their public and private property and arms. A proclamation was forthwith issued, declaring the province to be permanently annexed to the British dominions.

During the progress of events in Kumaon Major-General Ochterlony was prosecuting a career of success at once substantial and brilliant. His operations against Ummer Sing sustained, indeed, a momentary interruption in the result of a rally made by the enemy upon a party of irregulars occupying a stockaded post. This party, being taken off its guard, suffered severely, but no permanent advantage was secured, or apparently sought, by the enemy, as, after destroying the stockade, they returned to their position.

The wary progress of General Ochterlony had enabled him, by the middle of April, to obtain an accurate knowledge of the ground occupied by the enemy, and to ascertain the points at which their positions could be more easily penetrated. Of this information he availed himself, by forming and carrying into effect a plan of combined attack, distinguished not less by its masterly contrivance than by its fortunate results.

The movements of the British force commenced on the night of the 14th. A detachment, destined to occupy a post between Dooab and the first Deonthul, gained it without opposition. Columns, under Lieutenant-colonel W. A. Thompson, of the 3rd native infantry, and Major Thomas Lawrie, of the

7th, attained the heights of the second Deonthul almost at the same moment, and were proceeding along the ridge to possess themselves of an advanced post, when the head of the column, consisting of light infantry, received a check by a charge from the enemy sword in hand, which compelled them to fall back on the main body, by this time posted in the second Deonthul. Here they were greatly annoyed by their opponents, from the cover afforded by the jungle and the rocks. In the course of the night they were further harassed by false alarms; and at the first dawn of day a daring attack was made by nearly two thousand of the enemy, who almost surrounded the post. A desperate conflict ensued, and continued for above two hours. The Nepalese fought with a courage at once steady and impetuous; but they were encountered with at least equal courage and with better fortune. They were finally repulsed and totally defeated with very severe loss, Bughtee Thappa, who led the attack, being left among the dead. This action was distinguished by some splendid instances of individual exertion and bravery, as well as by the intrepidity displayed generally by the troops engaged. The result was, that the enemy's continuous chain of posts was broken, and the Nepalese commander was compelled to withdraw, concentrating his force in Malown and its immediate outworks; and from this time General Ochterlony pushed his success vigorously, seeing now that the time had arrived when it could be pursued with effect. A series of positions were taken up for the purpose of completely investing the enemy, and a battery was erected against one of his redoubts. The spirits of the enemy fell with their fortunes; their distress for want of provisions became extreme; desertions, both of individuals and of small parties, were of daily occurrence, and these were facilitated by the fondness which seems to have prevailed throughout the Indian army for advancing the operations of war by the refinements of diplomatic intrigue. It is no pleasing task to relate the adoption of such a mode of warfare by British officers, but the first duty of an historical writer is to speak the truth, regardless of consequences. Lieutenant Ross, who had taken up a post with special reference to this amongst other objects, made proposals to three sirdars commanding in and near the battered redoubt. Other communications followed, and when Lieutenant Ross determined to ascend the heights, it was in the conviction that he should meet with no resistance. The event justified his confidence; he attained the summit without opposition, the enemy retiring and remaining on a spot to their rearward. The redoubt being occupied, Lieutenant Ross invited the enemy's troops to pass into his rear, intimating that they would be unmolested. After a little hesitation, the movement recommended by the English commander was performed; other parties of the enemy followed this exam-

ple, and the second redoubt was gained with as little difficulty as the first.

It appears that the sirdars in a body had waited upon the Goorkha commander, insisting that he should either give them and their men food from the fort, or adopt some decisive line of conduct. It is said that he refused either, but urged them to endure a short time longer and wait the progress of events. Such advice was calculated to have little effect upon men not influenced by any rigid principles of duty or any refined sense of honour, and who, pressed by famine on the one hand, and allured by promises on the other, were already more than wavering in their fidelity. The result was, that the whole of the outworks were abandoned to the British troops, and those of the enemy came over almost universally to General Ochterlony's camp, leaving Ummer Sing shut up in the body of the fort with a garrison reduced to about two hundred men. Escape and the receipt of succour were alike impossible, and on the 8th of May the Goorkha commander wrote to General Ochterlony, desiring to be informed of his wishes. The general's reply was, that, agreeably to usage, proposals must come from the other side. Up to the 10th no farther communication was made. The interval was employed by the British commander in forming batteries and making other preparations for attack; these being completed, firing commenced, and continued during the greater part of the 10th. On the morning of the 11th Ram Dos, son of the Goorkha general, came out and intimated his father's desire to negotiate: the firing was consequently discontinued, but the blockade was rigidly kept up.

From the 11th to the 15th was occupied in negotiations, which were protracted in consequence of their being extended to other objects, as well as the surrender of Malown. A convention was finally signed, by which it was agreed that all the forts between the Jumna and the Sutlej should be delivered up to the British; that all the troops, except those granted to the personal honour of Ummer Sing and Runjore Sing, should be at liberty to enter the British service, and that those not employed should be maintained by the British government, on a specific allowance, till the conclusion of peace: that Gurrhwal should be forthwith evacuated, the garrison having permission to return to Nepal by the Kumaon route, carrying with them all public and private property, including warlike stores; Ummer Sing was to be permitted to retire across the Kali with the remaining garrison of Malown, retaining their arms, accoutrements, baggage, and waggons; Runjore Sing, the commander of Jyetuck, in the same manner, with two hundred men of that garrison, three hundred unarmed followers, and one gun. All private property was to be respected, and eighty-three persons in the various garrisons, who were related by blood or marriage to

Ummer Sing, were to retain their arms and accoutrements.

Of these arrangements neither party had much reason to feel proud. The Goorkhas made great sacrifices, and they received great indulgence. General Ochterlony spoke of the terms granted with the modesty which usually marked his official communications; regarding the arrangement not as positively good, but as the best that could be made under the circumstances existing. The rainy season was approaching, and the campaign could not have been protracted much longer. During the period of inaction it would have been necessary to maintain expensive establishments, a burden which was averted by the convention; and this circumstance, combined with the possession of the strongholds of the enemy, sufficed to attest its expediency. In concluding it, as well as in all his military operations, General Ochterlony displayed sound judgment.

It will now be necessary to return to the division under General Martindell. After the unfortunate termination of the double attack upon Jyetuck, that officer determined to attempt nothing farther until the arrival of reinforcements. These were not granted in the most gracious manner, and the communications addressed at this period to General Martindell, from the department of the commander-in-chief, were couched in the language of blame and reproach. On General Martindell instituting a comparison between his force and that of the enemy, he was told that "hitherto it had not been the habit of the Company's officers to calculate whether they had a numerical superiority to the enemy," and the introduction of such a principle was pronounced to be "novel, and infallibly destructive to our empire." This lofty language is, no doubt, very imposing; but the number of an enemy's force is, after all, an element that cannot be excluded from the calculations of a prudent general, and the war with the Nepaulese certainly did not form an exception to the general rule. It may be admitted that General Martindell was somewhat over anxious with regard to numbers, and it is undeniable that British officers had been accustomed to gain easy victories over vastly superior numbers of the feeble troops by whom they had heretofore been opposed; but in the Goorkhas they had an enemy surpassing in energy, as well as in military skill, any with whom they had previously contended in India, and a corresponding degree of caution was called for; the want of it had been severely felt in more instances than one. The irregular troops, to whom so much importance was attached, proved very generally worthless. It has been seen how Captain Harsey's irregulars behaved in Kumaon, and those attached to General Martindell's division appear to have been little better. Intelligence having been received that a reinforcement was on its way to join the garrison of Jyetuck, Lieutenant Young marched with one thousand four hundred

irregulars to intercept them. He was joined by several hundreds more, forming altogether a very considerable force; it is stated, in one report, to have amounted to nearly three thousand men, and it certainly very considerably exceeded two thousand. A party of these being attacked and put to flight, by the enemy, the whole body fell under the operation of panic, and were completely routed by a force which did not exceed five hundred fighting men. Such was the value of the irregular troops, though commanded by an excellent officer, whose personal exertions were strenuously but vainly used to induce them to keep their ground against an enemy greatly inferior in numbers.

The defeat materially abated the taste of the irregulars for a military life. Many deserted; many applied for their discharge; and the strength of the corps was reduced from between two and three thousand to about twelve hundred, exclusive of those on detached duty. This defection increased the difficulties of General Martindell. He had to contend, also, with weather of extreme inclemency, which his troops were ill calculated to support. He complained heavily of the want of correct intelligence, and, oppressed by all these difficulties, he signified a wish to be relieved from a command which he could no longer exercise with pleasure to himself or satisfaction to his superiors. This need excite little surprise; General Marley had been unable to contend with the difficulties of his situation, and General Ochterlony had expressed a diffidence of the adequacy of his own powers to meet the exigencies of the mountain warfare. But the commander-in-chief was impressed with a belief that Jyetuck might be reduced, and with the force under General Martindell's command. After a long-continued and somewhat angry communication of opinion, General Ochterlony was ordered, immediately on the fall of Malown, to take the command of the division before Jyetuck; but this arrangement was rendered unnecessary by the convention concluded with Ummer Sing, Jyetuck being one of the fortresses which were by that instrument surrendered to the British.

On the reduction of Almorah the Goorkha commander, Bum Sah, expressed a wish to become an agent for the restoration of peace, and proposed to address letters to Ummer Sing Thappa and Runjure Sing, recommending them to withdraw their troops across the Kali, preparatory to the commencement of negotiations. The proposal was assented to by Colonel Nicholls and Mr. Gardner; the letters were written and forwarded; the success of General Ochterlony had, however, precluded their necessity. That addressed to Ummer Sing Thappa was received by him as he was on the point of executing the capitulation; and though too late to have any effect on his decision, it was in time to afford him an apology for the course which he had previously determined to pursue. With true Oriental

finesse, he availed himself of its arrival to insert an article stating that he had surrendered at the instance of Bum Sah and the other chiefs of Kumaon; thus throwing on them the odium and the danger which he apprehended to himself.

Bum Sah and Ummer Sing belonged to opposite factions, and the former had no sooner transmitted his recommendation of retreat than he became alarmed at the probable consequences of what he had done. Though nearly related to the rajah, who was also much attached to him, the influence of his enemies preponderated at court. The situation of Bum Sah was, therefore, extremely critical; his character was timid and vacillating, and being apprehensive that his head would pay the forfeit of the discretion which he had exercised, he solicited from Colonel Gardner, who had accompanied him on his march homeward, permission to remain in Kumaon till the arrival of the communication from Nepal. This could not be permitted; but Bum Sah throwing himself upon the confidence of the British officer, declaring that his sole dependence was upon the government to which that gentleman belonged, and imploring at his hands counsel and instruction, Colonel Gardner, after apprising him that, as a servant of the British government, his authority extended no further than to see the terms of the convention fulfilled, suggested, as a private individual, that he should forthwith take possession of the province of Dootee, garrison the forts and places of strength with troops upon whom he could rely, dismissing all the rest, and, having established himself there in independence, assume a high tone, and insist upon the adoption of the measures which he thought necessary for the good of his country.

After some deliberation Bum Sah acquiesced, and an astrologer having been consulted, a fortunate day was chosen for crossing the river. It was clearly for the interest of Bum Sah to procure, if possible, the power of negotiating with the British government, and it was equally to be desired by the latter. The general views of Bum Sah and his party were far more favourable to the maintenance of peace and good understanding than those of their opponents; their hopes of escaping the probable consequences of their recent conduct depended upon their obtaining an ascendancy in the state; that ascendancy, again, being dependent upon their pursuing a course of policy different from that of the party by which they were opposed. The governor-general, therefore, was particularly desirous that the conduct of the negotiation should be placed in the hands of Bum Sah; but as an indiscreet publication of such a wish would have frustrated its fulfilment, and probably have involved Bum Sah and his partisans in serious difficulties, the expression of it was confided to him alone, accompanied by an intimation, that he might use it in any man-

ner likely to promote the object sought in common by himself and the British government. With regard to the seizure of Dootee, Bum Sah was assured of the support of the British government, if, on mature consideration, he would be satisfied that such a proceeding would tend to the promotion of his interest.

The earl of Moira, in his narrative of the negotiations, seems to have argued the questions of the justice and policy of this arrangement somewhat unnecessarily; there can be no doubt as to either with relation to the existing state of the circumstances. As the course of the negotiations took another turn, the perseverance of Bum Sah in the project of occupying Dootee might, however, have occasioned some inconvenience, which Lord Moira very properly avowed himself ready to incur rather than commit a breach of faith. The difficulty, however, was removed by Bum Sah subsequently declining the occupation of Dootee, from apprehensions for the safety of his family in Nepal.

Whilst these matters were in progress, an attempt was made to open a negotiation through Gooroo Gujraj Misser. This person had already been concerned in negotiations with the British government. He had resided some time at Benares, and was believed to be friendly to the British interests; he was also understood to entertain a strong personal attachment to the rajah of Nepal, and to be anxious to save him from the evils which might be apprehended from the protraction of the war. Having solicited permission to go to the frontier, he placed himself in communication with the rajah; and the result was an earnest invitation to proceed to Katmandoo. On the point of his departure the overtures of Bum Sah became known to the governor-general; but it not being deemed advisable, on that account, to discourage this mission of Gujraj Misser, he was permitted to proceed without interruption.

He returned with a paper under the rajah's red seal, empowering him to bring to an adjustment all matters in difference between the two states, and declaring that whatever he engaged for should be confirmed; he brought, also, letters from the rajah to the governor-general and to Colonel Bradshaw. The powers with which Gujraj Misser was invested appeared sufficiently ample, but his language, as well as that of the letters, was vague and indefinite. He declared that he had no instructions to propose anything, but that the rajah relied on the generosity of the British government. The wisdom of negotiating with a person whose commission appeared thus unsatisfactory may, perhaps, be doubted; but the governor-general determined upon the attempt, and instructions were forwarded to Colonel Bradshaw for his guidance. On receiving them, Colonel Bradshaw proceeded to open the subject of compensation for the expenses of the war: and having intimated in general terms the extent of the demand on

this ground, he was informed by Gujraj Misser that he had no authority to make such sacrifices, and that they were not contemplated by any party at Katmandoo. The attempt to treat was consequently suspended; but Gujraj Misser remained in Colonel Bradshaw's camp.

Negotiations were now resumed with Bum Sah and his brother, Roodber Beer Sah, but with the same success which had attended the proceedings with Gujraj Misser. The result of these endeavours was little calculated to invite a perseverance in them. In every instance the conduct of the enemy was marked by that evasion and duplicity which so eminently distinguish Nepaulese diplomacy. The governor-general, however, was weary of the war, and not without cause; another effort to restore the relations of peace was, therefore, resolved on. Availing himself of the opportunity afforded of communicating with the rajah, by addressing a letter in reply to that transmitted from him to the governor-general by Gujraj Misser, the earl of Moira determined to honour it with an answer. This communication differed little in substance from those made to the rajah at an earlier period. Its transmission to Katmandoo was intrusted to Gujraj Misser, who was apprized of its contents, and upon whose mind Colonel Bradshaw was instructed to impress the fearful consequences which must ensue to the Goorkha state if the communication were disregarded. The result was an enlargement of the Gooroo's powers and a renewal of the negotiation with him; which, after several fruitless conferences, ended, like the former, in an avowal, on the part of the Goorkha agent, that he had no authority to make such sacrifices of territory as the British minister required.

The governor-general's disappointment at the miscarriage of this attempt appears to have been extreme, and to have rendered him inaccessible to every other feeling. He ascribed the failure, in a great degree, to a deficiency of address on the part of the British agent, and an inattention to the spirit and principles of his instructions. There seems, however, little ground for such an imputation. The universal character of Goorkha diplomacy is quite sufficient to account for the miscarriage of the negotiation, and may supersede the necessity of seeking for any other cause; nor is the failure of Colonel Bradshaw more remarkable than that of others, who also failed under similar circumstances.

His lordship was, in truth, at this time suffering great mortification. On arriving in India, he appears to have pictured to himself a career of extraordinary brilliancy. Its commencement was shadowed by clouds which he had not anticipated. Disappointed, in a great degree, in the result of the Nepaulese campaign, fresh disappointment awaited him in the failure of the negotiations; and this seems to have given rise to ebullitions of ill-temper

not warranted by any thing that had occurred. Lord Moira, however, having convinced himself that a want of frankness was the great impediment to peace, determined to remove it by a distinct and explicit communication of the terms to which he was ready to agree. A project of a treaty was prepared, and transmitted to Colonel Bradshaw, together with the draft of a note, to be signed by the British agent, and delivered, with the former document, to Gujraj Misser. To aid the effect of these proceedings, Lord Moira, who appears to have thought extremely well of his own powers of persuasion and conciliation, addressed another letter to the Rajah of Nepal. The tone of the letter was somewhat subdued from that of former ones, and the conditions of the proposed treaty somewhat relaxed in favour of the Nepalese. Altogether, the confidence of the governor-general seems to have been greatly shaken; and the experience of one campaign had disposed him to make some sacrifices to avoid another.

The proceedings which have just been related were widely different from those which might have been expected, and indicate a remarkable change of purpose in the course of a few weeks. On the 5th of August, the governor-general, in a despatch addressed to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, declared his intention not to make any attempt to renew negotiations, and his determination that any fresh overtures for that purpose should come from the enemy. On the 23rd of September we find him instructing his agent to re-open a negotiation, which was suspended, though not absolutely terminated; for Gujraj Misser had proposed to refer the question of territorial cession to Katmandoo, and promised an answer in twenty-one days; but so impatient had the governor-general become for a conclusion of hostilities, that he could not prevail upon himself to wait the result of the reference to Katmandoo, but voluntarily made an offer of concessions, which his previous tone had given the enemy no reason to expect. The answer did not arrive within the stipulated time, and when the new project was communicated to the Goorkha negotiators, they declared, as they had previously declared with regard to former proposals, that to assent to such terms was beyond their power. The frankness of the governor-general succeeded no better than the reserve of Colonel Bradshaw: the Goorkha agents again made their favourite offer of a reference to their court, promising, on this occasion, an answer in fifteen days, and apologizing for the delay in answering the former reference. Before the expiration of the fifteen days an answer to the first reference arrived, couched in the most vague and indefinite language (the unvarying style of Nepalese state papers), and referring to more detailed advices to follow. The period fixed for an answer to the second reference expired, and none was received. At the solicitation of Gujraj Misser,

Colonel Bradshaw consented to wait a few days longer. An answer at length arrived, but it was neither favourable nor explicit: the Goorkha negotiators were not empowered to sign a treaty on the terms proposed. A further delay requested by them was refused by the British agent, and the Goorkha diplomatists then departed, expressing a belief that they should return in a few days authorized to execute the treaty.

The anxiety for peace felt by the governor-general amounted almost to weakness, and permission was conveyed to Colonel Bradshaw to make still further relaxations in his terms, if the Goorkha negotiators should return. But the permission was unnecessary: at the expiration of a month Gujraj Misser re-appeared, alleging that he had been detained at Katmandoo by illness. This might be true; but a far more probable cause for his detention may be found in the struggles of contending parties at the Goorkha court. The negotiation was forthwith resumed, and, after some delay, a treaty was signed, corresponding entirely with the project delivered on the part of the British government.

By this treaty it was stipulated that the Rajah of Nepal should renounce all claim to the lands which had been the subject of dispute, and should further cede the whole of the low-lands between the rivers Kali and Rapti, those between the Rapti and the Gunduck, with the exception of Bootwul Khaas, those between the Gunduck and the Koosi, in which the authority of the British government had been introduced or was in the course of introduction, and those between the Mitchie and the Teistah, together with all the territories within the hills eastward of the Mitchie, including the fort and lands at Naggree, the Pass of Naggarcote, leading from Morung into the hills, and the territory lying between that pass and Naggree. The chieftains whose interests would suffer by these cessions were to be remunerated by pensions to the aggregate amount of two lacs of rupees; the chiefs to be named and the proportions fixed by the Nepalese government. By other articles the Rajah of Nepal was bound not to interfere with the countries west of the Kali; not to disturb the Rajah of Sikhim in his possessions, but, in the event of any differences arising with that prince, to submit them to the arbitration of the British government, and abide by its award; and not to take into his service any subject of any European or American state without the consent of the British government. To secure and improve the relations of amity, accredited ministers from each state were to reside at the court of the other.

The treaty was ratified as soon as received at Fort William, and this event was distinguished by some very remarkable circumstances. At the very moment of ratification, the British authorities prepared to make the concessions which they had previously con-

templated, but which the unlooked-for facility of the Nepaulese minister had rendered apparently unnecessary. So extraordinary a circumstance as that of a government deliberating how much of territory shall be surrendered to a hostile state which asks nothing, is, perhaps, without parallel.

If the fact of any concession being meditated under such circumstances be calculated to excite surprise, an explanation of the nature of the concession which the British government resolved upon making must raise that feeling almost to bewilderment. The most romantic imagination could not have conceived that, among the points to be conceded, was the possession of those very portions of territory which had given rise to the war; yet so it was: the British government expressed itself willing to yield a part, or even the whole, of the lands of Bootwal and Sheoraj which before the war had been usurped by the Nepaulese.

The extraordinary spectacle of a state, after engaging in an expensive war for the defence of certain possessions, voluntarily relinquishing those possessions to the enemy, was, however, lost to the world by a fresh instance of obstinacy and bad faith of the court of Katmandoo, in refusing to ratify the treaty which its agent had been empowered to conclude. The usual exhibition of delay and chicanery took place; restitutions were required which could not be granted, and, finally, negotiations gave place to a renewal of hostilities.

The new campaign commenced by the advance of a portion of the force under Sir David Ochterlony, whose services had been rewarded with the grand cross of the order of the Bath. Colonel Bradshaw, who appears to have been little in favour with his superiors, was divested of his diplomatic functions, which were transferred to Sir David Ochterlony, and that officer thus united with his military command the entire political authority. In the exercise of the latter function he held some communication with Gujraj Misser, but it led to no satisfactory result.

On the 9th of February, 1816, Sir David Ochterlony advanced through the great Sal forest towards the passes leading into the valley of Muckwanpore. The road was a mere pathway through an excessively thick jungle; but though the enemy possessed ample means of annoying the British force and disputing its progress, it was permitted to advance unmolested. On the 14th the general was informed that there was a pass over the Cheereah Gantie range of mountains, unguarded and practicable; and on the 17th, after a harassing march and very severe labour, the passage was effected.

Sir David Ochterlony continued to advance, and encamped near Muckwanpore. The enemy occupied two positions on a ridge near that place, one of which they abandoned on the approach of the British force, who immediately took possession of it. They shortly,

however, returned in great numbers, and a severe conflict ensued. The positions of the British force were repeatedly assaulted; but they were gallantly defended, and the enemy finally retired in confusion, abandoning a gun and a large quantity of ammunition.

A few days afterwards Colonel Kelly dispossessed the enemy of a position on the Hurryharpore hills. Two days after the latter event negotiation was renewed, in consequence of a letter addressed to Sir David Ochterlony by a Goorkha vakeel named Burtawar Sing, stating that he was in possession of the ratification of the treaty formerly concluded, and intended to depute a person, whom he named, to convey it to the British government. This individual accordingly repaired to the British camp with the treaty duly ratified, and after some discussion, Sir David Ochterlony agreed to accept it, on the execution, by the vakeel, of a declaration that the Rajah of Nepaul relinquished all expectation of that relaxation of the conditions of the treaty which Colonel Bradshaw had been instructed to hold out to him. This stipulation was readily agreed to; the required declaration was given by the vakeel, and afterwards explicitly confirmed by the rajah himself.

After so prosperous a commencement of the second campaign, better terms might, perhaps, have been insisted on; but the sickly season was approaching—the British commissariat was in an impaired state, and the difficulty of getting supplies would have been considerable. These considerations suggested the expediency of perseverance in hostilities, and if the treaty, as originally ratified by the British authorities, satisfied the claims of justice and secured the safety of the British dominions, it would have been neither right nor reputable to demand more. It may be concluded, therefore, that Sir David Ochterlony made a right choice in determining in favour of peace upon the original basis.

During the discussions which preceded the Nepal war, and the progress of the war itself, events took place in other parts of the East connected with Great Britain, which, though not of sufficient importance to justify the interruption of the narrative, must not be passed over without notice. In Java, the British authorities inherited from their Dutch and French predecessors a series of quarrels with the surrounding princes, which afforded them abundant employment, in addition to that furnished by the necessity of taking active and efficient steps for the suppression of the standing opprobrium of Eastern commerce—piracy. A detail of the occurrences which sprung from these causes would exhibit most interesting evidence of patient and persevering determination on the part of those on whom the maintenance of the authority and interests of the British government devolved; and in a history devoted exclusively to Java and the adjacent islands such detail would

properly find place : in a work of a more general character, only the more prominent events can be noticed.

The Rajah of Bielling, in the island of Balli, and the Rajah of Boni, in that of Celebes, having manifested hostile dispositions towards the British government, an expedition for their correction was despatched from Java, under the command of Major-general Nightingall, who had succeeded General Gillespie. At Balli the troops occupied, without difficulty, the capital of the offending rajah, and this step was followed by his immediate submission, as well as that of several of his neighbours. At Boni severer labours awaited the British force. On arriving before the place, early in June, 1814, General Nightingall addressed a letter to the rajah, reciting the wrongs of the British government and demanding reparation. An answer was required within a specified time, and none being returned, the column which had been previously formed for attack was put in motion. The town and palace were assailed, and within an hour carried in the most gallant style, though not without loss. The rajah with difficulty effected his escape, attended by a few followers. His palace was destroyed, being deliberately set on fire after the capture of the place—an act of violence which, not being dictated by necessity nor calculated to advance the legitimate objects of the expedition, it seems not easy to defend. Ultimately the rajah was deposed. Though the attack on Boni was the most striking and important event that occurred in Celebes during the time that the English were in possession of Java, and has, for that reason, been selected for especial notice, it must not be inferred that, with this exception, the island remained in a state of peace: it was far otherwise. To Captain Phillips, of the Madras native infantry, and Major D. H. Dalton, of the Bengal light infantry volunteers, to whom the charge of the British interest in the island was successively allotted, and to the few troops placed under their command, the period was one of almost unrelenting anxiety, labour, and privation. All these, together with the blood and treasure expended in the capture of the Dutch settlements, were ultimately thrown away. By the arrangements consequent on the general pacification of Europe these settlements were restored—an additional illustration of that levity and disregard to consequences which seem to be inherent in British diplomacy. The maintenance of Java and its dependencies was necessary to the safety and integrity of our eastern empire, and they ought never to have been surrendered.

In another settlement acquired from the Dutch, the English, in 1815, became involved in hostilities. For about ten years the king's government in Ceylon had permitted the crimes of the usurping ruler of Candy to remain unrequited and even unnoticed. Some

new outrages, perpetrated by his servants on British subjects, at length roused the long-slumbering feeling of national honour; and happily the discontent of the principal subjects of the Candian prince at this period had attained a height, which seemed to warrant reliance upon their acquiescence in the necessary measures for divesting the tyrant of the power which he ought never to have possessed. The feeling was not misplaced. A British force entered the Candian dominions, and proceeded, almost without resistance, to occupy them. The king was made prisoner and deposed, and in the palace of Candy, on the 2nd of March, 1815, Sir Charles Brownrigg, the British governor and commander-in-chief, met in solemn conference the *adigars*, *dessaues*, and powerful men of the country, for the purpose of laying before them the plan upon which it was proposed to settle the government. By this it was declared that the dominion of the Candian provinces was vested in the sovereign of the British empire, to be exercised through the governor or lieutenant-governor of Ceylon for the time being. The race of the deposed king were for ever excluded from the throne, and their claim and title pronounced to be abolished and extinguished. All males belonging to the family, or pretending to belong to it, were declared enemies of the new government, and were prohibited, under the penalties of martial law, from entering the Candian provinces without written permission. Thus the British authority became established throughout the whole of the island of Ceylon.

Late in the same year a considerable force, under the command of Colonel East, was despatched from Bombay into Cutch. This movement was occasioned by the depredations committed by the Foudjar of Wagur, a district subject to the Rao of Cutch, on the subjects of some of the allies of the Company's government. An atrocious attempt to destroy the British force by poisoning the wells was happily detected and defeated. Colonel East had intended to advance directly upon Bhoj, but this discovery induced him to change his course and attack the fort of Anjar, which he captured. This success led to the conclusion of a treaty, by which the fort of Anjar, together with certain villages, was surrendered to the British government, and the Rao agreed to a series of necessary measures for the suppression of the depredations which had called the British troops into his dominions.

There were other occurrences contemporary with the Nepal war which deserve, and must receive, ample notice; but they were so intimately connected with an important series of events, hereafter to be related, that their proper place will be in a subsequent chapter: the present may close with a narrative of a serious insurrection at Bareilly, in the north-western provinces, which, from reasons which will appear in the course of the relation, de-

serves more attention than is ordinarily due to events of a similar character.

The part of India in which Bareilly is situated had been once occupied exclusively by a Hindoo population. Early in the eighteenth century, the country was reduced to subjection by an immigration of Affghan adventurers. Some years afterwards, during the administration of Warren Hastings, it was conquered for the vizier by a British force. At a still later period, its cession to the British government took place, under the arrangement concluded with the vizier by the Marquis Wellesley. Though divested of political power, the descendants of the Affghans continued numerous, and the proportion of Mahometans to Hindoos was greater than that found existing in most parts of India. They had not forgotten their recently lost power and distinction; they were high-spirited, sanguinary, and revengeful—strongly attached to a military life, but impatient of the restraints of European discipline. Great numbers of them had served under Holkar, and, at the period under consideration, many found a refuge in the service of their countryman Ameer Khan. A numerous body, however, remained unemployed and in distress; they consequently were ready to embrace any chance that appeared to promise subsistence and distinction, and even to accelerate the tardy career of fortune by fomenting discontent and disturbances.

Some curious particulars of the state of society existing in Rohilcund are related in two papers submitted to the Court of Nizamut Adawlut by Mr. Strachey, a distinguished civil servant of the Company. These papers were drawn up eleven years before the occurrence of the transactions about to be related, but the changes wrought in the intermediate period were not sufficient to render Mr. Strachey's statements inapplicable. It appears that robberies were much less frequent throughout the ceded provinces than in the lower provinces, and the reason assigned by Mr. Strachey for this fact is, not the supremacy of the law, but the reliance of the natives upon their own prowess, and their habit of standing by each other in the event of being attacked. "The grand object of law and police," says the writer—"security of person and property—is better accomplished here by the spirit of the people than in Bengal by the regulations." The number of crimes reported, it appears, was small, and the number of offenders taken and brought to justice, when compared with the number of cases reported, was larger than might have been expected.

One remarkable and characteristic feature in the criminal statistics of Rohilcund was, that, while offences against property were few, cases of homicide, in all its gradations of guilt, were comparatively of frequent occurrence. They were mostly the acts of individuals proceeding upon their own impulses, without

concert or confederacy with others. They rarely originated in a desire for plunder; they generally had their rise in revenge, jealousy, wounded pride, or the sudden impulse of anger; but there was an exception of an extraordinary character, and which was not less detestable than anomalous. The murder of children, for the sake of the ornaments which they wore, was one of the most common crimes, and this horrible fact tends very much to lower our estimation of a people who, with many of the vices of half-civilized nations, were supposed to possess many of the sterner and ruder virtues. That the really brave should, under any circumstances, imbue their hands in the blood of childhood, seems almost impossible: the fact that this cowardly crime was perpetrated in furtherance of petty robbery, is calculated to increase the disgust with which it must be regarded by all who retain the slightest tinge of humanity; and the alleged security of property in Rohilcund loses half its value in the well-constituted mind, when it thus appears to have arisen from no better motive than fear. Property was safe in the hands of those who had the strength to protect it; but weakness afforded lawful prey: the property which had no better guardian than infant innocence was seized without scruple, and the blood of its bearer shed without remorse. It is the disclosure of facts like these which reduces uncivilized and semi-civilized life to their true dimensions; and it is the concealment of them which has led, in a few instances, to the absurd belief of the superior excellence of the savage and the gradual deterioration of man by civilization.

The crimes by which Rohilcund was distinguished found a ready excuse in the prevalence among the Mahometans of the doctrine of fatalism; and the same convenient belief afforded consolation under the consequent punishment. Mr. Strachey represents the following confession as a fair sample of those which were usually made: "I was provoked—I was impelled by fate to kill the deceased—all must die at the hour appointed—no one can struggle against destiny—it was written, his time was come." Thus the assassin convinced himself that he was but a cog in the wheel of fate, performing his appointed part in the revolution of human events; and in the sentiments he avowed, he spoke those of his countrymen generally. Exertions, they said, were ineffectual to contend with a power in whose hands man is but a mere instrument—it was the part of mortals to resign themselves, and abstain from useless attempts to alter the established course of things. It is plain that, where the doctrines of fatalism are received, a door is opened for the wildest indulgence of the passions. The restraints of prudence, as well as those of principle, are removed, the fatalist arguing, "If it is decreed that I am to suffer, suffer I must; on the other hand, if fate has awarded me impunity, nothing can assail me, or endanger my safety." It is a

common and a dangerous error to suppose that men's religious opinions exercise little influence over their actions. If, unfortunately, they are too often unavailing for good, it is beyond doubt that they are found powerfully efficient for evil.

Among such a people, neither the British government nor any regular government could be popular. A few years only had elapsed since the country had been separated from the dominion of Oude, one of the worst governed states in the world. Its zemindars had been accustomed to exercise a degree of power which, under the British government, it was found necessary to control by subjecting all classes to the operation of fixed law. This was regarded as an insufferable grievance by the zemindars, and though the condition of the ryots was decidedly improved, the feeling of habitual dependence upon their chief was so strong, that it was difficult either to shake it, or to excite a counteracting feeling among the people in favour of their own rights. This state of things is depicted by Mr. Strachey with some force. He says, "Deprive the ryots of a necessary of life, and they sit silent; nobody cares for them, and they cannot help themselves. But take from their chief the management of the police, which he exercised only to oppress them; restrain him from disturbing the peace of the country, and he will prevail upon them to take up arms in his cause, and contend in a hopeless, desperate enterprise against all the powers of government, civil and military. Such are our subjects: they resist authority without pretence of right or hope of success."

The upper classes disliked the regular administration of law, and when the cause of their dislike is traced, it will increase the surprise felt at their having been able to induce the inferior classes to support them. According to Mr. Strachey, when a native of rank was asked what part of the established system was obnoxious to him, he would answer, "That which reduces me to a level with my domestics and labourers." By the same authority it is stated, that "a man of high caste and wealth, conceiving that he possesses superior rights and privileges, thinks himself disgraced by being called into court on any occasion." Such a man was averse to being examined publicly as a witness. "Is my testimony," said he, "rated no higher than that of my servants and coolies, and am I to stand on an equality with them, and reply as a criminal to their petty complaints for an assault or abusive language?" The dissatisfaction, therefore, originated in that which has generally been esteemed the perfection and glory of law—its impartiality and non-respect for persons.

Some auxiliary grounds of complaint were resorted to, as is usual in such cases, and the never-failing ones of the expense and delay of judicial proceedings were not forgotten. Upon this part of the subject the observations of Mr. Strachey appear very just. "Supposing

it," he says, "to be true that these evils exist to a great degree, such evils should not be charged to the introduction of our system as its most characteristic marks. Let not the present be compared to a state of things never known here, when justice was cheap and expeditious, but with that which certainly did heretofore exist, viz., one in which there was no justice at all to be got; where the important, sacred duty of redressing injuries and punishing crimes depended upon the tyranny and caprices of a revenue officer, who either entirely disregarded the duty, or by corruption and abuse made it a source of profit."

The views of Mr. Strachey are, to a certain extent, confirmed by the report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the disturbances at Bareilly, in 1816. They represent our courts of justice to be viewed as a grievance by the upper classes, and not as a blessing by the lower. With regard to the majority of the latter, the commissioners add, that the expense of our courts rendered them scarcely accessible, and their delay nearly useless. This charge, however, had been answered by anticipation by Mr. Strachey.

Upon the whole, the truth will be found to be, that there was some small share of grievance and a very large amount of discontent—that discontent arising from the lawless propensities of the people generally, from the mortified ambition of the upper classes, and the miserable poverty of the lower. Previously to its cession to the British, the country had, by misgovernment, been reduced to a state almost of desolation; and though it had subsequently improved, yet it must be remembered, that fourteen years is but a short period for raising a country from ruin. The misery of the people and the turbulence of their leaders were elements fearfully adapted to coalesce in the production of an explosion. The privations and sufferings of the lower classes were borne by them with sullen indifference, if not with patience, and little danger to the state might have arisen from this source; but the people of Rohilcund were actuated by a fanatical attachment to their chiefs, which induced them to follow wherever their superior would lead them. Their fidelity was the effect of mere habit; but it afforded the chiefs a powerful instrument for thwarting and annoying the government, whenever their caprice or calculation led them to employ it. The country was prepared for change of any sort, and by applying a very small portion of the principle of fermentation, the entire mass might be put in motion.

In the district of Bareilly this was found in the attempt to introduce some police regulations, which had been carried into effect without difficulty through the greater part of the territories subject to the presidency of Bengal. These arrangements, however, involved certain fiscal changes, which were eagerly seized at Bareilly as a ground for dissatisfaction and resistance. A new tax is not

a very popular thing anywhere: in India the amount of reluctance which most men feel at parting with their money is increased by the rooted aversion to change. In the East the land has been regarded as the legitimate object of taxation, but any thing resembling a personal tax has always been regarded by the people of India with great dislike, and the attempt to levy an impost of such a nature has generally been unsuccessful, often dangerous. There was, in the present instance, some encouragement to resistance afforded by the success which had attended earlier experiments in the art of agitation: a police tax and a house tax, previously imposed, had both been surrendered to popular disapprobation, and the people were, it appears, sufficiently versed in philosophy to expect the recurrence of similar effects from the operation of similar causes.

A sort of police establishment had previously existed, the expense of which was defrayed by voluntary contributions. The persons retained on this service received generally the allowance of one rupee per month, and in no case more than two. The number of these well-paid supporters of the social system was determined by the amount of contributions which could be obtained from any particular street or portion of a street; and in making the new arrangements, the government consulted the Indian love of unchanging continuity, by making the assessment with reference to the number of chokeedars formerly retained by voluntary contributions. As, however, the new chokeedars were to have a salary of three rupees per month, the amount of contribution was increased, as well as its character changed from a voluntary to a compulsory payment.

The wish of government, of course, was to carry its object quietly and securely, and the magistrate appears to have been desirous, in this respect, of forwarding the views of his superiors; but no one acquainted with Indian affairs can be ignorant how frequently the good intentions of the European authorities have been frustrated by the perverseness or treachery of native servants; and a fresh example was here afforded.

A native officer, called the kotwal, to whom fell the duty of collecting the assessment, discharged his duty in a manner the most overbearing and offensive. The official insolence of a functionary of humble rank, and of very low origin, could not fail to provoke the higher classes of a people like those of Rohilcund. It was said, moreover, that the kotwal had demanded in some instances rates far exceeding those which his authority warranted him to receive. It was currently reported, also, that he connived at the first indications of tumult, and even assisted in the counsils which led to them; that, like many patriots everywhere, and all disturbers in the East, he had a nice perception of the propriety of an alliance between the public good and his

own private interest; that he caused a communication to be made to the shopkeepers, that if they would raise a sum of money for his benefit, the tax should be relinquished; that, in consequence, a douceur of four thousand rupees was tendered, and that the consideration for this fee afforded by the kotwal was, his advice to the subscribers to pursue a plan which had been tried in other places, that of deserting their houses and encamping round the magistrate's residence.

What effect might have been produced by the presence of a larger number of the Company's European servants, it is impossible to conjecture; but it happened, at the period of the insurrection, that few were in the town. The senior and third judges of the court of appeal were absent on circuit; the fourth judge had proceeded to Benares, and the collector of the revenue was engaged in the interior of the district; the entire weight of responsibility, therefore, rested on the magistrate.

Among those who played the most conspicuous parts in the drama acted at Bareilly was Mooftee Mahomed Ewery, a person of great influence among the Mahometans. His first public appearance on the scene was on the 27th of March, when he became the channel of transmitting to the magistrate a petition alleged to emanate from the inhabitants at large. The petition was confined to generalities. The exactions and extortions which were believed to have been committed in carrying the new measure into operation were not even noticed. The tax was simply denounced as a public grievance, and the same tone was preserved in numerous placards published in the town. The resistance to the tax was one of those movements not altogether unknown in more western countries, but little expected in the East. A common spirit pervaded the whole people. As in similar movements in countries boasting a higher degree of knowledge and civilization, the larger portion of those engaged knew not why they resisted; it was sufficient for them that their neighbours set the example. Every man was ready to submit, if submission became general; but every man was determined to resist so long as resistance was the fashion. They were embarked in a common struggle, for a common object; and though the sense of individual grievance might refresh the energy of some, it was the force of habit and association which gave to their opposition coherence and steadiness.

The period of the presentation of the petition was marked by a tumultuous assemblage of the people, in consequence of which some of the parties engaged in it were apprehended; but it was not until the 16th of April that the insurrection assumed the formidable character which it ultimately bore. On that day the kotwalees were actively engaged in enforcing the levy of the chokeedaree assessment, and in the course of their progress they broke

forcibly into the house of a woman, for the purpose of distraining property, to realize her proportion of the assessment. A scuffle ensued, in which the owner of the house was wounded: this was a fortunate circumstance for the cause of the opposers of the tax. The suffering female was a martyr in the cause of the people, and was treated with all the honours due to such a character. She was placed upon a bed, and carried to the mooftee; the mooftee advised the bearers to take her to the magistrate, which they did, and the magistrate referred the woman for redress to the Adawlut. This advice was as little acceptable to the people as might be expected. Disappointed in obtaining summary justice, the procession returned to the mooftee and declared the result of their application. If the conduct of the magistrate was marked by indifference, that of the mooftee was certainly characterized by an ample degree of warmth. The story of the populace not only roused his indignation and awoke all the energy of his patriotism, but, according to his own representation, excited his personal fears. On hearing the relation of what had passed before the magistrate, he exclaimed that, if such were that functionary's justice, no person's life or honour was safe within the town, and that, therefore, it was high time for him to leave it. It is not likely that the mooftee then felt any apprehension for his personal safety; but a circumstance which occurred immediately afterwards might perhaps give rise to a feeling which previously he thought it expedient to simulate. The continuance of the tumult necessarily called for the interposition of the magistrate. He proceeded in person, with a lieutenant and a party of sepoy, for the purpose of putting an end to the tumult and dispersing the mob. The mooftee had quitted his house, either under the influence of the impressions which he had avowed or from some other cause, and the fact of his meeting the magistrate with an armed force was calculated to strengthen any fears he might previously have entertained, or to excite apprehension if it had not before existed. Conscious of the part he had acted, he might not unnaturally suppose that the magistrate meditated his arrest. It is true that the force was small, but it was sufficient for this purpose, and consequently not to be despised.

In cases of petty riot the sight of troops generally operates as a complete sedative; in the instance before us this was not the case. The government force, being assailed by the mob and by the servants of the mooftee, was compelled to act in its own defence. It has been questioned whether the attacks were made in a serious spirit of resistance, or whether they were only intended to facilitate the escape of the mooftee. Whatever the motive, the result was lamentable, for several of the rioters were killed. Among those who fell were two persons connected with the mooftee. This sacrifice of human life was ren-

dered unavoidable by the proceedings of the insurgents, and neither the magistrate nor the military can be blamed for it. It was, however, little calculated to calm the irritation which existed, or to render the new levy popular. The life of man, indeed, is not highly estimated in the East, and the people of Rohilcund were by no means remarkable for tenderness with regard to it. But it must be remembered, that two of the slain were adherents of the mooftee—this was a heinous scandal; but what was still worse, it unfortunately happened that, in the confusion, the eyebrow of the mooftee himself received the indignity of a scratch. This outrage was more than Mahometan patience could bear. Sacrilege appeared to be added to exaction, and the enthusiasm of the votaries of the prophet was raised to boiling heat. The old tale—threadbare and ridiculous as it was—of the intention of the British to force Christianity on India, was revived; and since fanaticism sees all that it chooses to see, and nothing besides, it need not be doubted that the charge was believed. The never extinguished hope of once more beholding the standard of the prophet wave in triumph over every spot formerly subjected to Mahometan rule, revived, as it never fails to revive, whenever circumstances present the slightest symptoms of encouragement. The object was no longer resistance to an unpopular tax, nor contention for a civil right; the dispute had assumed the lofty character and the deadly hue of a religious quarrel. The faith was in danger, and all good Mussulmans were bound to defend it.

The mooftee, notwithstanding the accident to his eyebrow, effected his escape; and his subsequent conduct was well calculated to keep alive the fanatical spirit of the people. He repaired to a mosque on the skirts of the town, and hoisted the green or holy flag, with the declared view of assembling his friends and followers to protect him from the presumed violence of the magistrate. This was obviously a course which the European authorities could not view without apprehension, nor pass over without precaution; and on the morning after the mooftee had taken his post at the mosque, a detachment of two companies of sepoy, with a brigade of six-pounders, was placed immediately in front of him.

The mooftee was not idle in his retirement, and he showed himself no unworthy follower of the prophet, who claimed the right to propagate his religion by the sword. He appears to have forwarded communications to the principal Mussulman towns in Rohilcund, calling on the followers of Mahomet to stand forth in defence of their insulted religion. The greater part of them, like the actors in another religious tumult, "knew not wherefore they were brought together;" but as the craftsmen were not the less ready on that account to cry "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" so the

Mussulmans of Rohilcund, knowing nothing but that the mooftee had raised the holy flag, were fully prepared to shout, "Blessed be the prophet!" and to second their exclamations by the sword.

Reluctant to proceed to extremities, the magistrate attempted to negotiate, and Major Hearsey and Lieutenant Roberts were despatched to confer with the mooftee; the nazir of the collector was also commanded by that officer to perform the same duty. The fanatical spirit of the people was strongly manifested during these conferences. They were constantly interrupted by persons who declared that they had come in express search of martyrdom, and as negotiation, if successful, would deprive them of the anticipated pleasure, they viewed the process which was going forward with great fear and the most unrestrained disapprobation.

Such were the feelings of a portion of the people. Their leader had evidently no appetite for martyrdom, and he had taken considerable pains to avert such a fate from himself. In the conferences with him religion seems to have occupied a very small share of attention; it was well to parade it before the people, but in meetings of business the mooftee was willing to let it sleep, and confine the discussion to temporalities. The chief complaint related to the conduct of the kotwal, which, without doubt, had been bad enough. His dismissal from office, and the surrender of his person to the mercy of the insurgents, were declared the first conditions of their returning obedience to the law. The further points contended for were, the abolition of the tax, the pardon of the mooftee—a matter too interesting to the chief negotiator to be overlooked—and a provision for the families of the persons killed in the previous affray.

The negotiations did not, however, advance satisfactorily. The mooftee probably thought that resistance had gone far enough, but this was by no means the belief of his adherents. The interruptions which the negotiations received from the burning zeal of the people to enjoy the company of the *houris* have been already mentioned. The invitations to arms which had been forwarded by the mooftee now too began to manifest their full effect. Hordes

of fanatical and armed Mussulmans, anxious for the blood of the infidel, flocked in from other towns of Rohilcund. A more temperate zeal would have better suited the purposes of the mooftee; but he had now no power of controlling the monster he had called into existence. If he declined extreme measures, there were others prepared to undertake them. The timidity of age might paralyze his resolution, but in a person named Mahomed Esa the mob found an unscrupulous and vigorous leader. He was young and reckless; he had obtained great influence over the insurgents, and availed himself to the full of the state of circumstances to inflame the popular phrenzy.

The anxiety of the malcontents for action became almost uncontrollable: one party proposed an attack by night upon the small force which the magistrate had placed to watch the movements of the mooftee. Happily, this was opposed, or its destruction would have been almost inevitable. The intention, however, was only postponed; and on the morning of the 25th of April, after murdering an English gentleman under circumstances of wanton atrocity, the attack was made. The insurgents were met by the British detachment, which was commanded by Captain Boscawen, with firmness. Its number was small, and the circumstances in which it was placed difficult; but its spirit was good. The insurgents were defeated with considerable loss, and this result led necessarily to their dispersion, and to the re-establishment of order.

The tax imposed at Bareilly was of small amount, and it had been introduced without much difficulty throughout a considerable portion of India; but it was at variance with the habits of the people upon whom it was attempted to be levied, and it offended many prejudices. The unpopularity of the impost was undoubtedly increased by the ill conduct of those engaged in the collection of it; but there can be no doubt that it was greatly disliked, independently of all aggravating circumstances. It was a change—this in India is always regarded as an evil. It might be a beneficial change, but it is useless and dangerous to insist upon benefiting men against their will.

CHAPTER XXV.

DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PEISHWA AND THE GUICOWAR—MURDER OF GUNGADHUR SHASTRY—TRIMBUCKJEE DAINGLIA SURRENDERED TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT—THE PINDARRIES—CAPTURE OF HATTRAIS AND MOORSAUM—ATTACK ON THE BRITISH RESIDENCY AT POONA—MEASURES FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PINDARRIES—TREATY WITH SCINDIA—BATTLE OF SEETABULDEE—RISE OF TOOLSEE BHEE—BATTLE OF MAHIDPORE—TREATY WITH HOLKAR—DEFEAT OF THE PEISHWA—FALL OF TALPHEE—PERFIDY AND ARREST OF APPA SAHIB—CAPTURE OF CHANDA AND MALLIGAU—PEISHWA SURRENDERS—FALL OF ASHKEGHUR—AFFAIRS IN CEYLON—PALMER AND COMPANY—RESIGNATION OF THE MARQUIS HASTINGS.

THE complicated drama which is about to open requires that attention should be carried back to a period antecedent to the occurrence of some of the events which formed the subject of the last chapter. When Lord Moira undertook the reins of government in India, the elements of commotion were almost everywhere prepared, and some favourable opportunity, or casual act of provocation, was only wanting to call them into operation. Among the causes which were likely to disturb the peace of the country were certain differences between the peishwa and the guicowar, for the settlement of which the former prince manifested a most extraordinary anxiety. This, however, was in perfect correspondence with the usual practices of native courts, of taking advantage of any change in the British government to press, with unwonted earnestness and pertinacity, every claim which they possess, or pretend to possess, either upon that government or upon the states under its protection.

The discussions between the peishwa and the guicowar arose partly out of the former connection between those princes; and the British government, by the treaties concluded with both, was bound to arbitrate upon their claims. A further ground of dispute was furnished by the circumstances of Ahmedabad. This district was divided between the peishwa and the guicowar; the former prince had granted a lease of his share to the latter, and arrangements had been made, under the sanction and influence of the British government, calculated to promote the advancement of the country in prosperity and happiness. The success of those arrangements was, however, endangered by a desire expressed by the peishwa to resume his portion of the territory. This was a result alike to be deprecated by the guicowar, the British government, and the inhabitants of the district in question; and it became necessary that endeavours should be made to avert it. With these questions were mixed up others, connected with the peishwa's interest in Kattywar; and altogether, the disputes were involved in much intricacy, while the objects to which they related were of great delicacy and importance.

Although the British government possessed

the power of arbitration, it was obviously desirable that this authority should not be exercised except in case of absolute necessity; and that, before calling it into operation, every opportunity should be afforded to the native powers of settling their differences by negotiation between themselves. Some attempts to effect this object were made by the guicowar's vakeel at Poona, but they were counteracted by the intrigues of a person named Trimbuckjee Dainglia, who enjoyed the confidence of the Peishwa, and had a personal interest in the determination of one of the questions at issue,—the resumption of the peishwa's direct authority in Ahmedabad.

Trimbuckjee Dainglia was one of those intriguing and fortunate adventurers naturally generated in the atmosphere of a despotic court. His origin was low, and his earliest employment under the peishwa was that of a menial servant. His disposition, however, led him to watch for opportunities of raising his fortune, and he found them. On some occasions the means fell in his way of rendering services desired by his master, and he was not slow to improve the advantages he thus gained. He rose rapidly in his sovereign's favour, and so successfully advanced his own influence, that at length, though the office of first minister was nominally held by another, all substantial power was actually in the hands of Trimbuckjee Dainglia. The British resident at Poona at this time was the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone. He formed and expressed a most unfavourable opinion of this man, and the progress of events proved that it was just.

The efforts of the guicowar's agent at Poona to effect an amicable arrangement being constantly frustrated by the machinations of the peishwa's unprincipled favourite, it was deemed advisable to make a change in the person by whom the negotiation was to be conducted. Gungadur Shastry, the guicowar's principal minister, was a man of extraordinary talent and judgment. The services which he had rendered to the guicowar state were pre-eminent. He had laboured strenuously to eradicate abuse from every part of the government, and to his exertions the rescue of the state from bankruptcy and ruin

was mainly attributable. The talents, rank, and character of this individual seemed to point him out as the fittest person to conduct the negotiations with the peishwa, and by the advice of Captain Carnac, who discerned and duly appreciated his merits, he was nominated to the performance of that duty.

His appointment was regarded by the prevailing party at Poona with dislike and apprehension, and, previously to his arrival, some frivolous objections were raised by the peishwa to receiving him. These were removed by the British resident, and Gungadthur Shastry proceeded to the seat of his mission. Here intrigue and counteraction awaited his proceedings. A servant of a former dewan of the Guicowar government, named Bundojee, was engaged in active attempts to frustrate the shastry's endeavours: he had frequent interviews with the minister, and even went so far as to produce a letter, purporting to be from Futteh Sing, the ruler of the Guicowar state, disavowing the mission. These proceedings, being communicated to Captain Carnac, were by him laid before Futteh Sing. The Guicowar prince explicitly and entirely disavowed them, and, in proof of his sincerity, intreated that an application might be made by the resident at Poona for the surrender of the person of the individual who had thus abused his name. The application, however, was not made; the principal reason for refraining being the difficulty of adducing sufficient evidence to justify such a demand.

Another active agent of intrigue was Bhugwunt Row Guicowar, a relation of the sovereign whom Gungadthur Shastry represented. He had visited the peishwa's territories under pretence of a pilgrimage, and, being there, sought an interview with the sovereign, on the ground of being the bearer of letters to him. Against this the British resident remonstrated, and at length obtained a promise from the peishwa, that he would not see Bhugwunt Row without a previous communication of his intention.

The designs of this promoter of intrigue and division had been penetrated by Captain Carnac, who forthwith was commissioned by Futteh Sing Guicowar to request that the British government would take effectual means of averting the mischievous consequences to be apprehended. In the mean time, however, the peishwa had violated the promise which he had given to the British resident, by receiving Bhugwunt Row at a very full durbar, in the presence of the accredited ministers of the Guicowar. This breach of his word he endeavoured to excuse by alleging that the appearance of Bhugwunt Row at durbar had not been sanctioned by him; the habitual conduct and feelings of the peishwa, however, render it almost certain that this statement was false.

With the view of testing the sincerity of the Guicowar prince, and at the same time of enabling the British resident at Poona

to encounter with better effect the mass of intrigue with which he was surrounded, Captain Carnac had been instructed to communicate to Futteh Sing the facts reported from Poona by the resident, and to submit to his highness the propriety of meeting the proceedings, in which his name had been surreptitiously used, by a disclaimer, framed in such a formal and authoritative manner that it could be officially used at the durbar of Poona. Some reluctance was at first manifested to this; but the objections of the prince were ultimately overcome by the address of the resident: the required document was given, and forwarded by the Bombay government to Poona.

Gungadthur Shastry had hitherto received few marks of favour from the peishwa or his minister, and his endeavours to arrange the matters in dispute had been abortive. The peishwa refused to renew the lease of Ahmedabad—on this point he was explicit: on others, every sort of evasion, chicanery, and delay was employed to postpone the conclusion of the negotiation. Gungadthur Shastry was at length about to take his departure from Poona, relinquishing to the British government the task which he had laboured assiduously, but vainly, to perform, when a sudden change took place in the conduct of the peishwa and his minister, which induced him to suspend the execution of his intention. Both the master and the servant began to make an ostentatious display of kindly feelings towards the shastry, and to appear anxious to atone for their former hostility by the most extraordinary marks of esteem and confidence. Prospects of a settlement of the disputed questions, upon terms consistent with the interest of the Guicowar, were held out, and the greatest apparent cordiality was established between the shastry and his former enemy, Trimluckjee. As a crowning mark of the peishwa's favour, he actually proposed a marriage between a female of his own family and the shastry's son, and preparations were made for its celebration.

The peishwa and his minister proceeded on a pilgrimage to Nassuck, and the shastry accompanied them. During the journey, reports that the shastry had been seized by Trimluckjee were extensively circulated at Poona. They were disbelieved by the British resident; but so much pains were taken to convince him that they had no foundation, as to excite in his mind considerable surprise. It has been stated that, at the period when Gungadthur Shastry and Trimluckjee were associated on friendly terms, the latter avowed to the former that, before their reconciliation, he had been engaged in plans for his assassination. This avowal seems scarcely credible, and if made, it is not easily to be traced to any rational motive. If intended as a parade of entire confidence, it was certainly a clumsy expedient, and would seem quite as likely to put the shastry on his guard as to command

his dependence on the good faith of one who did not hesitate to acknowledge having entertained such abominable designs.

The shastry, though he had formerly felt some apprehensions of treachery and violence, appears to have been divested, by the smoothness of the minister, of every relic of such feelings: they were again, indeed, roused, but it was when too late. Another devotional journey was proposed, and the shastry invited to accompany the peishwa and the minister to Punderpore. On this occasion, the shastry's colleague, Bappoo Mryaul, a man of wary and circumspect character, was not permitted to accompany him, and his exclusion was attributed to the influence of Trimluckjee. At his desire, also, the shastry consented to leave most of his attendants at Poona.

The visit to Punderpore took place in July, 1815. On the 14th of that month the shastry went to an entertainment; on his return he complained of fever, and desired that if any persons came to request his presence at the temple, they might be told that he was ill. In about half an hour after his return, a messenger from Trimluckjee came to request him to join that person in his devotions; but was told that the shastry was unwell, and would not go out. A second messenger arrived, shortly after, to acquaint the shastry that the peishwa was to go to the temple the next morning, and that he ought to take advantage of the interval and attend prayers; but not to bring many attendants with him. He still declined. Soon after the receipt of the second message, two of his friends left him and proceeded to the great temple. Here they met Trimluckjee, who lamented the refusal of the shastry to come to prayers, and entreated them to use their influence to change his determination. One of them returned, and told the shastry what had occurred; but he still pleaded illness as a reason for non-compliance. Reflecting, however, that his refusal to join in the devotions of the temple, after these various messages, might appear strange in the eyes of Trimluckjee, he at length agreed to go.

As he passed along, one of his attendants heard a man in the crowd ask, "Which is the shastry?" and another reply, "He who wears the necklace;" but not thinking the inquiry of any importance, he paid no attention either to the person asking the question or to him who made the answer. The shastry entered the temple, performed his devotions, and after remaining a few minutes in conversation with Trimluckjee Dainglia, returned towards the house which he occupied. He advanced but a short distance from the temple, when three men came running behind him, and, as if clearing the road for some person of distinction, calling out, "Make way! make way!" Their left hands were folded up in cloths, and each of them, in his right hand, bore what seemed to be a twisted cloth, such as appears to be commonly used for striking persons in a crowd

to make them stand aside. One of them struck the shastry a violent blow with the cloth, and it was then discovered that he had a sword in his hand; another seized him by the hair and threw him down; and, whilst in the act of falling, a third ruffian cut him on the head. Three of the shastry's attendants remained with their master; but two more assassins rushing from the front, the whole of them were wounded and disabled. The rest of the shastry's friends and followers, who do not appear to have been blest with any large share of personal intrepidity, ran away, leaving him in the hands of his murderers. Being thus at liberty to complete their bloody work, they mangled the unhappy man in a dreadful manner, and then departed; one of them exclaiming, in the Mahratta language, "We have now finished him."

Three of the shastry's people had remained at the temple, in attendance upon one of his suite. As they approached the spot where the murder had been committed, they saw five men, with naked swords, running towards the temple. This alarmed them, but not being aware of what had happened, they made their way as quietly as possible to the shastry's house; not finding him there, they returned to the road, where they discovered his body cut to pieces.

The British resident had accompanied the peishwa to Nassuck, but, understanding that his attendance at Punderpore would not be acceptable, he had, on the departure of the devotees for that place, proceeded to Ellora. There he learned the horrible events which had marked the devotional expedition of the peishwa, to whom he forthwith communicated his intention of immediately returning to Poona, calling on him, at the same time, to take measures for discovering and bringing to justice the murderers of the shastry. Captain Pottinger, the assistant, who had been left at Poona, was instructed to provide for the safety of the surviving parties connected with the Baroda mission; and, in case of necessity, he was to invite them to encamp in the neighbourhood of the British residency.

The demands of Mr. Elphinstone were unheeded; and the representations of the shastry's followers, of course, met with no better success. The day after the murder some of the shastry's attendants waited on Trimluckjee, and urged that it behoved him, alike as the friend of the deceased and minister of the peishwa, to institute an active inquiry. He received them with great civility, but said that he had no clue to guide him in tracing the criminals, and that the shastry was wrong to venture abroad without fifty or a hundred attendants. It was answered, that the shastry considered himself among friends; that it was not usual to bring many people on such occasions; and, with regard to the want of marks by which to trace the perpetrators of the crime, they observed, that the assassins wore the dress of the Carnatic, and that Trimluckjee well knew

who were the shastry's enemies. To this the minister replied by an appeal to that power whose agency is so universally recognized in the east. He asked, "How could I avert what fate has decreed?" And, having thus removed the transaction beyond the sphere of human responsibility, he consoled the shastry's followers by assuring them that, now their protector was gone, they must depend upon themselves; graciously adding, however, that he would do what he could for them. On the following day the shastry's followers obtained permission to return to Poona; but it was intimated to them, that they need not trouble themselves to attend any more, either upon Trimluckjee or the peishwa.

Although the remonstrances of the British resident did not produce any serious investigation into the circumstances of the murder, they were sufficient to induce Trimluckjee and his sovereign to take extraordinary measures for their own safety. Before the murder, indeed, the peishwa had adopted some unusual precautions. New troops were raised, additional guards were posted round his house, and, contrary to his usual practice, his progress was attended by a large body of armed men. After the murder these precautions were redoubled.

The peishwa returned to Poona, but his entry was marked by symptoms of anxiety and fear. His approach was not preceded by any notice: he arrived in a close palanquin, and was not met by any of his chiefs. The day of his arrival was a great festival, on which thousands of Brahmins were accustomed to attend, to receive his alms. He never before failed to be present at the dispensation; but, on this occasion, he did not appear. At night strong guards were posted, not only at the palace, but at the house of Trimluckjee. Subsequently, the levies of new troops, and the concentration of military force in the vicinity of Poona, continued; and every movement manifested distrust and alarm.

Soon after the peishwa's return, the British resident requested an audience; this, on various pretexts, was evaded. After much difficulty, Mr. Elphinstone succeeded in conveying to the peishwa a paper, containing a direct charge against Trimluckjee, and demanding his arrest, as well as that of Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, the two persons who had so anxiously endeavoured to undermine and counteract the labours of Gungadhar Shastry. In this paper, the resident, after stating the anxiety he had felt for an interview, expressed his surprise that no inquiry had been made into the circumstances of the shastry's assassination. The peishwa's pride and feelings were, however, respected, by averting the imputation of neglect and guilt from him, and casting it upon those whose duty it was to have informed his highness of the facts; a duty which, it was assumed, they had omitted to perform; and to this omission was attributed the forbearance of the prince

from those measures which were necessary to uphold the character of his government, and which, the resident took for granted, were in accordance not less with his inclinations than with his duty. The peishwa was informed that the public voice had been unanimous in accusing Trimluckjee as the instigator of the crime; the facts of the murder, and of the minister's conduct after its perpetration, were recapitulated; the necessity of the arrest of Trimluckjee, in order that witnesses might not be deterred from coming forward by the terror of his power and influence, was urged; and the paper terminated by distinctly apprizing the peishwa, that all communication with the British government must be suspended until its demand upon this point should be satisfied.

The peishwa now felt that, to preserve appearances, it was necessary to do something; but appearance being his only object, he resolved that it should be as little as possible. A day or two after the delivery of the paper, the resident received a message, assuring him that it had been perused with the fullest attention, and that the peishwa had taken certain proceedings in consequence. These steps were, however, very unsatisfactory. The two minor agents, Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, had been placed under restraint, but the grand conspirator, Trimluckjee, remained at large, and had actually the custody of his alleged coadjutors in crime; the guards placed over their houses belonged to Trimluckjee. Further evidence was afforded of the insincere and deceptive character of these proceedings, by the fact of an interview having taken place between Trimluckjee and Bundojee on the preceding night.

The charge against Trimluckjee could not be altogether passed over in the peishwa's message: but nothing explicit was stated with regard to it; an explanation being promised through a certain native agent of the British residency, whom the minister requested to be sent to him. This agent was incapacitated by age and infirmities, and another was consequently sent. To him a long message was delivered, compounded of professions of attachment to the British government, and a denial of the guilt of Trimluckjee; the latter being accompanied by an offer to arrest him immediately, if his guilt were proved (which, while he remained at large, was obviously next to impossible); and a promise to consider the establishment of the truth of his having sent invitations to the shastry to come to the temple with a few attendants, as sufficient evidence of guilt. To this Mr. Elphinstone replied, by repeating that he was prepared to make good his charges; by reiterating his call for the arrest of Trimluckjee; and by warning the peishwa of the danger in which he placed his alliance with the British government, by a perseverance in the course which he had hitherto adopted.

The grounds of suspicion against Trim-

buckjee were, indeed, too strong to be overlooked. His anxiety for the shastry's attendance in the temple on the night of the murder, and the pains he took to induce him to overcome the reluctance which he felt to leaving his house—his express desire that the shastry should be accompanied by few attendants, and the blame which, after the murder, he cast upon him, for not being provided with a greater number—the impunity of the murderers, in a place surrounded by the peishwa's guards, and the omission of all endeavours to trace them, or to ascertain their persons and motives—the fact of no measure being taken to arrest Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, on whom strong suspicion alighted, till pressed by the British resident—these, with many other minor circumstances, combined with the profligate character of Trimbucketjee, and his former notorious hostility to the shastry, tended to fix upon the minister the guilt of the atrocious crime by which the peishwa's territories had been disgraced and the British government insulted. The suspicion, indeed, extended further and higher; it ascended through the servant to the sovereign: but as it was impossible to reach the latter without measures of positive hostility, the effect of which might not be confined to Poona, but might possibly light up the flames of war through a large portion of India, it was deemed advisable, on the principles of expediency, to suffer the guilty sovereign to escape the doom he merited, and to be content with the surrender of his instrument.

The peishwa, however, continued to refuse this act of justice. He required the arrest of Trimbucketjee to be preceded by an investigation into the charges; a mode of proceeding nowhere adopted, where the grounds of suspicion are so strong and the imputed crime of so deep a dye, and one which he knew must be ineffectual, from the ample means which the minister of a despotic sovereign must possess, while he continues in the enjoyment of freedom and power, to silence the voices of all who may be disposed to accuse him. The arrest of Trimbucketjee was, therefore, an indispensable preliminary to a fair or effectual investigation; and by consenting to enter on an inquiry without it, the resident would only have insured to an atrocious criminal the benefit of a public exculpation. The peishwa would not admit this; he appeared determined to make common cause with his favourite, and to stand or fall with him.

Trimbucketjee had not only been a supple agent in the political intrigues of the peishwa, but also the active and ready promoter of the licentious and degrading pleasures in which a large portion of that prince's life was spent. He had been found a useful instrument for effecting any purpose, however base or wicked, to which his master called him. Nothing disgusted him by its vileness; nothing deterred him by its atrocity. Whether as the experienced purveyor to sensual indulgence; the

adept in intrigue and chicanery; or, lastly, the unscrupulous villain, to whom murder was but one among various means of accomplishing a desired end, he could not be spared; and the peishwa might, moreover, apprehend danger to himself, from the discoveries which hope or fear might induce Trimbucketjee to make. The wildest and most dangerous schemes were, therefore, sought to secure impunity to the favourite. It was even proposed that he should quit Poona and excite a feigned rebellion, in which, while ostensibly assailing the authority of the peishwa, he was to receive his secret support. Insane as was this scheme, some preparations were made for carrying it into effect. At other times, various modes of compromise were offered; but all these the resident, with proper firmness and a just sense of what was due to his country, rejected.

Some commotions at Hyderabad inspired the authorities at Poona with still greater confidence. Subterfuge and compromise then gave way to language and conduct approaching to defiance. It was determined that no concession should be made to the representations of the British resident; that Trimbucketjee should remain at liberty, at court, and in office, and that all demands for his punishment should be resisted. The tone assumed was that of menace and hostility, and the proceedings of the court corresponded with its language.

The resident had some time previously remonstrated against the concentration of the troops at Poona; but the sole effect was, to remove the rendezvous to twenty or twenty-five miles from the city. Recruiting still went on, and the assemblage of troops, combined with the altered tone of the durbar, at length rendered it necessary for the resident to take corresponding measures. The sanction of the governor-general to the course to which his own conviction led, enabled him to pursue it with the greater confidence. He once more warned the peishwa of the precipice on which he stood, and, pointing out the inevitable consequences of the continuance of his blind protection of his guilty minister, assured him that the British government would not desist from demanding his surrender. The firm and decisive conduct of the resident diffused some alarm among those opposed to him. A long consultation ensued between the peishwa and some of his more powerful followers, and the result was communicated in a message to Mr. Elphinstone. The proposal which emanated from the deliberations of this conclave was, that Trimbucketjee should be imprisoned, on certain conditions. These conditions were three in number:—the British government was not to demand the capital punishment of Trimbucketjee, nor his surrender to its own officers, nor any further inquiry into the transaction. In the mean time, Trimbucketjee, after an interview with the peishwa, said to be of a very friendly character, was sent off to Wamsunghur, a hill-fort near Sattara.

The conditions attempted to be forced on the resident were of course rejected, and an unqualified surrender of Trimbuckjee to the British government insisted on; but a private intimation was conveyed to the acting minister of the peishwa that, after the prisoner was in British custody, no further inquiry would take place. The propriety of this promise seems open to question. It had the appearance of a relaxation in the terms which the British resident had laid down, and to which he professed tenaciously to adhere. If the British government, satisfied with the possession of the person of Trimbuckjee, were willing to forego inquiry; still it could scarcely be prudent to bind itself to this course by a promise.

Passing over this error, the conduct of the resident was most firm and judicious. He continued to enforce the claims of the British government to the custody of Trimbuckjee, and the fears of the peishwa at length yielded what the sense of justice would never have extorted from him. The prisoner was removed from Wassuntghur to Poona, and there delivered over to a detachment of British troops; from thence he was conducted to Bombay, with Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, who were to be given up to the Guicowar government. On his arrival, Trimbuckjee was placed in strict confinement in the fort of Tannah.

Mention has been incidentally made of persons called Pindarries, occasionally found in the service of belligerent chiefs; and, as they are now about to occupy a more important place in the field of Indian politics than has hitherto been assigned to them, it becomes necessary to make some reference to their character and origin. In every country, at whatever point of civilization it may have arrived, some are found who, impelled either by want or depravity, seek a subsistence from sources less painful and less honourable than labour. In every country, at some period of its history, a vast number of persons have supported themselves by open plunder—have followed no other occupation, and have not even pretended to follow any other. The time during which this state of things prevails may be longer or shorter, and its duration will be determined by a great variety of circumstances; but, in a certain stage of society, it will as inevitably occur as storms or earthquakes under certain conditions of the natural elements. A great deal of wonder has been spent upon the character and conduct of the Pindarries: there seems, however, little ground for any very copious display of such a feeling, and a large portion of it is probably to be ascribed to the unusual name by which these adventurers are described.

They were in truth, except on account of their numbers, a very contemptible set of miscreants. Active and enterprising almost beyond belief, and wicked to the full measure which the most ardent lover of horror can desire, their adventures and their crimes were undignified by any of those nobler character-

istics of our nature, which have sometimes shed a deceptive glory over actions of great atrocity, and averted from their perpetrators the penalty of unmitigated disgust. No redeeming virtue marked the character of the Pindarie. Even animal courage, often the sole ennobling quality of his profession, he possessed not. The Pindarie marched, or rather darted, upon his victims with a rapidity certainly never equalled by any regular force; but, unfortunately for the romantic colouring of his character, he manifested equal or even greater alacrity in flight. No troops in the history of the world ever displayed such proficiency in the art of running away; and to this, their strong point, they invariably resorted if attacked. "They avoid fighting," said one who had carefully studied their character and habits, "for they come to plunder, not to fight." Other combatants seek to overcome their adversary; the Pindarries were only anxious to get out of his way. Call these persons freebooters, banditti, or by any name to which the ear is accustomed, and the mystery which has been attached to them vanishes. They were mean and cowardly thieves, engendered by a vicious and diseased state of society. To repress them was a duty imperative upon the British government, and it was no less so to take effectual measures to guard against a new race of robbers being called forth in their place.

The etymology of the term *Pindarie* has given rise to much and fruitless discussion. By some it has been traced to an ancient Hindee word, meaning 'plunder;' and if this be not a just derivation, it is at least a very appropriate one. The first mention of these persons in history has been sometimes said to occur in the latter part of the seventeenth century; at others, in the beginning of the eighteenth; a point of little moment, since it relates merely to a name, as it cannot be doubted that India contained within its ample boundaries a very plentiful supply of robbers, even at periods much earlier than either of the dates which have been mentioned.

The native princes of India have never been very scrupulous as to the means of accomplishing their purposes, and though not only high feeling, but even sound policy, would have led to the rejection of the services of the Pindarries, they were, in various instances, retained by what were regarded as regular governments. The services which they rendered were all of one description—they consisted in crippling the enemy of their employers by plundering his baggage or his convoys—driving off cattle from the vicinity of his camp, and desolating the country from which his supplies were to be drawn. The terms upon which their assistance was afforded are not so easily ascertainable. It is probable that they varied; perhaps they were rarely fixed with much precision, and it may be safely believed that the measure of Pindarie

remuneration was decided by the degree of ability to acquire and to retain. In some cases a trifling sum might be allowed by the government under which they served for each horseman employed, but plunder invariably formed the chief, if not the sole, source of their reward. But whatever the engagements between the Pindarries and the governments by whom they were retained, it is stated, on competent authority, that they were observed with just such a measure of good faith as might have been expected. It was not uncommon, according to Captain Sydenham, for the Pindarries to rob the government which they served; "and, on the other hand," he adds, "the government seldom loses an opportunity of extorting from them money under false pretences." This is precisely the state of things which those acquainted with the character of the Pindarries and their masters would have anticipated.

These marauders received especial marks of favour and encouragement from Holkar and Scindia. Holkar bestowed upon one of their chiefs a golden flag. This gave the Pindarries a sort of rank among the Maharrattas, but effected no change in their habits or character. Gurdee Khan, the fortunate receiver of this distinction, remained during his life attached to the armies of his patron: and notwithstanding the command subsequently passed from his family, that body of Pindarries continued faithful to Holkar. But, though entertained and encouraged, they were regarded with contempt. Community of feeling and of purpose did not secure the respect of the Maharrattas for those who were but one grade below themselves in the moral scale. The Pindarries always encamped apart from the rest of the army, and their chiefs were never allowed to sit in the presence of the prince.

A younger brother of Gurdee Khan, named Shah Bay Khan, attached himself to the service of Scindia. He left two sons, Hera and Burrun, each of whom attained as much celebrity as can be supposed to surround the character of a robber chieftain. Quitting the service of Scindia, these adventurous persons proceeded to Malwa, and, having encamped at Berniah, with about five thousand followers, they made an overture to the government of Bhopal to invade and lay waste the territories of Nagpore, with which state it was at war. The offer was declined, an act of forbearance which has been ascribed to fear. Nothing disheartened by the refusal, the Pindarie leaders proceeded to Nagpore, where they were graciously received. Their visit was a matter of business. Their offer, to accommodate the state of Bhopal by the plunder of Nagpore, having been rejected, they now made to Nagpore a like tender of their services for ravaging Bhopal. They found the ruler of Nagpore nothing loath; and, being able and experienced workmen, they executed his order so effectually, that,

at the distance of twenty-five years, Sir John Malcolm represents Bhopal as not then recovered from the effects of their visitation. Their zeal and efficiency, however, met with a most ungrateful return. The rajah of Nagpore, though glad of an opportunity of inflicting a vital injury upon an enemy, was too conscientious to allow such unprincipled persons as the Pindarries to retain the fruits of their labours. On the return of these faithful instruments of his will to his capital, he very unceremoniously surrounded their camp, plundered them of all the movables of which they had plundered the unhappy inhabitants of Bhopal, and seized Burrun, one of their chiefs: Hera, the other commander, fled.

A noted leader among the Pindarries was Kurree Khan. He was, at one period, an humble follower of Burrun and Hera, with a force of five or six hundred men. On the apprehension of Burrun, he fled from Nagpore and joined Dowlut Row Scindia, who was then preparing to attack the nizam. In the campaign which followed he gained an immense booty, and his experience at Nagpore warned him to take care of it. To secure this end, a retreat appeared to him advisable: he, accordingly, abandoned Scindia's army in the Deccan, and went to central India, to offer his services to Jeswunt Row Holkar. This prince showed no reluctance to receive and employ the fugitive: but the mind of the latter was still uneasy on account of his much-valued wealth; and not feeling it quite safe in the custody of Jeswunt Row, he at once withdrew his followers and himself, and opened a double negotiation with his former master Scindia, and with Ameer Khan, whose character was about on a level with his own in point of respectability, while his place in society was little less questionable. Both negotiations succeeded. Ameer Khan offered him an asylum, and when that adventurer was afterwards engaged in hostilities with Scindia, Kurree Khan repaid the kindness by making himself master of certain districts at the expense of his benefactor, and obtaining a confirmation of his possession of them from Scindia. By that prince Kurree Khan was created a nawab, and his ambition was further gratified by a marriage with a lady of rank.

The contemporaneous absence of Scindia and Holkar tempted this indefatigable person to make further additions to his territory. He now evidently contemplated the establishment of a regular state, and the jealousy of Scindia was excited. Scindia advanced from his capital, with the full determination of destroying a man who was becoming far too formidable for a dependant, but he was withheld by policy from resorting to force. Kurree Khan, being invited to attend him, proceeded with a degree of ostentatious splendour scarcely inferior to that of the chief to whom he professed allegiance. On

occasion of receiving a visit from Scindia, Kurreem Khan prepared a musnud of extraordinary materials. It was composed of one hundred and twenty-five thousand rupees, covered with a rich cloth. On this Scindia was seated, and the whole formed a present from the vassal to his liege lord.

The success of Kurreem Khan seemed worthy of his munificence. Scindia appeared enchanted by the extraordinary talents of Kurreem, both as a soldier and a statesman. His compliments far exceeded the usual extent of eastern hyperbole, and Kurreem had reason to rejoice in having secured the favour of a chief whose enmity he had reason to apprehend. He had still further reason to be pleased, that the flattering attentions of his patron promised some better results than empty praise. The Pindarrie chief was emboldened to solicit the transfer of several valuable districts, and tendered security for making an advance of four lacs and a half of rupees, if his desire were granted. The superior seemed as ready to bestow as the dependant was bold to ask. Every boon was graciously accorded. No prince ever appeared more sensible of the merits of a servant; no servant more enthusiastically attached to his prince. The transfer of the districts was ordered to take place forthwith, and a rich dress of investiture to be prepared.

In the midst of this seeming cordiality, some of the elder and more wary of the Pindarrie followers entertained doubts. They had before witnessed scenes somewhat resembling that which they now beheld, and they recollected how they had terminated. Kurreem himself was not a novice in these matters, and heretofore he had rather exceeded than fallen short of a due measure of caution. His temper, his experience, and the warnings of his followers, might have been deemed sufficient to excite some degree of suspicion as to the probable termination of the superabundant grace and condescension of Scindia: but such was not the case; Kurreem saw nothing but his own good fortune, and already in idea possessed all that was promised.

The interchange of compliments and presents having continued as long as was thought expedient, the day arrived for making the final arrangements for the transfer of the coveted districts, and formally installing Kurreem in the possession of them. He was then, after taking leave of his chieftain and benefactor, to proceed immediately to the exercise of his new authority.

Everything bore the most auspicious appearance. Kurreem advanced to receive his expected donation, with but a slender train of attendants, probably from a desire to show respect to his superior, and in the belief that, now his ends were gained, it was more politic to flatter the pride of his chief than to appeal to his fears. Scindia received his visitor with the same benignity which he had manifested throughout—to exhibit more was im-

possible. The sunnuds were called for—the dresses were produced, and Kurreem could see nothing between himself and the fulfilment of his hopes. Scindia, however, made some pretext for retiring, not thinking it proper to give his personal countenance to the scene which was to follow. This was an act of decorum very creditable to the taste of the Mahratta chief, for his continued presence could hardly have been reconciled with his previous bearing, and his departure rendered explanation impracticable, though probably in the opinion of Kurreem not unnecessary.

The expectant Pindarrie was not kept long in the pangs of anxious hope. Scindia had scarcely quitted the tent, when armed men rushed from the sides, and seized Kurreem, with some of his principal adherents. A cannon was now fired as a signal that this feat had been accomplished; and the troops which had been drawn out to do honour to Kurreem carried the compliment so far as to extend their care to all his followers, by advancing upon the Pindarrie camp. Suspicion is one of the strongest characteristics of the Pindarrie; this was soon excited in the camp, and as many as were able hastily declined the proffered attentions of Scindia's troops. A few only were killed, but, though the loss of life was small, the loss of that which, in Oriental estimation, is scarcely of less value, was considerable. The army of Scindia obtained an immense booty, a conclusion in itself sufficiently gratifying. But the value of the triumph was greatly enhanced in the eyes of the soldiery by the means which had led to it. It was the result neither of valour, nor of military talent, nor of far-seeing wisdom; but solely of that sinister art, in which the natives of the East are generally such adepts, and which, in the eyes of a Mahratta especially, is the first and most venerated of all human accomplishments.

Kurreem was four years a captive. The treasure which he had lost through the prudent arrangements of Scindia, though not inconsiderable, formed but a small part of what he could command, the mass of which was deposited at Shujahpooor. On the news of his arrest reaching that place, his mother packed up all that was portable, and fled towards the jungles of Baglee, from which place the fear of Scindia subsequently drove her further to the westward.

In the mean time Kurreem was not idle. He found opportunities of corresponding with his followers, and he enjoined them, with paternal authority, to plunder everywhere, but especially the territories of Scindia. These commands were too agreeable to their feelings to be neglected, and Kurreem had the high satisfaction of knowing that he was implicitly obeyed.

While the professional duties of the Pindarries were thus discharged, without suspension or impediment, some attempts were made to effect a negotiation for the release of

Kurreeem. These were long resisted by Scindia; but a door was at last opened for the exercise of his clemency, by an appeal to one of the passions most predominant in the heart of an Eastern potentate. Six lacs of rupees to the sovereign was regarded as a tempting offer, and the proposed distribution of one lac more among the officers of the court, by whom the treaty was negotiated, had a vast effect in facilitating their perception, both of the advantages of the plan to the interests of their master, and of the claims of Kurreeem to the indulgence which he sought. Security was given for the payment of these sums, and the prisoner was released. His former keepers were, however, not quite satisfied of the safety of the experiment, and endeavours were made to conciliate him by the accumulation of presents and marks of honour. But Kurreeem had bitter experience of the value of such blandishments. He determined, therefore, to trust to his own resources, and assembling his Pindarries from every quarter, he was soon in possession of territories more extensive than he had enjoyed before his misfortune.

Under these circumstances he was joined by another Pindarrie chief, named Cheetoo, who, it is said, had in early life been much indebted to him. This man was considered one of the ablest of the Pindarrie leaders, and his junction with Kurreeem was therefore regarded with apprehension. It was, however, of brief duration. The excesses which revenge led Kurreeem to perpetrate in the territories of Scindia caused that prince bitterly to repent the bargain which his avarice had led him to conclude; and he resolved to make every effort to annihilate the power of Kurreeem. In this labour he found a willing ally in the faithful Cheetoo, whose obligations to Kurreeem offered no obstacle to his engaging in the destruction of his friend and patron. The result was, that Kurreeem's camp was attacked and dispersed, and himself obliged to seek safety in flight.

He now sought the protection of Ameer Khan, and this worthy person, under pretence of recommending him to the good graces of Toolsee Bhye, the profligate favourite of Jeswunt Row Holkar, transferred him to the care of Ghuffoor Khan, a near relation of Ameer Khan, and his representative and creature at the court of Holkar. By him Kurreeem was placed under restraint. This durance lasted three years, during which his followers were actively and vigorously occupied. At last he effected his escape, and joined his adherents at Berniah, encouraged to take this step, it has been said, by the overtures of Scindia to forgive the past and provide for the future. A man rarely needs much encouragement to escape from captivity, if he thinks the object can be effected; and Kurreeem could hardly attach much value to the promises of Scindia. He did, however, escape, and prepared to act under Scindia's orders.

Cheetoo, who has already been honourably mentioned, first as the friend, and, secondly,

as the betrayer of Kurreeem, profited by the captivity of the latter so far as to gain the rank of chief leader among the Pindarries. The value of this distinction may be differently estimated by different minds; but whatever it might be, Cheetoo sought and obtained it. He fixed his abode amid the hills and forests situated between the north bank of the Nerbudda and the Vindhya mountains. His cantonments were near the village of Nimar, and he resided either there or at Sattram. During the latter part of his career he seldom made long excursions, but his troops were dispersed on duty at various points, and patrolled the country in every direction. He acknowledged a sort of allegiance to Scindia; but this did not restrain his followers from occasional inroads upon the territories of that prince, as evidences of their independence and impartiality.

Movements were sometimes made, with the ostensible purpose of putting the marauders down, but nothing was effected. A treaty was at length entered into, by which the Pindarries agreed to exempt the territories of Scindia from plunder, on condition of his bestowing on them certain lands. There were, however, some difficulties in the way of carrying this treaty into effect. Some of the lands conveyed belonged not to Scindia, but to other states, and though he had not the smallest objection to bestowing on the Pindarries the property of Holkar and the peishwa, it was not perfectly convenient to assume the power of making such donations. The alleged necessity, however, of protecting his territories finally led him to comply. Sunnuds were granted to different chiefs, and Cheetoo received five districts. Here again was a foundation laid for the conversion of a robber confederacy into a regular state.

Such were the characters of some of the leaders of the Pindarrie hordes; and though it would be unjust to say that they were much worse than those of most of their neighbours, the unsettled and predatory habits of their followers rendered it impossible for them to be recognized by any European government which had the slightest value for its reputation.

The settlements of these persons being to the north of the Nerbudda, their practice was to cross the river as soon as it was fordable, generally in November, and indiscriminately plunder friends and foes. Before the year 1812, though they continually visited the company's allies, they respected the British dominions. Subsequently, the latter partook of their visitations, and shared in all the horrors with which their progress was attended.

The Pindarries were not composed of any peculiar people or tribe, but of a variety—of the refuse of all tribes, denominations, and creeds. The ancestors of their chiefs are regarded as of Patan extraction; their followers were a motley multitude, brought together by the common impulse of necessity. "Every

horseman," said Captain Sydenham, "who is discharged from the service of a regular government, or who wants employment and subsistence, joins one of the durrabs or principal divisions, of the Pindarries; so that no vagabond who has a horse and a sword at his command can be at a loss for employment. Thus the Pindarries are continually receiving an accession of associates from the most desperate and profligate of mankind. Every villain who escapes from his creditors, who is expelled from the community for some flagrant crime, who has been discarded from employment, or who is disgusted with an honest and peaceable life, flies to Hindostan, and enrols himself among the Pindarries."

The Pindarries were generally armed with spears, in the use of which they were very expert; a proportion of them were provided with matchlocks, and all were mounted. The mode of warfare adopted by these bandits, if warfare it may be called, was distinguished by the precision with which it was directed to one object—plunder; they brought little with them, and their only object was to carry as much as possible away. A party consisted of one, two, three, or even four thousand. Each man provided himself with a few cakes for his subsistence and a few feeds of grain for his horse, trusting much to the chance of plunder for the means of supplying the wants of both. They frequently marched thirty or forty miles a day, and, in cases of extraordinary emergency, they were capable of accomplishing fifty miles in that period. To effect these extraordinary exertions, they were accustomed to sustain the vigour of their horses by spices and stimulants.

The celerity of their marches was not more remarkable than their secrecy. It was scarcely possible to gain information of their movements till they had completed them. They proceeded at once to the place of their destination, and, unencumbered with tents and baggage, they soon reached it. Here they divided into smaller parties, and commenced their career of plunder and devastation. Articles of the greatest value were disposed about their persons; cattle afforded the means of their own transport. But the atrocious propensities of these ruffians were not to be satisfied by what they could carry away. What was not removed they destroyed, and wherever they marched, villages were seen in flames, with the houseless and often wounded inhabitants flying in dismay to seek a shelter which not unfrequently they were unable to attain. When the ruffian visitors had laid the country completely waste, they approached a point of the frontier distant from that by which they had entered, and, uniting again into a compact body, returned home.

The horrors attending these visitations were such as could not be credited, were the evidence less complete and conclusive. Despatch being indispensable, every variety of torture was resorted to for the purpose of

extracting from the unhappy victims information of the treasures they were supposed to have concealed. Red-hot irons were applied to the soles of their feet; a bag filled with hot ashes was tied over the mouth and nostrils of the victim, who was then beaten on the back, to make him inhale the ingredients; large stones were placed on the head or chest, or the sufferer being laid on his back, a plank or beam was placed across his chest, on which two men pressed with their whole weight; oil was thrown on the clothes, which were then set on fire—these, with many other modes of torture equally frightful, were resorted to. Neither sex nor age afforded immunity. The hands of children would frequently be cut off, as the shortest way of obtaining the bracelets which adorned them; while women were subjected to outrages compared with which torture and death were mercy. To escape these, numbers rushed upon self-destruction. It is not one of the least revolting features in the economy of these murderous adventurers, that their women frequently accompanied their male associates in their excursions. They were mounted on small horses or camels, and are said to have exceeded the other sex in rapacity and cruelty. This may readily be believed, for when woman has once overcome the restraints which nature and universal feeling have imposed upon her, her progress downward is made with fearful rapidity.

When the work of ruin was completed, the Pindarries withdrew like wild beasts to their lairs. Then a change of scene took place; the operation of plunder was exchanged for that of huckstering. The claim of the government under which they served had first to be satisfied, or, if they were pursuing their vocation independently, that of their chief; but it is not very clear how far either claim extended. By some, the share of each has been fixed at a fourth part of the entire booty. By others, it has been alleged that the mode of apportionment was uncertain, but that elephants, palanquins, and some other articles, were heriots appertaining to the highest authority recognized by the captors. After the claim of the government or the chief, came that of the actual leader of the expedition; then the payment of advances made by merchants; for, like more civilized nations, these people occasionally contracted public debts. The fact of such a confederacy being able to borrow money would be regarded as remarkable anywhere but in India.

These preliminaries being disposed of, the scene that followed resembled a fair. Every man's share of the plunder was exposed for sale; purchasers flocked from all quarters, proximate and remote, the business of sale being principally conducted by the women. Whether this arose from the indolence of the men, or that the women had the reputation of making better bargains, does not appear, but such was the custom. In the mean time,

the men gave themselves up to amusement, of which intoxication constituted a considerable portion. The remainder was worthy of the association in which it was found. This lasted until the produce of the expedition was exhausted, and it became necessary to seek in fresh outrages renewed means of gratification. Thus passed the life of the Pindarrie robber, in an alternation of brutal exertion and sensual abandonment.

The marquis of Hastings, at an early period of his government, manifested a desire to put an end to the ravages of these marauders; but it was deemed fitting to refrain from any offensive operations until the receipt of orders from home. During the season of 1816-17, however, the ravages of the Pindarries extended over a wider expanse of territory than had ever before been attempted. But these enlarged operations were not carried on without considerable checks. On the 25th of December, 1816, Major Lushington, who was at Preputwarree, with the 4th Madras native cavalry, received intelligence that a party of these plunderers had entered the peishwa's territories by the Wauklee pass, and were engaged in plundering to the south-east of Poona. The news arrived at ten o'clock at night, and three hours afterwards, the regiment, with two galloper guns, moved in the direction in which the plunderers were reputed to be employed. The carriages of both guns broke down, and they were consequently left on the road, the regiment pursuing its way to Sogaum, where they arrived at seven o'clock on the morning of the 26th, having marched a distance of twenty-two miles. Here they learned that a large body of Pindarries had, on the preceding day, attacked the place, but, being beaten off, had moved in an easterly direction. Leaving at Sogaum the sick, recruits, heavy baggage, and camp-followers, Major Lushington, with three hundred and fifty men, again marched, after a pause of only half an hour, and at noon, having performed a further distance of twenty miles, arrived at Kame. At this place he found that the Pindarries had halted on the previous night: they had departed at day-break; had occupied the morning in firing and plundering several villages in the neighbourhood, and it was believed that they were then at no great distance. The short space of three-quarters of an hour was allotted for refreshment, on the expiration of which the indefatigable band resumed its march in the direction which it was understood the Pindarries had taken. At Pepree, seven miles from Kame, Major Lushington learned with much satisfaction, that his labours and those of his men were likely to be soon rewarded by a sight of the enemy; it being stated that their whole body were halted at Cowah, about three miles further, for the purpose of taking a meal. He immediately pushed forward at a brisk pace, and on ascending a rising ground beheld those of whom he was in search busily

occupied in cooking and eating. The surprise was complete, and the success proportionate. The Pindarries were mounted and in flight with their usual celerity; but it happened that the ground was favourable for pursuit, which was kept up by various parties for several miles. The killed and wounded of the enemy were estimated at between seven and eight hundred, and many who escaped without personal injury were incapacitated from further pursuing their avocation by the loss of their horses. Captain Thomas Darke, a valuable officer of the regiment engaged in this gallant service, fell by the thrust of a spear soon after the commencement of the pursuit, and this was the only casualty which the English had to lament. Not a man besides was either killed or wounded. The distance traversed by Major Lushington and his regiment, including the march, the pursuit, and the return to Cowah, was about seventy miles, and this was performed in seventeen hours, the whole affair being over by six o'clock on the evening of the day on which the troops had taken their departure from Preputwarree.

About the same time a party which had proceeded to ravage Ganjam, was dispersed with heavy loss by Lieutenant Borthwick. The fugitives subsequently suffered severely from falling in with a party of British troops under Captain J. Caulfield, by whom about four hundred were killed; the English losing only one man. The discomfort would have been more complete had not the progress of the British party been impeded by two deep nullahs, and the pursuit abruptly terminated by the arrival of night. Another large body of Pindarries was surprised about thirty miles west of Bidur, by a light force detached from Hyderabad under Major M'Dowall, the approach of which was so sudden that the infantry were close upon the tents of the chiefs before they were discovered, and scarcely a man of the party was mounted when the first volley was fired. The surprised party of course fled, and the greater part of their horses and booty was abandoned.

At the close of the year 1816, it was the unanimous opinion of the governor-general and members of council that the adoption of vigorous measures for the early suppression of the Pindarries had become an indispensable obligation of public duty. But it was a question whether the attempt should be made during the current season or suspended till the ensuing year, the interval being devoted to making such arrangements as might enable the government to act with greater effect. The preparations which were to be made during the period of postponement it was necessary to conduct with as much privacy as possible, in order to avoid giving alarm to those against whom they were directed, or to other powers, who, from various motives, might be expected to make common cause with the Pindarries, and to be inclined to offer obstructions to any

measures designed for their suppression. Before the preparations were complete, the determination of the government was fortified by the receipt of a despatch from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, conveying a qualified approval of such measures as might be necessary for pursuing and chastising the Pindarries, in case of actual invasion of the British territories. "Such an invasion," it was observed, "obviously constitutes a case in which we have a right to call for the co-operation of our allies." This admission was something gained, for previously the home authorities had "discouraged plans of general confederacy and offensive operations against the Pindarries, with a view to their utter extinction, in anticipation of an apprehended danger;" although it was now thought fit to explain these intimations, as not intended to restrain the governor-general in the exercise of his judgment and discretion, upon any occasion where actual war upon the British territories "might be commenced by any body of marauders, and where the lives and properties of British subjects might call for efficient protection."

But the interval devoted to preparation for suppressing the ruffian force which had so long, with comparative impunity, desolated and disgraced India, was not in other respects a period of repose. Among other sources of disquiet was that arising from the conduct of some turbulent chiefs in the north, who, having possession of the fortresses of Hatrass and Moorsaum, defied the British authority and committed innumerable acts of disorder and violence. A force under Major-General D. Marshal was employed to reduce the offending parties to subordination; and succeeded, though not without subjecting Hatrass to a regular siege. The progress of the siege was interrupted by some attempts at negotiation; but it being ascertained that on the part of the enemy no sincere desire for a peaceable adjustment existed, the operations of the siege were renewed with vigour, and prosecuted to a successful issue. Possession of Moorsaum was obtained without difficulty, and the place was dismantled. These events took place early in the year 1817.

It was not, however, exclusively in contests with petty chieftains that the British government was occupied during that eventful year. In that which preceded it, the foundation had been laid for a long and frightful series of warfare and bloodshed. Twelve months after Trimbuckjee Dainglia had been committed to the fortress of Tannah, he found means to escape from it, to become again an engine of disorder and mischief. There appears to have been some deficiency of vigilance in the custody of the prisoner. Little attention was paid to his personal movements, and in fact little was known of them. A habit, which it was subsequently ascertained he had for some time practised, of resorting every evening after dusk to a particular part of the fort, excited

neither suspicion nor increased watchfulness, and natives were suffered to pass the gate without examination at hours when peculiar circumspection was called for. As soon as the escape was discovered, the different ferries were secured, with a view to prevent any person quitting the island; but the precaution was too late; Trimbuckjee Dainglia was beyond the reach of his pursuers.

The escape of the miscreant was believed to have been contrived and carried into effect with the full concurrence of the peishwa, but no substantial proof of this existed. That the prince, after the escape of his unworthy favourite, concealed and protected him, was also a belief sanctioned by the strongest presumption, although the sovereign gave the most solemn assurances to the contrary. In the absence of proof, there was no course for the British government to pursue, but to yield apparent credence to the protestations of the peishwa, and keep a vigilant eye on his future proceedings.

There was, indeed, abundant reason to be convinced that the peishwa was exercising, and had long been employing, all his influence to undermine the British power in India. His intrigues extended far and wide, and the malignity of his hostile feelings was attested by his activity in diffusing them. From Baroda, the government were apprised by Captain Carnac of some proceedings on the part of the peishwa and his agents, sufficiently indicative of that prince's insincerity and hostility. Similar information was communicated from other quarters: every circumstance was calculated to inspire the British government with distrust, and there can be no doubt that this was their feeling.

There was reason for concluding that Trimbuckjee was concealed at no great distance from Poona; and suspicion was excited by intelligence of the assemblage of small parties of armed men in the neighbourhood of Mahadeo, about fifty miles distant from the former place. It was subsequently ascertained that considerable bodies of horse and foot were collecting in the same direction; that recruiting was actively going on throughout the peishwa's dominions, and that even in the city of Poona, under the very eye of the sovereign, the process was in full operation. Public opinion unanimously pointed out Trimbuckjee as the prime agent in these proceedings, and there was scarcely more hesitation in attributing to him the direct countenance and support of the peishwa.

The resident, of course, remonstrated. He urged the importance of adopting vigorous measures for dispersing the armed parties, and thus crushing the insurrection in its commencement: a contrary line of conduct, it was pointed out, would lead to the most unfavourable impressions as to the intentions of the peishwa; and the necessity of prompt and active measures, to relieve himself from the imputation of participating in the designs of

Trimbuckjee was enforced by the fact, that it was commonly believed and reported throughout the country, that the peishwa approved and sanctioned them. The suppression of the rebel movements, and the capture and surrender of their guilty contriver, were represented as being the only means by which the British government could be convinced of the falsehood of such reports, and the fidelity of the peishwa to his engagements.

The peishwa, however, was not to be roused; and, in addition to this apathy to military preparations, which, if not sanctioned by his authority, were calculated to place that authority in danger, there were circumstances in his conduct still more suspicious. It was indeed reported that he was in constant communication with Trimbuckjee; that he had even had more than one secret interview with the arch-conspirator himself; and that he had provided considerable sums in gold, as if for some expected emergency. These were but rumours; but there were facts beyond all doubt, which placed the peishwa's character for sincerity in a most unfavourable position. He affected ignorance of proceedings to which no one in the country was or could be a stranger. Trimbuckjee's friends and family remained in high favour, and constantly made excursions into the country, said (and probably with truth) to be for the purpose of consulting with their chief; one of Trimbuckjee's principal officers, after repeated visits of this kind, finally disappeared, and the peishwa declared himself unable to account for him. Some changes took place in the prince's habits so extraordinary as to excite general surprise. He made a journey to Joonere, while Trimbuckjee was supposed to be in that part of the country, which was alleged to be in discharge of an obligation of piety. He stated that, when in prison, he had made a vow of an annual pilgrimage to Joonere; but it was remarkable that for twenty years he had neglected to perform it—a fact exceedingly discreditable either to the activity of his memory or the steadfastness of his devotion. He chose also to seclude himself from observation at Phoolseahr, taking great pains to induce the British resident to believe that he was detained there much against his desire by an injury to his arm, the injury being only a slight bruise, and the distance which he had to travel but sixteen miles. He had been accustomed, from the time of his restoration, to make annual journeys to Goagur and Copergaum; but these places not possessing the attraction of Joonere, were now neglected, even when the state of his arm no longer afforded an excuse.

The suspicious conduct of the peishwa, in other respects, was corroborated by the warlike preparations which were evidently in progress. Troops were raised, forts repaired, and everything seemed to announce impending hostility. Finding it useless to persevere in his former course, Mr. Elphinstone at length

assumed a higher tone, and resolved upon more decisive measures. The British troops at Poona were put in motion, and by them the insurgents were driven from their haunts, near Mahadeo, to the northern part of the peishwa's territories. This being performed, and the peishwa's preparations continuing, Mr. Elphinstone determined on drawing the light division of the troops at his disposal to Poona, to be there ready for any emergency that might arise. The impressions which the peishwa's conduct had made on the resident were distinctly announced, and it was intimated that the latter abstained from measures even more active, only till he received the instructions of his own government. But by the time the purposed disposition of the British troops was completed, Mr. Elphinstone received such an intimation of the views of the Bengal government as enabled him to go on without hesitation.

In the mean time the insurgents continued their progress, began to unite their forces from distant places, and took possession of one of the peishwa's forts. They were represented as having obtained entrance by personating countrymen carrying bundles of grass, in which they had concealed arms. This stratagem had been sometimes practised in towns where there was a considerable influx of country people carrying their goods to the market, and under such circumstances the disguised persons might pass unsuspected; but it was little adapted to a hill fort, where there was only a small garrison, no market, and no great consumption of grass. The gross improbability of the story was pointed out to the person who related it to Mr. Elphinstone, and he was very clearly given to understand that the resident was not imposed upon by the idle tale with which it had been attempted to abuse his judgment.

The stoppage of the post by the insurgents in Cuttack, in the early part of May, 1817, rendered the receipt of the further instructions from his government, for which Mr. Elphinstone was looking, a matter of great uncertainty. He was thus left in a great degree to the uncontrolled exercise of his own judgment. Everything seemed to call for prompt and vigorous action. It was impossible to suppose that the British government would be satisfied without the surrender of Trimbuckjee; and it was the universal opinion that the peishwa would not give him up: in an extreme emergency, the probability was that the peishwa would fly to Ryeghur, in the Concan, where it would be impossible to carry on operations after the setting in of the monsoon, which might be expected to take place early in June. A lengthened contest was above all things to be avoided; the position of the peishwa, as the nominal head of the Mahrattas, rendering a junction of all the Mahratta states against the British highly probable.

Feeling the pressure of these circumstances, Mr. Elphinstone sent a message to the mini-

ter, to the effect that he had a communication to make which must bring the question of peace or war to a decision, and that he should forward it on the following morning. The actual transmission of the communication referred to was delayed by a message from the peishwa, inviting the resident to a conference, which accordingly took place. Mr. Elphinstone then demanded the surrender of Trim-buckjee, as an indispensable condition of adjustment. The peishwa, though informed that the consequence would be immediate war, still sought to evade compliance, and refused to be bound by any engagement. On the following day the threatened communication was made to the peishwa's minister. Its purport was, to demand that the peishwa should, within twenty-four hours, engage to deliver up Trim-buckjee within a month from that day, and should give up his forts of Singhur, Poorandur, and Ryeghur, as pledges for the fulfilment of his engagement.

The minister received the paper with extraordinary indifference. Before the expiration of the prescribed time, however, some attempts were made to procure a mitigation of the terms. This was refused, and the city was ultimately surrounded by the British forces. The people now manifested some alarm, but it was speedily allayed by the withdrawal of the troops, in consequence of a communication to the resident, accepting the proffered conditions. The forts were forthwith placed in possession of the British.

But, though the peishwa yielded to difficulties which he was not in a condition to overcome, he was still anxious to find some means of escaping the consequences of his engagement. He appears to have courted the advice of counsellors of the most opposite sentiments, and to have vacillated between their conflicting opinions, as his inclinations or his fears preponderated. Terrified at the prospect of the precipice upon which he stood, and swayed in some degree by the judgment of the more moderate part of his advisers, he at length issued a proclamation, offering a large reward for the apprehension of Trim-buckjee, dead or alive, and smaller rewards for any information concerning his adherents; a pardon was at the same time promised to all who should desert him, with the exception of twelve individuals, and those who should still refuse to come in, against whom severe penalties were denounced: the property of the twelve excepted persons, as well as that of Trim-buckjee, was confiscated. Negotiations then commenced for the purpose of fixing the future relations of the peishwa with the British government, and a treaty was finally concluded on the 13th of June, containing some provisions of great importance.

By the first article of this treaty, the guilt of Trim-buckjee Dainglia, and the obligation to punish him, were admitted; the peishwa engaged to use his utmost efforts to seize and deliver him up to the East-India Company;

the family of the criminal were to remain as hostages with the British government, and all who sided in his rebellion, and who had not surrendered to the proclamation, were to be punished. The second article confirmed the treaty of Bassein in all points not varied by the new treaty. The third article extended one in the treaty of Bassein, by which the peishwa engaged to dismiss all Europeans, natives of states at war with Great Britain. He was now bound never to admit into his territories any subject of either European or American powers, without the consent of the British government. By the fourth, the peishwa bound himself not to open a negotiation with any other power, except in concert with the Company's government, nor to admit the residence of vakeels or agents at his court. The great Mahratta confederacy was by this article dissolved, the peishwa renouncing all connection with the other Mahratta powers, and consequently his station, as their head, with certain exceptions.

The fifth article related to the matters in dispute between the peishwa and the guicowar; the former renouncing all right of supremacy over the latter, but with a reserve for his existing pecuniary claims, which, in accordance with the treaty of Bassein, were to be referred to the arbitration of the Company, unless the guicowar should consent to the annual payment of four lacs of rupees, in which case the reference was not to take place. The sixth article annulled one of the articles of the treaty of Bassein, by which the peishwa consented to furnish to the British government, in time of war, a certain number of troops, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores, and substituted in its place one by which he was required to provide funds for the payment of a force of similar strength, to place the British government in possession of the means of providing this contingent.

The seventh article transferred to the British government, in perpetuity, certain territories and rights, which were enumerated in an accompanying schedule. The eighth article provided for the convenient execution of the seventh; and the ninth, tenth, and eleventh had the same object. By the twelfth, the fort of Ahmednugger was surrendered to the Company. The thirteenth and fourteenth extinguished the peishwa's rights in Bundelcund and Hindostan. The fifteenth provided for an object very desirable to the British government and the Guicowar state, the renewal of the lease of the farm of Ahmedabad. The sixteenth article related to the settlement of the southern jagheerdars, and the seventeenth to the evacuation of the fort and territory of Mailghaut. The eighteenth related to the authentication and confirmation of the treaty. With the efforts of Mr. Elphinstone, in conducting the negotiation to such a conclusion, the British authorities had every reason to be satisfied; and the treaty, while it provided for the just expectations of the more powerful

party, was not inequitable nor unnecessarily harsh as concerned the vanquished.

The peishwa, however, was dissatisfied, and though unreasonably, not unnaturally. It was impossible that he could forbear contrasting his present humiliated condition with his former lofty pretensions, as the head of a people who had spread the terror of their arms over a large portion of India. It had now been shown to him that he held his dominions at the mercy of the British government—the discovery was unavoidable, but it was necessarily far from pleasing. The obstinacy of the peishwa had accelerated a crisis which the prudence of the Company's government would have postponed indefinitely; and notwithstanding they were blameless, he was indignant.

A few months only elapsed before it became evident that the peishwa was again preparing for some hostile proceedings. Levies of troops took place unremittingly throughout his dominions, and by the 1st of October (the treaty having been concluded on the 13th of June previously), there was not a single horseman in the country out of employ. The quality neither of the horses nor men was regarded; number seemed the only thing kept in view. The ostensible motive for these preparations was, a desire to comply with the wish of the British government for co-operation against the Pindarries. This disguise was, however, worn too loosely to deceive. In an interview with the British resident, in which the intended movements of the armies against the Pindarries were explained, the peishwa did not think it necessary even to affect any interest in the suppression of the marauders; his conversation being entirely confined to complaints of his own degradation. From various circumstances it was inferred that he was about to aim a blow at the British power, and though an appearance of confidence was maintained on both sides, it was formal and hollow.

Among other indications of the spirit by which the government of the peishwa was actuated, were numerous attempts to corrupt the native troops in the British service. It was in consequence deemed necessary to remove them from the town to a new position. The peishwa then, as if in defiance, pushed forward his own troops, and it was announced that he intended to form a camp between the old cantonments of the British army and the new. At last, on the 5th November, hostilities actually commenced, by the peishwa's troops moving so as to cut off the residency from the British camp. The residency was forthwith plundered and burned, but by the prompt advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, the enemy, after a severe action, was repulsed, and retired. The resident was on the field throughout the action, animating the zeal of the troops, and aiding the commanding officer by the suggestions which his local knowledge enabled him to offer. The strength of the

British force was about two thousand eight hundred; the peishwa's army was composed of not less than twenty-five thousand men.

It now became necessary to obtain possession of Poona; but this could not be effected by the small force in the neighbourhood. On the indication of approaching hostilities, Brigadier-General Lionel Smith, with the force under his command, had been summoned by Mr. Elphinstone from the south bank of the Godavery. That officer arrived at Poona on the evening of the 13th of November. On the 14th, arrangements were made for attacking the enemy, who were encamped on the opposite side of the river; but the design was abandoned, in consequence of the occurrence of unexpected difficulties. On the 16th, all the disposable corps, after providing for the camp and for the position of Kirting, were formed in divisions of attack. The passage of one of the divisions over the ford was obstinately resisted by the peishwa's troops, but the ill success of this resistance seems to have perfected the panic to which the previous defeat received from Colonel Burr had given rise. At two o'clock on the morning of the 17th the peishwa fled, and the enemy having thus disappeared, the British force recrossed the river to take the most favourable ground for bombarding the city; but this dreadful measure was happily unnecessary, the defence of the place having been left to a few hundred Arabs, who were prevailed upon to withdraw.

The state of affairs at Poona had rendered it necessary to combine with the measures in preparation for the suppression of the Pindarries, such other movements as might be requisite to counteract the treacherous hostility of the peishwa. The arrangements of the governor-general were accordingly framed with reference to both these objects, and they were conceived upon a large scale. The force on which he relied was partly to be furnished from the army in the Deccan, and partly from that of Bengal. Sir Thomas Hialop, commander-in-chief of the army of Madras, was intrusted with the command of the military force, as well as with a controlling authority over all political affairs in the Deccan. An illness by which he was attacked, and which detained him for some time at Hyderabad, together with the unusual violence of the monsoon, delayed the advance of this portion of the British force, and consequently of that proceeding from Bengal, it being inexpedient to place the latter in circumstances which would deprive it of those advantages of combined operation and support, which it had been a chief object of the governor-general to secure. The Bengal army consisted of three principal divisions and a reserve. On the 16th of October, 1817, the governor-general commenced his march from Cawnpore, and having joined the central division of the Bengal army at Secundra, crossed the Jumna on the 26th, and reached his destined position, on the Scind, on the

6th November. The left division had previously assembled in Bundelcund, and was prepared to advance towards Saugor, with a view to co-operate with the right of Sir Thomas Hislop's army against the Pindarrie posts. The right division assembled at the same period, ready to advance to Dholpore, on the Chumbul, as soon as circumstances should render it necessary; while the reserve, commanded by Sir David Ochterlony, was assembled near Rewaree. This part of the British force was destined to cover Delhi, to support our negotiations with the Rajpoot states (for in the East a negotiator never succeeds so well as when he has an army at his back), to perform the same office with regard to Ameer Khan, and eventually to attack the latter, or interpose between him and Holkar, if they should manifest any perverse or hostile feeling.

Besides these principal divisions of the Bengal force destined for active operations, two detachments were formed, designed principally for purposes of defence, but capable of acting offensively if necessary. One of these, under Brigadier-General Toome, was posted near Ooutaree, on the frontier of Behar. The other, under Brigadier-General Hamlyman, was formed at Mirzapore, and thence advanced to Rewah, for the purpose of securing the passes in that country, and the adjacent districts, in order to defeat any attempt of the Pindarries to penetrate into the British territories in that direction, while the principal part of the force was in advance. A force was also stationed in Cuttack, sufficient to guard that frontier from the entrance of the Pindarries through Nagpore.

The troops from the Deccan were distributed in five chief divisions and a reserve. The first was commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop in person, and this was to have crossed the Nerbudda in the direction of Hindia, in conjunction with the third division under Sir John Malcolm. But this arrangement was frustrated by the detention of Sir Thomas Hislop at Hyderabad. The division of Sir John Malcolm consequently crossed alone, about the middle of November, and that of Sir Thomas Hislop at a later date. The fifth division, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Adams, was to cross the river at Hoosingabad, at the same time with the other divisions destined to act in advance. Two divisions, the second and fourth, still remain to be accounted for. Of these, the former, under Brigadier-General Doveton, had a position assigned to it in the neighbourhood of Akolee, on the Nizam's frontier, to protect that line from attack, to support, if required, the troops in advance, and to sustain the British interests at Nagpore; the latter, under Brigadier-General Lionel Smith, was intended to perform the like service with regard to the peishwa's territory, and at the same time to keep Holkar in check. Considerable bodies of troops were also maintained at Hyderabad,

at Poona, and at Nagpore, as at none of those places could tranquillity be relied upon. The corps of reserve was assembled on the frontier of the ceded districts, and was subsequently advanced to a position on the Kriahna, from which point it could support the troops either at Hyderabad or at Poona: a separate detachment occupied the southern country recently ceded by the peishwa. The Guzerat field force, under Sir William Keir, was also assembled in advance of Baroda, ready to move into Malwa.

The advance of the troops from the Deccan of course excited some attention, but in a degree quite disproportioned to the importance of the movement. Scindia was especially interested in the matter, and the passage of a division of the army of the Deccan through his territories rendered it necessary to inform him of the purpose of its being put in motion. The requisite communication was made by the resident, Captain Close, and was met, as everything is met at a native durbar, by an attempt to gain time. This being resisted, a tardy, and without doubt a reluctant, assent was given to the passage of the troops.

This, however, was not sufficient. It was necessary to obtain either Scindia's active co-operation against the Pindarries, or at least his neutrality, and the exertions of the resident were directed accordingly. While the negotiations were pending, an extraordinary circumstance occurred, illustrative of the feeling entertained by Scindia. This was the arrest of two messengers conveying letters from Scindia's court to Catmandoo. As there was no customary intercourse between the two courts, its occurrence could not fail to excite strong suspicion. A part of the letters were open and part sealed. The former were read, and though the language was obscure, they evidently related to some project for a combination against the British government. The sealed letters were delivered to Scindia by the resident in the state in which they were found. Scindia made no attempt to explain his conduct, but the discovery was not without effect upon the progress of the negotiation.

A treaty, comprising twelve articles, was forthwith concluded with Scindia; by the first of which, the contracting parties engaged to employ the forces of their respective governments, and of their allies and dependents, in prosecuting operations against the Pindarries and other hordes of associated freebooters, to expel them from their haunts, and to adopt the most effectual measures to disperse and prevent them from re-assembling. The forces of the two governments and their allies were immediately to attack the robbers and their associates, according to a concerted plan of operations, and not to desist until the objects of their engagement were entirely accomplished; and Scindia, on his part, promised his utmost efforts to seize the persons of the Pindarrie leaders and their families, and to deliver them up to the British government.

The second article referred to the settlements which the Pindarries had gained in the territories of Scindia, and in those of other states. With regard to the former, the lands were to be immediately secured by the maharajah, who engaged never again to admit the plunderers to possession. The other lands were to be restored to their respective owners, provided they exerted themselves to the required extent in expelling the Pindarries, and entered into similar engagements never to readmit them, or to become concerned with them in any way whatever. In default of these conditions being complied with, the lands were to be delivered to Scindia, and held by him on the stipulated terms.

The third article extended and completed the first, and the former part of the second. By it Scindia engaged never to admit the Pindarries, or any other predatory bodies, into his territories, to give them the smallest countenance or support, or to permit his officers to do so. On the contrary, he promised to issue the most positive orders to all his officers, civil and military, enforced by the severest penalties, to employ their utmost efforts to expel or destroy any body of plunderers who might attempt to take refuge in his territories; and all officers disregarding these orders were to be dealt with as rebels to the maharajah, and enemies to the British government.

The fourth article commenced by formally announcing, that the Maharajah Dowlut Row Scindia was the undisputed master of his own troops and resources. This sounding overture was precursory to a stipulation for placing the troops and resources, of which he was the undoubted master, at the disposal of the British government, for which he certainly entertained no warm affection. The article proceeds to declare, that for the more effectual accomplishment of the objects of the treaty, the divisions of the maharajah's troops (amounting to five thousand horse), employed in active operations against the Pindarries or other freebooters, should act in concert with the British troops, and in conformity to the plan that might be counselled by the officer commanding the British divisions with which they might be appointed to act; that a British officer should be stationed with each division of the maharajah's troops, to be the channel of communication between them and the British commanding officer: and in order further to forward the purposes of their conjoint operations, the maharajah engaged that all his officers, civil and military, should afford every degree of support and assistance in their power to the British, in procuring supplies or otherwise to the British troops operating in his territories; and all who should neglect this duty were subject to the same appalling denunciation with which the third article closed.

The fifth article commenced with a very important stipulation—that the divisions of Scindia's army appointed to act with the

British troops should be marched in a state of complete equipment, both men and horses, and regularly paid. To make provision for these vital objects, and as the framers of the treaty considerably express it, to "prevent all future discussions or disputes," Scindia consented to renounce for three years the payments made by the British government to him, to certain members of his family, and to ministers of his government. These sums were to be appropriated to the payment of his troops, through the British officers stationed with them, the British government engaging that, at the termination of the war, and after the satisfaction of the claims of the troops, any balance that might remain due should be paid to the maharajah. For the same purpose as that for which the above payments were relinquished, Scindia agreed to surrender for two years the tribute to which he was entitled from the states of Joudpore, Bhoondee, and Kotah. These two articles, as well as the succeeding one, were directed to the removal of a difficulty which the marquis of Hastings had foreseen, and was anxious to guard against. "It was manifest," he observes, in one of his despatches, "that no active or useful aid was to be expected from Scindia's troops, if left to the direction of his own officers."

By the sixth article it was agreed that the troops of Scindia, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, should during the war occupy such positions as might be assigned by the British government, and should not change them without the express concurrence of that government. The necessity of giving a reason for this stipulation, rather than for any other in the treaty, is not apparent; but one is given, namely, that unconnected movements are calculated to derange the joint operations of the two states, and to give undue advantage to the enemy. For the due execution of the stipulation in this article, the British government was to be at liberty to station an officer in each division of the maharajah's army.

The seventh article assumes that the force to be put in motion by the British government, combined with that actually in the service of Scindia, would be fully sufficient to chastise the Pindarries, and effect the objects of the treaty; and, in consequence, proceeds to provide that, to prevent the possibility of collusion between the maharajah's officers and the Pindarries, the forces of the former should not be increased during the war without the approval of the British government. His officers were also prohibited from admitting into the ranks of his army, or otherwise harbouring or protecting, any of the Pindarries, or other freebooters. This article, like two former ones, concludes by denouncing those who may break it, as rebels to Scindia and enemies of the British government.

The eighth article was not an unimportant one. It declares that, with a view to the more effectual prosecution of the joint operations of

the two governments, and to the facility and security of the communication of the British troops with their supplies, the maharajah, reposing entire confidence in the friendship and good faith of the British government (which was assuredly far more than the British government could repose in his), agrees that British garrisons should be admitted into the forts of Hindia and Asseergurh, and should be charged with the care and defence of them during the war, with the liberty of establishing depôts in them. The flag of Scindia was, however, to continue to fly at Asseergurh, and he was at liberty to station a killadar, with a personal guard of fifty men, there; but the actual command of the place, as well as of Hindia, and the disposal of the warlike stores in both, were to be exclusively in the British. Some minor regulations followed with respect to stores and the movements of the garrisons; and it was stipulated that the territories dependent on the forts should continue to be managed by the officers of the maharajah, who were to receive every support from the British government and its officers. The whole of the resources, or such part as might be necessary, were to be appropriated to the payment of the troops, as stipulated in the fifth article; an account to be rendered at the conclusion of the war. At the same period the forts were to be restored in the condition in which they had been received—all private property was to be respected, and the inhabitants of the dependent towns and villages were to enjoy the protection of the British government, and to be permitted to depart with their property, if they should think proper.

The ninth article provided for an object which the marquis of Hastings deemed necessary for the attainment of the purposes which he had in view. By a former treaty the British government was restrained from entering into any treaty with the rajahs of Oudeypore, Joudpore, and Kotah, or other chief tributaries of Dowlut Row Scindia, situated in Malwa, Mewar, or Marwar. Of this provision the governor-general was desirous to procure the abrogation, an alliance with those states being indispensable to the contemplated arrangements for preventing the renewal of the predatory system. It was accordingly abrogated by the ninth article of the new treaty, upon the ground that the main object of the contracting parties was to prevent for ever the revival of the predatory system in any form; and that both governments were satisfied that to accomplish this wise and just end, it might be necessary for the British government to form engagements of friendship and alliance with the several states of Hindostan. Full liberty was therefore given to form engagements with the states of Oudeypore, Joudpore, and Kotah, with the state of Bhoondee, and with other substantive states on the left bank of the Chumbul. But the article was not to be construed as giving that government any right to interfere with states or chiefs in

Malwa or Guzerat, clearly and indisputably dependent on or tributary to the maharajah, whose authority over those states or chiefs was to continue on the same footing as before. The British government bound itself, in the event of concluding any engagements with the states of Oudeypore, Joudpore, Kotah, Bhoondee, or any others on the left bank of the Chumbul, to secure to Scindia his ascertained tribute, and to guarantee its payment in perpetuity; Scindia engaging on no account or pretence to interfere, in any shape, in the affairs of those states, without the concurrence of the British government.

The tenth article referred to a contingency not very improbable, the occurrence of which is deprecated with a degree of solemnity which charity must hope to have been sincere. This article is too edifying to be abstracted or abridged; it must be given at length, and in its original energy, without alteration or dilution. It runs thus:—"If (which God forbid!) the British government and the maharajah shall be compelled to wage war with any other state, on account of such state attacking either of the contracting parties, or aiding or protecting the Pindarries, or other freebooters, the British government, having at heart the welfare of Dowlut Row Scindia, will, in the event of success, and of his highness's zealous performance of his engagements, make the most liberal arrangements for the consolidation and increase of his territories." This display of piety and moderation is very remarkable, when it is remembered that one of the contracting parties was Dowlut Row Scindia. The terms of the treaty were, without doubt, dictated by the British government, and neither Scindia nor his servants were accountable for this effusion of virtuous feeling; but to whomsoever it is to be attributed, it is most unhappily out of place with reference to the character of the Maharratta chief, as well as to the total want of community of religious belief between the parties who joined in it.

After so rich a display of pious elevation, the descent to ordinary language is somewhat painful. It is proper, however, to mention, that the eleventh article provides for the continuance of such objects of the treaty of 1805 as were not affected by the new one, and the twelfth engages for the exchange of ratifications.

Such was the treaty concluded with Scindia by Captain Close, and which provided for all the objects which the governor-general had in view. It was ratified early in November, 1817, and shortly afterwards the ninth article was rendered operative by the conclusion of treaties with the Rajpoot states. A treaty with Ameer Khan was also concluded. This person, who has been characterized, and, it is believed, not unjustly, as "one of the most atrocious villains that India ever produced," was, on the whole, fortunate. The British government agreed to protect him in his possessions, on condition of his disbanding his

army, surrendering his guns, relinquishing his Pindarrie habits, dissolving his connection with those plunderers, and keeping better company. Seeing that he had no better claims to indulgence than those whom the English sought to extirpate, Ameer Khan had certainly reason to felicitate himself upon his good luck. The treaty with Ameer Khan was negotiated by Mr. Metcalfe.

While new engagements of amity were in course of formation, the relations of peace previously subsisting between the British government and one of its native allies were about to receive a shock. The rajah of Berar, Rughoosee Bhonslah, had invariably resisted the attempts that had been made by the British government to establish with that state a subsidiary alliance. On his death his only son, Pursajee Bhonslah, succeeded to the throne; but he being of weak mind, a cousin, known as Appa Sahib, exercised the functions of sovereignty under the title of regent. To secure the assistance of the British government in maintaining him in the power which he had thus obtained, and in promoting his ultimate advance to the higher rank and authority to which he aspired, the regent consented to form the long-denied engagement. Early in the year 1817 the imbecile occupant of the throne died, and Appa Sahib attained the final object of his ambitious hopes.

Although a subsidiary treaty had been concluded, the arrangements had not been brought into a condition to work properly. There had been considerable irregularity as to the organization and maintenance of the stipulated contingent, by which the British government had been subjected to expense which it was not obliged to bear. Discussion of course arose, but native evasion continued for a while to postpone the fulfilment of engagements which could not be denied. Procrastination is of too common occurrence in Oriental courts to excite much surprise, and the disposition of Appa Sahib was regarded as not unfriendly to the English. Circumstances, however, soon occurred, and especially a change with regard to his ministers, which convinced the British authorities that his professions of friendship were hollow and insincere.

At this period, indeed, the seeds of hatred to British influence were scattered throughout India with an unsparing hand, and the peishwa was the prime instigator and fomentor of the hostile feeling. Habits of ancient standing gave him considerable influence with the native princes. The Mahratta states might also be supposed to feel their pride in some degree wounded by the humiliation of their chief, and some suspicion may be supposed to have existed as to the probable aim of the British government, and the extent to which it proposed to carry its acquisitions. There might be an apprehension that England was looking to the entire dominion of India; and though this consummation would be devoutly

wished by the people, if they understood their own welfare, the prospect of it could, under no circumstances, be very acceptable to those whose thrones were to fall before the march of the victors.

It is certain that the plans of the governor-general for the extirpation of the Pindarries were regarded with great suspicion. This must, in most instances, have arisen from the apprehension of ulterior measures; for, with the exception of Scindia and Holkar, who entertained bodies of the Pindarries in a sort of feudal dependence, no prince would appear to have had any interest in supporting them. The interest of the rajah of Nagpore, indeed, lay quite the other way; for his dominions had suffered most severely from the devastations of these marauding adventurers; and by an express article of the subsidiary treaty, the British government was required to defend the state of Nagpore against their incursions.

The peculiar nature of a subsidiary alliance renders imperative the greatest circumspection in selecting the representatives of the British government at the courts of princes thus connected with it. The resident at Nagpore, at this time, was fortunately a gentleman whose sagacity and prudence were not to be overcome even by Mahratta dissimulation. Mr. Jenkins distinctly perceived the tendency which events were taking, and if the British connection could have been preserved by judgment, firmness, and caution, combined with suavity, that connection would not have been severed.

The resident was apprized that the rajah was engaged in intrigues with the peishwa. Conferences were held with an agent of that sovereign, who received letters almost daily from Poona, which he immediately carried to the rajah. Such proceedings, especially at such a period, were calculated to excite suspicion and alarm. Mr. Jenkins accordingly remonstrated against them, reminding the rajah that all communications similar to those with the peishwa ought, in conformity with the treaty, to be immediately communicated to the British government, and that the observance of this provision, at all times incumbent, was of peculiar importance at a time when it was notorious that measures of hostility were in progress at the court of Poona. The reply of the rajah was unsatisfactory. He admitted that he had received overtures from Poona, but observed, that it did not consist with his dignity to repeat them; and this, with general expressions of unceasing attachment to his English connection, constituted his answer. The objectionable communications continued, and the renewed representations of the resident on the subject produced no change of conduct.

The period was evidently approaching when the rajah was to throw off the mask of friendship: in anticipation of it, Mr. Jenkins apprized the military authorities of the prospect of their being speedily called into action,

and urged the march of troops towards Nagpore, to uphold the British interests. The rajah had dismissed the peishwa's vakeel, but he still retained at his court the brother of that functionary, and through him, as well as other channels, the intercourse with Poona continued to be carried on. The assemblage of troops at Poona was accompanied by a simultaneous collection of force at Nagpore. The completion of the contingent was delayed, and when troops were assigned for the purpose, they consisted mostly of new levies, evidencing that the rajah had no mind to part with his good troops. In addition to their being raw and undisciplined, the fidelity of the recruits to the British cause was more than suspected. The levies extended beyond Nagpore, and were conducted with great secrecy. This infuriated prince even entered into negotiations with the Pindarries, who were invited to bring down a force to attack the British. The Pindarries were also made useful in another way, by assigning the fact of their ravages as an excuse for keeping up an extraordinary number of troops.

In the midst of these warning circumstances a khelaut arrived from the peishwa, and the rajah sent to inform the resident of his intention to receive it with all the usual ceremonies indicative of his being invested with the character of commander-in-chief of the Mahratta armies. The principal ceremony consisted in going out to his camp, and remaining three days at the head of his troops. The communication was accompanied by a request that the resident, or some gentleman in the British service, would attend the ceremony, and that a salute might be ordered. As the British government was then in a state of actual warfare with the peishwa, it was quite obvious that such a request could not be complied with; and this public acknowledgment by Appa Sahib of a community of interest with the declared enemy of his protectors would seem to amount almost to insanity. Mr. Jenkins, of course, refused any participation in the ceremony. On the following day all communication between the residency and the city was interdicted. The palaces were stripped of everything of value, and the families of the rajah and of his principal ministers left the city. These movements were followed by an order for the contingent to remove to the city, the old cry of the Pindarries being set up as a pretext. Upon this Mr. Jenkins lost no time in sending for the troops from their cantonments.

A pretence was now made, on the part of the rajah, to open a negotiation; but the hostile manifestations which were contemporaneous showed it to be altogether delusive. The 26th of November placed the matter beyond question, by a repetition of the treacheries of Poona. An interview between the British resident and two of the rajah's ministers was interrupted by the commencement of firing. The strife of words was now

to give way to the combat of more deadly weapons. The conference was dissolved abruptly, and Mr. Jenkins repaired to the scene of action.

Reinforcements had been sent for, but they had not arrived; the duty of repelling the attack consequently devolved upon a very small body of troops. The whole British force at Nagpore consisted of a brigade of two battalions of Madras native infantry, the first of the 20th regiment, and the first of the 24th, both considerably reduced by sickness; the resident's escort of two companies of native infantry, three troops of the 6th regiment of Bengal native cavalry, and four six-pounders, manned by Europeans of the Madras artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Hopetoun Scott was the senior officer, and with this force, which did not comprise fourteen hundred men fit for duty, had to resist an army of about eight thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, supported by thirty-five guns.

When these troops had, at the request of the resident, marched from their cantonments, they took post on the hill of Seetabuldee, overlooking the residency and the city; at the same time taking possession of another hill, about three hundred yards distant, the occupation of which was necessary to their retention of the former. In the course of the day, large bodies of Arabs, with five guns, were observed to enter a village at the foot of the hill, where a strong body of the rajah's infantry had previously been posted; and at six o'clock in the evening, while Colonel Scott was engaged with Captain Bayley in posting sentries on the face of the hill, the Arabs in the village opened fire. This was entirely unexpected, as no overt act of hostility had yet taken place on either side, and the rajah's troops were aware that the posting of the sentries by the British was only a customary act of military precaution, and that no intention existed of attacking them. The small party of British troops, who found themselves thus suddenly engaged in action, returned a volley upon their assailants, and then retreated to the top of the hill, under the fire of all the troops in the village.

The action now became general, and continued without intermission for eighteen hours. A part of the troops being entirely exhausted, it was found necessary to confine the defence of the inferior hill to its summit. At eight o'clock on the morning of the 27th, a body of Arabs, by charging up the face of the hill with an overwhelming force, succeeded in gaining possession of the British post. The vast disproportion between the numbers of the contending bodies now appeared to give a fearful preponderance to the rajah's party, when the current of fortune was turned by one of those acts of romantic valour, which have so often changed the face of the battle-field, struck panic into the hearts of a powerful enemy, and secured the victory to the weaker side. At the moment when there seemed most cause

for despondency, Captain Fitzgerald, commanding a detachment of Bengal cavalry, reinforced by a native officer and about twenty-five troopers of the Madras body-guard, charged an immense body of the enemy's best horse, and having taken their guns and turned them against their late possessors, stood master of the plain, which was covered in every direction by the flying foe. Accident aided the advantage which daring courage had secured. While preparations were making for an attack upon the Arabs, who had obtained possession of the smaller hill, an explosion was observed to take place in the midst of them. No sooner was this perceived than the British troops made a rush towards the spot, and it was with great difficulty that Colonel Scott could prevent the hill which he occupied from being deserted, or even prevail upon the infantry to wait the arrival of the cavalry who were to support them. Their impatience for action would doubtlessly have been justified by their bearing through its dangers; but the trial was not afforded: on their approach the enemy abandoned their guns and fled. Shortly after, the Arabs beginning to collect in considerable numbers in front of the hill, a troop of cavalry, led by Cornet Smith, charged round its base, and numbers of the enemy were cut to pieces. All hope now seemed to be extinct with the defeated party; the attack slackened in every quarter, and by noon it had entirely ceased.

Courage and military conduct, like other meritorious qualities, are not always appreciated according to their deserts. The magnitude of the stake contended for, the proximity or distance of the scene of action, the numbers engaged, and various other accidents, influence the judgment of mankind with regard to them. Little is recollected of the heroic band who, on this occasion, illustrated the triumphant supremacy of living burning courage over the dead force of mere numbers. Yet the prodigies of valour which they performed have rarely been equalled, either in ancient or modern times. If glory were to be proportioned to difficulty and danger, the memory of such men would be imperishable. The noble spirit by which they were animated extended to the civil servants of the Company. The resident, Mr. Jenkins, was present throughout the action, and on the testimony of Colonel Scott it is established that his animated conduct tended, in a very considerable degree, to excite the troops to their duty. His first assistant, Mr. Sotheby, exhibited the same contempt of danger, and the same generous ardour, not merely to satisfy the claims of duty, but to surpass them. The latter gentleman met an honourable death on the field which he contributed to win. Such are the men whom the Company's service has from its commencement never ceased to produce, and their best eulogium is to be found in the magnificent empire acquired by their exertions.

Dismayed by the result of his first attempt in hostility, Appa Sahib sought refuge in negotiation, and the resident consented to a suspension of arms, on condition of the rajah's troops being withdrawn from the positions which they then held to those which they had formerly occupied. Any final arrangements he professed himself unable to make until he received further instructions from his government. Appa Sahib, in the mean time, remained still, but continued to increase his army and render his artillery more efficient; and as no instructions arrived for the guidance of the resident, that gentleman determined, on the 14th of December, to offer terms for the rajah's acceptance. Terms were accordingly tendered, and four o'clock on the morning of the 16th fixed as the latest period for accepting them. If the rajah then consented to the proposal made by the British resident, the troops of the former were to be withdrawn from their positions, and the city occupied by British troops, not later than seven o'clock on the same morning. The rajah was to repair to the British camp, and to remain there until everything was settled.

On these terms being submitted, the rajah at first required further time to consider of them, and to suggest some modification. This being refused, he sent a message on the evening of the 16th, signifying his assent to the terms, but requesting their execution to be deferred till noon on the following day. Subsequently he sent another message, intimating that he would proceed to the residency either that night or early in the morning.

The morning brought to the residency, not the rajah, but a message announcing that the Arabs would not allow him to come in. The resident, however, was prepared for this; reinforcements having a few days before arrived, and among them the division under the command of Brigadier-General Doveton. The troops were now drawn out, and three hours allowed to the rajah to come in; his refusal or neglect involving an immediate attack by the British force. This demonstration was successful, and the rajah proceeded to the residency.

The British authorities were thus relieved from further anxiety on that head; but the surrender of the guns, and the evacuation of the city by the rajah's troops, which were also among the stipulated conditions, still remained to be carried into effect. An agent from the rajah, with instructions for the surrender of the whole of the artillery, proceeded according to promise to General Doveton's camp, and, accompanied by him, the whole force moved forward to take possession of it.

On reaching the first battery symptoms of resistance were manifested; but the approach of the British force being rather unexpected, the enemy quitted the guns and retired. Having taken possession of them, and left them in charge of a division, General Doveton

advanced, when a heavy fire was opened upon him from a large body of troops, which was followed by a general discharge from the batteries. The infantry, however, continued to advance until the ground admitted of formation in line, when the batteries in front were carried in a gallant manner at the point of the bayonet. The horse artillery and cavalry, supported by a reserve, having made a *détour*, charged and carried the remainder of the batteries with equal gallantry, driving at the same time before them an immense mass of the enemy's cavalry, which having routed they pursued as long as a chance remained of doing them any mischief. A few of the enemy's guns which had been charged by the British cavalry, but had re-opened upon that body when it advanced in pursuit of the cavalry of the enemy, were again charged and again carried; and the whole of the enemy's artillery and camp equipage fell into the hands of the victors, together with upwards of forty elephants.

The two succeeding days were fixed for the evacuation of the city by the Arabs; but difficulty attended every step taken towards carrying the terms of the surrender into execution. Though all arrears had been paid, these troops refused to depart, and an attack upon the part of the city which they occupied became unavoidable. It was conducted by General Doveton, who having occupied a commanding position within two hundred and fifty yards of one of the gates of the town, erected a battery, which was opened on the morning of the 21st of December, with the view of effecting a breach in the old palace wall. This, however, being found unattainable, the firing was directed to another point; and on the 23rd it was reported that such an effect had been produced as would render an advance practicable with little or no loss. An attack upon three different points was determined on; and at half-past eight o'clock the troops, on a preconcerted signal, rushed to their various destinations. The principal attack was conducted by General Doveton, but the breach not being sufficiently wide to admit of a section entering at once, and the troops being exposed to the fire of the Arabs sheltered within the houses, it failed. The other attacks, which were conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott and Major Pittman, were more fortunate; but the failure of the main attack rendered it necessary, in the opinion of General Doveton, that both officers should resume their original positions. These attempts, though unsuccessful, were sufficient to deter the Arabs from offering a protracted resistance, and on the following day they signified their desire to surrender on conditions. Among the conditions demanded were personal immunity, and the protection of a British officer, with a small escort, to give them and their families safe conduct to Mulkapore. Immediate possession being highly desirable, and, if possible, without injury to the city, the request was granted, and on the

morning of the 30th of December the Arabs marched out.

The evacuation of the city was followed by the conclusion of a provisional engagement, under which the rajah returned to the palace. The conditions were, that certain territory should be ceded to the British government in place of the former subsidiary and contingent aid; that the civil and military affairs of the government of Nagpore should be conducted by ministers in the confidence of the British authorities, and according to the advice of the resident; that the rajah and his family should reside in the palace of Nagpore, under the protection of the British troops; that the arrears of subsidy should be paid up, and the subsidy itself continue to be paid until the final transfer of the territory stipulated to be surrendered; that any forts in the territory which it might be necessary for the British to occupy should immediately be given up; that the persons alleged to have been concerned in originating the recent disturbances should be discontinued, and, if possible, delivered up; and that the two hills of Seetabuldee, with the bazars, and an adequate portion of land adjoining, should be ceded to the British government, which should be at liberty to erect upon them such military works as might be requisite.

Brigadier-General Hardyman, commanding one of the divisions of the Deccan army destined to act against the Pindarries, was in the Rewah territory when the outbreak at Nagpore took place. On the menacing posture of affairs there becoming known to the governor-general, General Hardyman was ordered to move down to the Nerbudda, to be in readiness to act in any way that might be required by the resident at Nagpore; and in the event of his learning that hostilities had actually commenced, he was directed to push on with his reinforcement with all expedition. He accordingly pressed forward with a regiment of cavalry and his Majesty's 17th foot and four guns to Jubbulpore, from which place a small British force had previously been compelled to withdraw, in consequence of hostile demonstrations with which it was thought unable to cope. At Jubbulpore Brigadier-General Hardyman found the enemy drawn up and strongly posted to oppose his possession of the place. They were in number about three thousand, of whom one thousand were horse, stationed on their left: their right was on a rocky eminence, and they had four brass guns. General Hardyman placed his guns in the centre, with three companies of the 17th foot on each side of them and two companies in the rear. Two squadrons of cavalry under Major O'Brien were sent round the left of the enemy, another squadron masked the British guns, and a squadron in the rear was held as a reserve. On arriving near enough to the enemy's centre, the guns being unmasked, opened with shrapnel shells, and were immediately answered. After about

a quarter of an hour's firing the enemy's infantry evinced symptoms of indecision, on which the reserve squadron was ordered to charge the battery. This service was gallantly and successfully performed. By this time the enemy's infantry had descended from an eminence which they had occupied into the plain; but on an attempt being made by the advance squadron to charge them, they re-ascended the eminence, and compelled the assailants to retire under a heavy fire. One wing of the 17th foot was then brought up to storm the height, from which the enemy were bravely driven with severe loss, those who fled down the opposite side of the hill being partially intercepted by the advance squadron, which had made a *détour* round their right, as the British infantry ascended. In this affair the loss of the British amounted to only twelve men.

Great difficulties attended the formation of the contingent to be produced by Scindia in aid of the common cause. These difficulties the governor-general attributed "to the dilatory habits of the durbar and the bad quality of the force, combined with a desire to turn this arrangement to the personal benefit of individuals." He might have added, that while all these causes might be in operation, there was another, far more potent and influential than any of them—the reluctance entertained by the chief for the service which his situation compelled him to undertake. It at length became necessary to reduce the numbers to be furnished by Scindia himself to less than one-half of the stipulated quota, and to supply the deficiency by troops raised directly for the British government, but to be paid by Scindia. In this manner the number was at length completed. Such indirect indications of hostile feeling were not all. Scindia was in collusion with several of the Pindarrie leaders; he warned them of his inability longer to afford them any open assistance, and pointed out the best modes of effecting their escape from the British forces assembled for their destruction. In this occupation he was but too successful—the attempts of the various divisions of the British army to overtake the retreating freebooters being thus for the most part rendered fruitless.

It is now necessary to advert to a power once of some importance, but at this period sunk almost beneath contempt. This was the government of Holkar. The chief of that name, whose hostility to the British government has already formed the subject of narration, subsequently to the conclusion of the peace became insane, and the administration of the affairs of the state fell into the hands of a female named Toolsee Bhye. This personage was the pupil of a sectarian priest, whose reputed sanctity obtained him a local celebrity; and but that the priesthood of the sect to which the holy father belonged were subjected to the obligation of celibacy, she would have been believed to be his daughter. She

was possessed of extraordinary beauty, and a Mahratta adventurer, named Shamrow Madik, conceived the design of advancing his own fortunes by bringing her to the notice of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. It is true that the lady was already married, but this was regarded as a very slight impediment to the plan. Toolsee Bhye was thrown in the way of Holkar, who was instantly captivated; in a few days she was conducted to his zenana, and her liege lord to a prison. The lingering tenderness of the wife, however, was exercised to obtain the release of the husband, and he was dismissed with a horse, a dress, and a small sum of money, to console him for his loss. Toolsee Bhye henceforward ruled the fate of Holkar, and on that chief becoming insane, she succeeded to the regency. On his death, Toolsee Bhye, having no child, adopted Mulhar Rao Holkar, the son of Jeswunt Rao by another woman. An infant prince and an unpopular regent required some powerful support, and the latter by a secret message expressed a desire to place the young Holkar, his family and court, under British protection. In consequence, Captain Tod, under instructions from Mr. Metcalfe, took measures for opening a negotiation. But a great change had taken place in the spirit and temper of Holkar's durbar, in the interval that had elapsed since the overture was forwarded. During that interval the position of the British government towards the peishwa had changed from one of outward friendliness to that of open hostility. The influence of the name and authority of that potentate was sufficient to rouse the spirit of Mahratta partisanship to avenge his wrongs and retrieve his power, while the Patans, who formed the larger portion of Holkar's army, though not open to the operation of such feeling, were eager for war and its expected advantages, without the slightest reference to the grounds of quarrel. The army of Holkar had been in a state of great disorganization, arising chiefly from their pay being in arrear. The peishwa promised the means of removing this difficulty, and a large force was rapidly assembled near Oojein. Thither, too, Sir Thomas Hialop, with the first division of the Deccan army, directed his march. Sir John Malcolm, with the third division, had been engaged in a series of operations, principally directed against Cheetoo, whose name and character have been already brought to notice. But Cheetoo had no desire to encounter a British force, and he fled with Pindarrie precipitation. The English commander was prepared for battle, but in running he was no match for the agile freebooters, who consequently escaped. The active and persevering efforts of Colonel Adams and other officers met with similar success.

In almost every instance, indeed, where an attempt was made to strike a blow at the Pindarries, they were able to defeat it by the promptitude of their movements in retreat; their aptitude for flying rendered conflict im-

possible and pursuit ineffectual. The adopted son of Cheetoo was, however, taken with the garrison of a fort named Talyne, which was attacked and captured by a body of cavalry under Captain James Grant, after a march of thirty-two miles performed with such rapidity as enabled the assailants to take the foe by surprise; and though attempts to overtake the enemy usually ended in disappointment, one important object was attained in clearing the country. This operation having been effectually performed in Southern Malwa, Sir John Malcolm was recalled, and ordered, with reference to the state of affairs in Holkar's court and camp, to proceed towards Oojein. Near that place he effected a junction with Sir Thomas Hislop, and on the 12th of December the first and third divisions of the army of the Deccan having marched past the city, crossed the Seepra at a ford opposite to its north-west angle, and encamped on the left bank of the river. On the 14th the army marched by the high road towards Mahidpore, and re-crossing the Seepra, took up a position at a place about four miles distant from a town called Faun-Bahar. The approach of the British troops gave rise to some apprehension at Holkar's durbar, and negotiations, which had for some time been broken off, were resumed. Five days were thus occupied, during which Sir John Malcolm, by whom the negotiation was conducted on the part of the British government, urged the various grounds of complaint which that government had to allege; more especially the negotiations carried on with the peishwa subsequently to his treacherous conduct towards his European ally, and the assemblage of a large army to proceed towards Poona at a time when Holkar was not professedly at war with any state. Articles were submitted for the acceptance of the vakeels conducting the negotiation on the part of the Mahratta chief. These were discussed with seeming interest, and with an apparent desire to bring affairs to a satisfactory conclusion. Many references were made to camp, distant about twenty miles; but it is probable that all their proceedings were but feints designed to lull the British authorities into security and to gain time, procrastination being always a favourite object with diplomatists of this cast. The English negotiator in some degree yielded to the Mahratta agents the enjoyment of this precious privilege. The period at which the discussion was either to be brought to a successful issue or regarded as at an end was repeatedly fixed and postponed. At last it was wisely determined to close the door on indulgence; a decision the propriety of which was enforced by the systematic plunder carried on during the negotiation by flying parties of Holkar's horse. It was also to be apprehended, as a writer on the subject judiciously observes, "that any further tolerance of the delays artfully brought forward would be construed into doubts on the side of the British commander of his own strength.

This could not fail to embolden the party of Holkar, and to encourage the re-assembling in Malwa of all those elements of disorder which had been already dispersed or deterred. A native power can never account for the forbearance of another, except on the supposition of weakness." On the 19th of December, the vakeels were dismissed from the British camp, and on the same day that of the Mahrattas witnessed the opening of a fearful scene, which on the following was consummated. Toolsee Bhye had given offence to the party clamorous for war by her desire to secure the protection of the English. This desire she had subsequently sacrificed, partly to the violence of her opponents and partly to the influence of a favourite paramour, named Gunput Rao, who, though originally friendly to the English, had been gained over to the cause of the peishwa. The sincerity of her conversion was, however, doubted, and he who had been most instrumental in effecting it did not escape suspicion. The youthful Holkar was enticed from a tent where he was engaged in amusement, and possession of his person secured by the party hostile to the regency. Toolsee Bhye and Gunput Rao were at the same time arrested, and all access to the former strictly prohibited. The unhappy woman was not destined long to endure the torment of suspense as to her fate. The dawn of the following day was the last she was permitted to witness. As the light broke she was brought from her prison to be conducted to the bank of the river, where she was beheaded, and her body thrown into the water. Her piercing cries awakened many from their sleep, but none moved a hand or raised a voice to save her. Her career of power had been marked not less by vindictive cruelty than by the most scandalous licentiousness; and the beauty which had held captive the chieftain of the people among whom she perished failed at her latest moments to call forth any sign of commiseration for her fate. When thus violently deprived of life Toolsee Bhye had not numbered thirty years.

So great was the gratification felt by the war party at the revolution which had taken place, that it is said the battalions proposed to sign an acquittance-roll for the whole of the arrears of pay due to them. So extraordinary a manifestation of delight is scarcely credible, but all prospect of keeping down the warlike propensities of the more powerful faction in Holkar's camp was now at an end. On the 20th of December the British army moved a short distance in advance, and on the 21st was again in motion at break of day. Its march was pursued for about eight miles without sight of an enemy. The tameness of this undisputed progress was then slightly relieved by the appearance of a courier bearing a letter couched in the vague and ambiguous language usual in Oriental diplomacy. An answer was returned, inviting the young Holkar to join the British army, as the only

means of saving and establishing his government. Another communication from the enemy followed, intimating that, in consequence of the advance of the British, the Sirdar had resolved on war, and significantly adding, that the troops which the British would have to encounter were those of Holkar. To this no answer was sent. This interchange of communication had not been permitted to interfere with the advance of the British force. The march continued, and about nine o'clock an eminence was gained, whence was a commanding view of the valley in which was situate the town of Mahidpore; the foreground filled with the enemy's horse, some in large bodies, some in detached parties for skirmishing. The main position of the enemy was masked by a plantation. From an adjacent hill a more complete view was obtained of the disposition of the enemy's troops. They appeared behind the river in two lines, of which the infantry and heavy batteries formed the first, and the cavalry the second. The first question for the consideration of the British general was how to pass the river. There were fords both above and below the enemy's position; but that below was unapproachable for guns. To render it passable would have been a work of time, could it have been effected, which was matter of doubt, as those engaged in it must have been exposed to a tremendous fire from the enemy's batteries. The ford above was difficult of access on both banks. It was approachable only by by-paths, through a rugged country; and to reach the enemy in this way would have required a *detour* of many miles. This objection applied also to the ford previously noticed. With reference to these difficulties, it was resolved to abstain from any attempt to turn either flank of the enemy; and as the bed of the river afforded considerable cover for the troops during their formation, it was arranged that the attack should be on the enemy's front, and that the passage should be made by a single ford. Some light troops first passed, followed by the horse artillery, which opened their guns; a battery of foot artillery playing from the right bank of the river, and enfilading some cannon on the enemy's left which had opened a heavy and well-directed fire on the ford. The troops, as they crossed, were successively formed in the bed of the river and took up their respective positions, the cavalry ascending the bank to the left, where they were partially screened from the enemy by some rising ground, the horse artillery forming batteries in front of the ford. The light brigade had taken possession of two ravines which opened into the river, the object being to keep it clear for the passage of the remaining brigades, who, on crossing, were directed by a counter-march to bring their right in front. As soon as this manoeuvre was performed by the first brigade, Sir Thomas Hislop gave orders for the attack of the enemy along the whole front by

the troops that had crossed, leaving the second brigade of infantry to follow as a reserve.

The first brigade accordingly ascended the bank, leaving sufficient ground to the right for its formation into line, while the light brigade rose from the ravines and formed battalion companies on its left. This operation was performed under a galling fire of round shot and grape from several batteries. The fire of the enemy's batteries was likewise very destructive to the British horse artillery, whose guns were all silenced or dismounted. The light pieces of the latter, though admirably served, were quite unequal to the heavy guns in their front. The British cavalry also suffered from the same source of annoyance, as well as from a party of the enemy which came down a ravine. The two brigades of infantry advanced to the attack of the enemy's left, under the immediate command of Sir John Malcolm. Their ranks were fearfully thinned by the grape of the enemy; but pushing forward, they succeeded in carrying a ruined village which was regarded as the key of the enemy's position, and in gaining the batteries from which they had suffered so severely. The latter were defended with great determination, the men standing to their guns till killed or disabled by the bayonets of the British infantry. The two brigades of cavalry, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, of the 3rd regiment, and Major Lushington of the 4th, were to assail the enemy's right simultaneously with the attack of the infantry on his left. This service was performed by the two brigades, accompanied by the Mysore horse, with extraordinary brilliancy, the assailants pushing to the rear of the batteries opposed to them with a decisive rapidity which overcame every obstacle and spread dismay through the enemy's ranks.

The enemy's camp was standing, and the attention of the cavalry and of the commander-in-chief was almost simultaneously directed to it. It was, however, found deserted. Some feeble attempts at a stand were made by parties of the foe, but they were only for the purpose of covering the retreat of the remainder. The fortune of the day was decided. The British were masters of the field, and of the whole of the enemy's artillery, amounting to above sixty pieces. The loss of the enemy in men was estimated at three thousand; that of the English, though considerably less, was still lamentably heavy. The killed and wounded amounted to seven hundred and seventy-eight, including thirty-eight European and twenty-seven native officers.

As soon as practicable, a light detachment was formed for pursuit, but there was little opportunity for its employment. The prostrate enemy sued for peace, and after a discussion, not undistinguished by the usual characteristics of oriental diplomacy, but of unusual brevity, a treaty was concluded. By this instrument, the Company's government engaged

not to allow impunity to any state or freebooter that should commit any outrage or hostility against the territory of Holkar, he lending his utmost assistance in any manner that might be requisite; and his dominions were to receive at all times the same protection as those of the British government. Holkar confirmed the engagements made with Ameer Khan, and ceded in perpetuity certain pergunnahs to the rajah of Kotah; to the British government he ceded all his claims for tribute or revenue upon the Rajpoot princes; he renounced all right and title to places within the Bhoondee hills, or lying to the northward of them, and ceded to the Company all his territories and claims within the Saupoorah hills, or to the southward of them, including the fort of Sundewah, all his possessions in the province of Candeish, and in the districts in which they were intermixed with the territories of the nizam and the peishwa. In consideration of these cessions, the British government was bound to support a field force of adequate strength to maintain the internal tranquillity of Holkar's territories, and to defend them from foreign enemies, the station of such force to be determined by the power by whom it was raised and maintained. The purchase of articles for the use of any force acting in defence of Holkar's territories was to be made exempt from duties. The stipulation which followed the last was of a very comprehensive character: Holkar engaged never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any of the Company's allies or dependents, "or against any other power or state whatever,"—a hard condition for a Mahratta. The Company were to adjust whatever differences might arise, and Holkar was not to receive vakeels from any other state, nor to have communication with any other state except with the knowledge and consent of the British resident. The absolute authority of the chief over his children, relatives, dependents, subjects, and servants was acknowledged by a subsequent article, in which his new ally renounced all concern with them. By another article, Holkar agreed to dismiss his superfluous troops, and "not to keep a larger force than his revenues would afford"—a prudent provision, regard to which would have saved many a native prince from embarrassment and ruin. Holkar was, however, to retain in reserve, ready to co-operate with the British troops, a body of not less than a thousand horse, for whose regular payment it was somewhat emphatically stated, a "suitable arrangement must be made." A provision followed for securing a jaghire to Ghusloor Khan, a Patan adventurer, who had attained great influence in the camp of Holkar, and this was succeeded by stipulations restricting the Mahratta chieftain from employing Europeans or Americans without the knowledge and consent of the British government; providing for the residence of a minister of that government with

Holkar, and permitting the latter to send a vakeel to the governor-general. All cessions made under the treaty to the British government or its allies were to take effect from the date of the treaty, and the possessions recently conquered from Holkar were to be restored. Finally, the English government engaged never to permit the peishwa, nor any of his heirs and descendants, to claim and exercise any sovereignty over Holkar, or his heirs and descendants. Such a treaty forms a remarkable supplement to the warlike demonstrations which had so recently prevailed in Holkar's camp. Comment would be superfluous: the articles speak for themselves, and show how fully those who assumed the management of Holkar's interests and their own must have been convinced that they were completely at the mercy of their conquerors, and had no resource but in entire submission.

It has been seen that Holkar had been compelled to cede to the British government all claims upon the Rajpoot princes. In connection with this subject, it may here be convenient to state that, on the same day on which the treaty with Holkar was signed (the 6th of January, 1818), a treaty was concluded with the rajah of Joudpore, and a few days afterwards a similar engagement was made with the rajah of Ondeypore. By these treaties the British government took the two states under its protection, while their chiefs engaged to act in "subordinate co-operation" with it—to acknowledge its supremacy, and to have no connection with other chiefs or states. Several succeeding articles were of the description common in similar compacts; others were framed with reference to the peculiar circumstances of the states to which they were applied. Treaties of like character had previously been concluded with the rajahs of Kerrowlie and Kotah, and at later periods, treaties nearly corresponding in their terms, were formed with the rajahs of Bhoondee, Jyepoor, and other petty states. Thus was the non-interference system abandoned as completely as had been the unhappy allies of the British government at a former period; but here the abandonment was consistent with justice, while it was dictated by reason and sound policy. It is also evident that the course pursued by the governor-general was duly appreciated by the authorities at home, for on the conclusion of the war he was advanced a step in the peerage, and created Marquis of Hastings.

It is now time to return to the movements of the discomfited peishwa. After his defeat at Poona, his flight was in the first instance directed to the southward. The advance of the force under Brigadier-General Pritzer obliged him to change his course, and he took an easterly direction to Punderpore, whence he struck off to the north-west, followed by General Smith, who had by this time been able to make the necessary arrangements for

pursuit. Passing between Poona and Seroor, the peishwa then advanced as far as Wuttoor, having been joined on his route by Trimbuckjee Dainglia with a considerable reinforcement. Finding that General Smith, who had moved to the northward, on a line east of that taken by the peishwa, was in a position to intercept his retreat in that direction, he suddenly turned again to the south, taking the straight route for Poona, and still pursued.

On new-year's day, 1818, he encountered a British detachment, consisting of about six hundred infantry, with about three hundred auxiliary horse, and a detail of artillery, commanded by Captain Staunton. The detachment had marched on the previous day from Seroor, and were proceeding to Poona. On reaching the heights overlooking Corygaum, they discovered in the plain the whole of the peishwa's army, estimated at twenty thousand horse and eight thousand foot. Captain Staunton immediately moved upon the village of Corygaum, and on reaching it was attacked by three divisions of the peishwa's choicest infantry, consisting of about a thousand men each, supported by immense bodies of horse and two pieces of artillery. The enemy obtained immediate possession of the strongest post of the village; the possession of the remaining part was most obstinately contested from noon till nine at night. During this period almost every building in the place was repeatedly taken and retaken; nearly the whole of the British artillerymen were either killed or wounded, and about one-third of the infantry and auxiliary horse. Nearly all the officers were killed or disabled; those who survived suffered dreadfully from want of water, amidst the unparalleled exertions which they had been called upon to make after a fatiguing march of twenty-eight miles. The result, however, was most honourable to the British arms, the enemy being compelled to abandon the village after sustaining an immense loss in killed and wounded.

On the following day, the enemy, though in sight, did not renew the attack, and in the evening Captain Staunton returned to Seroor, carrying away his numerous wounded; and the noble band entered that place as became them, with drums beating and colours flying. The detachment had then suffered under an almost total privation of refreshment for two days. In this brilliant affair the medical officers, having no opportunity for the exercise of their proper duties, aided their brother officers in leading on the sepoy to charges with the bayonet, and one of them was killed. In such a struggle the example of even one European was of almost incalculable importance, from the confidence with which it inspired the native soldiers. The loss sustained was, as might be expected, severe. Of twenty-six artillerymen, twelve were killed and eight wounded. Of the native infantry there were fifty killed and a hundred and five wounded. Of the auxiliary horse, ninety-six killed,

wounded, and missing. Among the killed was Lieutenant Chisholm, of the Madras artillery; Lieutenant Patterson, of the Bombay native infantry, was carried mortally wounded to Seroor, where he died. Two other officers, Lieutenant Connellan and Lieutenant Swainston, were badly wounded. The loss of the enemy was estimated at from six to seven hundred. Its extent may be attributed in a great degree to the situation in which most of their attacks were made—in avenues raked by the guns of the British party.

The peishwa continued to vary his course as the approach of his pursuers warned him to escape them. After many changes of route he arrived at Sholapore; but instead of following him in that direction, General Smith resolved upon reducing Sattara, and effecting a junction with General Pritzer. These objects were accomplished. Sattara surrendered on the opening of the mortar batteries, and the desired junction of the forces under General Smith and General Pritzer was effected. Its object was to enable the entire force at disposal for field service to be formed into two divisions: one to be composed wholly of cavalry and light troops, to keep up an active pursuit of the enemy; the other of infantry, with an ample battering-train, to reduce forts, and gradually occupy the country. These arrangements being made, General Smith resumed the pursuit of the peishwa, and General Pritzer proceeded to reduce the forts and strongholds in the neighbourhood of Poona. On the 19th of February, the former officer surprised the peishwa's army at Ashtee, and completely defeated it. The rajah of Sattara and part of his family, who were in the peishwa's camp, fell into the hands of the victors; and Gokla, the peishwa's ablest general, as well as his chief counsellor, was killed.

In the mean time General Pritzer proceeded with the reduction of the forts south of Poona. Singhur alone offered very strong resistance, and there it was not protracted. Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon was equally successful in the same species of service in the north. Other detachments were employed in the Concan, and Brigadier-General Munro was occupied in the reduction of the country south of the Kistna.

The Pindarries continued to follow their invariable practice of flying when a British force approached them. "Were it possible," says Colonel Blacker, "to trace the several routes of the Pindarries during the time of their flight, such particulars would, perhaps, give but little additional interest to this account of the operations against them. When pressed, they fled collectively, if possible; otherwise they broke into parts again to unite. In some instances, from inability to proceed, or under the apprehension of suddenly falling in with British troops from an opposite quarter, parties of them lurked in small numbers about remote villages, or lay in the thickest jungles,

exposed to the most severe hardships, till their enemies had passed by." On the 12th of January Colonel Adams detached the 3rd Bengal cavalry, under Major Clarke, with instructions to march on the village of Ambee, where it was understood a party of Pindarries were about to plunder. Major Clarke was met on his way by a report of the exact position of the enemy, and continuing his march till night, halted within a few miles of them. At five o'clock he moved, and came upon them with his force in two divisions, just as they were preparing to march. One division immediately cut in among the enemy, and a large body, flying from the attack, encountered the other division, from which they suffered severely. The number of the Pindarries was estimated at fifteen hundred. Accounts vary as to the number of the slain, but by Major Clarke, whose estimate was formed on a comparison of the reports of the pursuers, it was computed at a thousand.

After the conclusion of the treaty with Scindia, British officers, in conformity with one of its provisions, were despatched to reside with those of Scindia at his principal station. Two of them, Jeswunt Rao Bhow and Bappojee Scindia, were known to be ill-affected to the English and friendly to the Pindarries. The former was placed under the care of Captain Caulfield, the latter under that of Major Ludlow. Nothing very remarkable occurred at Ajmere, where Bappojee Scindia managed Scindia's interests; but at Jadud, the seat of the head-quarters of Jeswunt Rao Bhow, it soon became evident that the duties of the British resident would not be light. In the face of Captain Caulfield's constant and urgent remonstrances, Jeswunt Rao Bhow continued to maintain an intimate intercourse with the Pindarries, and refused to move a man against them. At Jadud, Cheetoo met a friendly reception, and obtained such advice and information as was calculated to facilitate his objects; and there Kurreen found an asylum when flying from the British detachments employed against him. Much of this treacherous conduct of Scindia's officers was concealed at the time from the representative of the British government; but Captain Caulfield saw enough to convince him of the necessity of employing some stronger means of effecting the objects of his mission than remonstrances. In consequence, General Brown moved, in order to support Captain Caulfield's representations by the presence of an over-awing force, and arrived at Jadud on the 23rd of January.

The first step taken was to demand the surrender of two of the Bhow's officers, who had been most actively instrumental in executing his plans for the protection of the Pindarries. Some days having been spent in fruitless communications, the British authorities learned on the 29th, that one of the offending officers was, with his followers, preparing for flight. Jeswunt Rao Bhow had been previously in-

formed that the movement, without the consent of the British commander, of any part of his forces, previously to the adjustment of the points of difference, could not be permitted; and on the projected flight becoming known, a squadron of cavalry was sent down to prevent it. On the approach of the squadron it was fired upon. General Brown thereupon lost no time in making the necessary dispositions for attack. He sent two guns to reinforce the pickets, and ordered two squadrons of regular cavalry and some Rohilla horse round the town to gain the rear of the detached camp of the officer who had taken the lead in the movement. Before the line could be formed for attack, the fire of two twelve-pounders with shrapnell shells drove the enemy from the position which they had taken, the infantry flying into the town and the horse galloping off. The latter were pursued by the British cavalry; but these having just returned from a forced march of considerable length, in fruitless search of a party of Pindarries, were exhausted, and the pursuit was soon relinquished: the cavalry returned to destroy a remnant of the enemy which still lingered behind. In the mean time General Brown had proceeded to the gate of the town and demanded its surrender. The messenger was fired on; whereupon a twelve-pounder was run up to the gate, while the remaining ordnance swept away the defences about it. Jeswunt Rao Bhow now thought it time to provide for his own safety. He fled with a few followers at the gate opposite to that attacked, through which the British triumphantly entered, bearing down all attempts at opposition. The loss of the enemy was great; it was computed at a thousand. The British lost only thirty-six men.

The servants of Holkar, like those of Scindia, did not in all cases yield implicit respect to the treaties concluded by their superiors. The killadar of Talneir, a fort on the Taptee, determined to disobey the summons of Sir Thomas Hislop to surrender, and in consequence it became necessary to reduce it by force. On the 27th of February, some guns were opened against the fort, and preparations were made for storming. Thenceforward the circumstances of the affair are involved in ambiguity and confusion. In Sir Thomas Hislop's report to the governor-general it is stated, that though preparations were made for blowing open the outer gate, they were found unnecessary, as the troops were able to enter at the side by single files. Similar testimony is given by Colonel Blacker. The words of Colonel Conway, adjutant-general, however, when subsequently called upon to state the circumstances of the case, are, "We had forced the outer gate." According to all authorities, the second gate was forced open. At a third, a number of persons, apparently not military, came out on the approach of the British party, and were made prisoners: among these was the killadar. Sir Thomas

Hislop, in his despatch, stated that the killadar here surrendered himself to Colonel Conway. According to Colonel Conway, however, no communication took place between them, and the presence of the killadar among the prisoners was not known. According to Sir Thomas Hislop and Colonel Blacker, the party passed through a fourth gate without opposition, but were stopped at a fifth, which was also the last. Colonel Conway makes no mention of a fourth gate, but his statement coincides with theirs as to the stoppage of the party at the last gate of the series. Here a parley took place, but after a time the wicket was opened. Sir Thomas Hislop says, it "was opened from within." Colonel Conway, "at last they consented to open the wicket, but in doing so there was much opposition, and evidently two opinions prevailed in the fort." Colonel Macgregor Murray, who was present (and whose name will shortly appear in a more distinguished character than that of a witness), after quoting, apparently with approval, the statement of Sir Thomas Hislop, thus continues: "The Arabs still insisted upon terms. It remained doubtful whether the storming party, on reaching the last gate, were to receive the submission or to encounter the resistance of the enemy; and in this state of uncertainty, resulting from the equivocal conduct of the garrison, it became obviously requisite that the assailants should prepare for the latter alternative by effecting a lodgment within the gateway, as their position in the passage leading to it would have been absolutely untenable under fire."

Whatever were the circumstances of the case, whatever the expectations of the assailants or the intentions of those within, the wicket was opened. "On our entrance," says the witness last quoted, "the garrison received us with the most furious gesticulations, raising their matchlocks and calling out 'mar!' or kill! Colonel Macgregor Murray, Major Gordon, and one or two privates had passed through the wicket when an attempt was made to close it. This was resisted by Colonel M'Intosh and Captain M'Crath, who succeeded in keeping it open till a grenadier of the Royal Scots thrust his firelock through the aperture. The remainder of the storming party were thus enabled to force their way. All those who had previously entered were killed, excepting Colonel Macgregor Murray, who was rescued covered with wounds. Captain Macgregor, who was at the head of those who entered after the attempt to close the gate upon those who had first passed, also fell, but the fort was carried. The garrison, consisting of about three hundred Arabs, sheltered themselves for a time in the houses, but were ultimately all put to the sword, a proceeding manifesting a degree of ferocity not usual with British victors. It may not, however, be just to scrutinize too nicely the conduct of men in the heat of action, when inflamed by the belief that treachery has been employed

against them. The worst part of the transaction remains to be told. Immediately after the place fell, the killadar was hanged by order of the general in command, who, in the despatch in which he reported the occurrences at Talneir, uses language which implies a doubt as to the participation of the officer in the alleged treachery of part of the garrison. The general, indeed, drew consolation from the conclusion that, if innocent of the treachery, the killadar nevertheless deserved to be hanged for his resistance in the first instance, more especially as he had been warned, that if he persisted, severe punishment would await him. "Whether," says Sir Thomas Hislop, "he was accessory or not to the subsequent treachery of his men, his execution was a punishment justly due to his rebellion in the first instance, particularly after the warning he had received in the morning." This position requires some examination, and the transaction to which it relates is altogether so extraordinary as to invite a pause, for the purpose of endeavouring more accurately to estimate its character and merits. It excited a great sensation in England at the time when it first became known there, and the general impression of the conduct of the British general was far from favourable. The Secret Committee, the Court of Directors, and the General Court of the East-India Company, were alike of opinion that it required explanation; and in a similar spirit the subject was brought to the notice of parliament. The Marquis of Hastings volunteered a minute in defence of Sir Thomas Hislop,—a course to which he was, in fact, pledged, having long previously expressed his approbation, not only of the means taken for the reduction of Talneir, but also of the severity with which the conquest was followed. Sir Thomas Hislop called upon various officers present at the capture to afford such information as they possessed, and in transmitting their communications, he addressed to the government a long and laboured defence of his conduct—a defence distinguished not less by its weakness, than by its wordiness.

It is gratifying to turn from such a scene as that at Talneir; and the narrative of the progress of events at Nagpore must now be resumed. The engagement provisionally concluded with Appa Sahib, after the evacuation of his capital, was confirmed by the governor-general, and the resident was authorized to frame a definitive treaty on its basis. This was suspended by a proposal from Appa Sahib to transfer to the British government the whole of the possessions of the state of Nagpore, he retaining only the name and form of sovereignty, and receiving a certain share of the revenues. The proposal was rejected by the governor-general, and the original plan ordered to be carried into effect. But before the despatch conveying the final instructions of the government was received by the resident, the state of circumstances again forced him to

act upon the dictates of his own sound and vigorous judgment.

The delivery of certain fortresses stipulated to be surrendered was refused or evaded. Mundela was one of these. When the order for its surrender arrived from Nagpore, the rajah's ministers requested that a little time might be allowed for the evacuation of the fort, in order that persons might be sent to settle with the garrison, and thus prevent any demur to the delivery of the fort, under the pretence of arrears being due. A person deputed from Nagpore ostensibly for this purpose arrived at Mundela; but the surrender was still deferred, under the plea that an order had been received to make the collections for the year from the pergunnahs dependent upon Mundela, and to pay the garrison with the produce. The resident having brought the subject to the notice of the rajah's ministers, they stated the order in question to be, that payment should be made from the revenue already collected, and sufficient for the purpose. As a part of the territory from which the revenue was to be drawn was actually occupied by the British troops, and nothing could be obtained from the remainder but by gross extortion and oppression, the resident authorized the payment of the garrison from the British treasury, and Major O'Brien proceeded with a small escort to Mundela to make the necessary arrangements. On the arrival of this officer, various communications passed between him, the killadar of the fort, and the person deputed from Nagpore, professedly for the purpose of settling the arrears. These communications appeared to promise a satisfactory adjustment, and Major O'Brien was in expectation of being put in immediate possession of the fort. Instead of this result, the British commander, on the third morning after his arrival, while riding near the place, found that the garrison during the night had sent over the Nerbudda about four hundred cavalry, with four thousand infantry, and four guns. The cavalry advanced upon him, and the guns opened; but he was enabled, with his small escort, to reach his camp in safety; the enemy, whenever they approached, being successfully repelled.

In consequence of this treacherous proceeding on the part of the killadar of the fort, Major-General Marshall, with a considerable force, was ordered to advance upon Mundela; but before this could be effected Nagpore became the scene of a bloodless revolution. The retention of the fortresses in defiance of the provisions under which they were to be surrendered, and notwithstanding public orders had been given for their delivery, was traced to secret orders of a contrary purport—a fact suspected at an early period by the resident, and ultimately placed beyond the possibility of doubt. In addition to these circumstances, Mr. Jenkins received information that an intercourse was kept up with the peishwa, and that the rajah held secret conferences with

persons hostile to the influence of the British government, while those who entertained friendly feelings towards it were regarded with aversion. Rumours of the rajah meditating an escape were general; it was understood that one of the disaffected chiefs had received a sum of money for the levy of troops; and attempts were made to intercept the progress of supplies intended for the British force. Everything conspired to show that Appa Sahib was irretrievably leagued with the enemies of the British power. New and incontestable proofs of the rajah's treachery continually occurred, and were multiplied, till it became evident that extreme measures could no longer be postponed without compromising the honour and safety of the British government. The resident now acted with his usual vigour, and arrested both the rajah and his confidential ministers. This bold step was accelerated by the discovery of facts which impressed Mr. Jenkins with a conviction that Appa Sahib had been the murderer of his kinsman and sovereign, Pursagee Bhonslah, formerly rajah of Nagpore. At the time of Pursagee's death Mr. Jenkins had been led to suspect this; but circumstances having induced him in some degree to moderate his suspicions, and the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory proof of the suspected fact being apparently insurmountable, no measures were taken in consequence. Such additional information was now acquired as led to a conviction of Appa Sahib's guilt. His arrest took place on the 15th of March. Subsequently he was declared to be dethroned, and this step was followed by the elevation to the musnud of a descendant of a former rajah by the female line. As soon as a sufficient escort could be obtained, Appa Sahib was sent off to the British provinces, and provision was made at Allahabad for his reception and custody.

General Marshall having arrived before Mundela, proceeded to erect batteries, which being completed were opened by daylight on the 26th of April. They were answered by a spirited fire from the whole of the enemy's works. After several hours' battering, Lieutenant Pickersgill, with great gallantry, proceeded to ascertain by personal inspection the effect produced, mounting, with the assistance of his hircarras, to the top of the breach; from which, after making his observations, he returned with so favourable a report, as induced General Marshall to make immediate preparations for storming the works. The necessary dispositions having been made, Captain Tickell, field engineer, examined the breach, and at half-past five o'clock the signal was given to advance. The storming and supporting columns, both under the direction of Brigadier-General Watson, moved forward, the breach was instantly mounted and carried, and in a very short time the town was in the possession of the assailants. The troops were immediately pushed forward to the fort, and at daybreak on the 27th the garrison came

out unarmed, and quietly surrendered themselves. At midnight a small boat had been observed crossing the river, with four persons: by good management on the part of one of the advanced posts they were secured on landing, and one of them turned out to be the killadar of the fort. The governor-general had given orders that, if taken, the killadar and other principal officers should be immediately brought to a drum-head court-martial, and that any punishment that might be awarded by such tribunal, whether death or imprisonment with hard labour, might immediately be carried into effect.

It would be difficult to show that these orders were consistent either with discretion or with a regard to the usages of war. They appear to have been an ebullition of that infirmity of temper which shadowed the high character of the marquis of Hastings. The orders were so far followed, that the killadar was brought to a court-martial, charged with rebellion and treachery. He was acquitted of the charge of rebellion, on the proper ground of his having acted under the orders of the Nagpore government. The charge of treachery arose out of the attack on Major O'Brien. Of this the killadar was also acquitted, the major declaring his belief that the prisoner was not concerned in the attack upon him. This appears a somewhat refined view of the matter. If the attack were an offence against military law, it could be of little importance whether the killadar were personally engaged in it or not, as it must be quite certain that the movement of the garrison must have taken place with his cognizance and sanction; but the court must have been aware that they had no proper jurisdiction in the case, and that conviction and punishment under such circumstances could not be justified. Another officer was put on trial, charged with abetting his superior; but he, of course, shared the impunity of his principal.

The surrender of Chouragurh, another fortress which was to be ceded to the British government, was postponed by the same bad faith which had delayed the delivery of Mundela, and the pretence was the same—time was asked to settle the arrears of pay due to the garrison; but the killadar soon assumed a posture of direct hostility. A body of men armed with matchlocks sallied from the fort to attack a British force under Colonel MacMorine, and the garrison systematically plundered the villages which had been placed under the British government. A body of about five hundred, employed in the latter occupation, were attacked and put to flight by a small detachment under Major Richards. After the reduction of Mundela, the division under General Watson was ordered to march to Chouragurh, but before their arrival the fort and adjoining town were evacuated, and possession taken by Colonel MacMorine.

The continued disturbances in Nagpore had induced the resident to call for the advance of

Colonel Adams's force from Hoosingabad, where it had arrived in the beginning of March, after being employed beyond the Nerbudda. He accordingly marched for the city of Nagpore, which he reached on the 5th of April; and having halted there on the following day, resumed his march on the 7th for Hinghungut, where he arrived on the 9th. There he was joined on the 14th by a party which he had detached under Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, to intercept an apprehended attempt of Bajee Rao to enter Chanda. Little has been said of the movements of Bajee Rao, for it would have been alike tedious and unprofitable to follow minutely his tortuous flight. After the battle of Ashtee he wandered in almost every direction, in continual dread of some portion of the British force. On the 18th of April he became aware of the position of Colonel Adams's force, and to avoid him moved to Soondee. On the 16th he was alarmed by intelligence of the approach of General Doveton, and made preparations for flying. On the 17th Colonel Adams came suddenly upon him, after a fatiguing march over a most difficult country. An action ensued, in which the peishwa was completely routed, with the loss of several hundred men, four brass guns, three elephants, nearly two hundred camels, and a variety of valuable property. The peishwa himself had a narrow escape, the palanquin in which he had been borne having been taken immediately after he had left it to seek safety by flight on horseback. Hotly pursued by General Doveton, the peishwa fled to Ormekai, where, overcome by fatigue, privation, and terror, his army broke up, and the fugitive prince was abandoned by most of his sirdars.

After dispersing the army of the peishwa at Soondee, Colonel Adams returned to Hinghungut, to prepare for laying siege to Chanda, a strongly fortified city in the Nagpore territory, said to be equal in size to the capital. He appeared before it on the 9th of May, with a thousand native cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, one-half being Europeans of the Madras establishment, the remainder natives, of the Bengal establishment, a complete company of European foot artillery, partly provided by Bengal, partly by Madras, three thousand native infantry, two companies of pioneers, one from the Bengal, one from the Madras establishment, and two thousand irregular horse, with three eighteen-pounders, four brass twelve-pounders, six howitzers, and twelve six-pounders.

Chanda is situate between two small rivers, which unite at a distance of about half a mile from its southern extremity. On the north is a deep and extensive tank, beyond which are some hills, commanding the place, at a distance of nine hundred yards. Between them and the fort are thick groves of trees. On the east face are suburbs interspersed with trees and separated from the town by one of the rivers, and opposite to the south-east angle,

distant about seven hundred and fifty yards, are other hills, beyond which the British encampment was fixed. Within the place equidistant from the north and south faces, but nearer the eastern than the western wall, is situated a citadel: the rest of the interior consists of straggling streets, detached houses, and gardens. The walls are of cut stone, well cemented, and from fifteen to twenty feet high, and six miles round. They are flanked by round towers, capacious enough for the largest guns; and as the direction of the walls is frequently broken, and they are surmounted by a high parapet, an effectual enfilade of them is not practicable. Eighty guns of large calibre were mounted, and the garrison consisted of two thousand men.

At night, on the 13th of April, the first battery was completed. It was erected on the southern hill, and admitted one eighteen-pounder, two howitzers, and one six-pounder. The chief point of attack had not at this time been selected, and this battery was intended, says Colonel Blacker, "to amuse the enemy, while the necessary collection of materials for the siege was in progress." Shells and red-hot shot were thenceforth thrown into the town, but with little effect, while the fire was returned by the garrison with no greater. Coincident with the opening of the battery, a force, consisting of a battalion of Bengal light infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Captain Doveton, was established in a suburb lying south-east of the city. Four days were spent in reconnoitring, and the south-east angle being finally selected for breaching, on the night of the 17th of April a battery of four twelve-pounders was constructed within four hundred yards of that point. In addition to this, a howitzer battery was erected on the capital of the south-east angle, at a distance of six hundred yards, and a battery of three six-pounders on the prolongation of the eastern face, distant four hundred yards. Three of the enemy's guns were dismounted, but beyond this the effect of these batteries seems to have been unimportant. During the night of the 18th the breaching battery of three eighteen-pounders was completed, within two hundred and fifty yards of the angle attacked, and at daybreak on the following morning it opened. At four in the afternoon the breach was practicable, but the assault was delayed till the following morning. During the night, however, an incessant fire was kept up, in order to defeat any attempt made by the garrison to form a retrenchment. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott was appointed to command the storming party, which consisted of two columns. The right column was composed of four companies of Bengal grenadiers, followed by pioneers with ladders, and the first battalion of the 19th regiment of Bengal native infantry. It was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Popham. The left column, under Captain Brook, consisted of four flank companies, followed by pioneers with ladders, and the first

battalion of the 1st regiment of Madras native infantry. The first battalion of the 23rd Bengal, and the first of the 11th Madras native infantry followed; while with the advanced sections was a detail of artillerymen, provided with materials for either turning the enemy's guns or spiking them. A reserve, consisting of the Bengal light infantry battalion, four troops of the 5th cavalry dismounted, and two horse-artillery guns, was commanded by Major Clarke.

At break of day on the 20th of April, the storming party marched from camp, the heads of the two columns being equally advanced. They arrived at the breach without much annoyance, a tremendous fire from all the guns that could be brought to bear on the breach and defences having been previously poured in for half an hour. The garrison, however, were found prepared, and the heads of the columns were assailed by a warm discharge of small arms. The columns separated, according to a preconceived arrangement, and took different directions. The right met with considerable resistance from bodies of the garrison, who being driven back, appeared to cross over and fall into the route of the left column. That column, however, pursued its way, driving the enemy back as it advanced, and within an hour from the breach being passed the place was entirely occupied by the English. The killadar, with about two hundred of his men, was killed, and about a hundred were made prisoners. The rest escaped without the walls; some of them were intercepted and destroyed by the British cavalry, but from the great extent of the place, and the cover afforded by a thick jungle to the northward, most of the fugitives succeeded in eluding pursuit. The loss of the English was small, amounting only to twelve killed and something more than fifty wounded.

The circumstances attending the capture of Chanda exhibit nothing very remarkable or striking. But the occupation of the place was of vast importance, inasmuch as it was the great citadel of the principality in which it was situated, and its possession was associated in public opinion with the existence of the Nagpore state. On this account, its fall to the force under Colonel Adams was an event highly favourable to British interests in Nagpore. A large amount of property was found in the city, having been deposited there for safety. Nine lacs of rupees, which had been buried in the purlieus of a single palace, were discovered and dug out, a few days after the storm. The taste of the natives of India for articles of European luxury was proved by the discovery of many such in the captured city, and among them some of the elegancies and embellishments which, however highly valued in a more cultivated state of society, might be supposed to have but few attractions for Asiatic taste. Some pictures, of European production, formed part of the spoil of Chanda.

The operations of the British arms in other quarters were marked by much that would deserve recital, did space permit. A few only can be noticed without extending this part of the narrative to a disproportionate length. A detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Macdowell, occupied in the reduction of various refractory garrisons in Candeah, after obtaining possession of Trimbuck and various other places, partly by force and partly through the influence of the terror imposed by their success, arrived, on the 16th of May, before Malligaum, the strongest place in the valley of Candeah.

The following professional description of this fort will convey a lively impression of it. "The plan of the fort is quadrangular, having on one face and on half of the two adjoining, the river Moassum, which at this place forms a convenient curve. On the opposite side is the town, which nearly encompasses the remainder of the fort, by approaching the river at its two extremities. The fort consists of two lines of works, the interior of which, a square of about three hundred feet, is built of superior masonry, and surrounded by a *fausse-braye* seven feet high, and a dry ditch twenty-five feet deep by sixteen wide. The outer line is built of mud and stone, having flanking towers, and it approaches within a few yards of the town on one side, and of the river on the other. It is only of moderate elevation; but the inner fort is sixty feet high, with a *terre-pleine* sixteen feet wide, to which there are no means of ascent except through narrow covered staircases of difficult access." In this place a large body of Arabs had established themselves, actuated by a determined spirit of resistance to the British. Their means of inflicting injury on the force opposed to them were not equal to the advantages of their position. Their guns were not numerous, and those they had were badly mounted; but they had matchlocks, and these, says Colonel Blacker, "in the hands of the Arabs, were sure of hitting their mark."

The British army was, in the first instance, formed at an angle of the town, with its left on the junction of the river Moassum with another river named the Gheerna, the point of junction being distant something more than three hundred yards from the nearest parts of the town and of the citadel; but was on the following day moved to the right bank of the Moassum, that river, then low in water, being thus interposed between the British encampment and the fort. As soon as the materials were collected, an enfilading battery of two eighteen-pounders, one eight-inch mortar, and two eight-inch howitzers, was constructed for the south face, and another of two twelve-pounders for the west face. Each of these batteries was distant four hundred yards from the works, and at the same distance was marked out a place of arms in the centre of a grove of trees, situate between the camp and the river. At eight o'clock on the evening of the 18th of May the garrison made a sally on

the covering party at the place of arms, and directed their guns against the two batteries. A reinforcement arriving from the camp, the attack was repelled and the assailants driven back; but the British had to lament the loss of Lieutenant Davis, the commanding engineer. On the 19th the two batteries opened, and were immediately answered from the fort by seven guns. A corps of infantry from Colonel Macdowell's camp on that day took possession of a breastwork in the rear of a village lying a little higher up the river, and at night repulsed a second sortie of the garrison. On the following day another attempt was made to dislodge the British party posted in the rear of the village already mentioned, the village itself having been deserted by the inhabitants and occupied by the Arabs; but the post had been strengthened by the accession of two field-pieces, and the attempt of the enemy failed. The fire from the enfilading batteries continued, but with little vigour, from the scarcity of shot; and some smaller guns were brought forward to make up, in some degree, for the slackening fire from the larger, previously in battery. The approaches were, in the mean time, advanced, and on the 21st a parallel was completed along the bank of the Moassum, containing a battery at each extremity; that on the left for three guns, raking the bed of the river; the other designed for breaching the opposed angle of the fort. On the 22nd the breaching battery opened against the towers, but with little effect; it was therefore afterwards directed against the intermediate curtain. One of the enfilading batteries first erected was converted into a mortar battery, and the other dismantled. An additional post was established on the bank of the river, to confine the garrison, and some field-pieces were attached to it, with a view to their being brought to bear on the gate on that side of the fort. On the same day it became necessary to withdraw the British camp four hundred yards, in consequence of the guns of the fort having found its range.

For several successive days little occurred worthy of note, except repeated sallies by the garrison, which were invariably repulsed with spirit, an explosion within the fort caused by the fire of the howitzers, and the arrival at the British camp of some seasonable reinforcements. But though an accession of troops was very desirable, the besieging force were even in greater want of artillery and ammunition. On the 26th of May the breach was carried through the wall of the inner fort; but by this time the twelve-pounder shots were all expended, and every heavy gun was run at the vent. The advancement of the breach consequently depended on the eighteen-pounders, and for the supply of them a very small share of ammunition remained. Every endeavour was now used to effect a slope on the flanks of the breach, to facilitate the ascent of the *terre-pleine*, and shells were thrown at intervals to prevent the enemy constructing a retrench-

ment. These objects having been pursued through two days, it was thought that an attempt to storm might be made on the 29th with a probability of success.

The parties for the attack having been told off on the preceding evening, took up in the morning the positions assigned to them. The column for the attack of the breach was commanded by Major Greenhill, of the 17th Madras native infantry. It consisted of one hundred Europeans and eight hundred sepoy, who remained in the parallel on the bank of the river. The column destined to storm the pettah was composed of five hundred sepoy under Lieutenant-Colonel Mathew Stuart, of the Madras native infantry. This column crossed the river lower down to a point on the left bank, eight hundred yards from the walls. The third column, which was commanded by Major Macbean, of the Madras native infantry, had for its object the escalade of the outer wall near the river gate. This column took post near the six-pounder battery up the right bank. It consisted of fifty Europeans and three hundred sepoy. Each column was headed by a party of pioneers, with tools and ladders, and led by an engineer officer; and that of Major Greenhill was provided with bundles of long grass, to be applied as might be necessary in filling up trenches. These preparations, however, proved unavailing. After a warm fire of two hours from the breaching and mortar batteries against the point of attack, Major Greenhill's column moved forward. As it approached the outer wall, Lieutenant Nattes, the senior engineer since the death of Lieutenant Davis, ascended the breach in front, and had no sooner attained its summit than he discovered insuperable obstacles, the existence of which was previously unsuspected. He was in the act of pronouncing the word "impracticable," and warning back those behind him, when he fell, pierced by several balls: the storming party, not having noticed his signal, continued to advance under a fire of small arms by which their commander, Major Greenhill, was wounded. All doubt as to the result of the attack was soon removed by the unwelcome discovery that the ladders of the assailants were too short to be of use. Colonel Macdowell consequently ordered the party to retire, which they did in exemplary order under a harassing fire from the enemy. The attack under Colonel Stuart was more fortunate. He had gained a considerable portion of the pettah when he was joined by Major Macbean, the object of that officer's attack having been found unattainable; and the united force quickly succeeded in obtaining possession of the entire town.

After the failure of the attack on the 29th of May, it was resolved to direct the next upon a new point. On the 1st of June the camp was removed across the Moasum to the vicinity of Gheerna, which was close to its rear. In addition to other reasons, the

expediency of this measure was urged by regard to the season of the year, and to the probable filling up of the Moasum by the approaching rains, the effect of which would be to separate the besiegers from the fort. Various preparations, unnecessary to be related in detail, were carried on while the British commander awaited the arrival of a battering-train from Ahmednuggur, which arrived on the 10th of June. On that night the mortars were brought into battery, and on the following morning they opened a discharge, one effect of which was to fire a store of powder within the fort. The explosion threw down from twenty to thirty yards of the curtain of the inner line. A breaching battery was soon ready to follow up the work of destruction, and was forthwith put into operation. The enemy were now alarmed, and tendered submission upon terms. They were answered that nothing but unconditional surrender could be accepted. The Arabs, however, were from some cause apprehensive for their personal safety after surrender, and hesitated to trust the faith of those in whose power they were required to place themselves. "Finding," says Colonel Macdowell, "that treachery on our part was suspected, and wishing to do away a report all over Candeish so prejudicial to our character, I did not hesitate in signing a paper, declaring, in the name of my government, that the garrison should not be put to death after they surrendered." Nothing, under the circumstances, could be more judicious than the conduct of Colonel Macdowell; but the concession necessary to remove the distrust of the garrison led to subsequent dispute. The native scribe who drew up the paper employed words, either by mistake, inadvertence, or design, which promised indulgences never intended. These, of course, were claimed; and the question of yielding or refusing them being referred to Mr. Elphinstone, he, in a spirit as wise as it was liberal and honourable, decided that the Arabs must be admitted to the advantages which they had been led to expect.

Before the fall of Malligaum, the once haughty, but now humbled, peishwa, had ceased even to pretend to the exercise of sovereign power. He had wandered in every direction, and in every direction had met with disappointment and defeat. "His flight," says Colonel Blacker, "seemed restricted within a magic circle, from which he appeared destined never to be emancipated. He fled twice to the northward and twice to the southward. To the westward was the ocean, and to the eastward, where the land was wide and contained well-wishers to his cause, he had met with one of his severest defeats. Again he sought the north; and after a flight of several hundred miles, he found himself on the borders of Candeish, not far distant from the extreme point of a previous visit, but more closely beset by enemies than on the

former occasion." The sudden dispersion of the several sirdars and their followers in various directions, after the signal defeat of the peishwa by Colonel Adams, had rendered it difficult to ascertain the course of the peishwa himself, and both General Smith and General Doveton were led into wrong tracks. But the meshes were closely drawn around the fugitive, and escape being impossible, he ultimately made overtures of submission to Sir John Malcolm. That officer, having asked the vakeel by whom the message was conveyed whether he thought the peishwa was sincere in the proceeding, received an answer highly expressive of the opinion entertained of the fallen prince by one who may be supposed to have enjoyed opportunities of knowing him well. "I should imagine," said the discreet officer, "that he must be sincere, for I cannot guess what possible illusive project he can now have left." His situation was indeed desperate, and was so felt by himself. In an interview with Sir John Malcolm, which followed, the peishwa exclaimed, "How can I resist now? I am surrounded! General Doveton is at Borhampore; you are at Metowla; Colonel Russell at Boorham. I am enclosed." After some ineffectual attempts to obtain delay, in the hope of making better terms, he yielded to the force of the circumstances in which he was placed, and surrendered to the British government.

Long before this event it had been determined to deprive him of all sovereignty, and of this he was apprized by Sir John Malcolm previously to his surrender. The determination was just and wise. The perfidy which had marked his conduct, and the inveterate hatred which he had displayed towards the British power, rendered this course the only one consistent with prudence. If, indeed, additional grounds of justification were required, they would be found in the atrocious proceedings in which he had been implicated subsequently to his attack upon the British residency. His flight had been a career of crime, as well as of misfortune and suffering. He had put to death two British travellers in cold blood, and committed other acts at variance with the usages of even semi-civilized nations. None but himself and his coadjutors in crime could lament his fall.

The governor-general had resolved upon restoring the house of Sattara to sovereignty. The motive to this proceeding was, that the Sattara rajah was the descendant and representative of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, of which Sattara was regarded as the capital. The peishwa was nominally but the vicergerent of the rajah of Sattara; he received the dress of investiture from his hands, and rendered some other acknowledgments of dependency; though practically the superior had been the slave and prisoner of his lieutenant. A portion of territory was assigned for the new, or rather revived, state of Sattara, and prior to the

surrender of the peishwa the prince had been publicly enthroned with much ceremony. With the exception of the tract of land thus appropriated, the peishwa's dominions were annexed to the British territories, and he became a pensioner upon the British government. In these few words is recounted the end of a state and dynasty which had been regarded as the key-stone of Mahratta power.

The life of Bajee Rao, its last head, had been eventful. On the death of his father, his brother and himself were alternately raised to the musnud and dethroned, as rival parties gained or lost the ascendancy. Bajee Rao was at last apparently fixed on the throne by the assistance of Scindia; but, shortly afterwards, he and his ally were defeated by Holkar, and Bajee Rao arrived at Basseina fugitive and a wanderer. Here he formed an alliance with the British government, by whose assistance he was restored to a throne of somewhat diminished splendour but of increased security. The magnitude of the favour might have been expected to attach him to the interests of the power by whom it was bestowed. The general characteristic of Oriental potentates is, however, intense and unalloyed selfishness, and the peishwa's conduct afforded an instance, not an exception. His character was marked by timidity, his habits were those of the grossest sensuality, and he manifested an utter destitution of all honourable principle. His cowardice probably led him to suspect the intentions of the British government to be less friendly towards him than they originally were; his debasing sensuality led to the encouragement of despicable parasites, who at once flattered and ministered to his vices; and his total insensibility to those principles which impose restraint on better natures, made him unscrupulous as to the means employed for accomplishing his ends. From the time of the murder of Gungadhur Shastry, his course was that of a man rushing headlong to destruction. In addition to the qualities already mentioned he possessed an unusual portion of blind obstinacy, which was eminently displayed in the tenacity with which he clung to his wretched favourite, Trimbackjee Dainglia, in the hope of rendering him as serviceable a minister to his ambition and revenge, as he had already been to vices of a different character. By this mad adhesion to a connection as dishonourable as its object was hopeless, he involved himself in a dispute with the British government, from which he escaped, not indeed unharmed, but still in a better condition than he had reason to expect. Although the result of this attempt might have shown him the folly of his course, he repeated the error which had deprived him of a portion both of solidity and splendour, and he lost all. He descended from the rank of a sovereign to that of a dependent on the bounty of foreigners.

Two points in the arrangement connected with the fall of the peishwa and his territory appear open to serious blame. The provision made for his support was exorbitant; and with reference to the example afforded by the sons of Tippoo Sultan most unwise. This was the error of Sir John Malcolm. The governor-general's views on the subject of provision for the deposed prince were far more moderate. On learning that overtures had been received from Bajee Rao, he addressed a series of instructions to Sir John Malcolm, one of which prescribed that the amount of stipend for the peishwa's maintenance should either be left open for the decision of government, or fixed at the lowest sum adequate to support him in comfort and respectability. These instructions did not arrive till after Bajee Rao had surrendered, when Sir John Malcolm, having acted on his own responsibility, was no longer able to obey the orders of the governor-general, and when the latter could not, with a regard to good faith, refuse to confirm the promises of his officer. Sir John Malcolm warmly defended his own arrangement, urging that Bajee Rao's submission, and the consequent termination of the war, might be regarded as cheaply purchased by the sacrifices which he had consented to make; that the peishwa might still have succeeded in eluding the British detachments by which he was hemmed in, maintaining a desultory contest, and keeping alive the flames of war; that the surrender of the prince in the manner in which it took place, and his public renunciation of sovereignty, followed by his march through the country in the apparent condition of a prisoner, was a more desirable result of the war, and more calculated to make a useful impression on the public mind, and on the peishwa's late subjects, than his capture or fall in the field, supposing either of those issues probable. In regard to the large pecuniary provision, Sir John Malcolm referred to precedent, represented the improbability of a smaller sum being accepted, and contended that it was not more than a suitable maintenance for the peishwa, nor likely to be employed in creating combinations against British interests. The governor-general, however, was not convinced. Recurring to the subject after a lapse of four years, he said, "To none of these propositions could I give my assent; but, as already stated, I did not hesitate to ratify the terms actually made, however unaccordant to my own expectations."

The governor-general was not answerable for the error committed in this respect, and he acted in a spirit of honour and good faith, in surrendering his own views, under the circumstances that had taken place without his knowledge or concurrence. For the error remaining to be noticed he must be held accountable. He was fully aware of the tenacity of the Mahratta confederacy, so long as a rallying point remained round which association threw its mystic interest. He saw

that there must be no peishwa, either in name or in fact; for if there were, there would be no peace for India. He wisely determined, therefore, that there should be none; but while thus depriving Mahratta intrigues of one nucleus, he raised from oblivion and neglect another. All the reasons which counselled that there should be no peishwa pressed with equal cogency against the revival of the claims of the rajah of Sattara. To sever the usurping arm, and at the same time to elevate the long drooping head of the Mahratta body, was not a consistent course of policy, the object being to destroy. The master was now freed from the domination of his ambitious servant, and restored, in imagination at least, to the place which, according to the theory of the Mahratta league, was his right. It is not desirable, on general principles, to disregard the claims of rank in India, even in cases where they might be annihilated without injustice. For the sake of preserving some useful gradations in society, as well as to cast over its framework a covering of grace and dignity, it is expedient to uphold the distinctions of rank and birth, where they can be upheld without producing private injury or public mischief. But the re-organization of the sovereignty of the rajah of Sattara, the investment of that personage with territorial dominion and power, was not of this harmless character. The extent of territory assigned to him was indeed small, and the political power very strictly limited; but there was enough to afford stimulus to the wild visions of Mahratta fancy. The throne of Sevajee was restored, and though it could boast little of either power or splendour, it was to the Mahratta what Mecca is to the Mussulman—a source of enthusiasm and hope.

The wretched person whose guilty subservience to a profligate master had reduced that master from a sovereign to a captive was rendered too important, by the extensive mischief which he caused, for his fate to be a matter of indifference. When the army of the peishwa broke up, Trimbeckjee Dainglis retired to the neighbourhood of Nassick, where he for some time remained concealed. After an attempt to make terms through Sir John Malcolm, which ended in nothing, a body of horse under Captain Swanston was detached from a distant station, the selection being made with a view to avert suspicion. The detachment marched with so much rapidity that no intelligence of their approach preceded them, and they were, consequently, enabled to surround the village where the fugitive lay. Trimbeckjee was reclining on a oot when the gates of the house were forced, and the British troops entered. He had just time to fly to the upper part of the house and conceal himself among some straw. From this covert he was taken without any resistance, and sent to Tannah, the place of his former confinement. He was shortly afterwards sent round to Bengal, and lodged in the fort of Chunar.

The peishwa subdued and under restraint,

his army dispersed, and his minion and evil genius, Trimbuckjee Dainglia, once more a prisoner to the British government, the fearful course of events, which had their origin in the treachery of the court of Poona, might be regarded as brought to a happy termination. At Nagpore there still remained much to be effected. On the 25th of June the new rajah, a child only ten years of age, was solemnly placed on the musnud. But his place was not uncontested; for Appa Sahib had some time before effected his escape. As in most instances of the like nature, there appears to have been considerable deficiency of vigilance in those whose duty it was to keep the prisoner in security. Appa Sahib soon found himself surrounded by a band of adherents, who had anticipated his escape. Flying to the Mahadeo hills till fresh numbers continued to flock to his standard, and relying, not without reason, upon finding a party in Nagpore waiting to support him, he, after a time, proceeded to Chouragurh, and took possession of the fort without resistance. He had at this time an agent at Borhampore engaged in obtaining Arab soldiers, an employment at which Scindia's governor in that city, as might be expected, connived. The desire of Appa Sahib to collect an army was opportunely favoured by the dissolution of that of the peishwa. In addition to his exertions to this end in other places, he maintained a correspondence with his connections in the capital of his former dominions. These laboured indefatigably to enrol and organize bodies of armed adherents in the interior, while they supplied Appa Sahib with money for the collection and payment of troops on the frontier. Their endeavours were further directed to undermine the fidelity of the British troops, and to a certain extent they were successful. So alarming were the various indications of active hostility, that the resident felt it to be necessary to apply to General Doveton and Colonel Adams for reinforcements. Towards the latter end of October a combined irruption of different columns into the Mahadeo hills, for the purpose of surrounding Appa Sahib, was projected, and they moved accordingly. Appa Sahib then fled, escorted by a body of horse under Chettoo, the Pindarrie chief, but closely pursued. He was overtaken near Asseergurh, a fortress belonging to Scindia, and would probably have been captured, had not a part of the garrison sallied out to his assistance.

Asseergurh was one of the fortresses of which, as a precautionary measure, temporary possession was to be given to the British government, under the provisions of the treaty concluded with Scindia in 1817. The troops, however, destined for its occupation, were wanted in another quarter, and subsequently the course of events rendering it, in the judgment of the governor-general, unnecessary to enforce the claim, he determined to relinquish it. Before this determination was communi-

cated to Scindia, Jeswunt Rao Lar, the officer commanding at Asseergurh, had committed a direct act of hostility by firing on a detachment of the Company's troops which had occasion to pass the fort in moving to intercept the peishwa. This was not allowed to interfere with the fulfilment of the governor-general's intention. The marquis of Hastings was magnanimously disposed, and he caused an intimation to be given to Scindia, that if another commandant were appointed to Asseergurh, and Jeswunt Rao Lar should refuse to deliver the fortress, the place should then be reduced by the Company's troops and restored to Scindia without any charge for the expense of the siege. At this time the governor-general was aware that Scindia was in friendly correspondence with the peishwa, and that such correspondence was not even denied. But, in his own language, "no more austere tone" was adopted than had previously marked the intercourse of the British government with its perfidious ally. "My solicitude," said the marquis of Hastings, "to bring into confidential reliance upon us a prince whose sovereignty I meant to uphold stood upon its original principle of policy. Conformably to those sentiments, the punishment of Jeswunt Rao Lar was left to Scindia's own discretion." The "discretion" of the treacherous chief was exercised in forwarding orders for the recall of Jeswunt Rao Lar from his command, which orders even the governor-general qualifies by the word "ostensible." Jeswunt Rao Lar well knew the precise degree of obedience that was expected to these orders, and he was prepared with a never-failing supply of excuses for disregarding them. The commandant was aware that he was wanted at his post to insure the protection which he had constantly afforded to the Pindarries when harassed by the British forces, and to gratify his master by the exercise of such other acts of hostility to the British government as might be practicable. His sally for the benefit of Appa Sahib was one of those acts of apparent insubordination but real obedience. His conduct in this instance was brought to the notice of Scindia, who did not hesitate to issue out such orders as his connection with the Company's government required. He directed that Appa Sahib should be given up, and he repeated his command for the immediate appearance of Jeswunt Rao Lar at Gwalior to account for his contumacy. But the commandant did not obey, and the governor-general's good opinion of Scindia began at length to give way before the invincible perverseness of that chieftain's servant. "His shuffling," says the marquis of Hastings, "combined with other endeavours of Scindia at this juncture, awakened the surmise that there was more of active duplicity on the part of the Maharajah than we had been willing to believe." Under the influence of a light that had just broken in upon the governor-general, or at least had but just been acknowledged,

different corps of British troops were ordered to close upon Asseergurh for the purpose of reducing it. Scindia pressed strongly that means should be taken for the punishment of the commandant without reducing the fortress; and his conduct in this respect tended to confirm the suspicion now entertained by the governor-general as to his sincerity. The course proposed was, in the view of his lordship, and it may be added must have been regarded by all other men, as so obviously impracticable, "that it betrayed an interest in what was going forward beyond what could be accounted for by the simple repugnance to have the notion of the fort's impregnability exploded." This experiment upon the credulity or the moderation of the British government was unsuccessful. The siege of Asseergurh was determined on, and Scindia was required to furnish a body of troops to aid in the work. This he could not refuse without an open breach of his engagements, and the required aid was consequently furnished. The Mahratta, however, had the satisfaction of knowing that his troops, being cavalry, could be of little service in the conduct of a siege.

The force assembled against Asseergurh was under the command of Brigadier-general Doveton, who arrived in the vicinity about the middle of February, 1819. He was reinforced from various quarters, and on the 17th of March, was prepared to undertake an attack upon the pettah. Towards a just understanding of the movements for the reduction of the place, the following description of it by Colonel Blacker will be found serviceable:—"The upper fort, in its greatest length from west to east, is about eleven hundred yards, and in its extreme breadth from north to south about six hundred; but owing to the irregularity of its shape, the area will not be found to be more than three hundred thousand square yards. It crowns the top of a detached hill seven hundred and fifty feet in height, and round the foot of the wall enclosing the area is a bluff precipice, from eighty to one hundred and twenty feet in perpendicular depth, so well scarped as to leave no avenues of ascent except at two places. To fortify these has therefore been the principal care in constructing the upper fort, for the wall which skirts the precipice is no more than a low curtain, except where the guns are placed in battery. This is one of the few hill forts possessing an abundant supply of water which is not commanded within common range; but it fully participates in the common disadvantage attending similar places of strength, by affording cover in every direction to the approaches of an enemy, through the numerous ravines by which its inferior ramifications are separated. In one of these, which terminates within the upper fort, is the northern avenue, where the hill is highest; and to bar the access to the place at that point, an outer rampart, containing four casemates with embrasures,

eighteen feet high, as many thick, and one hundred and ninety feet long, crosses it from one part of the interior wall to another, where a re-entering angle is formed by the works. A sallyport of extraordinary construction descends through the rock at the south-eastern extremity, and is easily blocked on necessity by dropping down materials at certain stages which are open to the top. The principal avenue to the fort is on the south-west side, where there is consequently a double line of works above; the lower of which, twenty-five feet in height, runs along the foot of the bluff precipice, and the entrance passes through five gateways by a steep ascent of stone steps. The masonry here is uncommonly fine, as the natural impediments are on this side least difficult; and on this account a third line of works, called the lower fort, embraces an inferior branch of the hill immediately above the pettah. The wall is about thirty feet in height, with towers; and at its northern and southern extremities it ascends, to connect itself with the upper works. The pettah, which is by no means large, has a partial wall on the southern side, where there is a gate: but in other quarters it is open, and surrounded by ravines and deep hollows extending far in every direction."

The force assigned to the attack on the pettah were ordered to assemble at midnight on the 17th of March, and to move a short time afterwards. The column of attack, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, of the Royal Scots, consisted of five companies of that regiment, the flank companies of his Majesty's 30th and 67th foot and of the Madras European regiment, five companies of the first battalion of the 12th Madras native infantry, and a detail of sappers and miners. The reserve, under Major Dalrymple, of his Majesty's 30th, was composed of the companies of that regiment not employed in the column of attack, one company of the King's 67th, one of the Madras European regiment, and nine companies of native infantry from the first battalion of the 7th regiment, the first battalion of the twelfth and the second battalion of the 17th, with detachments from the 2nd and 7th Madras native cavalry, and four horse-artillery guns. The attacking column advanced along a nullah running parallel to the works on the southern side, till, arriving within a convenient distance of the pettah, they made a rush for the gate, and succeeded in gaining it. The reserve, in the mean time, in two parties, occupied points in the nullah by which the column of attack advanced, and in another running parallel sufficiently near to allow of their rendering eventual support. Sir John Malcolm had been directed to distract the enemy's attention by operations on the northern side, and the duty was performed by a force composed of the 3rd cavalry, the second battalion of the 6th regiment Madras native infantry, and the first battalion of the 14th, the first battalion of the 8th regiment of Bom-

bay native infantry, six howitzers, and two horse-artillery guns. The town was carried very expeditiously, and with small loss, the troops finding immediate cover in the streets.

In course of the day a battery for six light howitzers was completed on the pettah, and directed against the lower fort. On the night of the 19th of March, the enemy made a sally upon one of the British posts, which was considerably advanced, but were soon repulsed. In the course of the same night a battery for eight heavy guns was completed. On the 20th at daybreak its fire opened, and by the evening had effected a formidable breach in the lower fort, besides inflicting serious injury on some of the upper works. On that evening the enemy made another sally into the pettah, and gained the main street. They were repulsed, but the success was accompanied by the loss of Colonel Fraser, who fell in the act of rallying his men. On the morning of the 21st an accidental explosion in the rear of the breaching-battery proved fatal to two native officers and about a hundred men. The disaster did not extend to the battery, which continued firing with good effect. In the afternoon a mortar-battery was completed, and some shells thrown from it. For several days little occurred deserving report, except the erection, on the night of the 24th, of another battery, three hundred and fifty yards to the left of the breaching-battery. Two other batteries were subsequently erected, one on the south side, to breach in a second place the lower fort; the other designed to silence a large gun on the north-east bastion of the upper fort. On the 29th two batteries were constructed for an attack on the eastern side of the fort.

On the following morning the enemy abandoned the lower fort, which was immediately occupied by the British troops. The batteries which had been solely directed against the lower fort were now disarmed, and the guns removed from the pettah into the place which their fire had reduced. In the situation which had been gained, the firing against the upper fort was speedily resumed from various batteries, aided by others below. This continued for several days, and so many shot had been fired that a deficiency began to be feared, and a reward was offered by the besiegers, for bringing back to the camp the shot previously expended. This expedient stimulating the activity of the hordes of followers which hover about an eastern camp, succeeded in producing an abundant and seasonable supply. The operations of the siege were vigorously pursued till the 5th of April, when Jeeswunt Rao Lar expressed a wish to negotiate. Some intercourse took place, but the efforts of the besiegers, so far from being slackened, were increased. On the 8th Jeeswunt Rao Lar repaired to General Doveton's head-quarters, to endeavour to procure terms, but in vain; and on the morning of the 9th a British party took possession of the upper fort, the garrison

descending into the pettah, and grounding their matchlocks in a square of British troops formed for their reception.

Thus terminated a siege, occupying much time, occasioning a vast expenditure of materials, attended with severe loss to the besiegers, and which, when conquered, was not to be retained by the government under which they fought, but to be given up to Scindia. The deceitful chieftain was not, however, destined to enjoy the prize. It was known that Bajee Rao had deposited in Asseergurh jewels of great value, and the commandant was required to produce them. He averred that they had been returned to the depositor; but this being disbelieved, he was compelled, by a threat of sequestrating his own property till the jewels were produced, to exhibit the peishwa's receipt acknowledging their return. This document was contained in a casket, in which an officer who stood by discerned a paper in Scindia's handwriting. The recognition of it excited such visible confusion in the commandant, that it was deemed expedient to seize the casket and examine its contents. From the examination, and from the subsequent admission of Jeeswunt Rao Lar, it appeared that Scindia had not only directed the commandant to afford all the assistance in his power to Bajee Rao, but had also instructed him not to surrender the fortress in accordance with the public orders issued, but to maintain possession of it as long as practicable. Upon this discovery, the governor-general determined most properly to punish Scindia's duplicity by retaining Asseergurh. This was notified to the chief by the British resident, who placed in his highness's hands the documentary evidence obtained in Asseergurh of his perfidy. The communication was accompanied by an assurance that, in consideration of more upright conduct in future, the past would be buried in oblivion. This assurance was properly given, seeing that no hostile measures were meditated. But on this, as on so many other occasions, the unbounded confidence in men's good intentions which the marquis of Hastings entertained, or affected to entertain, broke forth. "Since that period," said his lordship, "he has experienced a continued series of benefits and services, which I believe him to have appreciated justly!"

With the fall of Asseergurh ends the Mahratta war. The elements of combustion had been long in preparation, but they exploded to the total ruin of some of those who had aided in collecting the materials or in firing the trains, and to the disappointment and discomfiture of all. The Mahratta confederacy was dissolved, and while some of its members were permitted to retain a contracted power, two main limbs had been ruthlessly lopped away; the peishwa was a prisoner, and the rajah of Nagpore a homeless fugitive. The latter escaped from Asseergurh, in the disguise of a fakier, to Berhampore. From thence he proceeded to Lahore, where he took up his

residence, receiving a trifling allowance from Runjeet Singh.

The Pindarries, whose ravages were the original cause of the military preparations undertaken by the marquis of Hastings, and who, with the various members of the Maharratta confederacy, had divided the attention of the government and its army, have made little figure in the narrative of the war. They were, in truth, despicable enemies, and afforded little room to their conquerors for exhibiting the higher qualifications of the military art. Rapidity of movement was all that was required in the contest with them. Wherever the British arms were turned they were successful; and the miserable adventurers, who had received protection principally from Scindia and Holkar, were left without resource. Driven from the lands which they had acquired, either by force or concession, they sought in vain for a place of security for their families and effects. Pressed on every quarter by the British detachments, a large portion abandoned themselves to despair; numbers relinquished their homes, fled into the jungles, and there perished miserably. Many died by the hands of the village population, whose vengeance was everywhere roused by the remembrance of their former cruelties. Others fell in rencontres with regular troops. Some of the leaders sought the mercy of the conquerors, and among them Kurree Khan. Cheetoo's horde survived rather longer than the rest, but it suffered severely in several abortive attempts to enter Guzerat, and was completely broken up in trying to gain its old lodgment on the Nerbudda. Cheetoo and his son then went to Bhopal, with the intention of submitting; but, from some unexplained cause, abandoned their design, and, as has been seen, fled to the Mahadeo hills, where they joined Appa Sahib. At Asseergurh they parted, and, soon after separating, Cheetoo met a most appropriate end, being slain in the jungles by a tiger. His son fell into the hands of the British government, and was indebted to its bounty for the means of life. The annihilation of these miscreants, as a distinct and recognised body, was complete. A large portion perished, and those who preserved life settled down into more lawful occupations. The sound policy of their suppression is unquestionable, and the marquis of Hastings deserves eminent praise for having performed a duty which had been neglected by former rulers.

The termination of the Maharratta and Pindarrie war closed the more glorious and more brilliant portion of the administration of the marquis of Hastings. A few events, however, some of them occurring anterior to the re-establishment of peace, and some of them at a subsequent period, call for brief notice. With Oude the marquis of Hastings had various transactions, principally financial. He borrowed large sums of the vizier, and extinguished part of the debt by a transfer of some of the territories acquired by the results of

the war with Nepal. On the death of Saadut Ali, which occurred while the marquis of Hastings administered the British government, his lordship advised the new vizier to assume the title without reference to the confirmation of the Mogul emperor; and a few years afterwards the ruler of Oude completed his renunciation of dependence, by assuming, on the like advice, the title of king.

Ceylon was not at this time under the government of the East-India Company, but its history cannot with propriety be separated from that of British India. Whilst the government of the continental possessions of Great Britain in the East were engaged in the wars which have occupied so large a part of the present chapter, the governor of Ceylon had to contend with disaffection in the conquered kingdom of Candy. The disturbances there possess no features of interest to warrant a detailed relation. It is enough to notice their occurrence, and to state that they were suppressed.

Returning to the government of the marquis of Hastings, it is to be lamented that an affair of very questionable character cannot, without a violation of fidelity, be passed over. A mercantile house, trading under the firm of William Palmer and Co., had engaged in pecuniary transactions with the government of the Nizam. A large part of the alleged transactions were involved in mystery, and the claims of the house were distributed in a variety of accounts which no human ingenuity could render intelligible. Unfortunately, an intimate connection of the governor-general became a partner in this firm, and through his influence the sanction of government was obtained to the establishment, by Messrs. Palmer and Co., of a commercial house at Hyderabad, and to its engaging in transactions which without such sanction would have been contrary to law. The transactions which took place under the authority of government were mixed up with others, which if they ever had any real existence, were undoubtedly illegal; and by the aid of mercantile charges, and charges for interest at enormous rates, a vast balance was shown to be due to Messrs. Palmer and Co. This, upon the strength of the permission granted them, they expected to recover through the interposition of the British government, notwithstanding a part of the transactions out of which the alleged balance arose took place at a period antecedent to the grant of such permission.

The marquis of Hastings was not personally interested in this attack upon the treasury of the nizam. No human power could possibly have prevailed upon him to countenance such transactions for his own benefit. In his character the sordid vices had no place. No man could be more free from the desire of employing the influence of his high station in advancing his own fortune. Unhappily there were persons around him whose appetite for wealth was greater, and their moral taste less

scrupulous. Over the marquis of Hastings the feelings of domestic and social attachment exercised an influence unbounded even by a regard to his own honour; and, to gratify the cupidity of others, he lent himself to schemes of acquisition which he would have spurned with indignant contempt if proposed for his own advantage. He defended the transactions of the house of Palmer and Co. when successful defence was obviously impracticable, and so zealously, that he even forgot his own dignity by descending to insult the authorities at home, who expressed a decided and becoming disapprobation of his conduct in this respect. Greedy of distinction, far beyond the ordinary measure of desire, the marquis of Hastings, in this unhappy affair, sacrificed his reputation, which he valued beyond all things, to the passion of others for amassing wealth—a passion in which he did not participate, and by the indulgence of which he was to gain nothing. “The transaction,” says a writer by whom it has been recorded, “recalls the early crusades which had been made against the coffers of Asiatic princes, and tarnishes the administration of a distinguished nobleman, who appears to have been made the dupe of designing men, in the prosecution of unsanctioned, if not unlawful, speculations.”

The history of the administration of the marquis of Hastings ought not to close with such a transaction as this. Happily, by once more recurring to the early part of it, an event is presented for notice on which the mind may dwell with unmixed gratification. The marquis of Hastings was not its author or mover, but its occurrence sheds grace and splendour on the period of his government. Immediately after the extension of the Order of the Bath by the Prince Regent, it was authoritatively announced that his Royal Highness, “having taken into consideration the eminent services which have been rendered to the empire by the officers in the service of the Honourable East-India Company, had been pleased to order that fifteen of the most distinguished officers of the said service, holding commissions from his Majesty not below the rank of lieutenant-colonel, may be raised to the dignity of Knights Commanders,” in addition to the number belonging to his Majesty’s sea and land forces previously nominated. In the event of future wars, the number of fifteen was to be subject to increase. At the same time it was declared, that certain officers of the East-India Company should be eligible to be appointed Knights Companions, in consideration of eminent services.

The measure of royal favour announced in the ordinance was subsequently exceeded by the elevation of Sir David Ochterlony to the dignity of a Knight Grand Cross, the first class of the order. He was invested by the marquis of Hastings at Terwah, during the

Mahratta war, with great pomp, and his lordship’s words on the occasion well deserve to be remembered:—“You have obliterated a distinction painful for the officers of the Honourable Company, and you have opened the door for your brothers in arms to a reward which their recent display of exalted spirit and invincible intrepidity proves could not be more deservedly extended to the officers of any army on earth.” Many instances have since occurred of the attainment of the like honour by officers of the East-India Company’s service.

The marquis of Hastings quitted the government of India on the 9th of January, 1823, after an administration distinguished by its unusual length, but far more by the brilliant success of the extensive military operations which had been undertaken, and brought to a prosperous conclusion,—by the additions made to the strength and solidity of the British empire in the East,—the increased respect secured to its authority,—and the benefits conferred on the people of India, in dispersing the hordes of marauders and murderers by whom the country was overrun, and strengthening the bonds of peace, order, and good government. Notwithstanding the multiplied and difficult military affairs which engaged his mind, his lordship had directed his attention with success to various questions connected with the civil administration of the empire, more especially the complicated subject of revenue.

In narrating the more prominent acts of the marquis of Hastings, his errors have neither been concealed nor palliated; but it has been shown that in the great and momentous questions of state policy which circumstances pressed upon him, he well understood the interests of his country, and was not slow to pursue them. He followed the policy of his great predecessor, the Marquis Wellesley—higher praise cannot be awarded to an occupant of the same elevated station; and it may be affirmed without hesitation, that, excepting the Marquis Wellesley, no governor-general of India ever did so much for the consolidation of the British empire, or for the glory of the British name there. His greatest failing was excessive vanity, and to this he too frequently sacrificed real dignity of character. In the private relations of life he was generous and confiding, and from this cause sprang some of his greatest errors. But lamentable as were the failings and weaknesses which in him marred a noble nature—painful as it is to witness their constant recurrence to darken the brightest moments of his career, the desire at its close is to forget them, and to fix the mind exclusively on the great and glorious recollections which surround his name. His services must ever be remembered with gratitude—his achievements recorded with pride.

CHAPTER XXVI.

MR. CANNING APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL, BUT REPLACED BY LORD AMHERST—THERMATIC ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN BURMAH—HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THAT EMPIRE—DISPUTES BETWEEN COMPANY AND BURMESE—MISSION OF COLONEL SYMES—INSOLENT DEMANDS OF THE BURMESE—AFFAIR OF THE ISLAND OF SHAPOOREE—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES—DECLARATION OF WAR—CAPTURE OF RANGOON—ACTION AT KEMMENDINE—PROGRESS OF THE WAR—SUCCESSSES AND REVERSES—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE—RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES—PROCEEDINGS IN PEGU—TERMINATION OF THE WAR—TREATY WITH SIAM—MUTINY AT BARRACKPORE—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF BHUTPORE—TREATY WITH KING OF OUDE—ARRANGEMENTS WITH NAGPORE—LORD AMHERST RETURNS TO EUROPE.

WHEN the marquis of Hastings determined to retire from the government of India, Mr. Canning, then at the height of his sparkling reputation, was appointed to succeed him. He accepted the appointment; but, great as were both the dignity and the emolument, it was not entirely accordant with Mr. Canning's wishes. An unexpected event made a sudden change in the aspect of the political world at home. The death of the marquis of Londonderry opened the Foreign Office to the aspirations of the newly-appointed governor-general, and he declined the dignity to which he had so recently been called. Lord Amherst was thereupon selected as the successor of the marquis of Hastings. His lordship arrived at Calcutta on the 1st of August, 1823, some months after his predecessor had quitted the seat of government; the office of governor-general having, in the intermediate period, been exercised by Mr. Adam, the second member of council.

Like the marquis of Hastings, Lord Amherst found himself the inheritor of disputes of considerable standing, which time had ripened to a fulness, just bursting into war. The Burman empire was the quarter where the coming storm was gathering. That empire had been formed by the union of several states, which at no distant period had a distinct political existence. One of them, Ava, appears to have been a dependency of the neighbouring country, Pegu. This relation was after a time inverted. The Burmans, who inhabited Ava, revolted, and subsequently subjected Pegu to their dominion. This state of things, however, was not permanent. About the middle of the eighteenth century the scale was again turned. After a war attended by much bloodshed, and marked by acts of great ferocity, the Peguers followed up a series of successes by obtaining possession of Ava, the Burman capital, with its sovereign and the greater part of his family. The entire subjugation of the country succeeded.

The duration of the Peguer dominion was short. A man, named Alompra, of obscure birth, and who commenced warfare, it is said, at the head of only one hundred followers, roused his countrymen to resist the invaders,

and, after defeating bodies of the Pegu force in several actions, marched suddenly upon the capital, the inhabitants of which, upon his approach, rose and expelled the strangers. This happened towards the close of the year 1753. In the following year, an army and a fleet of boats sent by the Peguers against Ava were totally defeated by Alompra. The war continued for some years, and the Peguers were assisted by the French from Pondicherry; but victory continued to follow the standard of Alompra. The capital of Pegu surrendered to his arms, and though, in a revolt which followed, the Burman viceroy was expelled, the presence of Alompra speedily put an end to the insurrection, and gave increased stability to his rule. Alompra reigned but eight years, but in that time he laid the basis of a great power, enlarged at later periods by the acquisition of considerable territory on the Tenasserim coast at the expense of Siam, by the subjugation of Arracan, previously an independent state, the annexation of Manipur, and the transfer of Assam to a Burman chief.

Although the British government had given the rising power of the Burmese no cause for offence, it was invariably treated by them with great haughtiness and injustice. As early as the reign of Alompra, acts of violence were perpetrated on the Company's servants, and appear to have passed unresented. In 1794, some robbers from Arracan having taken refuge in the British district of Chittagong, the Burman prince, without any demand of the surrender of the fugitives, or any previous notice, marched a body of five thousand men into the Company's territories, supported by a reserve of twenty thousand on the border. On his arrival, the Burman general sent a letter to the British judge and magistrate, declaring that he should not withdraw until the delinquents, in pursuit of whom he had entered the British territories, were given up to him; and he proceeded to fortify his position by stockades. A military force, under General Erskine, being despatched from Calcutta, some communication took place between the commanders of the two armies; the result of which was that the Burmese withdrew, upon an understanding that the subject

of complaint should be subsequently investigated. The alleged robbers were given over to the Burmese for punishment—a fate which they probably deserved; but the concession, after so atrocious a violation of national rights, was neither dignified nor wise; it served only to feed the arrogance of the Burmese authorities, and to induce a belief that the surrender of the criminals was to be attributed to fear of the consequences of a refusal. A mission to Ava, under Colonel Symes, followed, but it did not assist the British government in making any progress in the favour or confidence of the Burmese.

The ill feeling which existed was kept alive by the excursions of a considerable body of refugees from Arracan, who, on the subjugation of that country by the Burman power, had fled into Chittagong. These persons made occasional sallies into the Burmese territories for purposes of plunder or revenge. In 1811, a more regular and formidable movement was directed against the usurping authority in Arracan, but it ended in the defeat of those by whom it was undertaken, and their return to their retreat in the British dominions. To exonerate the British government from the suspicion of participating in these attempts, or of affording them any degree of encouragement, another mission was determined on, and Captain Canning was despatched to Ava to afford explanation. The British envoy, however, did not reach the place of his destined duties. He was unable to proceed beyond Rangoon, and, after being exposed to much both of insult and danger, returned to Bengal. The Company's government then took active measures for preventing a recurrence of any hostile excursions from its territories into those occupied by the Burmese; but the refusal to give up the parties who had been engaged in those which had previously taken place was regarded by the court of Ava as an unpardonable offence. After an interval of two years' tranquillity on the frontier, the surrender of these persons was formally demanded in a letter addressed by the rajah of Ramree to the magistrate of Chittagong. The marquis of Hastings thereupon addressed a letter to the Burmese sovereign, explaining that the British government could not, without a violation of the principles of justice, deliver up those who had sought its protection; that the existing tranquillity, and the improbability of the renewal of disturbances, rendered the demand particularly unseasonable; and that whilst the vigilance of the British officers should be directed to prevent and punish any enterprise against the province of Arracan, it could lead to no advantageous result to either state to agitate the question of the delivery of the insurgents any further. The Burmese government not returning to the agitation of the question, the governor-general was led somewhat injudiciously, but in perfect accordance with his character, to conclude that there was no reason for suspect-

ing the existence or contemplation of any hostile design on the part of that government; and on the strength of this conclusion he countermanded some orders for extended preparations of defence issued under the influence of the apprehension excited by the demand.

A few months dissolved the illusion. Towards the close of the Mahratta war a second letter was received from the rajah of Ramree, demanding from the British government, on the part of the Burmese sovereign, the cession of Ramoo, Chittagong, Moorsheadabad, and Dacca, on the ground of their being ancient dependencies of Arracan, then part of the Burmese dominions, and threatening hostilities in case of refusal. The answer of the governor-general was to the effect that, if the letter were written by order of the king, it was to be lamented that persons utterly incompetent to form a just opinion of the British power in India had ventured to practise on the judgment of so dignified a sovereign; but that the governor-general's respect for his Majesty induced him to adopt the belief that the rajah of Ramree had, for some unworthy purpose of his own, assumed the tone of insolence and menace adopted in the letter without authority from the king, and that the proceeding would experience his Majesty's just displeasure. Here the matter rested. No notice was taken of the answer of the governor-general, and whether the letter was a mere idle menace not intended to be followed up, or that the splendid successes of the British arms in central India was thought to render silence the most expedient course, or that the Burmese government found sufficient employment in the reduction of Assam, and in the conflict of domestic politics, must be matter for conjecture.

In Assam the Burmese had originally appeared as supporters of one of the parties in a civil war. They subsequently abandoned this position, and succeeded in conquering the province for a chief of their own nation. The Burmese frontier in this quarter was thus advanced to that of the British. Though ceasing to threaten the British government with war, the emissaries of the Burmese did not abstain from acts calculated to provoke it. In 1821, and again in 1822, they seized and carried off parties of elephant-hunters in the Company's employ, under the pretext that they were within the Burmese territories. An outrage committed on a boat laden with rice, entering the nullah on the British side of the Naf, led to more vigorous measures of resistance than had previously been resorted to. The military guard was increased, and a few men were placed upon an island called Shapooree. These an agent of the viceroy of Arracan required to be withdrawn, on the plea that the island belonged to the Burmese sovereign; the requisition being accompanied by an intimation that war would be the consequence of refusal. This took place in

January, 1823, the month in which the marquis of Hastings quitted India.

The rajah of Arracan being addressed on the subject of the dispute, reiterated the demand for the surrender of the island; and on the 24th of September a body of Burmese, under the rajah of Ramree, landed there, killed three of the British sepoys, wounded four, and drove off the rest. This feat was not very remarkable, seeing that the British guard on the island consisted of only thirteen men, while the Burmese force comprised a thousand. Having accomplished the object which they had proposed they returned to the main land. The rajah of Arracan was so proud of what he had done, that he reported it himself to the British government, intimating, at the same time, that in the event of the resumption of the island, he would take by force of arms the cities of Dacca and Moorahedabad, which, it was repeated, originally belonged to Arracan.

The island of Shapoorree was of small extent and value; it was, indeed, little more than a sand-bank, affording pasturage for a few cattle. With regard to the title to its possession, the pretensions of either party do not appear to have been very clearly made out, but the weight of probability inclined to the claim of the English. The records of the Chittagong collectorate showed that it had been long included within the British province, had been at various periods surveyed and measured by British officers, and during the preceding thirty years had been repeatedly held by persons under deeds from the British collector's office. It lay on the British side of the main channel of the Naf river, the acknowledged boundary of the two states; was separated from the main land of the district of Chittagong only by a narrow and shallow channel, fordable at low water, and might not improperly be considered as a continuation of that land. It is observable, also, that the British government was willing to accede to an inquiry, and even proposed that commissioners should be appointed on the part of each government to make an investigation. In the mean time, however, it was deemed necessary to re-occupy the island, and a force sufficient for the purpose was landed and stockaded. To give the Burmese government room for repentance and explanation, a despatch was forwarded, in which it was assumed that the occupation of Shapoorree was the unauthorized act of the local authorities, which would be disavowed by the Burmese monarch, and exemplary punishment inflicted upon the perpetrators. Had it suited the Burmese prince to have acted upon this suggestion, the sacrifice of his agents would have proved no impediment to its adoption; but the overweening pride of the court of Ava interpreted the despatch into an acknowledgment of conscious weakness, and ascribed its transmission to fear.

Manipur has been mentioned as a recent

acquisition of the Burmese. Here, as in Assam, they first appeared to aid one candidate for the throne in dispossessing another. Their arms were successful, and the sovereign whom they had elevated no sooner found himself tolerably secure in Manipur, than he became desirous of annexing to his dominions the neighbouring principality of Cachar, which he invaded. The rajah of Cachar fled to Sylhet, and solicited the assistance of the British government, offering, if thereby reinstated in possession of his territory, to hold it under an acknowledgment of dependence. The offer being refused, he had recourse to two brothers of the reigning prince of Manipur, one of them being the dispossessed rajah (who, it must be observed, had obtained the throne by murdering an elder brother), the other the youngest of the reigning family, who, not deeming a prolonged residence in Manipur entirely safe, had some time before fled to Cachar, where he had found the protection which he by whom it was afforded now needed for himself. The price of their services was to be an equal share of the territory of Cachar with the rajah, and on these terms their co-operation was secured. The efforts of the coalition were successful, and the rajah of Manipur was compelled to abandon his more recent conquest. But the rajah of Cachar did not long enjoy the reduced dominion to which he was entitled by the terms of the contract with his allies. To the latter the possession of two-thirds only of the country was unsatisfactory—they desired the whole, and were not slow in obtaining it. Some time afterwards the rajah of Manipur incurred the displeasure of his Burmese masters, by whom he was expelled, and his territories incorporated with the Burman empire. The deposed rajah fled in the direction which it might have been supposed he would have been most anxious to avoid. He sought refuge in Cachar, and, what is not less remarkable, he found it. His brothers received him graciously, and even assigned to him a portion of the territory of which they had become possessed, partly by bargain and partly by usurpation. But the friendship thus re-established was not more lasting than might have been anticipated. The two brothers, who had formerly in succession occupied the throne of Manipur, quarrelled, and commenced hostilities against each other. The elder was defeated, escaped to the Company's dominions, and, like the prince whom he had assisted in expelling, sought the aid of the British government. The disordered state of Cachar invited the exercise of the aggressive spirit of the Burmese, who prepared to invade it; whereupon the two brothers still remaining there followed the example of their senior by seeking British support. That support, which had formerly been refused to the rightful prince of Cachar not less than to one of his supplinters, it was now not thought prudent to withhold. The right of the parties

from whom the invitation came was indeed very disputable, but the power of the legitimate prince was nominally extinct, and it was certain that his interests could not be promoted by allowing the Burmese to add his dominions to the list of their conquests, while by the British government such a result was to be deprecated. There was no time for protracted negotiation. It was necessary to determine at once, either to interfere in defence of Cachar, or to see it transferred to the Burmese, with all the attendant facilities for attacking the British dominions. If the former course were to be adopted, it required to be followed without hesitation or delay; and in the emergency the British government took the step which was almost forced upon them by the pressure of circumstances, and declared Cachar to be under its protection. To support this declaration a force was advanced from Dacca to Sylhet, divisions of which were posted at various stations in advance of the Sylhet frontier.

The precaution was not unnecessary. In January, 1824, about four thousand Burmese troops advanced from Assam into Cachar, and having taken up a position, proceeded to fortify it by stockades. Another body, entering from Manipur, engaged and defeated the troops of Gumber Singh, the youngest of the fraternal partitioners of the province; and a third division was approaching by a different route. Major Thomas Newton, the officer commanding on the Sylhet frontier, determined, on becoming acquainted with their movements, to advance without delay against the party from Assam, before they should have time to complete their intrenchments. He accordingly marched on the 17th of January, and at daybreak came in sight of the stockade of the adverse troops. An attack was instantly commenced in two divisions; one, commanded by Captain Johnstone, upon the stockade; the other, under Captain Bowe, upon an adjoining village. The troops in the village fled almost immediately; those in the stockade made a vigorous resistance, but at length yielded.

Some communications between the Burmese generals and the English local authorities followed; but, as they shared the ordinary lot of Burmese diplomacy, by ending in nothing, it is unnecessary to dwell upon them. Major Newton deemed it requisite to withdraw his troops from Cachar, and the Burmese advanced to Jatrapore, where the party from Assam effected a junction with that which had advanced from Manipur, and erected stockades on both sides of the river Soorma. They proceeded to push those on the north side to within a thousand yards of the British post at Bhudderpoor, when, being attacked by Captain Johnstone, they were driven from their unfinished works at the point of the bayonet. The Assam division fell back upon the Bhurteeke pass, the other stockaded itself at Doodpattee. The former were dialogued with some

difficulty by Lieutenant-colonel Bowen, who had arrived to take the command; the latter were attacked by the same officer, but unsuccessfully; the party, however, subsequently withdrew into Manipur.

The British detachment which occupied Shapoorree had been withdrawn from the island in consequence of its extreme unhealthiness; but, in conformity with previous advances towards an amicable arrangement, two officers were deputed by the British government to meet any persons similarly accredited by the Burman authorities. The overture was met to the extent of sending four persons bearing a letter to the British commissioners; but the communication, in which the rajah of Arracan announced their approach, stated also that a force had been assembled under fresh orders from the Court of Ava, for the express purpose of dispossessing the English, at all hazard, of the island of Shapoorree. This was an unpromising commencement, and the progress of the negotiation was not at variance with it. The right of the Burmese sovereign to the island was asserted, but his agents professed that they would be satisfied with an admission of its being neutral ground, and a declaration that it should be occupied by neither party. The sincerity of this profession is scarcely matter for doubt. The Burmese were bent on aggression, and though it is barely possible that compliance with the proposal might have postponed hostilities for a short time, it is far more likely that, had it been accepted, the Burmese government would have disavowed the act of their agent; and however this might have been, the entire tenor of Burmese policy for years past rendered it clear that war could not ultimately be avoided, nor could its commencement be long deferred.

Waiving, too, all reference to the future, the outrages which the Burmese had perpetrated could not be overlooked. Such a course was not only forbidden by a regard to the honour of the British nation, but its direct tendency would have been to invite fresh and, without doubt, more important aggressions. Such was the view taken by the government, who, in replying to the letter communicating the proposal of the vakeels with regard to Shapoorree, observed, "that worthless and insignificant as the place must be to either party, and willing as the governor-general in council might have felt to listen to any such proposal, had it been brought forward by the government of Ava itself at an earlier stage of the discussion, and previously to the assault on" the British "post, and the slaughter of" the British "sepoys, the just indignation excited by that act of outrage, and the declarations and resolutions it had necessarily induced, must utterly preclude any compromise of the above nature, even if not proffered in the tone of insolent menace which the rajah of Arracan had invariably assumed." The British agents were then instructed, that no overture for the relinquishment of the absolute and unqualified right of

the Company to Shapoorie was to be for a moment entertained; and that if the Burmese deputies should recur to the intimation already given, of the determination of the Burmese government to prevent the British authorities keeping a guard on the island, it was to be met by a distinct statement of the positive orders of the British government to maintain the fullest right of possession, and to visit with instant chastisement those who might engage in any attempt to disturb that possession.

It was not long before the catalogue of Burmese offences against the British government was swelled by the perpetration of an act of gross and wanton treachery. When the British troops were withdrawn from Shapoorie, a pilot schooner, named the *Sophia*, was stationed off the north-east point of the island, with some gun-boats, to supply, in a degree, the absence of the troops. On the morning of the 20th January, 1824, some armed Burmese in a boat pulled alongside the vessel and asked a number of questions of a very suspicious character. In the afternoon a second boat approached, bearing an invitation to the commander of the English schooner to proceed on the following morning to Mungdoo, where some officers of high rank had just arrived from the court of Ava. The commander, Mr. Chew, was, at the time, absent, but on his return he ventured, somewhat imprudently, to accept the invitation. He was accompanied by an officer in charge of the row-boats, and a crew of eight lascars, the whole of whom, on landing, were, with Mr. Chew, seized and carried off into the interior, where they were detained until the 13th of February. They were then released without apology or explanation. The capture of Mr. Chew and his attendants was not the only exploit performed by the deputies at Mungdoo. They proceeded in solemn state to the island, with four large boats of armed men, and on their arrival planted the Burmese flag there. This ceremony concluded, they burnt a hut, the only work of human labour existing on the desolate spot, and returned.

The two governments were now to become avowedly at war—a state in which they had actually been for some time past. The British government explained its motives in a declaration dated the 24th of February, addressed to the government of Ava, and in a public proclamation dated the 6th of March following. Soon afterwards the government received from the viceroy of Pegu an exposition of the views of the enemy, couched in terms of singular arrogance. It re-asserted the claim formerly made by the rajah of Arracan to parts of the British territories, repeated the alleged grievances of the Burmese sovereign, and indicated the pleasure of “the fortunate king of the white elephants, lord of the seas and earth,” that as the governors on the Burmese frontier had full authority to act, no further communication should be made to the “golden feet” till everything should be “settled.” Full

political and military powers were declared to have been conferred on an officer called Men-jee Maha Bundoola, and in allusion to a reference made in a communication from the governor-general to the recent date of his own appointment, that functionary was admonished to “ascertain the truth, consider duly everything, investigate and judge properly, and by petition represent his case to the general by way of Arracan.”

In acting on the declaration of war issued by the British government, it was determined that, on the frontier, operations should be in a great measure defensive, but not so exclusively as to preclude the expulsion of the Burmese from territories in which they had recently established themselves by usurpation. Among these territories Assam was the first object of attention, and a force destined for its reduction was assembled at Goolpur, under the command of Brigadier-General M'Morine. It consisted of seven companies of native infantry, portions of various local corps, a small body of irregular horse, some artillery, and a gun-boat flotilla on the Bramapooter. This force moved on the 18th of March, the troops pursuing their route along both banks of the river with vast labour, through thick jungle and lofty grass, in which the men were at intervals completely buried; a number of small rivulets and ravines also intersected the road, the difficulties of which were further increased by the recurrence sometimes of heavy sands, sometimes of marshy swamps. But no enemy was seen until the 27th, when a small party of Burmese appeared, only to escape with a rapidity which defied pursuit. On the 18th the British force arrived at Gowahatty. Here the Burmese had erected strong stockades, but they were abandoned. The enemy in retreating had, it appeared, inflicted dreadful cruelties on their fellow-subjects the Assamees, a fact attested by the discovery of some bodies frightfully mutilated. To assure the people of protection, and to obtain their assistance, a proclamation had been issued by the British authorities immediately on their entering Assam.

But the main blow was intended to be struck at such part of the maritime possessions of the Burmese as should appear to offer the best prospects of success; and to the preparations for this purpose it is now necessary to turn. A part of the force required was provided in Bengal; the remainder, forming by far the larger portion, was furnished chiefly from Madras. From Bengal embarked his Majesty's 18th and 38th regiments, the second battalion of the 20th native infantry, and two companies of European artillery, amounting in the whole to two thousand one hundred and seventy-five fighting men. They were accompanied by four eighteen-pounders, four five-and-a-half-inch howitzers, four eight-inch mortars, and four six-pounders. Attached to the expedition were twenty gun-brigs and schooners, each manned by fifteen lascars, commanded by

a European, and armed with two twelve-pounder carronades and four swivels, mounted on their bows and quarters; twenty row-boats, carrying one eighteen-pounder each, manned exclusively by natives; two king's sloops, the *Larne*, Captain Marryat, and the *Sophie*, Captain Ryves; several Company's cruisers; and the *Diana* steam-vessel, the first ever employed in war.

The force from Madras was distributed in two divisions. The first consisted of his Majesty's 41st regiment, the Madras European regiment, five battalions of native infantry, and four companies of artillery, making a total of six thousand and twenty-six fighting men, with two eight-inch, and two five-and-a-half-inch, and two four-and-a-half-inch howitzers, two eight-inch and two five-and-a-half-inch mortars, four iron eighteen-pounders, six iron twelve-pounders, six six-pounders, and two three-pounders. The second division of the Madras force was composed of his Majesty's 89th regiment and two battalions of native infantry, the total number of fighting men being two thousand eight hundred and forty-one. The military force, when united, thus amounting to something more than eleven thousand. Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell was appointed to the chief command; Colonel Macbean was placed in command of the Madras force with the rank of brigadier-general; and Major Canning accompanied the expedition as political agent and joint commissioner with the commander-in-chief.

The place of rendezvous was Port Cornwallis, in the Great Andamans, for which place the Bengal expedition sailed in the beginning of April, and reached it at the latter end of that month. There it was joined, early in May, by the first division of the Madras force; the second, which sailed on the 23rd of May, arriving in June. Two additional king's ships, one of them, the *Liffey*, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore Grant, joined the expedition at Port Cornwallis. On the 9th of May the expedition arrived off the mouth of the Rangoon river, on the 10th came to anchor within the bar, on the morning of the 11th stood up the river, and about one o'clock on that day brought to off Rangoon, opposite a landing-place called the King's Wharf, the seat of a battery. A fire was opened on the fleet, but was returned from the *Liffey* with such effect, that several of the enemy's guns were split or dismounted, and, at the third broadside, the Burmese authorities left the town. At three o'clock the troops proceeded to land in three divisions, above, below, and in the centre of the town. Opposition had been anticipated, but none was offered: the town was found deserted by the inhabitants, and at four the British colours were flying on the Burman staff.

As soon as the alarm was given of the approach of the invading force, all foreigners in the town were seized and imprisoned, heavily fettered. The number of these per-

sons was eleven, the majority of whom were British subjects. When the British force were in actual possession of the town, one of the imprisoned party, an American missionary, was released from his fetters, and deputed with a native to inquire, on the part of the members of the civic government, who had taken refuge in the jungle, what terms would be granted, the inquiry being accompanied by an intimation that the applicants had several Englishmen in their power, and that the fate of those persons would probably depend on the answer of the British commander. They were told that it was too late to ask terms when the place was in possession of the English; that protection to persons and property was all that could be expected, and that the promise of this would not be confirmed until the prisoners were delivered up uninjured. Any outrage committed upon them, it was added, would be signally avenged. The messengers left, promising to return after consulting their employers; but these could not be found, their fear having driven them still further up the country. Three of the prisoners had, in the haste of flight, been left behind in Rangoon; the remainder the fugitives had carried away with them, and great fears were consequently entertained for their safety. Those fears were happily relieved on the morning after the occupation of the town, the missing persons being discovered by some reconnoitring parties, before whom the guards placed over them had fled.

In making the requisite disposition of the troops on shore, and in excursions by the boats to scour the river and destroy the armed boats and fire-rafts of the enemy, several brilliant instances of valour and enterprise occurred. A stockade having been observed in course of erection at the village of Kemmendine, only four miles from the shipping, it was attacked by a grenadier company of the 38th regiment and the boats of the *Liffey*, stormed with great intrepidity, and, though defended with much obstinacy by four hundred men, carried. Lieutenant Kerr, of the 38th, was killed, and Lieutenant Wilkinson, of the *Liffey*, dangerously wounded; but the enemy suffered still more severely, and left sixty of their number dead. In this affair the seamen of the *Liffey* commenced the attack without waiting for the soldiers, who were delayed by some mismanagement of the boats which conveyed them. At first, the enemy was inclined to treat the rusty blue jackets of the sailors with contempt; but an encounter with them hand to hand induced a very different feeling.

Some days afterwards, Captain Snodgrass, of the King's 38th, having observed a party of the enemy apparently employed in making observations on the British line, advanced with a small patrol for the purpose of ascertaining their strength and intentions. They found sentries and posts regularly established, which having driven before them for some distance, they were suddenly fired on from a stockade;

but an entrance being observed in an angle of the work, which the enemy had neglected to shut, an immediate charge was ordered, and the British party, consisting of only eighteen men, drove from the stockade at least two hundred, with the loss of only three wounded.

The stockade thus gallantly carried was situated at the junction of a pathway with a main road, and from the precautions taken for its defence, Sir Archibald Campbell conceived that the road must lead to some place from which it was important to keep the invading force. On the following morning, therefore, he proceeded with four companies of Europeans, from the King's 13th and 38th regiments, commanded by Captains Macphane, Piper, and Birch, a body of native infantry, a gun, and a howitzer, towards the stockade, which was found reoccupied, but only a few shots were fired from it. Advancing, they found other stockades, which they destroyed; but, from the nature of the country, and the fatigue incident upon traversing it, it became necessary to send back the guns, escorted by the native infantry. After proceeding some distance, the general with the European companies arrived in an extensive valley of paddy-fields, whence the enemy could be perceived drawn out in a long line, with an impenetrable jungle in the rear. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon the British troops from two stockades, so well masked as, at sixty yards' distance, not to be distinguishable from a garden-fence. Colonel Macbean kept the plain with a light company, while an assault was made on the stockades by the rest of the force under Major Evans, of the King's 38th, and Major Dennie, of the 13th. The first stockade was carried in ten minutes; the second in a very short time after, the garrison within, fighting man to man, being put to the bayonet. The enemy suffered severely; and the victors did not escape, the loss on their part including some valuable and meritorious officers.

An attempt was now made by the Burmese to gain time by mock negotiation, but without effect. At the end of May, Commodore Grant was compelled by ill health to withdraw to Penang, leaving Captain Marryat the senior naval officer.

An attack, made on the 3rd of June, upon a strong position of the Burmese at Kemmendine, about two miles distant from the post whence the enemy had a few days previously been driven, partially failed, in consequence, it is said, of some British columns having been fired on from the river, either from their being mistaken for Burmese, or from the shot having too great a range. This mischance was repaired a few days afterwards. On the 10th, Sir Archibald Campbell moved upon the fortified camp and stockades at Kemmendine, with about three thousand men, four eighteen-pounders, four mortars, and seven field-pieces, at the same time sending two divisions of vessels up the river. About

two miles from the town the head of the column was stopped by a stockade, apparently of great strength and filled with men. Two heavy guns and some field-pieces having been opened on it, in less than half an hour a considerable gap became apparent in the outer works. A part of the Madras European regiment, supported by a part of the King's 41st, then moved on to assault. At the same time, an attack by escalade was made on the other side by a party formed from his Majesty's 13th and 38th regiments, who, by helping each other up the face of the stockade, which was at least ten feet high, succeeded in entering about the same time as the party at the breach. The first man who appeared on the top of the work was Major R. H. Sale, of the 13th. The enemy left above a hundred and fifty dead—among them the Burmese commander. This point being gained, the British force moved on to invest the chief stockade. Batteries were erected during the night and opened on the following morning. After a cannonade of two hours, a party advancing to observe the breach found that the enemy had evacuated the stockade, carrying with them their dead and wounded.

A pause in the progress of these operations affords opportunity for adverting to the circumstances in which the expedition was placed. It was unfortunately undertaken with very imperfect knowledge of the country, and without any adequate provision for securing supplies. These, it had been calculated, would be found on the spot; but the care with which the enemy removed every article of sustenance frustrated the expectation. In addition to these difficulties others existed, seriously affecting the efficiency of the force and threatening the success of the expedition. With a tropical sun above, thick jungle around, and swamp beneath the feet, these sources of pestilence were aided by frequent deluges of rain. Almost every cause of disease and debility being thus actively at work, the health of the men rapidly declined, and fever and dysentery began fearfully to thin their ranks. Such was the cheerless and almost hopeless condition of the British force at the commencement of the Burmese war. Advance was impossible and even to maintain the position which they had gained appeared almost hopeless.

While the invaders had everything but defeat to dispirit and discourage them, the Burmese appeared to have lost nothing of that consolatory self-confidence, which had led them to brave the vengeance of the British power. Reinforcements and supplies of warlike stores were provided, and Thakia Woongyee, one of the chief ministers of state, was despatched to take the chief command, with distinct orders from his master to attack the British, and drive them at once out of the country; a result which, looking at their condition, might have seemed practicable, even to persons whose powers of judgment were not distorted

by Burmese arrogance. The havoc which disease and death had worked, was, however, in some degree repaired by the arrival, during the month of June, of the second division from Madras, and by the return of two detachments which had been despatched to Negrals and Cheduba. The former, under Major Wahab, had destroyed a stockade, and brought away the guns and ammunition found in it. The island, being found utterly worthless in every respect, was summarily abandoned, though not without an excursion to the mainland, in which a party under Lieutenant J. O. Stedman gallantly drove from a stockade a much larger body of the enemy, carrying off their guns to the boats. The expedition against Cheduba was conducted by Brigadier-General McCreagh, who, having effected a landing in the face of considerable opposition, found a body of the enemy stockaded. A battery was erected and the stockade carried. The island was defended by six hundred Burmese, of whom about three hundred fell, and the remainder escaped to the mainland. The rajah of Cheduba was taken in a jungle. Leaving a small force in possession of the island, the commander with the rest joined the main body of the British army.

The time approached when it became necessary for the Burmese general to begin to act upon the orders of his sovereign; and the bustle of preparation which marked the concluding days of the month of June showed that he was about to make the trial. The morning of the 1st of July was selected for the first attempt. Three columns of the enemy, estimated at a thousand men each, were observed marching to the right of the British position; a large force also occupied the left. The attack commenced on the right, a large number of the enemy having penetrated between two of the British pickets formed on a hill, and begun firing from some swivels. The firing having been returned from two field-pieces, Captain Jones, of the 22nd native infantry, advanced at the head of three companies, and drove the enemy, at the point of the bayonet, from the hill into the jungle, "their favourite haunt and only place of safety," as justly described by Sir Archibald Campbell. Their loss in killed amounted to at least one hundred, while the English had not a single man either killed or wounded. Thus ended the first exploit of the new Burmese general; and his immediate supersession deprived him of all opportunity for attempting a second. The result seems to have induced his successor to conclude that the military genius of the Burmese lay rather for the defensive, and he stockaded his army in the most difficult part of the forest, whence desultory attacks were made almost nightly upon some part of the British lines.

The British commander, however, determined upon affording him opportunity for the display of his talents in a general action, and on the 8th of July two columns of attack were

formed. One proceeded by land under the command of Brigadier-General Macbean; the other advanced by the river, and with it the commander-in-chief embarked. The enemy's principal stockade was erected on a broad and projecting point of land, where the river divides into two branches. On the opposite bank of both branches stockades and other works were erected, enfilading the approach to the principal work, and thus all protecting each other. Fourteen pieces of artillery were silenced by the fire from the shipping conducted by Captain Marryat, and at the end of an hour the signal of "breach practicable" being made from the mainmast-head, the troops destined for the assault entered the boats. They consisted of a detail of the 3rd, 10th, and 17th native infantry, commanded by Major Wahab, under whom they made immediately for the breach. Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, of the King's 41st, with two hundred and sixty men of his own regiment and one company of the Madras European regiment, pushed ashore at a little distance above and entered the work by escalade. The first stockade was carried with comparatively small loss. Colonel Godwin then re-embarked to attack the second stockade, which was carried, and the third was evacuated by the enemy.

The operations of the land column were equally successful. On arriving, General Macbean found himself surrounded by stockades, the extent or strength of which he had very imperfect means of ascertaining, destitute of guns, and with a force which as to mere numbers was contemptible, when compared with that opposed to him. Nothing daunted by his perilous situation, he determined to trust to the courage of his men to supply the deficiencies of the means at his disposal. The scaling-ladders were ordered to the front, and preparations made for storming the enemy's works by parties taken from his Majesty's 13th, 38th, and 89th regiments. The principal work, in the centre of the enemy's line, was composed of three distinct stockades, one within another. In the main one Soomba Wongee, the new commander-in-chief, had established his head-quarters, as he imagined, in perfect security. He was proceeding to dinner when the approach of the British troops was announced to him, and merely ordering his chiefs to their posts, to drive the audacious strangers away, he entered unmoved upon the work of refreshment. But the continued firing disturbed the quiet of his repast, and he judged it expedient to leave his meal unfinished and repair to the scene of action. He found that the capture of his first stockade had been the work of only ten minutes; that the second, after a stronger resistance, had yielded to the overwhelming courage of the assailants; that the third was now attacked by men whose energy would not suffer them to wait for the ordinary assistance of ladders, but who were raised to the work on the

shoulders of their comrades. The contest now was hand to hand. Major Sale singled out a chief of high rank for his opponent, and the haughty Burman soon fell by the sword of his English adversary. Four other stockades were captured in succession, making seven within the space of half an hour, and without the firing of a gun on the part of the British, all having been taken by escalade. Thus, in one day, the British army captured ten stockades, provided with thirty pieces of artillery, and garrisoned by numbers incomparably superior to those by which they were assailed. The enemy lost from eight hundred to a thousand men, their commander-in-chief, and three other men of distinction.

Shortly after this gallant achievement, the prospects of the British force were clouded by disappointment. An expedition, combining operations both by land and water, against a force stationed at Kyloo, was compelled to return without effecting, or indeed attempting to effect, its object. The land column was unable to advance from the inundated state of the country, and the sea column was unable to act from the want of co-operation on land. Other movements were more fortunate. At Syriam a body of troops were dislodged from an old fort with little difficulty beyond that arising from access to the place being impeded by a deep and impassable creek. This was overcome by a party of sailors under Captain Marryat, who in a very short time constructed a bridge, which enabled the attacking column to pass over. A party of the enemy were with equal facility driven from a pagoda, which, with a moderate degree of firmness in those within, might have been maintained for a long time. A successful attack was also made by a detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, of the Madras European regiment, upon two stockades on opposite sides of a creek near Dalla; great spirit and perseverance were displayed in this attack. The officers being less encumbered than the men, formed line breast-deep in mud and water, and thus passed from one to another the scaling-ladders to be placed against the walls of the stockade first attacked. It was immediately carried. Part of the troops being then re-embarked, took possession of the opposite stockade.

The stockades were not destroyed, and as the enemy raised several additional works, and thence sallied on predatory excursions, it became necessary again to expel them. This was effected, and in performing the service the gun-boats, under the orders of Captain Marryat, were eminently useful.

During the month of September little of importance occurred, but early in October misfortune again awaited the British arms. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith marched with a detachment of native infantry to attack a part of the enemy's force, which had taken up a position in the neighbourhood of Aunauben, and the pagoda of Kyloo, about fourteen miles

from the British head-quarters. After succeeding in some minor affairs, the pagoda was attacked, but a tremendous fire from within knocked down the principal officers, and spread such panic through the troops that retreat was the only course left; this disastrous result appears to have been aided by the treachery of the guides, whose instructions were followed. Panic, on this occasion, was not confined to the assailants; for on General M'Creaigh advancing a few days afterwards, he found the stockades deserted, and the enemy in disorderly flight; all efforts to overtake them were unavailing. About the same time, an expedition directed against a post at Thantabain was completely successful; the works, though of great strength, were carried almost without resistance, and the British did not lose a single man.

An expedition under Colonel Godwin, despatched against Martaban, arrived there on the 29th of October; but the state of the tide being unfavourable for immediate landing, advantage was taken of the requisite delay to examine the place with considerable care. The town was situate at the foot of a very lofty hill, washed by a beautiful and extensive sheet of water. On its right was a rocky mound, on which was placed a two-gun battery, with a deep nullah under it. The battery was found to communicate with a timber stockade, and behind this was a work of masonry, varying from twelve to twenty feet in thickness, with small embrasures for either cannon or musketry. The stockade ran along the margin of the water for more than three-quarters of a mile, joining at the extremity a large pagoda, which projected into the water in the form of a bastion. The defences thence were continued for a short distance further, terminating in a nullah, beyond which all was thick jungle. The town continued to run in an angle from the pagoda for above a mile, and terminated at the house of the chief, close to a stockade up the hill. The rear of the town and works was protected by thick jungle and large trees. During the night of the 29th a cannonade was kept up. At five o'clock on the following morning a party proceeded to land. It consisted of ninety-eight men of the King's 41st regiment, seventy-five of the 3rd Madras native infantry, eight of the Bengal artillery, and thirty-eight seamen—in all two hundred and nineteen. Some little difficulty occurred from a mistake as to the point of landing, but it was overcome; and from the time that the feet of the assailants pressed the shore, there was no halt till the place was in their possession. The number of the garrison was in a great degree matter for conjecture only, but it was estimated by Colonel Godwin at between three and four thousand; and in thus calculating he assumed its strength at only two-thirds of that assigned to it by common report. A great number of guns were taken, and the magazines and arsenals furnished a vast quantity of ammunition; one

thousand round iron shot, one thousand five hundred grape-shot, ten thousand musket cartridges, six thousand cartridges for wall-pieces, twenty-six thousand eight hundred pounds of gunpowder, twenty thousand flints, one hundred thousand musket-balls, ten thousand pounds of saltpetre, five thousand pounds of sulphur, nine thousand pounds of lead. There was a regular manufactory of gunpowder, which Colonel Godwin blew up.

A period of comparative repose which followed allows space for turning to the progress of the British arms in quarters remote from the principal scene of operations. In August, a small expedition, under Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, was despatched by Sir Archibald Campbell to the coast of Tenasserim. It arrived on the 1st of September at the mouth of the river leading to Tavoy, but from some impediments to its progress did not reach the fort until the 8th. The capture of this fort was not a work of difficulty; for the Burmese officer second in command sent a message to Colonel Miles, offering to seize or destroy his superior, or to obey any orders that the British commander might dictate. The answer of Colonel Miles was, that the British force was on the point of advancing, and that the governor must be arrested and confined till its arrival. This was done, and Colonel Miles on arriving had only to make the necessary dispositions for occupying the fort, pettah, and all the defences. Colonel Miles then moved forward to attack Mergui. Here, after about an hour's firing, the batteries were silenced by the Company's cruisers, and the troops proceeded to land. A party of the King's 89th then advanced to the stockade through deep mud and water, under a torrent of rain and a heavy fire from the enemy. As soon as ladders could be brought up, an escalade was undertaken, and the place immediately carried. These services being performed, Colonel Miles leaving sufficient garrisons, with part of the flotilla to protect the conquests on the coast, returned to join the main force at Rangoon.

The operations on the frontier, it will be remembered, were undertaken principally with a view to defence. To a certain extent they were successful, and the British authority was established over a considerable portion of Assam. In Arracan its interests were less prosperous. A detachment, under Captain Noton, had been left at Ramoo to watch the enemy in that quarter. It being reported that the enemy were threatening a British stockade at Rutnapulluing, Captain Noton, on the 11th of May, made a movement to support that position; but his progress being attended with a variety of disasters, and the conduct of some provincial troops evincing that little confidence could be placed in them, he retired to Ramoo. On the morning of the 13th of May the enemy appeared in great force on the hills to the east of that place. Their precise number could not be ascertained; but from the extent of ground which their encampment covered, it

was computed that they amounted to ten thousand fighting men, besides an equal number of coolies and camp-followers. The force under Captain Noton consisted of about three hundred and fifty regular native infantry, and six hundred and fifty provincial and irregular troops. The latter could in no respect be depended on; and with three hundred and fifty men to resist successfully a force of the estimated strength of the Burmese, was obviously not to be hoped for. Captain Noton, however, expected reinforcements from Chittagong, and in the belief that they would immediately arrive, he determined, with the concurrent opinion of his officers, to defend the post which he occupied at Ramoo.

A river flowed between the enemy and the British detachment. On the evening of the 14th the entire force of the former was observed to be concentrated on the bank, with the apparent intention of crossing. To frustrate their purpose, a party with two six-pounders was detached. On the morning of the 15th, however, the enemy contrived to pass the river unobserved, and commenced intrenching themselves about three hundred yards in front of the British position. The right flank of that position was protected by the river and by a tank about sixty yards in advance; its rear was defended by another tank. These tanks were surrounded by embankments about three feet high; that on the right was occupied by the picket, who opened a fire on the enemy, which was kept up without intermission during the day and throughout the succeeding night. But their fire appears to have done little damage, and the effect of the two six-pounders, which were directed against the enemy as they crossed the plain, was but small. Early on the 16th it was discovered that the enemy had opened trenches on the left flank of the British, and had considerably advanced those which they had previously opened in front. On this day the provincial troops, in addition to the cowardice which they had previously displayed, manifested symptoms of disaffection, and it being discovered that an intention existed of deserting to the enemy, Captain Noton arrested the ringleaders in the mutinous movement, and took measures to prevent the remainder acting on their suggestions. Under all these disheartening circumstances, Captain Noton determined to maintain his post, he having on the preceding day received information that the expected reinforcement from Chittagong was to leave that place on the 13th, and consequently its arrival might be hourly looked for. But by daybreak on the 17th the enemy had carried their trenches to within twelve paces of the picket, and had also very nearly approached the tank which sheltered the British position in the rear. By ten o'clock they were in possession of the tank, and consternation diffusing itself throughout the provincial and irregular troops, the whole fled with precipitation.

There was no course but retreat, and even orderly and successful retreat must have appeared almost hopeless. The picket was recalled, but from the confusion and noise that prevailed, the notice for its return was not heard, and the rest of the detachment proceeded, leaving their more advanced comrades to their fate. By accident the officer commanding the picket perceived the retrograde movement, but not till those making it were at a considerable distance. He then withdrew his men, and made an effort to join the main body, in which he succeeded; and for about half a mile the whole proceeded in tolerable order. The enemy's cavalry then pressing on the retreating troops with overwhelming force, a square was ordered to be formed; but the men, worn out by fatigue and privation, and appalled by the fearful circumstances in which they were placed, responded not to the command. Order and discipline were at an end, and no exertions of the officers could restore them. The attention of every sepoy was directed to his own safety, and none thought of anything besides. Hastily throwing away their arms and accoutrements, the troops dispersed in every direction, leaving to their officers no choice but that of providing, if it might be practicable, for their own escape. Three only, Lieutenant Scott, Lieutenant Codrington, and Ensign Campbell, succeeded in effecting it, and the two former were severely wounded; Captain Noton and the remainder were killed.

The success of the Burmese in this instance might have been expected to encourage them to push their fortune in a quarter where victory had crowned their first attempt, and some apprehensions of their advance were entertained at Chittagong and Dacca, and even at Calcutta. This apparently natural consequence did not follow; but the withdrawal of the British force from Sylhet to protect Chittagong, after the defeat at Ramoo, emboldened the Burmese again to enter Cachar. The alarm for the safety of the British possessions subsiding, the movement of the force from Sylhet was countermanded, and on its return its commander, Colonel Innes, after a short interval of rest, proceeded into Cachar. The events which followed were of indecisive character, and would possess no interest in the recital. It will be sufficient to state that little advantage was gained by either party, and that sickness, caused by the unhealthy nature of the country, ultimately compelled the British commander to suspend active operations.

The prowess of the army of Arracan, and of Menges Maha Bundoola, who commanded it, made so deep an impression on the court of Ava, that it was thought their warlike capabilities might be advantageously employed in repelling the invading force, which, under Sir Archibald Campbell, had entered the Burmese territories. They were consequently withdrawn from Arracan, and the general, after

visiting Ava to receive congratulations on the past and instructions for the future, proceeded at the head of an army, formidable in point of numbers at least, to attack the invaders.

On the 1st of December, after various indications of its approach, the Burmese army presented itself in front of the British position, with the obvious intention of surrounding it. Intrenchments were thrown up with extraordinary rapidity. In the afternoon this labour was interrupted by a visit from a detachment of the British army under Major Sale, which was so totally unexpected, that the approach of the party was not perceived till it was too late to do anything effectual towards repelling them. Having burst through the intrenchments and slain great numbers, the detachment returned, loaded with the enemy's arms, standards, and tools. In the evening a mass of skirmishers, who had been pushed forward by the enemy, were driven back by two companies of the 38th regiment, under Captain Piper. Various attacks were made during the day upon the British post at Kemmendinge, and attempts to drive the British vessels from their stations by the despatch of fire-rafts, but these were met and frustrated with signal gallantry and admirable effect by the British force under Major Yates and Captain Ryves.

Between the 1st and the 4th of December the enemy continued their approaches, and the British posts were annoyed by frequent attacks. Sir Archibald Campbell determined to become the assailant on the 5th. The left wing of the enemy was chosen for the intended attack; and, in aid of it, Captain Chads was requested to move up the Puzendoor creek during the night with the flotilla, and commence a cannonade on the enemy's rear at daylight. These orders were executed with great precision and effect. The enemy were thus kept employed by the naval force, until two columns of attack which had been formed advanced upon them. One, consisting of eleven hundred men, under Major Sale, was directed to penetrate their centre; the other, consisting of four hundred men, under Major Walker, of the 3rd Madras native infantry, was directed against their left, which had approached within a few hundred yards of Rangoon. Both attacks were successful; the enemy fled in great confusion and suffered dreadful loss. The loss of the English was not great; but among the killed was Major Walker, the leader of one of the victorious columns.

On the 7th the contest was renewed. Four columns of attack were formed under the superintendence of Colonel Miles, and under the immediate command respectively of Lieutenant-Colonel Mallet, Lieutenant-Colonel Parlbay, of the Madras army, Lieutenant-Colonel Brodie, also of the Madras army, and Captain Wilson, of the King's 38th. The approach of the troops was preceded by a heavy cannonade, after which the columns advanced

in the directions assigned to them—Colonel Mallet's on the enemy's right, Colonel Brodie's on their left, Colonel Parlbys and Captain Wilson's on their centre. An attack upon so many points at once gave a momentary shock to the enemy, which for a brief period seemed to paralyze them; but they soon recovered, and made a brave though unsuccessful defence. They were totally put to the rout, and flying into the jungle, left the British masters of their intrenchments. A body of the enemy, which lingered on the Dalla side of the river, was subsequently dispersed with little either of trouble or loss.

The scattered army of the Burmese being re-assembled and strengthened by considerable reinforcements, it was resolved that an effort should be made to turn the tide of fortune, and retrieve the disgrace of defeat. It accordingly returned to Kokeen, formerly occupied, and which was now rendered formidable by numerous intrenchments and stockades. The first exploit of the Burmese after their return was to set fire to the town of Rangoon. Such an occurrence had been apprehended. The population of the town, which had fled on the arrival of the invading force, had begun to return, and all who came unarmed were freely admitted. Among those who availed themselves of the privilege were many emissaries of the Burmese general, whose only object was to watch for an opportunity of perpetrating mischief. "Our situation," says Major Snodgrass, the military secretary to the commander of the expedition, "became critical in the extreme; spies, assassins, and incendiaries lurked in every corner of Rangoon; every native within our lines became an object of suspicion, and the utmost vigilance of the troops, combined with the energy and decision of their commander, could alone have prevented our losing every advantage of our late successes by the destruction of our stores and magazines, and the consequent impossibility of our following up the blow that had been given, even if greater disasters did not befall us." He adds, "the inflammable materials of which the town was composed required but a single firebrand to envelop our cantonments and everything they contained in a general conflagration; while the unseen enemy, lurking in the outskirts of the jungle, were held in constant readiness to rush in upon our lines during the confusion which so dreaded an occurrence could not fail to produce." The wishes of the enemy were, however, not gratified to their full extent. On the 14th of December the town was fired in several places simultaneously; happily the exertions of the garrison succeeded, after two hours, in stopping the progress of the conflagration, though not until half the place had been destroyed. The enemy contented themselves with this extent of mischief, and did not venture to take advantage of the occasion to make an attack. But they were not therefore permitted to enjoy repose. On

the following day the Burmese army was attacked by the British general. The attempt was marked by a degree of daring almost amounting to temerity, and, perhaps, had any other course been open, Sir Archibald Campbell would not have resorted to this. The position of the enemy was so formidable that the British commander declared that, but for the confidence which he felt in his troops, he should have hesitated to attack it with less than ten thousand men. The Burmese force consisted of at least twenty thousand; that which could be spared for attacking them amounted to only fifteen hundred, the remainder being necessarily left to guard the lines.

A column under Brigadier-General Wilmoughby Cotton was ordered to make a détour round the enemy's left, for the purpose of gaining his rear. This column consisted of two hundred of his Majesty's 13th regiment and three hundred of the 18th and 34th Madras native infantry, with one field-piece and a detachment from the governor-general's body-guard which had joined the army at Rangoon some time previously. Another column, which Sir Archibald Campbell accompanied, was destined to attack the enemy in front: it comprised five hundred men from the King's 38th, 41st, and 89th regiments, and the Madras European regiment, three hundred from the 9th, 12th, 28th, and 30th regiments of Madras native infantry, five field-pieces, and a detachment from the governor-general's body-guard. Of this column two divisions were formed, one commanded by Colonel Miles, the other by Major Evans. The order to General Cotton was to wait at the position assigned to him till a signal was made from the other column. The disposition of the latter being completed, the prescribed signal was given and immediately answered. The artillery then opened, and the troops with their scaling-ladders, moved forwards. Their advance was treated with contempt by the Burmese, who looked on their apparent presumption as little short of madness. They persevered, however, and entering by escalade, drove the Burmese from the ramparts at the point of the bayonet. Fifteen minutes sufficed to put the British in possession of that which Sir Archibald Campbell pronounced "the most formidable intrenched and stockaded works" which he had ever seen; those works being defended by men whose thousands outnumbered the hundreds of those by whom they were attacked and beaten. The Maha Bundoola did not command in person on this occasion, having retired to some distance, and left the command to another chief.

On the same day a part of the naval force, under the command of Lieutenant Kellett, of the *Arachne*, succeeded in an attack upon a number of war-boats, more than forty of which were captured: about thirty were retained, the remainder destroyed. The expedition was placed in circumstances of great

danger from the fire-rafts of the enemy, but the peril was escaped, and several of these instruments of mischief, with a great mass of materials for their construction, were destroyed. This was but one among many brilliant exploits performed by the naval force, the majority of which it would be impossible to notice, excepting in a narrative devoted exclusively to the events of the Burmese war.

The enemy, after their signal defeat on the 15th of December, retired upon Donobew, and the British force returned to its cantonments. Reinforcements, consisting of his Majesty's 47th regiment, some cavalry and artillery, arriving, Sir Archibald Campbell determined to advance upon Prome, the second city of the Burman empire. Before taking this step it was necessary to dislodge an advanced division of the Burmese force, stockaded at Thantabain, on the Lyne river. This task, which was allotted to a detachment under Colonel Godwin, assisted by a naval force under Captain Chads, was performed effectively, and almost without loss on the part of the assailants.

The force which the general was enabled to equip for the purpose of advancing upon Prome was of very moderate amount. One column to proceed by land, was composed of twelve hundred and thirty European infantry, six hundred sepoy, the governor-general's body-guard, amounting to something more than five hundred, a troop of horse artillery, and a rocket troop, with about two hundred and fifty pioneers. This, which was under the immediate command of Sir Archibald Campbell, was to proceed in a direction parallel with the Lyne river, and to join the Irrawaddy at the nearest practicable point, to co-operate with the water column. That column consisted of eight hundred European infantry, two hundred and fifty sepoy, a rocket troop, and a powerful train of artillery. It was commanded by Brigadier-General Cotton. The men were embarked in the flotilla, which comprised sixty boats, commanded by Captain Alexander, and escorted by the boats of the men-of-war lying at Rangoon, containing upwards of a hundred seamen. Another force, consisting of two hundred and fifty European and five hundred native infantry, commanded by Major Sale, was embarked in transports for the purpose of occupying Bassein. It may be here noticed that this duty was performed without much difficulty, and Major Sale, with the chief part of his force, rejoined the main army. After the departure of the bodies of troops commanded respectively by Sir Archibald Campbell, Brigadier-General Cotton, and Major Sale, nearly four thousand effective men were left in Rangoon, under Brigadier-General M'Creagh, to abide further orders.

These arrangements being completed, Sir Archibald Campbell commenced his march on the 13th of February, which he continued till the 11th of March, when intelligence, which

met him at U-au-deest, induced him to suspend his advance.

The water column for a time proceeded not unprosperously, attacking and destroying a number of stockades on its progress. On the 8th of March it took up a position about two miles below Donobew, and a flag of truce was despatched with a summons to surrender. This being refused, an attack by two columns, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Donoghue, of the King's 47th regiment, and Major Basden, of the 89th, was commenced on the pagoda stockade, which was carried, the enemy sustaining dreadful loss. The second defence, about five hundred yards distant, was then attacked; but the attempt failed, apparently from some deficiency of steadiness in the assaulting party; and General Cotton felt it advisable to re-embark his troops. On receiving the news of this failure, Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to return with his column to assist in the reduction of Donobew, and, after a most fatiguing march, he arrived before that place on the 25th. He found the fort much too extensive to be surrounded by the force at his disposal; and although anxious for the immediate fall of the place, he preferred (using his own words) "loss of time to loss of lives," and took his measures with great caution and deliberation. The naval commander was required to move up the river, to form a junction with the force under the commander-in-chief, and on the 27th the flotilla appeared in sight. It was no sooner observed than the garrison made a sortie with a considerable force and seventeen war elephants, fully caparisoned, bearing on their capacious bodies armed men. The governor-general's body-guard, under Captain Sneyd, was ordered to charge, which they did with great spirit, dashing in among the elephants, and shooting the riders off their backs. The animals stood the charge with far more coolness than might have been expected, manifesting little fear, and when released by the shots of the British troops from the control of their masters, retiring very calmly to the fort. The sortie failed to accomplish any object for which it could have been designed, and the flotilla gained the fort with small loss, though exposed to a heavy cannonade. While the troops on land were engaged in making approaches and erecting batteries, the naval force found occupation in pushing up the river in pursuit of the enemy's war-boats, several of which were captured. On the 1st of April the mortar and enfilading batteries commenced firing, and on that day Bundoola was killed by a rocket, after which neither threats nor entreaties on the part of the other chiefs could prevail upon the garrison to remain: they all fled in the course of the night. The breaching batteries commenced their fire in the morning at daylight, but simultaneously with their opening the enemy's small rear guard was discerned in full retreat

towards the jungle, and two lascars, who had been made prisoners, came running out of the fort to announce the state of affairs there to the British camp. The line was immediately under arms, and the deserted place speedily occupied by a new garrison. The flight of the enemy had been so hurried that no measures had been taken for the destruction of that which could not be removed, and one of the most welcome prizes secured by the English was a store of grain equal to supply the wants of the garrison for several months.

Immediately after the capture of Donobew, Sir Archibald Campbell resumed his march in the direction from which the ill tidings from that place had withdrawn him. On the 14th of April he was again at U-au-deet, from whence he had retrograded a month before, having been joined on his route by Brigadier-General M'Creaigh, with a column of reserve from Rangoon, and a supply of elephants, which were much wanted for the use of the commissariat department. On the 19th he was met by a Burmese messenger, bearing a pacific communication. He was a man advanced in years, but his discretion seems to have borne no reasonable proportion to his age. "The old man," says Major Snodgrass, "drank much too freely for a diplomatist, and when he rose to take his departure, whispered in the general's ear: 'They are frightened out of their senses, and you may do what you please with them.'" On the 24th of April Sir Archibald Campbell was within sight of Prome, of which place he took possession on the 25th without firing a shot, the enemy having deserted it in the night, leaving in the works above a hundred pieces of artillery and extensive supplies of grain. The town was on fire, and one entire quarter was destroyed. A number of war-boats, with a large quantity of arms, were a few days afterwards captured by a division of the flotilla under Lieutenant Wilkinson, which had been sent up the river for the purpose.

Before his arrival at Prome, Sir Archibald Campbell was met by another overture for negotiation in addition to that already mentioned; but its object seemed rather to save Prome from falling into the hands of the English than to restore peace, and its tone in one instance approached the language of threatening. "There are armies on both sides," it was said, "and the space between them would afford sufficient room for a meeting to take place. Let the British army stay on such grounds as it may select on the arrival of this letter, by which the inhabitants of Prome will be delivered from great trouble and distress." The answer of the British general was, as on the former occasion, that the military occupation of Prome by the British was indispensable; but the letter containing this answer was never received, the messenger by whom it was carried finding the city deserted by the Burmese authorities. But for the cowardice of the enemy, Prome

must have presented an almost impassable barrier to the progress of the British army. By nature and art it was rendered so formidable that, in the judgment of Sir Archibald Campbell, ten thousand steady soldiers might have defended it against ten times that force.

At this place several months were spent in inactivity, in consequence of the setting in of the rains and the prevalence of inundations; but the troops were in comfortable cantonments—an important consideration at such a season. Sickness returned, but not to the same extent as at Rangoon, and the loss of life was comparatively small.

The suspension of active warfare in this part of the Burmese dominions affords a convenient opportunity for returning to the events on the frontier. On resuming operations, the first object was to clear Assam of the Burmese, who had been only partially expelled, and who, on the retirement of the British troops to their cantonments, had reoccupied some of the stations from which they had previously been driven. This duty was assigned to a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Richards. It was performed with great spirit and activity; but as the Burmese generally fled on the approach of the British troops, could be brought to action only by stratagem, and when thus entrapped, took the earliest opportunity of flying, a minute recital of the operations would be destitute of interest.

In January, Colonel Richards was enabled to advance upon Rungpore, and on the 25th his head-quarters were only eight miles distant from it. On the 27th the garrison made an attack upon the advanced post of the encampment. On hearing the firing, Colonel Richards moved forward, and found the enemy threatening to surround a party defending the post under the command of Captain Macleod. To encourage the Burmese to advance, Colonel Richards withdrew the party from the post, and suspended firing. This had the desired effect; and as soon as the enemy showed a sufficient front, the British commander ordered a charge: the Burmese, however, declined waiting for it, and fled with great precipitation.

Having received some reinforcements, Colonel Richards proceeded towards Rungpore. A stockade which had been erected across the road was carried by escalade; a fortified bank on the right, and two temples, one on the right and one on the left, were also occupied. These successes had the effect of bringing a flag of truce from the fort. Its bearer was a Buddhist priest, born in Ceylon, but many years a resident in Bengal and the Eastern islands, in the employment of various public servants. These employments he had lately exchanged for the exercise of his sacerdotal functions to the authorities in Assam. The acquaintance with British habits and customs which his former experience had given him probably led to his selection for this duty. On being

admitted to Colonel Richards, he inquired what were the objects of the advance upon Rungpore. These being explained, the priest departed, promising to return within a specified time. He did return, and pointing out the difficulties in the way of accommodation, caused by the contests of conflicting factions within the fort, requested some further explanation of the British commander's views, with which request Colonel Richards complied. He instructed the priestly negotiator to inform the Phokuns (who were brother chieftains of considerable power and influence) that if they were prepared to make terms of alliance with the British government he was ready to meet them; that if they were bent on fighting, he was equally ready; and if they wished to retire out of Assam, they might do so, provided they took the most direct route, committed no ravages on the road, and carried away none of the inhabitants then in their possession by force. The last course was finally acted upon. All who chose left the fort; the remainder surrendered to the English on conditions, one of which was, that on the conclusion of peace they should not be delivered up to the king of Ava; a result of which they entertained great dread, and against which they evinced intense anxiety to be secured. To justify the guarantee to a part of the garrison of permission to escape, Colonel Richards represented that he was without the means of effectually pursuing them; that he was dependent for supplies upon the fleet, lying twenty miles down a river which was not navigable above its position; that the acquisition of Rungpore was of great importance; and that regard was to be had to the captive Assamese inhabitants, who would have been sacrificed by a different course. These reasons were certainly not without weight. The possession of Rungpore involved the virtual occupation of the whole of Assam. The Burmans made some border irruptions in May and June, and erected stockades; but they were driven out by parties of the British force, not without fatiguing marches, but almost without fighting.

From Sylhet it was proposed to march a large force through Cachar and Manipur to make a demonstration against the Burmese territory in that quarter. For this purpose about seven thousand men were collected, and placed under Brigadier-General Shuldham, who was appointed to command on the eastern frontier. The attempt was made, but abandoned, from the difficulties presented by the country and the state of the weather. The beasts employed to convey stores and supplies perished in vast numbers; some dying of fatigue, some from dislocating their limbs as they laboured through the plashy soil, and others from being so deeply fixed in the mire that no efforts could extricate them. The loss of bullocks, camels, and elephants was enormous.

The difficulties which had been insurmountable by a regular force, were, however, overcome by an undisciplined body of about five hundred men, under Gumber Singh. This force, which was accompanied by a British officer, Lieutenant Pemberton, succeeded, by the middle of June, in reaching the western boundary of Manipur. The Burmans were posted in the principal town, but they fled on the approach of Gumber Singh's party, and in a short time completely evacuated the district. Having left a division of his force for its defence, the leader of the expedition returned with Lieutenant Pemberton to Sylhet.

But the grand blow to the Burmese power from this quarter was to be directed against Arracan. The primary object was to occupy that province, and this being accomplished, it was believed that the force employed might be enabled to co-operate with the army on the Irawaddy. An army of eleven thousand men was assembled in Chittagong, under the command of Brigadier-General Morrison. A flotilla, under Commodore Hayes, was attached to it. It consisted of several pilot vessels and armed brigs, ten gun-pinnaces, and a large number of gun-boats, each carrying a twelve-pounder carronade. In consequence of insuperable impediments, General Morrison was unable to move until January. The coast was thought to offer the most eligible line of march, and a part of the troops proceeded by sea, while the remainder moved by land. The arrival of the former was delayed by adverse weather; and an unsuccessful attack on some stockades by part of the flotilla was attended by some loss. A junction of the two branches of the force was, however, effected; and the expedition advanced in the direction of the capital of the province. As it was approached, some fighting occurred, in which the character of the British arms was well maintained.

At daybreak on the 29th of March, the army moved forward to attack the defences of Arracan. The enemy occupied a range of connected hills, from three hundred and fifty to four hundred and fifty feet in height, strong by nature, and rendered more strong by art; escarpment, abatis, and masonry, having been resorted to wherever they could be advantageously employed. A single pass led to the capital, and that was defended by several pieces of artillery and about three thousand muskets. The entire number of the enemy ranged along the heights was estimated at from eight to nine thousand. The ground in front was an open plain of considerable extent, but in depth not altogether out of the range of the enemy's guns.

The advance of the British force having halted at a place where it was partially covered by a tank, the officer commanding, Brigadier-General Macbean, made a disposition for gaining the principal hills in the first range. Four pieces of artillery were ordered forward to cover the attack; the troops for the assault followed. They consisted of the light

company of his Majesty's 54th regiment, four companies of the 2nd light infantry battalion, and the light infantry companies of the 10th and 16th regiments of Madras native infantry, with the rifle company of a provincial levy, under Major W. H. Kemm, of the 2nd light infantry: six companies of the 16th Madras native infantry, under Captain A. French, of that regiment, formed a support. The ascent was exceedingly steep, in some parts nearly perpendicular, and the enemy showered a well-directed fire on the assailants as they moved up. Under these circumstances of difficulty and danger, however, many succeeded in gaining the summit. Lieutenant J. Clark, aide-de-camp to General Macbean, with several of the gallant 54th, got their hands upon the trench; but even with this assistance, they were unable to maintain their ground. Large stones were rolled on them, smaller ones were discharged from bows, and the effect was, that those who had thus fearfully ascended were violently hurled down again. But the attempt was not lightly abandoned. In despite of the difficulties which opposed them, the assaulting party persevered until every officer was wounded; while the troops engaged of every description displayed the same gallant and unyielding spirit which animated those who led them. "The conduct of the officers," said General Morrison, in his official account of the attack, "was emulated by the men, and European and native troops vied with each other to equal the example set" them.

It was now determined to change the point of attack. The right of the defences appeared to be the key of the enemy's position; and though the obstacles were great, it was resolved to attempt it. The approach was protected by a small lake; the ascent was more abrupt than at any other point, and the height greater. The natural advantages seemed to have inspired the enemy with a high degree of confidence in the security of this part of their position; for though the top was crowned by a stockade, and some other defences guarded the ascent, the number of men allotted to it was not considerable. To divert attention from this point a battery was constructed, and in the morning a vigorous cannonade opened upon the works at the pass. The meditated attack upon the enemy's right was intrusted to Brigadier-General Richards. It took place under cover of the night, and succeeded without the loss of a man. On the following morning preparations were made for pushing the success of the night, but the enemy abandoned the hills after a very feeble resistance, and no impediment remained to the occupation of the capital of Arracan. The naval force participated in these gallant deeds. A party of seamen accompanied the force under General Richards, which gained the hills. Indeed, the zeal which that force displayed throughout the operations of the Burmese war was exemplary.

One instance of it, immediately connected with the attack upon Arracan, may be mentioned. Commodore Hayes, finding that his boats could not be brought to the scene of action, landed two twenty-four pounders, and, with the British seamen, dragged them and their appurtenances five miles to the encampment before Arracan, rendering them available there for any service for which they might be required.

The loss of the capital caused the enemy to withdraw from all their positions in Arracan. The primary object of the expedition was thus attained; but the ulterior design, of marching General Morrison's army across the mountains to join that of Sir Archibald Campbell, was found to be impracticable. This disappointment was not the worst misfortune which befell the army of Arracan. The enemy had been vanquished, but a very large portion of the victors were doomed to periah under the visitations of disease. The rainy season brought with it fever and dysentery, and their ravages carried away vast numbers which the sword had spared and fatigue had left unsubdued. The prevalence of disease was all but universal; and it was at last deemed expedient to withdraw the troops altogether, leaving divisions of them on the islands of Cheduba and Ramee, and on the opposite coast of Sandoway, at which places the climate appeared to be more favourable to the enjoyment of health than in the rest of the country.

The army under Sir Archibald Campbell was left at Promé, waiting the abatement of the rains and inundations. On the return of the season for active operations, intelligence was obtained of the approach of a large Burmese force. Immediate hostilities, however, were averted by the arrival of an answer not unfavourable to an overture for negotiation which the British general had made to the Burmese government some time before. The deputation charged with the care of the letter proposed that two British officers should in return pay a visit to the Burmese commander-in-chief. Sir Archibald Campbell assented, and Lieutenant-Colonel F. S. Tidy, deputy adjutant-general, and Lieutenant William Smith, of the royal navy, were appointed to the mission. The result was, the conclusion of an armistice till the 18th of October. It was therein provided that the first minister of the king of Ava should meet the British commander-in-chief at a place midway between the positions of the two camps. The meeting accordingly took place. The first interview was one of ceremony; at the second the negotiators entered on business. Sir Archibald Campbell declared the terms on which he was ready to conclude a treaty of peace and evacuate the country. He required that the court of Ava should abstain from interference with Cachar, Manipur, and Assam; should cede Assam to the British government, and pay two crores of rupees as an indemnification for the expenses of the

war; one immediately, the other at a future period, the Tenasserim provinces being retained till its liquidation. The Burmese endeavoured to evade the questions in dispute, and modestly requested that the English would quit the country without making any stipulations for their own benefit, and leave their claims to the generosity of the ruler of Ava. After a discussion, alike tedious and frivolous, an extension of the armistice to the 2nd of November was requested by the Burmese deputies, under pretence of applying for their master's commands with regard to the proposed terms. This was granted, and thus ended a conference, the preparations and conduct of which had been arranged with the most scrupulous regard to the preservation of the formal dignity of the native diplomatists, and of the "king of the white elephants" whom they represented. The ultimate result was not more satisfactory. The court of Ava would concede neither money nor territory; and, at the expiration of the armistice, hostilities were resumed.

The first movement of any importance was disastrous to the English. The Burmese having pushed forward a division to Wattygoon, a few miles from Prome, a body of native infantry, with the view of dislodging them, was despatched to act on the left, while another body was to attack them in front. Both parties were unsuccessful; and Colonel M'Dowell, who led one of them, was shot through the head. A third body, which had been despatched by way of Saagie, to afford support if required, fell in with part of the Burmese army, then in pursuit of Colonel M'Dowell's force, who immediately fled; but the British party, being unable to learn anything of the troops which they had been sent to support, marched back to Prome without effecting anything further. This disaster occurring immediately after the interruption of the negotiations, tended to support the confidence of the enemy and encourage them to persevere.

The Burmese army continued to advance towards the British lines, throwing up intrenchments and stockades as it proceeded; but its slowness to attack disappointed the British general, who consequently determined to become the assailant. On the 30th of November, preparations were made for a general attack upon every part of the enemy's line, and on the 1st of December it took place, the operations by land being aided by the flotilla, now under the command of Sir James Brisbane. Two columns of attack were formed; one under Brigadier-General Cotton, the other accompanied by Sir Archibald Campbell. As soon as they were in motion, the naval force commenced a cannonade, and this so disconcerted the enemy, that the pickets of his left were withdrawn, and his position left exposed in that quarter to any sudden attack. General Cotton's column first reached the enemy's line, which consisted of a series of

stockades, which he at once assaulted, and in less than ten minutes carried. Panic and confusion then seized the masses within the works, and great slaughter followed. Sir Archibald Campbell's column pushing rapidly forward in the rear, met the flying masses endeavouring to cross the river, and opening the horse artillery upon them, did dreadful execution. Among those who fell within the works was the aged commander, Maha Nemion, who, under the burden of seventy-five years, had been carried in a litter from point to point, to endeavour by his presence and encouragement to sustain the energy of his men.

On the 2nd of December the British force was again in motion. The object of attack was the enemy's centre, which was strongly intrenched amid hills inaccessible by land, except by one narrow pathway defended by seven pieces of artillery, while the river was commanded by several batteries of heavy ordnance. Sir James Brisbane moved forward with the flotilla and cannonaded the works from the river. On the land side, after the enemy's posts had been driven in and sufficient impression had been made on the works by artillery and rockets, a brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sale, consisting of the King's 13th and 38th regiments, under Major Howlett and Major Frith, advanced by the trench to storm the heights in front, while some companies of the 87th proceeded through the jungle to the right. Scarcely a shot was fired in return for the enemy's continued volleys. The 38th led the way in entering the intrenchments on the heights, and the assailants, driving the enemy from hill to hill, secured to the British the whole of the position, which was nearly three miles in extent. During the attack, the flotilla, pushing past the works, succeeded in capturing all the boats and stores which had been brought down for the use of the Burmese army.

The right corps of that army still maintained its position. On the 5th it was attacked in flank and rear, while the batteries and boats of the British force cannonaded in front; and after a feeble resistance the position was evacuated, the enemy retiring to a second line of stockades, from which they were quickly dislodged; when, disheartened, dispersed, and broken, they fled in all directions through the woods.

The British army now advanced, the enemy flying before them and abandoning without an effort defences which could not have been taken without severe loss. But the success of the victors was not unattended by circumstances of discouragement. Their march was sometimes arrested by heavy rains, rendering the country impassable; sickness, in the awful form of spasmodic cholera, made its appearance; and on one occasion the European troops were compelled to halt, from the total failure of the supply of animal food. The expected co-operation of the army of Arracan

was not obtained, and though everywhere triumphant, the British general could not be free from anxiety. At the latter end of December the Burmese proposed to treat for peace, an event which it was to be presumed could not be disagreeable to either party. The proposal was entertained, but the army continued its march to Patanagoh, opposite the Burmese intrenchments of Melloon. Continued communications, having reference to the proposed peace, were here carried on, Sir Archibald Campbell being assisted by Mr. Robertson, who had been appointed civil commissioner in Pegu and Ava, and also by Sir James Brisbane. After much discussion a treaty was agreed to, upon the terms formerly proposed by the British authorities, excepting that the provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, and Mergui were added to the territorial cessions, and the pecuniary payment reduced from two crores to one. The English copy of the treaty was signed on the 2nd of January, the Burmese copy on the 3rd; and an armistice was concluded till the 18th, to allow time for obtaining the ratification of the king.

The ratification was not received by the appointed time, and the Burmese commissioners then offered to pay an instalment of five lacs of rupees, and to give hostages for the safe return of the English prisoners from Ava, provided the British force would return to Promé, or at least agree to a further suspension of hostilities for a few days. The British commissioners peremptorily refused to retreat, and declined undertaking to abstain from hostilities, except on condition of the Burmese evacuating Melloon within thirty-six hours, and retiring upon Ava; the march of the British army, however, not to be suspended until the receipt of the ratified treaty. This proposal was in return rejected by the Burmese, and hostilities recommenced. Batteries were erected opposite the selected parts of attack in the stockade, the heavy ordnance was landed from the flotilla, and by ten o'clock on the morning of the 19th, twenty-eight pieces of artillery were ready to open upon the enemy's defences.

After two hours' cannonading, the troops intended for the assault, who had been previously embarked in boats under the superintendence of Captain Chada, began to move. A brigade, under Colonel Sale, was ordered to land below the stockade, and attack it by the south-west angle, while three other brigades were to land above the place to attack it by the northern face. The boats pushed off together, but the current, aided by a strong wind, carried the brigade under Colonel Sale to its destined point of attack before the remaining brigades could reach the shore. The troops landed, and immediately formed under Major Frith, Colonel Sale having been wounded in the boats. This being effected, without waiting for the landing of the other brigades, they rushed on to the assault, entered by escalade, and established themselves

in the works, in the face of upwards of ten thousand men. The other brigades took the flying enemy, and completed the victory. A quantity of ordnance and military stores was taken, a magazine of grain, and specie to a large amount.

The army on its advance was met by Mr. Price, an American missionary, and Mr. Sanford, an English surgeon, who had been made prisoner, who were commissioned from Ava to ascertain the terms of peace. They were informed that the terms tendered before the capture of Melloon were quite open for acceptance, and that with respect to the pecuniary indemnification, the army would retire to Rangoon on the payment of twenty-five lacs of rupees, and would evacuate the Burmese territory upon the discharge of a second instalment of the same amount. With this answer the delegates returned.

Upon the 8th of February it was ascertained that the enemy were about five miles in advance on the road to the city of Pagahm, and on the 9th the British columns moved forward to attack. The Burmese army was commanded by a person named Ta-ya-soo-sang, who had represented to the king of Ava that the previous successes of the English were owing solely to the incompetence of the generals by whom they had been opposed; and that, if an adequate force were placed at his command, he would speedily drive the invaders out of the country. The wishes of the sovereign insuring belief to these representations, the army was reinforced by a new levy of several thousands, and the adviser of the measure, invested by the royal grace with the title of Nawung Thuring (Prince of Sunset), was sent to supersede the general previously in command of the army. The chief thus honoured was, on the 9th of February, at the head of about eighteen thousand men; the British force opposed to him on that day fell short of two thousand. The newly-created prince had drawn up his army in the form of a crescent, both its flanks being considerably advanced, and the main road running directly through its centre. This arrangement appears to have been adopted with reference to the nature of the country, which being greatly overgrown with prickly jungle, it was difficult for large bodies of troops to diverge from a direct course, either to the right or to the left. The Burmese general, therefore, anticipated that the British would advance by the main road, till opposed in front, when the wings of the Burmese army might have closed, thus taking them in both flanks and in the rear; and for the accomplishment of this he naturally relied on his vast superiority in point of numbers. But if he thus calculated, he was deceived. Instead of marching on the centre of the enemy, the British commander assailed his flanks. The right attack, which was directed by Sir Archibald Campbell in person, was made by the King's 18th regiment, accompanied by four guns of the Bengal horse artil-

lery and a small detachment of the governor-general's body guard, and supported by the King's 89th. General Cotton superintended the attack on the left, which was made by the King's 88th, supported by the 41st, and accompanied by two guns of the Madras artillery. Colonel Parib, with the 43rd Madras native infantry, advanced on the bank of the Irawaddy, on the extreme left of the British, to prevent the enemy throwing troops upon its rear.

The enemy received the charge with tolerable firmness, but were soon obliged to give way. Part of the troops broken by the 88th retired into a well-constructed field-work, but were so closely pursued that they had not time to form for its defence, and several hundreds perished at this spot, either pierced by the bayonet, or drowned in vain attempts to cross the river. When the Burmese general found both his flanks attacked, while the centre was apparently not threatened, he pushed forward a column on the main road, in the direction of an eminence crowned by a pagoda lying to the rear of the British; but the sight of the King's 89th in reserve checked their progress, and they returned. It were needless to enter further into the details of the engagement of the 9th of February. From the moment when the enemy's line was broken the fortune of the day was decided, and it is enough to record that, notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers, the result of the conflict was a decisive victory to the weaker party, the enemy abandoning Pagahm to the British, with all the stores, ordnance, arms, and ammunition which it contained. The Burmese on this occasion departed from their usual course of fighting within barriers, and ventured to dispute for victory in the open field. They met a signal and disastrous defeat, and the Prince of Sunset, who had promised to drive the English out of his master's dominions, was fain to seek safety for himself in the dark and mazy covert of the jungle.

The contest was now drawing to a close; but previously to recording its actual conclusion, it will be necessary to direct attention for a moment to some proceedings in Pegu.

A force had been stationed there under Colonel Pepper, to protect the province from the irruptions of Burman detachments. To check a series of incursions which took place under the command of the former governor of Martaban, Colonel Pepper, late in the year 1825, marched to Shoe-gein, on the left bank of the Sitang, which he occupied without resistance. From there he despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Conry, with a body of light infantry, to reduce a Burman post bearing the name of the river, and situate between Tongo and Martaban. The attempt failed, and the commanding officer was killed. Colonel Pepper then proceeded against the place with a stronger force, which he divided into three columns of attack. They

advanced simultaneously, and succeeded in carrying the works, which were subsequently destroyed. This conflict was attended by severe loss on both sides. Among the killed on the side of the English were two of the officers commanding columns, Captain Cushman and Captain Stedman, while the third, Major Home, was severely wounded; Colonel Pepper also was among the sufferers from wounds. The enemy, however, continued troublesome, and shortly after the capture of the stockade of Sitang, made a vigorous attack upon a British post at Mikow, which maintained the communication between Pegu and Shoe-gein; but the attempt was most gallantly repulsed by the young officer in command, Ensign Clarke, of the 3rd Madras native infantry, with a small detachment of that regiment.

Sir Archibald Campbell was in full march towards the capital of the Burmese empire, when he was met by Mr. Price and Mr. Sanford, announcing the accession of the Burman sovereign to the proposed terms; but as no formal ratification of the treaty was received, the advance of the British army was not interrupted. Mr. Price returned to Ava to procure the necessary ratification, and again met the army (being then accompanied by the Burmese commissioners) at Yandabo, within four days' march of the capital. The war was now at an end, for the Burmese agents brought not only the ratified treaty, but the sum of twenty-five lacs of rupees as the first instalment of the amount thereby stipulated to be paid.

The main provisions of the treaty have been already mentioned. It consisted of eleven articles, which number was increased by the addition of a supplementary one. They provided that there should be perpetual peace and friendship between the two states, and for the abrogation of all claims, on the part of the king of Ava, to Assam, Cachar, and Jyntee. With regard to Manipur, it was stipulated that should Gumber Singh desire to return to the country, he should be recognized by the king of Ava as rajah thereof. The title of Gumber Singh was certainly not of the clearest, and he was indebted for the support of the British government, not to the justice of his pretensions, but to the assistance which he had been able to render his patrons. The limits of the territories of the "two great nations," as, in imitation of the language of the Burmese diplomatists, they were termed, were thus fixed:—the British government were to retain the conquered provinces of Arracan, comprehending the four divisions of Arracan proper, Ramree, Cheduba, and Sandoway; and the Unnoupsectowmien, or Arracan mountains, described in the treaty as known in Arracan by the name of the Yeumatoung or Pokhingloun range, were to form the boundary on that side. Any doubts regarding the line were to be settled by commissioners, who, it was expressly provided, should be

"suitable and corresponding in rank." The Burmese government also agreed to cede the conquered provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies appertaining thereto, marking the Saloun river as the line of demarcation on that frontier. A crore of rupees were to be paid by the Burmese to the British government, one quarter immediately, whereupon the British army was to retire to Rangoon; another quarter in a hundred days, upon which second payment being made, the British army was to quit the dominions of the king of Ava; a third quarter at the end of one year from the conclusion of the treaty, and the remainder at the expiration of two years from the same period. This contribution was stated to be made, not merely as a partial indemnification to the British government for the expenses of the war, but also "in proof of the sincere disposition of the Burmese government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the two nations." No person, whether native or foreigner, was to be molested by either party on account of the part which he "had taken, or had been compelled to take," in the war. An accredited minister from each state was to reside at the court of the other, with an escort of fifty men; and a commercial treaty, upon principles of reciprocal advantage, was to be framed. All public and private debts contracted previously to the war, by either government or its subjects with the other government or its subjects, were recognized and liquidated; the property of British subjects dying in the Burmese territories was, in the absence of legal heir, to be placed in the hands of the British resident or consul, to be disposed of according to the tenor of the British law; and the property of Burmese subjects dying within the British dominions was to be made over to the minister or other authority delegated by the Burmese monarch to the British government. British ships in Burmese ports were to be relieved from all exactions, and from all acts of submission not imposed upon Burmese ships in British ports. The king of Siam, designated as "the good and faithful ally of the British government," was to participate in the advantages secured to that government; and in conclusion, provisions were made for the ratification of the treaty, and for the exchange of prisoners.

In England the Burmese war was not popular, and its progress was attended by little of the feeling of satisfaction which its general success might have been expected to excite. The still lingering impression of fear for the consequences of territorial extension, the inadequate preparation with which this war was commenced, the great expense by which it was attended, and the barren and seemingly unprofitable character of the country acquired, probably combined to produce this result. The course taken by the governor-general, however, was sufficiently approved by the king's

government to warrant his elevation to an earldom.

It has incidentally been mentioned that, pending the Burmese war, a treaty was concluded between the British government and the king of Siam, who in the treaty with Ava is recognized as "the good and faithful ally" of the former state, and as having taken part in the war. The part taken, however, seems to have been confined to making plundering excursions into such of the Burmese territories as lay conveniently for visitation, with little regard to the question whether such territories were occupied by the English or not, carrying off from them slaves and booty, and writing complimentary letters to the British authorities. As, however, the services of this "good and faithful ally" of the British government were deemed worthy of honourable mention, it may be expected that some notice should be taken of the instrument by which his majesty of Siam became entitled to be referred to in the terms which have been quoted. The treaty was negotiated on the part of the English by Major Burney, and concluded on the 20th of July, 1826. After an overture in the usual lofty strain, promising that "the powerful lord, who is in possession of every good and every dignity, the god Boodh, who dwells over every head in the city of the sacred and great kingdom of Si-a-yoo-then-aye, incomprehensible to the head and brain," and an inferior potentate described as "the sacred beauty of the royal palace, serene and infallible there," had bestowed their commands upon ministers of high rank, belonging to the "great and sacred kingdom," to frame a treaty, it is declared that the English and Siamese "engage in friendship, love, and affection, with mutual truth, sincerity, and candour." After a diffuse commentary upon this text, a second article provides for the arrangement, by negotiation, of any disputes that might arise between the two countries; other articles relate to the settlement of boundaries, and the respect to be paid to them. The protection of merchants in their occupation is the subject of multifarious provisions, which it would be tedious to detail. One of them may be quoted as an illustration of the jealousy of the Siamese. It is provided that merchants subject to the English, desiring to come and trade in any Siamese country with which it has not been the custom to have trade and intercourse, must first go and inquire of the governor of the country. "Should any country have no merchandise, the governor shall inform the ship that has come to trade that there is none. Should any country have merchandise sufficient for a ship, the governor shall allow her to come and trade." Under such a provision the government of Siam might obviously refuse to open to British commerce any part of their country not previously accessible. Among the commercial regulations was one strictly forbidding the introduction of opium into Siam or its dependencies, and sub-

jecting it, should the attempt be made, to confiscation. From another article it might be inferred that written correspondence had not previously been regarded as inviolate from the inspection of those for whose eye it was not intended. "If an Englishman desire to transmit a letter to any person in a Siamese or other country, such person only, and no other, shall open and look into the letter. If a Siamese desire to transmit a letter to any person in an English or other country, such person only, and no other, shall open and look into the letter." Other articles related to trade with Queda (possession of which was to be secured to the Siamese), and to the protection of the rajah of Perak in his government. The terms upon which the commercial intercourse of British subjects was to be regulated were fixed with greater precision by a supplementary paper, which, as well as the treaty, was concluded on the part of the British government by Major Burney.

To avoid breaking the current of the narrative, the notice of two events of some interest, occurring during the progress of the Burmese war, has been deferred till the history of its operations was complete. To these events it is now necessary to advert.

The earliest of them is of a painful and discreditable character. About the middle of the year 1824, the 47th native infantry had been marched to Barrackpore, from which, at a later period of the year, they were to proceed to take part in some of the operations of the Burmese war. To put an army in motion in India is a far more difficult process than in other parts of the world, where the climate is less enervating and the habits of the people less peculiar. From the first-named cause, European troops require aids which are neither bestowed nor expected elsewhere; from the second, similar assistance is to a certain extent required by a large portion of the native troops. No military force can move in India without a large number of beasts of burden. These are requisite, not only for carrying provisions and stores, but also for transporting a considerable portion of the personal baggage of the men. The European does not carry even his knapsack. The sepoy is not excused from this burden, but, in addition to ordinary necessities, he must find means of conveyance for a set of utensils for cooking, with which each man is provided; and these, added to his clothing, appointments, and ammunition, would constitute a load which the comparatively slender frames of the native troops would be altogether unable to bear through a lengthened march, more especially if it were to be performed, as must frequently happen, under unfavourable circumstances. Carriage cattle are, for this reason, of prime necessity for the movement of an army; but it is to be observed, that the expense of these animals, and their drivers, so far as employed for the use of the sepoys, had been accustomed to be defrayed by the sepoys themselves.

In the instance under notice, however, no bullocks could be provided; none could be hired, and they could only be purchased at an extravagant price. An application for assistance from the commissariat department was made, but was answered by an intimation that the men must provide the required accommodation for themselves. The commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, however, made disbursements from his private funds for the purchase of bullocks; and government, on learning the deficiency, directed the issue of a sum of money to aid in supplying it. Unfortunately, however, the remedy was not applied till the disease had attained a degree of virulence which set at defiance all corrective appliances. As is usual, too, the experience or apprehension of suffering called before the minds of the discontented every incident of their situation which could be construed into a grievance. The men were ordered to appear on parade on the 30th of October, in marching order. The greater part appeared without their knapsacks. The cause of the neglect was demanded, and the answer was that their knapsacks were unfit to produce. They were informed that new ones were on their way, and that till their arrival they must use the old ones. They refused to produce them; and part of the regiment then declared that they would not proceed to Rangoon or elsewhere by sea, nor would they move at all unless they were to have double batta, the claim for which was rested on two grounds—first, that increased pay had been given to bullock-drivers and persons engaged in similar services; secondly, that according to report, everything was very dear in the country to which they were going. After some attempts to subdue the prevailing discontent by reasoning, Colonel Cartwright, finding these efforts vain, and being unable, from the number of the mutineers, to take any more vigorous measures, dismissed the regiment, and sought the advice of General Dalkell. The latter officer proceeded to Calcutta to consult the commander-in-chief, Sir Edward Paget. On his return he ordered a parade to take place at daybreak on the morning of the 1st of November. At this parade all semblance of duty was cast aside, and the regiment, with the exception of the officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, burst into acts of open violence. During the night the mutineers slept on their arms, maintaining regular guards and pickets, and a strong chain of sentries and patrols. In this state of things Sir Edward Paget arrived. Two regiments, besides the 47th, were stationed at Barrackpore, preparatory to their proceeding on service; but both of them were infected in some degree with the mutinous spirit which had taken entire possession of the regiment last mentioned. It was necessary, therefore, to seek the means of overawing the mutineers elsewhere; and his Majesty's 1st royals, his Majesty's 47th, a battery of light artillery, and the governor-general's body-guard, promptly arrived from

Calcutta. The force intended to act against the mutineers having taken position, the commander-in-chief deputed the quarter-master-general and the adjutant-general, accompanied by Captain Macan, of the 16th lancers, as interpreter, and by the commanding officer of the regiment in rebellion, to give on his part an answer to a paper which had been forwarded by the malcontents, as well as to explain to them their situation, and the consequence that must result from their adhering to the course which they had adopted. Their fate, they were informed, would depend on their obedience to the command which they were about to receive from the adjutant-general. The word to order arms being given was instantly obeyed. The next order was to ground arms; with this only one man complied, while the silence which had hitherto been maintained was now broken by loud and continued murmurings. These were silenced by a few discharges from a battery in their rear, and the rebel troops speedily broke and fled in every direction, throwing away their arms and accoutrements, and, whenever practicable, divesting themselves of the military dress. A few were killed, and the fugitives being hotly pursued, many were taken prisoners. These were forthwith brought to trial before a court-martial. A considerable number were found guilty and sentenced to death, but a few only of the more active were executed, the punishment of the remainder being commuted to hard labour in irons for terms proportioned to their guilt. The native officers, though not participants in the rebellious movement, were believed to be cognizant of the acts and intentions of the mutineers, and they were in consequence dismissed the service. The number of the regiment was most properly erased from the list of the army, the European officers being transferred to another raised in its place.

The motives to mutiny are usually multifarious and complicated. The difficulty of procuring carriage for the baggage of the native troops was in this case, as has been already intimated, but one among various causes operating to produce discontent. It was like the change of atmosphere or of mode of life, which suddenly gives to predisposing causes freedom and force, and develops in the animal constitution diseases of which the foundation was previously laid. The prejudices of the Hindoo subject him to great privations on ship-board, and he is consequently averse to any service subjecting him to the necessity of a voyage. The mutineers seem to have believed that they were to proceed to Rangoon by water, and in aid of the annoyance derived from this belief came the feeling of dislike naturally entertained by men reared, for the most part, in the comparatively healthy provinces of upper India, to encounter the danger and misery of a country of marsh and jungle, more to be dreaded than the sword of the enemy. The Burmese war, moreover, had, in some respects, opened

inauspiciously, and the effect was to damp the spirit, if not to shake the fidelity of the native troops. The destruction of the detachment at Ramoo is represented by an officer of long experience in India, as having struck "alarm throughout the native army." From this cause, and from the difficulties in prospect, the war was far from popular. Further, all classes of camp-followers, whose services were in requisition, had taken advantage of prevailing circumstances to advance their claims to remuneration, and necessity had compelled the government to yield. The soldiers were aware of this, and soon began to think themselves entitled to partake of advantages so lavishly and indiscriminately bestowed on men whom they could not fail to regard as their inferiors. While this source of discontent was in full operation, there occurred, most unhappily, a disappointment as to the provision of new knapsacks, for which the men had been under stoppages. In aid of these various causes of discontent came the recollection of some promotions alleged to have been irregular, and to have resulted from the influence of the soubahdar-major with the commanding officer, the parties favoured being relatives of the former person.

The event remaining yet for notice, as occurring contemporaneously with the Burmese war, was one of greater dignity than that by which it has been preceded in the narration. It originated in the state of affairs at the court of Bhurtpore. The rajah Bundher Singh had died in 1823 without issue. His brother, named Buldeo Singh, thereupon assumed the government, notifying his accession to the British authorities, and soliciting from them the *khelat* of investiture as bestowed on his predecessor. Sir David Ochterlony, British resident in Malwa and Rajpootana, in reporting to his government the accession and application of Buldeo Singh, announced the existence of a rumour that Doorjun Saul, the son of a younger brother of the deceased rajah, intended to contest the succession, on the ground of his having been adopted by the departed prince. In consequence of this communication, the government thought it necessary to refrain from any formal recognition of the new rajah until the receipt of further information. The result of inquiry was a conviction that the claim of Doorjun Saul was utterly unfounded: Buldeo Singh being in peaceable possession of the musnud, the British resident was ultimately authorized to give him investiture, and the governor-general addressed a congratulatory letter to him as rajah of Bhurtpore.

The rajah, on finding himself confirmed in the seat of power, became anxious to secure to his heir the same powerful protection which had been extended to himself, and his conduct towards his British ally appears to have entitled him to expect this favour. The rajah's son was too young to maintain his own right to the musnud, in the event of his early

succession to it, and the recognition of his title by the British government seemed the most effectual method of stopping the claims and preventing the intrigues which otherwise would arise on the rajah's death. Sir David Ochterlony was very urgent in supporting the wish of the rajah that his son should receive public and immediate investiture from the British government, on the grounds that the reigning prince laboured under a disease which led to apprehensions for his life; that the recognition at once of the rajah's son would tend to check the assertion of pretensions similar to those which had been made on the accession of Buldeo Singh; and that the act would be gratifying to an ally whose adherence to principles calculated to promote peace and good order had been exemplary.

The British government, however, while avowing a desire to gratify the rajah of Bhurtpore, hesitated to comply with his request. A phrase in the rajah's letter to Sir David Ochterlony led to some doubts as to the degree of relationship in which the proposed successor to the musnud stood towards the rajah, and the government desired to be informed whether there were any other members of the family living, who could be regarded as having a better title than the child towards whom their protection was invoked. In reply, Sir David Ochterlony stated, that the boy was the son of Buldeo Singh, and his only son. It does not appear that any authority was thereupon given for the performance of the required ceremony; it seems rather that Sir David Ochterlony deemed himself authorized to proceed to it in virtue of some remarks of a general character contained in the despatch in which the government called for information as to the existence of other claimants of the throne. In January, 1825, he apprized the government of his intention of complying with the wishes of the rajah by acknowledging his son, and early in February the ceremony of investiture took place. On the 26th of that month the rajah, Buldeo Singh, died.

Doorjun Saul was not slow to avail himself of this event for advancing his own views, notwithstanding the recognition by the British government of the right of the deceased rajah's son. Several battalions having been gained over to his interest, the fort was attacked and taken, the uncle of the rajah murdered, and the boy seized by the usurper. Sir David Ochterlony, on learning this, adopted measures on his own responsibility for assembling the largest disposable force which could be obtained, aided by a formidable battering and bombarding train, in order to vindicate the rights of the youthful rajah of Bhurtpore and the dignity of the British government. He at the same time issued a proclamation addressed to the Jat population, calling on them to rise in defence of their lawful sovereign, and setting forth that British troops were advancing to rescue Bulwant Singh from his

hands; that they would assemble at Muttra, whither the resident had repaired for the purpose of advancing and superintending the requisite preparations.

These acts were strongly disapproved by the governor-general in council, and orders were issued peremptorily directing the resident to countermand the instructions which he had given for the march of troops, and to cause them to halt within the British territory. Before these orders were transmitted, it was reported that Doorjun Saul professed to disclaim any intention to usurp the throne; that he had been driven to the course which he had taken by the repeated indignities which he had received from the maternal uncle of the rajah, who had assumed the office of guardian and prime minister, and that he had acted throughout in concert with many of his tribe, who disapproved the administration which he had overthrown, and had invited him to establish a new one. On the receipt of this intelligence, the government resolved to order not merely the halt of the British troops, but their immediate return to their respective stations. They determined also to direct the resident to recall his proclamation, or neutralize its effect by another, declaring that, as Doorjun Saul had disavowed all intention of seizing the throne, the advance of the British troops had been countermanded, and that an inquiry into the cause of the commotion at Bhurtpore would be instituted. In the conduct of this inquiry, the orders of the government required that the resident should cautiously abstain from adopting measures or making declarations likely to commit the British government to any particular course of policy which might involve the necessity of resorting to arms, until after the whole matter should have been fully investigated and maturely weighed. The reasons assigned for the course taken by the government were the following:—That nothing but a case of most indisputable emergency could justify bringing into the field the small force at the time disposable in Upper India, and when the hot winds had actually commenced, engaging in fresh hostilities the duration and extent of which it was impossible to calculate with any certainty; that they could not view the occurrences at Bhurtpore as constituting such a case of emergency; that they were not prepared to admit the existence of any engagement, express or implied, binding the British government to support the succession of the rightful heir to the Bhurtpore raj by an immediate resort to arms at all hazards, and without reference to time, circumstances, or considerations of general expediency; that Sir David Ochterlony had acted upon imperfect and unsatisfactory information regarding the real facts of the case; that he had not called on Doorjun Saul for any explanation of his views and conduct, and that, consequently, it was not known what plea he might have to offer in vindication of the apparent violence

of his proceedings, nor what object he professed to have in view in exciting the disturbance; that it might turn out that he only claimed to exercise the regency during the minority of the rajah, in preference to the prince's relations by the female side, and that to this office it was likely he possessed the best title, though his manner of asserting it had been violent and irregular. The intelligence received pending the consideration of the orders to be issued to the resident was referred to as strongly confirming the views of the government on this last point.

The instructions for the suspension of military preparations and the withdrawal of the troops which had moved were followed by others, animadverting with some severity on the imperfect manner in which the proceedings of the British resident at Bhurtpore, previously to the death of the late rajah, had been reported, and on the investiture of the young rajah without positive and distinct authority; a proceeding which it was represented placed the government in the embarrassing dilemma of either disavowing the acts of its representative, or plunging into hostilities in Hindostan at a season unfavourable for military operations, and objectionable with reference to the state of the war then waging with the state of Ava.

Before these instructions reached Sir David Ochterlony, he had received a mission despatched by Doorjun Saul for the alleged purpose of explaining his views and pretensions to the representative of the British government. The answer of Sir David Ochterlony was, that the only course which appeared to him likely to satisfy the British government was for Doorjun Saul to come to the British camp with the infant rajah in his hand, and deliver him to the resident's care, with a public and solemn assurance of his own fidelity and obedience to the prince. A reference to Bhurtpore followed, but before any answer was obtained, the later orders of the governor-general in council were received by the British resident. He replied to them with great warmth, affirming that the military preparations which he had made were of such a nature as to justify the expectation that Bhurtpore would fall in a fortnight after the British force should appear before it; that even if the young rajah had not been acknowledged as the legal successor to the throne, he could not have supposed that the British government would tolerate the usurpation of the prince's rights by others; and that, after such acknowledgment, it was not to be believed that principle was to be made to yield to expediency and the dictates of timid policy calculated to defeat its own ends and purposes. The usurpation, he represented, would not have been attempted but under the "strongly prevalent impression" that the British were unable to chastise insolence and support right; and whether or not this error should be refuted was not with him, he added, a question

for a moment. The pretensions of Doorjun Saul, he alleged, were originally directed to the throne, though subsequently they might have been modified; but whatever they might be, he declared that it never entered his imagination that, with reference to the manner in which the power of that person had been acquired, it could have been recognized in any form until such concessions should be made as it might become the British government, in the high and commanding position which it maintained, to accept.

About this time the mother of Buldeo Singh, alarmed by the military preparations made by the resident, addressed to him a proposal not very dissimilar to that which had been offered by the vakeels of Doorjun Saul. It was to the effect that she should be declared regent, but Doorjun Saul intrusted with the administration of the state under the title of mooktiar. The lady proposed, in the first instance, to wait herself on Sir David Ochterlony; then to send Doorjun Saul to hold an interview with him at a spot half-way between Malwa and Bhurtpore; and lastly, that the British resident should proceed in person to the latter place, there to enter on an amicable discussion of the matters in dispute. Several letters were interchanged, but no meeting took place, and nothing resulted from the correspondence. Whether the proposal was a mere expedient to gain time and postpone the apprehended attack on the city, or whether its abortive termination was caused in any degree by the change of purpose enforced upon the resident, it is impossible to decide.

After this, Sir David Ochterlony returned to his usual place of residence, near Delhi, where he received a visit from a gooroo, or priest, of high influence at Bhurtpore. Some conversation took place respecting the terms of an arrangement, remarkable only on account of the new ground taken up by the representative of the ruling party at Bhurtpore. He considered that Bhurtpore was not a principality, but a zemindary, recently established by force of arms, and that, according to the rules of the Jats, as well as to the laws of Hindoo inheritance, the dominion ought to have been equally shared among the sons and heirs. In what manner this position was intended to be applied is not very clear, as it seems that the gooroo only required that his employer, Doorjun Saul, should be nominated by Sir David Ochterlony to the office of mooktiar. To speculate, however, on the intentions or the instruments of native diplomacy, is for the most part a waste of time, its tortuous character defying the efforts of the most minute and careful consideration.

The resident proposed to the gooroo three conditions, to which he recommended Doorjun Saul to subscribe, as being calculated to secure a favourable decision of the British government. They were to the effect that Doorjun Saul should recognize the right of

Bulwunt Singh to the sovereignty by his acts as amply as he had already done by his letters ; that his claim to the mooktiaree should be left for the decision of the governor-general in council ; and that, if demanded by the British government, a sum not exceeding five lacs of rupees should be paid for the expenses incurred by the late military preparations. The probability of obtaining such terms, more especially the promise of reimbursement for putting in motion a military force which had retired without the slightest attempt to effect its purpose, is a point that can require no discussion or observation. The proposal of the resident was met by a counter-proposal, the chief point in which was the immediate appointment by Sir David Ochterlony of Doorjun Saul to the mooktiaree. These communications, however, were followed by no result.

The feeling of Sir David Ochterlony, that the period for his retirement had arrived, seems to have been shared by the government. "Being fully impressed," said the governor-general in council, addressing the Court of Directors, "that his advanced age and continually increasing infirmities rendered his retirement from the active and laborious employment which he had so long filled with the highest distinction, a measure no less desirable on the public account than necessary for his own personal relief and recovery, we did not oppose the execution of the above purpose,"—that of retirement. Some modification with regard to the office held by Sir David Ochterlony took place. The duties connected with Malwa were transferred to another officer, while those of Rajpootana were allotted to Sir Charles Metcalfe, who was appointed to the residency of Delhi, an office which he had formerly held. It was the intention of the government to recommend that Sir David Ochterlony's services should be acknowledged by the grant of pecuniary provision sufficient to insure comfort to his retirement ; but the execution of this design was frustrated by his death, which took place at Meerut a very short time after his surrender of office.

In the month of June the situation of Bhurt-pore became still more distracted than before, by a quarrel which arose between Doorjun Saul and his brother, Madhoo Singh, with whom he had previously acted in concert, and who was believed to have been the chief instigator of his proceedings. Madhoo Singh attempted to seize the fort of Bhurt-pore and the person of his brother ; but failing in this, he retired early in July to the strong fortress of Deeg, established his authority over the surrounding country, collected troops, and repulsed, with considerable slaughter, some detachments sent by Doorjun Saul to reduce him to subjection. This state of affairs invited a great influx of armed men from the adjacent districts, some of which were under the direct authority of the British government. When numbers of

persons are at once anxious for military service, and careless as to the chief under whom they may find it, it is comparatively easy to collect an army ; and where, either from inability or avarice, the disbursement of pay is neglected, the deficiency is readily supplied by resort to the prescriptive practice of plunder. Thus it was in Bhurt-pore. Among those attracted thither by the cry of war was a considerable body of Mahrattas, who crossed the Chumbul, from Scindia's country, and joined Madhoo Singh at Deeg. With these adventurers plunder was but an ordinary mode of subsistence, and with such supporters it could not be doubted that Madhoo Singh would become as bitter a scourge to his neighbours as to the country of which he had taken possession. The magistrate of Agra, in advising his government of the immigration of Mahrattas which had taken place into Bhurt-pore, and the probability that more would follow, added, "Madhoo Singh has not, I am informed, the means of supplying his troops, and he is reduced to great distress for want of provisions. If he should not succeed in making peace with his brother, it is to be feared that he may place himself at the head of his rabble, and commence a system of plundering which is not likely to be confined to the Bhurt-pore country." This is indeed a natural step in the progress of an Indian adventurer disappointed in the attempt to establish a more respectable authority. At the time when this communication was made, the fact had indeed ceased to be matter of expectation ; for Madhoo Singh's troops had paid a visit to a village belonging to the rajah of Alwar, and relieved the inhabitants from the care of every article of property that admitted of ready transport.

The situation of Bhurt-pore, and the dangers with which that situation was fraught to the territories of the British government, as well as to those of its allies and dependents, now pressed strongly on the attention of the governor-general in council ; but their views as to the proper line of policy were not unanimous. Three members of council, Mr. Fendall, Mr. Harrington, and the commander-in-chief, Sir Edward Paget, recorded their opinions in favour of the interference of the British government, as well with reference to its own security, and to the probability that the prolongation of disturbances in Bhurt-pore might kindle the flame of war throughout Rajpootana, Malwa, and Delhi, as to the claim of the youthful rajah to protection. The danger of a general war was emphatically dwelt upon by Mr. Fendall, who took occasion to advert to the possibility of the powers whose thrones had fallen before the British arms taking advantage of events to endeavour to regain what they had lost. Mr. Harrington was earnest to vindicate the course which he recommended from the imputation of being at variance with orders from home against interference in the internal affairs of native states.

Such vindication scarcely appears necessary, but it was certainly successfully executed.

The commander-in-chief restricted his approbation of interference to the ground of the danger to which the British government was exposed by the probable extension of disturbances beyond the boundaries of Bhurt-pore. To avert this danger, he recommended, the assemblage of a military force near Muttra at the termination of the rainy season. After adverting to the possible success of negotiation in effecting the emancipation of the infant prince, and expressing confidence in the talents of Sir Charles Metcalfe, Sir Edward Paget pithily added, "Meanwhile, negotiations are very apt to thrive when backed by a good army."

The governor-general stood aloof. He was decidedly opposed to the views entertained by Mr. Fendall and Mr. Harrington, and, to a certain extent, by the commander-in-chief. He thought it inexpedient to interfere in the internal concerns of Bhurt-pore, and argued that such interference was not called for by the treaty, nor had ever been practically exercised, except in acknowledging, when invited, the lawful successor to the raj. To this extent he was desirous of limiting the interference of the British government, more especially with reference to the probability that a contrary course might involve the necessity of undertaking the siege of the fortress of Bhurt-pore. "I am not aware," he observed, "that the existence of that fortress has occasioned to us the slightest inconvenience during the last twenty years." His lordship was opposed to making any overtures to Doorjun Saul, as, if they should be rejected, the issue would be that the British government had exposed itself unnecessarily to alight; and if they should be accepted, the British government would be bound to support Doorjun Saul against his brother, and to attack Madhoo Singh in the fortress of Deeg. The safety of the young rajah, his lordship thought was most likely to be secured by abstaining from interference. He thought the life of the prince important to Doorjun Saul, under the circumstances that existed; he apprehended that interference might have the effect of uniting the brothers, and causing the sacrifice of the rajah. The occurrence of danger to the Company's territories his lordship admitted to be a cause for interference, but acts of aggression from either party he regarded as unlikely. He assented to the propriety of assembling a force at Muttra, as recommended by the commander-in-chief, but expressed a hope that this measure, and the presence of Sir Charles Metcalfe at Delhi, would prevent the "embers bursting forth in a flame."

Such were the respective views of the governor-general and the members of council, as recorded a short time after the death of Sir David Ochterlony. On the arrival of Sir Charles Metcalfe in Calcutta, preparatory to assuming the duties of resident at Delhi, all

the reports and documents connected with the affair of Bhurt-pore were referred to him for perusal, with an intimation that it was the wish of the government that he should state his opinions, both on the general question of interference and on the specific measures to be adopted in the existing juncture. This he did in a very elaborate, though not a very lengthy paper, delivered to the government at the latter end of the month of August. It is difficult to give a satisfactory account of the views embodied in this masterly exposition of the true policy of the British government, from the fact that every sentence is so pregnant with meaning as scarcely to admit of abridgment.

Sir Charles Metcalfe commenced by referring to the general rule of non-interference, and to the constantly recurring necessity of disregarding it in practice. He proceeded—"We have by degrees become the paramount state of India. Although we exercised the powers of this supremacy in many instances before 1817, we have used and asserted them more generally since the extension of our influence by the events of that and the following year. It then became an established principle of our policy to maintain tranquillity among the states of India, and to prevent the anarchy and misrule which were likely to disturb the general peace." After referring to instances in illustration of this statement, Sir Charles Metcalfe proceeded thus: "In the case of succession to a principality, it seems clearly incumbent on us, with reference to this principle, to refuse to acknowledge any but the lawful successor; as otherwise we should throw the weight of our power into the scale of usurpation and injustice. Our influence is too pervading to admit of neutrality, and suzerainty would operate as support." The questions actually at issue in the case of Bhurt-pore were subsequently adverted to in an abstract form. "It," said Sir Charles Metcalfe, "the prince be a minor, the constitution of each state will point out the proper person to exercise the powers of regency during the minority, and that person, for the time, must stand in the place of the prince. Such misrule may possibly occur as will compel us to interfere, either for the interests of the minor prince or for the preservation of general tranquillity, the existence of which is endangered by anarchy. In such an extreme case the deposition of the culpable regency, and the nomination of another according to the custom of the state, with full powers, would be preferable to the appointment of a minister with our support under the regency, for this latter arrangement can hardly fail to produce either a divided and inefficient government or an odious usurpation." After limiting the right of interference by the British government to the states towards which it stands in the relation of a superior and a protector, it was observed that, with regard to those states, "we cannot be indifferent spectators

of long-continued anarchy therein, without ultimately giving up India again to the pillage and confusion from which we rescued her in 1817 and 1818." Most justly did Sir Charles Metcalfe then proceed to apply the experience of the past as a warning for the future. "We attempted," he continued, "to act on the principle of non-interference after the peace of 1806; we had succeeded to Scindia, as lord paramount of the states between the Sutlej and the Jumna, but we abstained from exercising the authority which we had acquired. Some of those states had internal dissensions which they called on us to settle. We replied, that it was contrary to our system to interfere in the affairs of other states. The disappointed parties applied to Runjeet Singh. He was not loath, and after feeling his way cautiously, and finding no opposition from us, gradually extended his power and influence over the whole country between the Sutlej and the Jumna. It became the principal business of our negotiation with him, in 1808 and 1809, to remedy this mischief by throwing his power back beyond the Sutlej, which was accomplished with considerable difficulty, great reluctance on his part, and a near approach to war." Having laid down a series of general principles (some of which have been quoted at length), Sir Charles Metcalfe found no difficulty in applying them to the existing circumstances of Bhurtpore. "We are bound," said he, "not by any positive engagement to the Bhurtpore state, nor by any claim on her part, but by our duty as supreme guardians of general tranquillity, law, and right, to maintain the legal succession of Rajah Bulwunt Singh to the raj of Bhurtpore, and we cannot acknowledge any other pretender. This duty seems to me to be so imperative, that I do not attach any peculiar importance to the late investiture of the young rajah in the presence of Sir David Ochterlony. We should have been equally bound without that ceremony, which, if we had not been under a pre-existing obligation to maintain the rightful succession, would not have pledged us to anything beyond acknowledgment. The lawful rajah established, Bhurtpore may be governed, during his minority, by a regency, such as the usages of that state would prescribe. How this should be composed can only be decided by local reference. Doorjun Saul having unquestionably usurped the raj, seems to be necessarily excluded from any share in the regency or administration; and his banishment from the state, with a suitable provision, will probably be indispensable for the safety of the young rajah; the more so, if, as I suppose, Doorjun Saul, by the custom of that state, is next in succession to Rajah Bulwunt Singh, and, consequently, the actual heir presumptive to the gудdee." After discussing the claims of Madhoo Singh, to whom, on the whole, the writer of the memorandum was more favourable, he returns to Doorjun Saul, whose usurpation, if persisted in, must, he declares,

be put down by force of arms; but, under any circumstances, he continued to maintain that the usurper must be excluded from power, "Doorjun Saul," said he, "finding us determined to support the right of the young rajah, may propose to relinquish his usurpation of the raj, and stipulate for confirmation in the regency. This would be a continuation, in a modified shape, of the usurpation which he effected by violence, in contempt of our supremacy. It would not be possible to obtain any security for the safety of the young rajah, if Doorjun Saul, who is either the next heir, or at least a pretender to the raj, were regent."

Sir Charles Metcalfe then showed that, waiving these objections, such an arrangement was not likely to secure the peace of the country, and observed, "We are not called upon to support either brother; and if we must act by force, it would seem to be desirable to banish both." He contended, however, that all that could at that time be determined with certainty was, that the rajah, Bulwunt Singh, must be maintained, and a proper regency established; adding that every other point was open to discussion, and that a nearer view of the scene might probably suggest plans not likely to occur at a distance. The paper which has been so amply quoted contained, in addition to the exposition of the author's views as to Bhurtpore, some observations on the position of the British government with regard to Alwar and Jyepoor, with both which states some causes of difference had arisen. These, however, being comparatively of little interest, may be passed over; but some remarks on the possibility of war being unavoidable are too instructive to be omitted. "Desirable as it undoubtedly is," said Sir Charles Metcalfe, "that our differences with all these states should be settled without having recourse to arms, there will not be wanting sources of consolation if we be compelled to that extremity. In each of the states our supremacy has been violated or slighted, under a persuasion that we were prevented by entanglements elsewhere from efficiently resenting the indignity. A display and vigorous exercise of our power, if rendered necessary, would be likely to bring back men's minds in that quarter to a proper tone, and the capture of Bhurtpore, if effected in a glorious manner, would do us more honour throughout India, by the removal of the hitherto unfaded impressions caused by our former failure, than any other event that can be conceived."

The reasoning of Sir Charles Metcalfe, aided probably by the influence of his high character for ability, uprightness, and independence, appears to have produced effects which could hardly have been anticipated. The governor-general seems to have consented not only to shape his course of policy in accordance with the suggestions of the memorandum, but even to have been to a great degree convinced by its arguments.

The great obstacle to the adoption of a de-

cided course of policy in regard to Bhurtpore being thus removed, a resolution was passed by the governor-general in council, on the 18th of September, declaratory of the intentions of government. It is remarkable on account, not so much of the measures which it announced, for these might have been looked for as the natural results of the state of opinion and feeling which prevailed among the members of the government, but for the bold and unhesitating avowal of principles, the acknowledgment of which had, up to that period, been studiously avoided. Thus ran the most important part of the resolution:—"Impressed with a full conviction that the existing disturbances at Bhurtpore, if not speedily quieted, will produce general commotion and interruption of the public tranquillity in Upper India, and feeling convinced that it is our solemn duty, no less than our right, as the paramount power and conservators of the general peace, to interfere for the prevention of these evils, and that these evils will be best prevented by the maintenance of the succession of the rightful heir to the raj of Bhurtpore, whilst such a course will be in strict consistency with the uniform practice and policy of the British government in all analogous cases, the governor-general in council resolves that authority be conveyed to Sir C. T. Metcalfe to accomplish the above object, if practicable, by expostulation and remonstrance; and, should these fail, by a resort to measures of force." No instructions or suggestions were given to Sir Charles Metcalfe to regulate his proceedings; he was left to the unfettered exercise of his own judgment and discretion. Moreover, his views as to the final arrangement of the affairs of the Bhurtpore state were adopted and embodied in the resolution as those which, in the existing state of their information, the government deemed most worthy of being entertained.

It will be unnecessary to pursue minutely the proceedings of Sir Charles Metcalfe in attempting to settle the affairs of Bhurtpore by negotiation. It will be sufficient to say that they did not succeed. Doorjun Saul revived his claim to the throne, founded on a pretended appointment by a former rajah, the falsehood of the allegation being proved by the very circumstances referred to in support of its truth; while occasionally he held language which seemed to indicate submission. Though supposed to be a man of timid feelings, he evinced little fear, and his firmness was probably sustained by the apathy generally manifested as to the claims of the rightful prince. It was known to all that he was a usurper, and his character exhibited little that was calculated to win popular favour; but he commanded on one point the sympathy of the people. This was observed by Sir Charles Metcalfe, and thus noticed in one of his communications to the governor-general in council:—"The right of Rajah Bulwant Singh is unquestioned and unquestionable, and it seems

wonderful that, with so bad a cause, Doorjun Saul should be able to think of opposition to a predominant power which seeks only to render justice to the lawful prince. But notwithstanding the injustice of the usurpation, which every one admits, he will probably receive support from the circumstance of his placing himself in opposition to the British government as the defender of Bhurtpore. It must be known to the right honourable the governor-general in council that this fortress is considered throughout India as an insuperable check to our power, and the person who undertakes to hold it against us will be encouraged in his venture by its former successful defence, and by the good wishes of all who dislike our ascendancy, whatever may be the injustice of his cause." Here lay the secret of his strength and of his confidence. He felt safe in possession of the unyielding fortress of Bhurtpore, and he gained support by his disposition to defend it.

The period was rapidly approaching when the impregnability of the fortress and the resolution of its usurping master were to be tested. A vast force was advancing upon it under the command of Lord Combermere, who had succeeded Sir Edward Paget in the office of commander-in-chief in India. On the 25th of November Sir Charles Metcalfe issued a proclamation denouncing the pretensions of Doorjun Saul, and declaring the intention of the British government to support the interests of the rightful prince. On the 5th of December Lord Combermere's head-quarters were at Muttra. On the 6th he had an interview with Sir Charles Metcalfe, and having ascertained that no political reason existed for delaying the movements of the troops, he ordered the second division of infantry, commanded by Major-General Nicolls, with the first brigade of cavalry and a detachment of Skinner's local horse, to march from Agra by Danagore to Bhurtpore, and to take up a position to the west of the town. The first division of infantry, under Major-General Reynell, with the second brigade of cavalry, and the remainder of Skinner's horse, marched by another route to take up a position on the north-east of the town. With this column the commander-in-chief proceeded. The approach of the British force drew forth several letters and deputations from Doorjun Saul, having in all probability no object but to gain time. Sir Charles Metcalfe did not allow them to interfere with the progress of the army, and on the 10th of December the head-quarters of the commander-in-chief were before Bhurtpore. Here his lordship's humanity was manifested by the transmission to Doorjun Saul of a proposal for the withdrawal of the women and children from the town, the British general promising them safe conduct through his camp, and allowing twenty-four hours for their departure. An evasive answer being returned, a second communication was made to Doorjun Saul, repeating the proposal and

extending the time for embracing it twelve hours beyond the period fixed by the previous offer. This proposal was answered in a similar manner to that by which it had been preceded, and the benevolent purpose of Lord Combermere was thus defeated. Of the honour due to his humanity—an honour exceeding that which the most brilliant victory could have conferred—the brutal perverseness of the enemy could not deprive him.

Several days were occupied in the construction of works. During the progress of these operations a party of about two hundred of the enemy's horse attempted to make their escape; they were intercepted, thirty or forty killed, and upwards of a hundred made prisoners. On the 28th of December the advanced batteries opened. Others were brought into work as they were completed, and by the 4th of January they had produced visible effect. Still they were insufficient effectually to breach the walls, and on the evening of the 6th a mine was commenced in the escarp of the ditch on the northern face; but unfortunately the work not being sufficiently advanced by day-break, and the engineers apprehending discovery if their operations were continued, it was prematurely exploded, and produced no material effect. A second attempt to mine was made, but those employed in it were countermined from the interior before they had entered many feet. The gallery was subsequently blown in, it having been discovered that the enemy were keeping watch in it.

A serious accident occurred on the 8th; a shot from the fort set fire to a tumbrel, and in consequence about twenty thousand pounds weight of ammunition was destroyed.

On the 14th a mine under one of the bastions was exploded with little advantage. Two others were then driven into the same wall, which were sprung on the 16th, with such effect that, with the aid of a day's battering, a sufficient breach was made.

The morning of the 18th was fixed for the assault, which was to be made by two columns, the right commanded by Major-General Reynell, and the left by Major-General Nicolls. The signal was the explosion of a mine in the north-east angle, which took place at eight o'clock with terrible effect. Unfortunately, however, the explosion being in an unexpected direction, several men of General Reynell's column were killed, and three officers wounded. This created a momentary hesitation, but General Reynell giving the word "forward," the whole advanced with perfect steadiness. The enemy made a vigorous resistance, but the British troops proceeded, overcoming all opposition, until they united at the Kombheer gate with the troops of General Nicolls's division. That division had advanced to the left breach, and carried it, although the ascent was excessively steep, and the troops in their progress were annoyed by the guns of the ramparts, which, whenever movable, the enemy turned upon them. The citadel sur-

rendered about four o'clock. Doorjun Saul attempted to escape with his family, but was intercepted and secured by General Sleigh, commanding the cavalry.

Thus terminated the attempt to interfere with the rightful order of succession in the state of Bhurtpore, and thus were annihilated the boasted pretensions to impregnability of the fortress bearing that name. Those pretensions had been greatly strengthened by the failure of Lord Lake in 1805. Twenty years afterwards, they, with the fortress itself, were levelled with the dust. The defences that survived the siege were destroyed, and the place, which had been the watchword of confidence and hope throughout India, was reduced to the condition of a miserable ruin. With the fall of Bhurtpore perished all expectation of successfully resisting the British government. The remaining fortresses within the dominions of Bhurtpore promptly surrendered, and the rajah's authority was firmly as well as speedily re-established.

The reduction of Bhurtpore was the most striking event that occurred during the administration of Earl Amherst, and it was the last of any importance. The rajah of Colapore, a Mahratta prince of profligate character, became involved in disputes with the government of Bombay during the year 1826; but the march of a military force under Colonel Welsh brought him to submission without the necessity of firing a gun. It remains, therefore, only to notice such treaties and diplomatic arrangements concluded during the government of Earl Amherst as have not already been adverted to, and which may appear to deserve mention.

In 1824, Malacca, Singapore, and the Dutch possessions on the continent of India, were ceded by the king of the Netherlands, in exchange for the British settlement of Bencoolen in Sumatra. The situation of Singapore rendered it capable of becoming a place of great commercial importance; but it was little better than a continuous forest, vexed by the claims of two Malay princes, one of them nominally a vassal of the other, but, in conformity with Eastern fashion, exercising the actual rights of sovereignty. The English had established a factory there some years before the cession, but their position was undefined and uncertain; and though attempts had been made to fix the relations of the strangers with the native princes, they were in constant danger of coming into collision with them as well as with the government of the king of the Netherlands. When the pretensions of that government were transferred, it was deemed fitting to determine, with greater precision than before, the terms upon which the British government was to stand in regard to the native princes, known as the Sultan and Tumongong of Johore.

The best mode, if practicable, was to get rid of the claims of these personages by a commutation of their political and territorial claim

for pecuniary allowances, and this was effected. By a treaty concluded between them and the East-India Company, on the 2nd August, 1824, it was provided not only that "peace, friendship, and good understanding shall subsist for ever between the Honourable the East-India Company and" the two princes, their heirs and successors, but also for the cession by the princes to the Company of the island of Singapore, together with the adjacent sea straits and islets, for a specified extent, "in full sovereignty and property." By other articles of the treaty, the surrender was to be remunerated by liberal pecuniary provision, but which provision, contrary to ordinary practice, was to cease with the lives of the existing princes. In the event of the princes or their successors choosing to quit Singapore for a residence elsewhere, other payments were to be made in consideration of their immovable property, which was thereupon to devolve to the Company. While continuing to reside at Singapore and drawing their stipends, the princes were not to enter into any alliance or correspondence with other states without the knowledge and consent of the Company; and in the event of their departure, they were, in case of distress, to receive personal asylum and protection. Neither party was to interfere with the personal concerns of the other; both were to use their efforts to suppress robbery and piracy. Unshackled trade was to be maintained in the remaining dominions of the Sultan and Tumongong of Johore, and the British were to be admitted to trade there on the terms of the most favoured nations. The Company were not to harbour persons deserting from the service of the princes, such persons being natives of those parts of their dominions which they still retained; and, finally, all conventions and agreements previously subsisting between the contending parties were to be considered as abrogated, with the exception of such parts as might have conferred on the East-India Company any right to the occupation and possession of the island of Singapore and its dependencies.

With the king of Oude a treaty was concluded in 1826, the objects of which were the recognition of a loan of one crore of rupees, advanced by that prince to the Company in perpetuity, and the assignment of the interest thereon to various parties.

The relations of the British government with Nagpore were fixed by a treaty concluded in December, 1826, by Mr. Jenkins. By this instrument the effect of the treaty with Appa Sahib, concluded on the 27th May, 1816, was renewed so far as might be consistent with the new engagement. By the remaining articles, the rajah renounced all dependence upon the

rajah of Sattara, and all connection with that prince, or with any other Mahratta power, and agreed to relinquish all ceremonies and observances referring to the place which his predecessors held in the Mahratta confederacy; he was to hold no communication with foreign powers, except through the Company's resident; the British government was to have the power of determining what number of troops were required for the protection of the rajah's territories and the maintenance of tranquillity therein, and of stationing them where their presence might be deemed necessary. The rajah renounced all claims to the territories ceded to the Company by Appa Sahib, and the Company guaranteed the remainder to the rajah; provision was made for exchange of portions of territory, if found desirable, and for securing to the Company's officers the exclusive management of the territories ceded by the treaty, or which might be ceded under the provision for exchange. The British government, it was declared, had undertaken "during the rajah's minority, the settlement and management of the whole of the territory reserved to his highness, and the general direction of his officers in his highness's name and on his behalf;" but the nonage of the prince, "according to Hindoo law and usage, being now expired, the powers of government and the administration of his dominions," subject to certain specified conditions and exceptions, were "declared to be vested in the rajah." Some succeeding articles having been modified by a later engagement, it will be unnecessary to refer to them here. By the article which followed them, the memorable hill of Seetabuldee and that adjacent were annexed to the British residency. By other articles the British government was empowered to garrison and occupy such forts and strong places as they might determine, and the rajah was bound to furnish certain stores and other assistance to the Company's government. Thus Mr. Jenkins, who had successfully counteracted the machinations of Appa Sahib and supported the authority of the British government—who had placed the youthful rajah on the musnud, and carefully administered the affairs of his dominions till the prince was of fitting age to assume the authority of his station, had the gratification of completing the work which owed its success to his courage and prudence.

The administration of Earl Amherst presents nothing further which calls for report. Towards its close, his lordship made a tour to the Upper Provinces, and in March, 1828, he quitted India, leaving Mr. Butterworth Bayley in the discharge of the duties of governor-general.

CHAPTER XXVII.

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—MAHOMETAN REFORMERS IN BARASSET—AFFAIRS OF QUEDA—EVENTS IN COORG—DETHRONEMENT OF THE RAJAH—VARIOUS TREATIES—MISGOVERNMENT OF OUDE—ECONOMICAL REFORMS—THE HALF-BATTA QUESTION—INTERFERENCE WITH THE CIVIL SERVICE—ABOLITION OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN NATIVE ARMY—SUTTEE ABOLISHED—LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK QUITS INDIA.

THE difficulty of perfectly understanding the motives by which men are actuated, and on many occasions of reconciling them with reasonable expectation, is a subject too trite to justify any lengthened discussion. Lord William Bentinck had been removed from the government of Fort St. George under circumstances calculated, it might be supposed, to discourage any wish on the part of his lordship to revive the connection between himself and the East-India Company. It is true that, in dismissing his lordship from their service, the Court of Directors had expressed a hope that his "valuable qualities and honourable character might be employed, as they deserved, for the benefit of his country:" but this compliment could only be regarded as indicating a desire to avoid giving unnecessary pain, and to soften the mortification of recall, by mixing with the act somewhat of grace and kindness.

The hope, however, had been realized. The high connections of Lord William Bentinck had saved him from the tedium of idleness, and procured for him in Europe employment suitable to his rank and profession. But with this his lordship was not satisfied; he yearned for a return to the scene of his former disappointment, and on the vacancy created by Mr. Canning's sudden relinquishment of the office of governor-general, in which he had just been appointed to succeed the marquis of Hastings, Lord William Bentinck took the unusual step of offering himself as a candidate. Such a proceeding can scarcely be justified under any circumstances. Were it either common or in ordinary cases excusable, it might have been supposed that, situated as was Lord William Bentinck, an ordinary measure of self-respect would have rendered it impossible for him to make the application. He had been removed from the government of Fort St. George because his conduct was disapproved at home. If this severe step were just, the object of his lordship's application was to obtain the appointment to the highest office in India of a person whose only claim to the honour rested on previous misconduct in a subordinate office. If it were unjust, his lordship condescended to solicit a valuable favour from those at whose hands he had already received injuries; and whether, in fact, the recall were unjust or not, there can be little doubt that it was regarded as unjust by his

lordship. But whatever his views, or whatever might be the opinion formed by others on the subject of his recall, his application for the office of governor-general cannot be reconciled with propriety or dignity. It met at the time with the success which it deserved. His lordship's appeal was disregarded, and the vacancy, as has been seen, was filled up by the appointment of Lord Amherst. On the retirement of that nobleman, Lord William Bentinck was more fortunate, and his lordship's restless hankering for oriental power was gratified. He was sworn into the office of governor-general in July, 1827; but before his departure from England, the death of Mr. Canning gave to the administration, under whose advice the appointment had been approved by the Crown, a blow which it was not destined to recover. It was kept together for a short time by Lord Goderich, who succeeded to the chief place in it, but yielded with little resistance to the party which, on Mr. Canning being selected as the head of the ministry, had declined to act under a chief whose opinions were favourable to Catholic emancipation. Lord William Bentinck had not sailed when this last change took place, and he waited to ascertain its effect. Had the new ministers acted in the spirit of some who had gone before, and of some who followed them, his lordship would have experienced a second disappointment. They did not, however, advise the sovereign to exercise his revoking power, and in February, 1828, Lord William Bentinck departed to take possession of the office which he so ardently coveted. His administration was distinguished more by civil and fiscal changes than by events of stirring character. The former will be noticed hereafter, precedence being given in this, as in other instances, to the latter class of occurrences.

Among those which demand early notice are the disturbances in Baraset. These originated in the fiery zeal of a person of humble position in society, named Meer Niser Alee, better known by the name of Tittoo Meer. This man was a disciple of Syed Ahmed, a Mahometan reformer, who had been the cause of considerable annoyance to the Seik government. The movement raised by Syed Ahmed was alleged to be directed against the corruptions which, in the course of years, Mahometanism had acquired, principally from the residence of its professors among people hold-

ing a different creed ; and the attempts of the chief reformer and his disciples to extend the influence of their opinions had been attended by considerable success. In Calcutta and its neighbourhood they made many converts, and treatises explaining and enforcing their doctrines had been published there in the Persian and Hindoostanee languages.

The rigidity of the doctrines of the reformers, however, was disagreeable to the mass of their fellow believers, who found some of their most popular religious observances denounced as superstitious, idolatrous, and inconsistent with the purity of Mahometanism as it was delivered by the prophet. Among these were the ceremonies performed at stated periods after the death of relations, and the honours and offerings bestowed on the tombs of the saints. But while the reformers thus manifested their zeal against superstitions alien to the spirit of Mahometanism, they, with an inconsistency not uncommon, adopted a practice clearly borrowed, like the practices which they condemned, from the people among whom the lot of these restorers of the ancient fabric of the faith had been cast. They carried their assumption of superior sanctity to the degree of refusing to eat with any but members of their own sect ; and the exclusion was so strictly maintained as to lead to the separation of even the nearest relations. They seem to have been regardless of giving offence, to have been careless of consequences, and to have imbibed at least so much of the original spirit of Mahometanism as freed them from all repugnance to the use of violence when it could be employed in propagating the faith. They were met by their opponents in a corresponding spirit, and some zemindars unfortunately were led to exercise their authority in hostility to the new opinions. These zemindars being Hindoos, had little sympathy with the reformers. They were habitually averse to change of any kind ; their feelings on this account were against the new sect, and the more strongly, because its members were far more bitter and uncompromising enemies of Hindooism, than those Mahometans who were content to yield to their prophet such a measure of obedience only as was ordinarily current. Another motive for the interference of the Hindoo zemindars has been suggested in their desire to derive a profit from the controversy, the most obvious method of gratifying it being the infliction of fines on the parties complained against. In an exaction of this kind did the general disturbance originate. A zemindar had inflicted petty fines on several persons, some of whom paid the amount, while others resisted. Some servants of the zemindar were despatched to enforce payment from the obdurate, but without success. Not only was the required payment refused, but the persons sent to demand it were beaten, and one of their number forcibly detained. The zemindar came down with a greater force, and a petty disturbance ensued, in the course of which a

thatched building used as a mosque caught fire and was consumed. The police were now called in, and ultimately the case was brought before the magistrate's court. By this time the ferment had greatly increased. The fine levied by the zemindars was ordinarily spoken of as a tax on the beard, it being a point of conscience with the reforming Mahometans to cultivate that ornament of their persons with extraordinary care ; and the name added greatly to the previous unpopularity of the exaction.

In the magistrate's court, charges and counter-charges were made, and positive testimony on one side was met by contradictory testimony equally positive on the other. None of the parties were subjected to punishment, but some of the Mahometans were bound over to keep the peace. This partial success seems to have encouraged the zemindars to indulge in further vexatious proceedings. A suit instituted in the sillah court of the Twenty-four Pargunnahs by one of the zemindars against some of the reformed Mahometans was alleged to have a fraudulent origin, and it was further stated that the defendants were forcibly carried to the zemindar's house, where by maltreatment they were compelled to pay a part of the demand upon them, and to give security for the remainder. In the mean time preparations had been made by the Mahometans for presenting an appeal against the decree of the magistrate in the case of the affray. From some cause never explained, this design was abandoned, and the persecuted sect adopted the resolution of seeking redress by force. They assembled in large numbers and proclaimed their hatred of Hindooism by an ostentatious slaughter of cows, sprinkling the blood on the Hindoo temples, and committing other acts of the like character. In the first outbreak not only was a cow immolated, but a Brahmin wounded—a double source of scandal to the Hindoos. In a subsequent affray several of the holy order suffered from wounds, and one so severely as to cause his death. A European magistrate immediately repaired to the scene of riot with a detachment of local troops, in the hope that his presence thus supported would restore order ; but he was disappointed. His authority was defied, his troops resisted and beaten off, several of them killed, others dangerously wounded, and it was not without difficulty that the magistrate escaped unharmed. The magistrate of an adjoining district, on hearing of the disturbances, advanced with such force as he could command, to aid the cause of peace. On learning the result of his brother-magistrate's attempt, he determined to wait till he could form a junction with him ; but this intention was frustrated by false information, which led him into the midst of the insurgents at a moment when no additional assistance could be obtained, and when his own party, alarmed by the prospect before them, were gradually deserting him. Finding it hopeless to contend, he retired, but not without loss, several of his party being killed. He immediately

applied to the commanding officer at Barrackpore for a force to protect the country, and a regiment was despatched for the purpose without delay. Previously to this, the authorities at Calcutta, on learning the state of affairs, had directed the march from that place of a regiment with two guns and a small party of cavalry. Though miserably armed—clubs in many instances supplying the place of more formidable weapons—the insurgents drew up in position for resistance, and received the troops with shouts of defiance; but a few discharges from the guns shook their confidence, and they took refuge in a bamboo stockade which they had erected. Thither they were pursued, and it is scarcely necessary to add, that their defeat and dispersion were almost immediate. About fifty were killed, and three hundred and fifty made prisoners. Thus terminated the affair, in November, 1831.

The disturbances were restricted to Baraset: their occurrence was accidental—they were speedily suppressed, and after their suppression the country returned at once to its former state of quietness. Except for the instruction afforded by such events, the outbreak would have no claim to notice in a general history of the British empire in India. But no opportunity for recalling attention to the situation of the British government in that country should be lost, and the disturbances in Baraset afford one. Two sets of Mahometans engage in disputes on the comparative soundness and purity of their belief and practice. Some disciples of another creed, possessing local influence and authority, exercise an offensive and, as it should seem, an illegal interference. An affray takes place, the consequences of which are a general rising of one set of the Mahometan disputants, a general disruption of the public peace, and the loss of many lives. Such events are not of frequent occurrence in India, but the elements out of which they may arise are always in a state of preparation. The majority of the people are, as to religion, divided into two great parties, each subdivided into smaller sections, the members of which, differing widely in many respects, agree in clinging each to his favourite opinions in a spirit of the blindest and most devoted bigotry. With one of the great divisions, intolerance is a part of their creed, and the slightest cause of excitement may, without a moment's notice, give rise to an ebullition of wild and murderous fanaticism. The danger is increased by the necessity which exists for vesting at least some degree of authority in native hands, where it is almost certain to be exceeded and abused. The duty of a European and Christian government, under such circumstances, is difficult, but it is obvious. Such a government, while cautiously abstaining from giving approval or encouragement to any form of false religion, should not only maintain and administer even-handed justice among all its subjects, whatever their creed, but it should be careful to make it

apparent that such is the fact. It should enter into no disputes between rival parties, nor between rival sections of parties; but it should compel all to respect the rights of their fellow-subjects and the peace of society.

It will be recollected that in the treaty with Siam, concluded under Lord Amherst's government, the possession of Queda was secured to the Siamese. This country, situate on the western coast of Malacca, belonged at a former period to a prince with whom the British government had formed repeated engagements. In the year 1786, Captain Light, the master of a country ship, received from the king of Queda, the island of Pulo Penang (since called Prince of Wales Island), as a marriage portion with the sovereign's daughter. Captain Light transferred it to the East-India Company, by whom he was appointed governor, and an arrangement was concluded with the king of Queda for the payment to that prince of six thousand dollars annually, to compensate for the loss of revenue which he was likely to sustain. In 1800 a cession of territory on the main land was made to the Company. This acquired the name of Province Wellesley, and in consideration of its surrender the payment to the king of Queda was raised to ten thousand dollars. In 1821 the remaining territories of the king of Queda were invaded by the Siamese, and quickly subdued, the prince thereupon taking refuge in Prince of Wales Island. He subsequently removed to Province Wellesley, where his presence was inconvenient, with reference to some of the provisions of the treaty with Siam. With considerable difficulty he was prevailed upon to return to Prince of Wales Island, but the views by which the British authorities were influenced in effecting this change are far from clear. The residence of the king of Queda in Province Wellesley might be dangerous to the peaceable possession by the Siamese of the country which they had wrested from that sovereign; and the British government having undertaken by treaty that the usurped territories should be secured to the invaders, it was important to guard against this source of danger. The policy and the justice of the stipulation by which the English had agreed to give away the dominions of a prince with whom they had for forty years maintained relations of peace and friendship are alike questionable; but, having bound themselves to the cause of the Siamese, it might be expected that they should be anxious to maintain their engagement. The removal of the king to Prince of Wales Island, however, was a step not in fulfilment of the treaty, but in continued contravention of it; for it was expressly provided in the treaty that the sovereign of Queda should "go and live in some other country, and not at Prince of Wales Island, or Frye (Province Wellesley), or in Perak, Salangore, or any other Burman country." The article continued thus:—"If the English do not let the former governor of

Queda go and live in some other country, as here engaged, the Siamese may continue to levy an export duty upon paddy and rice at Queda." The residence of the exiled king at Prince of Wales Island was consequently not less inconsistent with the intention of the treaty than his residence in Province Wellesley. By his residence at either place, the Siamese became entitled to levy certain duties, and those who were so anxious to remove the king of Queda from Province Wellesley, while they were willing to permit his residing at Prince of Wales Island, must, it is to be presumed, have acted under a conviction, that if the English were willing to pay the penalty authorized by the treaty for non-compliance with the provision relating to the residence of the king, the other contracting party had no ground of complaint. The governor-general expressed an opinion that the banished prince had been rather hardly dealt with. This impression was creditable to his lordship's good feelings, and, from the circumstances of the case, it is not unlikely that others shared in it. The relations so long subsisting between the English and the king of Queda might not require that the former should draw the sword in defence of the dominions of the king; but it was scarcely consistent with good faith, that the English should enter into a treaty which secured to his enemies the fruits of successful usurpation.

It had been feared, as naturally it might, that some attempt would be made to restore the king to the dominions from which he had been expelled. But though such an attempt was not unlooked for, and though it was viewed with apprehension, as likely to impair the stability of the existing relations with the Siamese, it was believed, and indeed asserted, that it could not be attended with any serious danger to the existing government of Queda.

The attempt was at last made, and at a moment when apparently it was not at all expected, though the preparations for it were made within the British territories. On the 6th of April, 1831, the Siamese were expelled from the capital of Queda by a force embarked on board a flotilla, consisting of thirty-five or forty small boats. The number of men engaged in the enterprise was supposed to be between three and four hundred; they were under the command of a person named Tuanko Kudir, a known pirate, but highly connected, being son of the king of Queda's sister. Some Siamese boats were cruising off the place, but on the approach of the invaders their crews abandoned them, and with exemplary promptitude sought to provide for their own safety. The fort was garrisoned by about two hundred men, who, as the flotilla advanced, manifested their zeal by the discharge of a few shot, not one of which took effect. The assailants were more successful as well as more daring. They rushed to the attack with considerable spirit, and having contrived to set fire to the

buildings within the fort, carried the place by escalade in the midst of the smoke and confusion thereby occasioned.

Had the Siamese been of warlike temperament, this movement would have been well calculated to embroil them with the English. The expedition was partly fitted out from a British port, the stores were purchased in the bazaars of a British settlement, and some of the boats employed had British passes. Many of those engaged in the expedition were British subjects, and a few who had belonged to a disbanded local corps were attired in the Company's uniform. Some European merchants, it appeared, were aware of the preparations, though not, it was believed, of the destination of the expedition; but the government were without suspicion. In extenuation of this apparent absence of vigilance, the following reasons were adduced by the chief resident authority:—that the preparations, though somewhat extensive, were carried on with great secrecy; that the whole native community were favourable to a movement against the Siamese, whose cruelty and oppression had excited universal hatred, the feelings of the Mahometan part of the population being further inflamed by religious animosity; that some parties in Province Wellesley, on whom reliance was placed for information, were in league with those engaged in the movement and had joined them; that the island police were weak, ill-paid, and, like the rest of their countrymen, favourably disposed to hostile proceedings against the Siamese; and that the British government had neither guard-boats nor establishments of any kind for keeping watch in the harbour and examining native craft. These reasons may be admitted to account for the oversight, but perhaps they can scarcely be allowed to excuse it—more especially as the attack on Queda was not the first movement of the same description. A like attempt had been made some time before and had failed.

Some discussion took place as to the precise degree in which the exiled king was implicated in the attack on Queda. His desire to protract his residence in Province Wellesley originated, there is little doubt, in the hope of there finding the means of regaining his dominions. His pertinacity on this point had led to disputes with the British government, and payment of any portion of the allowances to which by treaty he was entitled had been for a time suspended. On his removal to Prince of Wales Island partial payment of his stipend was resumed, although, as has been pointed out, his residence in that island was not less at variance with the treaty with Siam than his residence in Province Wellesley. To what extent, however, he participated in the movement against Queda is a matter of no importance in any respect. He had been violently and unjustly expelled from his possessions; he had never, by any act, consented to the alienation, or confirmed it; and the

English had no better right to give away his dominions than the Siamese had to take them. Situated as was the king of Queda, his attempting to recover his power and territories involved no culpability, and could excite no surprise. He might thereby, indeed, occasion some embarrassment to the government from which he derived his only revenue, but that revenue was given in payment for a valuable consideration bestowed by the king while in possession of his throne, and which the English still retained. In asserting his rights against the Siamese, he was guilty of no breach of faith with regard to his British protectors. He was no party to the treaty by which they had acknowledged the claim of the Siamese to Queda, and he was not accountable for any inconvenience that might in consequence arise to them. Inconvenience had arisen, and the English, to escape it, now insisted upon the removal of the king to Malacca, a measure often pressed before, but always strenuously resisted by the king. But resistance at this period was hopeless. The king understood that, should he refuse compliance, his removal would be effected by force, and he therefore yielded the consent which it was no longer in his power to withhold.

Further to conciliate the Siamese government, and to atone for apparent disregard to the obligations of the treaty, it was deemed advisable by the British resident at Singapore to aid the recapture of Queda by blockading the mouth of the river. This proceeding was disapproved by the government of Bengal, who issued instructions discouraging any attempt, on the part of the British authorities in the straits, to mix themselves up in any operations of a hostile character either by land or sea. These instructions arrived too late to have any effect, for when they were received, the Siamese, aided by the blockading force employed by the English, had already repossessed themselves of Queda. The narrative of these proceedings cannot be more properly closed than by quoting the just observations made from home on the subject:—"The case was unquestionably one of conflicting obligations; but it is much to be regretted that, by our own default, we should have been placed in a position from which we could not extricate ourselves but by giving our assistance to replace the Malays of Queda under the yoke of a government which, from all that we learn, appears to be most deservedly odious to them."

Queda was not the only source of disquiet to the British government in the straits. The English, on obtaining the transfer of Malacca, seem not to have been minutely informed of the relation in which they stood towards the petty native principalities. Nanning, one of them, soon afforded occasion for dispute. It was regarded by the newly-established European authorities as an integral part of the territory of Malacca, and they believed that the British government possessed sove-

reign power over it. The chieftain of Nanning, called the Pangholoo, appears to have taken a different view, and to have regarded himself as an independent prince, the equal and not the vassal of the power which claimed to be his superior. The British government asserted its pretensions by claiming authority in Nanning for its courts of judicature, and by demanding a portion of the revenue of the country as tribute. These demands were resisted, and it was deemed necessary to support them by the despatch of a company of sepoy, whose presence it was not doubted would speedily bring the offending Pangholoo to submission. This expectation turned out to be erroneous. The officer in command of the party of sepoy found his progress obstructed by trees placed across the road, the intervals being studded with spikes. These difficulties being surmounted, the party attacked a stockade, which they carried, but the success was attended by the loss of an officer and several men. The return of the detachment to Malacca was effected with considerable difficulty, and by a route different to that by which they had advanced. Reinforcements being obtained, the Pangholoo was subdued and tranquillity restored. The relations subsisting between the Dutch government and the native princes, by which the respective positions of those princes towards the British government were necessarily governed, seem to have been but imperfectly understood, and probably they had never been defined with much accuracy.

While the settlements in the straits were thus agitated, the interior of the territories subject to the government of Bengal was not free from disturbances. They commenced in Chota Nagpore, a seminary forming part of the Ramgarh district, and which, with its subordinate pergunnahs, comprised an area of about ninety-five miles in length and eighty in breadth. The movement began in January, 1832, at the south-eastern extremity, whence it extended rapidly to the northward, till the whole of Chota Nagpore proper and the adjacent pergunnah of Palamow were in a state of insurrection; or it may rather be said, that violence and pillage were universal and indiscriminate. The state of the whole country, indeed, is depicted in the following brief but striking description of one part of it, by Mr. Neave, a commissioner employed therein. "Of Torree," said he, "I am at a loss to give any account, save that it is in a state of complete disorganization, to redeem it from which I can scarcely offer any plan." To illustrate the condition of the pergunnah, the commissioner then proceeded to state that, with the exception of a few large landholders, it was the practice, of all persons within it to beat and rob, if practicable, all other persons that might fall in their way, and that nothing but superiority of physical force could insure safety. "The system," said he, appears to be universal; the villages are fired,

the roads are blocked up, and all passers are plundered."

The government, on learning the state of the district, had been prompt in despatching a military force for the restoration of order; but the amount was insufficient. In some cases, where tranquillity had been apparently restored, the departure of the military was immediately followed by a renewal of disturbances. On one occasion a squadron of cavalry, encountering a body of six or seven thousand of the rioters, was compelled to retire with some small loss. A detailed account of the measures pursued for the re-establishment of order would possess no interest, as in their prosecution they were marked by nothing to distinguish them from the ordinary course of such proceedings. It will be enough to say that they succeeded, and the disturbances themselves would scarcely deserve notice, were it not that they afford additional evidence of the constant tendency of the wilder portion of the subjects of the British government in India to break loose from the restraints of law and order, and to return to a state where the hand of every man is against his neighbour.

The series of events next to be narrated will afford no unapt illustration of the ordinary blessings of native rule. Coorg was a small principality on the confines of Mysore, which the ambitious rulers of the latter state, Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan, had for a time held in subjection. The romantic character of the prince who held the raj of Coorg during the war carried on by Lord Cornwallis with Tippoo Sahib, his imprisonment in Mysore, his escape and subsequent activity in asserting his own claims and aiding the cause of the British government, have been already noticed. His son and successor was a person of widely different character. Late in the year 1832, the sister of the rajah, named Dewah Amajee, with her husband, Chinna Buswa, fled from Coorg into Mysore and claimed the protection of the British resident, Mr. Cassamajor, from the violence of their relative. The prince entertained a criminal passion for his sister, whose resistance he had threatened to visit with death. The fugitives received from the British government the protection which they sought. In the mean time the rajah, it was ascertained, had taken measures for increasing his military strength, the object of which proceeding was involved in doubt. It was currently rumoured that his intention was to invade Mysore. The British resident, however, was of opinion that the views of the rajah were purely defensive, and that he was acting under the apprehension of being himself attacked by a British force. To obtain some definite information, and to calm the fears of the rajah, if any were entertained, Mr. Cassamajor was deputed to visit Coorg. The result was not very important. The British resident found the state of the country as bad as imagination could have pictured it, and he made some representations on the subject. These, as might

have been anticipated, were without effect. The rajah denied the existence of discontent, and repelled all suggestions for improvement. But he disclaimed any intention of offensive warfare, alleging that he had been led to apprehend an invasion of his own territories by the Company's forces, and ascribed to this cause the preparations which he had made for increasing the efficiency of his army. With regard to this last point, the British resident expressed a hope that his visit had not been unproductive of good in putting an end to the rajah's fears.

The resident was to have borne a letter to the rajah from the governor of Fort St. George, but it did not arrive until after his return. It was then transmitted by another person, and the rajah forwarded an answer filled with complaints against Mr. Cassamajor, and demanding the surrender of Chinna Buswa.

Mr. Cassamajor, who had for some time discountenanced the belief of the rajah's hostile intentions, had subsequently changed his opinion. In September, 1833, he recorded a minute, declaratory of his conviction that measures should be immediately taken to terminate the correspondence with the prince. Before this time the resident had expressed a wish to be relieved from the duty of carrying on communications with the rajah, and he now suggested that Mr. H. S. Graeme, resident at Nagpore, but temporarily sojourning for the benefit of his health at Bangalore, should undertake the task which he was anxious to relinquish. The suggestion was adopted, and Mr. Graeme appointed. The instructions transmitted to him were altogether of a pacific and conciliatory character. Some doubt was thrown upon the accuracy of the information forwarded to the government. The reports, it was said, which had been received from the resident, as well as from other British officers in Mysore, relating to the hostile preparations of the rajah, and to other points connected with the affairs of Coorg, had been so various and contradictory, as to lead the government to believe that much of the information afforded had been greatly exaggerated, if not entirely unfounded. A hope was expressed—a very desperate one it must have been—that by a cautious avoidance of subjects calculated to irritate the rajah, that prince would be made sensible of the impropriety of his recent behaviour, and would be induced to retract the offensive language towards the British resident in Mysore, in which he had indulged in his correspondence with that functionary. A letter, framed in a similar spirit, was addressed to the rajah. In this paper his alleged preparations were treated as entirely defensive—as arising from "fears entertained by his highness of some hostile measures on the part of the British government," and these fears he was urged to dismiss. To the Court of Directors the representations transmitted by the local government were of a character scarcely less favourable.

Their expectations soon experienced a shock. The rajah declined receiving a visit from Mr. Graeme under the pretence of illness. His reluctance was attributed to the dislike which he felt for Mr. Cassamajor, and to the belief which he was supposed to entertain that Mr. Graeme had been selected by the advice of that gentleman. Some attempts were made to remove the unfavourable impression of the rajah by complimentary and apologetic communications, but their only fruit was the expression of a wish on the part of the rajah to receive Mr. Graeme as soon as he should be sufficiently recovered, accompanied by the extraordinary intimation of a desire that the new agent of the British government should be accompanied by his predecessor, Mr. Cassamajor, who, it was understood, held no favourable place in the rajah's opinion. No time, however, was appointed for the desired meeting, and Mr. Graeme returned to Bangalore. Personal communication seemed hopeless, but its place was supplied by a voluminous correspondence which it would be at once tedious and useless minutely to pursue.

Mr. Graeme seems very soon to have regarded the success of his mission as hopeless, so far as his personal efforts were concerned, but he thought it probable that better fortune might await an attempt to negotiate through native agency. Two persons were accordingly selected, one a Parsee merchant of Tellicherry, named Davosah, the other named Hamagery Merion, in employment under the principal collector of Malabar. These proceeded to Coorg under the presumed protection of passports furnished by Mr. Graeme. Ere long, however, fears were entertained for the safety of the native diplomatists, and it was deemed necessary formally to warn the rajah of the consequences of any act of violence exercised towards them. Davosah was then permitted to return to his ordinary place of abode: his colleague, less fortunate, was forcibly detained at Coorg. Mr. Graeme remonstrated. The rajah persisted in detaining Hamagery Merion till the conclusion of an inquiry into certain charges of intrigue said to have been made against him, an act which he defended by reference to the case of the fugitives from Coorg, who had been stationed in the British dominions. This specimen of reasoning is by no means calculated to give a high opinion of the rajah's logical powers. Because certain powers from Coorg are permitted, at their own express desire, to reside within the British territory, he argued that he was justified in detaining in Coorg an accredited agent of the British government, in opposition to his own wishes and in violation of the dignity of the state which he represented.

The rajah was again addressed; again reminded of the probable consequences of the course which he was pursuing, and a period was peremptorily fixed for the release of Hamagery Merion. Soon afterwards the governor-general arrived at Madras, his lord-

ship having previously addressed a letter from Calcutta to the rajah intimating an intention of proceeding to Mysore at an early period, and a hope of there meeting the prince, or some confidential agent, to consider the matters under discussion and adjust the existing differences. No answer being received to this letter, the governor-general, on arriving at Madras, despatched another, notifying his approach, and informing the rajah that at Bangalore he should expect a reply to his former communication. At that place, too, it was stated the governor-general expected to learn that the requisition of the British government for the release of its native agent had been complied with, in which event, and after explanation upon some other points, negotiations might be renewed, and it was hoped that the friendly relations formerly subsisting might be re-established. The period for releasing Hamagery Merion expired and that person was not released. The governor-general proceeded to Bangalore, but there the required answer to his letter did not meet him. It was now quite obvious, even to the most strenuous advocates of conciliation, that conciliation had been tried long enough; the most sanguine hopes of those who had relied on negotiation as an instrument for terminating the existing disputes were now at an end. Nothing short of infatuation could prolong the hope of avoiding war; and an appeal to weapons, better adapted than argument to operate on the brutal mind of the rajah, was resolved upon. Lieutenant Fraser had succeeded to the political duties previously performed by Mr. Graeme, who was about to proceed to Europe. The former officer accompanied the expedition against Coorg, and maintained communication with the vakeels of the rajah up to the moment when the authority of the prince was about to pass from him, and when it must have been evident to himself, and all beside, that he had no course but unconditional submission. Few words will suffice to relate the results of the expedition. On the 6th of April a column, under the command of Colonel Lindsay, entered Mercarah, the rajah's capital, where the British colours were forthwith hoisted, under a salute of twenty-four guns. Piles of firewood were found in various parts of the palace, apparently collected with the intention of destroying the building, but from some cause the execution of the purpose had not been attempted. On the 10th the rajah surrendered himself. His government was declared to be at an end, and the territories of Coorg permanently annexed to the British dominions.

The occupation of Coorg opened to the conquerors a vast body of evidence relating to the crimes of its former sovereign—evidence of numerous murders, some secret, some public, some the offspring of revenge, some the results of a barbarous policy. Women, not less than those of the sterner sex—children as well as adults, were numbered among the victims

of his cruelty. Of the royal house, not a single male, except the guilty rajah, survived. The chief agent of the prince in the work of murder, and as was believed, the prime instigator of many of his atrocities, was his dewan, and the close of this man's life was not unworthy of the career by which it was preceded. A reward being offered for his apprehension, he fled into a jungle a short distance from Mercarrah, upon one of the trees of which he was found hanging. Whether the dewan was his own executioner, or whether summary justice was inflicted by some other hand, cannot be certainly known, as the fact of his being discovered dead in the situation which has been described stands unillustrated by any explanatory evidence. But there is little reason to doubt that he added to the list of murders in which he had been concerned, either as principal or accessory, that of himself; and thus by the last act of despair avenged the numerous victims of his cruelty in the heart of the country which had been the theatre of his crimes. His profligate master was more fortunate. Relying, it may be presumed, on his royal privilege for earthly impunity, he did not brave the vengeance of Heaven by prematurely rushing upon its judgment. He found that indulgence which it is the practice of the British government to extend to the fallen, and though subjected, as he must have anticipated, to restraint, he was provided for in a manner befitting, not his character, but his rank. Had his lot been cast in times when native power was predominant, and had he fallen before that which for the time possessed the ascendancy, his fate would have been very different. That his life should have been spared would perhaps have been beyond reasonable hope; but had this boon been granted, he would most probably have been doomed to linger out the wretched remnant of his days in perpetual darkness. By the bounty of the British government he enjoyed not merely life, but all the means of rendering life agreeable. How far such excessive liberality is advisable or expedient it is not so easy to determine. It is at least worthy of remark that the government has not always shown itself equally munificent to those who were far more deserving of consideration than the deposed rajah of Coorg.

In removing such a monster from the throne which he disgraced, the British government conferred a valuable boon upon the unhappy people who had suffered under his misrule; and he must entertain a very extravagant view of the rights of princes who can regard the act of removal as needing any lengthened justification. The annexation of the conquered territory to the British dominions is not, on the first view, so clearly justifiable, but a very few words of explanation will show that, in this instance also, the right course was taken. The rajah was childless, and he had taken effectual measures to cut off all pretensions to the succession not derived from himself. The

vacant throne was without a claimant, and the power which had occupied the country was called upon to provide in some manner for the administration of the government. A stranger might have been placed on the musnud; but there was no reason for the exercise of such self-denial on the part of the British government, more especially as the people manifested a strong desire to become British subjects. The existence of such a desire removed every pretence for hesitation, since it was indisputable that the change which they wished was for their own advantage, and that no rightful claim stood in the way of its accomplishment.

The administration of Lord William Bentinck was not fertile in great or interesting events. Those occurrences which have been selected for relation will not bear comparison, in point of importance, with the events of previous years; and for posterity, the period during which Lord William Bentinck held the chief place in the Indian government will have few attractions. Nothing which it is consistent with the character of history to notice remains for report or observation, but the diplomatic arrangements concluded under his lordship's rule, and the internal changes effected by him. The former were neither numerous nor important. The treaty rendered necessary by the refractory conduct of the rajah of Colapore received its ratification from Lord William Bentinck. In Scinde a treaty was concluded with the rajah of Khyrpoor, by Colonel Pottinger, principally with a view to the navigation of the Indus. With Hyderabad, in Scinde, arrangements having the same object were concluded by the same officer.

Oude was, during Lord William Bentinck's administration, as at most other times, a source of apprehension and difficulty. To such a height had misgovernment arrived, as to overcome the reluctance of the home authorities to interfere in the affairs of native states; and the government of Bengal was authorized to assume for a time the management of the affairs of Oude. Lord William Bentinck, however, abstained from exercising his authority, an act perfectly in accordance with the general character of his administration.

Turning to matters of internal arrangement, it becomes necessary to advert to the measures for the retrenchment of expense, which may be regarded as the most peculiar, if not the most striking features of the policy which marked the period under review. At the time when Lord William Bentinck proceeded to India various causes combined to impose on the Indian government the observance of all practicable frugality.

Great expenses had been incurred, and the usual consequence had followed, that much difficulty was found in meeting them. Under a sense of this difficulty new measures of retrenchment were thought to be demanded,

while others prescribed long before, but never carried into effect, were revived and ordered to be adopted. Among them was the diminution, in certain cases, of extra allowances long enjoyed by the military at distant stations under the name of batta.

The mode in which these allowances were regulated had varied considerably down to the year 1796, when a uniform system was established, under which officers in garrison or cantonments were to receive what was termed half-batta, with quarters or house-rent; in the field they were to receive full batta; and in the vizier's dominions, in addition to full-batta, a further allowance of equal amount, thus giving to the officers stationed there an advantage equal to that which they appear to have previously enjoyed under the name of double batta. Orders had been given from home for the abolition of double batta; but when the arrangement by which it was in fact retained under another name was reported, the Court of Directors, though expressing some disappointment, did not think fit to disturb that which had been done.

The answer of the Court of Directors to the despatch communicating the adoption of the above regulations was dated in 1798. In 1801 the court, however, ordered the discontinuance of the extra allowance to officers serving in the vizier's dominions. The subject had in the mean time, attracted the attention of the government of Bengal. It was understood that the expense of residing in Oude, the ground on which the allowance was granted, had been greatly exaggerated by report, and it was believed that the effect of maintaining the privilege was to make every officer anxious to go to Oude and unwilling to return. The regiments stationed elsewhere, it was alleged, lost their best commanding officers, who, from the desire of the government to gratify men whose merit entitled their wishes to attention, were transferred, at their own solicitations, sometimes pressed with great earnestness, to the vizier's dominions. Further it was represented, that as the extra allowance ceased on going into the field beyond the province of Oude, the grant of it operated as a check upon the natural and honourable desire of officers to be employed on active service. On these grounds, with little reference to financial considerations, but rather from a regard to the spirit, activity, and discipline of the army, the Bengal government had anticipated the orders of the court for abolishing the extra allowance. They at the same time made another change. Great expense had been incurred in erecting and repairing quarters for officers at certain half-batta stations. To guard against this for the future, the officers were to be required to provide themselves with quarters, and to compensate them for the loss, they were to receive, not the established allowance for house-rent, but full batta instead of half batta. This latter arrangement was adopted

without any communication with the home authorities; but, on being reported, it was approved. The two changes appear to have been considered by the government of Bengal as parts of a single plan. They were so reported to the Court of Directors, the following remark being introduced into the letter in which they were communicated:—"The loss of the vizier's allowances will be compensated to the aggregate body of the officers of the army by the grant which his excellency in council has made to them in certain cases of extra batta, in consideration of their providing themselves with quarters." This view of the question was not confined to the Bengal government; it appears to have been entertained by the army—a point important to be noticed, as it was at a future period the origin of much dissatisfaction.

No further change was either made or meditated till the year 1814. A general review of the state of the military establishments of India appears then to have taken place at home, and it was ordered that the allowance of full batta at those stations where half-batta and quarters had previously been granted should cease, and that, for the future, half-batta and house-rent should be substituted. A revised scale of allowance for house-rent was at the same time furnished, the effect of which was to increase the amount at Madras and Bombay, but to diminish it at Bengal.

These orders arrived in India while the government were engaged in the Nepaul war. The Pindarrie and Mahratta war followed, and for a time the authorities had far more important claims upon their attention than any arising out of disputable questions of allowances. When leisure was found for examining the subject, the Bengal government, instead of acting immediately upon the orders from home, deemed it proper to address to the Court of Directors a representation against their being carried into effect. The ground of their remonstrance was the alleged compact previously adverted to. The court, they represented, "could not have been aware that full batta in Bengal stands on the footing of a compromise, for which the government stands virtually pledged *in foro conscientia*, since the order for granting full batta to the whole was contemporaneous with that for withdrawing double batta from a part." In place of the immediate reduction ordered, the Bengal government suggested that it should be prospective—that it should apply to no officer then in the service, but only to cadets who might thereafter enter it. The court rejected the suggestion, and severely censured the conduct of the Bengal government in making it, on the ground that such a proceeding tended to create expectations, which being ungratified, disappointment and dissatisfaction would ensue. Adhering to their former orders, they directed them to be carried into effect, but in a modified manner; the change was not to affect officers who at the time of the promulga-

tion of the orders might be serving at the stations to which they applied, nor to the officers who should be sent to those stations on the next succeeding relief.

These orders were transmitted in November, 1823. The marquis of Hastings had then quitted the government, but the prescribed retrenchment seems to have found no greater favour in the eyes of that nobleman's successor than in his. The local government still refrained from acting on them, and again transmitted an appeal against being required to enforce them. The ground they took was on one point the same with that on which the preceding government had made its stand—the presumed compact between the Company and its officers. But they added, that if saving were the object, the financial situation of the Company at that time did not call for such a mode of effecting it. The financial state of India, however, at the time when these statements came under consideration, was not such as to lend them much aid, and the feeling then prevalent in regard to the administration of Lord Amherst was calculated to prejudice rather than to advance the success of the attempt to shake the resolve of the home authorities. The instructions heretofore controverted by the local government under two successive chiefs were once more repeated, and it fell to the lot of Lord William Bentinck to enforce them, which he did by general orders, dated the 29th of November, 1823.

The publication of the general order produced, as was to be expected, great excitement in the army of Bengal. Numerous memorials complaining of the change effected by it were transmitted home; some of them, it is to be regretted, marked by an entire want of that calm and respectful tone which ought to characterize all communications addressed by those who serve to those entitled to their obedience, and the absence of which is an offence against good taste, not less than a breach of duty. Whether or not a more temperate course would have been attended with better success it is impossible to determine, but an offensive mode of prosecuting even a good cause is calculated to injure it, and it is not surprising that the remonstrances of the army on this occasion were without effect.

The half-batta reduction was but one of a series of retrenchments in which the governor-general engaged, and not a very important one. Lord William Bentinck had come to India as a reformer, and his zeal was quickened by repeated exhortations to economy from home. The civil service received the benefit of his lordship's regulating hand, and if the amount of savings which he was enabled to effect were small, his enemies cannot deny that the amount of change was considerable, or that the seeds of disorder were so liberally distributed as to insure an abundant harvest through many succeeding years.

It was not in financial affairs only that Lord William Bentinck was anxious to appear in

the character of a reformer. Under pretence of improving the character of the civil service and providing for the advancement of merit, he sought to establish a system of universal espionage, better suited to the bureau of the holy office of the Inquisition than to the closet of a statesman anxious to be regarded as the representative of all that was liberal. Every superior officer, court, and board, was required to make periodical reports on the character and conduct of every covenanted servant employed in a subordinate capacity. Like most of his lordship's projects, this plan met neither with approbation nor success, and it was soon abolished. Shortly before he quitted India, and when, consequently, it was certain that whatever inconvenience might follow, no portion of it would be encountered by his lordship, he by a general order abolished the use of corporal punishment in the native army. Whether such punishment can in all cases be dispensed with—and whether the power of inflicting it be not eminently calculated to avert the necessity for any punishment—these are questions of deep interest—questions which should never be discussed but in a spirit of grave and sincere anxiety to discover the truth. But, however they may be answered, the act of Lord William Bentinck must stand exposed to severe reprobation. He had no power to abolish the punishment with regard to one part of the troops serving in India, and the slightest reflection might have suggested to any mind but his own, the imprudence and inexpediency of abolishing it with regard to the remainder.

But for the indulgence of similar extravagance in a variety of ways, the administration of Lord William Bentinck would appear almost a blank, and were all record of it obliterated, posterity would scarcely observe the deficiency, while it is certain they would have little reason to regret it. Yet there is one act for which it deserves not only to be remembered, but to be held in eternal honour. By Lord William Bentinck an end was put to an atrocious system of murder which many of his predecessors had lamented, but which none had possessed the hardihood to suppress. If every other act of his government be covered by oblivion—and his lordship's reputation would thereby sustain no loss—let one, at least, be rescued from the fate of the remainder. When future inquirers are desirous of ascertaining at what period and under what circumstances the horrible practice of suttee, once so prevalent in India, ceased—when they seek to know to whom humanity is indebted for emancipating Hindoo widows from the necessity of destroying themselves by a death of torture on the funeral piles of their departed husbands, they will learn that it was Lord William Bentinck who afforded to the cause of truth and right this noble triumph. This recollection must not be permitted to perish—the honour of the British name forbids it. Murder is in British India no longer recog-

nized by law; and if in the dark recesses of superstition instances may yet occur, the British nation and the British government are cleansed from participation in the guilt.

The best and brightest of his deeds has been reserved to close the history of Lord William Bentinck's administration. It remains only to state that he quitted India in

May, 1835, having held the office of governor-general somewhat longer than the ordinary period; but having done less for the interest of India and for his own reputation than any who had occupied his place since the commencement of the nineteenth century, with the single exception of Sir George Barlow.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

EXPIRATION OF PRIVILEGES OF EAST-INDIA COMPANY—PETITIONS FOR FREE TRADE—HOSTILITY OF MR. HUSKISSON TO THE COMPANY—REPORT ON THE CHINA TRADE—CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION—PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT—EVIDENCE OF MR. MELVILL—DISCUSSIONS IN THE COURT OF DIRECTORS—RESOLUTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: ADOPTED BY THE LORDS—BILL FOUNDED ON THE RESOLUTIONS AND PASSED.

The exclusive privileges continued to the East-India Company by the Act of 1813 expired in 1834. During the intervening twenty years, the doctrines of free trade had been establishing themselves in every quarter: at the end of that period their reign was at its zenith. The servants of the Crown had unreservedly avowed a conviction of their abstract truth, and much had been done towards carrying them into practical effect. The protection heretofore afforded to various branches of trade and manufactures had in many instances been withdrawn; even the old navigation laws of England, which had been regarded as the foundation of its maritime strength, and which had commanded the approbation of Adam Smith himself, had fallen before the triumphant march of liberal opinions. The altered circumstances which followed the restoration of peace to Europe had increased the cry for new openings for commercial competition, and rendered it more general and more fierce. An attack of unwonted vigour upon the privileges which the East-India Company yet retained was, therefore, to be anticipated whenever those privileges should again come before parliament.

The usual period was not allowed to elapse before the note of preparation was sounded. In the year 1820 every interest in the country was suffering great distress. Free trade was, by its advocates, loudly vaunted as the only efficient remedy, and the marquis of Lansdowne, who took the lead upon the subject in the House of Lords, gave notice of a motion for a select committee to inquire into the foreign trade of the country, which motion, on the 26th of May, he brought forward. In the course of the speech with which his lordship introduced the motion, he adverted to that which had previously been a subject of popular animadversion and complaint—the facilities enjoyed by the Americans, in regard to the trade with China, in comparison with those of the merchants of Great Britain. The motion, being unopposed by the ministers, was carried, and the committee appointed.

On the 5th of June Mr. Baring, in the House of Commons, moved for the appointment of a committee on the same subject; and this motion also was carried, not only without opposition, but even without remark.

It falls not within the purpose of this work to dwell upon any of the various objects of inquiry to which the two committees directed their attention, excepting such as related to the trade of the East-India Company. The most important of these was the refusal to British merchants of the privileges already noticed as enjoyed by those of America. American ships were allowed to carry British manufactures from Great Britain to China, a privilege denied to British ships. With the manufactures thus carried from the shores of England, an American merchant might purchase the produce of China, and bring it from thence to any part of Europe excepting Great Britain. The right to trade between China and continental Europe was not indeed a privilege granted by the British government, for that government had no power to withhold it, but the interdiction of similar communication by British traders was its act; thus Englishmen were restrained from participating in a beneficial trade, and thus were its profits thrown exclusively into the hands of foreigners. The Americans had another advantage, in being enabled to carry on a profitable trade in furs between the north-western coast of America and China, in the practice of which the English were restricted. On these points, as well as with regard to increasing the facilities of trade in the eastern archipelago, and reducing the amount of tonnage requisite for obtaining a license for the trade with India, the two committees called for the opinion of several directors of the East-India Company. These opinions were decidedly opposed to any further concessions, and were stated by Mr. Charles Grant with great force and ingenuity.

Other witnesses, some of them merchants of great eminence, including Mr. George Lyall and Mr. Edward Ellice, of London, and Mr. John Gladstone, of Liverpool, offered testi-

mony of very different effect; and, after examining the evidence on both sides and weighing its value, many impartial inquirers will be led to the conclusion that, on this occasion, the East-India Company were somewhat unduly sensitive as to the probable effect of relaxation.

The reports of the two committees were, as must have been expected, favourable to a relaxation of the measures which the Company thought necessary for the protection of its privileges; but the existing compact was respected by the legislature, and no attempt was made to force a compliance with the suggested innovations. In the mean time the mercantile and manufacturing interests were gathering their strength for the fight which, at no very distant period, was to take place, and the issue of which was to determine the fate of the remaining privileges of the East-India Company.

Indistinct murmurings preceded the coming storm; and at length those anxious to participate in the restricted trade began to speak out. On the 12th of May, 1829, the House of Lords was enlightened by a petition from Manchester, presented by the marquis of Lansdowne. The petition, according to the statement of the noble marquis, prayed that the lords would take into their early consideration the expediency of opening the trade to the East Indies. It seems to have been forgotten that the trade was already open. The form of obtaining a license was required, and there was some limitation as to the ports to which ships were to proceed: such limitations, however, exist almost everywhere; and it must not be supposed that the petitioners sought unrestricted freedom of commerce. On the contrary, they modified their application for a consideration of the expediency of opening the trade to the East Indies, by adding, "and of imposing such limitations upon that trade as might be consistent with the commercial and manufacturing interests of this country." After some very general remarks in favour of the prayer of the petition, the marquis of Lansdowne said, "he was well aware that the most extravagant expectations had been raised. Those expectations had arisen out of the depressed circumstances of the country, which induced persons to look out anxiously for an opening in which to employ their capital. The petitioners stated that the opening of the trade to India would be calculated more than anything else to raise the manufactures and trade of this country to that prosperity from which they had fallen; and he was sure that under such circumstances, the petition would meet with their lordships' attentive consideration." Lord Calthorpe presented a similar petition from Birmingham. Lord Ellenborough, president of the Board of Commissioners, expressed his conviction of the great importance of the subject, but declined giving any intimation of the course which ministers intended to pursue.

On the same day the cry of free trade was raised in the House of Commons by Mr. Huskisson. When Mr. Canning thought fit to relinquish his seat for Liverpool, on the ground that the representation of a great commercial town was inconsistent with the duties of an adviser of the Crown, he surrendered the borough to Mr. Huskisson, who did not participate in the scruples of his chieftain. As the representative of Liverpool, Mr. Huskisson was, of course, the enemy of the East-India Company; and in presenting a petition praying for the abolition of such exclusive privileges as that body yet retained, he entered into a long and laboured statement, for the purpose of showing the great extension of trade which had taken place since the cessation of the Company's exclusive privileges with regard to India in 1813. It appeared, however, from a counter statement made by Mr. Astell, chairman of the Company, that the accuracy of the alleged facts with which Mr. Huskisson had been provided was by no means equal to the vivacity of the expectations which he had been instructed to profess. With regard to the comparative prices and qualities of tea, one of the points at issue, Mr. Huskisson subsequently declared that he knew nothing, except what had been told him, and what he learnt from price-currents. On another point, which related to the amount of tonnage employed in the India trade at different periods, Mr. Huskisson did not venture any explanation or defence.

On Thursday, the 14th of May, Mr. Whitmore submitted a motion for inquiry, which was negatived without a division: it furnished occasion, however, for a very long speech from the mover, and some shorter ones from other members. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Goulburn, thought the session too far advanced to admit of inquiry, and suggested its postponement until the next. Mr. Huskisson was for entering upon inquiry at once, as was also Mr. Hume. Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald and Mr. Robinson supported the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Wynne lamented the continuance of the China trade for so long a period in the hands of the Company. Mr. Baring took an intermediate view between the opinions that had been advanced by other speakers, and appeared to have equal doubts as to the advantages and disadvantages of any course. Sir Charles Forbes thought the union of sovereign and merchant in the Company disadvantageous; but added, that, objectionable and faulty as the Company's government might be, it was preferable to that of our colonial governments; and he congratulated the natives of India on being placed under the government of the Company instead of the Crown. With regard to the China trade, it was his opinion that the expectations formed of the advantages to be derived from opening it would be disappointed: that country was hermetically sealed against foreign commerce. The trade at Canton was

carried on by a monopoly; the whole empire was managed by monopolies. The Hong merchants fixed the prices of the commodities, and the markets of Canton had maintained such a uniformity of prices for twenty years that the article of cotton had seldom varied beyond eight or ten taels per pecul. Trade was interdicted at every other port in China; and it was within his own knowledge, that an enterprising individual had fitted out a vessel for the purpose of forcing a trade in other ports of the empire, who had not only been unable to effect his object, but had been obliged to purchase provisions by stealth and with hard dollars.

Mr. Astell afterwards addressed the House in a speech marked by great ability as well as by great moderation. Referring to the alleged increase of exports to India, he denied that it was by itself a proof of increased prosperity. To be satisfactory upon this point, the increased export should be accompanied by an increase of import from India. The Company had long been alive to the necessity of encouraging production in India. The article of cotton had received especial attention. But the maulins of India, once so famous, had been supplanted by the manufactures of Manchester and Glasgow. European articles, he said, were to be obtained at the presidencies as cheap as in England.

Mr. Warburton complained of the impediments thrown in the way of Europeans desirous of visiting India, at the same time that he complained of the want of sufficient protection for the natives against injuries inflicted by such persons. Against one part of the existing system for the government of India, he was singularly bitter. The constitution of the Board of Commissioners he thought highly objectionable. With respect to the persons who composed that board, no doubt they had the interests of our Indian possessions sincerely at heart; but how was it possible, he asked, that they could do any good when they held office only by the tenure of a day! The moment they had learned to do their duty they were removed to some other office, and new persons were introduced, just as ignorant of the state of India as their predecessors when they first became members of the Board. This subject, he declared, required the serious attention of the House.

Lord Ashley made some remarks in reply to part of Mr. Warburton's statements. He was followed by Mr. Brougham, whose speech was devoted principally to pointing out the difficulties of the subject. He wished the entire abolition of the Company's monopoly, and if the mercantile question only stood in the way, it could, he said, be easily dealt with: but the difficulty was, how the removal of this monopoly could be accomplished with perfect security to the other great interests that were concerned—with safety to the essential interests of the immense country governed by the Company, and with safety,

also, to its long-established government. When he said this, it would be at once conceived, that he did not wish to transfer that government to this country, because, though an anomaly, yet the government of India, as regarded the interests of the people and the maintenance of due and legal subordination, could not, he thought, be placed so safely in other hands, even if they lived to see the Company cease to be traders, and aspire only to be governors of a mighty empire. Taking into view everything connected with the subject, he thought it better to defer inquiry until an early period of the next session. A short reply from Mr. Whitmore closed the debate. The result has been already mentioned.

Early in the session of 1830 the question of the renewal of the privileges of the East-India Company was introduced in both houses by the government. In the House of Lords, on the 9th of February, Lord Ellenborough moved for a select committee "to inquire into the present state of the affairs of the East-India Company, and the trade between the East Indies, Great Britain and China." In his speech prefacing the motion, Lord Ellenborough adverted with some indignation to the fallacies and erroneous reports which, he observed, had been scattered through the country. Among these, he gave prominence to one assertion, most industriously propagated—that the territorial finances of India derived no benefit from the commercial funds or profits of the Company. So far from that being the case, it would, his lordship said, appear from the documents laid before parliament, that, during the course of the sixteen years that had elapsed since the modified renewal of the Company's privileges, the territorial finances of India had been aided, either directly or indirectly, by as large a sum from the Company's commercial profits as had been appropriated to the payment of dividends to the proprietors of East-India Stock. In other words, the Company had applied to the benefit of the people whom they governed, a portion equal to that enjoyed by themselves of the net profit derived from the exclusive trade against which so much interested clamour was raised. Lord Ellenborough, in other parts of his speech, alluded to the increased consumption of tea, and the reduction that had been effected in the price of that commodity; to economical reform, then an unceasing topic of discussion; to the substitution of native service for that of Europeans; and to the desire shown by the East-India Company to increase the commerce of India with England, as manifested by a large reduction of the duties imposed on the importation into the former country of the manufactures of the latter, as well as by a corresponding reduction in the duties on the export of indigo and cotton, articles of great importance to British manufacturers. The marquiss of Lansdowne signified his appro-

bation of the motion, and expatiated on the importance of the duty which the House was called upon to perform; after which the debate diverged into a discussion of a personal nature, which it is unnecessary to pursue. Lord Ellenborough's motion for the appointment of a committee was carried.

On the same day, in the House of Commons, Mr. Peel moved for the appointment of a select committee. Having stated his reasons for referring the whole subject to one committee, he proceeded to speak of the conduct of the East-India Company. Looking to the representations of which he was in possession, viewing the documents that were in his hands, he was bound to say, that any investigation into the conduct of that body would, he believed, tend to their credit. Contrasting the administration of the Company with that of any other colonial establishment that ever existed, he was convinced that their conduct had redounded greatly to their honour. On the commercial part of the question he refrained from giving any opinion, while on that which he admitted to be the most important of all, the welfare of the people of India, he urged the propriety of endeavouring, while keeping them under British rule, "to atone to them for the sufferings they endured, and the wrongs to which they were exposed in being reduced to that rule; and to afford them such advantages, and confer on them such benefits, as may in some degree console them for the loss of their independence."

After some remarks from Mr. Whitmore, Mr. Peel submitted a list of the proposed committee. Sir James Macdonald and Mr. Hume objected to the introduction of the names of two or three East-India directors, and General Gascoyne (member for Liverpool) took the same course, because one of the members named had written a pamphlet in favour of the East-India Company. The members, who were either led by their inclinations, or compelled by their position, to oppose the renewal of the Company's charter, seemed to think that no committee could be a fair one unless composed entirely of persons devoted to one side of the question into which they were to inquire.

This was noticed by Mr. Astell, who observed that he knew not why the defenders of the East-India Company were not to be heard in the house, or in the committee, as well as its professed opposers; nor why a gentleman who had been the public advocate of opinions hostile to the renewal of the Company's charter, and because he had presented petitions to the same effect, was on that ground to be appointed a member of the committee, while directors were to be excluded, because their leanings were presumed to be the other way.

These observations called up Mr. Huskisson, who maintained that there was a difference between the directors and persons who had not the same degree of interest in the concerns of the Company.

Mr. Baring, who followed Mr. Astell, balanced the advantages and disadvantages of admitting East-India directors to the committee, until it appeared almost impossible to determine in which direction the scale turned: on the whole, he seemed to conclude that it was preferable to have them. He thought the choice of the committee fair, but he said that he should go into the discussion with a strong impression that the task imposed upon them was beyond their power.

These views appeared to be adopted by Mr. Bright, who, however, claimed that for himself which he denied to the committee. He should reserve to himself, he said, the right of judging the question just as if no committee of inquiry had been instituted. Mr. P. Thomson, who followed, accused his predecessor in the debate of inconsistency, he having, in a former session, been loud in calling for a committee. After Mr. Huskisson had objected to so many county members being placed on the committee, and General Gascoyne had given notice of an intention (which he did not fulfil) to move an instruction to the committee to take into consideration the trade with China, and the propriety of removing impediments in the way of a free trade with India, the committee was finally agreed to.

The committees of the two houses entered, without delay, upon the duty for the discharge of which they had been appointed. The China trade was the first subject of inquiry, and the investigation was conducted, in the Commons committee more especially, with great and searching minuteness. Mr. Huskisson was one of the most active and diligent members. He was, as has been seen, a devoted partizan of one side of the great question in dispute, and the zeal which he brought to the service of the cause was on one occasion exhibited in a remarkable manner. The Company were by law precluded from putting up their tea for sale at any price which, upon the whole of the teas put up at any one sale, should exceed the prime cost, with the freight and charges of importation, together with lawful interest from the time of the arrival of such tea in Great Britain, and the common premium of insurance as a compensation for the sea risk incurred. In the course of the examination of one of the witnesses called before the committee, it appeared that losses upon the outward trade to China were considered by the Company as losses upon remittances made to China for the purchase of teas. This fact was eagerly seized upon by Mr. Huskisson, who contended that it was a violation of the law, and that the Company had thereby forfeited their charter. He was not content with expressing a mere opinion on the point; he gave notice of an intention to propose that the committee should make a special report, giving it the weight of their united authority. This notable plan of annihilating the hated privileges of the Company at a stroke was defeated by the clear and convincing state-

ments of a witness subsequently called—Mr. J. C. Melvill, auditor of the East-India Company's accounts. His explanation of the operations of the Company was, "that all the Company's arrangements and remittances to China were made with a view, solely and exclusively, to supplying their treasury at Canton with funds for the purchase of tea."

Another objection related to the charge made for interest in the Company's calculations. A doubt was expressed whether the Company ought, in fixing the price of tea, to charge interest previously to the arrival of the tea, interest from that period to the time of sale being allowed by Act of Parliament. This objection was met by pointing out that private merchants, in making similar calculations, would certainly include interest of money as part of the cost of an article, and that, if excluded in the case before the committee, the upset price of the tea would not be, as intended, the sum of the prime cost and charges, but that of the prime cost and charges exclusive of interest; the result being, that the public would have the use of the Company's capital for nothing. This result, as was justly remarked, could not be believed to have been within the intention of the legislature. It is not undeserving of observation, that in their calculation of interest the Company displayed a singular liberality. The charge for interest upon their outward consignments from England was for six months—the proceeds of these consignments, it appeared, were not realized for ten months. Again: they were entitled by Act of Parliament to charge interest upon the stock of tea in warehouse until the period of sale. They did not avail themselves of this permission to its full extent, their charge under this head being limited to eighteen months, while the average period that the tea remained in warehouse was twenty months.

In calculating exchanges, the Company had been accustomed to compute the value of fine silver at the old Mint standard of five shillings and twopence per ounce. This had become obsolete, gold having for some time been the only standard in Great Britain, and it was urged that by adhering to the old silver standard the Company had fallen into irregularity and error. It appeared that, upon an average of all the years from the renewal of the Company's term of the government of India and exclusive trade to China to the period of inquiry, there was only a small fractional difference between the value of the rupees at the market price and according to the old standard.

It is unnecessary to pursue further the captious and querulous objections raised by the enemies of the Company, and successfully disposed of by its witness, Mr. Melvill. It is sufficient to observe, that his evidence effectually silenced the assertion, that the Company had forfeited their charter by a systematic violation of the law, and the threats which were superadded to that assertion. It

was henceforth clear, that, whatever might be its fate for the future, the Company must enjoy its privileges for the remainder of the period secured by law, or be despoiled of them by a breach of national faith.

Portions of the evidence taken before the committee had been reported to the House from time to time. On the 8th of July the chairman presented a report on the China trade, eminently distinguished by clearness, completeness, and impartiality. It exhibited a lucid and comprehensive abstract of the evidence without any expression of opinion. A shorter report on matters unconnected with the China trade, and being no more than an introduction to a part of the evidence, was also presented. On this occasion Mr. Trant expressed a hope that, in the following session, the committee which might be appointed would especially consider Indian affairs with reference to the interests of the natives of India. General Gascoyne reiterated his former complaints as to the construction of the committee, and condemned the report as betraying a partiality to the East-India Company. The enemies of the Company in the House were obviously disappointed by the results of the inquiry. Mr. Stuart Wortley defended the report, and Mr. Ward, the chairman of the Committee, reminding the House that the report was only a summary of the evidence, stated that those members of the committee who were most opposed to the claims of the East-India Company expressed the highest opinion of its impartiality. He pithily added, that if the result of the evidence were favourable to the Company, it must be recollected that the committee had no power to constrain witnesses in their answers. Mr. John Stuart, a gentleman whose name was placed on the committee at the suggestion of Mr. Hume, added his testimony to the fairness of the report. The committee of the House of Lords reported in a manner less elaborate than the Commons committee, but with some admixture of opinion.

In October the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company were invited to an interview with the duke of Wellington, prime minister, and Lord Ellenborough, president of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. The duke of Wellington, in opening the business, suggested the probability of the Company being permitted to retain the government of India, but deprived of the monopoly of the China trade. The chairman, Mr. Astell, pointed out the financial difficulties which would arise from such a course; the advantages which resulted both to India and Great Britain from the continuance of the Company's trade with China and the necessity that the security of the Company's capital should be guaranteed in the event of any change. It was observed in reply, that the Company would have the security of their fixed property in India, and with regard to the assistance afforded to India from the

China trade, it was hoped that the reductions of Indian expenditure which had been and might hereafter be made, would bring the charges within the revenue; that if not, the deficit must be made good by loans or otherwise, as parliament might direct; but that, on the supposition of the revenues of India being no longer assisted by the profits of the China trade, it would be necessary to subject the expenditure to general and efficient control.

The communication of the king's ministers having been submitted to a committee of correspondence, a minute was recorded by that body, declaring that they could not recommend the Company to be a party to such an arrangement as that suggested by the minister of the Crown. It was remarked, that this was the first occasion, since the existence of the present system, on which a proposal had been submitted which, while it conferred no one advantage on the Company, put their commercial capital in hazard; leaving them without any security for the large sums which they had embarked in the government of India, except that which might be afforded by the property which they held in their own right, and which could not properly be taken from them. The advantage derived to India from the surplus profits of the China trade beyond ten-and-a-half per cent. (the amount to which the proprietors' dividends were limited) was pointed out, as well as the financial danger to be apprehended from the proposed change. These views, on being submitted at a later period to a Court of Directors, were approved and adopted by them.

Within a very short period of the interview which gave rise to the minute above mentioned, an important change in the king's councils took place. The administration, of which the duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel were the chief members, resigned, and a new one was formed under Earl Grey. It was composed of Whigs of various shades of liberality, with the intermixture of three or four members of the party of Mr. Canning. Among the latter was Mr. Charles Grant—subsequently Lord Glenelg—the new president of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India.

One topic of absorbing interest occupied the principal share of attention, both in the cabinet and in parliament; but in this place it is proper to advert only to such proceedings as were connected with the Company's tenure of government and exclusive trade. On the 4th of February, 1831, Mr. Grant moved the re-appointment of the committee of inquiry. Mr. Whitmore thereupon took occasion to express an opinion, that enough was already known to enable the House to take steps towards laying open the China trade. Mr. Hume concurred; while Mr. Outlar Fergusson and Mr. Astell dissented from the views of Mr. Whitmore. On the 15th of April, Mr. Grant moved that notice be given of

payment of the debt due by the public to the Company at the expiration of three years, preparatory to the cessation of its exclusive trade. On the 21st of April, on occasion of the marquis of Lansdowne presenting a petition to the House of Lords from Glasgow, praying for free trade to China, free trade to India, and permission freely to settle in India, Lord Ellenborough avowed, that it was the intention of the government of which he was a member to open the trade to China, and that, to enable them to effect that object, their efforts had been devoted to reducing the expenditure of India. This mode of supplying deficiency, vaguely hinted at in the communication made to the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company, by the duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough while in office, was now avowed by the latter nobleman; and by exhibiting a motive previously concealed, the declaration assists in explaining the intense anxiety which had for some years been displayed to reduce expenditure, not only in cases where it was excessive, but in all cases without exception.

A dissolution of parliament having taken place, it became necessary on the meeting of the new one to re-appoint the committee on East-India affairs, and a motion to that effect was made by Mr. C. Grant on the 28th of June. Mr. Whitmore complained that the directors of the Company had thrown impediments in the way of obtaining information. The charge was indignantly repelled by Mr. Astell, who maintained that the course pursued in the committee was strictly in accordance with the terms of its appointment. Mr. Outlar Fergusson averred that the directors had given every facility for inquiry by allowing access to their records, and charged Mr. Whitmore with having thrown everything into confusion by the method, or rather want of method, with which he had conducted his inquiries in the committee. Mr. C. Grant also vindicated the directors from the suspicion of throwing any obstruction in the way of the inquiries which the committee had considered it their duty to institute. Mr. Hume agreed in the observations of Mr. Astell, who, he said, had clearly stated that, till the Company petitioned, the matter was in the hands of government; and Mr. Hume thought government should suggest some mode of conducting the business. Sir John Malcolm recommended that the various subjects before the committee should be looked upon as forming parts of an entire system; and Sir Charles Forbes, after reproving some members of the former committee for non-attendance, said that he hoped the interests of the East-India Company would be duly attended to, as the country owed to that Company a debt of gratitude. Sir James Macdonald thought inconvenience arose from there being two parties in the committee strongly opposed to each other; and Mr. Robinson attributed the difficulty to members going into the committee

with pre-conceived opinions. The committee was re-appointed.

Mr. Whitmore, on the 20th July, presented a petition from certain British and native inhabitants of Calcutta, praying the abolition of the East-India Company's monopoly. This gave rise to some conversation, in which Mr. Cutlar Fergusson and Sir John Malcolm took part; but the result possessed little of interest, and nothing of novelty. The session closed without any further discussion of the subject, without any intimation of the intention of ministers, and without any result following from the evidence obtained by the committee, the tendency of which was decidedly in favour of a renewal of the Company's privileges.

Parliament again assembled on the 6th of December. On the 8th, Lord Ellenborough, in moving for certain returns connected with India, adverted to the omission of any notice of the subject in the king's speech, and inferred from thence that it was not the intention of ministers to bring the question before Parliament during that session. He disapproved of the postponement, expressed his belief that the Act of 1813 had been passed without proper consideration, and referred to an opinion to that effect, delivered by those who had since become the king's advisers. He thought the re-appointment of the committee indispensable; and, if not revived, said he would submit a motion on the subject. A full inquiry into the financial affairs of India, he thought, was called for, as upon that would depend the question whether the Company would be able to carry on the government without assistance from this country. Earl Grey admitted that ministers did not intend to bring on any measure on the subject of the East-India Company's charter during that session; pledged himself that ample time should be given for discussion, and intimated that he considered great part of the difficulty and responsibility attending the settlement of the question to have been obviated, by the extensive inquiries which had taken place through the committees of the two houses.

On the 27th of January, 1832, Mr. Charles Grant moved once more for the appointment of a committee. Mr. Courtney and Sir James Macdonald supported the motion. Mr. Goulburn wished to know, whether the committee were to report opinions, or only to collect evidence and put it in form. In reference to a suggestion of Mr. Grant, for dividing the committee into a number of sub-committees, Mr. Goulburn also inquired whether, if the suggestion were adopted, such sub-committees were to report to the House as to the particular topics of investigation submitted to them. Mr. Stuart Wortley also proposed a question as to the functions of the sub-committees. In answer, Mr. Grant said, the words of his resolution were the same as those used on a former occasion; that the precise duties of the sub-committees would be best regulated in the committee, and that the

general committee only would report to the House.

The committee met, and in the course of their labour collected the largest mass of evidence on Indian affairs extant. On the 16th of August they reported to the House. Though not entirely free from the expression of opinion, the report is for the most part an abstract of portions of the evidence, with references to the minutes and appendices on which it is founded. The close of the session prevented any discussion in Parliament, and the usual repose of a vacation suspended all reference to the subject until the end of the year.

Among the subjects which had occupied the attention of the committee, the most important and most exciting was finance. The accounts of the Company were divided into two great branches, — territorial and commercial. The most desperate efforts were made to show that the commerce of the Company had been sustained at the expense of the territory—that the Company had no capital, and that the trade was a constant drain upon the revenue. On the other hand it was maintained, that the Company had capital to a very large amount, and that the profits of their trade had not only paid the dividends on its stock, but had afforded a large surplus for the benefit of the territory, a surplus which would have appeared much greater, had not the adjustment of accounts between territory and commerce been made at a rate of exchange injurious to the latter, and arbitrarily imposed by the Board of Commissioners in opposition to the representations of the Court of Directors, for no apparent purpose but that of concealing the obligation incurred by that branch of finance, in regard to which the Company was only a trustee, to that in which it was a principal, administering its own affairs. These accounts, inevitably attended with some degree of intricacy, were thus involved in a labyrinth of confusion, well suited to the views of those whose object was to misrepresent and distort. Here, again, the Company found an able advocate in Mr. Melvill, by whose lucid, masterly, and convincing evidence, the errors and misrepresentations of their adversaries were exposed, and the question, whether territory had gained at the expense of commerce, or commerce at the expense of territory, triumphantly settled. Notwithstanding this, however, the accounts, at the suggestion of one of the leading opponents of the Company, were submitted to a professional accountant, selected by the Board of Commissioners. This gentleman (Mr. Pennington), after seven months' investigation, reported, that in the fifteen years commencing 1814-15, when the separation of territory and commerce took place, in conformity with the provisions of an Act of Parliament, territory had gained from commerce, exclusive of interest, £3,507,423, by the use of the Board's rate of exchange in repaying the sums advanced by commerce to

territory; that the average annual profit of the India and China trade during that period was £1,009,047; and that from the management of private goods and other sources, £864,564; and that of the commercial profits during the fifteen years a sum of £4,923,021 had been directly applied to territorial purposes, to the liquidation of Indian debt, or in a manner that operated to prevent its increase.

In December, the chairman received a communication of the views of Government as to the conditions upon which the charter should be renewed; one of the most important among the proposed changes being, that the China monopoly should cease. The Company were to retain their political functions; but their assets, commercial and territorial, were to be assigned to the Crown, on behalf of the territorial government of India. In return, an annuity of £630,000 was to be granted, payable in England by half-yearly instalments, to be charged upon the territorial revenues of India exclusively, and to form part of the territorial debt of that country,—to be unredeemable for a limited period, after which it might be redeemed, at the option of parliament, by the payment of one hundred pounds for every five guineas of annuity. The new annuitants were to retain the character of a joint-stock company. Some changes were suggested in the arrangements for the education of civil servants, with a view to create competition. Every British subject was to have the right of proceeding to the principal seats of government in India without license; but the right of visiting the interior, or of residing there, and of acquiring and holding property, was to be subject to regulation and restraint by the local government. It was further proposed to add to the power of the Board of Commissioners, by the following modifications of the system previously in operation:—That the receipt of a final and conclusive order from the Board for the transmission to India of any despatch, should bind the Court to send such despatch by the first ship; that in case of the refusal of the Court to prepare a despatch when directed by the Board, or to send out one altered by the Board, the Board should have power to send it out themselves; that the power of the Court to recall a governor or commander of the forces should not be exercised without the veto of the Board; that the Board should exercise the same control over the grant of pensions and salaries below two hundred pounds per annum, and gratuities below six hundred pounds, which they had previously exercised over those of larger amounts; and that the home establishment and expenditure should be placed under the control of the Board.

A long and tedious correspondence ensued between the Court and the president of the Board which was submitted to a general court of the proprietors of the East-India Company on the 25th March. The Chairman, Mr. Ravenshaw, introduced the subject in a

speech, touching on the principal points in discussion, but abstaining from any decisive expression of opinion. The papers were then read; and this operation occupying five hours, the consideration of the subject was postponed till the 15th of April, after a motion for printing the correspondence had been made by the chairman and carried.

On the 15th of April the court again met, and the discussion of the question before it was protracted, by repeated adjournments, to seven days. After the reading of a dissent, recorded by Mr. Tucker, from certain parts of the letters addressed to the president of the Board by order of the Court of Directors, Sir John Malcolm moved a series of resolutions expressive of a disposition on the part of the Company to accept generally of the bargain proposed by the ministers of the Crown, but with certain modifications of the terms. The alterations suggested were, that the guarantee fund should be extended to such an amount as would, with the probable accumulations, be sufficient to redeem the annuity in forty years, and that it should be a security for the dividends as well as for the capital; that the Company should retain the government of India for a defined period, not less than twenty years, and if deprived of the government at or after the expiration of that term, should be allowed to demand the redemption of the annuity, retaining the liberty of resuming their undoubted right to trade; that all measures involving direct or contingent expenditure should originate with the Court of Directors, and a system of publicity be secured, applicable to important causes of difference between the Court and the Board; and that sufficient power should be retained over the commercial assets, to enable the Court of Directors to propose a plan for providing for outstanding commercial obligations, and for the claims of commercial officers and servants of the Company affected by the new arrangements. An amendment, reprobating the denial of the right of the Company to invest their own undeniable property in the public funds, in place of drawing £630,000 per annum from the revenues of India, was moved, but withdrawn, as were also one for excluding from the resolution the words requiring that the Company's government should be renewed for a prescribed period of not less than twenty years, and one to the effect that the Company should, for the purpose of remittance, continue to carry on the China trade in common with the public. Another amendment, for leaving the whole negotiation in the hands of the directors, and in the event of their not speedily obtaining a just compromise, directing that they should apply to the legislature, was then put and negatived. Another, proposed as a substitute for the original resolution, and the principal variation from which resolution consisted in an acknowledgment that the time had arrived for surrendering the exclusive trade with China, shared the same fate. This

was followed by a further motion for an amendment, expressing apprehension from the indiscriminate access of Europeans to India; denouncing the opening of the China trade as perilous; claiming for the proprietors the power of investing their own property for their own security, or a guarantee if this power were withheld; objecting to the annuity of £630,000 per annum being made a burden upon the people of India; anticipating for the Company a successful trade with China, though deprived of all exclusive privileges and of the government of India; in the event of the Company retaining that government, calling for undiminished authority for the Directors, and the right of submitting at all times any differences with the Board to the decision of parliament, and expressing sympathy with the commercial servants who would be deprived of employment. This amendment, too, was lost. Another amendment, proposing to leave out the words fixing the rate at which the annuity was to be redeemed, was also lost; as was another, proposing to exclude the words "exercising the same powers as they do under the statute," from that part of the original motion which referred to the continuance of the Company's authority for a defined period. An amendment, approving of the abolition of the exclusive China trade, but impugning the security offered for the annuity, followed, and this was lost. Another, suggesting the abolition of the Board of Commissioners, an increase of the powers of the Court of Proprietors, and the continuance to the Company, for a limited period, of the right to trade to China in common with the private trader, was moved and followed its predecessors. The question was then formally put on the original resolutions, which were carried, on a ballot, by a very large majority.

These resolutions being communicated to the president of the Board of Commissioners, were laid by him before the cabinet, and the result communicated to the Court. Ministers agreed to fix the amount of the guarantee fund at two millions, but refused to increase it beyond that sum; they agreed that the fund should form a security for the dividends as well as the principal, to the extent of raising money upon its credit if necessary—to fix at twenty years the renewed term of the Company's government, and to withdraw the suggestion that the Board should have a veto on the recall by the Court, of governors and military commanders in India—to give the proprietors the option of having their annuity paid off, on three years' notice, at the expiration of the term for which the Company were to continue to administer the government of India, or at any subsequent period when their government might terminate, and to confirm their right to resume trade, if they thought fit—to maintain the principle previously existing with regard to expenditure, excepting only in future that no expense should be incurred without the previous sanction of the Board; and they

offered no objection to the suggestion that sufficient power should be retained over the commercial assets to enable the Court to provide for outstanding obligations and for the claims of commercial officers and servants, reserving only the full power of the Board to act as might be thought fit; but they refused to sanction the establishment of any means of publicity in cases of difference between the Court and the Board, and intimated a belief that no practicable means could be devised.

The concessions made by the ministers were neither few nor unimportant; but the Court of Directors still thought it necessary to press two points claimed in the resolution of the general court, but refused by ministers. They urged, that when it had been proposed that the sum set apart for the guarantee fund should be about two millions, the term of the annuity had not been fixed, and that as forty years had since been determined on, the guarantee fund, with its accumulations, at the end of that term, ought to be equal to the amount of capital to be discharged. To act upon this suggestion required about three millions to be set apart for the commencement of the guarantee fund, instead of two millions. The other point, which the Court never ceased to press upon ministers whenever an opportunity occurred, was the necessity of publicity. By this, it was explained, they did not mean the establishment of any tribunal of appeal productive of delay and expense, but only an enactment requiring that whenever the Court should, after previous remonstrance, pass a resolution of protest against the orders or instructions of the Board, such resolutions should be laid before both Houses of parliament. This, it was contended, could have no prejudicial effect; it would interpose no difficulty to giving full effect to the final orders of the Board, inasmuch as the communication to parliament would not be made until after the orders had been despatched. On both points the answer of the minister was a peremptory refusal of compliance.

The decision of the government upon these questions having been laid before the Court of Directors, a resolution was proposed by the chairman, declining to recommend to the proprietors to consent to a departure from the required amount of guarantee, or to surrender their views on the importance of publicity. The resolution was lost, and another, expressing continued adherence to the views of the general court, but recommending compliance with those of ministers, was carried. From this, the chairman, Mr. Marjoribanks, and the deputy, Mr. Wigram, dissented. The result of the decision of the Court of Directors was a reference of the subject to a general court, which met on the 10th, when the views of the majority of the Court of Directors were adopted and confirmed.

On the 13th of June, Mr. Grant, in his place in parliament, moved for the House to resolve itself into a committee on Indian affairs.

On the question that the speaker do leave the chair, Sir George Staunton moved, by way of amendment, a string of resolutions relating to the China trade, which having been negatived without a division, the House went into committee. Mr. Grant's speech, introductory of the resolutions which he was about to propose, was extremely long, but most of the topics had been discussed until no fertility of invention could impart to them any novelty of illustration. He panegyricized the Company's government, contrasting it with the government of native princes in India, and with the government of the colonies of Great Britain and other European nations. One point in its favour, advanced by the president of the Board, was, that by the interposition of the Company between the government and the people of India, that country had been preserved from being agitated by those constant fluctuations of party and political feelings, which were so powerful here, and which would have opposed so formidable a barrier to improvement. Mr. Grant, however, objected to the union of trade with the East-India Company's government—a union which marred its efficacy; and this he thought was a generally-admitted principle until he found two members of that House taking a different view. He objected to it, not on the ground of theory merely, but of practical inconvenience. Another evil, he thought, in the existing system was the want of a proper check on the expenditure of the subordinate presidencies; and a further evil was found in too much interference from home. Adverting to the question of the continuance of the China monopoly, he said it was one on which the nation had made up its mind; but he admitted that, if as a minister of the Crown he felt that the decision of the nation was not founded in justice, it would not become him to come forward to propose a change in conformity with it. Having noticed the plans suggested for levying the duties on teas, and the intention that the Company should not suddenly discontinue its establishments for the fabrication of silk, Mr. Grant came to the financial arrangements by which the Company were to give up the whole of their privileges and property for an annuity secured on the territory of India. After some observations intended to show that India was capable of bearing this additional burden, he proceeded to notice the intended extension of the power of the governor-general over the subordinate presidencies—the change proposed to be made in the state of the law, by subjecting Europeans to the same jurisdiction with natives,—the removal of all disabilities for office on account of birth or religion,—the issuing of a law commission,—and the appointment of two suffragan bishops for Madras and Bombay. He then moved three resolutions, the effect of them being to approve of the opening of the China trade,—of the surrender of the property of the Company to the Crown on condition of receiving a stipulated

sum from the territorial revenues,—and of the continuance of India under the government of the Company.

Mr. Wynne approved of the opening of the China trade, but he wished some further changes in the mode of governing India. He required that the number of directors should be reduced to six or eight; that they should be nominated by the Crown, and that each of them should have been resident in India twelve years. He remembered, he said, that during the time he was officially connected with the Board of Control, out of seven gentlemen with whom he had successively to communicate as chairmen of the Court of Directors, four had never been in India. Mr. Wynne, however, seemed aware that serious objections lay against his plan of transferring to the Crown the entire government of India. He protested against any comparison between the government of India and the government of their colonies by European nations, because India was not a colony, but a mighty empire. Mr. Wynne thought many better ways of disposing of the patronage of India might be found than that of continuing it with the Directors; and he referred to Lord Grenville's plan, proposed in 1813, and then torn to pieces by Mr. Charles Grant, the younger. The absence of responsibility Mr. Wynne thought a great evil; and this arose from the Court of Directors and the Board of Commissioners acting together. After some remarks on the change contemplated in the relative positions of the government of India and the subordinate presidencies, Mr. Wynne concluded by saying that he disliked delay, but recommended that the subject should be suffered to stand over to the next session.

After some remarks from various speakers, Mr. James Silk Buckingham proceeded to attack the East-India Company, and all connected with it. Mr. Outlar Fergusson followed, and appealed to the comparative condition of the Company's territories and those of native princes, as evidence of the good government of the former. He testified, from personal knowledge, to the feeling entertained by the Indian government towards natives; and said, that if he were to point out a fault in this respect, it was that the leaning was towards the natives rather than towards Europeans. Mr. Fergusson defended the exercise of the patronage of the Company, as having been performed with a degree of good faith, honour, and integrity, never surpassed; and concluded with pointing out the difficulties of improving the state of the law in India. The discussion, if discussion it might be called, was cold, meagre, and purposeless. The resolutions were, of course, carried.

On the 17th of June they were carried up to the Lords, where some conversation took place on the propriety of laying before the House additional information. On the 28th, Mr. Grant, in the Commons, presented a bill, founded on the ministerial plan of compromise with the

East-India Company, which was read a first time.

The great outlines of the bargain between the government and the Company were now settled; but there remained many points connected with the administration of the government of India to be arranged. The most important of these were, the proposed separation of the north-western provinces from the Bengal presidency, for the purpose of forming a separate government; the determination of the powers of the governor-general in council; and the constitution and functions of the subordinate governments. The ministerial bill was framed to give effect to the first-mentioned object. It endowed the governor-general in council with the sole power of legislation, and deprived the subordinate governments of the power of creating any new office, or granting any salary, gratuity, or allowance, without the previous sanction of the chief government. The governor-general only was to have the assistance of a council. The administration of the affairs of each presidency was to be vested in a governor alone, unless the Court of Directors, with the approbation of the Board of Commissioners, should, in any particular case, determine to the contrary.

The council of the governor-general was to be increased by the addition of two members. During the progress of the bill through parliament, the number of additional councillors was reduced to one. The new councillor was not to be chosen from the servants of the Company, and his appointment by the Court of Directors was to be subject to the approbation of the Crown. While all legislative power was concentrated in the chief government, its extent was greatly increased by other provisions. The governor-general in council was empowered to legislate for all persons, whether British or native, and for all courts of justice, not excepting those established by royal charter. The formation of a uniform code of laws for India was contemplated, and with a view to this end, a law commission was to be organized and paid.

On the 5th of July, in the House of Lords, the marquis of Lansdowne moved the concurrence of their lordships in the resolutions sent up from the Commons. In introducing this motion, the noble marquis first addressed himself to the China trade. He affirmed, that the trade of the Company was a losing trade. In answer to the position that the character of the government of China is inconsistent with the admission of individual enterprise and private speculation, he asserted that the Chinese government, despotism as it is, could not oppose itself to the wishes, the feelings, and the interests of the Chinese people. He illustrated this by referring to the opium trade from India to China. To the mode in which the Company had exercised the administration of the government of India, his lordship did justice. After a variety of financial details, he adverted to the intention to render natives of India

universally admissible to office; to the state of the law in India, and the necessity of compiling a code; and to the more free admission of Europeans to India—on all which points he, of course, justified the course proposed to be taken in the ministerial measure.

Lord Ellenborough, who followed, after speaking to the financial part of the question, admitted that some compromise, similar to that submitted to the House, would have taken place under the administration with which he was connected; but, he said, it was not intended to restrain the Company from trading. He expressed an apprehension that the character of the constituent body, the proprietors of India stock, would be deteriorated by the contemplated changes, and contrasted the position of the Company with respect to India before and after those changes. "Hitherto," said his lordship, "they have derived their dividends from the profits of commerce. Those profits have relieved the revenues of India. Then they appeared as beneficent conquerors, deriving no other advantage from their conquest than what a generous system of commercial intercourse with the conquered realized; what will be their condition now? They will appear in the very undignified and not very popular character of mortgagees in possession, all their profits being derived from sums drawn from the Indian people." Other parts of the ministerial plan his lordship considered still more injurious. His hostility was especially directed against the proposal that Indian governors should be relieved from the restraint of councils, and that the supreme government should legislate for all India. In reference to the former he said, "When first a man comes to be acquainted with the workings of the Indian government, I admit that his first impression is, that it would be convenient that the governors should not be embarrassed by councillors. There is hardly a circumstance which would not at first sight induce him to pronounce that opinion. There is delay, embarrassment, and annoyance, in having a proposition discussed in council, in writing minutes, and going through all those operations in a small room which are gone through by the ministers here in the two Houses of parliament. It is, my lords, in truth, very inconvenient, but it makes the government of India a government of record; it makes the government here a judge of the propriety of those acts done in India; but more than that, it controls the passions of the governor—it requires from him reflection as a preliminary to action—it leads to that constant record of proceedings which again establishes a certain, and ultimate, and not distant responsibility: it is a true security against the abuse of absolute power. In taking the councils from the governors of India, you take from the people the best security for good government. I care not what theorists may advance—you may talk to 'persons acquainted with the philosophy of man and of government,' as one of the wit-

nesses before the House of Commons expresses himself; but you know not man, nor the nature of man, if you suppose that absolute power can be exercised beneficially for a people without placing that absolute power under responsibility, and requiring from it reflection before it acts. But you propose in this case to take away this responsibility and this necessity for reflection; nay, more than this—for what are the future powers of this governor to be? Will any respectable man take the office? He is to be deprived of the power of legislation!—of the power of expending a single shilling! And yet to this man, so degraded by your jealousy, you leave the whole executive power of the government, without that control with which the prudence and wisdom of former parliaments have surrounded it.” In reference to the proposal to place with the governor-general in council the sole power of legislation for India, his lordship asked, “Can they legislate for distant places as well as if they were on the spot? Is it possible for them to legislate for the whole of India, fixed as they will be at Calcutta, so satisfactorily as a council being in the country where the laws are to be applied? It is evident they cannot. Legislation will be much better performed, as it has been, by a local than by a distant government.” To profess to open all offices to natives Lord Ellenborough regarded as a “mockery.” “The very existence of our government in India,” said he, “depends upon the exclusion of the natives from military and political power in that country. They should be eligible to hold every office which could be held by them with safety to the state; but we are there in a position not of our own seeking, a position from which we cannot recede without producing bloodshed from one end of India to the other. We won our empire by the sword, and by the sword we must preserve it. It is the condition of our existence there; but consistently with that condition let us do everything to benefit the people and for them, although, at present, perhaps it is not possible to do much by the people. I confess, when I look at all the great achievements of our predecessors in that country—when I look at all they have done both in war and in peace—when I look at the glory which first dawned upon our opening career, and at the real benefits which successive great men and wise statesmen have conferred upon the natives of that great empire—I do contemplate with dismay this crude, undigested mass of ignorant theories, formed by persons who know nothing of India, and who *will* know nothing of India; who imagine that men possessing all the passions and all the prejudices which we ourselves possess, can be governed as if they were ciphers; and who place at the head of an absolute government, contrary to all experience, and contrary to the recorded wisdom of former governments, men possessing great and unlimited powers, but from whom reflection before action will not be hereafter required, and who will be placed in a

position from which all real, ultimate responsibility will be taken away, because the records of their actions and the reasons for them will be altogether lost.”

The earl of Ripon defended the ministerial bill, and, in answer to Lord Ellenborough's remarks upon the intended abolition of councils, said this part of the subject had been misapprehended.

The duke of Wellington spoke with much feeling and felicity of expression. He said:—“Having been so long a servant of the East-India Company, whose interests you are discussing—having served for so many years of my life in India—having had such opportunities of personally watching the operations of the government of that country, and having had reason to believe, both from what I saw at that time, and from what I have seen since, that the government of India was at that time one of the best and most purely administered governments that ever existed, and one which has provided most effectually for the happiness of the people over which it is placed, it is impossible that I should be present when a question of this description is discussed, without asking your lordships' attention for a very short time, while I deliver my opinion upon the plan which his majesty's ministers have brought forward. I will not follow the noble marquis who opened the debate into the consideration whether a chartered company be the best calculated, or not, to carry on the government or the trade of an empire like India; that is not the question to which I wish now to apply myself. But whenever I hear of such discussions as this, I recall to my memory what I have seen in that country. I recall to my memory the history of that country for the last fifty or sixty years. I remember its days of misfortune and its days of glory, and call to mind the situation in which it now stands. I remember that the government have conducted the affairs of—I will not pretend to say how many millions of people (they have been calculated at seventy, eighty, ninety, and even a hundred millions), but certainly of an immense population—a population returning an annual revenue of twenty millions sterling; and that, notwithstanding all the wars in which the empire has been engaged, its debt at this moment amounts only to forty millions; being not more than two years' revenue. I do not say that such a debt is desirable, but, at the same time, I do contend that it is a delusion on the people of this country to tell them that it is a body unfit for government, and unfit for trade, which has administered the affairs of India with so much success for so many years, and which is at length to be put down (for I can use no other term) upon the ground that it is an institution calculated for the purposes neither of government nor trade.” His grace then proceeded to condemn the ministerial arrangements, as being framed without regard to the situation of the company—without regard to the relation in which its trade stood, not only with the East-

Indies, and the finances and general interests of that country, but also with the interests of England, and of the metropolis in particular. He alluded especially to the misery and ruin which would arise to those deriving their subsistence from the commerce of the Company, declared his hostility to the proposed arrangements for the local governments, expressed his conviction that no influx of European capital into India would take place, and concluded by urging the necessity of upholding the power and influence of the Company. "Depend upon it, my lords," said his grace, "that upon the basis of their authority rests the good government of India."

Some dispute took place as to the intentions of ministers with respect to the continuance of councils at the subordinate presidencies. Lord Ellenborough had assumed that they were to be abolished. The marquis of Lansdowne, referring to the bill which had been prepared, affirmed that they were to be retained. Lord Ellenborough, in explanation, said that, unless the speech of the president of the Board of Commissioners had been strangely misrepresented in the ordinary vehicles of intelligence, he had declared it to be the intention of government to dispense with the subordinate councils. The marquis of Lansdowne, in answer, said that, without consulting the president of the Board, he would take upon himself to state that the report of his speech must be incorrect, as it had always been intended that the Court of Directors should have power to appoint members of council.

This statement, however, must have been made under misinformation. The intentions of government were not left to be ascertained from a speech in the House of Commons, whether correctly reported or not. The point at issue had been the subject of correspondence between the Board of Commissioners and the Court of Directors, the Court upholding the continuance of councils at the subordinate presidencies, the Board opposing it.

After a reply from the marquis of Lansdowne the resolutions were carried.

On the 10th of July the bill was read a second time in the House of Commons. Mr. Buckingham protested against the principle of the bill, and made a long speech in support of his views. Mr. Hume gave a qualified assent to the bill. Mr. Whitmore took objections to several parts of it. Mr. Macaulay defended both its principle and details. Mr. Wynne gave a synopsis of his formerly expressed views. Mr. O'Connell made some remarks on the landed tenures of India. Mr. Todd found fault with some of the provisions of the bill, while Mr. Robert Wallace expressed his belief that it gave universal satisfaction. Mr. Ewart said India wanted skill more than capital, and glanced at the salt and opium monopolies. Mr. Chas. Grant replied. On the whole, the debate produced little to elucidate the questions agitated, or to affect their decision.

On the 12th, after some preliminary discussion, the House went into committee on

the bill. Mr. Hume proposed that the tenure of the Company should be determinable at the expiration of ten years. Mr. Lyall urged the impossibility of supposing that the Company would suspend their right of trading for the sake of having their charter renewed for so short a term as ten years. The amendment was lost. Some discussion took place on the question of relinquishing or abolishing councils in the subordinate presidencies; on the controlling power of the governor-general; on the establishment of a new subordinate government at Agra; and other topics: in the course of which Mr. C. F. Russell recommended the removal of the seat of the supreme government from Calcutta to Bombay, a suggestion which was noticed with approbation by Sir Robert Inglis.

The proceedings of the committee were resumed on the 15th. After much discussion on the legislative powers proposed to be intrusted to the governor-general in council, Mr. Cutlar Fergusson moved an amendment, excepting the local limits of the settlements of Fort William, Madras, and Bombay from its operation, which was lost. On the 16th Mr. Fergusson moved another amendment, the effect of which was to withdraw any discretionary power as to the existence of councils at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and to make the continuance of councils imperative. The amendment was supported by Mr. Hume, Sir Robert Inglis, Mr. Wynne, Sir Harry Verney, Mr. Charles Marjoribanks, Colonel Evans, and Lord Ashley, and opposed by Mr. Charles Grant, Mr. Robert Grant, Mr. Charles Buller, and Mr. Strutt. It was lost on a division. An amendment, moved by Sir Harry Verney, appointing the governor-general governor of the whole province of Bengal, with two lieutenant-governors to carry on the duties of the administration, one residing at Agra and the other at Calcutta, was withdrawn. Mr. Buller proposed an amendment, excluding the governor-general from the governorship of any particular presidency, which was supported by Mr. Strutt and Mr. Hume, but lost on a division. On the 17th of July Mr. Hume moved that a clause declaring it unlawful for persons to reside in certain parts of India without license should be omitted. The amendment was lost by a large majority. A clause respecting slavery was added, on the motion of Mr. Charles Grant. A rather stormy discussion on the proposed establishment of two new bishoprics in India followed, and after two divisions, the motion that the chairman report progress was agreed to without opposition.

On the 19th the discussion of the subject was resumed. Mr. O'Connell pleaded for a Catholic establishment in addition to a Protestant one. Mr. Grant took a conciliatory tone, and proposed that Catholic priests should be paid. Mr. Wynne approved of this course. Mr. Shiel opposed the payment of any religious teachers. The Chancellor of the Ex-

chequer (Lord Althorp) said government were as willing to sanction other churches as the Church of England; and Mr. O'Connell declared himself satisfied. Sir Robert Inglis supported the establishment of the new bishoprics; Mr. Hume opposed it altogether. Mr. C. Buller took the same course; while Major Cumming Bruce, avowing himself to be a member of the Church of Scotland, entreated the ministers to persevere in carrying the clause, which he believed would give great satisfaction in the country. Mr. Finch, Sir Matthew White Ridley, Lord Morpeth, Sir John Maxwell, and Mr. Cutlar Fergusson having spoken in favour of the clause, and Mr. O'Dwyer, Mr. Ruthven, Mr. Halcumbe, and Mr. G. F. Young against it, a division took place, and the clause was carried. The various clauses relating to the allowances of the new bishops gave rise to some discussion, as did also the provisions relating to the education of civil servants at Haileybury, and the mode of selecting them. On the latter point Mr. Wynne took the opportunity of republishing the opinions which he had so often advanced, in favour of distributing writerships by competition among candidates in the universities and public schools. To the ministerial plan, by which candidates were to be nominated in a four-fold proportion to the number of appointments, and the requisite number selected for Haileybury from among them, Mr. Lyall took a very powerful objection, that it made the conduct of the boy, instead of the man, the rule of promotion. An amendment moved by Mr. Hume, reducing the salary of the governor-general, was lost, and an additional clause, moved by Colonel Leith Hay, making it imperative to retain at each presidency two clergymen of the Church of Scotland, which was opposed by Mr. Hume and Mr. Warburton, was carried on a division.

The report being brought up on the 22nd of July, Mr. Wilbraham (member for Cheshire) submitted a motion in favour of abolishing the salt monopoly, which was seconded by Mr. Ewart (member for Liverpool). Mr. Buckingham and Mr. Hume supported the views of those gentlemen. Mr. Grant and Mr. Cutlar Fergusson craved time for the termination of the monopoly. The motion was not pressed to a division. Mr. C. Buller moved an amendment, reducing the period of attendance at the college at Haileybury, which was withdrawn; and Mr. Hume renewed his motion for a clause to admit of putting an end to the Company's government after the expiration of ten years, which was lost.

On the 26th of July a general Court of Proprietors was held, and a petition to the House of Commons against the bill agreed upon. The petitioners complained of the want of any provision for reporting to parliament cases where the Board of Control and the Court of Directors might finally differ,—of the increase given to the power of the governor-general, and the diminution of that

of the subordinate governments,—of the institution of a fourth presidency for the north-western provinces,—of the proposal to withdraw councils from the government of Madras and Bombay,—of the increase of expense which would be occasioned by the creation of new offices,—and of the retention of the college at Haileybury. The petition was presented the same evening by Mr. Cutlar Fergusson, who moved that the petitioners be heard by counsel at the bar of the House on the third reading of the bill. The motion was seconded by Mr. Hume, supported by Mr. Wilkes, Mr. Buckingham, and Sir Richard Vivian; opposed by Mr. Robert Grant, Mr. Macaulay, and the Solicitor-general, and lost on a division by a hundred to thirty-three. It was objected, that the petitioners ought to have come sooner. To this Mr. Fergusson answered, that they had not the opportunity; that the Court of Proprietors could not be summoned without giving several days' notice, and that the Court of Directors had delayed calling them together, in expectation of receiving communications from the president of the Board of Commissioners, which, however, he had not thought fit to give.

This refusal of a hearing to the East-India Company, who were about to be deprived of privileges and power, the growth of centuries, was followed by a desultory debate, each member selecting for his topic any point of Indian policy on which it suited him to expatiate. Mr. Buckingham declaimed against the limited right of settlement, and the church establishment; Mr. Wynne gave utterance to his oft-repeated wish to reduce the number of directors; Mr. Poulett Thomson defended the burdensome and unequal duties imposed in this country on Indian productions. Several other members speculated on futurity; after which Mr. Grant made a short and very unnecessary reply, seeing that the fate of the bill was as certain as though it had become law. It was read a third time, when Mr. Wynne moved, by way of rider, a clause embodying one of his favourite views as to patronage, by setting aside a certain number of military appointments, to be bestowed on the sons of officers. The clause was negatived without a division. Mr. Shiel, who had previously contended that no form of Christianity should be supported in India, then moved a clause for extending support to the Roman Catholic Church "and others differing" from the established churches of England and Scotland; but, on a promise from Mr. Grant to add to a future clause a proviso, leaving the governor-general at liberty to grant sums of money to any sect or community of Christians, Mr. Shiel withdrew his clause. Sir Richard Vivian then proposed a clause restraining the governor-general in council from making laws affecting the inhabitants of the presidencies, without registration in the European courts. It was lost; when Mr. Cutlar Fergusson moved the omis-

sion of the clause vesting the governments of the presidencies in a governor, irrespective of a council. This motion was pressed to a division, and the retention of the clause carried. After various additions, which excited little or no discussion, Mr. Grant proposed his proviso (promised to Mr. Shiel), allowing the governor-general in council, with the sanction of the Court of Directors, to grant money to societies of Christians not belonging to either of the established churches of Great Britain. This was strenuously opposed by Mr. Andrew Johnstone, who said he felt bound to the course he was adopting, by a sense of his duty as an elder of the Church of Scotland. Mr. Sinclair, Mr. Pease, and Mr. Plumptre agreed in the objections of Mr. Johnstone; but, on a division, the proviso was adopted by a great majority. Mr. Wynne moved an amendment, the effect of which was to dispense with the necessity of candidates for writerships passing through Haileybury. Mr. Lyall took occasion to avow his conviction that the four-fold plan of nomination could never be brought into effect. Several members attacked the college: its solitary defender was Mr. Robert Grant, but the amendment was lost. The bill then passed the Commons. On the 29th of July it was read a first time in the Lords, and again on the 2nd of August *sub silentio*.

A general Court of Proprietors of the East-India Company had been held on the 31st of July, when a petition to the House of Lords, similar to that presented to the Commons, was agreed upon. This petition was presented on the 2nd of August by the earl of Shaftesbury, who proposed to move that the petitioners be heard by counsel, if not contrary to the sense of the House; but as some peers opposed this proceeding, and none supported it, the noble earl took for granted that his intended motion was contrary to the sense of the House, and abstained from making it. The marquis of Lansdowne then moved the committal of the bill without a single remark, alleging that, as Lord Ellenborough intended to move an amendment, he reserved his observations to a future period of the debate. Lord Ellenborough thereupon claimed a right of reply, if he should deem it necessary, which the marquis of Lansdowne instantly conceded. It was certainly a novel mode of proceeding, to allot the opening and reply in a discussion on a ministerial bill to a member of the opposition. Lord Ellenborough, to whose care a bill, brought in by his opponents, was thus suddenly surrendered, then moved, "that it be an instruction to the committee to omit all such clauses in the bill as relate to alterations in the constitution and powers of the governments of the several presidencies of India." The marquis of Lansdowne made some observations in defence of the ministerial measure. The duke of Wellington followed, arguing against the total discontinuance of trade by the Company, and pointing out some difficul-

ties in the proposed constitution of the governments of India. Lord Ellenborough's amendment was lost, and the House then went into committee on the bill. Various clauses were despatched with great rapidity. On the 7th of August the remaining clauses of the bill were proceeded through with equal celerity. Those relating to the government of the subordinate presidencies were omitted on the motion of the marquis of Lansdowne, and others substituted, enacting that each presidency should have a governor and council, but subjecting the appointment of a council to be revoked, suspended, or modified by the home authorities. On the 8th, the amendments were reported, and on the 9th, after some discussion on the claims of various classes of creditors whose interests might be affected, the report was taken into consideration. Some amendments of a financial character were moved and negatived; after which the marquis of Lansdowne moved that the fifth member of the council of India, who was to be a person not in the service of the East-India Company, should be excluded from sitting or voting, except when making laws or regulations, which was agreed to; as was also a modification of the clause respecting slavery, submitted by the same nobleman.

The fate of the bill and of the Company in connection with the government of India was now approaching to a crisis. A general court was summoned for the 13th of August by the chairman and deputy-chairman, at the request of the president of the Board of Commissioners. On the previous day a Court of Directors was held, when a motion was submitted (it is presumed from the chair), declining to recommend the acceptance of the bill by the proprietors, and referring the question altogether to the discretion of that body. An amendment was moved, which, while lamenting the cessation of the Company's trade,—disapproving of the increased power of the Board,—regretting the refusal of parliament to provide a rule of publicity,—and avowing apprehension as to the effects of the intended changes of the finances of India,—yet, in the conviction that the powers of the Board would be exercised so as not to interfere with the independence of the Company as a body acting intermediately between the king's government and the government of India, which independence all parties had admitted it to be of vital importance to maintain,—and in the belief that parliament would interfere for the relief of financial difficulties, if any should arise in consequence of the changes, agreed to recommend to the proprietors to consent to place their trade in abeyance, in order to undertake the exercise of the government of India for twenty years, under the conditions and arrangements of the bill. The amendment was carried, and the chairman and deputy (Mr. Marjoribanks and Mr. Wigram) immediately delivered in a dissent.

At the general court on the 18th various papers were read—the minutes of the Court of Directors held the previous day; the dissent of the chairman and deputy-chairman; a letter from Mr. Tucker, stating some objections to the bill, but recommending that, with all its defects, it should be accepted; a paper signed by Mr. Thornhill, concurring with Mr. Tucker, both in his objections and recommendation, and a letter signed by Mr. Astell and thirteen other directors. A motion was then made, similar in spirit to the amendment carried on the preceding day in the Court of Directors, disapproving the change but accepting the government of India under the bill. An amendment was submitted declining to accept the bill, and condemning its provisions, as well on financial grounds as on that of placing despotic power in the hands of the governor-general “over a hundred millions of British subjects, over every authority in India, not excepting his majesty’s courts of justice.” The amendment was lost. A ballot having been demanded on the main question, it took place on the 16th, when the original motion was carried by a considerable majority. On the same evening the bill was read a third time in the House of Lords, the marquis of Lansdowne positively refusing to enter into any discussion upon its merits. The formal motion that the bill do pass was postponed until the 19th, when it was made and carried without remark. The Lords’ amendments were concurred in by the Commons, and the bill received the royal assent.

The history of the East-India Company from its commencement has been extraordinary; and the suspension of its commerce, the sole purpose for which it was formed, is not the least extraordinary part of that history. There was some plausibility in the principal objection taken to the continuance of the Company’s trade with India, that the characters of merchant and sovereign were incompatible; but that objection did not apply to its trade with China, the sacrifice of which was a tribute to ignorant and interested clamour. The Company’s exclusive privileges were eminently useful in extending and maintaining our commercial relations with a country with which it is difficult to maintain intercourse at all, and those privileges were so carefully guarded that they could not be abused. No impartial person, whatever his opinions on freedom of trade, can read the evidence on the China trade given before the parliamentary committees, without feeling convinced that the Company’s exclusive rights ought to have been maintained, with such

modifications as might have sufficed to place British subjects on an equality with foreigners. Government determined otherwise, and the reproach of having thus determined is not peculiar to the party which happened to be then in power: Whig and Tory were alike ready to surrender the China trade of the Company to those who clamoured for its destruction. The chief, if not the only, difference appears to have been, that the latter party would have allowed the Company to share in the trade (as in the case of opening the trade with India), while the former insisted on their abandoning trade altogether. No rights, however well established,—no interests, however important, are safe, where statesmen, abandoning their true position, are content to follow, instead of leading, public opinion.

Next to the abolition of the Company’s right of exclusive trade with China, the most objectionable parts of the new measure appear to be the refusal of the rule of publicity, and the transfer of so large a portion of the power formerly enjoyed by the subordinate governments to that of the governor-general. As to the first, it is certain that both individuals and bodies of men may conscientiously differ, and that their differences may be irreconcilable; but in such cases no ground for concealment seems to exist. Neither party need feel shame in avowing opinions which are the result of honest conviction. With regard to the second, it cannot but excite surprise that it should have been deemed either necessary or prudent to concentrate nearly all power in the chief government. The motives to this transfer were never adequately explained.

Of the other changes of the Act of 1833 little need be said. Some of those proposed have not been carried into effect. The subordinate presidencies of Madras and Bombay have not been deprived of their councils, and the erection of the new presidency of Agra has been suspended by the same authority which decreed its creation.

That the Company agreed to accept the important trust, under conditions to which strong objections were entertained, may be attributed to the recommendation of the majority of the directors, headed by some whose experience, sound judgment, and high character were eminently calculated to inspire confidence in their views, and give weight to their advice. Happily, this advice was successful, and India has had hitherto to boast of being incomparably the best governed of the dependent possessions of Great Britain.

CHAPTER XXIX.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COURT OF DIRECTORS AND BOARD OF CONTROL—STATE OF OUDE—
—CLAIMS OF THE LUCKNOW BANKERS—PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT—LORD HETTESBURY
APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL—APPOINTMENT CANCELLED—FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN PAR-
LIAMENT—SIR CHARLES METCALFE PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR-GENERAL—REMOVAL OF RESTRIC-
TIONS ON THE INDIAN PRESS—SIR CHARLES METCALFE SUPERSEDED BY LORD AUCKLAND.

It might have been expected that the arrange-
ment of the conflicting claims of the East-India
Company and the ministers of the Crown,
which took place in 1833, would have been
followed by at least some brief period of
repose; but such was not the fact. Early in
1834, an application on the part of the Crown
was made to the Court of King's Bench for a
mandamus to compel the Court of Directors,
“under the Act of 1793, to transmit certain
despatches to the East Indies, they having
been directed to do so by the Board” of Com-
missioners for the affairs of India. These
despatches related to the claims made upon
the king of Oude on the part of some of those
unprincipled plunderers with whom India
abounds, and who hover over misgoverned
native states with the instinct under which
birds of prey follow the march of armies. To
those acquainted with the modern history of
India, it will be unnecessary to state that
Oude, like Arcot and Tanjore, afforded an
ample field for the exercise of the arts of these
persons. Though nominally subjected to a
regular government, its state was actually that
of anarchy. Its princes were generally needy,
and its people always oppressed. The vizier,
Asoph-ul-Dowlah, like his brethren around
him, was frequently in want of money to afford
him the continued means of sensual gratifica-
tion or ostentatious display, and, like them, he
was beset by hordes of rapacious men, anxious
to minister to his necessities, with a view to
enriching themselves at the expense alike of
the prince and his subjects. The embarrassed
vizier accepted the assistance of the friendly
usurers, and dispensed his bonds, in acknow-
ledgment of its receipt, with truly oriental
munificence. Had these securities been satis-
fied in due course, the vizier would have set
an example altogether new in India. He did
not thus violate the principles upon which
Eastern rulers ordinarily administer their
pecuniary affairs. All experience warrants
the assertion that his creditors never could
have expected that their claims should have
been satisfied punctually, and to their full
extent; and it may be regarded as quite cer-
tain that, had the vizier thus agreeably ex-
ceeded their expectations, he would not less
have exceeded the measure of justice. Whether
or not any of the alleged debts were altogether
fabricated (as was certainly the case in the

Carnatic and Tanjore claims), it is beyond
doubt that demands which in their origin
might have some colour of justice, were, by
those processes with which Indian usurers are
so well acquainted, swelled to an amount cal-
culated to excite a feeling of astonishment at
the vast mass of rank vegetation springing
from so inconsiderable a seed. Some of those
processes are intimated in the following ex-
tract from the letter of the British resident at
Lucknow, in the year 1796, a period when
these debts were in the course of manufacture.

“The ruinous system of borrowing appears
more and more daily to have been the cause of
the general decline of this government. The
debt has increased annually by uniting prin-
cipal and interest, at thirty-six per cent., into
new bonds, to which have been added new
loans at twelve months, and some at shorter
periods; bills bearing discount, tendered in
place of ready money for *tuncaks* on the
aumils, who again charge interest on the
State for anticipation on their kists, while
the actual appropriation of the revenues has
been involved in the mysterious intricacies of
false intercourse with the aumils' *tuncaks*
debts, and separate allowances for purposes as
confused as the general system of government
has been.”

The vizier, after a time, made an attempt to
relieve himself from his complicated embar-
rassments by recourse to a mode not unusual
with Eastern princes: he proposed to com-
pound with his creditors, whom he divided
into classes. The division, however, appears
to have been guided by no principle having
reference to the origin of the debts, or to any
other point which might be supposed to give
reasonable sanction to such an arrangement.
The claims were all tainted by extortion.
Some of them, perhaps, were fraudulent
altogether, and others exaggerated by fraud;
but these considerations seem to have had no
influence with the vizier or his advisers, and
the distribution which they made regarded not
the character of the claims; it was governed
by the birth-place of the parties preferring
them, and, it may be inferred, was adopted
with the intention of paying as little as pos-
sible in any case. The claimants were divided
into Europeans and natives: to the former
class was offered one rate of composition, to
the latter another, more favourable to the

prince, and consequently less advantageous to the creditor. Among the native claimants were certain bankers, who refused the reduced dividend tendered to them, claiming to be placed on an equality with the European creditors of the vizier, and adhered to their refusal. The consequence of their pertinacity was, that they obtained nothing, and it was the protracted wrongs of these unhappy usurers that, after the lapse of nearly forty years, appealed so strongly to the sympathy of one branch of the home government, as to induce that authority to resort to the Court of King's Bench for the means of coercing the other.

Asoph-ul-Dowlah died in 1797, the year after the composition with his creditors was effected. To the temporary reign of his supposed son, Vizier Ali, succeeded that of Saadut Ali, the brother of Asoph-ul-Dowlah, and, from the definitive treaty concluded with this prince, any recognition of his obligation to discharge the debts of his predecessor was scrupulously excluded. In the preliminary engagement there was a provision for the liquidation of the "just debts" of the former vizier; and, if the claims of the usurious bankers could have been regarded as falling within the category, they might have benefited by the stipulation, had it been upheld. But in framing the definitive treaty this provision was omitted, and the following reason was assigned by the governor-general for its disappearance:—"The obligation contracted by the nabob, for the payment of the just debts of his predecessor, is altogether omitted, not only as contrary to that principle of non-interference in the claims of individuals which this government has invariably adopted, but from the consideration that the stipulation would involve us in the necessity of inquiring into the justice of all claims, and constitute the Company, in some measure, a guarantee for procuring the liquidation of them, which would be attended with very serious embarrassment." The bankers who had rejected the terms of composition accepted by other native creditors, were thus left, and properly left, to their own unassisted means of inducing a prince, whose master-passion was avarice, to pay debts contracted by another. Their success was such as, under the circumstances, might have been expected, and, probably, such as they deserved. The precise particulars of their claims are incapable of being investigated, but it is notorious that the debt, however contracted originally, had been enormously swelled by charges for interest. The precise rate of interest seems in some measure uncertain, but it was not less than twenty-four per cent. per annum, and probably was as high as thirty-six per cent.; and a claim thus made up would admit of very considerable reduction before those who urged it could be subjected to any actual loss. The claimants had rejected a composition which others had accepted—they hoped to obtain something more, and

they found themselves unable to obtain anything.

But the bankers and their representatives were not disposed to relinquish their claim, however slight the chance of enforcing it. In addition to the applications made to the government of Oude, which it may be presumed were sufficiently numerous and urgent, they submitted, through a course of years, a series of appeals to the British authorities, varying in their tone as in the mode in which they were preferred. These were prosecuted through an avowed agent, who manifested a degree of zeal and pertinacity which, if he were nothing more than an agent, may be regarded as singular, if not unprecedented. He filed a bill in equity against the Company, but, in little more than a month, applied for an order for its dismissal. He transmitted memorials and addressed letters to the Court of Directors, at one time praying that they would appoint an early period for the satisfaction and discharge of the claim of his constituents—principal and interest, the latter accumulated at the rates already mentioned; at another time, more modestly, imploring that the Court would transmit instructions to the government of Fort William to compel immediate payment by the vizier; and, subsequently, asking, with a further advance in moderation, that the Court would record a strong opinion in favour of the claims, and direct the local government to enter into negotiation with the vizier on the subject. But the Court were inexorable; they neither paid the alleged debt, nor interposed to assist the claimants in recovering it. In Bengal the indefatigable money-lenders were rather more fortunate. During the administration of the marquis of Hastings, an application for the interference of government on their behalf was met by a declaration that the case was not one which could receive the formal support of the British authorities, but that, notwithstanding, the resident should be instructed to state the claim to the vizier, with the opinion of the Bengal government thereon. The resident accordingly was thus instructed; he did, thereupon, state the claim and the opinion, and recommended that the former should be placed in a train of adjustment; but the recommendation was not of a character to win the favour of the prince then reigning, who was the nephew of the man by whom the debts were alleged to have been contracted. The vizier's reply was unacceptable to the claimants, but it was at least distinct and open: he declared that he had neither information nor concern in regard to the subject. And this was the sole result of the interference of the government of Bengal. On being apprised of the application and the answer, the Court of Directors forbade any further attempts of the like nature being made at the instance or for the benefit of any parties whatever. During the period which intervened between the failure of the applica-

tion to the vizier, under the administration of the marquis of Hastings, and the adoption of the claim by the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, the agent of the claimants made several abortive attempts to advance the cause of his clients, sometimes by applications to parliament, sometimes to the Court of Directors. These afford the only additional incidents belonging to the public history of the affair. There was, indeed, a succession of private intrigues scattered over nearly twenty years, all directed to abet the designs of the indefatigable usurers upon the finances of Oude. Some of these rest on evidence which history cannot receive; and the precise means by which the claim, after repeated rejections, found favour at the Board, cannot be satisfactorily traced. This was, indeed, a period when the good fortune of those who were desirous of preying upon the people of India was in the ascendant. Only two years before, a bill had been successfully passed through parliament to satisfy the ever-memorable claims of the creditor of the zemindar of Noozed. The next year was signalized by an application for a mandamus requiring the Court of Directors to send out a despatch to aid the demands of the firm of Palmer and Co. on the nizam; and now a similar measure was taken with regard to claims equally reputable with those which were the objects of parliamentary and ministerial favour in the previous instances. A rule in the Court of King's Bench was obtained by the attorney-general on behalf of the Board, but before the time arrived for showing cause against it, the views of the Board had, from some motive, undergone a change, and the threatened measure was suffered to drop. The firmness manifested by the Court of Directors, without doubt, led to this result; the utter rottenness of the ground upon which their opponents stood rendering them unwilling to risk further contest with those who had a good cause, and the courage to maintain it. Six directors addressed a letter to the Court, avowing their determination not to affix their signature, under any circumstances, to the objectionable despatch. The deputy-chairman took the same course. He remarked: "I am quite aware that I am called upon to act ministerially only, in signing the despatch of the Board; but there are cases where I cannot act even ministerially. There are obligations superior to that of yielding obedience to a mandamus, and there are acts which cannot be performed without a violation of those principles on which all law is founded." The chairman, though he did not refuse to sign the despatch, stated, with great force and distinctness, his utter disapproval of its object, declaring, "sooner than be responsible for this draft, I would resign my seat." "Every director," he subsequently observed, "is bound to support the Company by his best advice, counsel, and assistance. I acquit myself of that obligation, upon this occasion,

by the counsel I have given, and shall continue to give, that the Court should use every legal means in their power to prevent the transmission of this most objectionable despatch." Five other directors recorded their concurrence in the views of the chairman. The patrons of the usurious creditors of the Vizier Asoph-ul-Dowlah found their determination fail at the last moment, and the Court of King's Bench were not moved to make the rule granted absolute. But the attempt to compel the Court of Directors to aid, by their authority, the unrighteous cause was too extraordinary, and had been too public, to escape animadversion in parliament. Lord Ellenborough gave notice of a motion in the House of Lords on the subject; and on the 29th of April (the rule in the Court of King's Bench having previously been discharged), he inquired whether the Board intended to persevere. Earl Grey answered, that he believed it was not intended to proceed further. Lord Ellenborough, thereupon, put this further question—Upon what ground the determination of the Board had been taken? The premier naively answered, that he did not know. The Lord Chancellor then interposed, and after a few preliminary remarks, said, "Events have taken place which have quite put an end to the matter in question, and have taken away the whole grounds of the case upon which the proceedings of the Board of Control were founded." But his lordship did not state what those grounds were, nor what were the events which had taken them away. On the 5th of May, Lord Ellenborough submitted his notice, which was for papers connected with the subject. His lordship, in introducing it, stated his reason to be the desire of preventing a mischievous measure, the attempt to carry which in one way had been frustrated from being effected in another. He adverted to the miserable condition of Oude, which he alleged must have been known to the Board, and dwelt on the peculiar inexpediency of selecting such a time for pressing the claims in question. He inquired how the claims were to be pressed—whether by representation only, or whether, if necessary, resort was to be had to force; and he argued that the former course would be vain and fruitless, while the latter was forbidden alike by law and policy. After discussing at some length the origin and history of the claims, he proceeded to speak of the agent of the claimants, whom he represented as more than an agent, it being generally believed—indeed, his lordship said, "notorious, that he purchased the whole or part of the private claim of the party in whose name he has appeared." This purchase, he contended, was unlawful by the spirit and letter of the statute prohibiting British subjects from being concerned in loans to native princes; "therefore," added his lordship, "I say on that ground, as well as the other first mentioned by me, that the letter forwarded by the Board of Control to

the Court of Directors was an illegal letter. It was in favour of a claim which was entirely void by the English law—it was in favour of an individual who claimed by virtue of having purchased the bond, which purchase was a misdemeanour, and it directed the doing of that which could not be done without subjecting to the penalties of a misdemeanour the governor-general of India. Under these circumstances, I am not surprised that the rule for the mandamus has been discharged. I am perfectly satisfied that the Court of King's Bench could not have granted the mandamus, upon these facts being made known to the judges of that court. But more than that, I am quite convinced that when all these points should have been brought before the noble earl at the head of his Majesty's government, he would have agreed with me, that to send that letter to India was impossible; that it was most unjust and unfair to the governor-general of India to call upon him, contrary to treaty—contrary to law—contrary to equity—to use force where force was prohibited by Act of Parliament, and repugnant to the feelings, the honour, and the policy of this nation. Therefore, I do not thank the president of the Board of Control for withdrawing that letter, and not pressing for the mandamus. He could not have sent the letter or obtained the mandamus." Lord Ellenborough then, with reference to the possible revival, in another shape, of the abandoned orders on the claim, proceeded to argue the question on grounds of general policy, and concluded by submitting his motion.

The Lord Chancellor, whose withering exposure of the "Noozed affair," two years before, had commanded the admiration of all but such as were interested in the matter, now appeared as the champion of claims quite as questionable as those which he had formerly denounced. His lordship entered upon a vehement defence of the agent, or alleged agent, of the creditors, denying that he had purchased the claim of those whom he professed to represent, but at the same time maintaining that if he had, the purchase might have been made before the act referred to by Lord Ellenborough came into operation; in which case it would not have been tainted with illegality. On this point the noble and learned peer was very indignant, observing, in reference to the imputation cast by Lord Ellenborough upon the agent of the claimants, and by imputation upon the president of the Board, "Happily, the venom of this attack is accompanied by its antidote." The Lord Chancellor then proceeded, at great length, to examine and defend the character of the claims, and, nearly at equal length, to argue that the intention of sending out the offensive despatch having been abandoned, there was no pretence for Lord Ellenborough's motion. The duke of Wellington supported the motion, and expressed strong feelings of concern and surprise at the attempt to enforce upon the Court of Directors,

by the operation of the law, the measures contemplated by the Board. Lord Plunket, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, supported the views of the Lord Chancellor of England, and the debate was terminated by a reply from Lord Ellenborough, in the course of which he used language highly laudatory of the Court of Directors. The motion was carried; but this was a point of little moment, the object of bringing it forward being to obtain a public discussion of the question.

It was not to be expected that the extraordinary proceedings of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India would pass without notice in that assembly which has been termed the grand inquest of England. Accordingly, on the 8th of May, Mr. Herries, in the House of Commons, moved for some papers connected with the subject, and the motion was carried without opposition. On the 12th Mr. Herries put two questions to the ministry—first, whether the proceedings in the Court of King's Bench had been abandoned; and, secondly, whether it was still the determination of the advisers of the Crown to employ the authority of the government of India for procuring the settlement of the claims of the bankers! The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Althorp, in the absence of the president of the board, answered distinctly to the first, that the legal proceedings had been abandoned; to the second, he declined giving any reply. Some further papers were granted on the 15th of May, on the motion of Mr. Charles Ross, and on the 28th of July, Mr. Herries availed himself of an opening which occurred for bringing the matter to the notice of the House more distinctly and prominently, without the necessity of submitting any motion on the subject. After narrating, with some minuteness, the facts of the difference between the Board of Commissioners and the Court of Directors, Mr. Herries thus pointedly placed the nature of the question at issue before his auditors:—"The House will naturally ask, what has been the cause of all this? Is it some great point of Indian policy? Is it some scheme for the better management of that important part of the empire? No. It is neither more nor less than this—the settlement of an old, usurious job of forty years' standing. This it is which has induced the India Board to act as it has done." He then proceeded to examine the history of the claims in detail, and concluded by calling on the president of the Board for explanation. Mr. Grant followed, but his speech, though able and ingenious, afforded no insight into the reasons which had induced him, first to apply for the mandamus, and then to withdraw the application. He maintained the justice of the claims, and defended the demand for interest at thirty-six per cent. upon the ground that it was the market rate in India. To an allegation of Mr. Herries, that he had not met the arguments of the Court of Directors contained in their reply to

the communication of the views of the Board, the answer of Mr. Grant appears very insufficient. It was to the effect that the correspondence, of which that letter formed part, was not between the public and the India Board, but between the Court of Directors and that Board; that both parties had all the facts before them, and were intimately acquainted with all that had been written on the subject; and that, consequently, it was unnecessary to answer the arguments of the Court, more especially as the views of the president had been made known to the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company by personal communication. This mode of dealing with the matter would seem to justify all the apprehensions expressed by the Court during the discussion on the recent renewal of the Company's term of government, as to the effect of refusing a rule of publicity in cases of irreconcilable difference between the two home authorities.

Sir Robert Peel followed Mr. Grant, and placed the question on its just grounds in the simple form following:—"In point of fact, this question lies in the narrowest compass, and I wish to address myself to those gentlemen who are not conversant with the details of it, and who know nothing of the *Dosses* or the *Asoph-ul-Dowlahs*, nor have ever heard their names mentioned until this night. The question is this: a debt was contracted by the king of Oude, forty years ago, for which he was to pay interest at the rate of thirty-six per cent.; various other debts were also contracted by the same individual. During the lapse of those forty years, different governments in India have made amicable applications to the king of Oude for the payment of this debt; but they never resorted to other measures, conceiving themselves precluded from doing so by their amicable relations with that country; and the question now is, whether, after the lapse of forty years, the peremptory authority of the Court of King's Bench shall be used to compel a reluctant body, responsible for the government of India, to select one debt out of an indefinite number for the purpose of enforcing its liquidation." After many further remarks, illustrating the impolicy of taking up the claim of the bankers, Sir Robert Peel concluded by referring to the possible assumption of the government of Oude by the British, and solemnly deprecated, in that case, the commencement of the exercise of sovereignty, by appropriating eleven hundred thousand pounds sterling of the property of the territory to the liquidation of a claim for which it did not appear that the British state had ever made itself in the slightest degree responsible. Only one speaker more addressed the House, Mr. Hume, who defended the claim of the bankers, alleging that it was a peculiar case, inasmuch as theirs was the only debt remaining due to a British subject. He maintained that the debt was just; that the illustrations adduced by Sir Robert Peel were not apposite; and that

it was disgraceful to the British government that the claim should have been permitted to remain so long unsettled.

Thus ended the debate, and here terminated an affair in which, happily, moral strength was successful in resisting an undue exercise of legal power.

The course of the home government of India was not, however, destined long to run smoothly. In the month of August, a letter was received by the chairman of the East-India Company from Lord William Bentinck, tendering his lordship's resignation of the office of governor-general. Sir Charles Metcalfe, a highly distinguished civil servant of the Company, had been appointed to be the provisional successor of Lord William Bentinck; and, on taking into consideration the communication of his lordship's wish to retire, the Court of Directors came to a resolution that, "adverting to the public character and services of Sir Charles Metcalfe, whose knowledge, experience, and talents, eminently qualify him to prosecute successfully the various important measures consequent on the new Charter Act, this Court are of opinion that it would be inexpedient at present to make any other arrangement for supplying the office of governor-general." This resolution having been communicated to Mr. Grant, drew from that gentleman an answer, announcing the decided opinion of the king's ministers, that no time should be lost in appointing a permanent successor to the retiring governor-general; and intimating further, that with respect to the appointment of any servant of the Company, "however eminent his knowledge, talents, and experience" might "confessedly be," the ministry agreed in the sentiments which Mr. Canning had, on a former occasion, expressed, "that the case can hardly be conceived in which it would be expedient that the *highest* office of the government in India should be filled otherwise than from England; and that that one main link, at least, between the systems of the Indian and British governments ought, for the advantage of both, to be invariably maintained. On this principle," it was added, "it has usually been thought proper to act, and in the various important measures consequent on the new Charter Act, his Majesty's ministers see much to enjoin the continuance of the general practice, but nothing to recommend a deviation from it."

After this intimation, the Court of Directors abstained from pressing the claims of Sir Charles Metcalfe; but they did not suffer the objection to his appointment to remain unanswered. A letter was addressed by the Court to Mr. Grant, in answer to his communication, in which letter, after expressing their concurrence in the opinion of the king's ministers that a permanent appointment was to be preferred to a temporary one, and their conviction that Sir Charles Metcalfe was a fit person to have been permanently appointed,

the Court thus dealt with the general question: "The Court of Directors have learnt with deep regret that Sir Charles Metcalfe is considered by his Majesty's government to be ineligible to the station of governor-general, and upon grounds which would exclude the whole service of India from that high office. The Court of Directors feel little disposed to engage in discussing the merits of an opinion which his Majesty's ministers appear to have adopted upon the authority of Mr. Canning. They will only observe, that the whole course of our transactions in British India may be referred to, as furnishing the most conclusive evidence that the servants of the Company, both civil and military, are eminently qualified for the highest public trust, and that the important office of governor-general has been held by several of them with the utmost advantage to the national interests. The Court will not unnecessarily recall to the recollection of his Majesty's ministers those names which have rendered the service of India illustrious—that service to whose merits, to whose talents and high tone of character, the late Mr. Canning has himself borne the most unqualified testimony. But the Court cannot refrain from observing, that, independently of the impolicy of putting forth any general declaration of ineligibility, his Majesty's ministers appear to them to be scarcely justified in proposing to narrow the choice of the Court, by excluding any class of men, possessing the necessary qualifications, from the office of governor-general."

After expressing the desire of the Court to act in concurrence with the advisers of the Crown, it was intimated that the expediency of making an arrangement for filling up the office of governor-general would be taken into consideration at the proper time; for it is to be observed, that, though Lord William Bentinck had tendered his resignation, such tender did not, in the eye of the law, amount to an actual resignation of office. The president of the Board, however, appears to have taken a different view, and to have informed the chairman and deputy chairman that, in consequence of the proposal of the Court to continue Sir Charles Metcalfe, the ministry did not hold themselves bound to refrain from making an appointment under the provisions of the law, according to which, the right lapsed to the Crown after a delay of two months from the notification of a vacancy. The opinion of counsel was taken on the question, and that opinion being favourable to the Court, the president of the Board intimated that the power of the Crown would not be exercised to appoint, without giving a month's notice to the Court of Directors. This was certainly no great or generous concession, seeing that by law they were entitled to two months.

The intimation was given in October 1834, and thus the matter rested till January 1835, by which time the ministerial revolution

occasioned by the death of Earl Spencer, and the consequent elevation of his son, Lord Althorp, to the House of Peers, had introduced a new cabinet and new counsels. The former was framed from the party who had been excluded by the accession of the Whigs, and Sir Robert Peel, for the first time, held the chief place in it. The difficulty which had previously impeded the choice of a governor-general no longer existing, the Court of Directors proceeded to exercise the power of appointment. Their choice fell upon Lord Heytesbury, whose appointment was immediately approved by the Crown. Sir Charles Metcalfe was again selected provisionally to succeed on any vacancy that might occur by the death, resignation, or departure of the new governor-general. Lord Heytesbury was sworn into office, and, to all appearance, the duty of appointing a successor was not likely again to be called into exercise until the completion by his lordship of the ordinary period of service. But so far from completing that period, Lord Heytesbury never commenced it. He took the oath of office, and this was the last, as well as the first, of his official acts. The ministry under which his appointment had been sanctioned possessed the confidence of the Crown, but failed in obtaining that of the House of Commons. A dissolution had been resorted to, but the first division which took place in the new parliament left the ministers in a minority, and, after a brief endeavour to stem the tide of opposition, they retired, making way for the return of those whom they had but a few months before displaced. Mr. Grant did not return to the office of president of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, but became Secretary of State for the Colonial department, his place at the Board being assigned to Sir John Hobhouse. The preparations of Lord Heytesbury for his departure were complete; but no sooner was the Whig ministry again in office, than he received an intimation of the wish of Government that he should postpone it. This, after the expiration of three days, was followed by a communication to his lordship of the intention of ministers to advise his Majesty to revoke the appointment. A confidential communication of this intention had been previously made by the president of the Board to the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company, and on its being carried into effect, it was formally announced in a letter from the president, in which he further stated that ministers did not intend to recommend the approval of any successor to Lord William Bentinck till that nobleman should have arrived in England, but that no advantage would be taken of the delay to exercise the prerogative of the Crown, to the prejudice of the right of the Court of Directors. The Court, however, were by no means satisfied with the course that had been adopted, the effect of which was to render the office of

governor-general one of the prizes of party conflict; to connect the government of India with the parliamentary struggles of the United Kingdom, and to sacrifice the interests of the former country to the alternate gratification of rival factions in the latter. They consequently remonstrated against the step which had been taken. After adverting to the circumstances of Lord Heytesbury's appointment, they pointed out the difference between the mode in which the royal prerogative had in this case been exercised, and that followed on the only previous occasion in which the like course had been resorted to—that of the supersession of Sir George Barlow, in 1806. In that case, it was observed, there was a previous interchange of sentiments between the king's ministers and the Court; and the act of revocation was accompanied by an explanation of the grounds upon which it had been advised, and would be justified; while in the instance under examination, no previous communication had been made to the Court, no opportunity was afforded them to state their objections to the measure, nor had a single reason been assigned in its justification. The discrepancy of the views of the ministry, as to the expediency of postponing a permanent appointment, with those which they entertained a few months before, when they deemed an immediate appointment indispensable, was pointed out, and in the last place, the Court thus dwelt upon the danger with which the act of the ministry was fraught to India, and the independence of its government:—"The Court do not forget that the nomination of Lord Heytesbury was made and his appointment completed during the late administration. But this fact, connected with his removal by the present ministers, fills the Court with apprehension and alarm as respects both India and themselves. It has always been the Court's endeavour in their public acts, and especially in their nominations to office, to divest themselves of political bias; and in the same spirit they now consider it to be their duty frankly and firmly to express their decided conviction that the vital interests of India will be sacrificed if the appointments of governors are made subservient to political objects in this country; and if the local authorities, and, through them, all public servants, are led to feel that tenure of office abroad is dependent upon the duration of an administration at home; and, further, that the revocation of an appointment such as that of Lord Heytesbury, for no other reason, so far as the Court can judge, than that the ministry has changed, must have the effect of lessening the authority of the Court, and consequently impairing its usefulness and efficiency as a body intrusted with the government of India."

To ascertain, beyond the possibility of dispute, the precise extent of the pledge given to refrain from the exercise of the royal prerogative to appoint a governor-general, should

the right lapse by the delay of the Court—which delay was not their own act, but was virtually imposed on them—another letter was addressed to the president, in which it was assumed to be the intention of the ministry to consider the two months allowed to the directors by law for making an appointment as commencing from the arrival of Lord William Bentinck in England. The answer of the president disclaimed this interpretation, but, at the same time, intimated that he was ready to give to the pledge the more extended sense, and to construe it in the way most agreeable to the Court of Directors. Indeed, if the conduct and language of Sir John Hobhouse throughout this transaction be considered apart from the act of which he was either the mover or the instrument of carrying into effect, it must in justice be regarded as courteous, conciliatory, and liberal.

The arrangement by which the choice of a governor-general was to be postponed till the arrival of Lord William Bentinck, was discussed by some directors, and a dissent from it was recorded by Mr. Lyall. The chief ground of his objection was, that before the arrival of his lordship, the period during which the Court could claim of right to fill up the vacancy would have expired; that, consequently, they would forfeit not only the right of appointment, but the far more important power of recall. He admitted that the pledge of the president of the Board was satisfactory, so far as himself and his colleagues were concerned, but he apprehended that it would not be obligatory on a succeeding administration, should another change take place before the vacancy were supplied. But, independently of this danger, he objected to the principle of permitting so valuable and important a trust as that of appointing the governor-general of India to pass from the keeping of the Court voluntarily, without corresponding advantage, and upon grounds slight and inadequate. Sir Richard Jenkins recorded his general concurrence in the views of Mr. Lyall. Mr. Tucker, who had held the office of chairman at the time of Lord Heytesbury's appointment, subsequently addressed a letter to the Court, in which he defended the character of Lord Heytesbury, and justified his own conduct, with regard to the choice of that nobleman for office. He referred to the diplomatic services of his lordship, and to the sense entertained of them, not only by those agreeing with him in political sentiments, but also by some of the leading members of the party of the Whigs. He showed that Lord Heytesbury had been continued in the office of ambassador in Russia by his political opponents; that it was at his own express desire, made in consequence of the failure of his health, that he was permitted to retire; and that he then received from Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for the Foreign department in the ministry by whom his lordship was now displaced, a most flattering testimony to his merits and services. But the case

of the individual, Mr. Tucker observed, was of minor consideration; the public principle involved was the chief point at issue. "An open attempt," he remarked, "has been made to cancel an unobjectionable appointment, for mere party purposes. By rendering the governors of India the mere dependent nominees of the ministry holding office during pleasure, the administration of the day will acquire a power and influence which will enable it to assume and dispense the local patronage of India clandestinely, without responsibility, and (when bad men bear sway) for corrupt purposes, for the purpose of obtaining political power in this country, in utter contempt of the provisions of the legislature, both as they relate to Indian patronage and to the objects of those more recent enactments which profess to secure purity of parliament.

In conclusion, Mr. Tucker defended himself from what he regarded as a charge of having compromised the rights of the Court of Directors as to the appointment to the office of governor-general, by permitting the prescribed period of two months to elapse.

On the 29th June, the attention of the House of Commons was called to the question by Mr. Praed, who, on the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the order of the day for the committee of supply be read, moved an amendment calling for the production of any communications that had passed between the Board and the Court on the subject of the revocation of the appointment of Lord Heytesbury. After narrating the circumstances of the case, the mover of the amendment inquired whether there were any reasons for the objection made to Lord Heytesbury—whether the president of the Board would say that he did not consider the government of India would be safe in the hands of Lord Heytesbury—whether he thought that the commands of the government here would not be obeyed by the noble lord in India. He adverted to his lordship's diplomatic services, and to the approbation which they had received from the government; he argued that the power by which the appointment had been annulled was not a matter of pure prerogative, but was given by statute, and that the obvious purpose of the law under which it was exercised, and the avowed intentions of its framers, proved that it was not designed to apply to such a case as that under consideration. He referred to the famous contest on Indian affairs between the two great political parties, which terminated in the triumph of Mr. Pitt and the passing of the Act of 1784. "The House," he observed, "is familiar with the circumstances under which that Act was passed. The great difference between the bill of Mr. Pitt and that which had been previously introduced by Mr. Fox, was this—that the latter went to vest the whole patronage of India directly in commissioners, while the former placed it in the hands of the directors, subject, however, to the con-

trol of the Crown exercised by the Board of Control, in cases where any abuse might exist. If a mere change of ministers in this country were to justify a change in the government of India, how absurd was it to leave to the Court of Directors, a body separate from and independent of ministers, a concurrent share in the choice of the person by whom the government of India should be administered. The Act of Mr. Pitt, which gave to the Company a concurrent share in the choice, could not possibly contemplate a change of the person chosen for reasons in which the Company had no concern." In illustration of the spirit and object of the arrangement of 1784, Mr. Praed quoted the following explanation, by Mr. Pitt, of the powers of the Board. "The principal powers of the Board would consist in directing what political objects the Company's servants were to pursue, and in recalling such as did not pay obedience to such directions, or give satisfactory reasons to show that circumstances rendered disobedience a virtue." "This, then," continued Mr. Praed, "was the power of revocation possessed by the Crown. It was to be exercised only in case of disobedience of orders, or for gross abuse; and this power was continued to the Crown, as was also the patronage of the directors continued to them by the Act of 1833. If it were desirable that the extraordinary power thus vested in the Crown should be sparingly exercised under the Act of 1784, much more desirable was it under the Act of 1833; for under the Act of 1784 the Company existed as a trading company; under that of 1833, as a political body only. How unwise is it to interfere thus arbitrarily with the government of India by the Company, just when we have determined to maintain the existence of the Company solely for the sake of its utility in the government of India." Mr. Praed then referred to the supposed precedent afforded by the case of Sir George Barlow, which he maintained was in fact no precedent, the circumstances being different. He pointed out that when the appointment of Sir George Barlow had been approved, it was upon the understanding that it was to be temporary, and, further, that it was the same government which had sanctioned the appointment which caused it to be revoked. An irregular suggestion having been offered across the house, to the effect that Lord Heytesbury, not having actually assumed the government, was not "in his station," Mr. Praed proceeded thus to combat it:—"The appointment was complete by the Company—the approval was complete by the Crown—the forms had all been gone through—the expense had all been incurred. If the mere want of political sympathy with Lord Heytesbury makes him unfit to hold the government of India during your administration, it would have warranted you in recalling him from Calcutta; if it do not make him so unfit, it does not warrant you in preventing him from proceeding thither." He then re-

mind the House that the power of revocation by the Crown was not limited to the office of governor-general—that it extended to all subordinate officers; and that while it was exercised with regard to the occupant of the highest office under the Company to-day, it might to-morrow be employed for the removal of the most humble of their servants. After referring to the injury likely to result from the course taken by ministers, to the just influence of the Company in India, and its efficiency as an instrument for governing that country, he quoted the remarks of various members of both Houses of Parliament, all belonging to the political party opposed to Lord Heytesbury, but all maintaining the importance of upholding the Company on the ground of its freedom from party feeling.

Sir John Hobhouse, as might be expected from his official position, took the lead in defending the conduct of the ministry in superseding Lord Heytesbury; and after declaring his intention to refuse the papers moved for, making some remarks, according to the practice of all ministers on such occasions, on the inconvenience of producing papers, and quoting the authority of Lord Grenville on the subject, proceeded to state the ground on which the cabinet had acted; that ground being, that Lord Heytesbury did not possess their confidence. "The King's government," said the right honourable baronet, "had to consider whether it would be answerable for Lord Heytesbury's government in India or not; and, not wishing to be answerable for it, the course it had to take was simple and obvious. I repeat then, that not only were we justified in vacating his appointment, but we were called upon by the constitution to do so; for it is one of the first principles of the constitution, that there shall in all cases be responsible advisers for every act done. This is the real cause of Lord Heytesbury's not going to India." Proceeding to assert the right of the Crown to recall, or cancel an appointment, he again referred to the authority of Lord Grenville, and quoting a declaration of that nobleman, that it was always intended by the Act of 1784, that his Majesty's ministers should have the power of recall at discretion, he asked, "Now, if the honourable member admits this—if he do not mean to dispute that his Majesty's ministers have the power to recall at their own discretion—what just cause of complaint has he to make, because they now, at their discretion, have ventured upon the exercise of it?" He admitted that what had been done might operate inconveniently with regard to the authority of the Company; but he maintained that it would be a far worse result that the feeling of cordiality, so necessary to be supported, between the head of the Indian government and the cabinet at home should be destroyed. He quoted an opinion of one of the directors of the East-India Company, to the effect that the governor-general of India had always been a political character of dis-

tingtion connected with the government at home, and that he must possess the confidence of the national government. After some remarks on the personal topics introduced by Mr. Praed, Sir John Hobhouse passed to the allegation that no correspondence had taken place between the board and the court on this occasion, in which respect the case varied from that of Sir George Barlow. The answer of the president of the board was, that such correspondence was unnecessary, inasmuch as it was indisputable that Lord Heytesbury had not the confidence of his Majesty's ministers, and it was quite impossible for the court to convince them that he possessed it. In conclusion, the president repeated the expression of his determination to withhold the papers.

Mr. Hogg replied to the arguments of Sir John Hobhouse, and referred to the circumstances under which, in 1784, the power of vacating the office of governor-general had been vested in the Crown, as proving that this power was never meant to be exercised but in cases of gross misconduct; that it was never designed to be employed for party purposes. He referred to the case of Lord Minto, appointed under a Whig administration, and permitted by a Tory one to retain his office unmolested; and to the still stronger case of Lord William Bentinck, who, having been appointed under the administration of Mr. Canning, was allowed to retain his appointment by two successive premiers—Lord Goderich and the duke of Wellington—although, like Lord Heytesbury, he had not embarked for India, and although, with regard to the latter of the two administrations, that of the duke of Wellington, Lord William Bentinck enjoyed its confidence to no greater extent than did Lord Heytesbury that of the cabinet of Lord Melbourne. He concluded with an emphatic warning, well deserving of being quoted and remembered. He said, "I shall beg the attention of the House for a few minutes to the consequences in India of making the governor-general a political appointment. Having resided in Calcutta for seventeen years in a situation wholly unconnected with the service, I may be permitted to bear testimony to the merits of that service; and I will venture to assert, that in no country was there ever a body of public servants more distinguished for talent, intelligence, integrity, and a high sense of honour, than the civil and military servants of the East-India Company. To what, sir, do I attribute the great efficiency of that service?—mainly to this—that in India patronage has hitherto been purely and justly distributed, free from all personal and political influence. Men have been appointed to public offices from their standing, experience, and fitness, without reference to politics; and you have, therefore, had able and distinguished public servants in India. What, sir, must be the consequence, if the appointment be considered a political one; if a Whig government must have a Whig

governor-general, and a Tory government a Tory governor-general? The person so named will carry with him to India his political feelings and bias, and will there distribute his patronage for electioneering and political purposes, without reference to the merits of the individuals; and the public interests will thus be sacrificed and ruined."

Sir Robert Peel took the same side, and with reference to the admission that, if Lord Heytesbury had been in India, the new administration would not have recalled him he justly inquired, "Why not? If a want of confidence in Lord Heytesbury, grounded on differences of political opinion, justifies the revocation of the noble lord's appointment, would it not also justify his removal from the government of India, supposing he had assumed it?" The material for debate had, however, been so completely exhausted by preceding speakers, that neither Sir Robert Peel nor the ministerial leader, Lord John Russell, by whom he was followed, could do more than pass again over the trodden ground, and endeavour by some additional illustration, to give an appearance of novelty to old views and arguments. Besides the members already mentioned, Mr. Sydney Herbert, and Mr. Cressett Pelham spoke against the ministers; and Mr. Cutlar Fergusson (who had just relinquished the office of an East-India director for a ministerial appointment), Mr. Silk Buckingham, and Mr. Vernon Smith, in their favour. On a division, the motion for the production of the papers was lost.

Lord William Bentinck, whose approaching retirement had led to the disputes and discussions which have been narrated, quitted India, as already notified, early in 1835, and Sir Charles Metcalfe succeeded, by virtue of his provisional appointment, to the chief seat in council. His administration was short, and was distinguished by little deserving of especial record. It will chiefly be remembered by one act, which can scarcely fail to have a powerful effect, either for good or for evil, upon the interests of India, and of the British government in that country. This act was the removal of the restrictions to which the public press in India was previously subjected. For a long period preceding the year 1818, the press had been subject to a censorship, a measure first resorted to during the war with France, with a view of preventing the emissaries of the enemy in India conveying intelligence derived from the newspapers published there to the French cruisers in the Indian seas. The marquis of Hastings was induced to introduce a different system—partly, it may be presumed, by the influence of one of his ruling passions, the love of popularity, but partly, also, by another motive. The editors of newspapers were generally Europeans, and disobedience to the orders of the censorate was liable to be visited with deportation—the Company's government having at that period the power of removing,

from all parts of India, any person, not native born, whose residence there was considered dangerous. An Anglo-Indian editor, at length, recollecting that this punishment could not be applied to him, set the government at defiance, and refused to be restrained by the directions of the censor. The government then made a merit of necessity, and removed the censorship, but substituted a set of rules to which they required the conductors of the periodical press to conform. This was regarded as equivalent to the establishment of a free press, or at least it was professed to be so regarded by those who wished to commit the governor-general to such a measure, as well as by the governor-general himself, who luxuriated in the public congratulations poured in upon him with reference to this extraordinary exercise of liberality. The press, indeed, was relieved from the censorate, but editors were enjoined to comply with the rules introduced in the place of that more direct check upon publication—they were rebuked by the government, of which the marquis of Hastings was the head, when the rules were disregarded, and reproof, on these occasions, was not unmingled with reference to the power of inflicting summary punishment upon European offenders. The governor-general, indeed, who had eulogized a free press, and taken credit for bestowing this boon upon India, could not with decency be a party to the infliction of such punishment for using the privilege which he had professed to grant. His immediate successor, Mr. Adam, was not so shackled; and an editor who persevered, after many warnings, in passing the bounds prescribed by the rules, was ordered to quit the country. The authority of the Supreme Court was subsequently obtained to the passing of more stringent rules, and under these rules one or two newspapers were suppressed. The above were the changes to which the press was subjected in Bengal. At Madras, the censorship had never been abolished. At Bombay, the regulations of the marquis of Hastings were introduced by Mr. Elphinstone, and the censorship abandoned. The more severe regulations established in Bengal under the government of Mr. Adam were subsequently adopted at Bombay; but, as the Supreme Court refused to register them, their effect was limited. Such was the state of the press when Lord William Bentinck arrived in India, and his lordship, though an ostentatious upholder of liberal measures, made no change. During his administration, indeed, little or no interference with the press took place; either none was needed, or Lord William Bentinck was from principle averse to interference, or it might be that the press was, for the most part, laudatory of the governor-general and his measures. Some attempts were made to induce him to take a more decided course, and his lordship answered, that the subject was under consideration. Consideration, however, was all it received, and it was left to Sir

Charles Metcalfe to reap the harvest of popular applause consequent upon removing all restraint upon the publication of opinion. Under his brief and temporary administration, an Act was passed repealing the existing regulations, and giving to the press, in regard to the publication of political periodicals, a greater degree of freedom than is enjoyed in England.

The celebrated Press Law was passed on the 3rd of August, and on the 5th of March following the authority of Sir Charles Metcalfe was superseded by the arrival of his successor, Lord Auckland, who had some months before been nominated to the office by the Court of Directors, and confirmed in it by the approbation of the Crown.

CHAPTER XXX.

DEATH OF SAADUT ALI—STATE OF THE SUCCESSION—RESIDENT SEATS THE RIGHTFUL HEIR ON THE THRONE—AFFAIRS OF SATTARA—CONDUCT OF THE RAJAH—THE RAJAH DEPOSED—TREATY WITH PERSIA—MR. ELPHINSTONE'S MISSION TO KABOOL—RUSSIAN ENCROACHMENTS ON PERSIAN TERRITORY—SIEGE OF HERAT—MISSION OF CAPTAIN BURNES—ASCENDANCY OF RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA—OCCUPATION OF KARAK—SHOOJAH-OOL-MOOLK SUPPORTED BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT—TRIPARTITE TREATY—THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH ARMY, AND THE ARRIVAL OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH IN INDIA.

THE year in which Lord Auckland arrived in India was completed without the occurrence of any event sufficiently remarkable to require notice, and the first half of the ensuing year passed with equal tranquillity. The calm was then interrupted by some violent proceedings in that perpetual seat of trouble and disquiet, Oude. These were consequent upon the death of the king of whom, it is not too much to say that, low as is the ordinary standard, whether of mind or morals, attained by Eastern princes, he fell far below it in both respects. One of the most profligate, he was at the same time one of the most weak. His crimes and his excesses were terminated by death on the 7th of July, 1837. The British resident, Colonel Low, on learning that the life of the king was considered to be in danger, wrote without delay to the brigadier commanding in Oude, to have a thousand men in readiness to march at a moment's notice. Having despatched the order, the resident proceeded to the palace with two officers, one of them the residency surgeon. They found the king dead, and such precautions as were at the moment available were immediately taken for guarding the palace and protecting the property which it contained. More effectually to provide for these purposes, a second order was despatched to the brigadier in command, requiring him to send off five companies in advance to the palace, and to bring down all the disposable troops, both infantry and artillery. In the mean time measures were taken for investing the successor recognized by the British government with the external ensigns of sovereignty. This prince was an uncle of the deceased king, and the grounds upon which he was supported by the British government were these:—Saadut Ali, the grandfather of the monarch just departed, had ten sons, the eldest of whom, named Gazeo-odeen Hyder, succeeded him. Gazeo-odeen

had only one son, Nusseer-oo-deen Hyder, the unhappy prince whose death had led to the necessity of making provision for the vacant throne. Nusseer-oo-deen had at one time acknowledged two sons, but he had subsequently disavowed them, and their pretensions were believed by the British authorities to be unfounded. The right of succession would, thereupon, have passed to the second of the sons of Saadut Ali: but he had died previously to Nusseer-oo-deen, and, by the Mahomedan law, the death of an heir before his right to succeed has accrued, nullifies the claim of his children. No claim is transmissible through one who has himself never enjoyed possession of the thing claimed. The succession, therefore, passed to the third son of Saadut Ali, a prince named Nusseer-ood-Dowlah, and he it was whom it was proposed to elevate to the vacant musnud. This intention was not carried into effect without a struggle. The resident apprehended that the Padshah Begum, or Queen Dowager, might attempt some movement in favour of one of the pretended sons, and he had despatched a messenger enjoining her to remain at her own residence, situate about four miles from the regal palace. The messenger found the begum's followers ready to advance upon the city, and returned to communicate the intelligence to the resident, bringing with him a vakeel from the begum, entreating that she might be permitted to see the corpse of the deceased sovereign. In the mean time the new king had been conducted to the palace, where he arrived about three o'clock on the morning of the 8th of July. He was a man advanced in years and in feeble health, and while he indulged in a short repose before entering upon the fatigue of being enthroned, the resident and his assistants retired to arrange the ceremonies with which the event was to be accompanied. Their conference was dis-

turbed by the arrival of intelligence that the begum's troops were approaching the city, and were close to one of the gates. They were quickly before it, and upon the refusal of Captain Paton, a British officer in attendance on the resident, to allow it to be opened, they resorted to the strength and sagacity of the elephant to effect an entrance for them. The first animal which made the attempt failed; a second, vigorously urged on by an adroit driver, succeeded in dashing in one leaf of the gate, Captain Paton narrowly escaping being crushed by its fall. An opening being thus effected, the begum's followers rushed in, Captain Paton being knocked down by them and made prisoner. After a few minutes spent in parley, the insurgents pushed on for the palace, which they entered. Further orders directing the advance of the British force had been prepared, but the begum's followers having possession of the gates, both of the palace and the city, there was no opportunity of despatching them, and the resident with his few attendants were, for a short time, virtually prisoners. The pretender, who had arrived in company with the begum, was formally seated on the throne. The resident, with some difficulty, obtained admission to the place where the ceremony was performed, and after some fruitless endeavours to persuade the begum (who was present in a covered palanquin) of the utter hopelessness of the attempt in which she had engaged, he succeeded, by the aid of one of her servants, in escaping, together with his attendants. Captain Paton had previously been released from durance by a small party of the British force detached for the purpose. The five advanced companies soon arrived, and were followed, after a short interval, by the remainder of the British force, with some guns. Communications between the parties now took place. They ended with an intimation from the resident, that if, within a quarter of an hour, the begum did not surrender, and repair to the place where he was standing with the guns, an attack would be commenced. The time expired, and the begum did not avail herself of the opportunity offered for averting mischief. A fire of grape was then opened, and a party of British troops proceeded, by various ways, to effect an entrance into the building in which the mock king, with the begum and her followers, were acting their respective parts in the pageant of the court. The insurgents were soon dislodged, and the begum, with the unhappy boy who had afforded the pretence for the disturbance, were made prisoners. Between thirty and forty of the begum's followers were known to be killed or wounded during the assault, and the number of wounded was probably greater, since some in this situation may be supposed to have escaped. A few of the British sepoys suffered, but the resident had the satisfaction of finding that the new sovereign and his family were safe. No time was lost in giving to his

title all the strength that it could derive from the display of his possession of the mumm'd (a point of great importance in Eastern states), and as soon as the hall could be cleared of the painful evidence of the recent affray afforded by the bodies of the slain, Nusseer-ood-Dowlah was solemnly placed on the throne which the pretender had scarcely quitted.

The outbreak, thus terminated, seems to have been, from the commencement to its conclusion, singularly ill-judged and hopeless. With a band of followers not considerable in point of number, and who, it appears, might be regarded rather as an armed mob than a regular force, the Begum ventured to oppose the British government, whose force though numerically weak at the time, was capable of being increased, within a very short period, to a degree of strength which would render successful resistance impossible. When in possession of the palace, the insurgents seem to have had no settled plan of action. They placed their puppet on the throne, and appear to have been content. The king was in their power, but they neither attempted to remove him beyond the reach of British aid, nor, what was perhaps more to be expected, did they seek to get rid of his claim by the sacrifice of his life. This, perhaps, was owing to fear rather than to any better feeling; for though they abstained from any attempt on the lives of the king and his attendants, they treated them with insult, and vented their hatred in swaggering, threatening language and actions. It is to be lamented that the British force was not at the first sufficiently strong to have overawed the insurgents, and deterred them from even entertaining a thought of resistance; but it appears that the whole British force in the city amounted to only two companies and a half, one company being employed as the treasury-guard, half a company as the gaol-guard, and the remaining company as the honorary guard of the resident. From the two former duties few men could of course be spared, and those that could be taken were required at other points where plunder was to be apprehended. It seems extraordinary indeed, after allowing for all these circumstances, that the begum's party should so readily have gained admission to the palace; but it is to be remarked, that the defence of the palace was in native hands, and it is probable that it was not merely want of courage, nor want of vigilance, nor want of military skill that led to the result. The following passage from a paper drawn up by the second assistant to the resident may elucidate the matter:—"The smallness of the guard at that outer gate, there being no force placed on the outside of it, as the minister positively declares had been ordered by him, and as was actually done at several of the others which were passed by Lieutenant Shakepear on his road to the Nawaub Nusseer-ood-Dowlah; the supineness of many of the palace guards and servants; the perversion of orders sent by

the minister on different occasions; his declaration since, that there were many traitors in the palace—all tend strongly to induce the suspicion that the gate was left purposely unguarded to the attack of the Padshah Begum's troops. The latter, however, having once actually entered within the palace walls, could from no position have been so happily expelled, with less loss to our own troops and more disgrace to themselves, than from the Burra-durree, the scene both of their short-lived triumph and of their prompt and well-deserved punishment."

The residence of the begum and the pretender to the throne, in Oude, being found likely to endanger the continuance of the public peace there, they were removed into the Company's territories; and this step put an end to all attempts to assail the authority of the ruling prince by force. His title, however, was impugned by Yemeen-ood-Dowlah, the eldest son of Shums-ood-Dowlah. The person last named was the second son of Saadut Ali, and the elder brother of Nusseer-ood-Dowlah, the prince whom the British government had recently placed on the musnud of Oude. Had Shums-ood-Dowlah survived his nephew, the deceased king, he would undoubtedly have been entitled to succeed to the throne; but, dying before him, he could convey no right to his children; the Mahometan law, as already explained, not admitting the doctrine of representation. Of this, no one, having even a slight acquaintance with the subject, is ignorant; yet Yemeen-ood-Dowlah set up a claim upon grounds which, though recognized as valid by the law of England and many other countries, are rejected by the interpreters of the code of Mahomet. It is but just, however, to state that, on an intimation that his claim was inadmissible, he acquiesced at once in the decision, and made no attempt to push his pretensions further. A new claimant thereupon arose in the person of one named Akbul-ood-Dowlah, alleged to be the second surviving son of Shums-ood-Dowlah, but calling himself the eldest. This personage, under European advice, proceeded to England, and there addressed the Court of Directors of the East-India Company. The folly of undertaking a long voyage to assert a claim known to be absolutely and undoubtedly bad, and with a certainty of its being rejected, need not be dwelt upon. What profit the advisers of the claimant derived from the expedition cannot be known; but they were fully aware that none would accrue to the person on whose behalf they affected to act. Such occurrences are not, indeed, uncommon in the history of British India; and they will probably never cease altogether until native powers shall acquire sufficient acquaintance with the principles of British policy to prevent their becoming the dupes of unprincipled adventurers.

The origin of a very eventful series of operations, should now, according to the order of

time, be related; but, to avoid needlessly breaking the continuity of the narrative when begun, it is postponed for the purpose of directing attention to certain proceedings affecting the throne of Sattara, which strikingly illustrate the remarks called forth by the idle and ridiculous claim of Akbul-ood-Dowlah to the throne of Oude.

It will be recollected, that the rajah of Sattara was the nominal head of the great Mahratta confederacy, but that, for a long period before that confederacy was broken, all power had passed from his hands into those of his usurping officers. When the marquis of Hastings overthrew the peishwa, and held at his own disposal the forfeited territories of that chief, he, with an unwise liberality, drew the rajah of Sattara from the situation of a captive, and restored to him much of the dignity and some of the power which he claimed to possess, but had never before obtained or exercised. Credulous, indeed, must he be who relies on the gratitude of native princes. The marquis of Hastings professed so to rely, and, perhaps, he was sincere. In the case of the rajah of Sattara the result was that which has so frequently occurred, and which might reasonably be looked for. The rajah, at length, became suspected—inquiry took place; it was ascertained that, in contravention of the treaty to which he owed his power, he was habitually carrying on correspondence with various parties, some of whom were enemies of the British government—that he was fomenting hostilities against that government—and, further, it was alleged, and to the satisfaction of many proved, that he had attempted to seduce some native officers of that government from their allegiance. It was proved that he had, for a long course of years, carried on a correspondence with the Portuguese authorities at Goa, the object of which was to engage them in an alliance against the British government. Portugal was to furnish an army to recover for the rajah the Mahratta territories, of which the confederacy had been dispossessed by the English; and when the task was completed, they were to receive a due reward in money or territory, or both. It is obvious that these designs were too wild, ridiculous, and extravagant, to be entertained by the most ill-informed European; but they were not beyond the belief of an Oriental prince, who indulged in follies which entitled him to be ranked among the weakest of his imbecile order.

With Appa Sahib, the infamous ex-rajah of Nagpore, the rajah of Sattara appears for several years to have carried on a treacherous intercourse. The fact of his tampering with soldiers in the British service seems hardly more doubtful. Certain native officers in the Company's service professed to have received, from a Brahmin, communications indicative of a powerfully hostile feeling towards the British government. These communications being repeated, the officers reported them to their superiors, and were instructed by them as to

the course they were to pursue. They were subsequently admitted to the presence of the dewan, and, ultimately, it was said, to that of the rajah himself, whose language, at the interview, was similar to that which had previously been held by the dewan and the Brahmin. It cannot be denied that upon the face of it much of the above statement is improbable, but though the opportunity was afforded him, the rajah was unable to shake it; and the improbability is greatly lessened on recollecting the weak and wild character of the prince against whom the charge was made. Further, the difficulties of disbelief appear to be greater even than those of belief. Part of what was stated was certainly true; and though it has been alleged that the scheme was intended to advance the interests of the brother of the rajah, at his expense, no reasonable hope of promoting such an end by such means could at the time have been entertained; indeed, the possibility of connecting them would almost have been inconceivable, and this view of the matter is more incredible than that which implicates the rajah. But whether he were guilty or innocent of the last charge, he had unquestionably deprived himself of all claim to plead against the English government the obligations of the treaty under which he had exchanged the condition of a titled slave for the exercise of actual sovereignty; for the conditions of that treaty he had notoriously broken. Still, there was a disposition to view his case with favour, and he might have preserved that power which he had abused, if he had not unhappily followed the example of other weak and infatuated Indian princes. He distrusted the British government, but he gave credit to the professions of certain European advisers; to them he committed himself and his interests, and it will be seen with what success. There was the best disposition to treat him with kindness and indulgence. At the time when it became necessary to dispose of the rajah's case, a new governor arrived at Bombay. He was a man who in former years, when employed as a servant of the Company in diplomatic duties, had established for himself the character of being eminently the friend of native princes and of the native community. No man ever enjoyed greater popularity in India than Sir James Carnac, who had now returned to take the chief place in the government of Bombay. He arrived there on the 30th of May, and on the 19th of June he recorded a minute expressive of his opinion on the case of the rajah of Satara. This paper commenced with an avowal that the criminality of the rajah had been clearly proved; and the governor then proceeded to inquire how, under the circumstances, the offender should be dealt with. Three modes of treating the case were pointed out: first, by subjecting the rajah to a formal trial, and after inquiry made and sentence passed, visiting him with appropriate punishment; secondly, by proceeding in the mode

by which wrongs between independent states are avenged—commencing hostilities, taking possession of the rajah's territory, and acting as circumstances might justify under the right of conquest; thirdly, by bringing the rajah to a sense of his errors by remonstrance, and then giving him amnesty for the past, in the hope that his future conduct might be more worthy of his station and his relation to the British government. To the adoption of the first course several objections existed. There was no ordinary tribunal to which the rajah could be made amenable, and a special one must have been created for the purpose. Against such a tribunal, however, constituted, clamour would be loud. Further, the competency of such a tribunal might have been plausibly questioned. By assuming the power of subjecting the rajah to a legal trial, the British government would have placed him in the situation of a subject, whereas he had always been treated as a sovereign.

If a hostile course were inevitable, the governor declared that he should much prefer the second course—that of proceeding against the rajah as a prince bound by treaty, but who, having violated the conditions of the engagement, was at the mercy of the other party thereto, which party was at liberty to enforce its rights by war or otherwise. But the necessity for extreme measures, he thought, did not exist. The rajah, he remarked, could not be regarded as a very formidable foe to the British empire, and those with whom he had been connected were as little formidable as himself. No results, it was observed, have followed, "except the transfer of money to agents and adventurers"—those standing courses to Indian princes. The rajah had, indeed, as was stated in the minute, manifested great weakness and no inconsiderable portion of ingratitude; but it was added, "we have nothing to fear, and we can afford to act with generosity." Under the influence of these views, Sir James Carnac gave a decided preference to the mildest of the three courses of proceeding, and he suggested either that the resident should make a fitting representation to the rajah, or that this duty should be discharged by the governor in person, the latter course being, in his judgment, more advisable. This being done, and the admonition duly received and responded to by the rajah, it was intended that he should be frankly forgiven.

On the following day the governor recorded another minute, descriptive of the mode in which the intentions of the government towards the rajah of Satara should be carried into effect. The spirit in which it was proposed to deal with the offending rajah may be understood from the following passage, which occurs near the commencement of the minute:—"It will be inconsistent with our proposed amnesty for the past, to make any demand which can justly be regarded as a punishment; and under this impression I at once abandon

the measure which appears to have been thought of by the government of the late Sir Robert Grant, of requiring the rajah to maintain a contingent of horse for the service of the British government. Our demands should be limited as much as possible, and should be confined only to those which will again place the rajah in the precise situation intended by the treaty of September, 1819, and will insure the most efficient protection to all persons who have become obnoxious to him in consequence of the part they have taken in recent proceedings." The views of Sir James Carnac were adopted by the other members of the Bombay government (though, as to the important question of how the rajah should be treated, opposed to their own); and the governor-general in council having sanctioned the grant of amnesty to the rajah, the proposed conditions of the grant, and the visit of the governor of Bombay to Sattara, Sir James Carnac set out with a sanguine hope of rescuing the rajah from the dangerous position in which he had been placed by the evil counsels of designing men, and of restoring friendly relations between him and the British government. He arrived at Sattara on the 22nd of August, and on the 23rd had his first interview with the rajah. He explained in firm but conciliatory language the position in which the rajah stood, and the intentions of the British government towards him; and among much admirable advice, not the least valuable portion was that referred to in the following passage of the report made by Sir James Carnac to his council on the subject of this interview:—"I recalled to his recollection the warning long ago given to him by his friend, Mr. Elphinstone, against placing his trust and confidence in vakeels and low and intriguing agents, and earnestly urged him to discard from his councils the numerous agencies he had established." The conditions of the intended amnesty had been embodied in a memorandum drawn up in the Mahratta language for the information of the rajah, and this was placed in his hands. This paper, after referring to the infractions of the existing treaty by the rajah declared the readiness of the British government entirely to overlook them on the conditions which follow—that the rajah should now bind himself strictly and in good faith to act up to the articles of the treaty of 1819; that he should agree to certain specified arrangements affecting the interests of his brother; that he should dismiss from his councils and exclude from his territories an offensive and dangerous minister, who was named; and confirm a guarantee of safety given by the British government to certain parties. These were the whole of the conditions demanded from the rajah—and these he rejected. No sacrifice was required—no penalty inflicted; but the rajah, with a perverseness rarely equalled, spurned the friendship which was tendered him on terms neither burdensome nor dishonourable. He

demanding in what particulars he had violated the treaty of 1819, and on the three points being stated—the intrigues with the Portuguese government at Goa, the holding treacherous intercourse with the ex-rajah of Nagpore, and the tampering with the troops of the British government—he made no remark on either the first or third, thus tacitly admitting his guilt on those points. On the second, he took a course which would have been very proper in an advocate defending a client on legal and technical grounds, but which was scarcely consistent with a consciousness of innocence when adopted by a principal in a conference not partaking in any way of the nature of a legal inquiry. Some intercepted letters from the ex-rajah of Nagpore to him being adverted to, he did not deny having been engaged in correspondence with that person, but dwelt upon the fact of no answers from him being producible. A second interview took place, but with no better result.

The rajah, after a short interval, signified a desire again to visit the governor of Bombay; a third interview was granted, and it was the last. The obstinacy of the misguided prince led him still to resist the terms offered him, although the main condition insisted on was only a promise of adherence to the treaty by which he was previously bound—the remaining articles being of comparatively trivial import. It was, however, in all probability, that first article, though it enforced no new obligation, that constituted the chief obstacle to an amicable conclusion of the dispute, for he observed—not to the governor, but to the resident—that by assenting to it, he should be reduced to the condition of a mamlutdar farmer, or manager of a district. The governor saw him no more after the interview which has been last noticed, but the resident, Colonel Ovens, waited on him to receive his final decision. That decision was confirmatory of his previous resolution, and the necessary result was, that the rajah descended from the throne, and took up his residence within the British dominions; his brother being elevated to the place which he had quitted.

The rajah was the victim of interested parasites, some of whom seduced him into acts indicative of hostile feelings to his British protectors, while others encouraged him to persevere in repelling the hand of forgiveness stretched out to save him, by making professions, which they knew to be false, of power to enable him to defy the local government, and by holding out expectations of success in such a course, which they knew to be fallacious. Of the amount of the money expended in enriching these persons no precise account can be given, but it must have been very large. The number of his agents was almost incredible. He had European agents and native agents—agents at Bombay—agents at Calcutta—agents in England; two missions having been despatched thither.

The local press was freely employed to revile the government and support the rajah, and Englishmen did not hesitate to take the unhappy prince's money in payment for exertions directed against the interests of their own country, and the safety of its Indian dominions.

The cause of the rajah was taken up in England with much warmth, and without doubt from different motives—motives varying from those of the highest and most honourable character to those of the meanest and most despicable origin. But when the resources of argumentation were exhausted, it could not be shown that the rajah had not violated the treaty by which he held his throne. The only question that could with fairness be raised was, whether or not he should be forgiven. Upon this point, however, the advocates on both sides might have suspended discussion, for the rajah obstinately refused to be forgiven.

We pass from the fortunes of a petty prince—the feeble representative of a robber dynasty, which rose from obscurity to grandeur, and then declined into insignificance with meteoric rapidity—to events of greater dignity and greater interest; events important in themselves and in their widely extended relations. To render the narrative intelligible, some reference to treaties and negotiations of earlier date will be requisite.

The safety of British India on the westward had frequently been an object of great anxiety to its rulers. The countries intervening between Persia and the Indus were inhabited by a rude and barbarous but withal a warlike population, well calculated by their predatory habits, their poverty, and their recklessness, to excite the alarm of a comparatively opulent neighbour. India had more than once felt the evils of their visitations, and the Affghans were remembered as men whose trade was war, and whose constant divisions formed the only effectual check on their ambition and military taste. Some years before the termination of the eighteenth century, an Affghan chief named Zemaun Shah had begun to threaten the British frontier, and those threats were periodically repeated and withdrawn as circumstances dictated. The attention of the Marquis Wellesley was directed to this source of danger at an early period of the administration of that distinguished nobleman; and an attempt to invade India, which might have occasioned much both of trouble and expense, if nothing more, was foiled by exciting the alarm of Zemaun Shah for the safety of his own dominions. At this time danger to British India was apprehended from the machinations of the French; and to avert evil from either quarter, it was deemed desirable to draw Persia into a close alliance with the British government. This was effected. In 1801 a treaty was negotiated by Sir John Malcolm, by which the Persian Shah engaged to exclude the French from settling in any part of his dominions, and to hold the Affghans

in check in the event of their attempting to invade India.

The latter cause for apprehension was soon removed. Zemaun Shah was deposed, and, according to Asiatic custom, blinded, in the year in which the treaty with Persia was concluded, Zemaun Shah having treated in the same manner his elder brother, Hoomayon, whose throne he had usurped. The conqueror of Zemaun Shah, and author of his sufferings, was another brother, named Mahmood, who speedily found himself engaged in a contest for the throne with a fourth brother, named Shoojah-ool-Moolk, who finally triumphed; but, with unusual clemency, abstained from inflicting on the man whom he had vanquished the penalty of blindness. The country, however, continued torn by factions and divisions, and Shoojah-ool-Moolk tottered on his throne from the moment that he ascended it.

While Afghanistan was thus ceasing to be formidable, Persia was relaxing in her fidelity, and, finally, even the affectation of good faith was abandoned. The Persian sovereign, in 1806, sent a mission to Napoleon, then in the zenith of his power, and with all Europe, England excepted, prostrate at his feet. Two years afterwards a French mission arrived in Persia, with the avowed object of establishing such relations with that country as might aid the views which Napoleon had long cherished, of striking a blow at the British power in India, and it was received with extraordinary marks of favour and distinction. Lord Minto, a watchful and excellent guardian of the great interests committed to his charge, thereupon prepared to counteract the designs of the French Emperor. The alliance of Persia had previously been sought to check Afghanistan, and oppose a barrier to France. A similar connection with Afghanistan was now meditated in order to oppose the combined efforts of France and Persia. Prudent in his policy, Lord Minto was also happy in the choice of an instrument for carrying it into effect. It was resolved to despatch a mission to Cabool, and the charge of it was intrusted to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, then a very young man, but since eminently distinguished by many important services. Mr. Elphinstone was cordially received, and concluded a treaty with Shoojah-ool-Moolk, by which that prince bound himself to resist any attempts which might be made by the French and Persians to advance through his territories upon India.

While preparation was thus made to vanquish the enemy in Afghanistan, should they approach, measures to break the confederacy were not neglected. Endeavours were made, both from India and from home, to counteract the baleful influence which the French had acquired in Persia, and to detach that country from its inauspicious connection with England's bitter and irreconcilable foe. Sir John Malcolm arrived at Bushire, commissioned by the governor-general of India, almost simulta-

neously with the arrival of Sir Harford Jones in Persia, as plenipotentiary direct from the British Crown. The former met with an uncourteous reception, was refused permission to proceed to the capital, and directed to communicate with inferior authorities. With this he declined to comply, and having remonstrated without success, he returned to Calcutta without effecting anything, or enjoying an opportunity of effecting anything. Sir Harford Jones met with better fortune. He advanced to Tehran, and entered into negotiations which terminated in the conclusion of a preliminary treaty, by which the Persian monarch declared all treaties and agreements which he had previously made with any of the powers of Europe null and void from the date of the articles then concluded; and that he would not permit any European force to pass through his country towards India. In the event of Persia being invaded by any European power, Great Britain was to furnish a military force, or, in lieu thereof, "a subsidy, with warlike ammunitions, such as guns, muskets, &c., and officers, to the amount that may be to the advantage of both parties, for the expulsion of the force invading." The number of the forces to be furnished, or the amount of the subsidy and contribution of ammunition, were to be regulated by the definitive treaty to which that under notice was preliminary. One immediate effect of the conclusion of the treaty was the dismissal of the French mission. A treaty based on this preliminary arrangement was subsequently entered into by Sir Gore Ouseley, but, the British government requiring certain changes, the treaty actually deserving the name of definitive was not concluded till November, 1814, when it received the signatures of Mr. Morier and Mr. Ellis, on the part of Great Britain. In this treaty the renunciation of European alliances was somewhat modified, being confined to nations in a state of hostility with Great Britain. No individuals of such European nations entertaining a design of invading India, or being at enmity with Great Britain, were to be permitted to enter Persia; and if any European power should seek to invade India by way of Khorasan, Tataristan, Bokhara, Samarcand, or other routes, the King of Persia was, to the extent of his power, to engage the kings and governors of those countries to oppose such invasion, "either by the fear of his armies or by conciliatory measures." The King of Great Britain was not to interfere in disputes between the princes, nobles, and chiefs of Persia; and it was further considerably provided that, "if one of the contending parties should ever offer a province of Persia, with a view of obtaining assistance, the English government shall not agree to such a proposal, nor, by adopting it, possess themselves of such part of Persia." It was laid down that the purpose of the treaty was strictly defensive—that it was concluded only for the purpose of repelling aggression—

and that the word "aggression" was to mean an attack upon the territories of another state. This, with reference to the relative situation of Russia and Persia, formed a very proper introduction to the mention of the former country, and the mode of determining the respective limits of the two. This it was prescribed should be effected "according to the admission of Great Britain, Persia, and Russia." The amount of subsidy to be paid to Persia, if invaded from Europe, was fixed at two hundred thousand tomanes annually; but it was not to be paid if the war were provoked by any aggression on the part of Persia; and, as it was granted solely for military purposes, the English minister was to be satisfied of its being duly applied. The Persian government was to be at liberty to employ European officers to discipline its troops, provided such officers did not belong to nations at war or enmity with Great Britain. If any European power should be engaged in war with Persia while at peace with England, the latter state was to endeavour to establish a friendly understanding between the belligerents; but if unsuccessful, was to assist Persia with troops or money, in conformity with the preceding articles, for so long a time as that country should continue at war. The subsidy was to be paid early, to enable the party entitled to receive it to adhere to what was stated to be "the custom of Persia," the practice of paying the troops six months in advance—a custom the prudence of which in general cases may be questioned, though its liberality cannot be denied, but which certainly differs widely from the ordinary custom of Asiatic states, that being, not to pay their troops "six months in advance," but to suffer the pay to remain many months in arrear. The treaty contained two articles relating to Afghanistan. By one, the Persian sovereign engaged to send an army against the Afghans, should that people be at war with the British government, the expense to be defrayed by that government—the extent of assistance, mode of affording it, and manner of payment, to be arranged when the occasion might arise. By the other article, the British were restrained from interfering in the case of war between the Afghans and Persians, except their mediation should be solicited by both parties. Further, it was stipulated that, if any "Persian subject of distinction, showing signs of hostility and rebellion, should take refuge in the British dominions, the English government, on receiving an intimation from that of Persia, should (in the nervous language of the treaty) "turn him out" of the country, and if he should refuse to leave it, arrest and send him to Persia. If, previously to the arrival of the fugitive, the British government should be aware of the wish of the Persian authorities that the stranger should not be received, his entrance was to be prohibited, and if the prohibition were disregarded, the penalty denounced against disobedience in the former case was to be incurred.

The obligations of this article were declared to be reciprocal. In the last place came an article providing that the British government should assist Persia with ships and troops in the Gulf, if required, and if convenient and practicable; the expenses of such ships and troops being defrayed by Persia, and the ships being restricted to certain ports, to be specified, for their anchorage. Such was the treaty which, after five years of negotiation, was concluded. It remained in force, without alteration, till 1828, when the court of Persia found itself in the condition not uncommon with Oriental states, pressed by demands which it knew not how to meet, and ready to sacrifice prospective advantage for present relief. Persia had been engaged in a disastrous war with Russia, and had been amerced by the latter power in a heavy fine. The British government had felt inconvenience from the article of the treaty by which they were bound to afford military or pecuniary aid to Persia when engaged in war, and this appeared a fitting opportunity to get rid of it. An overture for that purpose was made, and the Persian prince, in consideration of receiving a sum of money to aid in discharging the claim of Russia, reluctantly consented to annul the fourth article of the treaty under which the obligation of the British government arose, as well as the preceding article which related to the boundaries of Russia and Persia, and gave Great Britain a voice in determining them.

A few years more rolled on, during which Persia became gradually weaker, and Russia gained a proportionate increase of strength. Indeed, the rise and extension of the Russian empire are among the most remarkable facts of modern times, or even of any time. The foundations of that empire were laid by Peter the Great as late as the conclusion of the seventeenth century. Before this time Muscovy was a petty principedom, obscure as it was barbarous, and not recognized as a member of the community of civilized and Christian states in the west. Since that period, the course of the Muscovite power has been, with occasional interruptions, a career of aggression and conquest. The Czar Peter was a man of extraordinary energy, and as unscrupulous as he was energetic. In every direction he sought the means of extending his territory, wealth, and power. Of his wars with Sweden and Turkey it is foreign to the purpose of this work to speak; but his designs upon Persia and eventually upon the trade of India—for beyond the possession of its trade even the sanguine mind of the czar could at that period hardly have speculated—require some notice. Peter sent an embassy to Persia, and secured a monopoly of the export of silk from that country. The Persian dominions were then fallen into ruin under an imbecile ruler, and Peter thought the opportunity favourable for obtaining territorial as well as commercial advantages. Under the pretence of assisting

the shah against some rebel subjects, he entered the country, seized some of its most desirable districts, and retained possession in spite of the attempts of the Persians to regain them. Having achieved this measure of success, he returned in triumph to Moscow. The sultan of Persia was now a prisoner in the hands of the Affghans. Peter undertook to relieve him, and, in consideration of this service, obtained a formal cession of the provinces which he had conquered, as well as of several others. The treaty was not ratified by the sovereign of Persia; but Peter, notwithstanding, held it good so far as it gave him a title to keep possession of the provinces thereby ceded to him, though he entirely passed over that portion of the treaty which imposed on him, as the consideration for what he gained, the duty of rescuing the shah from the hands of his enemies. The situation of Persia was now wretched in the extreme. The Affghans were in possession of one portion, the Russians of another, and the Turks of a third, when Peter died. But this event brought no change to the fortunes of the unhappy country, for after his death the Russian and Turkish governments proceeded coolly to settle the boundaries of their own dominions, as well as those of the Persian monarch, without calling the last-named power to any part in the discussion or decision of the matter.

The next step taken by Russia was remarkable. The rulers of that country had been unable to establish their authority in certain provinces which they claimed under the treaty which the shah had disavowed. They now transferred their right to those provinces, such as it was, to the head of the Affghan invaders whom the Russians were bound to expel, and as the condition of the territorial cession made to them, and in consideration of the sacrifice, if it can be so called, they obtained the concurrence of the Affghans in their retention of the remainder. But the designs of Russia soon afterwards received a considerable check. Nadir Shah arose, expelled the Affghans from Persia, and became its monarch. He claimed the whole of the ancient possessions of Persia, and Russia, not deeming it prudent to contest his claim, quietly abandoned all territory south of the Caucasus. But a dominion which rests on the personal character of the sovereign is necessarily unstable, and the death of Nadir Shah opened again the field for the exercise of Russian ambition. Rival princes of Georgia, an old dependency of Persia, sought the assistance of Russia, and though none was afforded, a series of proceedings of singularly insidious character followed, which ultimately led to the absorption of that province into the leviathan empire. The success of Russia against Turkey enabled her to command the Caspian Sea; this afforded additional means for fulfilling the designs long entertained against Persia; and those who have learned

with what perseverance Russia pursues her schemes of aggression will believe that they were not neglected.

The Russians and Persians were soon to come into actual conflict, but it was not the long series of aggression already noted which was the immediate occasion of it. The conflict could not fail to come sooner or later, but it was precipitated by the conduct of a rebellious vassal of the Persian king, who held the government of Erivan. The shah advancing with an army to reduce this person to obedience, the latter solicited the aid of a Russian force, which was promptly afforded him. At this time, it is to be observed, Russia and Persia were at peace; but this circumstance formed no impediment to the grant of the required assistance, seeing that it was attended by the prospect of aggrandizement, the rebel having promised to deliver up to the Russians the fortress which he commanded. Before arriving at Erivan, the Russian army met and defeated that of the shah; but on reaching the place, the surrender of which was looked to as the fruit of their victory, it was found that from some cause the rebel governor had altered his mind. He refused to admit the friends whose visit he had solicited, and they, being unable to maintain the siege, were compelled to retire. This was in 1804, and the war thus commenced by the Russians without any provocation but the lust of conquest, continued to be carried on in a desultory manner and with variable success till 1814. It was during its continuance that the diplomatic contest for the friendship of Persia took place between the English and French, and ended in the triumph of the latter. The course of European politics soon afterwards brought Great Britain into close alliance with Russia, and on this ground, as well as, it may be presumed, from a desire to prevent the addition to the Russian empire of the whole dominions of Persia, the British ambassador in the latter country interposed his good offices to establish the relations of peace. It was indeed an extraordinary fact, that Great Britain should be subsidizing an ally for the purpose of maintaining war with another ally of the country furnishing the subsidy. By the treaty thus brought about Persia surrendered to Russia a vast extent of territory, and engaged to maintain no navy on the Caspian. The conduct of the negotiation was highly characteristic of Russian policy. The basis proposed in the treaty was that known in diplomatic language as the "*uti possidetis*." This would have given to the Russians the right to a district which, for special reasons, the Persian government were most anxious to rescue from their grasp. The Persian plenipotentiary accordingly declined to accept the basis unless Talish were excepted. The Russian negotiator declared that his instructions did not allow him to vary or modify the basis; but to induce the other party to accept of it without qualification, he promised to procure from his

court the restitution of the disputed district as an act of grace and favour. The bait was taken, the treaty was signed,—the Persian government then looked for the fulfilment of the Russian plenipotentiary's promise, but it is needless to say that they looked in vain. The British ambassador at St. Petersburg remonstrated; his remonstrances produced all the effect that might be expected, and no more. From this time an uneasy state of feeling continued to exist between Russia and Persia, until, after the lapse of some years, it terminated in open war, a war most disastrous to Persia—that country being compelled to purchase peace by the sacrifice of further portions of territory to a great extent. Having gained thus much by war, the Russian government, according to its accustomed mode, resorted to the use of the more insidious and not less efficient modes of aggrandizement afforded by the arts of intrigue. Having laid down her arms for a season, every effort was made to establish the influence of Russia within Persia and beyond it, and her counsels were not less fatal than her sword.

These counsels became an object of alarm to Great Britain, and most justly. At the time under notice, the Persian government was altogether in the hands of that of Russia, and the intrigues of the latter to extend its influence beyond Persia, in the direction of India, were notorious. Some brief explanation of the circumstances of the intervening country will here be necessary.

Mention has been made of a prince named Shoojah-ool-Moolk as having succeeded, in opposition to his brother, Mahmood, in establishing himself on the throne of Afghanistan, and who ruled, or professed to rule, that country when it was visited by the British mission under Mr. Elphinstone. Shortly after the departure of that mission, Shoojah was compelled to yield to the better fortune of Mahmood, who escaped from confinement, and asserted his claim in arms. The defeated Shoojah fled to Lahore, where Runjeet Singh received him cordially, plundered him unscrupulously, and evinced a strong desire to retain possession of his person. Shoojah, after a time, escaped into the British dominions, where he was received in a manner becoming the character of the government.

But Mahmood was not to enjoy without molestation the throne which he had regained, or rather which had been regained for him. He mainly owed his success to a chief named Futeh Khan, of whom, on account probably of the services which he had rendered, Kamram the son of Mahmood, a man of dark and cruel character, became jealous. The vindictive prince recommended that Futeh Khan should be arrested and deprived of sight. Mahmood, with the measure of gratitude common to Oriental despots, complied with his son's request. The chief was subjected to the infliction suggested, and subsequently was murdered with circumstances of

atrocious cruelty. Futteh Khan left behind those who were not slow to avenge his death; who probably, indeed, were glad of a pretext for shaking off their allegiance to an ungrateful lord. A revolution, effected by the brothers of the murdered minister, deprived Mahmood of the larger portion of his dominions, and drove him to Herat, where he succeeded in maintaining his authority over a limited extent of territory. There he died, leaving his diminished power to his heir, Kamram, the guilty author of the sufferings and death of Futteh Khan, and of the subsequent ill-fortune which attended the house and throne of Mahmood. The dominions alienated by the revolution were divided among the brothers of Futteh Khan, one of whom, Dost Mahomed Khan, the most able and active among them, reigned in Kabool. A part of the country was held in a sort of common sovereignty by other brothers residing at Kandahar. Shah Shoojah twice unsuccessfully attempted to recover the throne from which Mahmood had been expelled; but Ranjeet Singh succeeded in wresting Peshawur from the grasp of the rebel chiefs, and annexing it to his own dominions.

This dismemberment was not the only one to be apprehended. Persia, encouraged by Russia, preferred certain claims, and prepared to maintain them. The nature and even the extent of these claims were somewhat vague. They seem to have rested partly on pretensions originating in the conquests of Nadir Shah, partly on the payment of tribute to Persia on certain occasions by Kamram, the ruler of Herat, and partly on certain engagements entered into by that prince while the prince-royal of Persia had been employed in reducing Khorasan to obedience. Upon these latter grounds the Persian claims would have been limited to Herat and its dependencies, but according to the first they extended to Kandahar and Ghuznee. With reference to the dependency of Persia upon Russia, it was obviously not for the interest of Great Britain that these claims should be pressed to any, even the smallest, extent. The danger is clearly stated in a memorandum drawn up in the month of January, 1836, by Mr. Ellis, the British minister in Persia, for the information of his government:—"The Shah of Persia lays claim to the sovereignty of Afghanistan, as far as Ghuznee, and is fully determined to attempt the conquest of Herat in the spring. Unfortunately, the conduct of Kamram Meerza, in violating the engagements entered into with his royal highness the late Abbas Meerza, and in permitting his vizier, Yab-Mahomed Khan, to occupy part of Seistan, has given the Shah a full justification for commencing hostilities. The success of the Shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia, and their minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution. The motive cannot be mistaken. Herat once annexed to Persia may become, according to

the commercial treaty, the residence of a Russian consular agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan. Indeed, in the present state of the relations between Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied that the progress of the former in Afghanistan is tantamount to the advance of the latter, and ought to receive every opposition from the British government that the obligations of public faith will permit; but while the British government is free to assist Persia in the assertion of her sovereign pretensions in Afghanistan, Great Britain is precluded by the ninth article of the existing treaty from interfering between the Persians and the Afghans, unless called upon to do so by both parties; and, therefore, as long as the treaty remains in force, the British government must submit to the approach of Russian influence, through the instrumentality of Persian conquests, to the very frontier of our Indian empire." War between Persia and Herat followed, under the auspices of Russia, and the anxiety of the British authorities was consequently increased. Russia, indeed, affected to disclaim the share imputed to it in originating the war, and copies of despatches from the Russian minister in Persia to his government were furnished to discredit the report. But despatches are framed with various objects. In this case circumstances sufficiently indicated what were the views of the Russian government. While its ministers were manufacturing show despatches to disarm the jealousy of England, they were not only inciting Persia to war with Herat, but actually engaging in the contest and aiding its prolongation by advances of money.

To counteract these efforts became a matter of pressing importance, and the practicability of converting eastern Afghanistan into a barrier for the defence of British India—a project previously entertained by Lord Minto—began to be seriously considered. With a view of effecting this object, or at least of ascertaining whether or not it could be effected, a mission, professedly commercial, was in September, 1837, dispatched from India under Captain Alexander Burnes, who had some previous acquaintance with the country and its rulers. When Captain Burnes arrived at Kabool, in the exercise of his functions, he found Persian and Russian intrigue actively at work in Afghanistan. Communications were passing between Kandahar and Persia, and further, between the chiefs of the former place and the Russian ambassador at the Persian court. These latter communications, it is said, originated with a fugitive from Herat, who, at Tehran, became the guest of the Russian ambassador. This person, possessing some influence with the Kandahar chiefs, suggested to them that it would be for their advantage to address the representative of the autocrat. It is stated that they did, to the effect of expressing a

strong desire to enter into a friendly connection with Russia; of representing their grievances, more especially the occupation of Peshawur by Runjeet Singh, and of soliciting pecuniary assistance to enable them to expel the invader. It is needless to say, that the ambassador did not afford them the required aid, but he expressed great joy at the receipt of the communication, treated the messenger who brought it with extraordinary distinction, and dispatched a courteous answer with the usual oriental accompaniment of presents. The epistolary favours of the Russian ambassador were not confined to Kandahar. He addressed a letter to Dost Mahomed Khan, the chief of Kabool, and this appears to have been unsolicited. Dost Mahomed had sent a messenger to the Shah of Persia, for the purpose, as it appears, of asking assistance against Runjeet Singh, whose occupation of Peshawur was, by all the brothers, regarded with extreme aversion. It does not seem that any overture was made to the Russian ambassador, but this did not prevent that personage from expressing his sympathy with Dost Mahomed. "The Russian ambassador, who is always with the Shah," writes the servant of the chief of Kabool, "has sent you a letter, which I inclose. The substance of his verbal message to you is, that if the Shah does everything you want, so much the better; and, if not, the Russian government will furnish you with everything wanting. The object of the Russian elchee by this message is, to have a road to the English, and for this they are very anxious. He is waiting for your answer, and I am sure he will serve you." The road to the English which the Russians wished to have was, of course, a road to India.

A new agent soon appeared in the field, in the person of a Russian emissary, who came to Kabool armed with credentials from the Count Simonich, the Russian ambassador at Tehran, and recommended by a letter from the Shah. The communications made by this person were justly characterized by Captain Burnes, to whom they were reported from two distinct but trustworthy sources, as "of a startling nature." He informed the chieftain, at whose court he appeared, that he was commissioned to express the sincere sympathy of the Russian government with the difficulties under which Dost Mahomet laboured; that they were willing to assist in repelling Runjeet Singh, would furnish a sum of money for the purpose, and renew it annually, expecting in return the chieftain's good offices. Even the means of remittance were adverted to, the Russian government undertaking to convey the treasure to Bokhara, whence Dost Mahomed was expected to find his own means of transit. It is not necessary to believe that there was any intention of sending the money thus proffered. The promise would answer the purpose for a while, and in the mean time there was opportunity for considering of some new device.

At Kandahar the combined intrigues of Russia and Persia succeeded in effecting the conclusion of a treaty with the Sirdars, which provided for the transfer to those rulers of the territory of Herat. It is true that it was yet unconquered, but this fact appears to have been no obstacle to the success of the negotiation. The treaty was guaranteed by Count Simonich in the following high-sounding terms:—"I, who am the minister plenipotentiary of the exalted government of Russia, will be guarantee that neither on the part of his majesty the Shah of Persia, nor on the part of the powerful Sirdars, shall there occur any deviation from, or violation of, this entire treaty and these agreements."

While Russian influence was thus in the ascendant, the British mission to the Persian court was subjected to such treatment as compelled its chief, Mr. McNeill, to withdraw. At Bushire and other places, the servants of the British government were exposed to insult and violence, and the continuance of friendly relations between Great Britain and Persia becoming daily more uncertain, it was expedient to make a demonstration in the Gulf; and, accordingly, the island of Karak was occupied by a British force.

Captain Burnes continued at Kabool, but his labours did not prosper. Dost Mahomed Khan was obviously playing off the British and Russian missions against each other, and endeavouring to ascertain from which party he could procure the best terms. The Russians had clearly the advantage in one respect—its agents did not scruple to promise anything and everything that Dost Mahomed desired. The servants of the British government were more scrupulous; and, being able to promise nothing but that which it was intended to perform, they stood in a position very unfavourable to success as compared to that of their rivals. The recovery of Peshawur was a great object of desire to Dost Mahomed. Vickovich, the Russian agent, promised that his government should interfere, for the purpose of gratifying him. Captain Burnes could make no such promise; and Lord Auckland, in a letter to the chief of Kabool, distinctly intimated that the restoration of Peshawur was not to be expected. This seems to have given the finishing stroke to the hope of conducting the negotiation to a successful issue; it was protracted for some time longer, but it was evident that nothing was to be looked for from its continuance, and, finally, Captain Burnes left the country.

The influence of Russia had thus defeated British policy in Afghanistan as well as in Persia. Captain Burnes had, some time before his departure, formed and expressed very decided opinions on the progress of Russian influence in Afghanistan, and the consequent danger to the British government.

On one occasion he observed that the proceedings of Russia were open to so much

remark, that after Count Nesselrode's disavowals, she must either disavow her emissaries or be made responsible for their proceedings. She chose the former course—Vickovich, the agent, who was so active at Kabul, was, upon representations made from the British government, recalled. Count Simonich, who had taken the lead in directing the war against Herat, and had guaranteed the treaty for its transfer to Kandahar, was recalled—or, according to the soft rendering of the Russian government, his period of service had expired, it happening most opportunely that when the remonstrance of Great Britain was received, another officer had been previously appointed to supersede the count—and the emperor refused to confirm the guarantee which had been given to the treaty with Kandahar.

The British minister in Persia, Mr. McNeill, an able and indefatigable servant of the government which he served, had constantly pointed out the injurious tendency of the course taken by Count Simonich. What was the conduct of the Russian ministry? They denied that Count Simonich had acted as was imputed, and alleged that the British minister was misled. This allegation was refuted. Other expedients were then resorted to and persevered in as long as they were tenable; when all resources of this nature were exhausted, the ambassador was withdrawn under arrangements pretended to have been made some months before. The cool audacity which characterizes Russian diplomacy is perhaps one of the elements of its success.

To check the approach of that formidable power, the British government sought to establish such relations with the ruling powers at Kabul and Kandahar as should be sufficient for the purpose; but the attempt failed—the "captain of Cossacks" was too strong for the English functionary with whom he was brought in opposition, and Russian influence was obviously predominant in those states as well as in Persia. The question, then, to be decided was. Shall those countries be calmly given up to the enemies of England, or shall some other means of establishing British influence in them be resorted to? The government of India determined on the latter course; and as the most obvious method of promoting the end in view, resolved to lend the expelled Afghan prince, Shoojah-cool-Moolk, its aid in another attempt to regain his throne.

To facilitate the objects of the meditated expedition, a tripartite treaty was concluded, the parties thereto being the British government of India, the head of the Seik state, Runjeet Singh, and the prince who was once more, under the auspices of the great European power of Asia, about to attempt the conquest of his lost dominions, the Shah Shoojah. This treaty was partially the same with one concluded in 1834, between Runjeet Singh and Shoojah-cool-Moolk, the execution of the

provisions of which had been suspended, "for certain reasons," as was delicately, though somewhat indefinitely, intimated in the preamble of the new treaty. To notice the chief stipulations of this treaty will be sufficient. One of the most important parts of it was a disclaimer, by Shah Shoojah, on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, of the territories, on either bank of the river Indus, then possessed by Runjeet Singh. These, including Peshawur and its dependencies, were "considered to be the property and to form the estate of the maharajah;" the shah solemnly declaring, "that he neither had, nor would have, any concern with them;" but that they belonged "to the maharajah and his posterity from generation to generation."

The prejudices of the Seiks were propitiated by a stipulation, to the effect that, when the armies of the two states (Afghanistan and Lahore) should be assembled at the same place, the slaughter of kine should not be permitted. The treaty contained some commercial provisions, some stipulations as to presents and points of ceremony, others relating to the assistance to be afforded by the allies to each other, to the payment of subsidies in consideration of military aid, and to the division of booty. Shah Shoojah renounced all claims, territorial and pecuniary, upon Sindh, on condition of receiving a sum to be determined under the mediation of the British government; he bound himself to abstain from molesting his nephew, the ruler of Herat, to refrain from entering into negotiations with any foreign state without the knowledge and consent of the British and Seik governments, and to oppose, by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability, any person having a desire to invade either the Seik or the British dominions. This treaty was signed at Lahore, on the 26th June, 1838.

To place one of the parties to the treaty in the position to which he aspired, and to which his right was recognized by the other parties, was a task yet to be performed. The military preparations consequent on the diplomatic arrangements concluded by the three powers were on a scale commensurate with the magnitude of the objects in view. Bengal and Bombay were each to furnish a portion of the British force, and the command of the whole was to be intrusted to Sir Henry Fane, commander-in-chief in India. From Bengal were provided two troops of horse and three companies of foot artillery, the whole under the command of Brigadier Graham. The Bengal cavalry brigade, under Brigadier Arnold, was formed of the 16th lancers and the 2nd and 3rd light cavalry. One division of infantry, comprehending three brigades (1st, 2nd, and 3rd), was commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton; another, consisting of two brigades (4th and 5th), by Major-General Duncan. The first brigade was composed of her Majesty's 13th light infantry and of the 16th and 48th native infantry; it was under Brigadier Sale.

The second brigade, commanded by Major-General Nott, contained the 2nd, 31st, 42nd, and 43rd regiments of native infantry. The third, under Brigadier Dennis, comprehended the Buffs and the 2nd and 27th native infantry. The fourth brigade, composed of the Bengal European regiment and the 35th and 37th native infantry, was placed under Brigadier Roberts; and the fifth, comprising the 5th, 28th, and 53rd regiments of native infantry, under Brigadier Worsley. An engineer department, under Captain George Thomson, was provided, together with two companies of sappers and miners, native soldiers, with European non-commissioned officers. The equipment of this force was completed by a siege-train of four 18-pounders, two 8-inch and two 5½-inch mortars, with two spare howitzers, one a 24, the other a 12-pounder.

The Bombay force, under Sir John Keane, the commander-in-chief at that presidency, consisted of two troops of horse and two companies of foot artillery, under Brigadier Stephenson; a brigade of cavalry, composed of two squadrons of her Majesty's 4th light dragoons and 1st Bombay light cavalry, under Brigadier Scott; and a body of infantry, consisting of her Majesty's 2nd and 17th, and of the 1st, 5th, 19th, and 23rd native regiments, under the command of Major-General Willshire. The Poona auxiliary horse were to accompany this force, which also brought into the field an engineer department, a detachment of sappers and miners, and a siege-train consisting of two 18-pounders and four 9-pounders.

Law has its fictions, and so has statesmanship. The force of which a detailed account has been given, though, in fact, intended for the conquest and occupation of Afghanistan, was regarded only as an auxiliary force aiding the operations of the Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk at the head of his own troops. Under the sanction of the British government an army had, indeed, been raised, ostensibly for the service of the shah; and this, as a point of decorum, was to be regarded as the chief instrument by which he was to regain possession of his dominions. The shah's army consisted of a troop of native horse artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and five of infantry. Major-General Simpson, of the Bengal army, was appointed to the command of this force, for which a staff and commissariat were duly organized, a military chest established, and satisfactorily provided.

The whole of the above force was to advance by Kandahar on Kabool. Another force, assembled in Peshawur, was to advance on Kabool by way of the Khyber Pass. This was called the shazada's army, Timur, the son of Shoojah, having the nominal command. It consisted of about 4,800 men, artillery, infantry, and cavalry, obtained from various sources—British sepoy and adventurers raised for the occasion, partly regular, partly irregular, and armed with almost every conceivable

variety of offensive and defensive weapon—sword, shield, matchlock, musket, and rifle. With this force acted the Seik contingent of 6,000 men, under General Ventura, one of Runjeet Singh's French officers. The whole of this combined force was under the command of Colonel Wade. Another Seik force, under one of Runjeet's native officers, was posted on the frontier of Peshawur, as an army of observation.

The views of the British government were solemnly enunciated in a proclamation issued by the governor-general from Simla, under date of the 1st October. This paper commenced with a declaration that his lordship having, with the concurrence of the supreme council, directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus, he deemed it proper to publish an exposition of the reasons which had led to the measure. His lordship, accordingly, proceeded to advert to various events which had produced this step;—to the treaties entered into by the British government with the Ameers of Sind, the Nawab of Bhawalpore, and the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, with a view to opening the navigation of the Indus; to the commercial mission of Captain Burnes to Kabool; to the disputes between Dost Mahomed Khan and Runjeet Singh, and the offer of British mediation; to the attack of the Persians upon Herat, and to the intrigues to extend to the banks of the Indus, and even beyond it, the influence of Persia (for the proclamation was silent as to the arm by which Persia was propelled); to the unsuccessful termination of Captain Burnes's mission, the preference shown by Dost Mahomed Khan to a Persian over a British alliance, and his hostile feelings towards the Anglo-Indian government; to the affront offered by the court of Persia to the British minister, and to the results which had followed; to the ill-feelings manifested by the chiefs of Kandahar towards the British government, and to the assistance which they had extended to Persia in the operations against Herat. In the crisis which had arisen, it was added, that the governor-general had felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards the territories under his administration; and this led to the introduction of the name of Shah Shoojah, as "a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British government; and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British dominions." The disunion prevailing among the Burakye chiefs was noticed, as well as their alleged unpopularity and their consequent unfitness to become useful allies to the British government. Notwithstanding this, it was pointed out that so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to its security, their authority was acknowledged

and respected; but, it was observed, that a different policy was now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and was indeed indispensable to the safety of the British dominions. "The welfare of our possessions in the East," continued the governor-general, "requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandisement." From these premises it was inferred to be just, politic, and necessary, on the part of the British government, to espouse the cause of Shah Shoojah, "whose popularity," moreover, "throughout Afghanistan" was stated to have "been proved to" the governor-general "by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities." The negotiation with Runjeet Singh, the conclusion of the tripartite treaty, and the effects of that treaty, were then noticed. "Various points," it was declared, "have been adjusted which had been the subjects of discussion between the British government and his highness the Maharajah (Runjeet Singh); the identity of whose interests with those of the Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the surrounding states. A guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Sind, and the integrity of Herat in the possession of its present ruler will be fully respected; while by the measures completed, or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence of the British government will gain their proper footing among the nations of central Asia; that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India, and that a lasting barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment." The means by which these objects were to be achieved were then propounded. The relative positions ostensibly assigned to the raw levies of Shah Shoojah, and the fine army by which they were to be accompanied, have been already intimated; the passage in which they were determined ran thus: "His Majesty, Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army. The governor-general confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn." The declaration concluded with earnest professions of moderation and liberality, and of the desire of the British government to promote the welfare of Afghanistan and of its people without exception. Contemporaneously with the issue of this declaration, Mr. William Hay M'Naghten was appointed envoy and

minister on the part of the government of India at the court of Shoojah-ool-Moolk; and political appointments under Mr. M'Naghten were bestowed upon Captain Burnes, Lieutenant D. E. Todd, Lieutenant E. Pottinger, Lieutenant B. Leech, and Mr. P. B. Lord, a medical officer.

The force destined to reseat Shah Shoojah on his throne—or, according to the official version of its duties, to aid the shah's troops in effecting that object—was to be called "the army of the Indus." By the end of November, the whole of the Bengal division was encamped in the neighbourhood of Ferozepore; and here a series of interviews took place between the governor-general and the "Lion of the Punjab," Runjeet Singh. Matters, however, of more importance than processions, exhibitions of dancing-girls, or even show inspections of troops, occupied some portion of the time and thoughts of the governor-general and the commander-in-chief. The Persians had raised the siege of Herat, and the intelligence of this fact led to a change in the amount of preparation for invading Afghanistan from the eastward. Less strength than had been assigned for the object was now deemed sufficient, and orders were issued directing that a part only of the force assembled at Ferozepore should go forward—that part to consist of the cavalry, one troop of horse artillery, one battery of nine-pounders and the artillery of the park, the sappers and miners, and three brigades of infantry. The remainder of the troops were to await further orders at Ferozepore. The selection of the troops to be employed in the expedition against Afghanistan had been made by Sir Henry Fane with reference to the results of his personal inspection. Where all were thus eminently fitted for the destined service, it was difficult to determine what portion should be left behind. The solution was intrusted to chance; lots were cast, and the fortune of marching onward fell to the following portions of the army:—the first, second, and fourth brigades of infantry, the second troop second brigade of horse artillery, the camel battery of nine-pounders. The disappointment of the remainder was soothed by the most flattering expressions of approbation from the commander-in-chief. A further change affecting this distinguished officer resulted from the receipt of the intelligence respecting Herat. The health of Sir Henry Fane was rapidly failing, the ordinary influence of an Indian climate having accelerated the effects of a long career of active military service. He was about to proceed to Europe when the expedition against Afghanistan was resolved upon; and in taking the command of it, he sacrificed to a sense of duty the gratification of a strong desire for an immediate return to his own country. The change of circumstances had rendered his retirement practicable without discredit, and he availed himself of the opportunity to seek that restoration of health which, in an Asiatic

climate, he could not hope for. It was accordingly resolved that the command of the advancing detachment should be assumed by Sir Willoughby Cotton; and that, on the junction of the Bombay division, the chief command should devolve on Sir John Keane.

Early in December the army of Shah Shoojah moved from Ferozepore, the privilege of precedence being thus given to the force which, according to official statement, was to be the principal arm by which the conquest of Afghanistan was to be effected. The Bengal division of the British army marched a few days afterwards.

On the 16th of January the shah's army arrived on the banks of the Indus, followed after a very short interval by the Bengal column. The march of the British force was performed with little loss except of camels; great numbers of these useful animals having been attacked by disease, attributed to change of forage combined with fatigue. The shah's army was equally fortunate, with the exception of some desertions: a very brief experience of the habits of a soldier's life being found in many instances sufficient to satisfy the curiosity of the newly enlisted warriors of which that army was composed. The shah's army crossed the river in boats; and though but few craft could be obtained for the service, the passage, through the good management of the officers superintending it, was effected in less than seven days. The British force was to take possession of Bukkur under a convention concluded by Captain Burnes with the ameer; but some delay took place, partly in consequence of the non-arrival of the ratification of the convention by the governor-general, partly from the habits of systematic evasion common to Eastern princes. The keys were at length obtained, but deceit was yet apprehended; and in the prow of one of the vessels conveying the party about to take possession was placed a quantity of powder deemed sufficient to blow in the great gate. It was, however, not required; neither resistance nor further evasion was attempted, and the British force marched into Bukkur as calmly as they would have performed an ordinary evolution on parade.

The advance of the Bengal column towards the point where it was intended to act was here arrested by intelligence relative to the situation of the Bombay force, and the course of the negotiations in Sindé conducted by Captain Pottinger. This intelligence appeared to render it expedient that the march of the column should be turned towards Hydrabad in Lower Sindé, and it accordingly moved in that direction; but its progress was checked by further information intimating that a change of circumstances had rendered its approach towards Hydrabad unnecessary. The column accordingly returned to Bukkur, where preparations had been made for crossing the Indus. This was effected by a bridge of boats, over which the troops, baggage, buxies,

and cattle were passed without a single accident. Previously to this event the army of Shah Shoojah had advanced to Shikarpoor, whence a detachment was despatched to take possession of Larkana, a place of some importance, being a great mart for rice, and also the depôt for the artillery of the ameers of Sindé.

On the 20th of February the head of the Bengal column was at Shikarpoor. Up to this time the army distinguished as that of Shah Shoojah maintained the place to which it was entitled in virtue of being considered the principal force by which the exiled king was to assert his title to reign in Afghanistan,—it had taken the lead, being followed at a convenient distance by the Bengal force, regarded as an auxiliary. Subsequently, however, the order of march was changed—the British troops led, the shah's army followed. On the 10th of March the head-quarters were at Dadur, a town situate near the entrance to the Bolan Pass; through this the column marched to Quetta, where it arrived on the 26th.

It will now be convenient to revert to the Bombay force, the composition of which has already been detailed. The facilities afforded by the opportunity of water transport were resorted to, and the force sailed from Bombay in November, 1838, and its disembarkation was effected in the vicinity of Vikkur, in the same month. The ameers of Sindé were to have made preparations for providing camels and supplies, but they had made none. In consequence the army was detained at Vikkur until the 24th of December, when it commenced its march for Tatta, at which place Sir John Keane arrived on the 28th. Here the army was further detained for a considerable period.

Nominally in the territory of a friendly power, the British force in Sindé experienced little of active friendship. The Ameers of Sindé had always manifested great disinclination to the formation of any intimate connection with the British government; but as a more fitting opportunity will occur for inquiring into the questions at issue between the parties, attention will not in this place be distracted from the main purpose of the narrative. It will suffice to state, that differences existed, and that great difficulty was found in arranging them. The existence of these differences had occasioned the Bengal army to deviate from their direct route for the purpose of approaching Hydrabad, and the accommodation which was effected occasioned its return. The dread created by the vicinity of two British armies undoubtedly led to the pacific conclusion which terminated a series of proceedings in which the extreme verge of hostility was approached. The Bombay army advanced through Sindé; and on the 4th of March was officially declared to have become part of the "army of the Indus."

Previously to this, a reserve force under

Brigadier Valiant had been despatched from Bombay to Sind; it was composed of her Majesty's 40th foot, a body of native infantry about two thousand two hundred strong, consisting of the 2nd grenadiers and the 22nd and 26th Bombay regiments, a detail of pioneers, and a detachment of artillery. At the desire of Colonel Pottinger, Sir Frederick Maitland, the naval commander-in-chief in India, proceeded to Kurrachee in her Majesty's ship *Wellesley*, having on board the 40th and the detachment of artillery. He arrived at that place on the evening of the 1st of February, and was there joined by the *Berenice* steamer and the *Euphrates*, having on board the 2nd grenadiers native infantry. The fort was summoned, and a quarter of an hour allowed to the commandant to decide his course. Upon his declining to surrender, five companies of the 40th were landed, and a position taken up by them in the rear of the fortress. The broadside of the *Wellesley* was brought to bear on the opposite face at a distance of eight or nine hundred yards, and these preparations having been made, a second summons was sent to the commandant. A second refusal followed, and the discharge of a gun from the fortress announced, apparently, the intention of those within to make a defence. The fire of the *Wellesley* was immediately opened, and with such effect, that in less than an hour the entire face against which it was directed was a heap of ruins. The troops who had been landed then entered the breach and took possession of the fort without resistance. It turned out that the garrison consisted of only twenty men, and these had fled, seeking shelter under the cliffs on the opposite side to that at which the British party entered; they were all made prisoners. The fort being occupied, the authorities of the town were required to give up military possession of it to the British, and with this demand they thought it prudent to comply without any delay. The capture of Kurrachee took place on the 2nd of February, at which time the final course of the Ameers was altogether matter of doubt, and it had certainly some effect in aiding the negotiations in progress at Hyderabad.

The Bombay column of the "army of the Indus" pursued its march to Dadur, and eventually took the same route to Afghanistan that had been pursued by the Bengal force. On the 16th of April, Sir John Keane, commander-in-chief, established his head-quarters at Quetta, with the advance column—that of Bengal—the Bombay column being several marches in the rear. The advance of neither column was marked by events worthy of being dwelt upon. Both portions of the army suffered great privations for want of adequate supplies; both were subjected to great inconveniences from the deficiency of beasts of burden; both were continually annoyed by robbers—a large portion of the population among which they were moving having no

occupation but plunder. These persons pursued their trade up to the very verge of the encampments of the British force, and, though the punishment of death was in some cases summarily inflicted, no effect seems thereby to have been produced on the associates of those who suffered. Indeed, it was not probable that any should be produced—they would regard the loss of life as an accident common to their profession—a contingency inseparable from the exercise of it.

The dangerous and difficult Kojuk pass was traversed in succession by the two columns, and on the 20th of April the head-quarters were at Kandahar. The Bombay column arrived at that place on the 7th of May. The city was occupied without opposition, the airdars having taken alarm and fled. On the 8th Shah Shoojah was solemnly enthroned. The united British army of Bengal and Bombay was drawn up in line in front of the city, to the extent of seven thousand five hundred men. A platform was erected to answer the purpose of a musnud, to which the shah proceeded on horseback, through a line of troops of his own contingent. On his approaching the British lines a salute of twenty-one guns was fired, and on his passing down the line there was a general salute, accompanied by the lowering of colours in honour of his majesty. On his ascending the throne a salvo was discharged from a hundred and one pieces of artillery. Sir John Keane and the other principal authorities then offered nuzurs; care being taken that the number of coins presented should in every case be an uneven one, this circumstance being an omen of good luck. Finally, the "army of the Indus" marched round in review order in front of the throne, and thus the ceremony concluded.

The march to Kandahar was a great military triumph, though no enemy, deserving the name, had been encountered, but it was attended by great suffering and great loss. "It must be confessed," says Captain Havelock, "that hitherto our task has been escorting, not campaigning, but this pacific duty has been performed under arduous circumstances; and the exposure to the vicissitudes of climate, the fatigue, and the deficiency of food and water, which tried the strength and resolution of our troops between Quetta and Kandahar, as well as the active hostility of the predatory tribes, ought never to be despised as military difficulties. How gladly would our army have exchanged them for the most determined opposition of the Afghans in the field! How often did our officers long for a battle to raise the sinking spirits of the soldier and make him feel that he was not labouring and suffering in vain."

Some conception of the privations endured may be formed from the recital of a few facts. When the Bengal column reached Kandahar, the troops, European and native camp followers, and mustered establishments, had been

for periods varying from twenty-eight to forty-eight days on diminished rations. Money allowances to meet the deficiency had been made to the natives, both combatant and non-combatant, but there was scarcely an opportunity of expending them, for provisions were not to be procured. The sufferings of the army for want of water were still less endurable. Referring to a part of the period during which the Bengal column were subjected to the above severe privations in regard to food, Captain Havelock says, "The plain on which our camp is now pitched is not, like the level of Siriah, watered by deep and well-supplied *kahreezes* (subterranean aqueducts), carrying coolness and the promise of fertility down their slopes. A small out through which we found water, flowing from a spring-head in the mountains, has alone supplied us with the useful element since first we advanced to this point. This little channel, the Kandahar sirdars have caused to be dammed up near its source in the hills, and behold two bold brigades and the levy of the shah reduced to the greatest straits. Horses, already half-starved for want of grain and good grass, were throughout the day panting in all the agonies of thirst; and in the evening a few drops of water could not be obtained even to mix the medicines of the sick in our hospitals, or to supply them with the refreshment and comfort of a few spoonfuls of tea. All ranks have been taught to understand to-day, how little prized when plentiful, how outrageously demanded when scarce, is that bounteous provision for the wants of God's creatures, water! Weary of the delays which had kept us so long at Dundi Goolae, we moved forward on the 21st April into the plains which we had surveyed from the summit of the Kojuk Pass, recognizing all the distinctive peaks of the scattered hills which we had observed from that commanding height. We saw them now magnified as we approached them, and casting a dark shade over the plains which they overhung. Anxious looks were from time to time cast towards these green eminences, and their bases were carefully searched for any small streams which might supply the urgent wants of a thirsting force." The search, it appears, was vain, and Captain Havelock thus continues:—"It was not very pleasant to discover that this day, too, we must depend for a supply of the indispensable element on the stream of a small and imperfect *kahreez*. Its water was brackish, and flowed scantily and sluggishly. Thousands of brass *lotas* and leathern buckets were soon dipped into the little channel; and though proper regulations were promptly established, one-half of the force had not been watered before the scarcity commenced. Soon diluted mud alone could be obtained, and whole regiments, under a burning sun, with parched lips, sighed for night to cool them, and then for morning, that they might move on to a happier spot. The troops were buoyed up towards evening with fallacious hopes of

the waters of a spring, actually discovered in the hills, being brought down to their relief into the plains; but up to the hour of early march no stream had begun to flow into the dry bed of a nullah, on which many were gazing in hope. The sufferings of the soldiers, both European and native, were for some hours so great as nearly to tempt some for a moment to forget the restraints of discipline; and never do its principles achieve a greater triumph than when troops are seen obedient and respectful, and trying to be cheerful, under this form of privation. At Killa Puttoollah, officers of the highest rank were brought to acknowledge the value of this simple element. This was no time for the luxurious ablutions which, under the sun of Central Asia, preserve health and restore strength; no time to waste a single drop of the precious fluid on any bodily comfort, or for any purpose but preparing food or slaking a raging thirst; and thousands felt this day that all the gifts of that God, whose public praise and ordinances were forgotten on this sabbath of unwilling penance, would have been worthless to man, if in his anger he had withheld the often despised blessing of water. The kindness and consideration with which some officers of no low rank shared the little portion of the much coveted fluid which they could obtain with the privates around them, was creditable to their humanity, and ought to have won the confidence and affections of those whom they commanded." On the following day, the column, after marching ten miles, was compelled to proceed further, from an apprehension of the want of water. Captain Havelock thus describes its progress:—"Forward the brigade moved, to finish a second march of ten miles, their horses dropping from drought and exhaustion as they toiled on, and leaving in the mountain passes melancholy traces of this day's sufferings and perseverance. When the cavalry had thus got over five miles, in the course of which British dragoons and native troopers were seen eagerly sharing with their chargers muddy and fetid water drawn from puddles at the side of the road, the very sight of which would, in Hindostan, have equally sickened all to whom it was offered; they struck into a by-road on their left, and winding their way by a narrow path through an opening in the undulating eminences, found themselves towards evening on the banks of a plentiful stream. The rush of unbridled indulgence of the troops and their horses into its waters, after all the privations of the morning, may fairly be described as uncontrollable. What moderation was to be expected from man or beast breaking forth from the restraints of a two days' unwilling abstinence?"

These sufferings were endured by men, not fresh from a state of repose or of ordinary exertion, but worn with the fatigues of a march of many hundred miles, parts of which lay through tracts of great difficulty. They had been subjected, also, to fatigues far ex-

ceeding the ordinary measure of military labour, in proof of which, the march through the Kojuk pass may be referred to. Through a portion of this defile, the battery and field train of the army had to be dragged up and lowered down by human agency, the situation rendering impracticable the employment of beasts for the purpose. The duty was consequently performed by parties of European infantry. When to the pressure of consuming hunger, maddening thirst, and the most exhausting fatigue, is added the irritating annoyance of constant alarm and frequent attacks from hordes of cowardly robbers, it will be obvious that the march of the British force, though unmarked by any conflict deserving the name of an action, made a far severer demand upon the spirits and soldierly qualities of those by whom it was performed, than many a brilliant campaign, the events of which glow in the page of the historian, and are embalmed in traditional recollections. The task was not accomplished without great sacrifices. The loss of beasts, especially, was enormous. Useful and valuable baggage was in some cases abandoned from the deficiency of camels for its transport; those patient and enduring animals having perished in incredible numbers. The loss of horses was unusually great. The Bengal army lost not fewer than three hundred and fifty—nearly one-seventh of the entire number employed. The Bombay column was rather more fortunate, but the loss, notwithstanding, was considerable.

At Kandahar the army enjoyed a brief interval of comparative rest; but beyond this, little cessation of its difficulties was experienced. Provisions still continued scarce, and robberies were as frequent as before. Some reasons for doubting the alleged popularity of Shah Shoojah had by this time begun to manifest themselves. No alacrity was shown in joining his standard, though he was now by virtue of the British arms in possession of one of the chief cities of Afghanistan, and was about to march upon the other with the best prospects of success. It was the custom of the princes of Afghanistan, when they required the services of a clan, to send a supply of money, ostensibly for "shoeing the horses"—actually to provide all necessities; to do which, in most cases, without such aid, would have been neither within the power nor consonant to the will of the parties to whom the appeal was made. In conformity with this custom, Shah Shoojah sent ten thousand rupees to the Ghilzie chiefs, in the hope of inducing them to join him. The aid, in accordance with established precedent, was accompanied by a copy of the Koran, on which the chiefs were expected to swear allegiance to the shah; and this ceremony, combined with the retention by them of the book, would have been a pledge of adherence to the royal cause. This pledge, however, the Shah was not destined to receive, nor was the withholding it the only disappointment connected

with the transaction; for while the chiefs returned the book, they did not feel the necessity of acting in the same manner with regard to the money. The latter they kept, though they refused the pledge which it was intended to purchase.

From Kandahar a detachment was sent to take possession of Girisak, a fort on the Helmund, situate about seventy-five miles distant. The duty was performed without any difficulty except that opposed by the river, which at that period of the year, is deep and rapid. It was crossed by means of rafts composed of empty casks, and the fort having been evacuated by the hostile authorities, the British party had nothing to do but to place Shah Shoojah's garrison in possession. This was accomplished, and the party returned to Kandahar after a very brief absence. The British army was detained there, chiefly by the difficulty of procuring supplies, till the 27th of June: on that day an event occurred which, though not known to Shah Shoojah or his allies till some weeks afterwards, might have altogether changed the aspect of affairs in Afghanistan. This was the death of the Seik ruler, Runjeet Singh. His army was at that time employed in Peshawur, in support of the objects of the tripartite treaty. His death, whenever it might occur, was expected to lead to much change and great confusion; and it was to be apprehended that, happening at so critical a period, the event might have placed Shah Shoojah and his British ally in a most embarrassing position. Of the imminence of the danger they were, however, ignorant, though it was known that the "Lion of the Punjab" was seriously ill.

The march towards Kabul was commenced under circumstances not the most auspicious. A large convoy of grain furnished by the Lohani merchants had been brought in safely, and this would have enabled the army to march with full rations; but the Lohanis refused to accompany the army, and no means for the conveyance of the grain could be obtained. The consequence was, that this supply—for the arrival of which the troops had been for some time detained—was obliged to be left in Kandahar, and the troops and followers to march on half rations.

Little occurred worthy of notice until the arrival of the army, on the 20th of July, at Nannee, situated ten miles from Ghuznee. Here preparations were made for the attack of the latter place, which proved a fortress of considerable strength, and was the residence of one of Dost Mahomed's sons, who dwelt there in the capacity of governor. The army marched from Nannee early on the morning of the 21st in three columns. On the advance arriving within a short distance of the fortress, it was perceived that preparations were made for stopping its progress. The men engaged in this work were, however, soon drawn from the open ground into the outworks, and the British horse artillery guns being brought up,

a fire was commenced on the fort, with shrapnells and shot, at the distance of about seven hundred yards. This movement appears to have been introduced for no other object but to ascertain the extent and power of the enemy's fire, which was forthwith opened, and caused some casualties among the British troops before they were withdrawn from its reach.

The appearance of Ghuznee seems to have unpleasantly surprised those who were to direct the force of the British arms against it. It had been represented as very weak, and as completely commanded from the adjacent hills. Further, those who professed to have a deep knowledge of the most secret springs of action among the Affghans, reiterated the most positive assurances that neither Kabool nor Ghuznee would be defended, and these assurances seem to have received implicit belief. In consequence, a small battering train, which had been dragged at an enormous cost several hundred miles to Kandahar, was left there, it being very desirable, on account of the scarcity of cattle, to reduce as far as practicable the demand for their labour. The impressions, however, afforded by the aspect of Ghuznee did not correspond with those derived from the reports received at Kandahar. "We were very much surprised," says the chief engineer of the army of the Indus, Captain Thomson, "to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty-five feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a *fausse braye* and a wet ditch. The irregular figure of the *enceinte* gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged; screen walls had been built before the gates; the ditch cleared out and filled with water (stated to be unfordable), and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it." Such was the impression made by the first near view of the fortress of Ghuznee. "The works," Captain Thomson adds, "were evidently much stronger than we had been led to anticipate, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner with the means at our disposal. We had no battering train, and to attack Ghuznee in form a much larger train would be required than the army ever possessed. The great height of the parapet above the plain (sixty or seventy feet), with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack merely by mining or escalading."

A nephew of Dost Mahomed Khan had quitted Ghuznee, and taken refuge with the British force as it approached the place, and he afforded some information highly valuable to those who proposed to attack it. The knowledge thus acquired was improved by a careful and minute reconnaissance. The engineers, with an escort, went round the works,

approaching as near as it was practicable to find cover. The garrison were aware of these proceedings, and kept up a hot fire on the officers whenever they were obliged to show themselves. The fortifications were ascertained to be of about equal strength in every part. There were several gates, but all excepting one, called the Kabool gate, because opening on the face of the fortress in the direction of that city, had, it was reported, been closed by the erection of walls across them. This gate was deemed by the engineer officers the only eligible point for attack; the advantages which it presented were thus stated by Captain Thomson:—"The road up to the gate was clear—the bridge over the ditch was unbroken—there were good positions for the artillery within three hundred and fifty yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the gateway was not built up, a reinforcement from Kabool being expected." The result of the observation of the engineers, therefore, was a report to the commander-in-chief, "that if he decided on the immediate attack of Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of attack, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was a dash at the Kabool gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder."

The army, on arriving before Ghuznee, had encamped on the southern side of the fortress. The report of the engineers, and the determination of the commander-in-chief to act upon its suggestions, rendered a change of position necessary, and the force had not been encamped above three hours when it received orders again to march. It moved from the ground first taken up, in the afternoon, in two columns. The march was rendered somewhat circuitous by the necessity of keeping beyond the range of the guns of the fortress. The troops were wearied by the march of the morning, and there were some difficulties to be overcome, among them the passage of the river Logur, as well as several small water-courses; a lofty range of heights, lying to the north-west of the place and opposite to the guns of the citadel, lay in the route of one column; the ascent was attended with great labour, and some peril—and this accomplished, the descent was scarcely less laborious and dangerous. When the regiments of the first division had surmounted all these difficulties, and arrived at their ground, which was not until long after nightfall, the baggage and camp followers were still far in the rear, and the troops were, consequently, obliged to pass the interval which yet remained before the light of morning could be expected, in a state of famishing and shivering destitution. They had neither tents nor rations, and were thus sentenced for some hours to hunger and a bivouac. Shots were occasionally fired from the fortress, but they produced no damage, and seemed to have no object but that of showing to those without the fortress that those within were awake. Lights were dis-

played from the citadel, and these seemed to be answered by the kindling of fires in the surrounding country. Conjecture on the meaning of these signals offered food for meditation to the weary but sleepless occupants of the British lines.

The situation of the besiegers through this comfortless night is thus depicted by one of themselves:—"It was known that Mahomed Ufrul Khan, another son of the Ameer of Kabool, had marched down from the capital with the view of deblocking Ghuznee, and was now close to us. The forces of the Ghiljies, Abdoolruhman and Gool Moolhummud, were in the field at no great distance. A party, also, of fanatics from the Sooluman Kheils, who had taken arms when a religious war had, as a last resource, been proclaimed by the tottering Baruksyes, now occupied the heights to the eastward of the valley in which the fortress stands. Reflections on these circumstances and on our want of a battering train, the glimmering of the lights on the hostile battlements and in the plains, and the chill of the night air, effectually chased away slumber until day broke on the 22nd."

The first employment of the welcome dawn was to rescue the baggage, camp followers, and sick, from the various points to which they had been led in the bewilderment of a night march over unknown ground, and to bring them to the place selected for encampment. It was mid-day before the whole of the baggage reached the camp. The commander-in-chief and the engineers made another reconnaissance on this day, and the result of their observations tended to confirm the resolutions previously taken. The day was enlivened by the descent from the hills of some fanatical opponents of Shah Shoojah, with the intention of attacking his camp. They were charged by the shah's cavalry, and driven back. Captain Outram, at the head of a party of the shah's infantry, followed them into their fastnesses, and succeeded in capturing many prisoners, and even the holy banner of green and white, under which the horde had been brought together.

The requisite orders for the attack on Ghuznee were circulated among the commanding officers in the evening, and so much of them communicated to the troops as was necessary to enable them to perform what was required. The various parties of the British force destined to take part in the attack were in position before daylight. The night was stormy, and loud gusts of wind tended to deprive the besieged of the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the movements of their assailants from the noise with which they were inevitably attended. Within the fort a dead calm prevailed, not a shot was fired, and some suspicion was entertained that the place had been evacuated.

When all were in position, the attention of the enemy was partially diverted by a false attack. The British batteries opened, and were

answered from the fortress. In the mean time, the explosion party were preparing themselves for the assault, which it was anticipated would put the British force in possession of the place. The party consisted of Captain Peat, of the Bombay engineers; Lieutenants Durand and M'Cleod, Bengal engineers; three sergeants, and eighteen men of the sappers. The charge ordinarily recommended to be employed for blowing open gates is sixty to one hundred and twenty pounds of powder, but as it was apprehended that the enemy might have taken alarm at the approach of the British army to that side of the place on which the Kabool gate was situated, and might thereupon have strengthened the gate, the charge was increased to three hundred pounds. The movements of the explosion party were discerned from the ramparts, but the enemy did not penetrate their precise object. Blue lights were thrown up to afford them a better opportunity of ascertaining what was in progress, but being burned from the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below, they afforded little assistance to those who employed them. Had they been thrown over, it would, in the opinion of Captain Peat, have been impossible to place the powder. As it was, the besieged were content with firing from loop-holes upon the explosion party, and those by which they were protected, and these random operations produced little effect. The powder accordingly was placed, the hose laid, and the train fired. The gate was instantly blown away, together with a considerable part of the roof of the square building in which it was placed. Captain Peat was struck down and stunned, but recovering almost immediately, had the gratification of finding that the operation of which he had been the acting conductor had entirely succeeded. The batteries poured their fire into the works, and the bugle sounded for the assaulting column to push on. It was commanded by Brigadier Sale, and consisted of her Majesty's 2nd, Major Carruthers; 13th, Major Fraser; 17th, Lieutenant-Colonel Croker; and the Bengal European regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Orchard. The advance, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, entered the gateway, followed by the remainder of the column. A series of desperate struggles took place within the gateway and town, and several officers, amongst whom was Brigadier Sale, were wounded. As soon as the storming party had well entered the centre square, the enemy made a general rush, some for the citadel, some for the houses, from which those who gained possession of them kept up an annoying fire on the British force below. To the attack of the citadel her Majesty's 13th and 17th regiments moved, the latter leading. This was the residence of the governor. There, the female members of the principal families had been collected, and there, too, was the magazine and granary. A strong resistance was expected, but none was offered. The 17th, on arriving at the gates,

forced its way in, followed closely by the 18th; and, while those below were watching for the effects of the heavy fire which it was anticipated would be poured on the assailants, the feeling of anxiety was suddenly exchanged for that of gratified astonishment, by the display of the colours of the two regiments on the top of the upper fort. The garrison had abandoned their guns and fled in all directions, casting themselves down, in some instances, from immense heights, in the hope of effecting their escape. The firing from the houses was kept up for some time after the capture of the citadel. Some fanatical Afghans, who had succeeded in picking off men from the parties employed in clearing the streets, obstinately refused quarter, and when escape was impossible, voluntarily rushed on death, consoled by reflecting that they died fighting the battle of the faith, and with the well-aimed shots which had sent so many infidels to their eternal home yet ringing in their ears. The reserve, under Sir Willoughby Cotton, which had entered immediately after the storming-party, succeeded in clearing many of the houses which had afforded shelter to combatants of this description.

Hyder Khan, the governor, had been led by the false attack away from the point where the real danger lay. On learning that the British troops were entering from an opposite direction, he rode back, but it was only to find that all was lost. He succeeded in reaching the citadel, though not without being exposed to some peril: a bayonet passed through the waistband of his dress, and his horse rearing, he was in danger of falling, the result of which would have been instant death; but he recovered himself, and finally surrendered to two officers of the Bengal army.

"In sieges and stormings," observed Sir John Keane, in a general order issued after the capture of Ghuznee, "it does not fall to the lot of cavalry to bear the same conspicuous part as the two other arms of the profession." On this occasion, indeed, the employment of the cavalry, in the only duty for which it was fitted, was delayed by the apprehension of an attack on the British camp, or on the rear of the storming party. It was thought that Dost Mahomed Khan might march to the relief of Ghuznee, and one of his sons, Meer Ufzul Khan, with a force of five thousand horse, was actually in the immediate neighbourhood. It appears that he heard the firing, and waited only for daylight to learn the state of affairs in Ghuznee. Daylight came, and by its aid the British flag was seen waving on the summit of the fortress. Meer Ufzul Khan, thereupon, made his way back to Kabool with all speed, abandoning his elephants and the whole of his baggage. The same light which warned the Afghan commander to withdraw, showed to the British general that no reason existed for restraining his cavalry from pursuing the fugitives.

The loss of the enemy in the operations of

Ghuznee does not appear susceptible of being estimated with any reasonable confidence of approaching accuracy; but it was undoubtedly great. That of the British was comparatively small, amounting only to one hundred and ninety-one officers and men killed, wounded, and missing. In the first class, that of killed, not a single officer was included, but several were desperately wounded. Among those who suffered most were Major Warren, of the 1st Bengal European regiment, and Lieutenant Hazlewood, of the same.

A few days of repose followed the storming of Ghuznee, and during the interval Nawaub Jubbur Khan, brother of Dost Mahomed, arrived at the British camp with an overture for accommodation. The proposal was, that Shoojah should be acknowledged as the sovereign, but that Dost Mahomed should be his vizier. The answer on the part of the allies was, that Dost Mahomed would be provided for, but that he could not be retained in Afghanistan as vizier, nor be permitted to reside there at all, but must proceed to India. To this condition it was replied, that Dost Mahomed would not on any terms consent, and the negotiation ended.

On the 30th of July the army began to move towards Kabool. On its approach Dost Mahomed, like his brothers at Kandahar, fled, and on the 7th of August, the shah, under the protection of the British force, made his public entry into his capital. It was graced by all the marks of honour which the British authorities could offer, and was deficient in nothing but the congratulations of the people over whom the restored king was to reign. He however appeared to have felt himself secure, either in the affections of his subjects or the strength of his allies, and he proceeded to exercise one of the functions of royalty in European fashion, by instituting an order of knighthood, framed on the model of the British Order of the Bath. To the honour of this institution the officers of the "army of the Indus" were to be liberally admitted, as well as a few distinguished civil functionaries, the latter being selected by Mr. Macnaghten, envoy and minister, and the former by Sir John Keane.

On the 3rd of September the force under Colonel Wade arrived at Kabool. It had moved from Peshawur in May, on Colonel Wade receiving intelligence of the march of the British army from Kandahar for Ghuznee and Kabool. It proceeded through the Khyber pass, where the chief obstacle to its progress was the fort of Ali Musjid. Possession of this was obstinately contested for a time; but the advancing force having occupied some hills which commanded the fort, the garrison abandoned it. This acquisition was purchased at the expense of about a hundred and eighty killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy is believed to have been of less amount. "In such a warfare," says Major Hough, "the enemy, from a perfect knowledge of every

nook and corner, and every rock near their position, would lose less than the attacking party." The defence of Ali Musjid being provided for, Colonel Wade pursued his course to Jelalabad, of which he took possession, and then, without encountering further opposition, to Kabool.

About the time of the arrival of the shahzade's army at Kabool, those by whom the shah had been restored to his throne were warned that though this object was achieved, they were yet practically in an enemy's country. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, of the 37th Bengal native infantry, was marching in charge of a treasure convoy from Kandahar to Kabool; on arriving at a place called Hyder Kheil, about thirty-five miles beyond Ghuznee, he strolled up some hills in the vicinity of his encampment, accompanied by two other officers, and followed at some distance by an orderly havildar and two sepoy. The officers, who, with singular imprudence, had wandered forth unarmed, were suddenly attacked by a party of a freebooting tribe called Kojuks; they retreated towards their camp, which two of them succeeded in reaching, but Colonel Henry fell mortally wounded. The havildar and sepoy were not slow in advancing to protect their commander, but the numbers opposed to them rendered their services of no avail, and the havildar was severely wounded. Some weeks afterwards the party of Kojuks were attacked by a force under Major MacLaren, the British commander at Ghuznee, at Kolalo, a village about thirty-two miles distant from that place. The freebooters were found posted at the base of some rocky heights, up which they fled after receiving the fire of the British party. They were pursued, and though they made an obstinate resistance—making the best use of the vantage ground, and plying their matchlocks with great assiduity and perseverance—the whole force were either killed or made prisoners. The spoil afforded ample evidence of the activity and success with which the vanquished Kojuks carried on their predatory occupation at the expense of the British army.

Notwithstanding this and many other indications of the general prevalence of hostile feelings, it was deemed safe to withdraw from Afghanistan the larger part of the force which had seated Shah Shoojah on its throne. A part of the Bengal force was to remain under the command of General Nott and Colonel Sale; the remainder, with the commander-in-chief, were to march homeward, and the whole of the Bombay column were to take the same course. The march of the latter was soon distinguished by an important achievement undertaken to avenge a series of injuries committed several months before.

During the advance of the army of the Indus, in the spring, Mehrab Khan, the ruler of Kelat, a Beloochee state, while professing friendly feelings towards the British govern-

ment, had employed all the means and influence at his disposal in counteracting their views and impeding the progress of their arms. Of the acts of plunder and outrage by which the advancing army was inconvenienced, Mehrab Khan was a prime instigator; and his influence over the predatory tribes being great, his power of inciting to mischief made a fearful addition to the difficulties with which that army had to contend. His offences had been passed over till the establishment of Shah Shoojah in Kabool, partly, as it seems, from a hope of making him instrumental to the procurement of supplies; but his treachery remaining unabated and his hostility unsubdued, it was resolved to visit his crimes by deposal, and to elevate a relation to the throne from which he was to be removed. The task of effecting this change was assigned to Major-General Willshire, who, on arriving at Quetta, marched in the direction of Kelat with a brigade composed of two queen's regiments and one of native infantry, two guns of the Bombay horse artillery, four of the shah's, and a detail of engineers. On approaching Kelat the brigade was attacked by a body of horse, and skirmishing continued till the British force arrived in sight of the place. It then appeared that three heights on the north-west face of the fort were covered with infantry, with five guns in position, protected by small parapet walls. Captain Few, chief engineer, reported that nothing could be expected till possession of these heights had changed hands. Major-General Willshire immediately determined on storming them. Three columns of attack were formed, commanded respectively by Major Carruthers, of the queen's 2nd, Lieutenant-Colonel Croker, of the queen's 17th, and Major Wilson, of the 31st Bengal light infantry, the whole under the command of Brigadier Baumgardt. A hill was allotted to each column, and the artillery under Brigadier Stephenson having opened fire on the enemy, the troops moved forward under its cover and commenced ascending. Before they reached the summits the enemy had yielded to the fire of the artillery and fled; having made an effort to carry off their guns, in which, however, they failed. Conceiving it possible that an entry might be gained by closely following the fugitives from the heights, General Willshire directed a rush for the purpose, but the attempt was defeated, the gate being closed before the assailants could reach it. Four companies which had been detached under Major Pennycook, of her Majesty's 17th, to occupy some gardens in the vicinity of the place, were now brought up and dispersed wherever shelter could be found, to await the result of the operations of the artillery. These were directed towards opening a way for them. Two guns from the heights opened fire against the defences above the gate, two others were turned against the gate itself; the remaining two were sent round by the road leading up to

the gate, to aid in its demolition. The fire of the last two was not commenced till within two hundred yards of the object at which it was directed; and after a few rounds, one-half of the gate was knocked in. This being perceived by General Willshire, he rode forward, pointing to the gate, thereby intimating that it was open—a signal no sooner perceived than obeyed by the prompt rush of the troops from their cover to the breach. The companies under Major Pennyquick, being the nearest to the gate, were first in; they were closely followed by the storming columns, the whole entering under a heavy fire from the works and the interior; the enemy making a most obstinate resistance and disputing every inch of ground.

A company of her Majesty's 17th regiment was now detached with a body of native infantry to secure the heights near which the southern angle of the fortress is situated, and intercept the escape of the garrison from that side. The heights were rapidly carried, and the united detachment then rushed on to the gate on that side, driving a party of the enemy before them, who succeeded in closing the gate, but had not time to secure it. It was, therefore, speedily burst open, and a second entrance thus effected. The party by whom this had been performed were here joined by two companies from the reserve of the 17th, and two of the shah's guns which had proceeded by another route. The guns were intended to blow open the gate, but that operation being unnecessary, they were immediately placed in position to bear on the citadel, which still remained in possession of the enemy. The infantry party uniting with those who had carried the gate, the whole proceeded through the town towards the still resisting citadel. An entrance therein was at length found, but the conflict did not terminate with the capture of the gate. The enemy continued to fight with desperate valour, and resistance was protracted long after it could be available in regard to the possession of the place. Vast numbers of the enemy were destroyed; and among the slain was Mehrab Khan, whose death was far more creditable than had been his life. He fell at the head of his people, sword in hand; he had lived a robber, but he died as a soldier; and though the issue of the combat, in which he was laid low, transferred his stronghold into the hands of strangers, it must, in justice, be admitted, that it was not ingloriously maintained. The British standard waved in triumph over the loftiest towers of Kelat, but it was not planted there without a struggle, which conferred honour on those who resisted, as well as on those who aided its elevation.

It is supposed that about four hundred of the garrison were killed. Several hundred prisoners were taken; a few of those, deemed likely to be dangerous if at large, being retained in confinement, and the remainder liberated. The loss on the side of the British

was heavy, especially so with reference to the fact that a considerable portion of General Willshire's force was not engaged, and to the shortness of the contest; not quite an hour having elapsed from the formation of the columns for attack to the period when the troops were within the fort. Thirty-two officers and men were killed, and a hundred and seven wounded.

That part of the British army which was returning under Sir John Keane met with little that would afford interest in the recital, though its difficulties, from the loss of camels and similar disasters, were scarcely inferior to those which attended its advance. The wild tribes, moreover, who dwell in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass, caused some annoyance. These men had long been accustomed to sell their forbearance for money. They had been subsidized both by the Dooranee princes and by Dost Mahomed Khan, and they were to have been subsidized by Shah Shoojah. Some misapprehension and delay, however, arose; and a meeting which was meditated between Colonel Wade and the Khyberes chiefs from some cause never took place. The tribes constantly sought to revenge themselves on the British force, and in some instances succeeded in carrying off considerable plunder. A party, returning from escorting a convoy of provisions to Ali Musjid, was attacked, several hundred camels carried off, and, with atrocious cruelty, maimed, to prevent their being made serviceable if recovered. A regiment of Sikhs accompanied the British party on this occasion, but they manifested little of the lion-like character claimed by their chiefs. As soon as the attack commenced, they ran, and, says Major Hough, "never stopped till they got out of the pass." Their flight threw the whole party into confusion. Another party, a few days afterwards, despatched to convoy ammunition to Ali Musjid, was, in like manner, attacked on its return, but made a good defence, and drove off the enemy. Terms of agreement were subsequently settled by Lieutenant Mackeson, but immediately afterwards broken by the Khyberes, by an attack made upon a detachment marching from Jelalabad under Lieutenant-Colonel Wheeler, of the Bengal native infantry. This attack was characterized by great treachery, as the Khyberes manifested indications of friendly feelings up to the moment of commencing it. The British troops behaved admirably, and repulsed the assailants: the manner in which the bayonet was used by some sepoy of the 37th native infantry, who had scarcely passed the period of boyhood, was spoken of in terms of admiration by their officers. Ultimately, terms were made with the barbarous hordes, by the personal interference of Mr. Macnaghten.

A general order, dated the 2nd of January, 1840, announced the breaking up of the "army of the Indus;" and this will be a fitting opportunity for noticing the honours

bestowed on those engaged in the expedition to Afghanistan. In addition to the thanks of Parliament and of the East-India Company, the governor-general, Lord Auckland, received from the favour of the sovereign an advanced step in the peerage, being created Earl of Auckland. Sir John Keane was created a peer, and the bounty of parliament added to the grace of the crown, by the grant of a pension of two thousand pounds a year to the general and his two next heirs male. Mr. Macnaghten and Colonel Henry Pottinger were created baronets; Colonel Wade obtained the honour of knighthood; Sir Willoughby Cotton received the grand cross of the Bath; General Willshire, Colonel Thackwell, and Colonel Sale were made knights commanders; and Colonels J. Scott, Perce, Croker, and R. Macdonald, companions of that order; while, by an extensive grant of brevet rank, the merits of several other officers were recognized.

The constitution of the army of the Indus was formally dissolved, and the services of many of its officers who had enjoyed opportunities of distinguishing themselves had been acknowledged. Shah Shoojah had taken his seat on the throne of Afghanistan, and the functions of government, as far as they were exercised at all, were carried on in his name. But there was a vast amount of dissatisfaction prevailing in the widely extended territories which the shah aspired to rule; and though the bayonets of his European allies had driven into exile the chiefs who previously claimed sovereignty at Kandahar and Kabool, there were spirits in every part of the country ready, at any moment that seemed to promise a chance of success, or even without this temptation, to manifest their dislike to the restored prince, and their determination not to submit to his sway. In one instance of this nature occurring early in 1840, the British arms sustained a reverse. A refractory chief, named Syud Hoshien, had taken up his abode in a fort named Pishoot, situated about fifty miles from Jelalabad; to dislodge him, Lieutenant-Colonel Orchard was despatched with a force consisting of a wing of the 89th Bengal native infantry, eighty men of one of the Company's European regiments, twenty sappers, a troop of cavalry, a regiment of the shah's infantry, and another of that prince's cavalry, with three guns. The march was performed amidst torrents of rain. On the morning of the 18th of January, the guns and troops having been brought into position at an early hour, the attack commenced. After two hours' firing, a practicable breach being made on each side of the gate, Lieutenant Pigou, with a small party of Europeans and sepoy, advanced and entered. By some mistake, the bugler with the party sounded an advance, and, in consequence, the storming column rushed on. It appeared, however, that there was an inner gate; the ardour of the stormers was thereupon checked

by an unlooked-for order to stop and seek for cover. An attempt was then made to blow open the inner gate, but the powder, having become wet from the continued rain, would not explode; and, moreover, its quality is said to have been so bad, that had it been dry, there was but little chance of its being effective.

Another attempt to blow open the gate was made, with no better success, and the second failure decided the question of prolonging the attack. The stock of ammunition was exhausted, and the inner gate still mocked the efforts made for its destruction. The troops had been for several hours exposed to a deluge of rain, and to a harassing fire from the fort—it was obviously useless to subject them further to these annoyances, and they were accordingly withdrawn. The attack had thus failed to drive the garrison from the fort, but it was not without effect in terrifying them, for they withdrew soon after its discontinuance, not only from Pishoot, but also from another fort in the vicinity, conveying with them, there is reason to believe, everything of value, for nothing was found in the places evacuated but some very small stores of grain and gunpowder. The officers and men engaged in this unfortunate attack manifested the greatest zeal and gallantry, under circumstances perhaps more discouraging than the ordinary accompaniments of an assault. The loss was considerable, and the ill-success of the attempt showed but too clearly that the reduction of the fort had been undertaken with insufficient means. Captain Abbott seems to have done all that was practicable with his few guns of no great calibre, and his worthless powder; but with materials so inadequate to the work to be performed, courage, coolness, and military skill were alike unavailing.

In March it became necessary to attack a mud fort in the vicinity of Bamian, belonging to a petty chief of the Huzareh tribe. The necessity originated in one of those apparently unaccountable changes in the feeling of the people, or rather in their manifestation of it, of which so many instances occurred. The British commissariat had for some time been accustomed to obtain supplies from the valley in which the fort is situate, and apparently these were furnished with perfect good-will. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the conduct of the Huzarehs changed, and an application at one of their forts for a small quantity of grain was met, not only with a refusal to sell any, but with defiance, threats, and even personal outrage. Explanation was required, but not obtained, and in consequence, a small party, under Captain Garbett, was detached to seek by force that redress which remonstrance had failed to procure. The fort selected for attack was situated between four and five hundred yards from the base of a table-land, the summit of which was crowned by men armed with matchlocks, who kept up a hot fire on the troops below. Unfortunately, the gate of the

fort was immediately opposite to this elevated land, so that the British party, in assaulting, were exposed to a fire both in front and rear: to add to their perils, a third fire was commenced from some heights on their left. They had only two guns; one of these was brought to bear on the gate, the other opened a fire of shrapnels and round shot on the table-land, which was soon cleared, while a charge of infantry and cavalry up the heights on the left produced the like effect in that quarter. In the mean time, Lieutenant Mackenzie had succeeded in breaking down the gate. A party, headed by Lieutenant Broadfoot, entered, and the fort was soon carried. The garrison, however, retreated to the tower, whither the assailants followed them, making repeated attempts to force their way in, but without success. As a last resource, the tower was fired at the base, but this failed to drive out its inmates, and all the men were either burned or suffocated. The women and children were saved, having been removed to a spot where the fire had not penetrated when the captors entered. This affair was of small importance, but it deserves record, both as marking the spirit of the people with whom the British force had to contend, and as reflecting great credit on the small party by whom the achievement was gained.

Further illustration of the degree of repose likely to be enjoyed by Shah Shoojah and his ally was afforded by an outbreak of the Ghiljies. This event was not very remarkable: the Ghiljies had ever been a wild and lawless tribe, yielding steady obedience to no ruler or dynasty, and, consequently, no deep reverence for the restored king was to be looked for from them. It was, however, requisite to impose some check upon their lawless movements, if the authority of Shah Shoojah was to be anything more than nominal. A party of cavalry, under Captain Taylor of the European regiment and Captain Walker of the 4th horse, were despatched for the purpose. These were subsequently joined by a detachment of infantry and cavalry under Captain Codrington, and, at a later period, by a regiment of the shah's infantry and four guns of the horse artillery, under Captain W. Anderson, of the Bengal artillery. On the 16th of May the combined force encountered and defeated a large body of the insurgents. Another expedition despatched from Kabool, under Colonel Wallace, was equally successful. Several forts, the strongholds of the troublesome chiefs, were blown up; and if the tribe were not thus converted into good and peaceable subjects, they were at least awed into acquiescence, while their powers of resistance were considerably impaired.

In another quarter the British arms met with a fearful misfortune. Lieutenant Walpole Clark, a young officer of distinguished zeal and bravery, left the fort of Kahun, which had been occupied by the English, for the purpose of procuring supplies, having with

him a small party of infantry, a few horse, and about five hundred camels. While halting for rest and refreshment, he was attacked by the Beloochees in vast numbers, and his party, almost to a man, cut off. It has been said that the unhappy result was caused by the commander of the devoted party persisting in halting his men in a position of extreme danger, in opposition to better advice. How far this was the fact can never be known; but whatever might be the degree of error committed in this respect, it was not aggravated by any lack of spirit when the danger burst; for Lieutenant Clark maintained to the last the character which he had previously established: he shared the fate which overwhelmed those whom he led.

Another disaster shortly followed in the recapture of the fortress of Kelat. The British government had given to this place a new chief, a descendant of an elder branch of the house of which the deceased ruler, Mehrab Khan, was a member. Either from deficiency of force or from an undue confidence, the defence of the place had been intrusted to this chief and a garrison of the country. A British officer, Lieutenant Loveday, was, indeed, there with a few sepoy, but the number was utterly insufficient for the defence of the place; more especially as, in addition to the danger without, there was far more from treachery within. An attempt was made to carry the place by escalade, the assailants being helped up by their friends in the garrison. The opportune appearance of a small party of sepoy frustrated the success of this project. Several of the enemy were brought down, and some of those who were aiding their entrance justly shared their fate. This state of things was protracted for several days, when all hope of defending the place with such a garrison was given up, and the chief capitulated. Lieutenant Loveday was made prisoner, and subsequently murdered.

Pressing hard upon this calamity came another more heavy. The destruction of Lieutenant Clark and his party, who were proceeding to procure supplies for Kahun, had rendered it necessary that some means should be found to meet the approaching deficiency which was to be apprehended there. For this purpose, Major Clibborn was despatched on the 12th of August with a convoy from Sukkur. His force consisted of about five hundred men, rank and file (including thirty-four artillerymen), three guns, two hundred irregular horse, and twenty pioneers. On the 29th they encamped at the mouth of the Nufsook pass, in which Lieutenant Clark and his party met destruction. In the morning they commenced the ascent, which was rendered oppressively laborious from being performed under the heat of a burning sun. A halt of a few hours then took place to rest the cattle. The men obtained little or no repose, being under arms the greater part of the night—a precaution rendered necessary by the

enemy continuing to fire into the camp. On the following day the march was resumed, over a road presenting, in an almost constant recurrence of ruts and ravines, a series of obstacles to the passage of the guns which required unceasing exertion on the part of the sepoys to surmount. A march of six miles brought the force to ground convenient for encamping; but the guides reported that there was no water, and there was, apparently, no choice but to suffer both men and cattle to perish from thirst, or to carry the pass of Nufosk, which was environed by hordes of the enemy. The latter was resolved upon, and preparations were made for storming the pass. The movement to attack commenced at two o'clock in the afternoon, when the flank companies of the first and second grenadiers, led by Captain Raitt, of the former regiment, moved forward to storm the height, supported by the remaining companies of the 1st regiment, and by fifty volunteers of the Poona horse under Lieutenant Looch. The road up the face of the mountain, at all times difficult, had been rendered still more so by the enemy. In some places it had been altogether destroyed, in others it admitted of the advance of only one man at a time, while at other parts breastworks had been raised across, surmounted with thorn bushes. The enemy from above kept up a heavy fire, which told fearfully; but, notwithstanding, a ridge at the head of the pass was gained. At this moment a dense mass rose on the crest of the mountain, and almost overwhelmed the stormers with discharges of musketry and showers of stones. Major Clibborn now deemed it necessary to recall the advance companies to the support of the guns and colours, when a large body of several hundred of the enemy rushed down the mountain, "yelling and howling," as they are described in a private account, like "beasts of the forest." A temporary confusion ensued in the British ranks, but it was soon overcome. The troops performed their duty with their wonted steadiness and alacrity, and the enemy were repulsed with severe slaughter. The loss on the part of the British was severe; several officers fell, and among them Captain Raitt, the leader of the storming party.

A scene followed more terrible than the conflict which preceded it. The heat was intense; the labours which the troops had undergone sufficient to subdue the physical powers of the strongest among them. The thirst produced by the combined influence of heat and fatigue, in some instances increased by loss of blood, was overpowering; but no water was to be had. The cries of the wounded and the dying for relief, which water, and that alone, could afford, were aggravated into shrieks of despair and frenzy. A guide reported that water was procurable at a nullah a short distance off, and all the animals that could be mustered for the duty were despatched to bring a supply of the greedily-

desired luxury, escorted by a party of irregular horse. But the hope, which for a time supported the spirits of the sufferers, proved fallacious: not only did the information of the guides prove false, but the guides themselves turned out to be treacherous. They conducted the water-party to a place where they were surrounded by the Belooches and killed, with the exception of a few, who cut their way through, and bore to their perishing companions the fearful intelligence of the failure of their mission, and the destruction of the greater part of those who had preceded on it. What now was to be done! The enemy had been beaten back with severe loss, but the pass was yet in their possession; and the heaps of the dead which they had left on the field scarcely affected their strength, though the repulse they had received might have damped their spirit. They yet numbered several thousands, and for a few hundred fainting men to fight their way through such a force, over ground almost impassable when without a foe, was obviously hopeless. Further, could success have been hoped for, neither the stores nor the guns could have been carried forward, for the gun-horses had been sent for water and had never returned, while the camel-drivers and the dooly-bearers, with an oriental instinct of disaster, had fled, plundering the commissaries of all they could carry away. There was nothing left, therefore, but to relinquish the hope of throwing supplies into Kahun, and to fall back. Even this step, the only one practicable, involved a vast sacrifice. The safe return of the men was all that the most sanguine could hope for: guns, stores, camp equipage, all were to be abandoned, for the means of transporting them did not exist, even had no enemy been watching the movements of the devoted party. The guns were spiked, and the melancholy march in retrogression commenced. "We moved off," says Major Clibborn, "with as much quietness as the frantic state of the men would permit:"—a line pregnant with fearful meaning. At the pass of Surtaf, the retreating force was attacked, and the small remnant of baggage which circumstances had allowed to be removed fell into the hands of the enemy, who here, also, slaughtered many of the camp-followers. Pursuing their way without food to sustain their failing strength, or water to quench their burning thirst, or tents to afford shelter from the scorching sun, the force was unable to halt till it reached the town of Poolajee, whence it was not long before it departed. In the brief period that intervened, it had lost a hundred and seventy-nine men killed (ninety-two more being wounded), together with all its artillery, ammunition, stores, and beasts of burden. "Excepting its arms and colours," says the official account, "the detachment is completely disorganized." Victorious over those who had opposed its progress, it arrived at Poolajee with all the disastrous indications of defeat. "We beat

the enemy," wrote one of the sufferers, "but heat and thirst killed us."

Of the conduct of Major Clibborn it is impossible to speak too highly. He yielded, indeed, to difficulties, but they were difficulties which no degree of energy or skill could, under the circumstances in which he was placed, have surmounted.

In other quarters, the state of affairs presented but an unpromising aspect. British officers were continually engaged in suppressing outbreaks of a spirit of resistance towards the shah, caused frequently by the demands of the prince for tribute. Their efforts were usually successful, but the necessity for them indicated but too clearly that the shah was supported on the throne, not by his own strength, but by that of his allies. Lieutenant-Colonel Wheeler was thus engaged in Wuzerence valley, and late in the month of August, a small fort situated therein was very brilliantly carried by a party under his command. In Kohistan a refractory disposition was also manifested, and Sir Robert Sale was despatched to suppress it. The point against which his force was to be directed was a fort, or rather cluster of forts, named Tootumdurra, held by a chief reluctant to acknowledge the supremacy of the shah. On arriving in front of the place, he found the enemy posted in a very strong position. But the arrangements of Sir Robert Sale were so masterly, that a very short time sufficed to put the enemy to flight, and to transfer possession of the forts to the supporters of the shah. The capture was effected almost without loss; but Captain Edward Conolly, of the 6th light cavalry, who had joined as a volunteer, was shot through the heart in advancing on the village.

An attempt upon another stronghold, made a few days afterwards, was less successful. A breach, believed to be practicable, having been made, a storming party proceeded to ascend. They reached the crest of the breach, and for some time maintained themselves there; but the resistance was so determined, that it was found impracticable to force an entrance, and the party were necessarily withdrawn. The garrison, however, were not disposed again to measure their strength with that of their assailants; the fort was evacuated a few hours after the cessation of the attack, and the British took possession of it.

Previously to the event last noticed, Colonel Dennie had added one more to the triumphs of the British arms. Dost Mahomed Khan, after various wanderings, had succeeded in establishing an alliance with the Uabega, under the Walli of Kooloon, by whose aid he hoped to regain the position from which he had been expelled by the British arms exerted in favour of his rival, Shah Shoojah. The army of Dost Mahomed and the Walli were advancing upon Bamian, and Colonel Dennie marched to its relief. He arrived there on the 14th of September, and before preparing to meet the

enemy, he had occasion to perform a disagreeable duty, by disarming an Affghan corps, whose fidelity was something more than questionable. On the 17th he received information that bodies of cavalry were entering the valley, and on the following morning he learned that they had attacked a friendly village. He had intended to allow of their further advance before attacking them, but the circumstance last mentioned induced him to change his course, and to give them an immediate check. He had been led to believe that the number of those who had entered the valley did not exceed a few hundreds. Under this belief he had taken with him only one-third of the force at his disposal, and he was greatly surprised to find himself in front of an army estimated at six thousand strong. This was an embarrassing situation. "To have sent back for reinforcements," says Colonel Dennie in his despatch, "would have caused delay and given confidence to the enemy. It would have checked the proud feeling that animated the party with me, and gave assurance of success." He accordingly resolved to engage with the apparently inadequate force which had accompanied him. It consisted of something more than two hundred of the 35th native infantry, two hundred and fifty of the shah's infantry, three hundred native cavalry, and a detail of artillery, with two field-pieces. The confidence of the commander was justified by the event. The enemy had got possession of a chain of forts reaching to the mouth of the defile by which they had entered, but they made a miserable defence. At each of the forts they exhibited a show of making a stand with their main body, their wings crowning the heights. The latter were dislodged with some loss, and finally the whole force fled in a confused mass to the gorge of the pass. Cavalry were ordered in pursuit, who followed the fugitives about four miles up the defile, cutting down many of them and scattering the rest in all directions, numbers throwing away their arms, and creeping up the hills for safety.

The result of this attempt to invade Affghanistan seems to have prepared the way for a dissolution of the alliance between Dost Mahomed and the Walli of Kooloon. A little diplomacy completed the separation, and Dost Mahomed was again thrown on his own resources. In this emergency he sought to effect a junction with his son, Mahomed Ufsul Khan, and, in prosecution of the design, moved towards the Ghorbund pass, and took possession of some small forts. Sir Robert Sale, on becoming acquainted with this movement, broke up his camp and marched to Purwan. The forts and villages were evacuated at his approach, and on reaching Purwan, the British infantry ascended the hill overlooking the pass and valley, and cleared it of the enemy, who deserted one position after another, and ultimately fled in the direction of the Punchshir valley. All circumstances went prosper-

ously and honourably for the British arms but one. The progress of the infantry was greatly retarded by the guns, the road being very unfavourable for the passage of artillery, and it was deemed expedient to send forward the cavalry to overtake the fugitives, whose pace was far too rapid to allow any other species of force to come up with them. The 2nd Bengal cavalry had preceded the column about a mile, when a body of the enemy's horse, supposed to be led by Dost Mahomed in person, came down a hill to attack them. They were forthwith formed into line, and led on to charge by Captains Fraser and Pensonby, who commanded the two squadrons. The officers pushed on in perfect confidence that their men would perform their duty; but they found themselves in the midst of the enemy, unsupported by their troopers. They cut their way out, being both severely wounded, and then had the mortification of seeing their men flying before the enemy. In this unhappy affair Lieutenant Crispin, adjutant of the regiment, was killed, vainly attempting to bring the men to action. Dr. Lord, distinguished as a man of science as well as a diplomatist, was also killed in this affair, as was Lieutenant Broadfoot, an engineer officer, who accompanied the advance. The officers were unusually exposed to danger from the defection of the men, and they suffered proportionately. Various motives have been assigned for the scandalous defection of the regiment, but the probable conjecture is, that their conduct was the result of sheer cowardice—a contagious quality, which, like its opposite, rapidly communicates itself to those around, whenever it makes its appearance. The circumstances well warranted the infliction of the heaviest punishment, and the displeasure of the government which these traitors professed to serve was intimated in the most signal manner. The wretched troopers were not subjected to any corporal sufferings, but the regiment, whose name they had made a by-word of reproach, was struck out of the list of the Bengal army. The native officers and privates present on the day of disgrace were dismissed the service and rendered incapable of ever re-entering or being employed in any way under government; the remainder to be draughted into other cavalry regiments. The dismissal of the degraded officers and men was carried into effect with all the marks of ignominy usual on such occasions.

But, though marked by this scandalous instance of defection, the battle of Purwan was not only honourable to the British arms, but important in its consequences. Dost Mahomed galloped from the field of battle, and surrendered himself to the power with which he had no longer the means of contending. The circumstances of his surrender have somewhat of the character of romance. The British envoy, Sir William Macnaghten, was returning from a ride of pleasure, when, within a few yards of his residence, a single horseman

presented himself, anxiously inquiring for the representative of the British government. Having been satisfied as to the identity of the person whom he sought, he announced that Dost Mahomed Khan had arrived, and claimed the minister's protection. The chieftain himself then appeared, alighted from his horse, and presented his sword. The sword was returned, the chief invited to remount his horse, and the envoy and the dethroned prince rode on together as though on an excursion for exercise or amusement. On reaching the place where the envoy resided, a tent was pitched for Dost Mahomed, who appeared very calmly to reconcile himself to his fate.

The month of November, 1840, opened auspiciously for the British arms. The battle of Purwan, which led to the surrender of Dost Mahomed, was fought on the first of that month; on the third the surrender took place, and on the same day General Nott re-occupied Kelat, which had been abandoned by its garrison. On that day, also, Major Boscawen defeated the army of Nasir Khan, son of the ex-chief of Kelat, who had a few days before received an impressive lesson from Captain Watkins, in command at Dadur. On the 1st December an action of a decided character was fought. Nasir Khan, who occupied a strong position near Kotree, was attacked by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall, consisting of about nine hundred Bombay native infantry of the 2nd grenadiers, the 21st and 25th regiments, commanded respectively by Captains Boyd, Ennis, and Teasdale; sixty irregular horse, under Lieutenant Smith, and two guns, under Lieutenant Pruett. The attack took place as soon as daylight dawned, and the enemy were completely taken by surprise. So great, indeed, was the surprise of their chief, that he made his escape upon the first alarm, accompanied by only two followers. His chiefs showed more spirit, and made a long and desperate defence; but the disposition of the British force was so judicious, and the spirit which pervaded it so good, that the efforts at resistance, strenuous as they were, were unavailing. Five hundred of the troops of Nasir Khan yielded up their lives in the cause of their fugitive master; and in the number of the slain were four powerful chiefs. The principal commander, named Meer Bohun, with six others, surrendered themselves prisoners, but not until those whose confidence they had sought to sustain were in irretrievable flight. The whole of the enemy's baggage and a large quantity of arms fell into the hands of the victors. The conduct of those by whom this gallant action was won was fitly characterized by their commander, whose testimony is thus given in a very soldierly field order, issued on the day after the engagement:—"The lieutenant-colonel now concludes with saying that he never wishes to lead braver men into the field, for braver could not be found."

In narrating the gratifying events of this

period, the retreat of Captain Brown, the gallant defender of Kahun, must not be passed over. It was effected by arrangements with the Beloochees, through whom he passed unmolested. It is not improbable that the loss which they suffered at Nufoosk had its effect in giving security to this arrangement; and thus, though the expedition under Major Clibborn failed of its immediate object and was attended by circumstances of extreme disaster, it might yet, indirectly, be instrumental to the security of the garrison of Kahun. Captain Brown arrived at Poolajee on the 1st of October.

The opening of the year 1841 commenced less auspiciously. The Kojuks had been accustomed to pay tribute to the sovereigns of Afghanistan whenever those princes were enabled to enforce payment. Shah Shoojah wished to revive the custom; but the tribe, with the spirit invariably prevalent in the East, determined to withhold compliance until it should be extorted by arms. The chief place of the Kojuk country is Sebee, and against this a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of the 8rd Bombay cavalry, was, in February, 1841, despatched to give effect to the shah's demands. The force consisted of Colonel Wilson's regiment of cavalry, some local horse, a wing of the 20th Bombay native infantry, two hundred of the 2nd grenadiers, and a troop of horse artillery. The place to be attacked was strong, and the *matériel* for a siege found by Colonel Wilson inefficient. The attack was, however, made and supported with much gallantry, but it altogether failed, and the loss in British officers was serious with reference to the object to be gained. Colonel Wilson was mortally wounded, Lieutenant Falconer, of the 2nd grenadiers, and Lieutenant Creed, of the artillery, killed. The latter officer was shot through the heart while, with a small party of steady followers, vainly attempting to turn the fortune of the day. The Kojuks pursued on this occasion the course—not unusual—of defending a fortified place with desperation, and then seeking safety in flight. In the morning Sebee was found abandoned.

In the north, affairs were somewhat more prosperous, though there the intervention of military force to uphold the house of Shah Shoojah was also required. It was deemed necessary to coerce a tribe inhabiting the Nazeem valley, and thither a considerable force was despatched under Brigadier Shelton. It was composed of her Majesty's 44th regiment, the 27th Bengal native infantry, a troop of horse artillery, a detachment of sappers and miners, and a considerable body of the shah's force, of various descriptions. The valley which was the object of attack was thickly studded with small forts; these were attacked in succession and carried; but success was dimmed by the loss of two valuable officers, Captain Douglas, assistant adjutant-general, a volunteer, and Lieutenant Pigou, a highly meritorious engineer officer, who was blown

away by the premature explosion of a bag of powder applied to the gate of one of the forts.

Further illustration of the difficulty of establishing Shah Shoojah on his throne, and maintaining him there, was afforded by the continued disturbances created by the Ghiljie tribe, and the constant necessity of armed interference on the part of the British forces to suppress them. Early in May a fort near Khelat-i-Ghiljie became an object of contention. It was taken by the English after some resistance, the gate being blown open with bags of powder, an operation which, after the success which attended it at Ghuznee, seems to have been a favourite one. On the 29th of the same month, a detachment under Captain Wymer, marching from Kandahar to Khelat-i-Ghiljie, in charge of a convoy, was attacked at Eelme by a body of Ghiljies, amounting, at the commencement of the engagement, to two thousand five hundred, but swelled, by reinforcements, to upwards of five thousand before its termination. On intelligence of the meditated attack reaching the commanding officer, he placed his small force in the position which he deemed most favourable for receiving the enemy; it being, as he observed, impracticable, "from the paucity of troops and the magnitude of the convoy, for him to act otherwise than on the defensive." The British force consisted only of four companies of the 38th regiment of Bengal native infantry, a wing of the shah's cavalry, a small party of sappers and miners, and two guns of the horse artillery. On the first appearance of the enemy, which was in one dense mass, the two guns were opened on them with great precision and effect, whereupon the Ghiljies formed into three distinct columns, in order to make a simultaneous attack on the right, left, and centre of the British. The attack was met with admirable coolness and gallantry; the enemy was permitted to approach within a short distance, when the fire of the infantry line was poured upon them with such effect as to indicate the necessity for a change of operations. The enemy's force was again consolidated, his right and centre columns uniting, with the left resting upon and lining the banks of the Turnak river, near which the engagement took place. This change rendered necessary a corresponding one in the position of the British detachment, which was made with great steadiness, though under an annoying fire, and an interruption, occasioned, it is believed, by an impression entertained on the part of the enemy that their antagonists were about to retreat. Under this impression, a large body of infantry, armed with swords, rushed upon the 38th, uttering a loud shout, and anticipating the speedy discomfiture of those whom they assailed; but they had the mortification to find that they were mistaken, and the reception which they met with soon convinced them that the field was not yet in their possession. From this time the combined efforts of the enemy were devoted in succession to all points, but

without their gaining a single advantage; and after continuing the fight between four and five hours, they withdrew from a contest in which they had been worsted in every attempt which they had made to shake the security of the British position. By daybreak they had moved beyond the range of any intelligence which Captain Wymer could procure. The conduct of the 88th native infantry, on this occasion, was most exemplary, and in some instances under circumstances where the habitual obedience of the soldier is severely tested. At one time, when they were exposed to a heavy fire from the enemy, it became necessary that they should refrain from returning it, and an order to that effect was obeyed with the most rigid exactness; not a shot was discharged till the men were commanded again to commence firing. Obedience like this is among the best fruits of military discipline. The loss of the British was small; that of the enemy considerable, but its amount could not be estimated with any degree of precision, as many of the killed and wounded, lying at a distance from the British position, were carried off under cover of the night.

A large body of Ghiljies and others, amounting, it is said, to six thousand, was defeated on the 2nd of July by Captain Woodburn, commanding a field detachment on the Helmund. The value of the services of Captain Woodburn, and of the British officers and men, on this occasion, is greatly enhanced by a consideration of the very indifferent instruments with which they had to work. The whole force was furnished from the levies of the shah, and a portion at least of it could not be trusted. With an effective force the enemy might have been pursued and dispersed, but prudence forbade any attempt of the kind under the circumstances which existed. Captain Woodburn, in his report of the affair, says: "In both a military and political point of view, it would be of the greatest importance to follow up and disperse the rebels, but with reference to their numbers, and the notoriously disaffected state of the country, I do not consider that I should be justified in moving after them with a weak regiment of infantry, two guns, and with cavalry in which every confidence cannot be placed."

Success followed the British arms in various engagements of smaller or greater importance with the same enemy. In the beginning of August a body of Ghiljies were routed by some regular and irregular cavalry commanded respectively by Lieut. Bazett and Captain Walker, and forming part of a detachment encamped in the Karrootoo valley under Lieut. Colonel R. E. Chambers. Later in the same month, Captain John Griffin, commanding a field detachment in Zemindawur, attacked and dispersed a body of about five thousand, near Khishwura. They were headed by two chiefs, named Akram Khan and Akhtar Khan, the latter having commanded

the Ghiljies when they were defeated in July by Captain Woodburn. On this occasion the enemy, in an attempt to form into columns, were broken and thrown into utter confusion by a charge made by Captain Hart, with a regiment of the shah's cavalry, who do not appear previously to have enjoyed a very good reputation. A similar regiment had been placed on rear-guard duty, under Lieutenant Golding, but the success of their companions inspired them with a desire to take part in the engagement. They were indulged by being permitted to join in the pursuit, and behaved well. The force of the British, though not small, was not exclusively of the best description as to men, and it was inferior in numbers to that of the enemy. The 2nd regiment of Bengal native infantry were engaged; the remainder of the force employed belonged to the army of the Shah Shoojah. It numbered thirteen hundred and fifty bayonets, eight hundred sabres, and four six-pounders.

The month of September passed in a manner generally tranquil. Little of an opposite character occurred, excepting in the Zoornut valley, whither a small force had proceeded to enforce payment of the shah's tribute. Another object proposed in the employment of this force was the seizure of some persons hostile to the government, who, it was stated, had taken refuge in a fort in that country. The fort was represented as being very weak, and further it was believed that no defence would be attempted. On both points expectation was disappointed. The fort was defended, and it was so strong that the means possessed by the British officer in command, Captain Hay, were altogether insufficient for its reduction. Instead of being permitted to occupy it without resistance, as had been anticipated, the shah's troops were fired upon: a few shots were fired in return, but without making any impression on the walls within which the enemy were sheltered from attack. A force better provided with materials for destruction was subsequently despatched, and the fort, with others in the vicinity, razed.

At the close of September, the country generally exhibited greater appearance of tranquillity than it had manifested at any former time since the entry of Shah Shoojah under the auspices of his British ally. It was now in a perfect state of peace. Such a state had never been known in Afghanistan, and the surface was so smooth, that the belief that Shah Shoojah was firmly seated on the throne seems to have been entertained; not indeed so firmly as to forbid all exhibition of occasional outbreaks of opposition, but to such an extent as to lead to a persuasion that he might be left in a great degree to himself; that the British troops might at an early period be altogether withdrawn, and that the European adviser, by whose counsels the shah had been guided from the outset of the expedition, might without any further delay be relieved from his onerous duties. Sir James Carnao

had resigned the government of Bombay : Sir William Macnaghten had been appointed to the office, and proposed, on the 28th of October, to surrender his charge in Afghanistan to Captain Sir Alexander Burnes, and depart to take possession of his new office. Before the arrival of that day, a great change had taken place in the aspect of affairs.

Revolt and intestine war were certainly not to be regarded as events of improbable occurrence in the newly established kingdom of Afghanistan ; with or without reasonable cause, they were to be looked for, at least, for a considerable time. The beginning of the month of October was marked by the departure from the court of Shah Shoojah of some chiefs of considerable power and influence. Their first act was the plunder of a caravan—an exploit perfectly in accordance with the prevailing code of morals in Afghanistan. Humzee Khan, a man of high rank, was despatched after the fugitives, to induce them to return by the promise of redress of any real grievances ; but his mission was attended with exactly the degree of success that might have been looked for from the fact, which does not appear at the time to have been known to the British envoy, but which he soon afterwards learned that Humzee Khan was himself the chief instigator of the hostile movement which he was despatched to check.

The ostensible reasons for the defection of the Ghiljie chiefs were two ; the first being the reduction of certain allowances which they had received for services rendered in keeping in some degree of order the predatory tribes frequenting the passes. The reduction was defended upon the two grounds of necessity and justice. The government of Calcutta had made many and heavy complaints of the expense of the proceedings in Afghanistan, and had urged the necessity of Shah Shoojah ceasing to rely on his ally for pecuniary support ; the difficulties of collecting tribute were great ; to borrow, the ordinary resource of Eastern princes, was, in the circumstances of Afghanistan, not easily practicable ; and there seemed no course open but to diminish in some way the charges of the government. The particular head of charge selected for reduction was that which was made up of the allowances above noticed. The point was delicate, and the prospects of success not very promising ; for those who unwillingly paid a reduced amount of tribute were not likely to give a very cheerful assent to the payment of an enhanced amount. Financial pressure was, undoubtedly, the chief motive which led the British authorities to acquiesce in the reduction. With regard to Shah Shoojah and his native advisers, it is not necessary to resort to the existence of such pressure for a motive. The Eastern principle of wringing from a dependent as much as possible, and of never observing an engagement if it be practicable to break it with advantage, is quite sufficient to account for their approval of the plan. It

has, however, been intimated that the plea of necessity was supported on another, grounded on a sense of justice. It was said that, in consequence of a reduction in the price of grain, the reduced allowances were substantially greater than the chiefs received from Dost Mahomed for services similar to those for which they were now to be paid by Shah Shoojah ; but this was not an argument likely to satisfy those who claimed the allowances ; nor, in truth, could the inferior advantages derived by these chiefs under an agreement made with one man be very reasonably alleged as a ground for setting aside a different agreement made with another. Shah Shoojah would have been justified in refusing at first to give more than his predecessor ; but if he did agree to give more, he was bound to fulfil his engagement.

The second ground of discontent put forth by the dissatisfied chiefs was, that they were required to be responsible for robberies by the eastern Ghiljies, wherever such robberies might be committed. This might be oppressive ; but here the remark suggested by the conduct of the shah seems applicable to his insurgent chiefs. If the responsibility of which they complained formed part of the contract into which they entered, their reflections on its inconveniences came too late.

Other causes have been assigned, and they, without doubt, aided in precipitating insurrection at this particular time. The great chiefs saw that their independence would be affected and their power shaken by the new order of things. They had never known any but a state of anarchy, and they dreaded any other. Personally, Shah Shoojah seems to have been unpopular, but any one who required obedience from the wild and reckless chiefs of Afghanistan would have been unpopular also. But further, the Afghan chiefs and people were Mahometans, inflamed with all the burning bigotry which scorches the bosoms of the sincere and zealous followers of the pseudo prophet, abhorring Christians more than the most dangerous beasts that prowl for midnight prey, or the most noxious reptiles that find shelter in the jungle, and extending their hatred to a prince whom they saw enthroned amid the bayonets of a people professing the religion which they so much detested. All these feelings were, undoubtedly, at work to counteract British authority and influence in Afghanistan. How much of each entered into any one outburst cannot be determined. Private interest, personal vanity, fanatical excitement, were alike enlisted against the British and the shah. In a long course of years, if a strong government could have been maintained, their influence might have been crushed, but time and a vigorous arm were both requisite for the task.

The mission of the perfidious minister, Humzee Khan, having failed, more efficient means of dealing with the insurgent chiefs were resorted to in the employment of a military force

commanded by Sir Robert Sale, which was marching to Jelalabad, preparatory to its return to India. The first task to be performed was the forcing the pass of Khoord Kabool, which the disaffected chiefs had occupied. They here held a strong position, their main body being posted behind a breastwork near the middle of the pass, while parties occupied the surrounding heights. While the attention of the enemy was partially diverted by an assault upon another point, the troops destined for the chief attack, which was to be directed against the enemy's front, entered the gorge of the valley. The advanced guard consisted of two companies of her Majesty's 13th light infantry, the flank companies of the 35th Bengal native infantry, a detachment of pioneers, and two guns. The remainder of the two regiments of infantry formed the main body. As the British force approached, it was discovered that the enemy were withdrawing from their position in the valley, and occupying the rocky ridges of the mountains on both sides. They opened a well-directed fire, and in an early stage of the action Sir Robert Sale was wounded, and compelled to leave the field. He had previously directed two companies of the 13th and one of the 35th to ascend the precipitous heights for the purpose of clearing them. Colonel Dennie, who assumed the command on Sir Robert Sale being disabled, brought up the main column and guns to the enemy's breastwork in the valley, and, finding it evacuated, pushed them forward to the extremity of the pass, opposite to that by which they had entered, where he took up an excellent position under cover of the walls of a fort which, though deserted, was of some strength. In the mean time, the skirmishers on the heights had ably performed their work of clearing them of the enemy. The native infantry remained at the fort, which had been taken; the European force returned to their encampment at Boothank. As they marched back, some parties of the enemy occasionally showed themselves, and some loss was sustained in repelling their attacks. While the force under Sir Robert Sale was thus divided, they were exposed to several night attacks, in one of which the 38th suffered severely, many men and one officer, Lieutenant Jenkins, having fallen in the conflict. Later in the month of October, Sir Robert Sale, having been reinforced, marched in the direction of Taseen, the force feeling its way cautiously through the defiles, occupying the hills on its flanks with skirmishers, and leaving parties for the protection of its baggage and rear at selected points. No enemy was seen till the advance and main body had halted in the valley of Taseen. From this valley another stretches out in a south-easterly direction, and on the sides and summits of the mountains inclosing the latter were observed bodies of the enemy; while another portion of their force prepared to dispute the possession of a small conical hill which partly closes the en-

trance to the branching valley, and thus to bar the approach of the British force to a fortified spot called Mahomed Ussul's fort, of which the insurgents had possession. They were, however, driven from the hill by the advanced guard under Colonel Monteith. The fort was then assailed, and after a feeble defence abandoned. Sir Robert Sale intended to establish here a depôt for his sick and wounded, and to adopt the place as a *point d'appui*; but the enemy continuing to occupy a nearly circular range of heights, and even occasionally to descend from them, it became necessary to dislodge them from those parts of the mountains from which they were able to command the British position, and inflict considerable annoyance, especially by night. This led to a series of skirmishes, which ended in the British commander completely accomplishing his object.

While the force of Sir Robert Sale occupied this position, a further attempt to terminate, by negotiation, the disputes with the disobedient chiefs was made under the auspices of Captain Macgregor. He was received by them with a profusion of pacific professions, and an agreement was concluded, but without a shadow of intention on the part of the chiefs to adhere to any part of it. In proof of this, they continued to harass the British detachment under Sir Robert Sale on its departure from Taseen. The most serious annoyance received was on the 29th of October, on marching from Jugduluk in the direction of Gundamuck. Some loss in men was here sustained, and a very considerable one in baggage and camp equipage; but the detachment succeeded in gallantly forcing its way, though the difficulties of the ground, surrounded by terrific mountains, were almost insuperable. The labours encountered by the detachment, and the spirit in which they were sustained, will be best illustrated by quoting the language of its distinguished commander, who thus speaks of his men:—"Since leaving Kabool, they have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Taseen they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labour, throwing up intrenchments, and very severe outpost duty; whilst each succeeding morning has brought its affair with a bold and active enemy, eminently skillful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with jezails, which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached by our artillery. Though compelled, by the effects of my late wound, to witness these conflicts from a dooly, I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the gallantry of officers and men on every occasion of contact with the enemy, and especially in scaling the tremendous heights above Jugduluk."

At Gundamuck the difficulties of Sir Robert Sale began to thicken, and amidst a variety of

gloomy intelligence which reached him from various quarters, he learned that Jelalabad was menaced by the enemy from the direction of Lughman. To secure the possession of that important place, he resolved to march upon it forthwith. He entered it on the 12th of November, having sustained considerable annoyance from plunderers. A party of these, who had the imprudence to follow the rear guard under Colonel Dennis into the plain, were sent abruptly back to the heights by a brilliant charge of cavalry, headed by Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne, before whom more than a hundred of the marauders fell.

Jelalabad was found invested on every side by hordes of enemies. The defences were weak, but Sir Robert Sale proceeded with characteristic vigour to improve them. In the mean time, the enemy were active. They burned down a cantonment raised by the English at great expense in the preceding year, and under cover of trees and old buildings, kept up a fire of musketry against the walls at a short range, by which some loss was suffered. To get rid of this continued source of annoyance, a sortie was made on the 14th of November by a party under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteith. The attempt was entirely successful, and a body of at least five thousand men were utterly dispersed by a force consisting of three hundred men of her Majesty's 13th, three hundred of the 35th Bengal native infantry, a hundred sappers and miners, two hundred of the Khyber corps, a squadron of the 5th light cavalry, a few irregular horse, and three guns.

It was obvious that, though the enemy was dispersed for a time, their speedy and frequent return was to be expected; it was not less obvious that no early relief was to be looked for by the British force in Jelalabad. To diminish the consumption of provisions as far as was practicable, was, under these circumstances, an indispensable measure of precaution; and with a view to this object, Sir Robert Sale proceeded to dismiss from the place the women and children, whose presence could only be embarrassing to the garrison and dangerous to themselves, and all the male population, excepting shopkeepers, whose continued residence was to be desired. This clearance not only reduced the number of claimants for food, but had the effect of purging the city of suspicious characters, of whom there were many. The repose that followed the dispersion of the enemy was employed in carrying on the improvements in the defences with redoubled vigour. "We have availed ourselves of the pause," said Sir Robert Sale, "to put the walls into a state of defence, which will, I trust, enable us to defy the efforts of any Asiatic force, unaided by siege artillery." Yet was there enough in the circumstances in which the brave garrison of Jelalabad was placed to have justified some shadow of despondency, had its noble commander been capable of entertaining such a

feeling. "Two regiments, and the corps of sappers," he writes, "do not more than suffice to man these extensive walls, and great efforts are required of us. We need succours in every way; troops, treasure, provisions, and ammunition now, and a siege train to enable us to retrieve things by active operations on the conclusion of the winter." Thus did this eminent officer look forward through months of anxiety, destitution, and suffering, with feelings tinged with hopefulness, to the period when he trusted to be again able to take the field in vindication of his country's honour.

Before reaching Jelalabad, Sir Robert Sale had learned that all was not well at Cabool. While engaged in preparing for the defence of the former place, he received a summons to march the troops under his command immediately to the capital. This task he declined to attempt, and it would be unjust to give his reasons in any other than his own simple, lucid, and forcible language. "I beg to represent that the whole of my camp equipage has been destroyed; that the wounded and sick have increased to upwards of three hundred; that there is no longer a single depot of provisions on the route, and the carriage of the force is not sufficient to bring on one day's rations with it. I have, at the same time, positive information that the whole country is in arms, and ready to oppose us in the defiles between this city and Cabool, while my ammunition is insufficient for more than two such contests as I should assuredly have to sustain for six days at least. With my present means I could not force the passes of either Jugduluk or Khoord Cabool; and even if the *débris* of my brigade did reach Cabool, I am given to understand that I should find the troops now garrisoning it without the means of subsistence. Under these circumstances, a regard for the honour and interest of our government compels me to adhere to my plan already formed of putting this place into a state of defence, and holding it, if possible, until the Cabool force falls back upon me, or succours arrive from Peshawur or India." Personally, Sir Robert Sale must have wished to have been at Cabool, for his wife and daughter were there, and exposed to danger; but he could not sacrifice an army to the gratification of his personal feelings.

There was, indeed, a fearful need of further military assistance at Cabool; but before entering into the particulars of the necessity, it will be convenient to state the positions of the forces of the allied powers in the vicinity of that place. The force at and near Cabool, in the beginning of October, had consisted of her Majesty's 13th and 44th foot, the 5th, 35th, 37th, and 54th Bengal native infantry, the 5th Bengal light cavalry, a company of foot and a troop of horse artillery, two regiments of the shah's infantry, a mountain train of artillery, with some others belonging to the shah, and some cavalry, both Hindostanee and Affghan, forming part also of the shah's force.

The Queen's 18th, the 85th and 87th Bengal native infantry, a squadron of the 5th cavalry, and some details of artillery and sappers, constituted the force of Sir Robert Sale; but the 37th had not gone forward with the rest of the force to Gundamuck, and subsequently to Jelalabad, but had been left in position at Khoord Kabool to keep open the communication. The force which remained at Kabool was divided between the Bala Hissar, the royal residence, which overlooked the town, and the cantonments, lying about three miles from it. Some British officers resided within the town, and parts of the commissariat establishments were within its walls. Much of this arrangement appears to have been injudicious, but there seems to have been an almost unanimous determination to shut the ears against all intimations of danger, and indulge in a luxurious dream of safety equal to that enjoyed within the Mahratta ditch.

The morning of the 2nd of November dissipated the spell—it broke with signals of violence and alarm. The city was in a state of commotion; the shops were plundered, the houses of the British officers attacked, and their servants everywhere insulted and threatened. Among the first of the houses assaulted were those of Sir Alexander Burnes and of Captain Johnston, paymaster of the shah's forces. It is believed, that had the former officer acted with decision, the outbreak might have been at once checked; but Sir Alexander Burnes forbade his guard to fire on the insurgents, and preferred trying the effect of addressing to them a speech. What were the arguments by which he sought to soothe into calmness the excited passions of desperate men can never be known, for his powers of moral suasion failed, and he perished in a parade of magnanimous forbearance. With him fell his brother, Lieutenant Burnes, of the Bombay army, and Lieutenant William Broadfoot, of the Bengal European regiment—an officer whom all reports unite in eulogizing, and whose life was dearly paid for by his assailants, six of whom met destruction from his hand before it was paralyzed by death. The sepoys who formed the guard of Sir Alexander Burnes and of the treasury fought nobly, so soon as they were permitted to fight, and manifested the firmness and fidelity which the native soldier has so often displayed in the cause of the government whose "salt he eats;" but they were overpowered by the numbers which unthrifty delay had permitted to accumulate, and with their lives they surrendered their trust. The shah's treasury, as well as the residence of Sir Alexander Burnes, was plundered; every man, woman, and child found in either massacred; and, finally, the buildings fired. The whole city was now in a state of insurrection, and it was dangerous for a European countenance to be anywhere visible. Some British officers were wounded, and others very narrowly escaped. Captain Sturt, of the engineers, was assailed in the pre-

cincts of the palace, and stabbed in three places by a young man whose dress indicated respectability of position, and who immediately escaped into an adjacent building, the gates of which, as soon as he had passed them, were closed. Captain Lawrence, military secretary to the British envoy, while riding to deliver a message to the shah, was attacked by an Afghan of ferocious appearance, who aimed at him a furious blow. The officer avoided it, and putting spurs to his horse, escaped the fate which had that morning overtaken some of his brethren in arms: he was immediately afterwards fired on by a considerable body of the insurgents, but succeeded in reaching the palace in safety.

While such events were in progress, it cannot be supposed that the authorities, either native or British, were altogether inactive. The shah despatched one of his sons with some Afghan retainers, a Hindostanee corps in his service called Campbell's regiment, and two guns, to check the insurrectionary movement; but this force was beaten back by the insurgents, and it was not without difficulty that they succeeded in bringing off their guns. Early in the day an order had been despatched to Brigadier Shelton, who commanded a force encamped at a place called Seeah Sung, a short distance from the capital, to march a part of his troops to the Bala Hissar, or royal citadel, where the shah resided, and the remainder into the British cantonment. Orders were likewise forwarded for the return of the 37th Bengal native infantry, who were posted at Khoord Kabool. Brigadier Shelton's force arrived, but, as it appears, to little purpose: "the day," says an officer on the spot, "was suffered to pass without anything being done demonstrative of British energy and power." Early on the morning of the 3rd, the troops from Khoord Kabool arrived under the command of Major Griffiths, having had to fight their way for the whole distance with a body of several thousand Ghiljies who hung upon them. They, nevertheless, succeeded in preserving nearly the whole of their baggage, as well as in bringing in all their wounded, and they arrived at Kabool in as perfect order as if the march "had been a mere parade movement." But, though thus reinforced, nothing decisive seems to have been attempted, and this day passed much like the preceding one. A few desultory efforts were made, but no connected or sustained plan either for attack or defence appears to have existed. In consequence, the insurgents gradually gathered strength, and obtained possession of post after post in quick succession. A tower occupied by Captain Trevor, of the 5th cavalry, a fort within musket-shot of it, used partly as a storehouse by the shah's commissariat, partly as a residence for Brigadier Anquetil, and a house at a short distance from the fort inhabited by Captain Troup, brigade major of the shah's forces, were all defensible posts, and were for a time defended. They were lost for

want of ammunition, for a fresh supply of which pressing application was made, but without effect. A considerable number of chiefs who remained faithful to the cause of the allies had proceeded to the house held by Captain Trevor with a tender of assistance. That they were sincere is placed beyond question by two facts. One of the chiefs offered his son as a hostage for his good faith, and actually placed him in the hands of the British officer; and further, when all hope was lost, from the non-arrival of assistance, several of the party escorted Captain Trevor and his family to the British cantonments. Neither Brigadier Anquetil nor Captain Troup was present at the fort and house which they respectively occupied, and the task of defending the fort fell to Captain Mackenzie. He held it till he had not a shot to fire, and then cut his way through the enemy to the British lines, which he reached, though not without being wounded.

It is not easy—perhaps it never will be practicable—to ascertain precisely the causes of the unfortunate want of energy which at this time pervaded the counsels and movements of the British. The chief military command was held by General Elphinstone, an officer of high character, but considerably advanced in years, and severely shaken by disease. The same apathy which had led to the loss of the tower and fort on the 3rd of November, continued to reign on the 4th, and with similar disastrous results. Ensign Warren, of the 5th Bengal native infantry, who, with a small force, occupied the fort of the British commissariat, reported that he was pressed by the enemy, and that, unless reinforced, he could not long hold out. On the possession or the loss of this fort depended the solution of the question whether the British army at Kabool should be fed or starved; yet, strange as it must appear, the answer to Ensign Warren's communication was the despatch of a small force to assist him in evacuating a place which it was so essential to retain. The attempt to reach the fort failed, as did another subsequently made, and both were attended by severe loss. In the mean time, intelligence of the intention of abandoning the fort having reached Captain Boyd, the chief commissariat officer of the British army, he hastened, in conjunction with Captain Johnson, who held the same situation in the army of the shah, to lay before the general the fatal consequences that must result from such a step, representing that the place contained supplies of grain, rum, medicine, clothing, and other stores, of the value of four lacs of rupees—that the immense loss which would be sustained by the abandonment of them was not the worst effect to be apprehended, but that such an act would greatly add to the confidence of the enemy, while it would involve the almost certain destruction of the whole British force, there not being within the cantonments a stock of provisions

equal to more than two days' consumption, while no hope could be entertained, under the circumstances that existed, of procuring supplies elsewhere. The representation was too powerful to be resisted, though it cannot but excite surprise that it should have been required, and it was determined to direct the commander of the commissariat fort to persist in its defence. A further communication from that officer announced that his difficulties increased—that the enemy were preparing for an attack, and were, as he believed, engaged in mining one of the towers—that the temper of his garrison was bad—that some of his men had made their escape over the wall, and that, with reference to all circumstances, he could not maintain himself many hours unless reinforced. The answer to this communication was, that he should be reinforced by two o'clock in the morning.

The gate of the commissariat fort was commanded by another fort called Mahomed Shureef's, and the possession of this latter fort was, consequently, deemed requisite to insure success to any attempt to relieve the former. Some information as to its means of defence was obviously desirable, and a man was despatched to gather such as hasty observation might furnish. On his return, he reported that about twenty men were seated without Mahomed Shureef's fort, smoking and talking; but, from what he could learn, the force within was very small, and unable to resist a sudden attack. The tidings brought by this messenger produced no result but a determination to send another, who, returning, corroborated the report of his predecessor. Still nothing was done—consultation and discussion consumed the hours, albeit at best too few, which remained for affording effectual succour to Ensign Warren, and saving from the grasp of the enemy his incalculably valuable charge. At last it was resolved that in the morning a detachment should be sent off; but, just as it was on the point of marching, news was received that Ensign Warren had arrived in cantonments with his garrison, having abandoned the fort, and by consequence surrendered all the means of subsistence on which the army could rely. The enemy had set fire to the gate, and the garrison were led out through a hole in the wall. This was a blow at the British cause in Kabool before which it reeled. The train was fired, and an explosion could not be far distant which might be expected to involve in common ruin those who had entered Afghanistan in pride and triumph, to change its rulers and its laws, and him who owed to their arms a diadem which now trembled on his brow. "It no sooner," says Lieutenant Eyre, "became generally known that the commissariat fort, upon which we were dependent for supplies, had been abandoned, than one universal feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison; nor can I describe the impatience of the troops, but especially the native

portion, to be led out for its recapture—a feeling that was by no means diminished by their seeing the Afghans crossing and recrossing the road between the commissariat fort and the gate of the Shah Bagh, laden with the provisions on which had depended our ability to make a protracted defence." Well, indeed, might indignation and impatience prevail; and so strongly were they expressed, that at last it was resolved to make an attempt against Mahomed Shureef's fort, the practicability of capturing which had occasioned so much solemn discussion, during which all the stores were lost. Two guns, under Lieutenant Eyre, were to open a fire on the fort, under cover of which a party, under Major Swaine, was to advance and blow open the gate with a bag of powder. The guns opened their fire, and continued it until their supply of ammunition was nearly exhausted; but, from some cause, the party which was to force the gate remained still, without attempting to perform their allotted task, and the whole were recalled into cantonments. "Thus," remarks Lieutenant Eyre, "the enemy enjoyed their triumph undiminished, and great was the rage of the sepoys of the 37th native infantry, who had evinced the utmost eagerness to be led out, at this disappointment of their hopes."

On the following day another attempt was made upon the embarrassing fort, which would seem to have been erected for no other purpose but to confuse the counsels and baffle the efforts of the British force. At an early hour three iron nine-pounders were brought to bear upon the north-east bastion, and two howitzers upon the contiguous curtain. The firing was maintained for about two hours, during which the artillerymen were exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters stationed on a couple of high towers which completely commanded the battery. A practicable breach being effected, a storming party, consisting of three companies, one of her Majesty's 44th, one of the 5th native infantry, and one of the 37th native infantry, marched forward and speedily carried the place. The death-throe of this redoubtable fort was far less violent than might have been expected from the degree of tenacity attributed to it. About one hundred and fifty men succeeded in planting the British flag upon it; but it is to be lamented that the gallant officer, Ensign Raben, of the Queen's 44th, who first waved it on the summit of the breach, was shot through the heart while in the act of thus displaying the signal of his country's triumph.

The cavalry pursued the fugitives from the place, and the hills were speedily covered with the enemy's horse issuing forth for their protection. A severe encounter took place, but the enemy threw out such vast numbers that no serious impression could be made on them, and as the day closed, both parties retired from the conflict.

For some days after this affair, shot and shells were thrown from the Bala Hissar into the town, but with little effect, beyond the alarm which they were calculated to create. Plans were suggested for recapturing the commissariat fort, and so much of the stores as yet remained in it; but they were suggested only, not acted upon.

The enemy appeared on the heights in great numbers, and with great boldness, and little was done or attempted that was calculated to check this feeling in them. The very debilitated state of General Elphinstone's health, at this time, rendered it necessary that he should have the assistance of a conductor possessed of greater bodily vigour, and accordingly Brigadier Shelton, the officer second in command, was called from the Bala Hissar to cantonments. His presence was followed by increased activity; but the credit of the change appears to be due to Sir William Macnaghten, towards whom it is a bare act of justice to state, that whatever of promptitude and energy was displayed in the higher departments of affairs at Kabul during these unhappy scenes, seems traceable to him. The enemy had taken possession of some forts, one of which, called the Rika Beebee fort, was situated directly opposite an inclosure, known as the Mission compound, at the north-east angle of the British cantonments, and within musket-shot of the works. Into these they poured their fire, and a party of sharpshooters, who found cover among some ruins in the vicinity, picked off with deadly certainty the British artillerymen while engaged in working their guns. Sir William Macnaghten strongly urged the necessity of dislodging the enemy from this post, but would probably not have succeeded in obtaining the consent of the military authorities to the task being attempted, had he not offered to take on himself the entire responsibility of the act. Thereupon the general ordered a force to be provided to storm the fort. It consisted of the Queen's 44th regiment, the 37th native infantry, two horse-artillery guns, one mountain-train gun, and a considerable body of native forces. Captain Bellew undertook to blow open the main gate, but from accident or error he missed it, and instead, blew in the wicket gate at the side, affording an aperture of such small dimensions that not more than two or three men could enter abreast, and these were compelled to stoop. Under these disadvantages, a handful of the assailants got in; among these were Colonel Mackerell, of her Majesty's 44th; Lieutenant Cadott, of the same regiment; Lieutenant Hawtry, of the 37th Bengal native infantry, and Lieutenant Bird, of the shah's force. Though the number of those who had passed the gate was small, it was sufficient to spread dismay among the garrison, who, not doubting that the whole British force would follow, rushed, in consternation, through a gate on the side of the fort opposite to that which had been

carried. Unhappily, at this moment a charge of cavalry round the corner of the fort spread panic among the troops before the gate; they turned, and it became, says one of the narrators of the event, "*à sa vue qui peut.*" The officers in vain exerted themselves to bring back the men to their duty; and when Major Scott, of the 44th, after resorting without effect to command, expostulation, and entreaty, called on volunteers to follow him, the call was answered by only a single private. All would now have been lost but for the iron perseverance of Brigadier Shelton, who, amidst the hot fire of the enemy and the wild rush of the recreant troops, stood firm and unmoved—striving, by the exercise of his authority, and still more by his animating example, to save the British name from the disgrace impending over it. He at last succeeded in rallying the men, who advanced once more to the attack, and once more wavered, although now the fire of the guns from the cantonments, and a demonstration on the part of the British cavalry, had checked the career of the Afghan horse. But the hesitation was overcome by the energy of the brigadier. The assailants pressed forward, and the fort was won.

The situation of the small British party who had entered the fort, and remained within it while their comrades were shrinking from their duty without, was a subject of intense and painful interest. Lieutenants Cadett and Hawtry had returned, to endeavour to bring up the men, but the fate of the rest was to be ascertained. The little band, it appears, on finding themselves deserted, had hastily shut the gate through which the greater part of the garrison had escaped, and secured the chain with a bayonet. The unhappy circumstances, however, prevailing on the opposite side, encouraged the enemy to return, which they did in considerable numbers; and having succeeded in removing the bayonet, the gate was re-opened, and the foe rushed in. Their fury was exercised without restraint upon Colonel Mackerell, whom they hacked in a frightful manner. Lieutenant Bird, with two sepoy of the 37th, found shelter in a stable, which they barricaded. One of the sepoys was killed, but Lieutenant Bird and the other defended themselves for a considerable period—maintaining a fire which knocked down all who ventured to approach their retreat, with a precision proportioned to the closeness of the combat. In this way more than thirty of the enemy met their death; and when the fort was gained, the gallant pair were found by their companions unharmed. The rescue, indeed, was at the last moment, for the ammunition of the besieged combatants was reduced to a stock of five cartridges.

The loss of the British on this occasion amounted to two hundred killed and wounded. Captain McCrae, of the 44th, was cut down in the gateway on the first rush, and Captain Westmacott, of the 37th, was shot while

engaged in skirmishing without. The fate of Colonel Mackerell has already been mentioned.

Several adjacent forts were, on the fall of Rika Bashee, abandoned by the enemy. In one some grain was found—a most welcome discovery. No time was lost in beginning to transport it to a safer spot, but there was not time to remove the whole before nightfall. A guard was applied for to protect the remainder, but refused; and in the morning, as might have been anticipated, it was gone.

On the 13th November, the enemy again appearing in great force on the heights, and firing into the British cantonments, a force was sent out to disperse them. This movement, like the attack on the Rika Bashee fort, was suggested by Sir William Macnaghten, who, on this occasion also, was required to take upon himself the entire responsibility attached to it. There was another and more lamentable point of resemblance between the two occasions. On both, the infantry, European and native, manifested an unsteadiness not to be expected. The fortune of the day, however, was with the British, and a gun was taken from the enemy. Another might have been captured, but it was protected by a hot fire from a body of Afghan infantry, and the 44th could not be prevailed upon to incur the danger attendant on carrying it off. The fear of the Europeans was shared by the native troops. The capture of the gun being thus frustrated, Lieutenant Eyre, with a horse-artillery gunner, descended into the ravine where it lay, and spiked it.

The feeble hold which Shah Shoojah and his allies had on Kabool was manifested simultaneously in almost every part of the country. About the middle of November, Major Pottinger, political agent in Kohistan, accompanied by Lieutenant Haughton, adjutant of a Goorka regiment in the shah's service, and a single soldier of that regiment, arrived in Kabool, after undergoing extraordinary hardships, and encountering great danger in effecting a safe retreat from the scene of his official functions. His fort in Lughman had been attacked, his assistant, Lieutenant Rattray, murdered, and himself forced to withdraw to Charekar. There, however, he found no permanent resting-place. Charekar was closely invested by the enemy—the British outposts attacked, and in succession carried. In defending them, Captain Codrington, the officer in command, was killed, and Major Pottinger wounded. The garrison at Charekar suffered fearfully from want of water; it being necessary after a time to dispense this prime necessary of existence in quantities equal only to half a wine-glass for each man, and finally the supply failed altogether. Desertion had been for some time going on, and open mutiny followed. On Lieutenant Haughton attempting to seize two deserters, who had returned apparently for the purpose of persuading their comrades to follow their example, he was cut down by

a jemadar of artillery, who repeated the blow while the officer lay on the ground, and then rushed out, followed by nearly all the Mahometans in the place. The troops who remained were completely disorganized; and from this post, also, it became necessary to retreat. Proceeding towards Kabool, the toils and perils of the road were so dispiriting, that all the fugitives dropped off excepting the single soldier who, as already mentioned, arrived with the two officers at the British cantonments, where, says Lieutenant Eyre, "they were received by their brethren in arms as men risen from the dead." Other officers exposed to similar dangers were less fortunate. Dr. Grant, a surgeon, who, like many members of his profession in India, had honourably distinguished himself by services not falling within the routine of his proper duties, departed with Major Pottinger and Lieutenant Haughton from Charekar; but shortly afterwards disappeared, from what cause was unknown; and two officers stationed at a fort in Kohistan, about twelve miles from Kabool, Lieutenant Maule and Lieutenant Whelan, after being deserted by their men, were barbarously murdered.

The chapter of disasters was further swelled by the surprise and destruction of a detachment proceeding under the command of Captain Woodburn, of the shah's service, from Ghuznee to Kabool. At Gundamuck, the force left by Sir Robert Sale on his departure fell rapidly into disorder; the larger portion deserted to the enemy, and the rest refused to remain at Gundamuck; with them the officer in charge, Captain Burn, was compelled to retire to Jelalabad, leaving two guns and much baggage behind them. At Pesh Boolak, between the Khyber pass and Jelalabad, Captain Ferris, of the shah's service, found himself surrounded by the enemy, destitute of ammunition, and in danger of being abandoned by his troops. Some of them had gone over the walls, but were cut up by the enemy; and the fear of meeting the same fate was believed to be the chief motive by which the rest were deterred from following their example. Having no prospect of relief, he resolved to make an attempt to cut his way through the enemy, and he succeeded; but the abandonment of the fort involved the loss of treasure to the amount of thirty-eight thousand rupees, as well as some stores and private property.

At Kabool, the state of affairs remained for a period of several days almost unchanged in any respect. The same indecision and inactivity which had heretofore prevailed in the British cantonments continued to exist; and the enemy appear not to have been without a due share of the same unmilitary qualities. Nothing was done or attempted on either side. On the 22nd of November both parties seemed suddenly roused to the recollection that they were in the position of belligerents. A village called Behmauroo, from which the English

drew some supplies, was occupied by the enemy; and Major Swayne, of the 5th native infantry, was despatched, with a small force of horse and foot, and one gun, to dispossess them. A second gun was afterwards ordered to his support. The village was to have been stormed, but no attempt was made to carry this intention into effect. The officer in command, according to Lieutenant Eyre, "would neither go forward nor retire," but continued for several hours to maintain a useless fire on the houses in the village; the infantry of the party being under cover, but the cavalry and artillery exposed to the fire of the enemy without the opportunity of effecting any object of importance adequate to the risk incurred and the loss sustained. In the evening Brigadier Shelton joined them, with a reinforcement under Colonel Oliver, but no more daring or decisive course was the result; and, finally, in the language of Lady Sale, "The troops returned, having done nothing."

It was resolved on the 23rd to repair the error of the preceding day, as far as reparation can be said to be practicable in cases where the loss sustained is not so much in physical or material strength as in confidence and character. At two o'clock in the morning Brigadier Shelton marched out with seventeen companies of infantry, consisting of five of her Majesty's 44th, under Captain Leighton, six of the 5th native infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver, six of the 37th native infantry, under Major Kershaw, of her Majesty's 18th; one hundred sappers, under Lieutenant Laing; one squadron of the 5th light cavalry, under Captain Bold; one squadron of irregular horse, under Lieutenant Walker; a hundred men of the corps known as Anderson's horse, and a single gun. The gun was with great difficulty got to its position on a knoll, commanding an inclosure in the village, which, from the fires perceived in it, was judged to be the principal bivouac of the enemy. The gun, as soon as practicable, opened, and the enemy, in some alarm, retreated, from the open space to the shelter afforded by the houses and towers, from whence they kept up a sharp fire of jezails. The brigadier was strongly urged to storm the village under cover of the darkness (there being no moon), and before the enemy had time to recover from the panic into which they had been thrown; but the opportunity was suffered to pass without profit.

"Both officers and men," says Lady Sale, "were most anxious to be led against the village, to take it by storm, but the brigadier would not hear of it." At length, as day dawned, the caution of the commander gave way. The fire from the village had slackened, and, it was believed, from the failure of ammunition. Parties of the enemy were observed hurrying away, and, according to the belief of Lieutenant Eyre, not above forty men remained in the place. A storming party was formed under Major Swayne; but mischance

frustrated the effects of a movement too long postponed. The officer commanding the storming party missed his way, and instead of arriving at the principal gate, which was now open, he came to a small wicket which was barricaded, and believing himself unable to force it, he withdrew his men under cover, where they remained until recalled. In the mean time vast numbers of the enemy issued from the city, and covered a hill immediately opposite to that occupied by the British force, and separated from it only by a narrow gorge. Lieutenant Walker, with his irregular horse, had been despatched to cut off the fugitives from the city, but the plain was now swept by hordes of cavalry, who evidently designed to perform the same duty with regard to Lieutenant Walker. He was therefore recalled. The abandonment of the attempt to storm had afforded opportunity for throwing reinforcements into the village as well as supplies of ammunition, and thus the purpose for which the troops had marched out of cantonments was irreparably frustrated. Major Kershaw, with three companies of the 37th, being left in the position first taken by the British force, the brigadier marched with the remainder of the troops, and his gun, to oppose the enemy on the opposite height. Here his disposition of his force is stated by military authorities to have been singularly injudicious. Skirmishers were brought forward to the brow of the hill: the rest of the infantry were formed into two squares, supported by his cavalry, but the whole exposed to the fire of the enemy, which was delivered from behind hillocks and other defences. But worse even than defective generalship, was the sunken spirit of the men. The skirmishers could with difficulty be kept to their posts, and when a daring party of the enemy descended the gorge, and, availing themselves of such cover as they could find, crept gradually up the hill on which the British force was posted, they gave way. Rewards, of an amount magnificent in the eyes of a private soldier, were offered for the capture of the enemy's flag, but in vain. The endeavour to lead to a charge was fruitless, as though the appeal had been made to men of wood. Several officers advanced to the front, and pelted the enemy with stones, the men looking on. The enemy made a dash at the British gun, and the cavalry were ordered to charge for its protection, but neither the command nor the example of their officers could induce them to stir. The gun was captured, the artillerymen fighting gallantly in defence of it, though unsupported, and two of them were killed. The first square of the British infantry was now in flight. The second kept its position, and in its rear the flying troops were with some difficulty rallied by their officers. The reappearance of firmness was not without effect upon the enemy's party, whose ardour was further diminished by a casualty which had befallen one of their chiefs, and abandoning

the gun, they made off with the limber and horses. The conflict was renewed, and for some time maintained; but a second attack from the enemy similar to that which not long before had caused the British infantry, European and native alike, to turn in disgraceful flight, was made by the enemy with the same result. No effort could recall the men into action, nor even prevail on them to retire in order. They ran in the most outrageous confusion, pursued by the enemy, who destroyed them in vast numbers. The gun, for which on its rescue fresh horses and limber were procured, was overturned and lost; the wounded were for the most part left on the field, to be hacked and hewed by the weapons of their ferocious enemy, and nothing was wanting to render disaster complete and overwhelming. A fire opened on the pursuers by part of the shah's force; a charge made by Lieutenant Hardyman, with a fresh troop of cavalry; and the extraordinary conduct of one of the Afghan chiefs, who, in the heat of pursuit, suddenly halted and led off his followers, favoured the progress of the flying: but for the help thus afforded, scarcely one of those who went forth to capture the village of Behmauroo would have returned. Lieutenant Walker, while charging with Lieutenant Hardyman, at the head of a few of his horsemen whom he had rallied, received a mortal wound. Colonel Oliver, Captain Mackintosh, and Lieutenant Laing, were also left dead on the field. The three companies of the 37th native infantry who remained with Major Kershaw do not seem to have manifested any portion of that craven spirit which unhappily pervaded the rest of the British force. They were hard pressed throughout the day, and were among the last to leave the hill. One company returned with a naick and two privates only.

A result so fatal, and withal so dishonourable, as that which befell the movement of Brigadier Shelton, cannot be passed over without some attempt to trace its causes; and the views of Lieutenant Eyre upon this subject appear to be countenanced by probability, as well as by the agreement of competent judges. He says, "No less than six great errors must present themselves even to the most unpractised military eye, each of which contributed in no slight degree to the defeat of our troops, opposed as they were by overwhelming numbers." The first and greatest of these mistakes, according to the opinion of the authority quoted, was the taking out a single gun. It appears that a general order, issued under the government of the marquis of Hastings, forbade less than two guns being taken into the field, under any circumstances or on any pretence whatever, where a second was available. Brigadier Shelton, it is stated, had intended to take another gun, but it was disabled, and was twice specially reported as incapable of being got ready for use before twelve o'clock on the disastrous day when the

British, eight hours before mid-day, moved to defeat, destruction, and disgrace. The single gun was served by men worthy of the country whose honour they maintained, but their fire was constantly interrupted, as, after a time, the vent became so hot that it was impossible to continue it. The second error is the very obvious one of neglecting to take advantage of the temporary panic produced in the enemy, by storming the village before they had time to recover from it. "Had," says Lieutenant Eyre, "a storming party been led to the attack, under cover of the darkness which would have nullified the advantage they," the defenders, "possessed, in being under cover, the place must inevitably have fallen into our hands; and thus would the principal object of the sally have been gained, and a good line of retreat secured for our troops in case of necessity." The third error enumerated by the writer above quoted, was the neglect of raising defences for the protection of the British troops on the hill; and this error he pronounces "so manifest as to be quite unaccountable." A party of sappers had accompanied the force for the purpose of forming a breastwork, but their services were not called into requisition, though it is said the expediency of resorting to them was specially pointed out at the time when the enemy were crowning the opposite height with multitudinous numbers, after the attack on the village had failed. The good effects of raising such a defence would not have been limited to the protection of the men, important as was this object; it would have enhanced the difficulties of the enemy in advancing, and have given confidence, not only to those within the work, but also to those beyond it, from the knowledge that, if hard pressed, they could fall back upon a place of safety. Why such a precaution was neglected, it is now impossible to explain. The fourth error adverted to by Lieutenant Eyre, was the extraordinary step of forming the infantry into squares. The value of such a formation, when the object is to resist an attack by horsemen, is well understood. "All," says Lieutenant Eyre, "have heard of the British squares at Waterloo, which defied the repeated desperate onsets of Napoleon's choicest cavalry. At Behmauroo we formed squares to resist the distant fire of infantry, thus presenting a solid mass against the aim of, perhaps, the best marksmen in the world, the said squares being securely perched on the summit of a steep and narrow ridge, up which no cavalry could charge with effect." It thus appears that the men were disposed in the manner best adapted to oppose cavalry, there being no chance or possibility of any cavalry being brought against them, and, at the same time, in the manner best adapted to admit of their being picked off, in the largest numbers, by the species of force actually engaged against them. The astonishment expressed by the critic whose views are here followed, is heightened, as well it might

be, by the reflection that the officer who thus disposed his men, had enjoyed, in his younger days, "the benefit of Peninsular experience." The disposition of the cavalry is mentioned by Lieutenant Eyre as the fifth of the great errors committed; this force, instead of being in the place where they might have been useful in protecting the line of communication with cantonments, and further have been able to advance readily to any point where their services would have been required, being hemmed in between bodies of infantry, and "exposed for several hours to a destructive fire from the enemy's juzzails, on ground where, even under the most favourable circumstances, they could not have acted with effect." The arrangement seems to have been erroneous from the beginning, and at the disastrous close of the day the error became frightfully apparent, horse and foot being mixed up together in a way which increased the confusion and rendered it irretrievable—it being alike impracticable, under such circumstances, either to rally the men, or to withdraw them in good order. The sixth and last error of this fatal day, was the prolongation of the fight when nothing could be gained but some addition of loss and discredit to the vast mass of both previously accumulated. Lieutenant Eyre's judgment upon this point shall be given in his own words. "Shortly after our regaining possession of the gun, one of the brigadier's staff, Captain Mackenzie, feeling convinced that, from the temper of the troops, and from the impossibility of rectifying the false position in which the force was placed, not only was success beyond hope, but that defeat, in its most disastrous shape, was fast approaching, proposed to the brigadier to endeavour to effect a retreat while it was yet in his power to do so with comparative impunity. His reply was, 'Oh no! we will hold the hill some time longer!' At that time, even if the slaughter of the soldiers, the loss of officers, the evident panic in our ranks, and the worse than false nature of our position, had not been sufficient to open all eyes as to the impossibility even of partial success (for the real object of the expedition, viz. the possession of the village of Behmauroo, had been, as it were, abandoned from the very first), the weakness and exhaustion of both men and horses, who were not only worn out by bodily fatigue, but suffering grievously from extreme thirst, and the debility attendant on long fasting, ought to have banished all idea of further delaying a movement in which alone lay the slightest chance of preserving to their country lives by the eventual sacrifice of which, not even the only solace to the soldier in the hour of misfortune, the consciousness of unimpaired honour, was likely to be gained." The simple facts of the case appear to be these. The troops marched out to capture the village of Behmauroo, and the object might have been achieved; but the opportunity was suffered to pass, and then the fight was continued

with no prospect but that of retreat before the enemy sooner or later, in good or in bad order, as might happen, and seemingly without any purpose but the gratification of mere wilfulness. Nothing apparently could be worse than the military arrangements of the day, excepting it were the temper of part of the troops engaged. The deficiency of manhood in the latter completed the disasters which had their origin in the blunders of the former. It is beyond doubt that the troops could feel but little confidence in their leader, who, amidst an abundant display of personal courage, manifested no other quality of a good general; but for English soldiers to turn when called upon to advance, is happily so rare an occurrence, that even with the partially extenuating circumstances above mentioned, the fact is calculated to inspire as much of astonishment as of disgust. Instances of individual heroism there were, but with reference to all the occurrences of the day, he to whom his country's honour is dear must wish it were possible that all recollection of it could be obliterated.

The character of the British arms in Kabul was now low indeed, and no chance of safety for either civil or military seemed to exist but in negotiation. Sir William Macnaghten had repeatedly urged the military authorities to make some demonstration worthy of their country, and when they had yielded a reluctant consent, they had generally thrown on him the responsibility of the experiment. They appear now to have been not less strenuous in recommending him to negotiate than he had previously been in urging them to fight. The Kabul chiefs also manifesting an inclination for an exercise of diplomacy, a series of negotiations commenced, and was continued through many days. Any high degree of precision in relating the particulars of these negotiations being unattainable, it would be idle to enter into them at length. It is said that the proposals of the Afghans were, in the first instance, of such a nature as to call forth an unqualified and indignant rejection from the British envoy. Proposals more moderate and reasonable were subsequently submitted by him, and received by the chiefs with apparently a sincere desire for an amicable arrangement, the only exception to the seeming prevalence to such a feeling being furnished by Mahomed Akbar Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed Khan. The conditions were afterwards modified in various ways. At one time Shah Shoojah was to descend from the throne; at another he was to be maintained on condition of his daughters forming matrimonial engagements with some of the chiefs in opposition to his government, and of his abandoning some offensive manifestations of pride which had given great offence. The shah seems to have vacillated not less than his enemies; he consented to retain the sovereignty on the conditions specified, and afterwards withdrew his consent, thus leaving the negotiators to revert to the original terms. It

mattered little, however, what terms were professedly adopted, for it was evident that the chiefs meant to observe none, but to avail themselves of every opportunity which might offer to counteract the British authorities by trick and fraud, exercises of ingenuity which, in Afghan estimation, mark the highest triumph of human intellect. While these diplomatic proceedings were in progress, the British troops were suffering great privations, and had in prospect still greater. Various plans were suggested for their retreat without asking the aid or the permission of the Afghans, but all were beset with dangers and difficulties so great as to insure their rejection. Under the terms of the convention, the British were entirely to evacuate Afghanistan, surrendering the fortresses which they still held therein; and their march was to be facilitated by a supply of beasts of burden, to be furnished by the Afghans. These, however, were not provided; and almost every day brought some new experiment on the patience of the British envoy. Affecting distrust, or perhaps really feeling it from consciousness that they were themselves unworthy of trust, the Afghan chiefs demanded the delivery of the guns and ammunition of the British force. This was conceded, and an officer was sent to select such as might appear to be the most desirable. Hostages were required and given. The Afghans demanded that Brigadier Shelton should be one, but, as Lieutenant Eyre states, the brigadier "having expressed a decided objection to undertake the duty," the demand was not insisted on. But it was not in the diplomacy of this unhappy period that the British name met with its deepest humiliation. While negotiations, ever shifting and never ending, were in progress, the countrymen of Clive, and Lawrence, and Coote, and Lake, and Wellesley, were miserably throwing away that military character which those great men had raised, and which had been far more efficacious in raising and maintaining the British empire in the East than all other agencies of human origin.

The English in India, while pursuing a career on the whole of unparalleled brilliancy, had yet received occasional checks; they had sustained reverses, but down to this miserable epoch they had met them like men. Now, the spirit which had borne the British standard triumphant through so many fields of carnage—which had so often planted it on the summit of the breach choked with the bodies of those who had fallen in the attempt to bear it thither—the spirit displayed by the officer who, marching to the relief of Trichinopoly, entered it in triumph, supported by two of his men, because unable to support himself; by the disabled and suffering man, and his array of sick and wounded, whose unexpected appearance at Mulwagul turned the fortune of the day, and saved a British force from destruction; and by the humble sergeant who, with a handful of men, maintained, against

an overwhelming force, a miserable fort till it crumbled around him into a shapeless heap of rubbish—that spirit seemed to have departed from the British soldier in Kabool. The rich heritage of glory bequeathed to him by his predecessors in arms—the fruit of toils and struggles innumerable in every part of the world—was forgotten or despised, and a mean regard for personal safety, which tended to defeat itself, usurped the place of the noble and unshrinking endurance which had so long been classed among the prominent characteristics of his countrymen.

The defence of Mahomed Shereef's fort, which seemed destined to be a never-ending source of annoyance and discredit, furnished occasion for a display of pusillanimity far more disgraceful than the blunders which preceded its capture. The enemy were very desirous of regaining possession, and resorted to various modes of attack for the purpose. In imitation of the English, they attempted to blow open the gate with powder, but of the proper management of this operation they seem to have been entirely ignorant; the powder exploded, but the gate was unharmed. They next commenced mining one of the towers, but Lieutenant Sturt, under cover of the night, entered their mine and blew it up. The garrison were so much alarmed by these attempts, that they were not deemed trustworthy; and a change was consequently made. The new garrison consisted of one company of the Queen's 44th, under Lieutenant Gray, and one company of the 37th Bengal infantry, under Lieutenant Hawtreay. In order to destroy the enemy's mine, it had been necessary to open a passage near the walls, and this opening was, when the work was performed, secured by barricading. Through this defence, a party of the enemy, who had crept up, discharged a few shots, and Lieutenant Gray was slightly wounded. He proceeded to cantonments to get his wound dressed, and the men of the 44th, immediately on his departure, prepared for flight. Lieutenant Hawtreay used every possible exertion to withhold them, but in vain; they precipitated themselves over the walls, and were soon followed by the sepoys of the 37th, who previously were disposed to stand to their duty. Two of the latter body, indeed, were left dead in the fort, but not a man of the 44th. The enemy of course took possession of the fort. The bazaar village was garrisoned by a party of the 44th, who, on observing the flight of their comrades from Mahomed Shereef's fort, were about to follow their example, but were stopped by their officers. After this manifestation, a guard of sepoys was stationed at the entrance of the bazaar, with orders to prevent the departure of any Europeans on duty there; and on the following day the European garrison was withdrawn, and a company of the 37th native infantry put in their place. "This," says Lieutenant Eyre, "being the weakest point of our defences, had hitherto been protected entirely by par-

ties of her Majesty's 44th, which post of honour they were now considered unworthy to retain."

Days passed away, the British in cantonments having continually before them the prospect of starvation; a result averted only by temporary supplies, of the continuance of which no reasonable confidence could be entertained. In homely but expressive phraseology, they were literally supported "from hand to mouth." The restraints of discipline gradually pressed more and more lightly, till at last they were scarcely felt. With a view to the approaching necessity for retreat, when the magazine would inevitably become a prey to the enemy, the general had ordered some ammunition to be distributed to certain camp-followers; and commanding officers were directed to indent for new arms and accoutrements, in exchange for such as were old or damaged. But little attention was now paid to the letter of orders, and it is stated, that many officers in command of companies rested content with sending their men to the magazine, to help themselves at pleasure; the stores, in the absence of any building proper for their reception, being placed under the trees of an orchard, in charge of a small guard. The consequence was, a scene of confusion and plunder, soldiers and camp-followers indiscriminately rushing to the spot, and each man carrying off what his fancy suggested as desirable for him to possess. Some officers exerted themselves to check the tumult and protect the property, but for some time their authority was openly defied. The semblance of order was ultimately restored, and the larger portion of the misappropriated articles recovered; but the incident afforded a lamentable indication of the relaxation of those ties which withhold a body of soldiery from degenerating into a disorderly mass of armed adventurers.

The negotiations having arrived at a stage when, if they were to be regarded as sincere or binding, effect might be given to the stipulations agreed upon, the British troops in the Bala Hissar marched out to join their brethren in cantonments. But the Afghan chiefs still held back from the execution of the provisions to which they had bound themselves. The British force was entirely at their mercy. The enemy were in possession of all the forts which commanded the cantonments, and the distress, for want of provisions and forage, which prevailed, was extreme. Further to aggravate the sufferings of the unhappy force, the winter became intensely cold, and a heavy fall of snow covered the ground.

At this moment,—when difficulties, multifarious and seemingly insurmountable, surrounded the British force; with fierce enemies, or pretended, but treacherous, friends without the cantonments, and a perishing mass within; when to remain or to fly seemed alike fraught with destruction; when the troops had lost all energy, and when no conceivable amount

of energy appeared equal to the occasion; when the access of hope on every side seemed barred,—a proposal was suddenly made to the British envoy, to which, unhappily, his embarrassments induced him to lend a willing ear. It came from Akbar Khan, and was to this effect: that Ameencollah Khan, one of the most influential of the opposing chiefs, and believed to be one of the most hostile, should be seized, and become prisoner; that Mahomed Khan's fort and the Bala Hissar should be re-occupied by the British troops, who were to remain in the country some months longer, and then to evacuate it in a friendly manner; Shah Shoojah to retain the sovereignty, but Akbar Khan to be named his vizier, and, in addition to that office, to receive pecuniary reward to an enormous amount. In one respect, the proposal went further than has been stated. To imprison the chief most active in his opposition to Shah Shoojah, was, in Afghan eyes, but little; and the envoy was assured that, for a sum of money, the head of his enemy should be laid at his feet. The answer of Sir William Macnaghten was such as became the representative of the government with whose interests he was intrusted; he intimated that it was neither his custom nor that of his country, to give a price for blood.

Looking at the proposal with the coolness which time and distance, and the absence of anxiety allow, it appears too monstrous to pass, even with a novice in diplomacy; still less could it be expected to succeed with one so experienced in the ways of men, and so familiar with the wiles of eastern policy, as was Sir William Macnaghten. It came, however, at a moment when almost any change seemed a relief from the harrowing troubles which had pressed so overwhelmingly on his mind; and it should be remembered also, that, extravagant as were the suggestions offered to him, the history of the East affords multitudinous instances of the severance of apparent friends and the union of avowed enemies in no wise more strange and unaccountable than those which were involved in this overture. But, whatever the degree of plausibility which the proposal may bear to different minds, Sir William Macnaghten eagerly, as it seems, embraced it; excepting, however, let it be repeated, that part which involved the infamy and guilt of assassination. His consent having been secured to the outline of the plan, it was suggested that a conference, for the purpose of arranging the details, should take place between him and Akbar Khan. The place selected for the interview was the plain, and thither, about noon on the 28rd of September, Sir William Macnaghten proceeded, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie. He had requested that the general would have two regiments and two guns ready for secret service; and the existence of a feeling that the experiment he was about to make was attended with danger,

was indicated by his desiring that the garrison might be kept on the alert, and the walls strongly manned. It does not appear, however, that much regard was paid to his wishes on this point; for, on leaving the cantonments, he expressed disappointment at the paucity of men on the ramparts and the apparent weakness of the garrison, remarking to his companions, with not less of justice than of bitterness, that it was "of a piece with the military arrangements throughout the siege."

The troops required to carry out the objects of the proposed agreement were not in readiness, and a letter from the general, remonstrating against their being thus employed, was despatched to the envoy after he had taken his departure, and which consequently he never received. On approaching the place of meeting, the small escort which had accompanied the envoy halted, and he advanced with the three officers to the selected spot, which was partially screened from view from the cantonments by some small hillocks. Akbar Khan soon afterwards appeared, with some other chiefs, among whom was the brother of the man proposed to be seized and imprisoned. A carpet was spread, and the conference began. It had not long continued, when a number of men, heavily armed, gradually drew near, and seemed to be forming a circle round the spot. This was noticed by Captain Lawrence, who suggested that, as the conference was of a secret nature, they should be ordered to a distance. Akbar Khan answered, that it was of no importance, for that they were all in the secret. Immediately afterwards, he exclaimed, "Seize! seize!" and the envoy and his three companions were immediately pinioned from behind, deprived of their swords, and carried off prisoners. Captain Trevor was speedily put to death, and the same fate befell Sir William Macnaghten, who, it is reported and generally believed, was shot by Akbar Khan with a pistol, one of a pair just before presented by the envoy to the ruthless chief. The bodies of the murdered men were exposed to the indignities and outrages with which eastern revenge is wont to visit the remains of fallen foes, and were paraded through the streets of the city in barbaric triumph. The hand of Sir William Macnaghten was exhibited in savage derision at the window of the place in which the two surviving prisoners were confined.

It will naturally be supposed that the events last related were sufficient to rouse the British military authorities from the torpor which had so long oppressed them; that some effort worthy of the country that gave them birth, the service to which they belonged, and the character which they had to maintain, would have been made to rescue from captivity, if they still lived, the victims of Akbar Khan's treachery, or to inflict just retribution if that treachery had been consummated by assassination. And what was done? Let the ques-

tion be answered by Lieutenant Eyre, an eye-witness. His testimony is, that the intelligence brought, "instead of rousing our leaders to instant action, seemed to paralyze their faculties; and although it was evident that our envoy had been basely entrapped, if not actually murdered before our very gate, and though even now crowds of Affghans, horse and foot, were seen passing and repassing to and fro in hostile array between Mahomed's fort and the place of meeting, not a gun was opened upon them; not a soldier was stirred from his post; no sortie was apparently even thought of; treachery was allowed to triumph in open day: the murder of a British envoy was perpetrated in the face and within musket-shot of a British army; and not only was no effort made to avenge the dastardly deed, but the body was left lying on the plain, to be mangled and insulted, and finally carried off to be paraded in the public market by a ruffianly mob of fanatical barbarians." And thus low was British spirit sunk, and thus was British honour tarnished, and thus were a knot of obscure barbarians suffered to revel in successful treachery, and defy the arms of that power before which the choicest troops of Europe had given way!

And now the onward progress of humiliation was rapid and fearful indeed. Insult followed hard upon treachery, in the transmission, from the chieftains upon whose hands the blood of Sir William Macnaghten and Captain Trevor was yet fresh, of a new treaty for the acceptance of those into whose hands the management of the interests of the British government might have passed. It contained the same articles as the previous treaty, with the addition of three others:—1st, That the British force should leave behind all their guns excepting six; 2nd, That they should give up all their treasure; and 3rd, That the hostages already held by the Affghans should be exchanged for married men, with their wives and families. Some demur arose as to the acceptance of this treaty. Major Eldred Pottinger, who had consented, at the urgent request of the general, to act as political agent, objected, and a council was summoned to consider his objections. It consisted of General Elphinstone, Brigadiers Shelton and Anquetil, Colonel Chambers, Captain Bellew, and Captain Grant. To these officers Major Pottinger opened his views, avowing his conviction that no confidence could be placed in any treaty formed with the Affghans, and that to bind the government of India by engagements to evacuate the country, to restore the deposed ameer, and to pay a sum amounting to fourteen lacs of rupees—for this formed part of the arrangement—was inconsistent with the claims of public duty. Entertaining these opinions, the only honourable course, in his judgment, was, either to hold out to the last at Kabool, or to endeavour to force a way to Jelalabad. Major Pottinger appears to have found no support in the council. One and all declared

that neither branch of the alternatives suggested was practicable, and that it would be better to pay any sum of money than to prolong hostilities. It was resolved, therefore, to accede to the demands of the enemy; and had they been ten times more unreasonable, and a hundred times more humiliating, probably the same determination would have been adopted. Bills were given for the vast ransom required, under the pretence, indeed, of affording protection, but still a difficulty remained. The hostages demanded could not be furnished. A circular was addressed to the married officers, offering considerable personal advantages to those willing to risk the safety of their wives and families, by allowing them to be detained, but nearly all refused. A magniloquent answer was therefore given upon this point, to the effect that "it was contrary to the usages of war to give up ladies as hostages, and that the general could not consent to an arrangement which would brand him with perpetual disgrace in his own country." It was not stated to the chiefs that, unusual and disgraceful as was the surrender required, an attempt to obtain the means of making it had been resorted to and had failed. The enemy were not inexorable—the bills on the government of India had probably softened them—they agreed to receive hostages of the sterner sex; and the requisite number being provided, this ground of difficulty was removed. Captains Drummond, Walsh, Warburton, and Webb, were accepted, and proceeded to join Captains Conolly and Airey, who were already in the keeping of the Affghans. Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie, who had been seized with Sir William Macnaghten, were permitted to return, as was also Captain Skinner, who was previously in the power of the enemy.

The sick and wounded of the British force, it was arranged, should not accompany their companions on the approaching march from Kabool. They were to be left in care of the chiefs, and in furtherance of this design they were conveyed into the Bala Hissar. The movement of the rest was delayed under various pretences till the 6th of January, when, in the language of Lieutenant Eyre, "the fatal morning dawned which was to witness the departure of the Kabool force from the cantonments in which it had sustained a two months' siege, to encounter the miseries of a winter march through a country of perhaps unparalleled difficulty, where every mountain defile, if obstinately defended by a determined enemy, must inevitably prove the grave of hundreds." The circumstances under which the march commenced are thus described by the same author:—"Dreary indeed was the scene over which, with drooping spirits and dismal forebodings, we had to bend our unwilling steps. Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain with one unspotted sheet of dazzling white, and so intensely bitter was the cold as to penetrate and defy the defences of the warmest clothing." Sad and suffering,

issued from the British cantonments the mingled mass of Europeans and Asiatics, of combatants and non-combatants, of men of various climes, creeds, complexions, and habits; part of them peculiarly unfitted to endure the hardships of a rigorous climate, which hardships, however, had to be shared by them in common with some whose sex ordinarily exempts them from participating in such scenes, and others whose tender age might well entitle them to the like privilege. The number of the fugitive crowd was large; about four thousand five hundred fighting men, and not less than twelve thousand followers, besides women and children. The advance was in motion at nine o'clock in the morning, and from that hour till the evening the throng continued to pass through the gates of the cantonments, which were immediately occupied by hordes of fanatical Affghans, "rending the air with their exulting cries, and committing every kind of atrocity." A fire of jezails was opened on the retreating troops, and Lieutenant Hardyman, of the 5th light cavalry, with about fifty rank and file, fell victims to it. The cantonments were no sooner cleared than all order was lost; troops, camp-followers, and baggage, public and private, became intermingled in one disorderly mass, and confusion, universal and inextricable, prevailed. Thus was the march commenced. The shadows of night overtook the fugitives while still pursuing their weary course, but its darkness was relieved by the blaze which rose above the British residency and other buildings which the enemy had fired upon taking possession of the cantonments. Many sepoy and camp-followers, unable to contend longer with their misery, lay down to wait, in silent despair, the approach of the relief from earthly suffering which death, at no distant period, must bring; and of those who struggled forward, some perished before the morning dawn. The provision for encampment was miserably deficient; here, as on the march, all was disorder and destitution. Thousands of wretched men were unable to obtain either shelter, fire, or food; the snow was their only bed, and to many it proved the bed of death.

The morrow brought no alleviation of suffering; it brought only the agony of consciousness, in exchange for the oblivion of slumber. The march was resumed in a different order from that pursued on the preceding day, "if that," says Lieutenant Eyre, "could be called order which consisted of a mingled mob of soldiers, camp-followers, and baggage-cattle, preserving not even the faintest resemblance of that regularity and discipline on which depended our only chance of escape from the danger which threatened us." One of the shah's regiments had disappeared, and was believed to have returned to Kabool. The rest of the force proceeded, numerous small bodies of Affghans, horse and foot, hanging on its flanks, and moving in a parallel direction with it. The chiefs, in whose favour bills to

the amount of more than fourteen lacs had been drawn, had promised in return an escort; and the parties which thus hovered round the British force were at first supposed to constitute a portion of it. This belief was after a time dispelled by their taking a step which not even by the most liberal construction could be regarded as forming any part of the duties of an escort. They attacked the British rear-guard, under Brigadier Anquetil, composed of her Majesty's 44th, the mountain-train guns, and a squadron of irregular horse. The guns were captured, but gallantly retaken by Lieutenant White and a few artillerymen, who, however, being unsupported, were unable to retain what they had so honourably won back. The 44th could not be brought up, and the guns were in consequence necessarily abandoned, though not until they had been spiked, "amid the gleaming sabres of the enemy." Ten more guns were afterwards spiked and abandoned, the horses attached to them being unable to drag their burden further through the snow.

It was now learned that Akbar Khan was in the vicinity; and communications were opened with him. That trustworthy personage declared that he had been sent to escort the British force to Jelalabad, and that the annoyance which they had suffered was the result of their having marched contrary to the wishes of the Affghan chiefs. He insisted, accordingly, on the force being halted at Boothank till the following morning, and moreover demanded six hostages, to insure its not marching beyond Taseen till news should be received of the evacuation of Jelalabad by Sir Robert Sale, for which an order had been despatched, in compliance with a stipulation in the treaty. The required halt was made, but in the morning the Affghans resumed their attacks. A party of them was rapidly dispersed by Major Thain, at the head of her Majesty's 44th, who on this occasion showed no lack of soldierly spirit.

And now the fearful pass of Boothank had to be traversed. The defile is about five miles long, and is bounded on both sides by lofty and precipitous hills. A mountain torrent dashes through it with such impetuosity that the frost had produced no effect upon it beyond the edges, where ice was accumulated in slippery masses, affording to the wretched animals which were still retained a footing neither easy nor safe. This stream had to be crossed twenty-eight times. The defile gradually narrows towards the spot where the force was to emerge from it, or such portion at least as might survive the dangerous passage, for the heights were crowned with infuriated Ghiljies, ready to deal death to those below. "The idea," says Lieutenant Eyre, "of threading the stupendous pass before us, in the face of an armed tribe of bloodthirsty barbarians, with such a dense, irregular multitude, was frightful, and the spectacle then presented by that waving sea of animated beings, the majority of

whom a few fleeting hours would transform into a line of lifeless carcases, to guide the future traveller on his way, can never be forgotten by those who witnessed it." But the concentrated difficulties and perils were not to be avoided. The advance entered the pass, and a hot fire was commenced on them. Several ladies accompanied the advance, but no feeling of respect for the character or the timidity of woman operated to slacken the fire from above. These helpless and unoffending females were compelled to make their way through the pass with hundreds of shots flying around them. Happily none of them sustained injury, excepting Lady Sale, who received a ball in her arm. Akbar Khan, it will be remembered, had promised protection, and several of his adherents rode forward with the advance, and employed themselves strenuously, whether sincerely or not, in exhorting the occupants of the heights to desist from firing. Their admonitions were unheeded; the balls fell thickly among the throng laboriously struggling onwards, and fearful was the slaughter. To maintain order and regularity under a murderous fire which those sustaining it have no power to return with effect, may be regarded as one of the highest triumphs of discipline; but the force exposed to this severe trial in the pass of Boot-hauk had become dreadfully deteriorated in moral as in physical strength; and it will excite no surprise, that, among men who for several days had been strangers to both food and repose, and who, for a much longer period, had been gradually losing the sense of duty, and with it that of self-respect, panic should arise, and spread with tremendous rapidity. Such was the fact; soldiers and followers rushed on indiscriminately, impelled by the wildness of despair, caring for nothing but the one object of reaching the end of the pass, and perhaps conscious of nothing but of the dangers which beset them. "Thousands," says Lieutenant Eyre, "seeking refuge in flight, hurried forward to the front, abandoning baggage, arms, ammunition, women, and children, regardless for the moment of everything but their own lives." Some of the details of this most disastrous passage are thus given by the same authority. "The rear-guard, consisting of her Majesty's 44th and the 54th native infantry, suffered severely; and at last, finding that delay was only destruction, they followed the general example, and made the best of their way to the front. Another horse-artillery gun was abandoned, and the whole of its artillerymen slain. Captain Anderson's eldest girl and Captain Boyd's youngest boy fell into the hands of the Affghans. It is supposed that three thousand souls perished in the pass." Such was the price of flight, and what remained to those who survived the carnage! Misery even exceeding that which they had previously endured, the task of describing which will best be performed by again quoting the testimony of Lieutenant Eyre. "On the force reaching Khoord Kabool, snow began to

fall, and continued till morning. Only four small tents were saved, of which one belonged to the general; two were devoted to the ladies and children, and one was given up to the sick; but an immense number of poor wounded wretches wandered about the camp, destitute of shelter, and perished during the night. Groans of misery and distress assailed the ear from all quarters. We had ascended to a still colder climate than we had left behind, and were without tents, fuel, or food." To this miserable night succeeded a morning bringing with it the confusion, uncertainty, and woe which had marked so many by which it had been preceded. Two hours before the time fixed upon for marching, a large portion of the troops, and nearly all the camp-followers, moved off without orders. They were recalled, in consequence of communications from Akbar Khan, promising supplies, and, at the same time, strongly urging a halt till he could make some arrangements for carrying into effect his benevolent desire of escorting his British friends in safety. This halt, like almost every other measure which had been taken since the outbreak in Kabool, seems to have been most injudicious. "There can be no doubt," says the author to whose brief but valuable narrative reference has so frequently been made, "that the general feeling in camp was adverse to a halt, there being scarcely even a native soldier who did not plainly perceive that our only chance of escape consisted in moving on as fast as possible. This additional delay, therefore, and prolongation of their sufferings in the snow, of which one more march would have carried them clear, made a very unfavourable impression on the minds of the native soldiers, who now, for the first time, began very generally to entertain the idea of deserting."

The halt, however, if it answered no other purpose, afforded opportunity for further communications with Akbar Khan; and one of a most extraordinary nature was received from him. It was to the effect, that the ladies who accompanied the British force, with their husbands and children, should, in order to preserve them from further hardship and danger, be placed under his protection, he pledging himself to escort them safely, keeping them one day's march in the rear of the army. This was a startling proposal; but time and circumstances pressed, and the general gave an unhesitating consent. There could be little doubt that the object of Akbar Khan was to get possession of the married men and their families as hostages, a point previously attempted to be carried, but defeated by the refusal of the officers interested. It does not appear that any resistance was now offered on their part; and, indeed, the dangers which surrounded those most dear to them were so imminent, and the sufferings to which they were unavoidably subjected so great, as to warrant, in some degree, the belief that no change could be for the worse. The general

had not objected to the former demand of the enemy, till compelled by the determination of his officers; it need, therefore, excite no surprise that he should yield now, when the motives for yielding were so much more urgent, nor can his reasons be an object of much curiosity. As, however, he left them on record, it is right to give them as stated by himself. They were two: a desire, natural and laudable, to remove the ladies and children, after the horrors they had already witnessed, from the further dangers of a camp; and a hope that, "as from the very commencement of the negotiations the sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the married people as hostages, this mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him."

Orders were given for all married officers and ladies to depart immediately with a body of Affghan horse who had been despatched to conduct them to the asylum in which they were to find refuge. It was the intention of the general to give all the wounded officers the opportunity of availing themselves of the advantages, such as they might be, of Akbar Khan's protection. As this desire could have been suggested by no other feeling than humanity, it is proper to notice it, as corroborating the received impression of the character of General Elphinstone, who, whatever may have been his failings in the unhappy proceedings at Kabool, is universally represented as an amiable and estimable man. Few were benefited by the kind intentions of the general, for the Affghan guard were in such haste to return with the charge which they had been appointed to receive, that only two of the wounded officers were in time to join them.

The women who had shared in the dangers and horrors of the march to Boothank were now in the hands of the enemy; for though Akbar Khan professed a different character, that of an enemy is the only one in which he can be justly regarded. The men had to struggle on—the food and fuel so liberally promised by the ruffian chief came not. "Another night of starvation and cold consigned more victims to a miserable death." Another morning revealed the same weakness—the same suffering—the same disruption of military ties which had marked preceding ones, but in an aggravated degree. The men who had proudly marched from the Indus to the heart of Afghanistan, had occupied its fairest cities, beaten down its strongest fortresses, and given law from its capital, were now unable to defend themselves from those who thirsted for their blood. It was not alone that death and desertion had frightfully thinned their ranks—a large portion of those who survived and remained faithful to the standard which they followed, were incapable of performing the duties of soldiers: their limbs scarcely retained sufficient strength to bear them along their despairing way; and that elasticity of spirit which sometimes sustains

the sinking frame against the attacks of physical suffering, was unknown. Such is the representation of Lieutenant Eyre. "The European soldiers were now almost the only efficient men left, the Hindostanees having all suffered more or less from the effects of the frost in their hands and feet; few were able even to hold a musket, much less to pull a trigger; in fact, the prolonged delay in the snow had paralyzed the mental and bodily powers of the strongest men, rendering them incapable of any useful exertion. Hope seemed to have died in every breast; the wildness of terror was exhibited in every countenance."

The end was now rapidly approaching. At a narrow gorge, lying between the precipitous spurs of two hills, the advance of the retreating force was met by the destructive fire of the enemy securely perched on the high ground. The straitened pass soon became literally choked with dead and dying; and here the last remains of the native infantry disappeared. Many fell; the rest, throwing away their arms and accoutrements, fled for life. Finally, the enemy rushed down sword in hand, and captured the public treasure, with the remnant of baggage which up to this point had been preserved. A part of the advance succeeded in getting through; this halted to enable the main and rear columns to come up with them. A straggler from time to time arrived, bearing heavy news; another and another appeared, and in this manner all that escaped the fury of the enemy joined; the direful truth that, with these miserable exceptions, the two missing columns had been cut off and destroyed, at length becoming apparent beyond the possibility of question. The British force now consisted of seventy men of the Queen's 44th regiment, a hundred and fifty cavalry troopers, about fifty horse artillerymen, with one twelve-pound howitzer. Such was its strength as to combatants, but the number of camp-followers was still large.

Akbar Khan approached, and proposed that the remainder of the British force should be disarmed, and placed under his protection. The general refused, and the march was resumed. Its course lay through a narrow defile, in which the troops were exposed to the harassing and destructive fire of the enemy as before. The energy of Brigadier Shelton saved the force from total destruction here, and it reached the Tazeen valley, where negotiations were again renewed with Akbar Khan. The same proposal was again made by him, and again it was rejected by the British general. After this failure, it was determined to push on for Jugdulluk, distant twenty-two miles. On moving off, the last gun was abandoned; the same fate befell the exhausted and wounded. The march commenced at seven o'clock, and it was hoped that Jugdulluk might be reached under cover of the night, but this was not accomplished. It was not till

dawn of day that the advance arrived at Kutter-Sung, a place ten miles short of that which was in view; and the junction of the rear did not take place till eight o'clock. The march had not been without annoyance from the enemy, but the darkness depriving them of the opportunity of calling into operation their skill as marksmen, their fire was comparatively harmless, excepting as to the alarm which it excited. In this way it greatly embarrassed the movement of the retreating force; "the panic-stricken camp-followers now resembled a herd of deer, and fluctuated backwards and forwards *en masse* at every shot, blocking up the entire road, and fatally retarding the progress of the little body of soldiers who, under Brigadier Shelton, brought up the rear." Of the exertions of this officer throughout the last and fatal stage of the proceedings of the Kabool force, all narrators speak in terms of the highest praise and admiration. If he had failed in some of the higher and more delicate duties of command, he well supported that reputation for daring courage and indomitable perseverance which has never been denied him. Jugdulluk was reached in the afternoon, but no repose awaited the hapless fugitives. A fresh invitation to communicate with Akbar Khan was answered by the despatch of Captain Skinner, but the renewal of negotiations was accompanied by no cessation of hostile operations. From the hills the fire of the enemy was kept up, excepting during a brief interval, when Captain Bygrave, at the head of fifteen Europeans, pushed up, the enemy flying before them in the greatest trepidation. But short was the period of relief, for the valiant band had no sooner returned than the enemy were again at their post, in the exercise of their occupation of slaughter. The result of Captain Skinner's interview with Akbar Khan was a message from that chief to the general, requesting his presence at a conference, and demanding Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson as hostages for the evacuation of Jelalabad. Among the strange occurrences of the period, it is not the least strange that this invitation was accepted. General Elphinstone made over the command to Brigadier Anquetil, and, accompanied by the officers whom Akbar Khan had selected for captivity, proceeded to wait upon that personage. They were received with great show of civility; food was placed before them, and this substantial indication of friendship was accompanied in profusion by the lighter and more aerial refreshment of gracious promises. In the morning a conference was held, at which the three British officers and all the influential chiefs were present. It seems to have been stormy, and Akbar Khan played the part of a mediator with a degree of skill and dexterity only to be displayed by one who, from the earliest dawn of reason, had entered into an apprenticeship of hypocrisy. Nothing decisive was determined upon, and the day beginning to wane,

General Elphinstone became anxious to return. But this was not a matter which depended on himself; he was in the toils, and, though he might struggle, he could but beat the air. The expression of his wish to withdraw, and of his desire to be furnished with the requisite escort, after sundry repetitions, was enforced by representing that it was altogether at variance with British notions of honour that a general should be separated from his troops in the hour of danger; but Akbar Khan was no child of chivalry, and the appeal was vain.

At the British position, the return of the general had been long and anxiously looked for—it were, perhaps, too much to say expected. Early in the morning, Major Thain and Captain Skinner had ridden out in the direction of the camp of Akbar Khan, to watch for the approach of some messenger with tidings of the state of affairs, when they were attacked, and Captain Skinner mortally wounded. Throughout the day hunger, thirst, exhaustion, and the galling annoyance of the enemy's unceasing fire, continued to be endured; and as night drew on, it became obvious that nothing was to be hoped from a longer stay. The whole body accordingly sallied forth, to make their way to Jelalabad, in the best manner that they could. The Ghiljies were not at first aware of the movement, but they soon gained intelligence of it, and marched in vast numbers to their work of destruction. Officers and men, troops and followers, fell in incredible numbers, and the progress of the retiring party was a moving massacre. Some officers, who were well mounted, rode forward with the few remaining cavalry; straggling parties of Europeans, under various officers, followed, as circumstances would permit. The day dawned; the remnant of the infantry approached Gunda-muck, and now their numerical weakness was obvious to the enemy—they could muster only about twenty muskets. An attempt to negotiate was made by one of the officers, but it ended in nothing, and the unhappy party had no resource but to stand on their defence without a hope of ultimate success. This gloomy task they executed with an unshrinking determination. They occupied an eminence opposite to another held by the enemy; the fire of the latter gradually diminished their numbers, and at intervals the work of extermination was accelerated by a rush, sword in hand, upon the devoted party, by whom, notwithstanding the utter hopelessness of their situation, the assailants were several times repelled. The struggle lasted till nearly every man of the British party was wounded, when a final onset of the enemy completed their destruction. Captain Souter, one of the few that survived the slaughter, but severely wounded, had, before leaving Jugdulluk, tied round his waist the colours of the regiment, which were thus preserved.

It has been stated that twelve officers and some cavalry rode on ahead of the rest of the

troops, and it remains to record their fate. Six of them dropped before reaching Futeelabad; the rest arrived at that place in safety, and were received by the inhabitants with professions of friendship and sympathy. Food was offered them, of which they naturally, but unwisely, stopped to partake. The inhabitants in the mean time armed themselves, and suddenly rushing on the men whom they had ensnared, cut down two of them. The remainder mounted and rode off. The enemy, however, pursued, and all the fugitives perished before reaching Jelalabad, with the exception of one, Dr. Bryden, who arrived there but to report the destruction of all his companions. Such was the fate that befell the remnant of the Kabool force.

And now it is time to turn to the spot where the solitary man, bearing the baleful tidings of its annihilation, arrived, and where he found a refuge. Jelalabad was still held by the English under Sir Robert Sale. He had been required, under the conditions of the treaty concluded by the British authorities at Kabool with the Afghan chiefs, to evacuate the place and march for India. The answer was, that Akbar Khan was known to be inciting the chiefs in the neighbourhood to raise their followers, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying the force now at Jelalabad; and that, under these circumstances, it was deemed proper to await further orders, which, it was requested, might point out the nature of the security to be given for the safe march of the garrison to Peshawur. Sir Robert Sale had no superfluity of provisions, and was obliged to place the men under his command on half-rations; he was greatly in want of ammunition, and as to treasure, was almost literally without a rupee; his force was barely sufficient to perform, with very great exertion, the duties required of it; his chance of obtaining relief or reinforcements seemed extremely slender, and he had reason to expect, that after they had disposed of the Kabool force the Afghans would concentrate their power in an attack upon Jelalabad. But he had a spirit which saved him from yielding, amid all these discouragements, and he resolved not wantonly to throw away the lives of those under his charge, nor to place in jeopardy the honour of his country and the *prestige* of its name.

It is not to be supposed that in India his situation was regarded with indifference, but the difficulties in the way of affording succour were great, and the first effort made for the purpose ended in failure. Immediately on the government becoming advised of the commencement of the disturbances at Kabool, a brigade, consisting of four regiments of native infantry, had been assembled in Peshawur, under Colonel Wyld. That officer, with his brigade strengthened (numerically at least) by some Sikh battalions and the artillery attached to them, prepared to march through the Khyber pass; but the Sikhs shrunk from the

duty at the moment when it was about to be commenced; camel-drivers and others deserted in vast numbers, a series of disastrous accidents involving the loss of much baggage and treasure occurred, and the brigadier was compelled to retreat. The fort of Ali Musjid, after an ineffectual attempt to relieve it, was at this time abandoned to the wild tribes inhabiting the vicinity of the pass.

This misfortune occurred in January. Early in that month a reinforcement, consisting of her Majesty's 9th foot and 10th light cavalry, a regiment of native infantry, and a detachment from another, together with details of artillery and irregular cavalry, crossed the Sutlej on its way to Peshawur. Subsequently, the force assembled there was strengthened by the despatch of her Majesty's 3rd dragoons and 31st foot, the 1st light cavalry, two regiments of native infantry, some recruits for her Majesty's 13th, and some details of irregular cavalry and artillery. The command of the entire force was destined for Major-General Lumley, but the state of his health preventing his undertaking the duty, it was transferred to Major-General Pollock. Such were the arrangements made by the government of Lord Auckland, the period of whose retirement from his high office was approaching. He was about to quit India under circumstances widely different from those which a few months before had been contemplated. The policy which had been carried out at great expense had been frustrated, and of the army which had marched to the invasion of Afghanistan, a large part had been destroyed, while the portions that had escaped this fate were shut up in isolated positions, where it was difficult to convey assistance.

At Kandahar the course of events had been more prosperous than at Kabool. When the insurrection broke out at the latter place, the same apparent calm which had there preceded it, and the same feeling of security, prevailed at Kandahar. A brigade, under Colonel Maclaren, had actually commenced its return march for India, and its progress was interrupted only by the receipt of intelligence of the disaster which had befallen Captain Woodburn. On the arrival of a demand for assistance from Kabool, this brigade was ordered to march thither, but, after sustaining dreadful hardships, was compelled by the severity of the weather to return without effecting its object. Akbar Khan, when he had cleared his hands of business at Kabool, approached Kandahar, which was crowded with chiefs from whom danger might reasonably be expected; and it became a question how to avert from that place mischief similar to that which had occurred at Kabool. Money seems to have been considered to be the most efficient instrument for the purpose, and a lac of rupees was disbursed to the chiefs, to induce them to resist the enemy. The money was readily taken, and when no more was pro-

curable, the chiefs joined Akbar Khan, the same step being taken by a son of Shah Shoojah's, named Suftur Jung. The enemy gradually approached Kandahar. On a large body taking up a position within a short distance of that place, General Nott determined to attack them, and on the 12th January moved out for the purpose, with nearly all his disposable force. The enemy were strongly posted, with a morass in front, and the fire of their matchlockmen was, for a time, well kept up; but they broke and fled, on the close approach of the British force, so rapidly, indeed, as to escape severe loss. The attack, however, and the success which attended it, led to very beneficial results: it gave confidence to one party, and tended to dispirit the other.

A pause in the active course of events affords a convenient opportunity for withdrawing attention for a space from the affairs of Afghanistan, suspension being further expedient from the change which took place in the office of governor-general. The position of General Nott at Kandahar, of Sir Robert Sale at Jelalabad, and of the force under General Pollock in Peshawar, will be borne in mind. It is only necessary to add, with respect to the state of affairs on the western side of British India, that the son of the former khan of Kelat had been recognised by the government, that in Sind and Beloochistan all was quiet, and that a force stationed in those countries was prepared to advance under Brigadier England to co-operate with General Nott in any manner that might seem expedient. A very brief notice of certain events cotemporary with the progress of the Afghan war, but unconnected with it, will be required, in order to complete the history of the Earl of Auckland's administration.

Of these, the first to be mentioned is the occupation of Kurnool by a British force. This territory, lying in Southern India, was held by a native chieftain, whose conduct, both as regarding his neighbours and his own subjects, was so extraordinary as to call imperiously for interference. No difficulty was experienced in obtaining possession of the capital, but the nawab, with some hundreds of his followers, withdrew from the place; or rather, the former was carried away by the latter, and detained as a sort of hostage for the satisfaction of arrears of pay. Lieutenant-Colonel Dyce, 34th Madras light infantry, marched with a force against them, and, after a sharp encounter, succeeded in securing the

person of the nawab, as well as several other prisoners, and much property. An immense quantity of warlike stores was found at Kurnool, the greater part being concealed in and about the zenana, and other places little likely to be chosen as receptacles for such articles. The conduct of the nawab was indeed altogether so unaccountable, that his sanity might reasonably be questioned. But, whatever the causes which led to his extraordinary acts, he was properly removed from the government of a people whom he oppressed beyond even the ordinary measure of oriental despotism, and his territory was annexed to the British dominions.

Bundelcund, always distracted, afforded another call for British intervention. It became necessary to move a force against a fortified place called Cherong. The force, which was partly regular and partly irregular, was under the command of Captain W. F. Beaton. The garrison was reputed to be four thousand strong; but, after two days' cannonading, and a severe conflict under the walls, they withdrew, leaving the place to be occupied by the British.

On the 28th of February, Lord Ellenborough, who had been appointed to succeed the Earl of Auckland in the government of India, arrived at Calcutta, and on the 12th of March following the latter nobleman took his departure. For obvious reasons, no attempt can be made towards a general estimate of the character of the Earl of Auckland, in the manner pursued with regard to some of his predecessors. The judgment of the reader must be determined altogether by the facts recorded. The great event of his lordship's administration was the invasion of Afghanistan, and to what extent he is responsible for this is uncertain. The impression which he left in India appears to have been highly favourable, and the candid among those who dissent from his policy will unhesitatingly concede to him the possession of many qualities calculated to command respect, and many to conciliate regard. Though the larger portion of the period of his administration was passed amid the turmoil of war, he found opportunity to turn his thoughts to questions connected with the internal improvement of the country which he governed; and had his lot been cast in calmer times, it cannot be doubted that such questions would have occupied much more of his attention, and have been pursued to results of practical utility.

CHAPTER XXXI.

GHUZNEE RECAPTURED BY THE AFFGHANS—DEFENCE OF JELALABAD—DEFEAT OF AKBAR KHAN—GENERAL POLLOCK RELIEVES JELALABAD—PROCEEDINGS AT KANDAHAR—MURDER OF SHAH SHOOJAH—LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERALS NOTT AND POLLOCK—MARCH OF GENERAL POLLOCK ON KABOOL—MARCH OF GENERAL NOTT—ACTS OF RETRIBUTION—RECOVERY OF THE PRISONERS—RETURN OF THE ARMIES TO INDIA.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH arrived in India in the midst of a disastrous war, and the first event of importance occurring after his arrival partook of the character of too many which had preceded it. The fort and citadel of Ghuznee, so gallantly won by the British arms, returned into the hands of the enemy. The town had been lost at an earlier period. It appears that when the affairs of Shah Shoojah and his ally began to go wrong, Colonel Palmer, the officer commanding at Ghuznee, applied to the British authorities at Kabool for sanction to certain necessary repairs and alterations there, but failed to obtain it. "The infatuation that appears to have seized the chief authorities there," says an officer present at the time in Ghuznee, "not only hurried them on to ruin at the capital, but also paralyzed us at Ghuznee." It is, however, to be remembered, as some extenuation of the apparent neglect, that there was quite enough to be done and thought of at Kabool to occupy all the energy and all the reflections of those who held command there. "At the eleventh hour," continues the writer above quoted, "the colonel took the responsibility on himself;" and it is certainly to be lamented that he did not assume it at an earlier period, for, it is added, "most invaluable time had been suffered to pass unimproved, and when the enemy made their appearance under our walls, they found us but ill prepared for a siege, especially when it was not man alone we had to combat with, but the rigours of a winter as intense as that of Canada." The inhabitants of the town were believed to be faithful to the British cause. It turned out that this, like many similar convictions, was a delusion. They intrigued with their countrymen outside, and finally provided means for their admittance, when they poured in, in such vast numbers, that the garrison, after fighting for a night and a day, were compelled to abandon the town and retire to the citadel. This was maintained until the 1st of March, more than ten weeks after the loss of the town. During this interval the duty was most oppressive, and the weather frightfully severe. Snow would often fall in the course of a single night to the depth of two feet, and the thermometer was sometimes fourteen degrees below zero. Every officer and man in the place was on duty during eight hours of the twenty-four; provi-

sions were scarce, fuel still more scarce. The sepoy, compelled to undergo such severity of duty in a climate to which they were unaccustomed, and whose rigours they were unfitted to sustain, rapidly became diseased, and the hospital was soon crowded. The supply of water at last failed, a result accelerated by an occurrence which might otherwise be regarded as of favourable aspect—the disappearance of the snow, on which the garrison mainly depended. This continuation of suffering enforced the surrender of the place, a step which Colonel Palmer had been authorized, and indeed required, to take by the authorities at Kabool, in pursuance of the arrangements into which they had entered with the Affghan chiefs, but which he had avoided as long as practicable. The evacuation was to be effected on terms according to which the garrison were to march out of the citadel within six days, when a portion of the city was to be assigned for their abode till they could pursue their march from the place, which was to be performed with their colours, baggage, and a sufficient stock of ammunition, and under an escort for protection. To observe the terms of agreement the chiefs solemnly bound themselves by an oath upon the Koran; and on the 6th of March the British troops quitted the citadel, and took up their quarters in the town. The value of an Affghan oath was soon ascertained. On the day after the evacuation of the citadel by the British, they were treacherously attacked by the enemy, and during three days had to defend themselves in the best manner they were able against the guns of the citadel, so lately at their own disposal, and the furious onsets of countless numbers of fanatics thirsting for their blood. Overtures for a termination of hostilities came at intervals from the commander, Shumsodeen Khan, nephew of Dost Mahomed, but the horrible conditions tendered for the acceptance of Colonel Palmer were, that all the officers should surrender themselves to the personal care of Shumsodeen, abandoning the sepoy to the fury of the murderous hordes who surrounded them. This of course was refused, and the slaughter proceeded; officers and men alike falling victims to it. Certain death, sooner or later, seemed to await every individual of the garrison, and this was the impression of the sepoy,

who at length, without the knowledge of their officers, held a consultation among themselves, and framed a plan of escaping to Peshawur through a hole in the outer wall of the town, which they forthwith commenced digging. When their determination had been taken, they informed their officers of it, expressing a desire that they would go with them, but intimating that, however this might be, the men would go. Thus virtually deserted, the officers had no choice but to surrender themselves to Shumsoodeen.

The attempt of the sepoy to escape proved a miserable failure. A heavy snow fell, in which they became bewildered as to the route to be pursued, and they were all either cut to pieces or made prisoners. Had they got clear of the Affghans occupying and surrounding the city, they would have had but little chance of safety. They appear to have utterly mistaken the distance to Peshawur, believing it to be much less than it actually was, and no reasoning could satisfy them of their error, or of the utter impracticability of their reaching the place. The officers fared little better than the sepoy; their lives were preserved, but they were subjected to almost every description of suffering that can add to the necessary and unavoidable evils of imprisonment.

Greatly was the fall of Ghuznee to be lamented, and much its probable effects on the enemy, as well as on the British troops, to be feared. But Jelalabad still happily held out, under the command of Sir Robert Sale. The difficulties with which this most able and most heroic officer had to contend have been already adverted to, but now, when the narrative has advanced to the period when a crisis in the affairs of Jelalabad was impending, it may be proper to notice them somewhat more in detail. He found the walls in a state which, in his own language, "might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them." Not only was the space inclosed by the walls far too extensive with reference to his force, but their tracing was bad; there was no parapet except for a few hundred yards, and this not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated about the ramparts to such an extent that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of four hundred yards together at no point of which, excepting one, the garrison could show themselves; the population within was disaffected, and without the place was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened on the defenders at twenty or thirty yards' distance. It has already been mentioned that the garrison were greatly in want of provisions and ammunition; every possible exertion was made to reduce the consumption of both to the point of necessity, and to procure fresh supplies, while the apparently hopeless task of placing the town in a respectable state of defence was carried on with a vigour

and success which seemed to recognize difficulties only to defy and overcome them. The successful sallies by which Sir Robert Sale cleared the vicinity of vast bodies of the enemy have been narrated in their proper place. When the first disastrous news from Kabool reached him, he hoped that Jelalabad might afford a place of refuge to the retreating army from the former place. That hope was met by a miserable disappointment in the intelligence that the Kabool force had been totally destroyed in the Ghiljies defiles. While thus deprived of the opportunity of affording succour to others, Sir Robert Sale was disappointed of that which he expected for himself by the check which the force under Brigadier Wyld received. His position was now most critical, and one of the grounds upon which it had been maintained had ceased to exist. But he determined to persevere. "I might," he says, "whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Kabool, have attempted and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across Khyber, but I resolved, at all hazards, on not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the valley of Ningrahar, and the key of eastern Affghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our government desired to retain it." The restoration, or rather the reconstruction of the works was now completed. The labour had been great, extending to the removal of a vast quantity of cover for the enemy, the demolition of forts and old walls, the filling up ravines, the cutting down of trees, and sweeping away of gardens. Such were the operations of the destructive kind. In the constructive they had embraced the raising the parapets to the height of six or seven feet, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve in width round the whole of the walls. "The place," observes Sir Robert Sale, "was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy not provided with siege-artillery." The greater part of their defences, however, were overthrown by one of those awful visitations not unusual in Affghanistan, the effects of which are thus described by Sir Robert Sale:—"It pleased Providence on the 19th of February to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets, built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the ramparts of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Kabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins." "Thus," observes Captain Broadfoot, the garrison engineer, "in one moment the labours of three months were in a great measure destroyed. Dispiriting as was this fearful overthrow of the product of so much time and labour, it did not paralyze the energies of either officers or men. No

time was lost in lamentation or despairing bewilderment; "the shocks had scarcely ceased when the whole garrison was told off into working parties; and before night the breaches were scarped, the rubbish below cleared away, and the ditches before them dug out, while the great one on the Peshawur side was surrounded by a good gabion parapet." It is not easy to give an adequate impression of the labour performed, or of the noble spirit which prevailed among those who laboured, without quoting at an inconvenient length from official reports. One extract respecting the general result must suffice. "From the following day all the troops off duty were continually at work, and such were their energy and perseverance that, by the end of the month, the parapets were entirely restored, the Kabool gate again serviceable, the bastions either restored or the curtain filled in when restoration was practicable, and every battery re-established." So extraordinary did this appear to Akbar Khan, who had now advanced to a spot about seven miles distant from the place, that he could find only one solution of the difficulty, and unhesitatingly attributed the unlooked for security of Jelalabad to English witchcraft. The enemy soon approached nearer,—Akbar Khan establishing his headquarters about two miles from the city, and a secondary camp about a mile distant,—invested the place, and kept up a vigorous blockade. Various skirmishes from time to time took place, and the spirit, gallantry, and military skill displayed in them would justify a minute detail of the circumstances of each, did space permit. They must, however, be passed by with this general notice, saving the mention of some of the officers who respectively led the detachments engaged, and who well merited the approbation which they received from the illustrious officer under whom they served; they were, Colonel Dennie, a name long associated with noble deeds; Captain Broadfoot, garrison engineer, who was severely wounded; Captain Fenwick, of the Queen's 13th light infantry; Captain Pattison, of the same regiment; Captain Oldfield, and Lieutenant Mayne, of Shah Shoojah's cavalry. These successes, as Sir Robert Sale observed, were "crowned by Providence by the issue of the decisive and brilliant attack on the camp of the sirdar, on the 7th of April." Of this attack it will be proper to take somewhat more extended notice. Three columns of infantry were formed, the centre consisting of the larger part of her Majesty's 13th, mustering five hundred bayonets, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie; the left, of the chief part of the 35th native infantry, also five hundred strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath; and the right, of one company of her Majesty's 13th, and one company of the 85th native infantry, with a detachment of sappers, the whole amounting to three hundred and sixty, and under the command of Captain Havelock. The columns

were to be supported by the fire of the guns, and by the small cavalry force at Jelalabad. The troops issued from the Kabool and Peshawur gates early in the morning, and found the whole force of the enemy, amounting to about six thousand, formed in order of battle for the defence of their camp, their right resting on a fort, their left on the Kabool river. Some ruined works, recently repaired, were filled with Afghan marksmen, ready to pour forth a fatally directed fire. The attack was led by the skirmishers and column under Captain Havelock, by whom the extreme left of the enemy's advanced line was pierced. The central column directed its efforts against a square fort upon the same base, which was obstinately defended. And here a calamity occurred for which victory scarcely affords compensation; Colonel Dennie, while leading his regiment to the assault, was mortally wounded, and shortly afterwards breathed his last. The command of the column thus devolved upon Captain Wilkinson, of the same regiment, and the conflict proceeded. The rear of the work having been with some difficulty gained, orders were given for a combined attack upon the enemy's camp. The Afghans made repeated attempts to check the advance by a sharp fire of musketry, by throwing forward heavy bodies of horse which twice threatened in force the detachments of foot under Captain Havelock, and by opening guns under cover of a garden wall, served, as it was said, under the personal superintendence of the sirdar, but in vain. The artillery advanced at a gallop, and directed a heavy fire on the enemy's centre, whilst two of the columns of infantry penetrated his line near the same point, and the third forced back his left from its support on the river, driving into it some both of horse and foot. In a very short time the foe was dislodged from every part of his position, his guns captured, his camp involved in flames, and Akbar Khan, with his discomfited army, in full retreat towards Lughman. This defeat in open field by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading was indeed, as stated by Sir Robert Sale, "complete and signal." On the 16th of April, nine days after this memorable affair, the force under General Pollock reached Jelalabad.

General Pollock, on arriving in the camp at Peshawur, had found the four infantry regiments there dispirited by their recent failure; in truth, a very bad spirit prevailed amongst them, and, further, the ravages of an epidemic disease had thrown hundreds of men into hospital. Under such circumstances, it was obviously imprudent to attempt to advance, and the junction of her Majesty's 9th foot did not, in the general's opinion, change the state of things so materially as to warrant his taking such a step. Reinforcements were in the rear, and it was deemed advisable to await their arrival. It was contrived, however, to open communications with Sir Robert Sale, warning him of the approach of relief, and representing

the expediency of waiting for the junction of the whole force destined for the purpose ; but intimating, that in case of extreme emergency, an attempt to advance would be made at all hazards. Ultimately, it was resolved not to wait for the infantry regiment, but to move forward as soon as the cavalry and guns arrived ; but further delay became necessary, in order to complete arrangements with the Seikhs who were to co-operate in forcing the passes. Attempts had been made to purchase the aid of some native chiefs, and some money had been paid, but it seems to little purpose. On the 5th of April, General Pollock found himself in a condition to move forward to force the pass. The task was accomplished, not indeed, without difficulty, but with complete success. Two columns were formed to storm the heights, while a third advanced to the mouth of the pass. The severer duty fell to the lot of the flanking columns, the right of which was under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of her Majesty's 9th foot, and Major Anderson, 64th native infantry ; the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, of the 64th native infantry, and Major Huish, of the 26th native infantry. The conduct of some jezailchees, under Captain Ferris, was highly spoken of by General Pollock. The arrangements for the protection of the baggage were so complete that not a single baggage-animal was lost. This immunity from plunder is attributable to General McCaskill, who commanded the rear-guard. After this encounter, General Pollock experienced little opposition until he arrived in safety, and happily in due time, at Jelalabad.

Kandahar continued to be maintained by General Nott, who, like Sir Robert Sale, refused to recognize the treaty concluded at Kabul, or to yield obedience to the order extorted from General Elphinstone for the surrender of the place. On the 7th of March he moved out of the city, with the larger part of his force, to attack the enemy, drove them before him across the Turnack, and then across the Urgundab. On the 9th he was able to approach sufficiently near to open his guns on them, when they dispersed in every direction and in comparative safety, General Nott being unprovided with cavalry adequate to the task of pursuit. During his absence a strong detachment of the enemy made an attack on the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates, but they were repulsed, with great loss by the officer in command of the garrison, Major Lane of the 2nd regiment of Bengal native infantry.

Less fortunate was an attempt to relieve Kandahar from Sinde. For this purpose Brigadier England, with an inconsiderable force, advanced through the Bolan pass, and arrived safely at Quetta. It was his intention to proceed through the valley of Pisheen to the village of Hykulzie, and there to await the arrival of reinforcements coming up through the pass ; but on reaching the entrance of a

defile leading to the village, he unexpectedly found Mahomed Sadig, an insurgent chief, strongly posted in the pass and on the contiguous heights to oppose his progress. The difficulty of acquiring accurate information in a country like that in which the British government were now carrying on war, the danger of relying on friendly professions, which in the East are bestowed with a reckless profusion proportioned to their want of sincerity, were here illustrated. At a village only six miles from the mouth of the defile, the British commander and his officers had been received by the chief men of the place with the greatest show of cordiality ; but, though minutely questioned as to the state of the country, their friendliness did not suffer them to proceed to the length of warning General England of the resistance which awaited him. When the first symptoms of opposition appeared, it was believed that the force of the enemy was small, and four light companies, supported by a small reserve, under cover of four guns, were ordered to attack the hill. The strength of the enemy was concealed behind a succession of breastworks, with a ditch and abatis, until the British advance party reached the crest of his exterior defence, when a vast body sprang into view, and it became evident that the contest could not be advantageously maintained. The four companies engaged consequently fell back on the supporting column, which had to sustain an attack from the enemy's cavalry, who, on the retreat of the assaulting party, rushed down from the hills. Their efforts to break the column were, however, unavailing, and the entire British force moved off in good order and without loss of baggage. Subsequently, General England deemed it advisable to fall back to Quetta. This abortive attempt was attended by the loss of ninety-eight men, killed and wounded. Among the killed were two British officers, Captain W. May, of her Majesty's 41st, and Major Apthorp, of the 20th Bombay native infantry. The action took place on the 28th March.

On the preceding day Colonel G. P. Wymer, commanding a foraging party despatched from Kandahar, dispersed with great brilliancy a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who hung upon him and threatened the security of his convoy.

In the month of April an event happened which, though of little political importance in itself, may be regarded as relieving the British government from one source of embarrassment in dealing with the affairs of Afghanistan—Shah Shoojah was murdered. Had his life been prolonged, it is not to be supposed that exertions to maintain him on his throne would have been persisted in. British rulers, both at home and in India, were heartily weary of the connection with Afghanistan ; and the only questions to be solved were, in what manner and how quickly could it be dissolved ? In a communication from the governor-general in council to the commander-in-chief, Sir Jasper

Nicolls, dated 15th March, the following observations occur:—"The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Afghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the government of India. They will in the first instance endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Afghanistan which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief in any case without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the government they serve. To effect the relief of the prisoners taken at Kabool, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can probably only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in or may come into our possession; and with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber pass, or take a forward position near Jelalabad, or even advance to Kabool. We are fully sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Kabool, the scene of our great disaster, and of so much crime, even for a week; of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners; of the gratification which it would give to the army; and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds on which we retired, as solemn as that which accompanied our advance, and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that general should be satisfied that he can—without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Seikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed—feel assured that he can by his own strength overawe and overcome all who dispute the pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus." Similar feelings appear to have been entertained before the arrival of the new governor-general. In a letter of instruction addressed to Sir Jasper Nicolls shortly before the departure of Lord Auckland, even the maintenance of Jelalabad is spoken of as an event scarcely to be hoped for. Intelligence, then recently received, is said to have convinced the government that,

excepting under some very unforeseen change, no sufficient advantage would be derived from an attempt to retain possession of Jelalabad—for any prolonged period during the present season. "The fate," it is continued, "of the gallant garrison of that place will probably have been determined before the intimation of our opinion to the above effect can reach Major-General Pollock. But we would request your excellency, without delay, to inform the major-general that the main inducement for the maintenance of a post at Jelalabad,—namely, that of being a point of support to any of our troops escaping from Kabool,—having now, it must be feared, unhappily passed away, it is the object of the government that he should, unless any unforeseen contingency should give a decidedly favourable turn to affairs, confine himself to measures for withdrawing the Jelalabad garrison in safety to Peshawur, and there for the present holding together all the troops under his orders in a secure position, removed from collision with the Seikh forces or subjects." A few days afterwards, the following instruction, among others, was transmitted to General Pollock by the government of India, Lord Auckland being still at its head:—"On the whole, you will understand that the great present object of your proceedings in Peshawur is, beyond the safe withdrawal of the force at Jelalabad, that of watching events, of keeping up such communications as may be admissible with the several parties who may acquire power in the northern portion of Afghanistan, of committing yourself permanently with none of those parties, but also of declaring positively against none of them, while you are collecting the most accurate information of their relative strength and purposes for report to the government, and pursuing the measures which you may find in your power for procuring the safe return of our troops and people detained beyond the Khyber pass." There was, therefore, no substantial difference on this point between the views of the retiring governor-general and those entertained by his successor. General Pollock, who, from being on the spot, as well as from his military knowledge and habits, could best appreciate the difficulties around him, appears, even previous to his advance through the Khyber pass, to have been deeply impressed with a sense of the fatal consequences, temporary and permanent, which must follow the sudden abandonment of all hope of again establishing British superiority in Afghanistan. "If," he observed, "I were to advance with the intention of merely withdrawing the garrison of Jelalabad, my success in advancing must chiefly depend on concealing my intentions; for although (if I succeed in any negotiation to open the pass) every precaution will be taken by me to secure a retreat, I must expect that every man will rise to molest our return, as they would be left to the mercy of the Afghan rulers; and I must confess I sincerely believe that our return here,

unless I have first an opportunity of inflicting some signal punishment on the enemy, would have a very bad effect both far and near."

The receipt of the intelligence of the fall of Ghuznee, and of the check received by General England in attempting to advance to Kandahar, seems to have added to the desponding feelings entertained in the highest quarters, and orders were transmitted to General Nott to take immediate means for drawing off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilje, to evacuate Kandahar, and to take up a position at Quetta. "The object of the above-directed measures," it was added, "is to withdraw all our forces to Sukkur, at the earliest period at which the season and other circumstances may permit you to take up a new position there." Subsequently, the governor-general heard of the defeat of the enemy by Sir Robert Sale before Jelalabad, and of the easy retreat of General England to Quetta, but neither of these events seems in his mind to have excited any sanguine hope. In a despatch to the secret committee, dated Benares, 22nd April, after adverting to these transactions, the governor-general continues: "These several events, although they improve our prospects to some extent, have in no respect altered my deliberate opinion that it is expedient to withdraw the troops under Major-General Pollock and those under Major-General Nott, at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they may have certain and easy communication with India. That opinion is founded upon a general view of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly changed." Three days before the date of the despatch last quoted, the governor-general, being then aware that General Pollock had entered the Khyber Pass, and concluding that he had effected a junction with Sir Robert Sale, thus wrote to Sir Jasper Nicolls, in reference to a previous request that the commander-in-chief would issue instructions which might be necessary for the guidance of General Pollock:—"The object of the instructions which will thus be given to those officers is, to bring their respective corps into easy and certain communication with India. What ulterior destination may be given to those corps when that of Major-General Nott, having drawn off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilje, shall be concentrated ultimately in the vicinity of Sukkur, and that of Major-General Pollock, having drawn off the garrison of Jelalabad, shall be again on this side of the Khyber Pass, is a matter for the most serious consideration." After expressing a wish to confer with the commander-in-chief on the subject, and adverting to the possibility of selecting a new line of operations, if aggressive measures should be deemed necessary, his lordship adds the following remark, clearly showing the tendency of his own judgment:—"It will, however, likewise be for consideration, whether our troops, having been redeemed from the

state of peril in which they have been placed in Afghanistan, and it may still be hoped not without the infliction of some severe blow upon the Afghan army, it would be justifiable again to push them forward for no other object than that of revenging our losses and of re-establishing in all its original brilliancy our military character." Sir Jasper Nicolls hesitated to give the required instructions, and thus wrote in answer to the demand for their issue. "I have not ventured to give any instructions to Major-General Pollock. The fifth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh paragraphs of your orders of the 15th March must now guide him. It is for him alone to decide between the practicability of a forward movement, either upon Kabool or Gundamuck (or its vicinity), and the withdrawal of the whole force to Peshawur. The general is a clear-headed officer, and you have loaded his advance with heavy cautions."

So anxious, however, was the governor-general that instructions of the proposed tenor should be conveyed to General Pollock, and so opposed was he at that time, not merely to an advance, but to maintaining the positions yet held by the British in Afghanistan, that, on being apprised of the hesitation of the commander-in-chief, he took upon himself the task of making to General Pollock a communication of the nature which he had suggested. It is thus conveyed, in a letter from the secretary to government with the governor-general:—"The aspect of affairs in Upper Afghanistan appears to be such, according to the last advices received by the governor-general, that his lordship cannot but contemplate the possibility of your having been led, by the absence of serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst the Afghan chiefs, and by the natural desire you must, in common with every true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph upon the scene of our late disasters, to advance upon and occupy the city of Kabool. If that event should have occurred, you will understand that it will in no respect vary the view which the governor-general previously took of the policy now to be pursued. The governor-general will adhere to the opinion, that the only safe course is that of withdrawing the army under your command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Khyber Pass, where it may possess easy and certain communication with India." A further communication was, at the same time, made to Major Outram, with a view to the movements of the British forces in Lower Afghanistan. For reasons which do not appear, Sir Jasper Nicolls, on the 29th April, did forward instructions of the character required by the governor-general. They directed General Pollock to "withdraw every British soldier from Jelalabad to Peshawur;" to "destroy the fort and any useless guns;" but, it was added, "as there need be no haste in the retreat, when commenced,

you are requested not to leave any trophies." These orders were qualified by reference to three circumstances, as authorizing, not any wide departure from them, but delay in obeying them. They are thus enumerated:—"First, that you may have brought a negotiation for the release of the prisoners lately confined at Buddesabad to such a point, that you might risk its happy accomplishment by withdrawing. Second, that you may have detached a lightly equipped force to endeavour to rescue them. Third, that the enemy at Kabool may be moving a force to attack you. In this improbable case, should any respectable number of troops have descended into the plain below Jugdulluk with that intent, it would be most advisable to inflict such a blow upon them as to make them long remember your parting effort." The exceptions under the first and second head were limited by the following observations. "I do not recommend delay in the first case, unless the prisoners are actually on their way to your camp, as no faith can be placed in Afghan promises. The second would of course require that you should await the return of the detachment. I allude entirely to the officers and ladies now or lately at Buddesabad or its vicinity. Those at Kabool cannot, I think, be saved by any treaty or agreement made under existing circumstances at Jelalabad." In ignorance of the issue of these instructions, the governor-general, on the 4th May, caused a further communication to be made to General Pollock, enforcing the views previously propounded, representing that they had derived additional strength from the victory of Sir Robert Sale and the death of Shah Shoojah, and avowing an expectation that the general had already decided upon withdrawing his troops within the Khyber Pass. "The first object of the governor-general's anxiety," it was observed, "has ever been to withdraw with honour into positions of security the several corps of the army which he found scattered and surrounded in Afghanistan. That object," it was added, "may now be accomplished, as respects the army under your command."

The quotations that have been made from the despatches of the government of India show an accordance between the views of Lord Auckland and Lord Ellenborough, as to the course to be pursued with regard to Afghanistan; and they equally show that those views tended to an evacuation of the country with the greatest possible celerity. It has been shown, too, that the judgment of some at least of the military authorities was not in favour of this policy. That Sir Jasper Nicolls hesitated to give orders for carrying it into effect, and yielded at last, perhaps, rather from a feeling of deference to the governor-general than from any change in his own opinion; while General Pollock, "a good and clear-headed officer," as he was well characterized by the commander-in-chief, was anxious that some step should be taken to assert the

honour of the British name, and disperse the clouds which had been permitted to enshroud it. This feeling was shared by General Nott. As soon as he had reason to doubt the intentions of the government to "redeem the credit of the British arms in Afghanistan," he remonstrated strongly against the indulgence of any craven feeling. Adverting to the noble retention of Jelalabad by Sir Robert Sale, to the reinforcements advanced for its support, and to the unfavourable effect which the abandonment of Kandahar must have upon the means in progress for the relief of the former place, he said, "Under these circumstances, I never had a moment's hesitation as to the course I ought to pursue, so long as discretionary power was left me; and all my arrangements have consequently been made with a view to the present maintenance and future extension, should such prove desirable, of our power in this country." After dwelling on the importance of standing fast, both at Kandahar and Jelalabad, he says, "If government intend to recover, even temporarily, and for the security of our national honour, their lost position in this country, even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue, I earnestly hope that before any immediate retrograde step is made in either direction, our whole position in Afghanistan will be attentively viewed; and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have upon the whole of Beloochistan, and even in the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Kabool, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to insure; and in what other light could a withdrawal from Jelalabad or Kandahar be viewed?" In a subsequent letter General Nott says, "Perhaps it is not within my province to observe that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessary alarm has been created regarding the position of our troops in this country, and of the strength and power of the enemy we have to contend with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the field with any chance of success, however superior they may be in numbers, provided those precautions are strictly observed which war between a small body of disciplined soldiers and a vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half-civilized people constantly renders necessary. True, the British troops suffered a dreadful disaster at Kabool; and it is not for me to presume to point out why this happened, however evident I may conceive the reasons, and the long train of political and military events which led to the sad catastrophe."

It thus appears that the military commanders in Afghanistan, certainly the best judges, were far more sanguine as to the probability of a successful advance, than was either Lord Auckland or Lord Ellenborough. On the 4th of May, the latter nobleman, addressing General Pollock, declared his views as to the immediate retirement of the British troops to be unaltered. On the 6th, writing to Sir Jasper Nicolls, he expressed his approbation of the orders for such retirement, issued by the commander-in-chief. On the 14th his views, however, appear to have undergone a change. Again addressing Sir Jasper Nicolls, his lordship seemed disposed to acquiesce in the retention, for a time, of the positions held by the British commanders. The change is apparently to be ascribed to a communication of the opinion of General Pollock, and of that of the commander-in-chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls. Those opinions were to the effect, that neither the army at Jelalabad nor that at Kandahar could properly commence their return march till the autumn. The language of his lordship, however, is that of toleration, rather than of approval. "The advance of the season," he observes, "which really renders the retirement of Major-general Pollock, at the present moment, a measure of some hazard to the health of his troops—the improved facilities which the major-general finds of obtaining supplies of provisions—but more than all, the influence which those now about him, anxious to vindicate the army by some signal blow against the Affghans, and to effect the restoration of the prisoners to liberty by negotiation supported by force, must necessarily have upon his mind—all these things induce me to apprehend that it will hardly be until October that the major-general will commence his homeward march. Your excellency is of opinion that Major-General Nott cannot safely commence his march to the plains before the same time. It will, therefore, probably not be until the end of November that the army of Major-General Pollock, nor until the end of December that the army under Major-General Nott, will be established within the British territory." In this letter it is also announced to be the intention of Lord Ellenborough to assemble an army of reserve, in a position from which it might advance to the support of either General Pollock or General Nott, a step represented as necessary for the purpose of misleading the Affghans as to the design of the British government to withdraw its armies from the country; "even," it is added, "were there no other object." The other object contemplated is explained to be that of overawing the states of India—a very important one at a period when the influence of the British name had suffered serious diminution. In the Punjab and other countries bordering on the British territories there were sufficient causes for alarm to warrant such a measure, without reference to any endeavour to retrace the march to Kabool. Indeed, such a march

seems to have been as remote as ever from the contemplation of the governor-general; and in a letter addressed, on the 25th of May, to Mr. Clerk, resident at Lahore, the opinion formerly expressed, as to the maintenance by General Pollock of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass, is again emphatically brought forward. On the 29th of the same month, a communication was made to the general, to prevent his misinterpreting the orders which he had received, to retire, so as to give the qualified permission to remain a wider range than was intended. The supposed necessity for this caution seems hardly reconcilable with the previous assent of the governor-general to the maintenance of the British positions till October.

A further communication made to General Pollock on behalf of the governor-general, bearing date the 1st of June, is couched almost in terms of reproach. After expressing extreme regret that the want of carriage should have rendered the army unable to move, it thus continues: "The retirement of your army immediately after the victory gained by Sir Robert Sale, the forcing of the Khyber Pass, and the relief of Jelalabad, would have had the appearance of a military operation successfully accomplished and even triumphantly achieved. Its retirement, after six months of inaction, before a following army of Affghans, will have an appearance of a different and less advantageous character. It would be desirable, undoubtedly, that, before finally quitting Afghanistan, you should have an opportunity of striking a blow at the enemy; and since circumstances seem to compel you to remain there till October, the governor-general earnestly hopes that you may be enabled to draw the enemy into a position in which you may strike such a blow effectually."

To multiply quotations from official papers, and references to such documents, may be tedious, but in this case it is necessary, in order that it may be distinctly apparent to whom the merit or the blame of the course ultimately taken is due. On the 6th of June the governor-general caused a further communication to be made to General Pollock, intended, like a former one, to guard him against misconceiving his orders. In one of his letters, General Pollock had adverted to the proposed transfer of Jelalabad to the Seikhs, and expressed a belief that he should receive a communication on the subject from the resident at Lahore. The object of the governor-general's explanatory intimation was to warn General Pollock that he was not expected to defer his departure from Jelalabad till it should be decided whether the place should or should not be given up to the Seikhs, in case that decision should be protracted. Here again, as it was understood and admitted that the British force was not to move till October, there seems to have been little necessity for the extreme anxiety displayed

to guard against misapprehension on the point.

The state of affairs in Lower Afghanistan now claims attention. General England, on retiring to Quetta, after the repulse which he experienced in attempting to advance, commenced fortifying the lines and town of that name; but General Nott requiring him again to advance through the Kojuck Pass, and undertaking to despatch a strong force to meet him, the general, having in the mean time been joined by his expected reinforcements, resumed the march so unfortunately interrupted at Hykulzie. Near that place he again found the enemy posted in a strong position; but on being attacked they rapidly dispersed, and General England and his force arrived at Kandahar with little further interruption.

In May, General Nott, in obedience to his orders, despatched a large force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, to bring off the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghiljje. On the 20th of May that place was attacked by a body of Ghiljies, consisting of upwards of two thousand. It was gallantly defended by Captain J. Halsell Craigie; and the enemy, after an hour's hard fighting, were beaten back with severe loss. On the 29th of the same month, advantage was taken by the enemy of the reduced strength of the force at Kandahar, caused by the detachment of the troops under Colonel Wymer, to occupy some hills near the city of Kandahar, believing that the force left after marching the detachment was not sufficient to admit of holding the city and at the same time making an attack in the field. But they were mistaken. General Nott moved out with portions of her Majesty's 41st regiment, the 42nd and 43rd Bengal native infantry, the Bombay light battalion, the 25th Bombay native infantry, the Poonah and the shah's 1st cavalry, with a detail of horse artillery, and twelve guns. The enemy were in great strength, mustering about eight thousand in position, and two thousand more engaged in guarding the pass and roads leading to their camp. The troops under General Nott amounted only to about a thousand infantry, two hundred and fifty cavalry, and something more than a hundred artillerymen; but the great disparity of numerical strength availed nothing—the positions of the enemy were rapidly carried in the most gallant style, and in less than an hour.

Colonel Wymer having performed the duty of destroying the works at Kelat-i-Ghiljje, escorted the guns and ammunition in safety to Kandahar. One part of the governor-general's orders was thus fulfilled, much against the inclination of the officer holding the chief command in Lower Afghanistan. General Nott had intended to throw supplies into the place, to make an effort to recover the garrison of Ghuznee from the hands of the enemy, and to make a diversion in aid of General Pollock. All these measures were delayed, and part of them entirely defeated by the instructions re-

ceived from the governor-general, whose only object, as he avowed, was to effect the safe return to India of the British troops in Afghanistan. He had acquiesced in their temporary stay at the positions which they occupied, but this was all, and the concession was obviously made with reluctance. There can be no danger of misrepresenting his lordship's views, for his efforts to prevent their being mistaken were unceasing. On the 4th of July he caused a letter to be addressed to General Pollock, with reference to a movement contemplated by that officer. Satisfaction was expressed that the means of making the intended movement existed, and credit was taken for suggesting it. But the general was cautioned not to mistake the governor-general's views, in which he was again emphatically informed, "no change" had "from the first taken place." On the same day (so anxious was his lordship not to be misunderstood), General Nott also was addressed for the purpose of guarding him against being misled by the activity of General Pollock. A copy of the cherished instructions of the 1st of June was transmitted with the letter to General Nott, in order that he might not suppose that any change had taken place in the main object of the instructions heretofore furnished. On the same day, however, other letters were addressed to General Pollock and General Nott, which letters were withheld from the records, for the sake, it was alleged, of secrecy. The letter to General Pollock consisted only of a few lines, calling his attention to the letter to General Nott, of which a copy was inclosed to him, and suggesting that, in the event of the latter officer taking a particular course, the movements of General Pollock should be regulated accordingly. The letter to General Nott was the important one, and its extraordinary character will justify an extended notice of its contents. It commenced by referring to the understanding that General Nott should not move towards the Indus till October; and after adverting to the despatch of Colonel Wymer to Kelat-i-Ghiljje, and to a supply of camels recently received at Kandahar, thus proceeded:—"I have now, therefore, reason to suppose, for the first time, that you have the means of moving a very large proportion of your army, with ample equipment for any service. There has been no deficiency of provisions at Kandahar at any time, and after harvest you will have an abundant supply." It would not be easy to conjecture to what this prelude was to lead, but it could hardly be expected to lead to what actually follows it. "Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first opinion, that the measure commanded by considerations of political and military prudence is to bring back the armies now in Afghanistan, at the earliest period at which their retirement can be effected consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops, into positions where they may have easy and certain communication with India, and to this extent the instructions you have

received remain unaltered." The matter of the above passage has been repeated so often, and nearly in the same words, that it is calculated to excite no surprise, excepting from the exordium by which it is ushered into notice. That which succeeds offers more of novelty. "But the improved position of your army, with sufficient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in Afghanistan, induces me now to leave to your option the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country." The words, "improved position of your army," did not, of course, apply to local position, for the army was still at Kandahar, where it had been many months. They must have referred to the supplies of ammunition, treasure, and medicines which had relieved General Nott from the chief causes of his difficulties, and perhaps more particularly to the means of carriage placed at his disposal. In furnishing these articles, the governor-general had been most laudably active; and, therefore, the "improved position" of General Nott must have been a "position" which he had for some time contemplated. It is not to be supposed that, while exerting himself so laboriously and so honourably, he acted under a persuasion that all his efforts would be thrown away; and why, therefore, he should express a feeling almost approaching to surprise on finding that General Nott's situation was improved, it is not easy to conceive. His lordship proceeds to weigh the comparative advantages of retiring by the line of Quetta and Sukkur, and by that of Ghuznee, Kabool, and Jelalabad; showing the practicability and ease of passing by the former, and pointing out in very discouraging language the danger and difficulties of the latter. The leaning of Lord Ellenborough's mind was obviously in favour of the easier and less hazardous course. His lordship writes: "I do not undervalue the aid which our government in India would receive from the successful execution, by your army, of a march through Ghuznee and Kabool, over the scene of our late disasters. I know all the effect which it would have upon the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin, and I would endeavour to inspire you with the necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be obtained by success, the risk is great also." Subsequently, his lordship speaks of the movement on Kabool as an "adventurous march;" and the tone of the instructions in respect to it is uniformly discouraging and desponding. In a letter to General Nott, dated July 10th, the same tone was preserved. A copy of a letter from General Pollock was inclosed, and it was intimated that efforts were in progress to increase the amount of carriage at the disposal

of the latter officer; but it was added, that the terror of Afghanistan operated so strongly on the drivers, that extensive desertion might be apprehended, and that the animals which left Ferozepore might never reach Jelalabad. General Nott was warned that his success in marching upon Kabool must in a great measure depend on the support to be expected from General Pollock, and the dangers to be apprehended in passing Gundamuck were pressed upon his attention; after which the governor-general thus continued, maintaining strictly the tone of his previous letter: "The return of your two armies to India in a state of efficiency is of more importance than any success you might obtain at a great cost of men; and, as I have already told you, the occurrence of another great reverse would be of very fatal consequence." Writing to General Pollock a few days afterwards, when, as his lordship stated, he expected General Nott was in possession of his letter of the 4th, above quoted, he says: "My expectation is, that Major-General Nott will feel himself sufficiently strong, and be sufficiently provided with carriage, to march upon Ghuznee and Kabool." Believing, therefore, that General Nott was sufficiently strong to take this step, the governor-general had notwithstanding held language calculated to make the commander doubt its success; and which, if addressed to many men, would certainly have led to its abandonment. With General Nott it had no such effect. The opening sentence of the gallant officer's answer contains the pith of his decision, and well deserves to be quoted, on account of its soldierly character. "Having well considered the subject of your lordship's letter of the 4th instant; having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected on the advantages which would attend a successful accomplishment of such a move, and the moral influence it would have throughout Asia, I have come to a determination to retire a portion of the army under my command *via* Ghuznee and Kabool. I shall take with me not a large but a compact and well-trying force, on which I can rely. Your lordship may rest assured that all prudence and every military precaution shall be observed: there shall be no unnecessary risk; and, if expedient, I will mask Ghuznee and even Kabool. But if an opportunity should offer, I will endeavour to strike a decisive blow for the honour of our arms."

It now remains to trace the progress of the gallant armies permitted to vindicate the reputation of the government and country which they served.

The first event to be noticed, is the destruction of thirty-five forts in the Shinwabee valley, a short distance from Jelalabad. This service was performed by a force under the command of Brigadier Monteth. The enemy from some adjacent heights contemplated their blazing forts as long as they were allowed to occupy the situation; but their enjoyment

of the spectacle was interrupted by an attack from part of the British force, led by Major Skinner, of her Majesty's 31st, which, aided by a few shrapnels, completely cleared the eminences. This affair took place at the latter end of July.

General Pollock moved from Jelalabad on the 20th of August, and on the 23rd was at Gundamuk. Here he learned that a body of the enemy, under two chiefs, held the fort and village of Mammoo Khail, about two miles distant, and he determined to attack them on the following morning. Accordingly, at four o'clock, he moved towards the enemy with her Majesty's 9th foot, the 26th and 60th Bengal native infantry, two squadrons of light cavalry, some sappers and miners, and a light field-battery. The enemy at first made a show of resistance, and continued in position so long that it was hoped they intended to resist with their entire force; but they retired as the British troops advanced, and the latter entered the village. The fort and another village in the vicinity were speedily occupied by British troops; others drove the enemy from the hills. Upon the more elevated and precipitous of these a stand was sometimes made, and a sharp fire of jezails maintained. But the vigour with which the various attacks were pressed rendered these attempts unavailing, and the whole of the enemy's camp-equipage, with their carriage-cattle, fall into the hands of the English.

General Pollock remained at Gundamuk till the 7th of September, when he marched with the 1st division of his army, commanded by Sir Robert Sale; the second division, under General McCaskill, being left to follow on the 8th. On that day the progress of the first division in its advances towards Jungduluk was interrupted; the hills commanding the pass being occupied by the enemy. These hills formed an amphitheatre inclining towards the left of the road on which the British troops had halted, and the enemy were thus enabled to fire into the column; the intervention of a deep ravine precluding any direct approach to them. Guns were opened upon them, but with little effect; and their fire in return caused several casualties in the British ranks. It was, consequently, necessary that an attempt should be made to force their position. This was effected with great labour, from the steepness of the ground, but with little fighting; the enemy retiring as the British came near them. But the labours of the day were not at an end. A large body of the enemy took up a position still more formidable than that which they had quitted, planting their standards on the summit of a lofty and almost inaccessible mountain, and showing every demonstration of an intention to defend them. From this post of defiance, however, General Pollock determined to dislodge them. In his own words, "the achievements of the day would have been incomplete were they suffered to remain;" and feeling a

just confidence in his troops, he despatched a portion of them, consisting of her Majesty's 13th, one company of the 6th, one company of the 35th Bengal native infantry, and some sappers, to perform the required duty.

"Seldom," says General Pollock, "have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution. These lofty heights were assaulted in two columns, led by Captains Wilkinson and Broadfoot; the discomfited Ghiljies, not relishing an encounter, betook themselves to flight, carrying away their standards, and leaving our troops in quiet possession of their last and least assailable stronghold. It gratifies me," continues the general, "to be enabled to state that we have thus signally defeated, with one division of the troops, the most powerful tribes and the most inveterate of our enemies, the original instigators and principal actors in those disturbances which entailed such disasters on our troops last winter." Captain Nugent, sub-assistant commissary-general, was killed in this affair, and Sir Robert Sale slightly wounded.

The first division advanced without further molestation to Taseen, where they were joined by the second. The cattle belonging to the latter division being fatigued by the march, it was deemed expedient to halt for a day. This was regarded by the enemy as the result of hesitation, and in the afternoon they commenced an attack on the pickets on the left flank. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, with two hundred and forty men of her Majesty's 9th, being ordered to drive them back, some sharp fighting took place, and the enemy was forced up the neighbouring hills, from the crests of which they kept up a heavy fire, till they were engaged by Colonel Taylor, who, with a small party, contrived to creep up one of the hills unperceived, and to lie concealed till joined by a few more of his men, when, rushing on the flank of the astonished Affghans, he put them to rapid flight, pouring on them a destructive fire as they escaped down the hill. This well-planned and admirably-executed scheme relieved the left flank of the British from the enemy, who forthwith withdrew to the right, where they attacked a picket of eighty men of the 60th Bengal native infantry, under Lieutenant Montgomery. The assault was met with great intrepidity, and Lieutenant Montgomery succeeded in keeping the enemy off till reinforcements reached him, when they were driven back. So close was the conflict, that recourse was frequently had to the bayonet. Repeated attempts upon the pickets were made during the night, but in no instance with success.

This was but the prelude to a more serious attack. The valley of Taseen is completely encircled by lofty hills, and on the morning of the 18th of September, it was perceived that the enemy had occupied in great force every height not previously crowned by the British troops. On the army commencing to march,

the enemy's horse appeared in the valley, with the intention of falling upon the baggage, but the dragoons and native cavalry, by a brilliant charge, put them to the rout, and their flight was attended by considerable loss. On the heights the enemy fared no better, though they made an obstinate defence. On the approach of the British, the Affghans, contrary to their usual custom, advanced to meet them, and the thrust of the layonet in many instances decided the contest. The conflict, however, was not only severe but protracted, the fight being continued through the greater part of the day. The series of passes called Huft Kabul was defended by the Affghans with great obstinacy, but they were driven in succession from all their positions, which were both numerous and strong; and the British signal of three cheers at length announced that the summit had been gained. The victory was complete, and the loss of the enemy in men severe, in addition to that of their guns and several standards. The number brought by them into the field was about sixteen thousand, and Akbar Khan in person commanded. At the spot where this battle took place, the massacre of the British in the early part of the year was consummated, and here they were now avenged, the energetic representations of the military authorities having happily succeeded in obtaining permission to perform this act of justice.

The loss of the English was only thirty-two killed. The number of wounded was more considerable, being a hundred and thirty. Among the latter were Captain Lushington, of her Majesty's 9th; Captain Geils and Lieutenant Montgomery, of the 60th native infantry; and Lieutenant Norton, of the 58th native infantry. No British officers were killed; but a distinguished native, named Hyder Ali, who commanded the Jezailchees, and who is noticed by General Pollock as "a most gallant and enterprising soldier," fell in the act of seizing one of the enemy's standards. Attacks on the baggage of the British were frequent during the day; but through the vigilance of Lieutenant-Colonel Richmond, commanding the rear-guard, all failed.

The enemy being completely dispersed, General Pollock pursued his march, and encamped at Khoord-Kabool, without encountering further opposition. On the 14th of September he marched to Boothauk, and on the 15th moved on to Kabool, and encamped upon the race-course there. On the following morning, he proceeded with a party of troops to the Bala Hissar; and there, amid the shouts of the soldiery, the roar of artillery, and the inspiring strain of the British national air, planted the colours of his country to wave in proud triumph over the place from whence, a few months before, a miserable band of British subjects had crept forth, humiliated, destitute, and spiritless—relying on the sufferance of a treacherous enemy, whose vengeance was soon glutted by their destruction. The

counsels of General Pollock and General Nott had prevailed; and here was the result.

The progress of General Pollock has been traced to the spot whence the tarnished honour of the English name called aloud for vindication, and the blood of slaughtered English subjects for punishment on the murderers. It now remains to delineate that of his gallant coadjutor. It has been intimated that General Nott proposed to take only a portion of his force to Ghuznee and Kabool. The rest retired, under General England, by way of Quetta, and pursued their march with little molestation. General Nott commenced his march on the 9th of August, with her Majesty's 40th and 41st foot, the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Bengal native infantry, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, and some irregular horse, a troop of Bombay horse artillery, two companies of foot artillery (one Bengal and one Bombay), a troop of the shah's native horse artillery, and some sappers. The number of guns was twenty-two, of various calibre. A large stock of ammunition was taken, and forty days' provisions. Nothing beyond the ordinary annoyances of a march through a hostile country occurred, till the 28th of August, when an attack on the rear-guard, by a body of the enemy, required the despatch of some cavalry to disperse the assailants. This duty was satisfactorily performed by two parties of irregulars. A more serious affair occurred on the same day. The enemy having fallen on some grass-cutters, while engaged in their labours, Captain Delamere, of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, with two companies of that regiment, and about three hundred irregulars, set off to rescue them. The enemy retired precipitately, and led on the British party a considerable distance, till the pursuers unexpectedly confronted a vast force, believed to be the army of Shumsoodeen, the Affghan governor of Ghuznee. Retreat was, of course, inevitable; but it was commenced in an orderly manner. The enemy, however, closing in upon the retreating force, to within fifty or sixty yards of them, and pouring in a heavy fire, it became necessary to make an attempt to drive the foe to a greater distance. The squadrons were accordingly ordered to front, and one of them to charge. The charge was intrepidly executed; but a tremendous fire of matchlocks being brought in aid of the enemy's force, their assailants were hurled back in disorder. They rallied at the distance of a few hundred yards, though still under a heavy fire, and the retreat was thenceforward conducted in good order. The loss sustained was heavy, and it included several valuable officers. Captains Bury and Reeves, of the 3rd Bombay cavalry were killed; the former is said to have cut down four of the enemy before he was overpowered. Captain Ravenscroft and Lieutenant Mackenzie, of the same regiment, and Lieutenant Chamberlain, of the shah's horse, were wounded, the two former severely.

The attack on the grass-cutters was said to have proceeded from the occupants of a fort in the vicinity, to which the attention of the British commander was now directed. On his approaching it, some unarmed persons came out to supplicate his forbearance, representing that themselves and their companions had taken no part in the attack. Captain F. White, with the light company of her Majesty's 40th, was thereupon ordered to enter, and ascertain, by examination, whether there was reason to believe the representation to be true; but on advancing, with Major Leech, who acted as interpreter, they were greeted by a volley of matchlock-balls. The company, with Captain White, thereupon rushed in, and another company of the 40th, the light company of the 41st, and some companies from native regiments, were ordered to their support. The fort was found full of people, all armed, and resisting. The assailants were infuriated by the treacherous scene just executed before them, and the horrors common on such occasions followed. Every man that was met was put to the sword, the place was set on fire, and in a short time was a mass of blazing ruins. The hollowness of the assertion by which it was sought to divert the British commander from attacking the fort, was demonstrated by the seizure, among other spoil, of a string of camels bearing the commissariat brand.

On the 30th of August, Shumsodeen was in the vicinity of the British camp in great force, and General Nott moved out with about half his troops to meet him. The enemy's left was upon a hill of some elevation; their centre and right extended along a low ridge, until their flank reached a fort filled with their men. This fort appears to have been the first object of attack by the British force; and it does not seem that the attempt was successful. During the time thus occupied, a cannonading was maintained on both sides with apparently no great effect; but on the advance of the British columns the enemy gave way and dispersed in all directions. Their tents and an immense quantity of ammunition were captured, and two guns, one of which was broken by the shot of the British and left on the field, the other brought in by Captain Christie and Lieutenant Chamberlain, of the irregular horse.

On the 5th of September, General Nott was before Ghuznee. The hills north of the city were cleared of the enemy and occupied by the British. The camp was established at Roseh, about two miles and a half distant, and preparations were actively commenced for assault, a principal attack, supported by two false ones, being meditated. Throughout the night the besiegers carried on their preparations, and the enemy appeared to be in some degree on the alert. A brisk matchlock-fire had been commenced early in the evening, but it gradually slackened, and after a time ceased altogether. At dusk the enemy's infantry had been observed crossing the river near the water gate,

with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the working party during the night, but in the morning it was ascertained that the place had been evacuated, and before sunrise both town and citadel were in quiet possession of the invaders. There being no enemy, the sole labour of the victors was that of destruction, and the 7th and 8th of September were employed in this work. Fourteen mines were sprung in the walls of the citadel, all with effect, and the gateways, both of the citadel and town, with the roofs of the principal buildings, were fired. Among the trophies of success, were the gates of the tomb of Mahomet of Ghuznee, believed previously to have belonged to the temple of Somnauth, respecting which the governor-general had expressed considerable interest. On the 10th, General Nott marched from Ghuznee, and on the 14th and 15th his army had to dislodge about 12,000 men, occupying a succession of heights, and intercepting his march upon Beenee Badan and Mydan. On the 16th, General Nott was at Urghundee, and on the 17th within five miles of Kabool, which city General Pollock had previously entered.

The Afghan war was now drawing to a close. No party had ever contemplated any attempt to re-establish permanently the British power in the country; but it was deemed expedient to despatch a force under Major-General McCaskill against Istalif, a rather large and populous town in Koh-i-daman, upwards of twenty miles distant from Kabool, in a north-westerly direction. The force encamped within four miles of the place on the 28th of September, and on the evening of that day a reconnaissance was made. The position of the place was found extremely strong. The town, which was composed of masses of houses and forts, was built on the slope of a mountain, in the rear of which appeared yet loftier eminences, shutting in a defile leading to Toorkistan. No mode of access was discernible except by surmounting ridges of hills separated by deep ravines, or threading by narrow roads a series of gardens, vineyards, and orchards, fenced in with strong inclosure walls; the whole of which, with the mountain sides and the tops of the houses, were occupied by Jezailboes. The confidence which the enemy reposed in the strength of the place was attested by their having retained within the town the women and children of the inhabitants, as well as those of numerous refugees from Kabool.

Notwithstanding these indications of difficulty, General McCaskill ventured upon an assault, and soon after daylight broke on the morning after his arrival, the troops were in motion in two columns; the right, to which was attached the mountain-train, commanded by Brigadier Tulloch; the left, which was accompanied by Captain Blood's battery and the eighteen-pounders, by Brigadier Stacy. A third column, composed of a wing of her Majesty's 4th and the cavalry under Major

Lockwood, and commanded by Major Simmons, was allotted as a reserve. Captain Christie's horse protected the baggage. The columns in their progress met with some annoyances from the Jezailchees, but these were repressed by the light troops and guns. The point selected for attack was a village called Ismallah, which Brigadier Tulloch's column assaulted on its left, while that of Brigadier Stacy, by making a long *détour*, attacked its right. The former column came into action first, but was followed after no great delay by the other. The combined attacks were marked by extraordinary steadiness as well as impetuosity, and the enemy gradually gave way, until the inclosures, forts, heights, suburbs, and town were successively won by the assailants. The reserve established itself on the lower heights, all beyond being in possession of the columns which had preceded. A vast amount of property was found in the town, and two guns were taken, one of which was immediately turned on the enemy by its captor, Lieutenant Elmhirst, of her Majesty's 9th foot. This regiment distinguished itself greatly in the assault, as did also her Majesty's 41st, the 26th, 42nd, and 43rd native infantry, and the sappers and miners. The loss sustained was not severe; one officer only was killed, Lieutenant Evans, of her Majesty's 41st. A considerable part of the town was destroyed by the captors before they quitted it. The same fate awaited Charekar, and was carried into effect by the same hands.

But far more gratifying than any exercises of vindictive justice, however signal and necessary, was the recovery of the prisoners, for whose safety the most serious apprehensions had long been entertained. Akbar Khan had threatened to carry them to Toorkistan, and there distribute them as slaves; a threat which the character of him by whom it was uttered rendered of very probable fulfilment. Saleh Mahomed Khan, who had charge of the prisoners at Bameean, had received orders to remove them to a greater distance. "All hope of deliverance," says Lieutenant Eyre, "seemed now at an end; and we endeavoured to resign ourselves to a fate that seemed inevitable. But Providence had mercifully ordained otherwise. At ten P.M. to our unbounded astonishment, Major Pottinger came to inform us that Saleh Mahomed Khan had offered to make us over to the British general, on condition of our securing to him the payment of 20,000 rupees in ready cash, and 1,000 rupees per month for life." The latter sum was the amount of his pay as commander of a regiment. General Shelton and Colonel Palmer refused to become parties to this agreement, lest they should implicate themselves with Akbar Khan; but the remainder of the British officers resolved to embrace the chance presented to them, and, if treachery should be manifested, to endeavour to master the guard, and hold possession of the fort till

succour should arrive. They had not, however, occasion to resort to this desperate attempt. Saleh Mahomed gave no cause for suspicion; and the decisive conduct of Major Pottinger, in nominating a new governor of the province, in the name of the British government, secured the obedience of that numerous body who are always prepared to give their adhesion to the party that seems to be in the ascendant. The Huzarah chiefs declared in favour of the British party, and the latter commenced its march unmolested. General Pollock being apprised of the turn which affairs had taken at Bameean, caused a body of 700 Kuzulbash horse to advance towards that place, accompanied by Sir Richmond Shakespear. The zeal with which this movement was executed is proved by the fact of the force having traversed ninety miles of mountainous country in two marches. Four days after the departure of the Kuzulbash force on this duty, General Pollock despatched a force, under Sir Robert Sale, to occupy the Urghundee Pass. On the 17th of September, the emancipated prisoners were met by Sir Richmond Shakespear and the Kuzulbash; and on the 20th they re-entered Sir Robert Sale's camp at Urghundee. The illustrious veteran had arrived at that place on the preceding day; it was the anniversary of his birth, on which he numbered sixty years. Having halted for the night, he left his camp standing, and mounted to meet the returning captives, whom he had then the happiness of placing in triumph under the protection of the brave men who had been the sharers of his toils and his glory.

Nothing now remained but to withdraw the army to India; and this operation was effected with little annoyance—none of sufficient importance to call for notice in this work. As the British government renounced all connection with Afghanistan, there was no motive for retaining Dost Mahomed and the other Afghan prisoners in captivity. Their intended release was accordingly announced in a government notification, couched in that grandiloquent tone which seems to have been inseparably associated with our Afghan expedition. One act, marked by singularly bad taste, was threatened, but not performed. It was publicly intimated to be the intention of the governor-general to parade the prisoners for exhibition at a grand military show to be got up at Ferozepore. The motives which led to the abandonment of the design are not known; and in the absence of authentic information, it would be worse than useless to attempt to conjecture them. It is well that our national reputation escaped the stain which would have been incurred by a renewal of one of the most barbarous practices of bygone times, in the production of an array of captive princes to grace the triumph of conquerors. The pageant, however, took place, though the actors chiefly relied on for attraction were withdrawn. Still it seems to have

been a showy spectacle; and perhaps the stage of Drury-lane Theatre has not often presented anything better calculated to please the "children of a larger growth" who delight in such displays. There were painted elephants, triumphal arches, waving banners, and roaring artillery. The curtain had fallen on the tragedy, and, in accordance with theatrical usage, a splendid pantomime followed. This latter performance, it is to be presumed, afforded gratification to its contrivers; and if it effected this, its object was,

without doubt, answered. And thus, with masking and mummery, terminated a war more calamitous than any which Britain had previously waged in the East—a war the termination of which, but for the noble spirit evinced by those intrusted with high military command, would have left the name of our country a byword of reproach; would have roused every unfriendly state to active hostility, and have placed in mortal peril, not merely the supremacy, but the very existence of British power in India.

CHAPTER XXXII.

STATE OF SINDE—TREATIES WITH THE AMEERS—SIR CHARLES NAPIER ORDERED TO SINDE—HIS SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS—CAPTURE OF EMAUN GHUR—MAJOR OUTRAM'S NEGOTIATIONS—BATTLES OF MEEANEE AND HYDERABAD—REDUCTION OF OMEROOTE—AFFAIRS OF GWALIOR—INTERVENTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT—BATTLES OF MAHARAJPOOR, CHONDA, AND PUNNIAR—LORD ELLENBOROUGH RECALLED BY THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

The festivities of Ferozepore closed with noise and show the chapter of British adventure in Afghanistan; but there was another country bordering the western frontier of the English possessions in India with which unadjusted differences yet existed. In regard to Sindé, the time for painted elephants and other constituent parts of Oriental spectacle had not arrived. Diplomacy and intrigue were there actively at work. A British force was in the country, and the question of the continued existence of Sindé as even a nominally independent state, trembled in the balance which the active commander of that force held in his grasp and directed at his will.

To understand the relations then existing between Sindé and the Anglo-Indian government, a brief retrospect will be necessary. For a considerable period preceding the year 1786, Sindé was ruled by a tribe called Kulbooras. At that period the Kulbooras, after a series of struggles extending over several years, were displaced by another tribe, the Talpoors, the chief of which was named Meer Futteh Ali. This personage assigned distinct portions of the conquered country to two of his relations; and thus arose the states of Khyrpoor and Meerpoor. But the larger division of territory was retained by Futteh Ali himself, in connection with his three brothers, whom, by a strange arrangement, he associated with him in the government. This chief state contained the capital of the country, Hyderabad, and from this cause was generally called by that name. The extraordinary mode of government introduced by Meer Futteh Ali continued to be maintained after his death, and was imitated at Khyrpoor, where a plurality of ameers claimed and exercised authority, though one was recognized as chief.

The efforts of the East-India Company to

prosecute their commercial pursuits in Sindé had never been very successful. The earliest attempt to establish a factory seems to have been made in the year 1758; but the establishment was withdrawn in 1775, under instructions from England. The reason for the withdrawal was not the absence of mercantile promise, but the existence of differences with the government, which led probably to the apprehension of serious danger to the factory, and those who conducted its affairs. Twenty-four years elapsed without any endeavour on the part of the East-India Company to revive their mercantile connection in Sindé; but in 1799 permission was obtained for the establishment of a factory at Tatta, and it was subsequently sought to extend the transactions of the company to Kurrachee. The Kulboora dynasty had now given way to that of Talpoor; but the new rulers were not more favourably disposed to foreign commerce than the old ones. The chief of the British establishment was peremptorily ordered to quit Kurrachee, and confine his operations to Tatta; and after a few months he and his associates were expelled from Sindé altogether. So many important affairs then, and for some time afterwards, pressed upon the attention of the Anglo-Indian government, that for some years Sindé and its jealous spirit of exclusion seem to have been little thought of. In 1809, however, a treaty, singularly brief and dry, was concluded between the British government and that country, the only noticeable article in which provided for the exclusion of the French from Sindé. In 1820, another treaty was concluded, by which all Europeans and Americans were excluded from settling in Sindé, while it was stipulated that the subjects of each of the contracting states should be allowed to reside in the dominions of the other, so long as they should conduct themselves in an orderly and

peaceable manner. The ameer also undertook to restrain all tribes and persons within their limits from making inroads upon the British dominions, or committing depredations within them. Thus matters stood, the British and Sindian governments treating each other with a cold and restrained civility, till 1832, when the opening of the Indus for the purposes of commerce became a favourite object with the Anglo-Indian government, as well as with the mercantile community at home. Through the agency of Colonel Pottinger a treaty was concluded with Khyrpoor, by which the use of the river and roads within the limits of that state was secured to the merchants of Hindostan, upon whatever terms might be settled with the government of Hyderabad; and a written statement of just and reasonable duties was to be furnished. A treaty having the same object was more reluctantly acceded to by the rulers of Hyderabad whose jealousy was distinctly marked by the conditions which they attached to the privilege of navigating the river and traversing the roads. They were these:—first, that no military stores should be conveyed by either; secondly, that no armed vessels or boats should be used on the river; thirdly—and this restriction is the most remarkable of all, seeing that by the treaty of 1832 the subjects of the British government were entitled to remain in the dominions of the ameer—that no English merchants should settle in Sind, but should come as occasion might require; and “having stopped to transact their business,” should return to India. Further; merchants from British towns were to be provided with passports, the grant of which was to be duly intimated to the authorities of Hyderabad, by whom a scale of duties was to be fixed, and not departed from. A supplementary treaty, bearing date two days later than that last noticed, promised that the table of duties to be levied by the ameer should be examined by officers of the British government versed in affairs of traffic; and if it appeared to them too high, the government of Hyderabad, on a representation to that effect, was to reduce the duties. This was certainly one of the most extraordinary stipulations ever inserted in a commercial treaty. It virtually gave to the British government the power of fixing the duties to be levied by the government of Hyderabad on foreign goods passing through their territories. The concession of such a power evinces great confidence, or great fear; to which motive it is to be attributed, is a question which it would be a waste of time to discuss. The time necessary for making the inquiries requisite to a just determination of the amount of toll to be levied, seems to have been considerable; for it was not till the 23rd of December, 1834, that the scale was settled. This was effected by an additional treaty with Hyderabad, bearing date on that day.

Some time afterwards, Sind was threat-

ened by Runjeet Singh. The British government was not unwilling to undertake the office of a mediator between the parties; but it would seem as though something more was looked for than the preservation of peace. If this only had been the object, it might have been effected without any important change in the subsisting relations between the two states. A most important change was, however, contemplated by the British government, and it may best be explained in their own words:—“We considered it our duty to endeavour to induce the maharajah to lay aside his hostile intentions. It appeared to us also, that this opportunity ought not to be neglected, of establishing the British influence on a solid basis in Sind, a country which is of great importance to us, both from its commanding the entrance to the Indus, and from its position in reference to the Punjab and Afghanistan. With these views, we, on the one hand, instructed Captain Wade to endeavour, by any means short of actual menace, to deter the maharajah from advancing against Shikarpore, while, on the other, we desired Colonel Pottinger to intimate to the ameer that we were ready to enter into a closer alliance with them on such terms as might be mutually agreed on. Owing to the distance of the scene and the uncertainty of events, we did not consider it expedient to prescribe to Colonel Pottinger the precise conditions on which he was to treat. He was authorized by us to offer our protection against the Sikhs, and we expressed our hope that, with a view to enable us to fulfil this obligation, the ameer would consent permanently to receive, and to pay the expense of, a body of British troops, to be stationed at their capital. Short of this, we informed him, that he was at liberty to offer the mediation of the British government with Maharajah Runjeet Singh, on condition of the reception of a British agent at Hyderabad, and, of course, of all the relations between Sind and Lahore being conducted solely through the medium of British officers, and of the expense of any temporary deputation of the British troops into Sind, which might be found requisite, being defrayed by the ameer.” The state of affairs was not ripe for the former of these plans; but one feature of the latter was introduced in a treaty concluded by Colonel Pottinger in April, 1838, by which the British government engaged to interpose its good offices to adjust the differences between the ameer and their powerful neighbour; and the ameer agreed to the permanent residence of an accredited British minister at the court of Hyderabad, with the power of changing his ordinary place of abode, and the right of being attended by such an escort as might by his own government be deemed suitable. The reception of a permanent British agent was very distasteful to the government of Hyderabad; but Colonel Pottinger was instructed to state, that unless this point were conceded, the interposition of

the British government with Runjeet Singh could not be affirmed. The presence of a British agent was probably necessary to the preservation of the unmolested right of navigating the Indus, which had been assented to by the ameers some years before; and had the demands of the government of British India been restricted to this, they would scarcely have been accused of asking too much for their services in preserving Sindé from an unequal contest with the ambitious and powerful ruler of the Punjab. But the further views which were entertained, and in all likelihood never lost sight of, cannot be approved. The desire to reduce Sindé to the condition of a subsidiary state, ought to have found no place in British counsels. The Sindéan governments had always been cold and unfriendly, but never hostile. They wished to keep aloof from British connection, but they had never afforded ground for anxiety or alarm.

About two months after the ratification of the new treaty between the British government and Sindé, the position of those two powers was embarrassed by the conclusion of the tripartite treaty, to which the British government, Runjeet Singh, and Shoojah-ool-Moolk, were the parties. Sindé had formerly been a dependency of Kabool—that is, its rulers had paid tribute to the sovereign of Kabool whenever the latter was strong enough to enforce payment. But the low state of the Affghan power had for many years rendered this impracticable, and consequently nothing had been paid. By the tripartite treaty, Shah Shoojah renounced all claim to further payment, and consented to receive, in consequence of the arrears, such a sum as might be determined by the British government. On this arrangement the ameers had never been consulted, and consequently its effect was to transfer to another an undefined portion of their wealth without their own consent. They had, without doubt, never intended to pay anything, and it is quite certain that, without the aid of their British ally, Shah Shoojah could never have compelled them to make payment of the fraction of a rupee. The British government had proffered its services to arrange the differences of the ameers with Runjeet Singh, and they had been accepted; this government now undertook, without reference to one of the powers interested, to determine how much of an outstanding claim should be paid, and how much remitted. Shah Shoojah consented to be bound by their award, for on that rested his only hope of getting anything; but that the ameers should be equally ready to submit to an authority founded, with regard to them, upon pure assumption, and which was created for the very purpose of levying a contribution upon them, could not reasonably be expected. But the case was embarrassed by a release from Shah Shoojah which the ameers produced. By this document, the former renounced all claims or pretensions upon Sindé or Shikarpore, and engaged that

none should ever be made. With reference to the release, the resident might well observe, "how this is to be got over I do not myself see." The authority which the resident represented took a different view, and he was apprised of that view in the following terms:—"The governor-general is of opinion that it is not incumbent on the British government to enter into any formal investigation of the plea adduced by the ameers;" though it was added that the arbitration of the question might possibly be left, by mutual consent, to the British envoy at the court of Shah Shoojah.

It happened most opportunely, that about this time one of the ameers was detected in carrying on a correspondence with Persia. This undoubtedly indicated an unfriendly spirit towards the British government; but with reference to its own proceedings, that government could scarcely deem itself aggrieved. The discovery, however, was employed in aid of the designs already in progress, and great indignation was expressed at the "duplicity" of the ameer, "in maintaining, at the same moment, professions of submission to Persia and of close alliance with the British government. That "close alliance," it should here be remembered, had never been sought by the ameers—it had been forced upon them; and an alliance which was to allow the stronger party to dispose of the treasures and occupy the territory of the weaker at pleasure, could not be regarded by the latter with much gratification.

The summary and determined manner in which the British government was prepared to treat the insubordination complained of will best be illustrated by a few extracts from the instructions furnished to its agent for his guidance in dealing with the refractory party. "It seems open to you to decide upon proclaiming, as soon as a force from Bombay may enable you to do so with effect, that an act of hostility and bad faith having been committed toward the British government, the share in the government of Sindé which has been held by the guilty party shall be transferred to the more faithful members of the family; and it may be thought right to accompany this transfer with a condition, that, as a security for the future, a British subsidiary force shall be maintained in Sindé; or, secondly, the maintenance of this force may be required without the adoption of an act so rigorous as that of deposition; or, thirdly, it may be thought expedient, upon submission, and the tender by the ameer of such amends as may be in his power, to point out to him that no better reparation can be given than by exertions to give effect to the treaty formed for the restoration of Shah Shoojah, by a cordial adoption of its terms, and by exertions on every side to facilitate the success of the coming expedition, the party or parties to the breach of faith now commented upon being required to contribute much more largely than the other ameer or ameers to the pecuniary

composition to be paid to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk. The course first named is, in the opinion of his lordship, clearly justified by the circumstances of the case; it would alone give security for the future; and every other course would seem to put the friends and the unfriendly, the faithful and the faithless, on the same footing."

These instructions it was easy to enunciate: to carry them out in any way was a matter of difficulty. With this difficulty the resident had to grapple, as well as with others connected with the arrival of the Bombay force destined for the invasion of Afghanistan. The ameers were expected to afford facilities for obtaining supplies—they afforded none, but, on the contrary (those of Hyderabad at least), were not unnaturally anxious to throw every possible impediment in the way of procuring them. Through the exertions of various officers, the force, however, was provided with the means of advancing; and it gradually approached the capital of Lower Sindh.

The resident had deferred making to the ameers a definite communication of the views of the British government as to their future position till this period; and as a diplomatist he acted rightly. The ameers were intensely averse to even the passage of troops through their territories: the notion of a British force permanently occupying any part of those territories had never entered their minds. The time at length arrived for suggesting it, and the draft of a treaty was submitted to them, the second article of which declared that the governor-general of India had commanded that a British force should be kept in Sindh, to be stationed at Tatta, where a cantonment was to be formed, and that the strength of this force was to depend on the pleasure of the said governor-general. Thus in the outset it was assumed that the rulers of Sindh were dependent upon the government of British India, for the stationing of a military force at Tatta, and the determining the amount of the force, were not made subjects of mutual contract; the first point was rested on the governor-general's command, and the second was left to his pleasure. By the next succeeding article it was provided that the ameers should pay a sum (left open in the draft) "in part of the expense of the force, from the presence of which they will derive such vast advantages." Such was the language employed; the chief advantage, as far as can be discerned, being the exchange of sovereignty for dependence.

The draft treaty was laid before the ameers, and Lieutenant Eastwick, with some other British officers, were admitted to an audience, for the purpose of discussing and explaining this extraordinary document. On this occasion, Noor Mahomed took from a box all the treaties that had formerly been entered into with the British government, and significantly asked, "What is to become of all these?" The question was not an inappropriate one, and it was followed by some observations not unfaithfully

describing the progress of the intercourse between Sindh and the British government. The ameer said, "Here is another ameer. Since the day that Sindh has been connected with the English, there has always been something new; your government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted. We have given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to remain."

It would be useless to pursue the history of this period minutely. The ameers of Hyderabad were well disposed to resist, and the Beloochee population not less ready to support their resistance. The British ameer returned from the capital to the British camp, danger being apprehended from a continued stay at the former place. But difficulties, discouragements, and circumstances of embarrassment congregated thick and fast round the ameers. The army of Sir John Keane was marching onward to Hyderabad; the reserve was in possession of Kurrachee. Sir Alexander Burnes had concluded a treaty with the ameer of Khyrpoor, by which possession of Bukkur had been obtained; and Sir Willeghby Cotton, with the force under his command, was approaching from that quarter. In this situation the ameers had no choice, but, in their own language, to become our "humblest slaves," and the offensive treaty was accepted; the sum to be paid for the subsidiary force being fixed at three lacs. But this treaty was not entirely approved by the government of British India. Three of the articles which related to the use of Kurrachee as a port during the months when other modes of communicating between Bombay and Sindh were not available, were struck out, inasmuch as the English were in possession of that place, and their government meant to keep it. In the second article, as accepted by the ameer, the exercise of the "pleasure" of the governor-general, as to the force to be maintained in Sindh, had been restricted to the employment of five thousand men. This was qualified so as to declare no more than that "it was not intended" that the force should exceed five thousand fighting men; thus virtually restoring the article to its original state. By another modification, the power of the British government was almost indefinitely extended as to the choice of the locality in which this force should be stationed. Instead of being fixed absolutely at Tatta, it was to be either there, or at "such other place westward of the river Indus" as the governor-general might select. There were other alterations, the most important of which was the omission of an article restraining the British government from forming any treaty or engagement which could possibly affect the interests of Sindh, without the knowledge and concurrence of the ameers. The remainder it will not be requisite to notice. The result of the changes may readily be anticipated; the ameers objected, implored, and finally gave way, by

affixing their seals to the revised documents. Thus, in a very brief period, was Sindé reduced from a state of perfect independence to that of a feudatory of the British government.

When Lord Auckland retired from the government of British India, the subsidiary treaty was that which regulated the relations of that government with Sindé. Little of importance had occurred since its ratification, except the death of Noor Mahomed, the chief of the college of ameeris at Hyderabad, and some negotiations for transferring to the British the management of Shikarpore, which were never concluded. It was alleged that the ameeris had been engaged with various parties in correspondence of a tendency opposed to British interests. The charge is not improbable, and may have been true; but it is remarkable that the terrible reverses which our armies sustained in Afghanistan, and the consequent diminution of our military reputation, did not tempt the ameeris, writhing as they were under a deep sense of wrong, into any overt act of hostility. Indeed, the man likely to be best informed on the subject, Colonel Outram, political agent in Sindé, declared that "nothing very definite had been resolved on," and expressed an opinion that "such changeable, puerile, and divided chiefs" were not "ever likely to enter into deep, and consequently dangerous, conspiracy;" nor did he "consider that anything of the sort would be persevered in so long as no further disasters befell our arms in Afghanistan." This was written on the last day of May, 1842, when our prospects in Afghanistan were brightening.

Early in the year 1842, Lord Ellenborough, as already mentioned, arrived in India as the successor of Lord Auckland. In May, from what especial cause does not appear, his lordship transmitted to Colonel Outram letters addressed to the three divisions of the ameeris, threatening them with the confiscation of their dominions in the event of their proving faithless to the British government. The agent was allowed a discretion as to the delivery of these letters, and in the exercise of that discretion he withheld them.

The governor-general was prepared to dispossess the ameeris of their territories; but on the supposition that no sufficient, or ostensibly sufficient, cause might be afforded for this step, he meditated an important change in their situation, in regard to the British government. This was the commutation of the tribute payable by the ameeris to that government, by the transfer of territory; and the localities where cessions of territory were to be derived, were specified. Colonel Outram submitted to the governor-general the sketch of a supplemental treaty, embodying these views; but, for some reason not explainable, his lordship deemed it not advisable to press negotiations on the ameeris "precipitately," and determined "to leave their minds for the present in tranquillity."

The "tranquillity" conceded was not of long duration. In the month following that in which expression had been given to the wish that the ameeris should enjoy this inestimable boon of tranquillity, Major-General Sir Charles Napier was ordered to proceed to Sindé, to assume the chief military command there. This was not all; he was also to exercise the chief political and civil authority. Such an arrangement, under peculiar circumstances, may be sometimes beneficial. The present instance is pronounced by a writer hostile to Lord Auckland, and generally favourable to Lord Ellenborough, to have been "a step, at such a crisis, of very questionable policy."

Sir Charles Napier, in accordance with the instructions of the governor-general, proceeded to Sindé, and on the 5th of October reported that the ameeris levied tolls on the river, contrary to the treaty. Without waiting for the result of the remonstrance which the British representative made on the subject, that functionary was, by instructions forwarded in answer to his communication, directed to intimate to the ameeris that he was authorized to treat for a revision of the treaty. The agent to whom these instructions were addressed was nothing loth to follow them; and in a paper of extraordinary length he recorded his conviction that the existing state of political relations between Sindé and the British government could not last—"That the more powerful government would, at no very distant period, swallow up the weaker;" and that "it would be better to come to the results" at once, "if it could be done with honesty." The difficulty of doing it "with honesty" was great; but Sir Charles Napier was not a man to despair. An array of charges against the ameeris, extending over a considerable period, was transmitted to the governor-general, and was answered by the draft of a treaty to be presented for the acceptance of the alleged offenders. By this document, required to carry into effect the project of obtaining territory in place of tribute, certain places were pointed out as centres, to which a convenient *arrondissement* of country was to be assigned, at the pleasure of the British general and political representative of his government. Another portion of territory was to be taken to reward the fidelity of the khan of Bhawalpore as a British ally. The ameeris were to provide fuel for the steamers navigating the Indus; and if they failed, the servants of the British government were to be entitled to fell wood within a hundred yards of the banks of the river, within the territories of the ameeris. This was an offensive privilege, but not the most offensive that was claimed. By a series of articles in the treaty, which would seem to have been framed purposely with a view to insult, the ameeris were to cease to exercise the privilege of coining, one of the chief characteristics of sovereignty. The British government were to coin for them; and, to aggravate the indignity offered to these

composition to be paid to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk. The course first named is, in the opinion of his lordship, clearly justified by the circumstances of the case; it would alone give security for the future; and every other course would seem to put the friends and the unfriendly, the faithful and the faithless, on the same footing."

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The draft treaty was laid before the ameers, and Lieutenant Eastwick, with some other British officers, were admitted to an audience, for the purpose of discussing and explaining this extraordinary document. On this occasion, Noor Mahomed took from a box all the treaties that had formerly been entered into with the British government, and significantly asked, "What is to become of all these?" The question was not an inappropriate one, and it was followed by some observations not unfaithfully

describing the progress of the intercourse between Sinde and the British government. The ameer said, "Here is another annoyance. Since the day that Sinde has been connected with the English, there has always been something new; your government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted. We have given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to remain."

It would be useless to pursue the history of this period minutely. The ameers of Hyderabad were well disposed to resist, and the Beloochee population not less ready to support their resistance. The British mission returned from the capital to the British camp, danger being apprehended from a continued stay at the former place. But difficulties, discouragements, and circumstances of embarrassment congregated thick and fast round the ameers. The army of Sir John Keane was marching onward to Hyderabad; the reserve was in possession of Kurrachee. Sir Alexander Burnes had concluded a treaty with the ameers of Khyrpoor, by which possession of Bukkur had been obtained; and Sir Willoughby Cotton, with the force under his command, was approaching from that quarter. In this situation the ameers had no choice, but, in their own language, to become our "humblest slaves," and the offensive treaty was accepted; the sum to be paid for the subsidiary force being fixed at three lacs. But this treaty was not entirely approved by the government of British India. Three of the articles which related to the use of Kurrachee as a port during the months when other modes of communicating between Bombay and Sinde were not available, were struck out, inasmuch as the English were in possession of that place, and their government meant to keep it. In the second article, as accepted by the ameers, the exercise of the "pleasure" of the governor-general, as to the force to be maintained in Sinde, had been restricted to the employment of five thousand men. This was qualified so as to declare no more than that "it was not intended" that the force should exceed five thousand fighting men; thus virtually restoring the article to its original state. By another modification, the power of the British government was almost indefinitely extended as to the choice of the locality in which this force should be stationed. Instead of being fixed absolutely at Tatta, it was to be either there, or at "such other place westward of the river Indus" as the governor-general might select. There were other alterations, the most important of which was the omission of an article restraining the British government from forming any treaty or engagement which could possibly affect the interests of Sinde, without the knowledge and concurrence of the ameers. The remainder it will not be requisite to notice. The result of the changes may readily be anticipated; the ameers objected, implored, and finally gave way, by

affixing their seals to the revised documents. Thus, in a very brief period, was Sindé reduced from a state of perfect independence to that of a feudatory of the British government.

When Lord Auckland retired from the government of British India, the subsidiary treaty was that which regulated the relations of that government with Sindé. Little of importance had occurred since its ratification, except the death of Noor Mahomed, the chief of the college of ameers at Hyderabad, and some negotiations for transferring to the British the management of Shikarpore, which were never concluded. It was alleged that the ameers had been engaged with various parties in correspondence of a tendency opposed to British interests. The charge is not improbable, and may have been true; but it is remarkable that the terrible reverses which our armies sustained in Afghanistan, and the consequent diminution of our military reputation, did not tempt the ameers, writhing as they were under a deep sense of wrong, into any overt act of hostility. Indeed, the man likely to be best informed on the subject, Colonel Outram, political agent in Sindé, declared that "nothing very definite had been resolved on," and expressed an opinion that "such changeable, puerile, and divided chieftains" were not "ever likely to enter into deep, and consequently dangerous, conspiracy;" nor did he "consider that anything of the sort would be persevered in so long as no further disasters befell our arms in Afghanistan." This was written on the last day of May, 1842, when our prospects in Afghanistan were brightening.

Early in the year 1842, Lord Ellenborough, as already mentioned, arrived in India as the successor of Lord Auckland. In May, from what especial cause does not appear, his lordship transmitted to Colonel Outram letters addressed to the three divisions of the ameers, threatening them with the confiscation of their dominions in the event of their proving faithless to the British government. The agent was allowed a discretion as to the delivery of these letters, and in the exercise of that discretion he withheld them.

The governor-general was prepared to dispossess the ameers of their territories; but on the supposition that no sufficient, or ostensibly sufficient, cause might be afforded for this step, he meditated an important change in their situation, in regard to the British government. This was the commutation of the tribute payable by the ameers to that government, by the transfer of territory; and the localities where cessions of territory were to be derived, were specified. Colonel Outram submitted to the governor-general the sketch of a supplemental treaty, embodying these views; but, for some reason not explainable, his lordship deemed it not advisable to press negotiations on the ameers "precipitately," and determined "to leave their minds for the present in tranquillity."

The "tranquillity" conceded was not of long duration. In the month following that in which expression had been given to the wish that the ameers should enjoy this inestimable boon of tranquillity, Major-General Sir Charles Napier was ordered to proceed to Sindé, to assume the chief military command there. This was not all; he was also to exercise the chief political and civil authority. Such an arrangement, under peculiar circumstances, may be sometimes beneficial. The present instance is pronounced by a writer hostile to Lord Auckland, and generally favourable to Lord Ellenborough, to have been "a step, at such a crisis, of very questionable policy."

Sir Charles Napier, in accordance with the instructions of the governor-general, proceeded to Sindé, and on the 5th of October reported that the ameers levied tolls on the river, contrary to the treaty. Without waiting for the result of the remonstrance which the British representative made on the subject, that functionary was, by instructions forwarded in answer to his communication, directed to intimate to the ameers that he was authorized to treat for a revision of the treaty. The agent to whom these instructions were addressed was nothing loth to follow them; and in a paper of extraordinary length he recorded his conviction that the existing state of political relations between Sindé and the British government could not last—"That the more powerful government would, at no very distant period, swallow up the weaker;" and that "it would be better to come to the results" at once, "if it could be done with honesty." The difficulty of doing it "with honesty" was great; but Sir Charles Napier was not a man to despair. An array of charges against the ameers, extending over a considerable period, was transmitted to the governor-general, and was answered by the draft of a treaty to be presented for the acceptance of the alleged offenders. By this document, required to carry into effect the project of obtaining territory in place of tribute, certain places were pointed out as centres, to which a convenient *arrondissement* of country was to be assigned, at the pleasure of the British general and political representative of his government. Another portion of territory was to be taken to reward the fidelity of the khan of Bhawalpore as a British ally. The ameers were to provide fuel for the steamers navigating the Indus; and if they failed, the servants of the British government were to be entitled to fell wood within a hundred yards of the banks of the river, within the territories of the ameers. This was an offensive privilege, but not the most offensive that was claimed. By a series of articles in the treaty, which would seem to have been framed purposely with a view to insult, the ameers were to cease to exercise the privilege of coining, one of the chief characteristics of sovereignty. The British government were to coin for them; and, to aggravate the indignity offered to these

wretched princes, the coin was to bear on one side "the effigy of the sovereign of England." Thus every transaction at every bazaar throughout Sind was to be made the means of publicly proclaiming that the ameer had ceased to rule; that they had become dependents of a foreign potentate, and held so much of authority as was allowed to remain with them only by the sufferance of a superior, or of the servants of that superior. Separate treaties were to be tendered to the governments of Hyderabad, and to those of Khyrpore, but they were framed upon the same principles, and directed to the same ends.

The justice of imposing such severe terms was rested upon the authenticity of the letters said to have been written respectively by Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, and Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, and on the escape of an insurgent leader from the British authorities through the agency of a servant of the latter prince. As to the letters, every one acquainted with Oriental affairs knows that correspondence is constantly fabricated to aid any purpose that may be in hand. The authenticity of the letters was denied by the alleged writers; the denial is certainly not to be received as conclusive against belief in their authenticity, but such belief is not warranted by any sufficient evidence. The seal attached to the letter professed to be from Meer Nusseer Khan differed from the ordinary seal of that prince, but was said to correspond with another seal which he was represented to possess. The authenticity of the letter, however, was doubted by at least one very competent judge. The letter of Meer Roostum Khan, according to the admission of those who brought it forward in accusation against him, could not be traced to his cognizance; it was believed to have been written by his minister, but whether with or without his knowledge was not shown; and the escape of the prisoner from British custody was in like manner traceable no further than to the agent by whom it was effected. Certainly the rights of princes were never assailed on such slender ground as these charges afforded. But it was enough: for reasons not then disclosed, it was resolved to go forward with the process which had been commenced under a different administration, to tighten the grasp of the British government upon Sind, and thus to accelerate the progress of the movement which was to convert that country into a British province in name as well as in fact.

The treaties were presented for the acceptance of the ameer both of Upper and Lower Sind, on the 6th of December. They were accompanied by letters from Sir Charles Napier, intimating his intention to take immediate possession of the districts which it was proposed to assign to the khan of Bhawalpore. The letters were dated the first of the month; and on the 18th publicity was given to the intention by the issue of a proclamation, signed by the British general, which, after re-

citing the orders under which he acted, and the purpose which he had in view, declared that if the ameer should, after the commencement of the ensuing year, collect any revenue in advance, or impose any new tax within the districts which they were destined to lose, they should be punished by amercement. At this time the new treaties were matters for discussion—they had not been ratified—they were mere proposals from one party, which the opposite parties might reject; subject, of course, to the penalty attached to rejection. But it cannot fail to be observed, that Sind is dealt with by Sir Charles Napier as though the right of the governor-general of British India to parcel it out at his pleasure were unquestioned and unquestionable; and, moreover, as if it were desired to exercise this right in a manner as offensive as possible to those who were to suffer privation from the exercise. The direct tendency of the proclamation was to render the ameer contemptible in the eyes of those whom they were yet, perhaps, for a time to be permitted to regard as subjects. Such a course could not facilitate the acceptance of the proffered treaties; it was directly calculated to influence hostile feelings already believed to prevail in their minds; and had it been determined to hurry on an appeal to the sword, no more likely means could have been devised than the issue of this most injudicious and insulting proclamation.

The extraordinary constitution of the Sind government has already been adverted to. An incident arising from this cause has now to be noticed. Meer Roostum was the chief of the ameer of Khyrpore. He was above eighty years of age, and consequently no long tenure of life and power (such power as he was likely to retain) could be anticipated for him. According to the constitution of the Sind state (if constitution it had), Ali Moored, brother of Meer Roostum, was the legitimate successor of the prince in the chieftainship. Meer Roostum, it was alleged, wished to divert the succession in favour of his own son; and Ali Moored applied to Sir Charles Napier for support against any such attempt, should it be made. It was promised, on condition of the fidelity of Ali Moored to the British cause. But something further was wished. The unmanageableness of a government constituted like that of Sind was obvious enough; and it occurred to Sir Charles Napier that the age of Meer Roostum, and a presumed indisposition on his part to be longer burdened with the toils and vexations of government, might afford means for effecting some modification favourable to British influence. The following statement rests upon the authority of Sir Charles Napier; but it is proper to observe in the outset that it is not in all points uncontroverted. Meer Roostum sent a secret communication to Sir Charles Napier, to the effect that he could do nothing, and would

make his escape to the British general's camp. This step was not desired; it was regarded as inconvenient, and by a very adroit, if not a very straightforward, piece of diplomacy, the general was relieved alike from the embarrassment which would have resulted from entertaining Meer Roostum in his camp, and from that which would have followed his refusing him this refuge. As the transaction was in many points extraordinary, it will be best to relate it, as far as possible, in the words of the chief actor, Sir Charles Napier himself. It appeared, then, to him, that the only desirable system to follow in Sind was that of "making the chief powerful, and holding him under the power of the government," the British government being meant. "This," writes Sir Charles Napier, addressing the governor-general, "made me promise Ali Moorad your lordship's support in having the turban, which your lordship has approved of. The next step was to secure him the exercise of its power now, even during his brother's life. This I was so fortunate to succeed in, by persuading Meer Roostum to place himself in Ali Moorad's hands." Meer Roostum, accordingly, instead of proceeding to the British camp, threw himself upon his brother, and surrendered to him the chief authority. He seems, however, soon to have repented of the step which he had taken, for in a very few days he escaped from the care of the person to whom he had been commended by the British general.

The flight of Meer Roostum—his first flight, namely, that which was followed by the surrender of his power to Ali Moorad—excited great consternation among his family and followers. They forthwith fled; but not to the British camp, nor to Ali Moorad. Their choice was the desert; and the greater portion were reported to have sought safety in a fort called Emaun Ghur. Thither Sir Charles Napier resolved to follow them, and commenced his march without delay. No certain intelligence as to a supply of water being attainable, it was deemed prudent to take forward only a very small force. It consisted of three hundred and fifty men of the Queen's 22nd, mounted on camels (two on each animal), two hundred Sindian horse, and two 24-pounder howitzers. The want of forage rendered it necessary to send back a hundred and fifty of the horse. The remainder of the force encountered the difficulties of the desert march, which were great, and reached Emaun Ghur, which place was occupied without difficulty, and destroyed. The fort was stated to belong to Ali Moorad, who consented to its destruction. The march of the British general, and the capture and destruction of a fortress belonging to some or other of the authorities of Sind, took place at a time when we were professedly in a state of peace with all. It is greatly, therefore, to be desired, for the credit of the British name, that the statement above noticed should be correct. It has, how-

ever, been disputed, and with some appearance of truth. The fall of Emaun Ghur took place early in the month of January, 1843.

The event was not without effect; but the ameers were yet naturally anxious to put off the evil day which was to divest them almost of the very semblance of sovereignty. Major Outram, whose powers had been withdrawn, and who had consequently retired to Bombay, it was thought might, by his personal influence, be able to effect something in the way of diminishing the reluctance of the prince to sign the sentence of their own virtual deposition. He returned, held various conferences with the ameers, and finally prevailed on them personally to affix their seals to the treaties. But there were other parties who claimed the privilege of judging beside the ameers. The Beloochee tribes—bold, fierce, and intractable—were greatly excited against the European intruders, who, by no slow advances, were establishing their own authority supreme in Sind. As the British commissioner and his attendants departed from the final conference, they were assailed with execrations from an assembled crowd, who were restrained from more dangerous expression of their feelings only by the presence of a strong escort of horse, sent by the ameers, under the command of some of their most influential chiefs.

One great point on which the ameers had dwelt in their conferences with Major Outram, was the wrong which the British authorities had caused, and continued to uphold, in the transfer of authority from Meer Roostum to Ali Moorad. It was stated, that the surrender of power by the latter had been the effect of compulsion; and seeing that the aged chieftain was altogether in the hands of his brother, it is very probable such was the fact. The political move which the British general thought a masterstroke of diplomacy, thus became a chief cause of embarrassing the negotiation, while it placed a chief, venerable for his years at least, in the position of an oppressed and injured man, and left on the shoulders of the highest British authority in Sind the charge of being the principal author of the chieftain's degradation.

It was constantly represented by the ameers, that the continued advance of Sir Charles Napier would exasperate the Beloochees, and cause them to resort to arms in defence of the independence of their country. That officer, however, continued to advance, and on the 15th of February the long-threatened outbreak took place; the first object of attack being the residence of the British commissioner, Colonel Outram. A dense body of cavalry and infantry took post in a manner to command three sides of the inclosure in which the residence was situated, the fourth being defended by a British steamer, which, happily, lay in the river at no great distance. A hot fire was commenced and kept up for four hours by the assailants; but their attempts to effect an

entrance were defeated by the judicious efforts of Captain Conway, the officer in command, ably and zealously supported by his subalterns, Lieutenant Harding and Ensign Pennefather, of her Majesty's 22nd, and by two volunteers, Captain Green, of the 21st native infantry, and Captain Wells of the 15th. Captain Brown, Bengal engineers, was despatched to the steamer, and there rendered valuable assistance in directing her fire. The number of men under Captain Conway was entirely inadequate to any protracted defence, and the stock of ammunition was scanty. A reinforcement of men and a supply of ammunition were expected by another steamer, but she arrived without either, and it became obvious that there was nothing to be done but to effect a retreat with as little loss as possible. An attempt was made to remove the property within the residence; but the camp-followers became alarmed, and after reaching the steamer with their first loads, could not be brought to return; while the fighting men had employment more important as well as more stirring than looking after baggage. The greater portion of the property was therefore abandoned, and the British party evacuated their quarters in a body, covered by a few skirmishers. The movement was effected with perfect order; and the British commander, with his brave escort, arrived in safety at the camp of Sir Charles Napier.

There was now no mode of deciding the existing differences but by the sword. Sir Charles Napier accordingly advanced to a place called Meeanee, about six miles from Hyderabad, which he reached on the 17th of February, where he found the ameers posted in great force. Their position was strong, their flank being protected by two woods, which were connected by the dry bed of the river Fulailce, having a high bank, behind which, and in the woods, were the enemy posted. In front of the extreme right, and on the edge of the wood protecting it, was a village. Having made his observations, the British general prepared for attack; posting his artillery on the right of the line, and sending forward skirmishers to drive out the enemy's force. The advance then took place from the right in echelon of battalions; the left being declined to escape the fire of the village. The artillery and her Majesty's 22nd formed the leading echelon; the 25th native infantry the second, the 12th native infantry the third, and the 1st grenadier native infantry the fourth.

About a hundred yards from the bank the British opened the fire of their musketry in answer to that of the enemy. Thenceforward the official details of the battle are neither very full nor very clear. This much is certain, that the conflict was obstinate and sanguinary, and that for a time the event was doubtful. The British, however, continued to press determinedly on their opponents; and a charge from the 9th Bengal light cavalry (which

formed the reserve), aided by some Sinde horse, completed the discomfiture of the enemy, who slowly retired. The victory cost the British a loss of sixty-two killed, and one hundred and ninety-five wounded. Among the number was a large proportion of officers. The loss of the enemy was estimated at five thousand; but this amount seems incredible.

Immediately after the battle, six of the ameers (three of Khyrpore and three of Hyderabad) surrendered themselves prisoners; and on the 20th of February Sir Charles Napier entered the capital of Lower Sindh. But the contest was not yet at an end. Shere Mahomed, ameer of Meerpoore, remained in arms; and on the 24th of March the British commander marched out of Hyderabad to attack him. He found him at the head of a great force posted behind a nullah, which had been partially scarped and otherwise strengthened. Shere Mahomed, perceiving that the British force was outflanking him on the right, moved in that direction; and Sir Charles Napier, believing that the movement drew him away from that part of the nullah prepared for defence, chose the moment for commencing an attack. A troop of horse artillery, under Major Leslie, was ordered to move forward and endeavour to rake the nullah, while the 9th light cavalry and Poonah horse were ordered to advance in line on the left of the artillery, which was supported on the right by her Majesty's 22nd; that regiment being, however, considerably retired, to avoid interfering with the oblique fire of the artillery. The artillery opened upon the enemy's position, and the British line advanced in echelon from the left, the Queen's 22nd leading the attack.

From the official account of the battle, the following particulars are to be collected. The enemy appearing to shrink from the cross fire of the British artillery, Major Stack gave an impetus to their movement by a brilliant charge upon their left flank with the third cavalry, under Captain Delamain, and the Sindh horse, under Captain Jacob. These troops crossed the nullah, and pursued the enemy for several miles. While this was in progress, the Queen's 22nd, under Major Poole, commanding the brigade, and Captain George, commanding the corps, attacked the nullah on the left, marching up to it under a heavy fire of matchlocks without returning a shot till they came within forty paces of the intrenchment, which they forthwith stormed in gallant style. Lieutenant Coots, who was the first man to mount the rampart, seized one of the enemy's standards, and was severely wounded while waving it to encourage his men. The efforts of the 22nd were supported by batteries commanded by Captain Wilmoughby and Captain Hutt, the fire from which crossed that of Major Leslie; while the Poonah horse, under Captain Tait, and the 9th cavalry, under Major Story, turned the enemy's right flank, pursuing and cutting

down the fugitives. A brigade consisting of the 12th, 21st, and 25th regiments, commanded respectively by Captain Fisher, Captain Stevens, and Captain Jackson, the brigade being under Major Woodburn, was also meritoriously engaged, supported by the fire of a battery under Captain Whittle, on the right of which were the 1st and 8th regiments, under Major Brown and Major Oliborn, which regiments appear to have manifested great coolness and great anxiety for action. Of the details of the battle little can be gathered; and all the information furnished amounts in fact to this:—that Sir Charles Napier, with a force the component parts of which are only incidentally mentioned, met a large body of Beloochees, engaged and defeated them. The loss sustained by the British amounted to two hundred and sixty-seven killed and wounded. Among the killed were two valuable officers, Captain C. Garrett, of the 9th light cavalry, and Lieutenant J. C. Smith, of the Bombay artillery. The latter officer fell while exhibiting an instance of desperate valour, in riding along the top of the nullah in advance of his battery, with a view of ascertaining where his guns could be brought to bear with the greatest effect.

After this battle, Sir Charles Napier marched forward, and took possession of Meerpoore. The reduction of Omercote, situate in the desert, and a fortress of some importance (with reference to Oriental notions), was the next object sought. A detachment was despatched against this place, originally under Captain Whittle; but Major Woodburn subsequently assumed the command. Acting on information reaching him at a distance from the spot, Sir Charles Napier ordered a retreat when the force sent against Omercote was about twenty miles from the fortress. At the moment when the order was received, the officer in command was informed that the place had been abandoned by the garrison; but the order to retire seems to have been peremptory, and he did not feel justified in disregarding it. Under the influence of this embarrassment, the capture of Omercote might have been postponed indefinitely, but for the energy of Captain Brown, who, mounting his horse, performed, without halting, a journey of eighty miles, under the burning sun of Sind, in order to put Sir Charles Napier in possession of the report which had been received by Major Woodburn, and obtain his revised decision. Permission being given to advance, it was acted upon by Major Woodburn. The final march was commenced at midnight on the 4th of April. It lay over a good road, but through jungle, which became thicker and higher as Omercote was approached; and it was not till arriving within eight hundred yards of the north-west frontier, that a fair sight of the fort could be obtained. On a party of horse approaching to reconnoitre, a few armed men showed themselves on the walls, and this induced Major Woodburn to

order Captain Jacob, with the Sind horse, to proceed round to the eastern face of the fort, to intercept the escape of the garrison, if they were disposed to resort to such a step, or to induce them to display their strength, if they were prepared for defence. The chief persons of the Hindoo population within the place came out, however, and tendered their submission to the British commander, assuring him, at the same time, that the greater part of the garrison had fled some days before; that there remained few armed men within the fort; and that those few had no desire to resist, but were ready to depart, if the safety of their lives were guaranteed. An officer was despatched to inform them that their lives would be spared, on condition of their coming out and laying down their arms. In the mean time some guns were brought up, and placed in position, Major Woodburn rightly concluding "that the sight of them" was likely to "hasten the determination of the garrison." There was no necessity for employing them, the remnant of the garrison meeting the communication made to them by opening their gates, surrendering the keys, and laying down their arms.

Sir Charles Napier had directed a squadron of horse to be left as a garrison for Omercote. Major Woodburn determined to add to this a company of infantry, and his reasons appear well founded. "I beg," he says, "to submit to the major-general's consideration, that foraging parties will, from all I can hear, be obliged to go often to the distance of many miles, and will be required to be in strength, as there are now many parties of the followers of the Ameer Shere Mahomed scattered about the country, as well as others of different tribes, who are always to be met with where forage is most plentiful. To make these foraging parties sufficiently strong might, were a squadron left alone, often leave too small a garrison in the fort; and on this account I have been induced to add the infantry, so as to admit of all the cavalry being absent at one time, when such is required."

Sir Charles Napier concluded his despatch to the governor-general, announcing the occupation of Omercote, with the words, "Thus, my lord, I think I may venture to say Sind is now subdued." But the subjugation of a country inhabited, for the most part, by a wild and warlike population, is a thing easy to talk of, but not easy to accomplish. The governor of Sind (for to this office Sir Charles Napier had been appointed by Lord Ellenborough), for many months after uttering this declaration, found that he had something more to do than merely to make the requisite arrangements for carrying on the civil administration of the country which he represented as subdued. The Ameer Shah Mahomed continued to break the tranquillity upon which Sir Charles Napier had calculated. The chief was attacked on the 8th of June by a British force under Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, consisting of twelve companies of native infantry,

followed by the 6th, 15th, and 20th regiments, a troop of the 3rd light cavalry, and a battery of four guns. Shah Mahomed was encamped at a place called Peer Assee, with a force reported to amount to two thousand men. On the approach of Colonel Roberts, the enemy was discovered in retreat. Captain Walker was despatched with the cavalry to intercept this movement, and succeeded in destroying many of the fugitives. The remainder of the detachment continued to advance, and a party of the grenadier company of the 20th native infantry, scouring an inclosure, discovered Shah Mahomed, with three or four servants, concealed in some under-wood. He seemed at first disposed to resist; but Captain Travers, of the 23rd Bombay infantry, coming up, he delivered his sword to him. Thus terminated the endeavours of this chief to disturb the British in Sindh.

Another ameer, named Shere Mahomed, was still at the head of a large force of Beloochees; but his situation was one of peril. Colonel Roberts' column was threatening him on the north; Sir Charles Napier, with the troops under his personal command, was marching upon him from the south; and another force, under Captain Jacob, cut him off from retreat to the desert. The force last-named, Shere Mahomed determined to attack; and his choice was probably governed by two considerations: in the first place, it was the weakest of the three bodies of troops by whom he was menaced; and in the second, it interfered with his chance of escaping the others. On the night of the 13th of June, Captain Jacob received information that the ameer was about to attack him; and about three o'clock on the morning of the 14th, the enemy were discovered approaching. The advance, however, was too slow to meet the expectations of the British officer in command; and, leaving a troop and a company to protect his camp, he went out with the rest of his force in search of the tardily advancing enemy. The Beloochees formed on the bank of a nullah, in considerable strength, both horse and foot, and opened three guns, which advanced on the British, and showed a front of defiance. But its continuance was brief; for no sooner had the British commander formed his line, and brought his guns into play, than the Beloochees were perceived moving off; and on Colonel Jacob advancing with the Sindh horse, they broke, dispersed, and fled in all directions, leaving their guns in the hands of the British, without an effort to save them. The deprivation of these, and of several standards, constituted almost their entire loss, for five or six only were killed. But the dispersion was complete, and Shere Mahomed fled from the field with ten horsemen, the remnant of a force of about four thousand that he had brought into action.

Since this period Sindh has been more tranquil; but it was long ere the irruptions of the wild Beloochee tribes ceased to afford

ground for alarm. The proceedings of the British government with regard to Sindh were never popular in England, and even the splendour of victory failed of securing public approbation to a course of policy believed to be based in injustice.

Another subject, not unfringed with anxiety, had divided with Sindh the attention of the British government during the year in which that country was added to the British possessions. This was the state of the dominions of the house of Scindia, where events occurred which threatened to light up again the flames of war but just extinguished in Afghanistan, and the embers of which yet glowed in Sindh. Dowlut Rao Scindia, with whom, it will be recollected, treaties had been concluded, under the administrations of the Marquis Wellesley and the marquis of Hastings, died in the year 1827, leaving no son, and having adopted none. His widow, the daughter of the notorious Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, thereupon assumed the exercise of the sovereign authority, and meditated introducing a member of her own family as her successor. But this design she was forced to abandon; and, ultimately, she adopted a boy of the Scindia family, who was declared to be the nearest relation of the deceased chief eligible for adoption, with reference to age. The youth of the new chief secured to the ambitious widow of the deceased one the continued exercise of power for some years; but on the former attaining the age of seventeen, he aspired to the actual possession of the authority which he had been selected to inherit. After a struggle, he succeeded; and, in 1833, was proclaimed sovereign, the regent retiring, after some months of hesitation, to Agra. Years were required to settle the amount of pension to be assigned to her, and the provision of a place for her residence; and these points were scarcely arranged, when, in 1841, the chief was attacked by sickness, of which he sustained repeated shocks, until the 7th of February, 1843, when he died, childless, and without having made any arrangement for the succession by recourse to the ceremony of adoption. His widow, who was under thirteen years of age, adopted, with the concurrence of the influential persons and powerful officers of the court, a boy, named Bhageerut Rao, reputed to be the nearest relative to the deceased maharajah, and he was forthwith seated on the gaddie, with the usual ceremonies.

The maharajah was about eight years old. His youth, therefore, rendered imperative some special provision for the discharge of the active duties of sovereignty; and the maharajah, having little advantage, in point of age, over her adopted son, it was obvious that her hands were not those in which the requisite power should be placed. The British resident, Colonel Spier, supported the pretensions of Mama Sahib, the maternal uncle of the deceased chief, and the governor-general acquiesced in the opinion of the resident. Mama

Sahib had enemies and rivals; in an Oriental court every man, intent solely on his own advancement, is an enemy to every other man whose success may impede it. But the influence of the British resident prevailed. Mama Sahib was appointed regent, and on the day on which the maharajah was enthroned, was invested with a dress indicative of his accession to the office.

Thus far the views and wishes of the British government were realized. But from the period when Mama Sahib entered upon the exercise of his functions, he found himself counteracted by sinister influence. A woman named Nurungee, whose power over the mind of the rane appears to have been great, exercised it in hostility to the regent. She was removed, but the effects of her evil counsel did not cease with her presence. A more serious evil was the state of the army, more especially of a brigade of infantry, consisting of three battalions. One of the three, commanded by a person named Ishoorree Singh, had committed great excesses during a march to Malwa. This had occurred before the death of the late maharajah; and, on the representations of the British resident, orders had been despatched for the recall of Ishoorree Singh, which step was to be followed by his dismissal from the service, and imprisonment. The order required Ishoorree Singh to return alone, leaving his battalion where it might be when the order reached him. But this did not correspond with his views; he returned, but brought the battalion with him; and on the arrival of this force in the camp, the disaffection which pervaded it spread to the two other battalions, which formed part of the brigade to which that of Ishoorree Singh belonged.

The British resident called for the immediate and signal punishment of the contumacious officer whose conduct had diffused a mutinous spirit through an entire brigade of the army, and offered the assistance of British troops for the purpose of effecting it. The regent, Mama Sahib, expressed his readiness to act upon the suggestion of the resident, but preferred accomplishing the desired object without the aid of British troops; the introduction of which, he represented, might cause a disturbance extending through the whole army. He believed himself capable of bringing Ishoorree Singh and his battalion to punishment; but not immediately. A delay of a month or six weeks was necessary, that time being required for issuing pay to the troops—a process necessary to be performed before they were called upon to act in support of the government. This was communicated to the governor-general, then at Agra, and he was thereupon satisfied that no necessity would arise for the march of troops on Gwalior; a measure which he had previously thought likely to be called for.

For nearly three months after his appointment to office, the regent, Mama Sahib, was

thwarted by the maharanees, and the cliques of intriguers by whom she was surrounded. Suddenly and unexpectedly, on the 18th of May, the British resident received a message from the maharanees, intimating a wish that the young maharajah should contract a matrimonial alliance with the niece of the regent. The next evening was fixed for the performance of the initiatory ceremony of the *teeka*, and it accordingly took place. This turn of affairs was sufficiently strange, but it was almost immediately followed by another not less startling. On the 18th of May the current of court favour seemed to flow entirely in the regent's favour, and by the proposed marriage of his niece with the maharajah his tenure of power appeared to be rendered secure. On the 21st the maharanees summoned to her presence all the chiefs in camp, excepting Mama Sahib, and subsequently despatched a message to the British resident, complaining of the conduct of the regent, and expressing a desire for his removal. The resident remonstrated, but in vain; and in a few days Mama Sahib was on his journey from Scindia's camp, which he had been ordered to quit.

Oriental intrigues are rarely explicable, except by the parties engaged in them; and in a majority of instances, perhaps even they would be unable to give a rational account of their motives and conduct. It would be vain to inquire at length into those of the actors in the extraordinary course of events which raised Mama Sahib apparently to the summit of uncontrollable power only for the purpose of immediately precipitating him headlong into ruin and disgrace. One point, however, is clear, that the British government had little influence. The regent, who enjoyed its support as far, at least, as verbal assistance went, was dismissed with as little ceremony as a menial servant would have been discarded, and this by a faction headed by a girl whose immature age would in Europe have precluded her from the exercise of any control over the most ordinary matters of business. It appears strange that no effort should have been made to sustain the regent by military aid, such having some months before been tendered to enable him to put down the mutinous battalions. The resident applied for permission, in case of need, to call on the officer commanding at Agra for troops to support the regent, but was refused; the governor-general declaring the sending troops to interfere in the internal disputes of an allied state to be a matter of too much importance to justify his delegating to any one the power of so employing them. The letter by which the resident was apprised of this determination concluded with the emphatic declaration: "Under no circumstances does the governor-general desire that a single man be permitted to pass our frontier without his personal direction."

Troops were refused, but despatches were written. The resident was advised that the

British government could not acquiesce in the removal of the Mama Sahib without the assignment of some better reason than the wish of the maharanees; he was to hold no official intercourse with the successor of the deposed regent without special instructions from the governor-general; and it was authoritatively announced, that "the maharanees and the chiefs must bear in mind that the frontier of the territories belonging to the British government, and of those of the Gwalior state, being for the most part contiguous," it was "a matter of paramount importance that there should exist in Gwalior a government willing and able to preserve tranquillity along that extended line;"—that "the British government" could "not permit the growing up of a lax system of rule, generating habits of plunder along its frontier;"—that "its duty to its own subjects imperatively" required "that it should interfere effectually to maintain the public peace by all such means as" might "appear best calculated to secure that essential object;"—that "it would be far more satisfactory to adopt the necessary measures in cordial co-operation with the authorities of the Gwalior state," and that it had been hoped "that under the regency of the Mama Sahib this might have been done; but" that "in any case the public peace must be preserved, and" that "the Gwalior state" would "be held responsible for all such interruptions thereof as" might "arise out of the mal-administration of its dominions." These declarations were well; but the movement of a brigade would have been much more effective. In the East no argument is so convincing as that presented by strong battalions. "I do not think it possible," said the resident, "to restore the Mama Sahib to power by remonstrance alone;" and beyond all question he thought correctly.

The British resident, in conformity with instructions from his government, prepared to remove from Gwalior for a season. This step appears to have excited in the minds of the maharanees and her admirers that vague apprehension of evil not uncommon where there is a consciousness that offence has been given, and where every act of the party offended is regarded with suspicion. Inquiries were made as to the cause of the resident's removal; and the hollow professions of regard always current in eastern courts were tendered with great liberality. The representative of the British government was entreated, on behalf of the maharanees, to consider the maharajah and herself as his children (albeit her recent conduct had exhibited little of filial obedience); his forgiveness was implored, and that of the governor-general, but the Mama Sahib was not recalled. The resident answered in language less warm than that in which he had been addressed, but designed to have little more meaning; and, this edifying intercourse concluded, he proceeded to Dholepore. There he was informed that it was deemed by the

governor-general inexpedient that he should return to Gwalior till some government should be created, "having the appearance of good intention, and giving the promise of stability;" or, until the maharanees and chiefs should "earnestly call" for his assistance, in forming such a government. The governor-general had been sojourning in the upper provinces, but was now on his return; and the distance by which he was about to be separated from the resident made it obviously inconvenient that, under all circumstances, the latter should wait for instructions. The inconvenience was perceived and noticed; but it was declared that the governor-general deemed the return of the resident to Gwalior to be a measure requiring so much consideration, that, except in case of unforeseen emergency, it was not to be adopted without previously representing the circumstances, and waiting for orders, having reference to the representation. These instructions were forwarded from Allahabad on the 27th of June.

The principle of non-intercourse was, it appears, difficult to be adhered to. The Mama Sahib had retired to Seronge, and it was apprehended that some attempt might be made by the ruling parties at Gwalior to seize him there. The calm acquiescence of the British government in the deposal of the Mama Sahib had not tended to raise its character; and the seizure of the ex-regent at Seronge would have completed its humiliation in this respect. The governor-general had declared that he did "not wish to have any concern with the Mama Sahib's proceedings;" and the resident had accordingly been instructed to abstain from taking any notice of that person's residence at Seronge, or any other place. This was on the 30th of June. On the 13th of July a different tone was adopted. The resident was desired, if he entertained the least apprehension of danger to the Mama Sahib, to address the maharanees in the language of warning, intimating that the entrance of a single man into the territory of the British government would be considered as an attack upon that government itself, and punished accordingly. The threat was to be enforced by reference "to the conduct recently adopted by the British government towards the amcers of Sind, its enemies"—a most unhappy reference, except as to the indication of power—and towards the chiefs of Bhawulpore, of Joudpore, and of Jessulmere, its allies. A copy of this letter was transmitted to the maharanees, with whom it had been deemed necessary to open communications on matters of state, without the intervention of any minister. This was a complete departure from the principle laid down some months before, that the maharanees was to have no power, not even that of appointing ministers, but that all authority was to be centred in a responsible regent. The maharanees, in her answer, denied that any intention existed of attacking the Mama Sahib, and a second

representation on the subject received a like reply.

It would be impracticable to give any clear account of the intrigues at Gwalior, except at a length disproportioned to the importance of the subject; and the details, if furnished, would have little interest. The following brief notice may be sufficient:—The person most active in the disposal of the Mama Sahib, and whose influence became predominant after the fall of the regent, was called the Dada Khajee Walla. An attempt was made to obtain for the maharanees's father a portion of the power of the state, and it was directed that he should be consulted on all affairs; but the Dada Khajee Walla represented that great evils were likely to arise from a divided authority; and thereupon he was reinstated in that plenitude of power which he so disinterestedly claimed.

But all real power was, in fact, in the hands of the army. This body comprised above 30,000 men; a number out of all proportion to the demands of such a state as that of Gwalior for defence, and not less to its means of supporting them. These troops were, in some instances, commanded by officers of European birth, or of European parentage on one side; but the ordinary relation between officers and men was constantly inverted, the latter assuming the province of command, and punishing their officers at pleasure.

Somewhat tardily the British government turned its attention to the necessity of interposing by force, if other means should fail, to suppress the disorders which prevailed in Gwalior and menaced the peace and security of its own dominions. On the 10th of August, the governor-general recorded a minute, containing the following passage:—"The recent change of ministry at Gwalior, effected through the expulsion of the regent, who had been recently nominated with our sanction; the concentration at Gwalior itself of almost the whole army; the removal from that army, with circumstances of violence, of almost all the officers of European or Eurasian origin; the selection for posts, civil and military, of persons known to be hostile to our government, and of some whose removal from their appointments had but recently been carried into effect by the late maharajah, on our representation; all these things, exaggerated as they will be by a people desirous of change, make it desirable that the representations our government may find it necessary to make to the Gwalior durbar, and our general influence over native states, should be supported by the presence of an army. It may be impossible accurately to calculate upon the future, when its complexion must depend upon troops without discipline, who may soon be without pay, and upon men unscrupulous as to the means by which the objects of their bad ambition may be effected; but the course of events which seems most probable is this, that the inhabitants of the detached territories of the

Gwalior state in Malwa, and of the districts adjoining Saugor and Bundelcund, being under no real control, will become the invaders and plunderers of our subjects and allies, and thus compel us to demand from the Gwalior state a reparation which it will be really unable to afford, and which we must, therefore, in some manner, take for ourselves. The measures we may thus adopt with respect to the districts belonging to the Gwalior state in Malwa, and adjoining Saugor, will be most conveniently covered by the union of a considerable force in a camp of exercise upon or near the Jumna." In accordance with the views herein propounded, the commander-in-chief was desired to form his camp at Cawnpore, on the 15th of October next ensuing, and it was directed that shortly afterwards an army of exercise, consisting of at least twelve battalions of infantry, with a proper complement of cavalry and artillery, should be assembled upon or near the Jumna.

In the mean time anarchy continued to increase, though communications between the maharanees and the British resident at Dholepore were not suspended. The maharanees expressed a strong wish for the return of the resident to Gwalior; but the latter, acting under the instructions of his government, refused, except on condition of the Dada Khajee Walla being not only deprived of authority, but punished by fine and banishment; or, what was regarded as a preferable course, surrendered to the British government. A paper, addressed to the maharanees by the resident, which contained the demand for the punishment or surrender of the dada, was by that personage intercepted; he very naturally feeling reluctant that such a proposal should reach the royal ear. When this fact became known to the governor-general, great indignation was expressed at the conduct of the dada in withholding the communication, which was declared to be "an offence of a most criminal character against the state of Gwalior, amounting to a supersession of the maharanees's authority, and the transference of all power in an unlawful manner to himself. The governor-general in council," it was added, "will not permit any subject of the state of Gwalior thus to supersede the authority of his sovereign." As the British government had authorized its representative to communicate with the maharanees, disappointment, not unmixed with anger, might be felt at the step taken by the dada to prevent the transmission of any representation hostile to himself. But it seems rather an exaggerated tone of writing, to designate the act of the dada as a criminal offence against the state of Gwalior; that state, if it deserved the name, being at the time altogether without any responsible or recognized government. One of the reasons adduced in illustration of this view—that the act amounted to a suspension of the maharanees's authority—seems perfectly idle. It is true, Dada Khajee Walla had no right to the

power which he had assumed ; but it is equally true, that, according to the declared conviction of the British government, neither had the maharanee any right to the exercise of sovereign authority. It had been solemnly and most justly determined, that her extreme youth rendered her utterly unfit for the charge. She had no authority but that which, like the *dada*, she had usurped. A regent had been appointed, with the sanction of the British government ; he had been deposed, and the maharanee took the power for which she had been adjudged incompetent. Yet the same government which had so adjudged, condescended, by its representative, virtually to recognize her usurpation, by holding intercourse with her, as the guardian of the interests of the house of Scindia. Not only so, but in an official paper issued by that government, the maharanee is adverted to in a character which the most devoted of her adherents would scarcely have ventured to claim for her. The *dada* is spoken of as a subject, and the maharanee as his sovereign. Now, it is quite clear that the boy Scindia was the sovereign, and that even if the usurpation of the maharanes were overlooked and submitted to, she could be regarded, at most, only as regent. Strange it is, that after denying her the latter office, she should, without a shadow of claim, have been invested with the higher rank of sovereign.

The governor-general was now preparing to leave the presidency for the purpose of proceeding to the vicinity of the place, where, by negotiation or force, the differences between the British and Mahratta states were about to be determined. But before he departed, he recorded his view of the cause of his journey in a lengthened minute. In this document the rights and obligations of the British government as the paramount power in India within the Sutlej, were adverted to and maintained. The doctrine that in India such a paramount power must exist, and that the British government should be that power, was one which statesmen, both at home and in the East, were slow to learn ; but it may be hoped that it is now too deeply seated in the minds of men of all parties to be easily effaced, and Lord Ellenborough was justified in assuming it as the basis of his proposed movements.

It would appear from the next paragraph of his lordship's minute, that he had little hope of effecting a settlement of the affairs of Gwalior otherwise than by force, and that at this period (the 1st of November) he contemplated something more than merely menacing the frontiers of the disturbed country ; for he continues :—"To maintain, therefore, unimpaired, the position we now hold, is a duty, not to ourselves alone, but to humanity. The adoption of new views of policy, weakness under the name of moderation, and pusillanimity under that of forbearance, would not avert from our own subjects, and from our own territories, the evils we let loose upon

India ; and the only result of false measures would be to remove the scene of a contest, altogether inevitable, from Gwalior to Allahabad, there to be carried on with diminished force, a disheartened army, and a disaffected people."

After noticing the scattered and ill-connected nature of Scindia's territory, and the sources of evil to be found in the existing state of Gwalior, the governor-general proceeded to speak of the maharajah in a manner which, did not the result refute the belief, might have been understood as intimating an intention to dispossess the youthful prince of the chieftainship to which he had so recently been elevated. The maharajah, it was stated, was a boy of poor parentage, and altogether uneducated. This latter point was referred to more than once in the minute, from which circumstance it may be inferred that some considerable importance was attached to it ; but it is difficult to conjecture upon what grounds. Indian princes are seldom highly educated ; and though the attainments of the maharajah afforded no cause for boasting, it does not seem that he was properly described as altogether uneducated : it was stated on official authority, that in Mahratta literature "he had made as much progress as boys of his age generally do." It is not often that boys at nine years of age are either great linguists or great philosophers. A further objection to the prince, to whose elevation the British government was an assenting party, is found in the allegation, that he was not "descended from any one of the family of Scindia who has possessed sovereign authority ; but from a remote ancestor of those by whom sovereignty was acquired." Yet in a public notification, issued on the death of Jankojee Rao Scindia, dated at Delhi, the 11th of February, in the same year in which the minute under examination was recorded, the following passage is found : "The governor-general has also received information of the adoption, by the widow of the late maharajah, with the assent of the chiefs and people, of Bhajeerut Rao, the person nearest in blood to the late maharajah." As the adopted prince had been recognized in February as the nearest in blood, it does not appear how, in November, any reasonable objection could be taken to him on the ground that his relationship to the robber chiefs who had held dominion was only collateral. Further, that no possible objection to the maharajah's title might be omitted, it was alleged in the minute, that the prince was "elected by the *zenana* and the chiefs of the army for their sole benefit, not for that of the people." This, without doubt, was quite true ; but as the election had been confirmed by the British government, it was rather late to object to it. Indeed, the entire passage in which the objections are embodied is almost immediately neutralized by the following : "On the decease of the late maharajah, the British government readily acknowledged the suc-

cession of the present maharajah. He was the member of the family of Scindia nearest to the deceased sovereign by blood." Here, then, after the turns and doublings of the preceding sentences, we arrive at a conclusion to which certainly they cannot be regarded as a preparation.

A passing reference to points noticed before—the maharajah's youth and deficiency of literary acquirement, and the immature age of the maharane (with whom, notwithstanding, public business had been discussed)—was followed by a history of the then recent proceedings at Gwalior, concluded by a statement, the perusal of which is not calculated to give a very high impression of the vigour, decision, and unity of purpose with which the British government was at the time administered. After relating the expulsion of the regent, the governor-general thus went on:—"The representations made by the British resident were of no effect. The successful rival of the regent became all-powerful. The Christian officers were, with few exceptions, ill-treated and turned out of the camp by the soldiers. Persons who had been deprived of their offices on our representations, were restored. Offices were taken from those who were supposed to be favourable to the maintenance of friendly relations with us; and Gwalior has exhibited to all India the example of a regent, to whom our support had been promised, expelled from the territory he governed, and of a successor, whose acts show him to be hostile to our interests, established in power in despite of our remonstrances."

Notwithstanding all these proceedings, so insulting to the British government as well as so dangerous to the maintenance of peace, it appears, however, that no intervention with Gwalior might have taken place—the governor-general might have been contented with sullenly withdrawing the British resident to a distance, and leaving the bandit army to pull down and set up its officers at discretion, plunder at will, and continue a terror to all within the territories of the house of Scindia, and to all on its borders, had it not been for the peculiar situation of affairs at the time. The events that primarily led to the intervention were those which occurred subsequently to the death of Runjeet Singh, when in the struggle for peace a series of crimes and excesses were perpetrated worthy of the worst days of the worst governed state of India. From this quarter danger was not unreasonably apprehended, and his lordship's views on the subject were thus expounded:—"Within three marches of the Sutlej is an army of 70,000 men, confident in its own strength, proud of its various successes against its neighbours, desirous of war and of plunder, and under no discipline or control. It may be hoped, it may perhaps be expected, that no hostile act on the part of this army will occur to produce a war upon the Sutlej; but it would be unpardonable were we not to take

every possible precaution against such an event; and no precaution appears to be more necessary than that of rendering our rear and our communications secure, by the re-establishment of a friendly government at Gwalior."

After stating his opinion that it was desirable, with reference to Lahore, that disputes with Gwalior should be brought to a speedy termination, the governor-general on this ground expressed his conviction that the government should confine its claims there to a single point—the expulsion of the Dada Khasjee Walla. This he considered would for a time give to the government an actual predominating influence in Gwalior, and to this he trusted for effecting a reduction of the army, and all other measures that might be desirable. The mode of carrying out these measures he left to be determined by circumstances; and modifications of the views themselves were contemplated as not of improbable occurrence.

At the time when the minute above quoted was recorded, the state of affairs in Gwalior seemed to be approaching to a crisis. The army was divided into three parties—one friendly to Dada Khasjee Walla, another hostile to him, and a third neutral. The second party obtained possession of the person of the dada, and it was expected that they would deliver him up to the British resident at Dholepore: this expectation was not fulfilled; but Bappoo Setowles Deshmook, one of the chiefs most active in the capture, transmitted a communication to the resident, informing him of what had been done, and expressing a hope that his conduct, and that of the chiefs who had acted with him, would be approved of by the British government, with which they were anxious to re-establish the usual good understanding. The resident, in acknowledging this communication, spoke of the conduct of the chiefs in commendatory terms, and concluded by strongly urging that the custody of the dada should be made over to him. Similar advice was given in two letters addressed, within a few days of each other, by the resident to the maharane. The representations contained in these letters were enforced at the Gwalior durbar personally by a moonshee, but in vain. The maharane had not, in fact, any control over the person of the dada, that officer being in the hands of a party opposed to that to whose influence she had yielded herself. For this reason she might have pleaded inability to comply with the demand for his surrender, and have rested her case upon this point. But she, or rather her advisers, for she was but a puppet in their hands, met the requisition in a manner more direct than might have been expected. To the declaration that the delivery of the dada was the only measure which could arrest the advance of British troops, it was answered that this was the first instance in which a prisoner of the Gwalior state had been demanded by

the British government. The moonshee returned to his employer at Dholepore without having gained a single step towards effecting the purpose for which he was sent, and leaving the state of parties in Gwalior at a dead lock, as thus described by a news-writer at the time:—"All parties say that there are difficulties on all sides; the basee (maharanees) is young and inexperienced; the goopurra (her father) has not sense sufficient for such a crisis. Both parties are afraid of the treachery of each other, and no one is trusted by either party. The basee's party wish Bappoo Sahib to come to durbar and consult; but it is impossible that the goopurra can give him confidence that he will not be seized. The Bappoo Sahib wishes to go to durbar and consult, but wishes Colonel Jacob (commander of a brigade) to stand security against treachery. Colonel Jacob is alarmed, as both the Bappoo Sahib and the goopurra are powerful; there are no means in his power of doing anything if either of them act treacherously. Under these circumstances, there appears no way of settling differences."

Some further communications passed between the maharanees and the British resident, but they produced no result. Colonel Spier, who had been superseded in his functions at the court of Gwalior, on grounds not very intelligible, now quitted Dholepore to proceed to Nagpore, where he had been appointed resident. Shortly after this the two parties most strongly opposed commenced cannonading each other, and continued the operation during parts of two days. The firing ceased in consequence of orders from the maharanees (though it is stated that it was begun by the troops who adhered to her interests), and the chiefs opposed to the court were invited to a conference. They overcame their fear of treachery, accepted the invitation, and were received with honour. The next step was still more remarkable, for Bappoo Setowlee Deshmook was appointed to the ostensible administration of public affairs. The proximity of a British military force, and the probability of its advance to the frontier of the Gwalior state, occasioned much alarm there, and the expectation was for a time raised, that to avert such a result the dada would be given up. But all remained in the state of uncertainty which had so long prevailed. On the 11th of December, when the governor-general arrived at Agra, he immediately resolved on moving forward the assembled troops with as little delay as possible, and on the following day he addressed to the maharanees a communication expressive of his intentions. The forward movement of the army had the desired effect. Dada Khasjee Walla was surrendered, and conducted to Agra.

The object was thus attained which the governor-general had professed to regard as that of chief importance, indeed the only one proper to be pressed on the durbar of Gwalior; and his lordship had expressed an opinion, that

when it should be accomplished, the influence thereby established, would "place within our easy and early reach the attainment of all just objects of policy," including the reduction of the army. The opinion, it will be recollected, had been given, not at a time when it was expected that the dada would be given up to a demand unsupported by a military force, but when the movement of such a force was contemplated, and its assemblage had for the purpose actually taken place. But the facility with which the surrender of the dada had been yielded under the influence of the terror imposed by the march of the British force seems to have effected a change in the policy of the governor-general, and he determined to employ that terror as an instrument for obtaining those ulterior objects which, less than two months before, he had been content to leave to the effect of "influence." An intimation to the new resident, dated the 18th of December, thus commences:—"The governor-general is gratified by the delivery of the Dada Khasjee Walla to the charge of the British government, as indicating, on the part of her highness and the durbar of Gwalior, a disposition to restore the accustomed relations of friendship between the two states. But her highness is already informed, that the movement of the British armies cannot be arrested until the governor-general has full security for the future maintenance of tranquillity upon the common frontier; nor until there shall be established at Gwalior a government willing and able to coöperate its own subjects, and to maintain permanently the relations of amity with the British government and its allies." Reference is then made to the expediency of increasing the force maintained in Gwalior under British officers, and to the assignment of districts to be administered under the British government for its support. The increase of the contingent had been noticed in the minute of the 1st of November; but any attempt to enforce it, except by predominating influence, was then disclaimed. Now a different course was to be taken. At a conference held between the governor-general and certain chiefs of the Gwalior state, on the 20th of December, it was required, as the only condition on which the march of the army could be stopped, that a treaty making provision for these and various other points should be ratified within three days. Thus, what was formerly proposed to be left to "influence," was to be extorted at the point of the bayonet.

This was not the only change. In the minute of the 1st of November, the right of interference with the Gwalior state had been rested on the claim of the British government, as the paramount authority in India, to maintain the peace and safety of the whole of the country; and on the dangers with which its own frontiers, and those of its allies, were threatened by the disordered state of Scindia's

territories. In the following passage these grounds are very distinctly set out:—"In Europe there is no paramount state. The relations of a paramount power to a dependent state create in India rights and duties altogether different from those which can exist in Europe between states subject to one admitted international law, and controlled in the exercise of their individual power by the general opinion of the great republic of states to which they belong; but, even in Europe, a condition of affairs in any country which manifestly threatened the general repose would not long be suffered to exist; and the combination of the leading powers would effect that which, in India, must be effected by the British government alone. When the existing relations between the state of Gwalior and the British government are considered, it is impossible to view the expulsion of the Mama Sahib, and the elevation of the Dada Khasjee Walla to the ministry, otherwise than as an affront of the gravest character offered to the British government by that successful intriguer in the zenana of Gwalior, and by the disorganized army by which he has been supported. That army of 30,000 men, with a very numerous artillery, under the direction of a person who has obtained and can only retain his post in despite of the British government, is within a few marches of the capital of the North-western provinces. The frontiers of the Gwalior state, for a great distance, adjoin ours in the lately disturbed districts of Sangor. They adjoin the territories of the chiefs of Bundelcund, and so scattered are they as to touch the dominions of almost all our allies in Malwa, while they extend beyond the Nerbudda, and even to the Taptee. Everywhere along this line the most cordial and zealous co-operation of the Gwalior authorities is essential to the maintenance of tranquillity; and we know that, under the present minister, the most we can expect is that such co-operation will be coldly withheld, if, indeed, it should not be covertly given to the plunderers we would repress." Such were the original views of the governor-general recorded on the right of interference. In the communication made by his lordship on the 12th of December, to the maharajah, it is vaguely stated that the person and rights of the maharajah, as the successor of Dowlut Rao Scindia, "are placed by treaty under the protection of the British government." In a conference between the governor-general and one of the Gwalior chiefs, on the 19th of December, the chief referred to this statement, and it thereupon appeared that the treaty under which the supposed obligation to defend the person and uphold the rights of Scindia's successor had its origin, and on which the right of interference was now grounded, was the treaty of Boorhampoor, concluded in the year 1804. The chief seemed to know very little about this treaty, alleging, that though he had it among his records, he

had not referred to it for many years, and did not recollect with accuracy the engagements which it contained. An article which provided for the employment, "on the requisition of the maharajah," of a subsidiary force, to be stationed near his frontier, being pointed out, the chief asked, admitting such an engagement to exist, what was its practical bearing on the question in hand—whether the interference of the British government was restricted to cases in which the maharajah might apply for such interference? He was answered, that the case under the spirit of the treaty had arisen from the fact of the maharajah and the maharanee, both children, incapable of acting for themselves, having, by the machinations of evil-disposed persons, who had usurped the whole authority of the government, been virtually set aside; that in consequence of the proceedings of those persons, the usual friendly relations of the two states had been for the time dissolved, and that the ruin of the Gwalior state must ensue, if the British government (which was almost in the place of guardian of the infant sovereign) did not interfere to save the person of the maharajah and preserve the government of the country.

On the day after the conference just noticed, another, as already intimated, took place, at which the chief subject of discussion was a proposed meeting between the governor-general and the maharajah. On the part of the latter, it was suggested that the place of meeting should be the ground then occupied by the British army, that being the spot where former governors-general had been met on occasion of visiting Gwalior, and any deviation from the established usage would, it was represented, detract from the honour of the maharajah. The governor-general, however, expressed his determination to advance. The chiefs thereupon earnestly entreated that he would reconsider the matter, urging that if the British army passed the Gwalior frontier before the maharajah had a meeting with him, "it would be a breach of all precedent, and eternally disgrace the maharajah and the government of Scindia." The governor-general being unmoved by these representations, the language and manner of the chiefs in pressing them appear to have increased in earnestness: they expressed their belief that "if the British army crossed the frontier before the meeting with the maharajah, the troops of Gwalior, who were already in a state of the utmost alarm, would believe that the governor-general was coming, not as a friend, but with a hostile purpose." In the language of the paper from which this account is framed, "they implored him (the governor-general), with joined hands, to weigh well the step he was taking, for that the state of Scindia was in his power to uphold or to destroy; and that, in their opinion, the most serious consequences depended on the passing of the British army across the frontier before

the meeting between the governor-general and the maharajah."

After some further discussion, or rather some further interchange of prayers on the one side and refusals on the other, the following proposal was made by the governor-general: that the details of a treaty, framed in accordance with the principles laid down at the previous conference, should be drawn up on the following day, the 21st of December; that the maharajah should meet the governor-general on the 23rd, prepared to ratify such a treaty, and that the chiefs present should guarantee the ratification taking place. Upon these conditions, the movement of the army across the river Chumbul was to be delayed till after that day; but if the chiefs failed of redeeming their guarantee, the failure was to be punished by a heavy fine. After some consultation, the chiefs came to the conclusion that the maharajah could not be brought to the ground at so early a day, and the conference broke up with an apparent understanding that the meeting should take place at Hingona, the first stage beyond the Chumbul, on the 26th.

It was not by Mahratta chiefs only that representations were made of the extreme repugnance felt to the governor-general crossing the Chumbul before an interview had taken place between the maharajah and himself. Colonel Sleeman, the newly appointed resident, in a letter dated the 21st of December, made the following communication of the impression entertained at Gwalior on the subject. "When I mentioned his lordship's intention to cross the Chumbul on the 22nd, Suchurn Rao, the brother of Ram Rao Phalthea, and Bulwant Rao, who had come to meet me, expressed a very earnest desire that this might not take place, as it was usual for his highness to pay the first visit to the governor-general on the other side of the river. They seemed to have this very much at heart, and I think it my duty to mention it." This statement was followed by an account of the ceremonies observed in 1832, when the chief crossed the Chumbul to visit the governor-general, and the latter, on the following day, crossed the river to return the visit. In a letter dated the 22nd of December, Colonel Sleeman, after reporting his having visited the maharajah and maharanees, and having announced to them and the assembled chiefs that he had been commanded to repair to the governor-general's camp, and then to return and accompany the young chief, added, "They were exceedingly earnest in the expression of their hope that his lordship would remain to receive the young chief's visit on the other side of the Chumbul."

On the 24th of December, Colonel Sleeman wrote to the secretary with the governor-general, thus:—"The soldiers talk largely to my people of the army crossing the Chumbul as a hostile movement on the part of our government." On the 25th, Colonel Sleeman

again wrote, in terms which sufficiently described the utter disorganization of the army, the feeling which they entertained in regard to the expected passage of the Chumbul, and the impossibility of averting collision, if British troops were brought into contact with them. Colonel Sleeman had retired from Gwalior, after his interview with the maharajah and maharanees, but was expected to return, in order to accompany them to meet the governor-general. The resident, however, was desirous that they should join him at Dhunaila, and these are his reasons: "I think it to be my duty to state, that I do not think it possible for me to advance further towards Gwalior without collision with the disorderly troops who fill the road from this place to Gwalior." After referring to the danger which would attend any attempt of certain native chiefs to return to Gwalior, and to the absence of all restraint upon the conduct of the soldiers, he continued:—"If I go on, it must be without a single soldier, horse or foot, for it will be impossible to prevent collision if any of them accompany me; and among such a licentious soldiery, without any ostensible commanding officers, I do not think it will be safe for any European or native officer to go with me. This is the universal feeling and opinion of my camp. There is a large park of artillery on each side of the river, at this place (Dhunaila), and the troops vauntingly declare that they are come out to resist the further advance of his lordship towards Gwalior, and to make the British force recross the Chumbul."

Before this time, the important step for good or for evil—the passage of the Chumbul—had been made. From Hingona, the governor-general, on the 25th of December, transmitted to the maharanees a proclamation, announcing that the British army had entered the territories of Scindia, as a friend bound by treaty to protect his highness's person and maintain his sovereign authority. This was followed, on the 26th, by a communication that the treaty to be framed on the terms formerly laid down was expected to be ratified on the 28th, and that for every day that the ratification might be delayed beyond that date, a fine of fifteen thousand rupees would be inflicted. On the 27th, another proclamation was issued, much in the tone of that which had appeared two days before.

Before this time, the reception which the British visitants were likely to meet with was placed beyond doubt. Bappoo Setowlee Deahmook, who had been understood to be friendly to the British interests, and who had proceeded to the British camp to negotiate the terms of reconciliation, left it on the 25th, three days after the head-quarters with the governor-general's camp had crossed the Chumbul, returned to Gwalior, and undertook the command of a division of the troops destined to oppose the march of the English. On the 26th, the Sumbajee Angria, one of the coad-

jutors of Bappoo in the work of negotiation, also left the British camp without notice. The 28th, the day fixed for the ratification of the treaty, passed without producing the expected event; and on the 29th, the British army, under Sir Hugh Gough, became suddenly engaged in deadly conflict with that of the Mahrattas.

It is to be regretted that the details of the circumstances under which the engagement was commenced are vague and imperfect. The despatch to the governor-general, reporting the battle and its results, begins thus:—"Your lordship having witnessed the operations of the 29th, and being in possession, from my frequent communications, of my military arrangements for the attack on the Mahratta army in its strong position of Chonda, I do not feel it necessary to enter much into detail either as to the enemy's position or the dispositions I made for attacking it." After giving the above reasons for the omission of information, which certainly ought not to have been withheld, the commander-in-chief proceeds to observe, that the position of the enemy at Chonda was particularly well chosen and obstinately defended, and that he never witnessed guns better served, nor a body of infantry apparently more devoted to the protection of their regimental guns, "held by the Mahratta corps as objects of worship." Some brief reference to part of the details previously noted as well known to the governor-general follow. It appears to have been the intention of the commander-in-chief to turn the enemy's left flank by Brigadier Cureton's brigade of cavalry, consisting of her Majesty's 16th lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Macdowell; the governor-general's body-guard, under Captain Dawkins; the 1st regiment of light cavalry, under Major Crommelin; the 4th irregular cavalry, under Major Oldfield, with Major Lane's and Major Alexander's troops of horse artillery under Brigadier Gowan; the whole under the orders of Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell. With this force, the third brigade of infantry, under Major-General Valiant, was to co-operate, the brigade consisting of her Majesty's 40th, under Major Stopford; 2nd grenadiers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton; and 16th grenadiers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Maclaren. The enemy's centre was to have been attacked by Brigadier Stacy's brigade of the 2nd division of infantry, consisting of the 14th native infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gairdener; the 31st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Weston; and the 43rd light infantry, under Major Nash. To this brigade was attached a light field-battery, under Captain Browne; the whole being under the command of Major-General Dennis. This force was to have been supported by Brigadier Wright's brigade, composed of her Majesty's 30th regiment, commanded by Major Bray, and the 56th native infantry, under Major Dick, with a light field-battery under Major Sanders. Major-General

Littler, commanding the third division of infantry, was to superintend the movements of this column. On the left, with a view of threatening the enemy's right flank, it was proposed to place the 4th brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier Scott, consisting of the 4th light cavalry (lancers), under Major Maotier, and the 10th light cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, with Captain Grant's troop of horse artillery. The country through which this force had to advance is represented as of extreme difficulty, being intersected by deep ravines, and rendered practicable only by the unremitting labours of the sappers, under Major Smith. The Koharee river was to be passed by the army in three divisions on the morning of the day in which the battle took place; but the whole of the force were in their appointed position, about a mile in front of Maharajpoor, by eight o'clock.

Such is the account given by the commander-in-chief of his intentions and preparations. These had reference to a meditated attack upon the Mahrattas at Chonda. It was not expected that they would be met at Maharajpoor; but on arriving at this place, the British force was made aware of the presence of the enemy, by receiving the fire of their artillery. This was evidently a surprise. The language of the despatch is as follows:—"I found the Mahrattas had occupied this very strong position during the previous night, by seven regiments of infantry with their guns, which they intrenched, each corps having four guns, which opened on our own advances. This obliged me to alter in some measure my disposition." The alterations were these:—General Littler's column being directly in front of Maharajpoor, was ordered to advance upon it direct, while General Valiant's brigade was to take it in reverse; both being supported by General Dennis's column and the two light field-batteries. The details of what followed are very slight; but it appears that her Majesty's 39th, supported by the 56th native infantry, drove the enemy in a very dashing style from their guns into the village. There a sanguinary conflict ensued; the Mahratta soldiers, after discharging their matchlocks, fighting sword in hand with great courage. General Valiant's brigade, it is stated, displayed equal enthusiasm in the duty assigned to them—that of taking Maharajpoor in reverse, and the capture of twenty-eight guns resulted from this combined movement. The cavalry, under Brigadier Scott, was opposed by a body of the enemy's cavalry on the extreme left; some well-executed charges were made by the 10th, supported by Captain Grant's horse artillery and the 4th lancers; and some guns and two standards were taken in these encounters.

The enemy having been dislodged from Maharajpoor, General Valiant, supported by the third cavalry brigade, moved on the right of the enemy's main position at Chonda. During his advance, he had to take in succes-

sion three strongly intrenched positions, where, in the language of the despatch, the enemy defended their guns with frantic desperation. In these services, her Majesty's 40th was much distinguished. This regiment captured four standards, and two of its commanding officers in succession (Major Stopford and Captain Codrington) were disabled by wounds. By the 2nd grenadiers, two standards were captured; and the 16th grenadiers worthily aided the achievements of this portion of the British force.

The brigade under General Littler, after dispersing the right of the enemy at Maharaj-poor, advanced, supported by Captain Grant's troop of horse artillery and the 1st regiment of light cavalry, to attack the main position at Chonda in front. It was carried by a rush of the Queen's 89th, under Major Bray (who was desperately wounded), supported by the Queen's 56th, under Major Dick. Two regimental standards were captured. A small work of four guns on the left of this position, long and obstinately defended by the enemy, was compelled at length to yield to the grenadiers of the Queen's 89th, under Captain Campbell, aided by a wing of the 56th native infantry, under Major Phillips.

The victory was complete, but it was not gained without difficulty, nor without very heavy loss; the killed, wounded, and missing amounting to nearly eight hundred. So strenuous a resistance has rarely been offered by a native army when opposed to a British force, even when the disparity of numbers has been far greater than it was on this occasion. The commander-in-chief thus expresses himself on the subject:—"I regret to say that our loss has been very severe, infinitely beyond what I calculated upon; indeed I did not do justice to the gallantry of my opponents."

On the same day which gave victory to the British force under the commander-in-chief, the left wing of the army, under Major-General Grey, defeated a large body of Gwalior troops, and captured their guns, twenty-four in number, a standard, all their ammunition, and some treasures. General Grey had marched from Simmeresra to Burka-ka-Serai on the 28th of December, and there learned that the enemy were in position at Antree, seven miles in front of his camp, and intended to make a night attack. On the 29th, General Grey made a march of sixteen miles, being desirous of getting through a narrow valley extending from Himmutghur to Punniar. The enemy, it appeared, marched from Antree early on the same day by a parallel movement, took up a strong position on the heights in the immediate vicinity of the fortified village of Mangore, near Punniar, and commenced firing on the British line of baggage. Some cavalry, under Brigadier Harriott, were detached to oppose them, and a troop of horse artillery, under Captain Brind, took up a position from which they were enabled to return the enemy's fire with precision and effect; but the cavalry

were unable to approach the enemy, from the ground being intersected by ravines. About four o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy was observed to have taken up a position on a chain of high hills, four miles to the east of the British camp. Here General Grey determined to attack them, and arrangements for the purpose were made. The attack was commenced by her Majesty's 3rd Buffs and a company of sappers and miners, who had been detached to take up a position opposite to that occupied by the Mahrattas. It was directed against the centre of the enemy's force, who were driven from height to height in gallant style, with the loss of their guns. A wing of the 39th native infantry having occupied the crest of a hill commanding the enemy's left, after pouring in a destructive fire, rushed down and captured a battery of two guns. Brigadier Yates and Major Earle, successively commanding the 39th, were both wounded. An infantry brigade, under Brigadier Anderson, of the Queen's 50th, gave the finishing stroke to the enemy, and captured the guns which had escaped the previous attacks. Her Majesty's 50th regiment, and the 56th and 58th native infantry, seem to have been chiefly concerned in achieving the satisfactory termination of the conflict.

The natural consequence of the success which had attended the British in the two battles was to bring the maharajah and her advisers to accept whatever terms it might please the victors to dictate. On the 30th of December the maharajah and maharanees were admitted to a conference with the governor-general, and after an interchange of the usual expressions of civility, and of much more, scarcely less usual on such occasions, and certainly not more sincere, the British authorities, in conjunction with the native chiefs in attendance on the maharajah and maharanees, adopted the following propositions to meet the existing state of circumstances:—The maharajah to issue an order to all his officers and servants to desist from hostilities against the British armies; the governor-general to issue a similar order, forbidding hostilities on the part of the British troops, unless they should be attacked; the maharajah to issue orders for furnishing all necessary supplies to the British armies on the requisition of the commissary-general; these orders of the maharajah to be sent by *huzzooreeahs*, in such manner as distinctly to make known his highness's determination to have them observed; the maharajah to send *huzzooreeahs*, with a safe-conduct, with the messengers despatched by the British commander-in-chief to the army in Bundelcund; to prevent collision, no Gwalior troops to be allowed to come within three miles of any position taken up by the British armies; the British armies to advance to the immediate vicinity of Gwalior on the 2nd of January, and the governor-general to take the maharajah with him; the British government to give compensation to such cultivators and others, in

the Gwalior states, as might have been exposed to loss by the passage of its armies, and the amount of the compensation to be paid under arrangements to be made at a future time by Scindia. Lastly, the maharajah was to issue the following proclamation, and to cause it to have the quickest and widest circulation possible :—"The British armies have entered the Gwalior territories to protect the person of the maharajah, to support his just authority, and to establish a government capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of friendship between the two states. All faithful subjects of Scindia are therefore directed to give them every aid in their power. No person will be injured by the British armies. All supplies furnished will be paid for. All damage unintentionally done will be compensated."

These arrangements were followed by others for settling anew the relations between the British government and that of Scindia, the dispersion of the mutinous army, and the future mode of conducting the affairs of the government. On the 5th of January, the governor-general and the army having advanced to Gwalior, the chief points of a new treaty were agreed upon at a conference held with some of the chiefs. The mode adopted for carrying on the government was very different from that which had formerly been deemed the most advantageous. Instead of vesting it in a single person, and thus securing an undivided responsibility, it was committed to a council, the president to be the principal agent in the conduct of affairs, and the medium of communication with the British resident. The disbandment of the army was effected much more quietly than had been anticipated. The task was commenced on the 9th of January, and completed by the 17th, without a single disturbance. Part of the men were enlisted in the new contingent force; the remainder received a gratuity of three months' pay, and departed to seek their future livelihood elsewhere.

The new treaty was ratified by the governor-general on the 18th of January. It consisted of twelve articles. The first recognized and confirmed all existing treaties and engagements, except as to points where alterations might be made by the new one. In the enumeration of the treaties understood to be in force, that of Boorhampoor was included. By the second article it was provided that the contingent force stationed in the territories of Scindia should be increased, and that permanent provision should be made for defraying its charge by the assignment of the revenue of certain districts enumerated in a schedule attached to the treaty; such revenue to be in addition to any source of income previously set apart for the purpose. By the third article, if, after defraying the charges of the contingent force, and of the civil administration of the districts assigned for its support, there should be any surplus beyond the amount of eighteen lacs of Company's

rupees, the surplus in excess of such sum was to be paid over to the maharajah; but if the revenues and receipts should fall short of eighteen lacs, the maharajah was to make up the deficiency. The fourth article declared, that for the better securing of the due payment of the revenues of the assigned districts, and for the better preserving of good order therein, the civil administration of those districts should be conducted by the British government in the same manner as in the districts of which the revenues had been previously assigned. The fifth article introduced a subject of standing importance and interest in India—that of debt. The claims of the British government on that of Gwalior, arising from a variety of sources, were taken (subject to future examination) at twenty-six lacs of rupees, and it was agreed that payment of that sum should be made within fourteen days from the date of the treaty. In default, the revenues of further districts, enumerated in another schedule attached to the treaty, were to be made over to the British government, to be held by it until such time as its claim on Scindia's government should be liquidated, together with interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum. In regard to this subject, the governor-general observed, in the despatch announcing the conclusion of the treaty, "Schedule B was from the first a mere form, as the durbar declared their intention of paying the amount demanded from them, and have now intimated to the resident that it is ready for him to send for when he pleases." The sixth article commenced with another recognition of the treaty of Boorhampoor, though it was not distinctly named, and then proceeded to limit the amount of military force to be maintained by the maharajah, and to provide for the reduction of the army to the prescribed number. The seventh provided for the discharge of the arrears of pay to the disbanded troops, and for bestowing a gratuity on those not re-enlisted. The operation of reduction was in progress when the treaty was ratified, and, as already mentioned, was completed four days afterwards. Next came that important part of the treaty which was to regulate the future government of the Gwalior state. By the eighth article it was determined that the minority of the infant prince should be considered to terminate on his attaining the full age of eighteen years, and not sooner; and a day was fixed as that on which such age would be attained; namely, the 19th of January, 1853. It was then declared to have been agreed, that during the prince's minority the persons intrusted with the administration of the government should act upon the advice of the British resident; and the words which followed gave to this provision as wide a range as could possibly be desired. Those exercising the functions of government were to act upon the British resident's advice, not only generally or on important points, but "in

all matters wherein such advice shall be offered." No change was to be made in "the persons intrusted with the administration," as they are properly designated in this article, though more pompously referred to in the next as "the council of regency," without the consent of the British resident, "acting under the express authority of the governor-general." Considering the importance of the point to which it relates, the latter part of this article would seem not to be characterized by all the precision desirable. It might become a question, what was meant by the "express authority of the governor-general." The ninth article nominated the persons who were to form the "council of regency." The tenth assigned to the maharajah an annual allowance of three lacs, to be at her own sole disposal. The eleventh pledged the British government, as "heretofore," to "exert its influence and good offices for maintaining the just territorial rights of the maharajah and the subjects of the state of Scindia at present existing in the neighbouring and other native states." The twelfth and last article recorded the settling and ratification of the treaty.

On the 26th of February, 1844, the governor-general returned to Barrackpore, and on the 28th, he entered Calcutta. This was the second anniversary of his lordship's arrival from Europe, and whether the concurrence were designed or fortuitous, it was somewhat remarkable. On the occasion of his return, he received an address from the inhabitants of Calcutta, which falls on the ear with the effect almost of rebuke. His lordship had passed a considerable portion of his time in India at a distance from the ordinary seat of government, a fact noticed by those who welcomed his return in the following manner:—"We, the undersigned inhabitants of Calcutta, beg to present our hearty congratulations on your lordship's return to the presidency, after the accomplishment of the great objects that called you hence to Upper Hindostan. That those objects should have been so promptly and so triumphantly attained, is a matter of national concernment; to us it is doubly gratifying, inasmuch as it enables your lordship to devote the energies of a powerful mind towards measures of internal benefit, second only in real importance to those affecting public security. The presence of the head of this colonial empire is so essential in every way to its prosperity, as to make it but natural that we should bear even his necessary absence with something like impatience, and hail his return with the warmest expressions of satisfaction. That your lordship's residence among us may be continued; that no state emergency may again demand your personal care in other parts of this wide territory, must always be our earnest desire. It will be our study to make that residence as

much a matter of choice, as it is of public expediency."

No further "state emergency" occurred to call his lordship away from Calcutta; but his residence there was not of prolonged duration. On the 15th of July it became known that his lordship had been removed from the office of governor-general by the Court of Directors of the East-India Company. From this unusual exercise of authority, it must be concluded that the points of difference between Lord Ellenborough and those whom he served were neither few nor trivial. The precise grounds of removal were not made public, and, consequently, they can for the present only be inferred from a consideration of his lordship's acts.

There can be no doubt that Lord Ellenborough's Indian administration disappointed his friends; and if a judgment may be formed from his own declarations previously to his departure from Europe, it must have disappointed himself. He went to India the avowed champion of peace, and he was incessantly engaged in war. For the Afghan war he was not, indeed, accountable—he found it on his hands; and in the mode in which he proposed to conclude it, and in which he would have concluded it but for the remonstrances of his military advisers, he certainly displayed no departure from the ultra-pacific policy which he had professed in England. The triumphs with which the perseverance of the generals commanding in Afghanistan graced his administration seem completely to have altered his views; and the desire of military glory thenceforward supplanted every other feeling in his breast. He would have shunned war in Afghanistan by a course which the majority of his countrymen would pronounce dishonourable. He might without dishonour have avoided war in Sind, and possibly have averted hostilities at Gwalior, but he did not. For the internal improvement of India he did nothing. He had, indeed, little time to do anything. War, and preparation for war, absorbed most of his hours, and in a theatrical display of childish pomp many more were consumed. With an extravagant confidence in his own judgment, even on points which he had never studied, he united no portion of steadiness or constancy. His purposes were formed and abandoned with a levity which accorded little with the offensive tone which he manifested in their defence, so long as they were entertained. His administration was not an illustration of any marked and consistent course of policy; it was an aggregation of isolated facts. Everything in it stands alone and unconnected. His influence shot across the Asiatic world like a meteor, and—but for the indelible brand of shame indented in Sind—like a meteor its memory would pass from the mind with its disappearance.

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
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
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